1

Divided Societies and Identity Boundaries: A Conflict Analysis

Framework

Angela Kachuyevski and Ronnie Olesker

Introduction

Divided societies present particular challenges to the theory and practice of conflict prevention,

management and resolution, due to the deep ethnic, religious and cultural cleavages that are not

only the result of material factors, but are also based at least in part on subjective experience,

emotion and perceptual factors that are difficult to systematically assess. The literature on

divided societies, accordingly, analyzes these conflicts from a number of perspectives, all of

which conceptualize these conflicts in terms of contestation. Contested politics are complicated

by minority-majority relations that may make it difficult to achieve political objectives through

the normal democratic process, and thus require institutional solutions that allow for political

accommodation. These studies explore how power sharing, territorial self-governance, power-

dividing and centripetal approaches, and constitutional negotiations can contribute to conflict

management (Wolff and Yakinthou, 2012; Guelke, 2012; Lerner, 2011; Noel, 2005; McGarry

and O’Leary, 2004). Contested social relations in the aftermath of violent conflict require

societies to accept responsibility, acknowledge victims, and rebuild the shattered community

they share. Prospects for reconciliation are explored from social, communal and justice

perspectives (Lederach, 1997; Daly and Sarkin, 2007). Contested cultural relations are explored

through the examination of the cultural contestation of national symbolic landscapes, and

contested historical and political memory (Ross, 2009)..

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Despite their different analytic perspectives, these approaches share a focus on deep

ethnic, cultural, religious or other divides. Identity is clearly connected to the causes of and

solutions for divided societies, but the above approaches do not directly engage with how

perceived identity impacts these conflicts. We propose a framework that examines contested

identity as an additional approach to the study of divided societies, wherein the identity of the

society is itself a matter of deep division. We draw upon relational identity theories (Tajfel,

1970, 1981; Turner 1985; Turner et al., 1987, Drury and Reicher, 1999, 2000) that focus on

accounts that separate “us” from “them.” That is, who “we” are is directly related to how “we”

understand who “they” are. These theories largely assume that societies understand the

boundaries between in- and out-groups in similar terms. This may not, however, be the case

(Abdelal et al., 2009). Social identity is multilayered, and may include contestation about the

boundaries that lie between in-groups and out-groups. We develop a model that takes into

consideration how both the minority and the majority in divided societies view the boundaries

that shape their relationship, offering a more nuanced understanding of how identity contributes

to conflict in these societies.

After beginning with a brief overview of the conceptual framework that captures the

connections between societal security and identity boundaries, we explore this model in three

cases that illustrate the three dyads of identity boundary perception proposed by the model that

we argue lead to conflicts of contested national identity: Crimea/Ukraine, Estonia and Israel. Our

central thesis is that differing perceptions of the identity boundary between majorities and

minorities lead to the contested identity of the state and its polity, and are instrumental in

explaining the conflict dynamics in these societies which, in turn, require different conflict

management approaches.

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Identity, security, and social boundaries

In the modern state era, societies are rarely homogenous. Deeply divided societies based on

identities with high political salience that are sustained over a substantial period of time (Lusitck,

1979: 325) pose a particular challenge to conflict management due to entrenched and politicized

positions. The concept of societal security, which focuses on threats to identity as a distinct

security threat (Buzan and Waever, 1997), sheds light on how threats to identity in divided

societies can lead to conflict, and can make management and resolution difficult. Just as a state

cannot survive if it loses its sovereignty, so too, a society cannot survive if it loses its identity,

because “we will no longer be able to live as ‘us’” (Waever et al., 1993: 26). In multiethnic

states a societal security dilemma may emerge when one group’s action, taken to strengthen its

own identity, causes a reaction in the other group, resulting in a cycle of reactive measures taken

by each side to strengthen and secure its identity, but resulting instead in the insecurity of both

(Roe, 2005: 73).

Identity is not exogenous or immutable, but rather constructed and negotiated by

individuals and groups through numerous processes over time, but once constructed and socially

entrenched, it becomes a possible referent object of security and therefore of analytical study

(Buzan and Waever, 1997: 243). Much of the literature assumes that collective identity is formed

along clear lines that define unambiguous “in” and “out” groups. While acknowledging that

identity is not static but multifaceted, and can change over time, group behavior is often

explained in terms of shared understandings of one’s own group in relation to outsiders (Esman,

1994: 13). We argue, however, that this may not be the case. We draw upon relational accounts

of social boundaries as a conceptual tool to analyze collective identity. These accounts are

particularly well suited for the analysis of societal security given that they illustrate how group

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interactions can transform boundaries and reproduce new or different identities (Tilly, 2005;

1997). Yet, these approaches assume that each group clearly identifies the boundary between

“us” and “them,” and more importantly, that group perceptions of the boundary are the same;

that is, it is assumed that each group is in complete agreement as to where the boundary lies. In

most states where there are not homogenous cultures or identities, however, group identity is

much more complex, and perceived identity boundaries are rarely so neatly defined or shared

across group lines. Further, in divided societies where the “national” identity is fractured or

contested, the majority may perceive any minority as being outside the core group around which

the nation-state is constructed (Jarve, 2000; Smith, 1996; Smooha, 1990; Yiftachel, 1993). In

cases where significant resident minorities share an ethnic and cultural background with an

outside population, the majority may engage in a perceptual “lumping together” of the minority

with that population. That is, they see the minority residing in their territory as being part of the

“other” even if the minority does not. This categorization by the majority group, illustrated

below, results in a perceived identity boundary that resembles the letter “L,” and bounds group

identity by ethnicity, not civic nationality. In cases where relations with the “other” are

threatening , this increases the prospects for conflict, even if the minority does not share this

perception.

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But do minority groups identify with their ethnic kin in ways that are threatening to their state of

residence? We argue not necessarily so. Minority populations often possess a complex, nuanced

identity wherein they do not fully identify with the nation-state they live in, especially if it is

defined in exclusive ethnic terms, or presents a threat/challenge to the identity of the minority,

yet they also do not fully identify with their ethnic kin residing outside their nation-state. The

minority, as illustrated below, may thus perceive the boundary quite differently, in what

resembles the letter “T”, where the minority is separated both from the ethnic majority in their

state of residence and their ethnic kin outside their state. As is true for the L boundary presented

above, the majority may or may not share this impression.

Figure 2: T Configuration

Figure 1: L Configuration

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The above discussion illustrates how it is possible for two social groups to perceive the

identity boundaries that separate them in very different ways, and invites exploration of how

different perceptions could lead to different conflict dynamics, which would, in turn, require

different conflict management approaches. Using a framework that incorporates these

perceptions allows analysts to account for the impact of external actors in shaping and

maintaining identity boundaries, and allows for a consideration of the possible differing

interpretations of the boundary held by different groups as well as the implications this has for

conflict analysis.

A framework for analysis

In divided societies majorities and minorities may perceive either the “L” identity boundary or

the “T” identity boundary. This gives rise to four specific dyads of identity boundary perception:

T-T (both majority and minority perceive “T” identity boundary between them); T-L (majority

perceives “T” identity boundary, but minority perceives “L” boundary); L-T (majority perceives

“L” boundary but minority perceives “T” boundary); and L-L (both majority and minority

perceive “L” boundary). We identify four distinct conflict scenarios based upon these dyads of

group perception that illustrate the consequences differing perceptions of identity boundaries

have for conflict dynamics. Each scenario has specific implications for conflict management

approaches, thus provides a useful tool for conflict analysis.

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Majority Group Perceives

T Boundary

Majority Group Perceives

L Boundary

Minority Group Perceives

T Boundary

‘Détente’:

Identity of the state is not

contested:

differentiation between the

groups, but neither side is

grouped with a threatening

external actor. Politics may be

deeply divided, but the

legitimate membership of the

polity is not under question;

allows for the construction of

political institutions that

encourage cooperation and assist

the parties in resolving conflicts.

‘Besieged Regime’:

Identity of the state is

contested:

minority not accepted by

majority as loyal, legitimate

members of the society;

conflict escalation more likely

from the majority side,

especially when majority

threatened by ethnic kin of

minority. Majority unlikely to

accept institutional solutions

nor is autonomy an option;

other conflict management

approaches need to be sought.

Minority Group Perceives

L Boundary

‘Irredentist Threat ’:

Identity of the state is contested:

minority identifies most strongly

with ethnic kin, not with state;

conflict escalation more likely

from the minority side,

especially when state is in

conflict with ethnic kin.

Autonomy and other forms of

territorial self-government may

be a good option.

‘A State Divided’:

Identity of the state is

contested:

state lacks legitimacy for

minority; majority sees

minority as disloyal; conflict is

likely from both sides, and

under broader circumstances.

Institutional solutions are

unlikely to be acceptable to the

majority, nor is autonomy an

option, therefore other conflict

management approaches need

to be sought.

In cases where the identity is not contested, power-sharing agreements or other institutional

approaches that encourage cooperation may be successful in resolving political tensions. Given

that we focus our analysis on contested identities in divided societies; that is those instances in

divided societies where the identity of the society is itself a matter of deep division, we illustrate

Table 1: Framework for analysis

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how the model captures differing perceptions of identity boundaries in three scenarios, and what

the resulting consequences are for conflict analysis and management.

The brief analysis that follows is not an empirical test of the model, rather is meant to be

a preliminary illustration of a theoretical concept, which intends to “put concrete flesh on the

bare bones of an abstract idea in order to help readers see its meaning more clearly” (Odell,

2001: 163). It also serves as a “plausibility probe” that may determine whether the model

warrants further scholarly study. Therefore, the intent here is not to engage in a rigorous attempt

at empirical validation of the model, but rather an attempt both to illustrate how the abstract

concepts play out in real world examples, and to determine if the potential validity of the model

is great enough to warrant further research and testing (Eckstein, 1975: 108).

Cases were selected, partly based upon existing expertise of the authors, that fulfilled the

requirements of the model in terms of majority-minority boundary perception, and for which a

reasonable amount of secondary data sources were available. We also selected cases where the

minority population is significant, as existing scholarship demonstrates that deeply divided

societies with minorities consisting of a substantial segment of the population (more than 15%)

are more likely to experience political instability, especially when cleavages run along ethnic

lines (Guelke, 2012: 20). This allows both for a brief illustration of the model’s utility, and for a

determination if it warrants further empirical study. We limit our analysis to cases involving two

clear groups. We do not ignore the existence of other minority groups within the cases we

illustrate here, but we focus on the societal cleavages that are highly salient and politicized, and

thus most likely to instigate political instability. While it is clear that many divided societies

(Crimea included) have more than one significant minority, the model is meant to focus on

perceptual dyads, thus is limited to two parties in this brief exploratory analysis.

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Crimea was selected because the Ukrainian government, as representatives of the

majority group, perceives cultural and linguistic distinctions between the various regions of

Ukraine, in particular Crimea, but the minority group (which in fact constitutes a majority in

Crimea itself) actually identifies to a great extent with Russia and not with Ukraine. This case

fits the criteria for a “T-L” configuration where the majority accepts an identity boundary

between itself and the minority, but also perceives a boundary between the minority and external

actors, while the minority itself perceives an identity boundary only between itself and the

majority, and not between itself and the external actor. Our model conceptualizes an “irredentist

threat” scenario in this configuration.

Estonia was selected because the majority group does not see the Russian speaking

minority as a legitimate member of the polity to the extent that they have not assimilated into the

dominant culture. Yet the lack of direct ties or interest in emigration that the minority exhibits in

this case suggests that they may not share this perception. This case fits the criteria for an “L-T”

configuration where the majority perceives an identity boundary that lumps Russian speakers

together with Russians in Russia proper, but where the minority in fact perceives an identity

boundary that separates them from the Estonian majority, but also from the Russians in Russia.

Our model conceptualizes a “besieged regime” scenario in this configuration.

Finally, Israel was selected because in this case, increasingly, both sides perceive an

identity boundary that excludes the minority from the polity and connects it culturally, ethnically

and increasingly, politically to an external group. This case fits the criteria for an “L-L”

configuration, which our model conceptualizes as a “state divided” scenario.

Our model suggests the creation of a social boundary affects intergroup relations such

that the identity of the in-group might change as a function of their interactions with the out-

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group (Drury and Reicher, 2000: 582). Nonetheless, while we recognize that the study of how

identity perceptions develop over time is an important one, such a study exceeds the scope of this

article. Further, to argue that identities are threatened and defended is not to imply that they do

not change, but state policies, especially security policies, can stay the same throughout the

period of the relevant analysis. Therefore, analysis of the existence of the identity boundary over

a specific period of time can have utility both for conflict analysis and for conflict management

policy. The following brief illustrations of how perceived identity boundaries have impacted, and

continue to impact, conflict management in each case will hopefully generate interest in further

detailed study of boundary construction and maintenance, which will deepen our understanding

of how identity boundaries impact conflict in divided societies.

Irredentist Threat (T-L: Majority Perceives T Boundary; Minority Perceives L Boundary)

In the “irredentist threat” scenario, the majority sees a distinction between the minority group

and the minority’s ethnic kin state (T-shaped boundary). This could be due to relations with the

ethnic kin state, who may deny support for irredentist or separatist conflict and who, indeed, may

have little interest in the minority group’s affairs. Nonetheless, the minority group identifies

more closely with their ethnic kin than with the “national” identity of their state of residence (L-

shaped boundary). In this scenario, we hypothesize that conflict escalation is more likely on the

minority side since they perceive a threat to their societal security. The risk is higher when there

is conflict between the ethnic kin state and the state of residence. Accordingly, economic, social

and cultural protections are required. If the minority is territorially concentrated, autonomy and

other forms of territorial self government are a good option since the minority will be able to

protect threats to its identity without harming the interests of the majority. In this scenario, any

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conflict management approach must also include a dimension to manage the role played by the

external actor. To the extent possible, they should be encouraged to support autonomy and not

encourage separatist sentiment.

An example of this scenario is Crimea, Ukraine. Although Russians are a minority group

in Ukraine, they comprise the majority of the population in Crimea, a peninsula off Ukraine’s

southern Black Sea coast that was Russian territory until 1954. Ukraine and Russia were part of

the same country for more than 350 years and, despite Ukrainian independence in 1991, many

Russians do not view Ukrainians as “foreigners” but as part of the greater-Russian/East Slavic

ethno-cultural group (Kuzio, 2001: 344). The possibility for violent conflict was acute in the

early days of Ukrainian independence as separatist sentiment in Crimea led to a crisis1 that was

resolved only after years of concerted mediation on the part of the High Commissioner on

National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE) resulted in the passage of a constitutional solution in 1996 (Kachuyevski, 2012).

The deep disconnect between the identity of many Crimean Russians and the Ukrainian

vision of differentiation with Russia reflects the different perceived identity boundaries between

the two groups, and the resulting clashing view of who constitutes “we”. For the Ukrainian

majority, as discussed below, there is a clear boundary between Ukrainians and Russian

Russians, even as there is also acknowledgement of differences between Ukraine’s regions (T-

shaped boundary). In contrast, many Crimean Russians maintain a distinctly Russian identity (L-

shaped boundary). A large number of Crimean Russians were born in Russia, which may explain

why Russian national identity and pro-Russian political orientation is so much stronger than in

other “Russified” areas of Ukraine (Pirie, 1996: 1088). Further, the Russian population in Crimea

is more firmly attached to the Russian Orthodox Church and the Moscow Patriarchy, which

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suggests a well preserved Russian national identity among Crimean Russians (Pirie, 1996: 1090).

While support for the constitutional solution of autonomy reached in 1996 has grown, a

substantial number of Crimean Russians continue to support the idea of separation from Ukraine.

For example, a poll conducted in the fall of 2011 found that while 49% of Crimean Russians

expressed support for Crimea remaining an autonomous republic in Ukraine, a full 39% believes

that “Crimea should be separated and given to Russia.”2

Faced with such divisions in society, Kiev has been immersed in a complex effort to

articulate a national identity that both distinguishes Ukraine from Russia, but also defines a civic

nationalism that makes it possible for the large number of Russian-speaking3 citizens to be

incorporated into the Ukrainian polity. This dilemma has compelled the Ukrainian political elite

to draw clear distinctions between Ukraine and Russia, since it is more urgent to articulate a

clear “Other” when two groups are ethnically close and one side refuses to recognize the second

as a separate nationality (Kuzio, 2001:344). Yet, given the large number of Ukrainians who

speak Russian as a native language, the number of intermarriages, and the longstanding ties

between the two nations, the concept of who “we” are necessarily includes a diverse group with

major divisions in terms of language and geopolitical orientation. The resulting boundary drew

distinctions between Russia and Ukraine, but also acknowledged differences between Ukrainian

speakers and Russian speakers (T-shaped formation). This was a direct result of the need to

constitute Russia as the “Other” as a necessary precondition to construction of a national

identity, along with the resulting need to “tread carefully when differentiating between ‘our

Russians’ and ‘those Russians’ living in the neighbouring Russian Federation.” (Kuzio, 2001:

356). Thus, all Ukrainian citizens were included in the perceived polity, despite deep divisions

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over issues such as what the national language(s) should be and how to orient foreign policy.

This allowed for a constitutional solution granting substantial autonomy for Crimea.

The Crimea case supports our hypothesis that, in this scenario, conflict escalation would

be more likely on the part of the minority. The Russian minority in Crimea did not differentiate

themselves from the very “Other” that was at the heart of the national Ukrainian majority’s

efforts to articulate a unified national identity. Therefore, conflict management or prevention

strategies in this scenario should seek to do two things. First, it is necessary to construct an

agreement that will address the minority’s needs in the absence of trust toward the government.

This may involve a power-sharing agreement and other economic, social and cultural guarantees

such as special language rights, or, as in this case, autonomy or another form of territorial self-

government. Second, it is essential to persuade the ethnic kin state not to provide support to any

separatist movement or other potentially violent action. In this case, both concerted diplomacy

and Russia’s unwillingness to support violence determined the fate of political efforts to resolve

the separatist conflict and constitutional crisis in Ukraine.

Besieged Regime (L-T: Majority Perceives L Boundary; Minority Perceives T Boundary)

In this scenario, the dynamic is reversed. The majority sees the minority as closely identified

with an external group (L-shaped formation), while the minority perceives itself as a distinct

group, and may actually identify with their state of residence to a much greater extent than the

majority perceives (T-shaped formation). Conflict escalation is more likely on the part of the

majority, especially if they perceive the threat to “who ‘we’ are” to be acute. The role of external

actors is, as in the above scenario, therefore particularly important. Differing perceptions can

lead to intergroup conflict, but they also open opportunities for management and resolution if the

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minority and majority can move toward a shared vision of “détente” (T-T formation). Conflict

management approaches should, therefore, seek to ensure minority rights protection while also

encouraging the majority to accept a more inclusive concept of national identity.

In Estonia the large Russian-speaking minority has challenged the majority’s “national

idea” from the collapse of communism to the present day. The minority posed an acute threat to

the Estonian vision of a “return to Europe” after the restoration of independence in 1991 (Lieven,

1993, Taagepera, 1993, Yusupovsky, 1997). Thus, the political elite sought the “de-

Russification” of public life and the promotion of the Estonian language, a process that was

threatening to the non-Estonian population that had risen from approximately 12% of the

population in 1935 to 38% of the population in 19914 (Kirch, 1992: 206), and was a legacy of the

communist past:

During the entire Soviet period a discourse on how to maintain the border

between “us” and “them” has taken place, especially among the titular

nationalities. A positive image of the “typical” Estonian and Latvian was

maintained against a correspondingly negative perception of the “typical” Russian

in an attempt to create a culture of opposition resistant to russification. (Merritt,

2000: 249).

Upon the restoration of independence, this differentiation proved resilient since Estonians

continued to define themselves in opposition to the “Other” (Merritt, 2000: 250).

Yet, while the presence of the rather substantial Russian minority was seen by the

Estonian majority as a threat to the nationalizing state, in fact the minorities in question did not

necessarily identify with Russia in the same way they had with the Soviet Union and were not,

therefore, necessarily a “fifth column.” That is, the majority perceived an L-shaped boundary

while the minority saw a T-shaped boundary. Views toward Estonian independence, the Soviet

period and Russia varied greatly, but Russian speakers who were born and raised in Estonia often

lack a close connection with Russia (Lahelma, 1999: 20). In 1990, for example, 27% of Estonian

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Russians polled expressed a favorable view toward a sovereign Estonia, and a further 40%

expressed critical views of the leaders of the Communist Party and support for an independent

Estonian republic in the Soviet Union (Kirch, 1992: 209).

These divisions have continued on despite years of Estonian independence. For example,

polls taken long after the collapse of communism demonstrate that only 37% of Estonians

believe that non-Estonians are loyal to the state, while 78% of non-Estonians believe so

(Rouillard, 2005: 393). This is partly due to the Estonian perception that knowledge of the state

language is a strong reflection of loyalty, and many Russian speakers have not mastered

Estonian. However, even Estonian Russians who maintain cultural attachment to Russia and do

not speak Estonian express deep attachment to Estonia, and consider themselves to be different

from Russians living in Russia (Rouillard, 2005: 405). Indeed:

Estonian Russians clearly set their attitudes and opinions against those of Russian

Russians and at the same time try to be close to the opinion of Estonians. By

distinguishing themselves as an ethnic group, Estonian Russians draw a certain

line between the two groups—Russian Russians and Estonian Russians.

Therefore, in general, the latter do not identify themselves with the Russians,

whence they come, but have formed a distinct group in today’s Estonia with a

pronounced “self.” (Kirch, 2000: 7).

This pattern of differentiation reflects an identity boundary separating Estonian Russians from

their ethnic kin in Russia. Further, “negative boundary construction between ethnic Estonians

and Estonian Russians is not reciprocal. Whereas many ethnic Estonians associate Estonian

Russians with backwardness and Soviet occupation, Russians in Estonia stress their cultural

similarities with ethnic Estonians” and see themselves as “fundamentally different from Russians

in Russia” (Fein, 2005: 335).

Yet, for Estonians, suspicion as to the loyalty of the Russian population is exacerbated by

the civic-culture divide whereby Russian speakers maintain a cultural attachment to Russia, but a

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civic attachment to Estonia (Vihalemm and Masso, 2003: 103). In this way, Russian speakers

identify more with the basic values of Estonians than with Russians and therefore see Russia

paradoxically both as “foreign” and as their “homeland” (Laitin, 1998: 165). The attachment to

Russian culture combined with a clear differentiation of “self” that is quite distinct from

Russians in Russia, and a complete lack of political or civic attachment to Russia, reflects the

complex, nuanced identity of Estonian Russians. Recent research establishes that living in mixed

neighborhoods decreases the likelihood that Russians will find other cultures threatening, while

for Estonians, “living together with people of other ethnic backgrounds increases the probability

they will view other cultures as threatening” (Schulze, 2011: 175), which may reflect the

ongoing legacy of the Soviet period. The resulting difference in perceived identity boundaries

between Estonians and Estonian Russians has complicated the potential for mutual

accommodation and societal integration.

The Estonia case supports our hypothesis that, in this scenario, conflict escalation is more

likely on the part of the majority, since they are the group who perceive a threat to their societal

security. In this scenario, therefore, it is the government who should be targeted in any conflict

management or prevention approach, in contrast to the focus of the previous scenario on the

minority. As the Estonia case illustrates, negative boundary construction may not be reciprocal,

and it may be possible to seek accommodation with the minority population. It is particularly

dangerous in this scenario to create a “self-fulfilling prophecy” if governmental discriminatory

action does in fact erode the loyalty of the minority, pushing them toward their ethnic kin.

Conflict management and prevention approaches should, therefore, focus on moderating

government policies while protecting their right to define their national identity. Given that the

majority is the threatened group, institutional arrangements or territorial self government are not

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likely an option as this would weaken the power of the central government. Thus, continued

engagement is necessary in order to successfully manage these types of conflicts.

In this case, concerted efforts by the High Commissioner on National Minorities to

prevent escalation5 substantially alleviated insecurity on both sides, and encouraged Russia to

limit involvement to the political sphere, successfully preventing a potentially violent

confrontation in the 1990s. Nonetheless, recent research reflects continuing divergent attitudes

between the two groups, with Estonians expecting the minority to assimilate into the majority

culture while Russian-speakers favor the cultivation of multicultural tolerance and acceptance

into society (Schulze, 2011: 166). Further, Estonians are “increasingly disturbed by the different

cultural practices of Russians” pointing to the lack of knowledge of the Estonian language and

different lifestyle and way of thinking (Schulze, 2011: 177). Yet, the perceived pressure to

assimilate to Estonian culture and the exclusive ethnic nature of the dominant national identity is

the main obstacle to acquiring a sense of belonging to Estonia among second-generation Russian

youth, (Nimmerfeldt, 2011: 221), who instead express a generalized sense of alienation from

Estonian society (Schulze, 2011: 171).

A State Divided (Majority and Minority Perceive L Boundary)

The most volatile scenario emerges when neither the minority nor the majority view the minority

as a part of the legitimate societal “we.” In this scenario, we hypothesize that conflict escalation

is likely on both sides of the identity boundary. The majority rejects the minority as part of the

polity, seeing them as some sort of foreign element (L-shaped formation), while the minority

also does not see itself ethnically linked to the society in which it resides but rather to another

“other” (also an L-shaped formation). From the majority’s perspective, a threat to societal

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security emerges when who “we” are is contested or compromised. From the minority’s

perspective societal security may also be threatened if state policies threaten the cultural

distinctness of the minority by, for example, denying it autonomy over its education system or

the ability to express its distinctive cultural/religious practices publically.6 This can also intensify

into a societal security dilemma if the majority perceives the minority’s resistance to assimilation

as a threat to the national identity, or when the minority denies the legitimacy of the state’s

identity altogether. The threat to the societal security of the majority can exist even when the

minority does not express secessionist goals, but rather seeks national acceptance of its minority

status, recognizing its links to an ethnic “other”, as is the case in Israel.

Israel is constitutionally defined as a Jewish and democratic state. It is characterized by

deep ethnic, cultural divisions, with high political salience, particularly between Jewish and

Arab-Palestinian citizens. The Arab minority, often referred to as “second-class citizens”, suffers

from severe forms of discrimination.7 The Palestinian citizens of Israel constitute approximately

20% of the population, half of which locate themselves on the periphery of the Israeli society

(compared with only 23% of Jews), a classic L-shaped perception (Hermann et al., 2011: 293).

Nearly a third of Jews (28.5%) do not consider Arabs to be part of the Israeli society (13.9% of

Arabs agreed) (Hermann et al., 2011: 265). The minority is also excluded from the central

political decision making process. In its 66 years of existence, no Arab party has ever been a

member of the government. Two-thirds (62%) of Jews maintain that as long as Israel is in a state

of conflict with the Palestinians, the views of its Arab citizens should not be taken into account

on security issues. Moreover, polls indicate that 84.3% of Jews would be very troubled or

somewhat troubled if an Arab were elected prime minister (Hermann et al., 2011: 266).

Increasingly, the Israeli state has adopted legislation that seeks to further delegitimize the

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Palestinian identity of its minority (Olesker, 2013) thereby exacerbating the discrimination

against it. Such policies threaten the societal security of the minority by severely curtailing its

ability to exercise and reproduce its ethnic identity by denying, for example, its ability to

commemorate ‘al-Nakba’ (the disaster)8 (Olesker, 2011).

The minority on its part does not recognize the legitimacy of the Jewish character of the

state and actively seeks to challenge that identity. Ahmed Tibi, leader of the Ra’am-Ta’al Arab

party and a prominent Arab political leader, called for the redefinition of the state of Israel as a

state for all its nationalities, recognizing the bi-national (Jewish and Palestinian) character of the

society.9 In fact, in the lead-up to the 2013 Israeli elections, Ra’am-Taal went so far as to change

its political platform from supporting a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to

supporting one bi-national state, essentially calling for the elimination of the Jewish state. This

opinion was also expressed in the Future Vision documents, drafted by the political and

intellectual elites of the Arab population in Israel. These documents, published in 2006–7, reject

Israel’s identity as a Jewish state, call for the recognition of Israel as a bi-national state, deny the

Jewish right of return in Israel, calling instead for the recognition of the Palestinian right of

return.10

Of course, the Arab demand to change the Jewish character of the state is viewed as a

direct threat by the majority, and has the effect of worsening relations between the two groups

(Amar, 2003: 258–259).

This situation most corresponds with our L-L formation. Neither the majority nor the

minority view the minority as part of the collective national identity. Though most Arabs in

Israel express a desire to remain Israeli citizens, only 17.8% of Arabs sampled in 2011 felt part

of Israel and its problems and 41.6% were not so proud or not proud at all to be Israeli

(compared with only 11.3% of Jews sampled) (Hermann et al., 2011: 244). This indicates that

20

while Palestinian Arabs in Israel feel disconnected from Israeli society, and do not identify with

it, they nevertheless do not express secessionist goals, consistent with our hypothesis. In other

words, Palestinians in Israel acquiesce to their minority status and accept Israel as a political

entity, but reject the Jewish identity of the state and want to be recognized as a national minority,

with ethnic and national ties to the Palestinian people. Jews see this demand as an existential

threat, and thus reject granting any national recognition to the minority, continuing to see it

through a security lens. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict further exacerbates the “lumping

together” of the Palestinian minority with its ethnic kin, which is engaged in a violent, protracted

conflict with the state. Such a reality reflects a divided society in which neither the minority nor

the majority view the minority as a part of the societal “we”, reflecting the L shaped perception

of identity. If identity is inherently relational, as suggested earlier in our discussion, then the

Jewish rejection of the Palestinian minority from the collective “we” results in the very security

dilemma the state wishes to thwart—the identification and perhaps political collaboration

between the Palestinian minority and its ethnic kin across state lines.

Though the identity requirements of Palestinians and Jews in Israel are incompatible,

separation in this case is not suitable since the groups are not always territorially separated and a

majority of both Palestinians and Jews reject this option. In this scenario, we hypothesized that

conflict escalation would be likely on the part of both the majority and the minority, since both

perceive a threat to their societal security. Unlike the previous two scenarios where either the

minority or the majority should be targeted in any conflict management or prevention approach,

this scenario is the most challenging for conflict management. The most appropriate approach

would encourage the application of multinational federalism, where the accommodation of

minority identities is accepted and provisions have been put in place to institutionalize this

21

accommodation. This process would involve broad efforts to change societal perception of

different groups and their role in the polity. However, in many cases, particularly in ethno-

national states defined by their ethnic identity, this is, as Roe notes, “logically impossible” (Roe,

2004: 290) because the political environment does not provide the space for such an

accommodation to take place. This is evident in the Israeli example where resolution is

extremely difficult, because the minority and the majority see their security needs in exclusive

and incompatible terms, with each group threatening the societal security of the other (Olesker,

2011).

Conclusions and future research

The analysis here demonstrates the utility of including relational theories of identity and social

boundaries in international relations frameworks of conflict analysis, especially when examining

intergroup conflict in ethnically divided societies. Though exploratory, the analytical framework

presented here begins to illuminate important distinctions between different scenarios of ethnic

contentious politics and allows for some preliminary observations.

Our model hypothesized that conflict in divided societies is driven by threats to societal

security, but that differences exist between scenarios drawn from differing perceived identity

boundaries. The implications are that groups who perceive an “L” boundary (whereby they

perceive the “other” as being linked to a threatening external actor) will act to protect their

societal security. While institutions may do a good job of protecting societal security by allowing

groups to protect their cultural identity, this option may not work in all cases, particularly in

cases where the majority’s societal security is threatened. Further, in such cases, the institutions

constructed by the majority may alienate and isolate the minority group since they exclude them

culturally from the accepted “we”. This, we argue, could lead to a “self-fulfilling prophecy if the

22

minority indeed does become disloyal to the state due to discrimination and isolation. Our model

also allowed for a consideration of the importance of external actors by including them in both

the “T“ and “L” boundaries. We hypothesized that external actors play a key role in any conflict

involving threats to societal security since it is the linkage with them that creates the societal

security threat to the other.

These preliminary illustrative cases confirm these hypotheses and allow for some

preliminary observations of theoretical significance. First, we find that the identity of those who

perceive a threat to their societal security matters (whether it is the majority or the minority).

Since differing perceptions of identity boundaries carry different potential threats to societal

security, and lead to different conflict dynamics, it is important not to assume that majorities and

minorities view the social boundary between them in similar ways. The Crimea and Estonia

cases illustrate how conflict escalation can emanate from differing perceptions, led by the group

who perceives the greatest threat to their societal security, even when the negative boundary

construction is not reciprocal. In such divided societies, third parties can help alleviate tensions

and construct political solutions that address the underlying identity issues, but the approach

taken must address the needs of the group whose societal security is threatened, while balancing

out the basic needs of the other side. For example, autonomy or other forms of territorial self-

government are acceptable options when the societal security of the minority is threatened, and

should be accompanied by strong support for the territorial integrity of the state in order to meet

the interests of the majority. In contrast, when the societal security of the majority is threatened,

autonomy is not likely to be acceptable, nor are other forms of power sharing. In these cases, the

right of the state to form its own laws and institutions should be upheld, while the guarantee of

minority rights can meet the needs of the minority. The role of third parties is crucial in these

23

scenarios, and international actors such as regional organizations can have a positive effect in

creating and monitoring institutional and normative solutions, with care taken to ensure adequate

measures protect the minority and its own societal security. Yet, to be successful, it is imperative

that the ethnic kin state of the minority not support any separatist or other violent actions.

Second, we also find that understanding how the minority perceives its place in the

collective “we” is critical for effective conflict analysis. In the Israel and Crimea cases, the

minority does not share a clearly articulated national identity with their state of residence, and it

sees itself tied ethnically to another external group even as it wishes to exercise its civic and

political rights within its state of residence. The minority is therefore politically tied to the state

of residence, but shares an identity with its ethnic kin. As the Crimea case illustrates, political

accommodation is possible if the majority accepts the minority as a legitimate part of the polity,

and grants substantial rights to allow them to protect their identity. If the state does not follow

this model, the risk of a self-fulfilling prophecy is high, and action taken to isolate the perceived

threat the minority presents to the majority’s societal security may backfire and actually increase

that threat as the minority becomes increasingly isolated from the state, as we see in Israel.

Third, we find that a feeling of cultural connection to ethnic kin may imply negative

boundary construction and alienation from the state, but not necessarily so, as all three of our

cases demonstrate. While Palestinians in Israel increasingly see themselves as alienated from the

state, and express their national consciousness through overwhelming support for a Palestinian

state, Estonian Russians see themselves very much connected to Estonia and have formed a

separate identity that blends cultural connections with Russia and political and civic connections

with Estonia. Though a substantial number of Palestinians see themselves as a unique group, not

quite Israeli or Palestinian, while at the same time belonging to both societies (Rouhana, 1997),

24

the degree of alienation of the minority in Israel is higher than it is in Estonia. Moreover,

although the Palestinian minority maintains political independence from their ethnic kin and a

strong territorial connection to Israel, they nevertheless demand to be recognized as a national

minority and that Israel become a bi-national, rather than a Jewish state. The Russian minority in

Estonia does not challenge the identity of the state in similar ways and does not maintain an

emotional connection to ethnic kin to the extent that the Palestinians in Israel do (Bligh, 2002:

291). While European integration and the role of the OSCE may help explain these differences,

the fact that both the majority and the minority in Israel perceive the minority as outside the

collective “we” offers a compelling explanation.

Fourth, we find that when the ethnic majority, which controls the state apparatus,

perceives the identity of the minority as part of a greater, more threatening “other,” it is likely to

take action that manifests that identity, thereby locking the two groups in an often unnecessary

zero-sum game, whereby the identity of one is a direct threat to the societal security of the other.

By incorporating both the concept of societal security and social boundaries, this model is able to

demonstrate how the majority’s identity boundary may increase the likelihood of the minority’s

identification with the more threatening exclusive identity of the “other,” their ethnic kin. But, as

we begin to explore here, the minority may not otherwise see itself as part of the external other.

The minority may possess a more nuanced, multilayered identity, which does not directly

correspond with its civic or ethno-national identity, and yet draws on both. If the state fails to

recognize the different perceptions of identity, it may manifest the very threat it wishes to thwart.

We use the examples here as illustrative, rather than an empirical testing of the model, but even

this preliminary analysis makes a persuasive case that there are missed opportunities to move

toward more constructive conflict management strategies due to not recognizing the differences

25

between how the majority group perceives the minority and how the minority group perceives

itself. What we begin to uncover here are distinct differences in conflict dynamics that result

from different perceptions of identity boundaries in divided societies. We find that the potential

validity of the model does indeed warrant further research and testing. While it is not possible to

both introduce our model and track how identity perceptions have been constructed over time in

each of the cases we illustrate here, we believe our findings invite future empirical research to

track identity perceptions over time and space in order to shed greater light on how interactions

between groups influence and shape boundary construction, maintenance and change.

Nonetheless, as we note earlier, even without understanding how identity perceptions change

over time, analysts can still begin to draw conclusions on the policy implications of those

differing perceptions in a specific time and space and understand how those perceptions differ

from each other. As a first step, we offer an important new framework that draws upon the

concept of social boundaries as a tool for conflict analysis that better captures what may motivate

minorities to either act against the state, or choose to contribute cooperatively to internal

reconciliation processes.

1 For a detailed case study of the political and constitutional crisis, see Sasse (2007).

2 Baltic Surveys Ltd. The Gallup Organization with Rating Group Ukraine, Public Opinion

Survey: Residents of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (September 20–October 2, 2011), 35. 3 Russian-speakers include both ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians who speak Russian as a

native language. 4 Recent figures place the current Russian-speaking population (which includes other non-

Estonian nationalities such as Ukrainians, Jews and Belarusians) at approximately 29% (see

http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/country/population-by-nationality.html). 5 For a detailed account of the HCNM’s work in Estonia, see Kemp (2001).

26

6 This has become increasingly so since the eruption of the second intifada after which the Israeli

legislature adopted increasingly discriminatory laws which severely curtail the Palestinian

minority’s societal security. See Olesker (2013). 7 For an excellent review of the minority’s status in Israel see Rouhana (1997) and Reiter (2009).

8 Al-Nakba is commemorated on the day of Israeli independence, which was considered to have

devastated Palestinian national aspirations. 9 Interview with author, September 6, 2011, Jerusalem.

10 The National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, The Future

Vision of the Arab Palestinians In Israel, 2006. Available at

http://www.adalah.org/newsletter/eng/dec06/tasawor-mostaqbali.pdf (accessed October 12,

2012).

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