Disrupted Exchange and Declining Corporatism: Government Authority and Interest Group Capability in...

PerOla Öberg, Torsten Svensson, Peter MunkChristiansen, Asbjørn Sonne Nørgaard,Hilmar Rommetvedt and Gunnar Thesengoop_1343 365..391

Disrupted Exchange and DecliningCorporatism: Government Authority andInterest Group Capability in Scandinavia

FOR MANY DECADES, DENMARK, NORWAY AND SWEDEN HAVE BEEN

among the most corporatist liberal democracies in the world.1 Corpo-ratism is still comparatively viable in Scandinavia, but has declinedover the last decades.2 There are several possible explanations for thisdevelopment, and in this article we explore one of them: whethersome basic prerequisite for corporatist exchange has been disrupted.We understand corporatism as a mutually beneficial exchangebetween interest groups and government.3 The basic exchangemechanism is that some actors control something that others desire.We assume that governments still desire acquiescence to public policy,while interest groups still desire public policy that is favourable to

1 A. Lijphart and M. M. L. Crepaz, ‘Corporatism and Consensus Democracy inEighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages’, British Journal of PoliticalScience, 21: 2 (1991), pp. 235–56; A. Siaroff, ‘Corporatism in 24 Industrial Democracies:Meaning and Measurement’, European Journal of Political Research, 36: 2 (1999),pp. 175–205.

2 J. Blom-Hansen, ‘Still Corporatism in Scandinavia? A Survey of Recent EmpiricalFindings’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 23: 2 (2000), pp. 157–81; P. M. Christiansenet al., ‘Varieties of Democracy: Interest Groups and Corporatist Committees inScandinavian Policy Making’, Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and NonprofitOrganizations, 22: 1 (2010), pp. 22–40.

3 G. Lembruch, ‘Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks’, in J. H.Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, Oxford, ClarendonPress, 1984; O. Molina and M. Rhodes, ‘Corporatism: The Past, Present, and Futureof a Concept’, Annual Review of Political Science, 5 (2002), pp. 305–31; L. Baccaro andM. Simoni, ‘Policy Concertation in Europe: Understanding Government Choice’,Comparative Political Studies, 41: 10 (2008), pp. 1323–48.

Government and Opposition, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 365–391, 2011doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2011.01343.x

© The Authors 2011. Government and Opposition © 2011 Government and Opposition LtdPublished by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 MainStreet, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

them. We focus on whether actors still control their exchange part-ners’ desires, that is, if governments and interest groups are trust-worthy actors in corporative exchanges. As outlined below, a credibleexchange partner needs to have means, motive and opportunity, ormandate and unity (opportunity), assets (means) and intent (motive).Hence our investigation into possible disturbance in essential pre-requisites for corporatist exchange in Scandinavia. If we can findsome disruption, we have taken a step further in understandingde-corporatization; if not, we have to look for explanations elsewhere.

AN EXCHANGE MODEL OF CORPORATISM

In the wake of the seminal work of Philippe Schmitter and hisreintroduction of ‘corporatism’,4 several definitions of the term havebeen presented, and further dimensions added to Schmitter’s exten-sive list. Corporatism is often viewed as a system of concertationbetween particular economic interests – mainly labour market part-ners – and the state, and includes several (often different) structuralfeatures and outcomes.5 This conception tends to merge how publicand private interests interact with the conditions for and conse-quences of intermediation.

Corporatism as a political exchange may be understood as a gamethat takes place in institutionalized arenas in which each actor con-trols resources that the others desire. The state controls publicexpenditure and legislation. Furthermore, the state can privilegeselected organizations by granting them the status of group repre-sentatives in the policy-making process;6 the position of selectedpartner is crucial when organizations recruit adherents. Interest

4 P. C. Schmitter, ‘Still in the Century of Corporatism’, Review of Politics, 36: 1(1974), pp. 85–131; P. C. Schmitter, ‘Reflections on Where the Theory of Neo-Corporatism Has Gone and Where the Praxis of Neo-Corporatism May Be Going’, inG. Lembruch and P. C. Schmitter (eds), Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making, London,Sage, 1982.

5 Cf. Molina and Rhodes, ‘Corporatism’; L. Baccaro, ‘What is Alive and What isDead in the Theory of Corporatism’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 41: 4 (2003),pp. 683–706.

6 C. Offe, ‘The Attribution of Public Interest to Interest Groups: Observationson the West German Case’, in S. Berger (ed.), Organizing Interest in Western Europe,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 136–7.

366 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION

© The Authors 2011. Government and Opposition © 2011 Government and Opposition Ltd

groups may also possess resources desired by the state: they ‘control’their members,7 for example by binding them to negotiated agree-ments. Claims by radical members may be made satisfiable 8 throughinterest intermediation.9 In contrast to Baccaro and Simoni’s decla-ration of this type of exchange as ‘a peculiarity of electorally weakgovernments facing weakened unions’,10 we argue that corporatismpresupposes that both actors control resources demanded by theother. The question is not whether the government/organizationsare weak or strong, but whether the government/organizations canand will deliver in mutual exchanges.

Corporatism understood in terms of an ‘exchange relationship’11

is not confined to the labour market and negotiations on wages,profits, and economic policy. Corporatist arrangements may exist ina multitude of policy areas: ‘democratic corporatism as a structure forbargaining does not predetermine either the issues to be joined orthe content of agreements’.12 The crux of corporatism is institution-alized political exchange between privileged interest groups andthe state. A corporatist exchange assumes that organizations controlinternal opinions, while the state controls authoritative decision-making. An exchange does not need to be symmetrical (howeverdefined), but it can be realized only when the state offers policies ofinterest to the organizations which, in return, provide tacit consent,approval or active support of government policy that is of interest tothe state. In real life, of course, it is politically disputed what those

7 A. Cawson, ‘Varieties on Corporatism: The Importance of the Meso-level ofInterest Intermediation’, in A. Cawson (ed.), Organized Interest and the State, London,Sage, 1985, p. 6.

8 Offe, ‘The Attribution of Public Interest to Interest Groups’, pp. 126 ff.9 P. C. Schmitter, ‘Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal

Change in Western Europe’, in P. C. Schmitter and G. Lembruch (eds), Trends TowardCorporatist Intermediation, Beverly Hills and London, Sage, 1979, p. 93; P. C. Schmitter,‘Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary Western Europeand North America’, in S. Berger (ed.), Organizing Interest in Western Europe, Cam-bridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 295.

10 Baccaro and Simoni, ‘Policy Concertation in Europe’, p. 1340.11 J. S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press

of Harvard University Press, 1994; P. O. Öberg, Särintresse och allmänintresse: Korporat-ismens ansikten, Uppsala, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 1994; Molina and Rhodes,‘Corporatism’.

12 H. L. Wilensky, Rich Democracies, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California UniversityPress, 2002, p. 87.

367DISRUPTED EXCHANGE AND DECLINING CORPORATISM


interests are; neither the government nor the interest organizationsare unitary actors. The simplified theoretical model is illustrated inFigure 1.

Exchange between state and organized interests requires that oneparty is in control of resources in which the other is interested. Thuswe need to pinpoint what it takes for the state to control ‘favourablepublic policy’ and for interest groups to control ‘disciplined, moder-ated opinions’. We argue that state authority and interest groupcapability presupposes a strong mandate to engage in exchanges, ahigh degree of unity, mobilization of relevant assets and a sincereintent to engage in corporatist exchanges (that is, corporatist-friendlyattitudes) on both sides of the exchange. Without these features,actors are not trustworthy exchange partners.

One fundamental prerequisite is the mandate to make decisionswithin the relevant sphere. For a government, this means sovereignty– controlling legislation at central government level.13 Correspond-ingly, interest groups need to organize a relevant constituency withlegitimate interests: they have to be accepted as the representativeof that specific interest, otherwise they do not have a legitimatemandate to participate in public policy-making.

13 L. Hooghe and G. Marks, ‘Unraveling the Central State, But How? Types ofMulti-Level Governance’, American Political Science Review, 97: 2 (2003), p. 234.

Figure 1An Exchange Model of Corporatism

Disciplined, moderated opinions (support of public decisions)

Favourable public policy (legislation, financing and status)

Interestorganizations

The state(governmentauthorities)

Control of

Control of

Interest in

Interest in



Mandate alone is not enough; a certain level of unity to makeefficient decisions is also required.14 The government must be able togather support from a parliamentary majority,15 while interest groupshave to be sufficiently cohesive to represent their members effec-tively; in other words, to have a high degree of representationalmonopoly.16 Both parties must retain a capacity for making bindingcommitments if credible exchange is to take place.17

These prerequisites will be of scant interest to the counterpart ifnot matched by relevant assets. Even a cohesive and united govern-ment will be constrained in its ability to offer favourable and crediblepolicy deals when it is under economic pressure. Similarly, an interestgroup must be able to mobilize members who are willing to supportleadership decisions made in corporatist exchanges and, ultimately,to back the government involved. Governments that are punishedat the ballot box for corporatist exchanges will soon come to seecorporatism as a liability.18

Finally, even if the exchanging actors have mandate, unity andassets, these essentials are not worth much if fundamental valuesclash with engagements in corporatist exchanges. Leaders cannotcredibly assert that they are in control of favourable public policy ordisciplined, moderated opinions without a sincere intent to partici-pate in exchanges and compromises.19 Potential exchanging partieswill be cautious about long-term exchanges if their counterparts donot embrace fundamental positive ideas about corporatism. We callthis ‘corporatism-friendly attitudes’. Table 1 sums up the prerequi-sites for trustworthy actors in corporatist exchanges.

According to corporatist theory, all this should be important whenactors determine whether to participate in corporatist exchange or ifthere are better options. So, if required properties are in decline,

14 Wilensky, Rich Democracies.15 Cf. S. Rokkan, ‘Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism’,

in R. A. Dahl (ed.), Political Opposition in Western Democracies, New Haven, CT, YaleUniversity Press, 1966.

16 Schmitter, ‘Still in the Century of Corporatism’; Schmitter, ‘Reflections onWhere’.

17 Molina and Rhodes, ‘Corporatism’, p. 325.18 Lembruch, ‘Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks’.19 M. Anthonsen and J. Lindvall, ‘Party Competition and the Resilience of Corpo-

ratism’, Government and Opposition, 44: 2 (2009), p. 170.



non-corporatist options such as lobbying will be relatively less costly,and corporatism will decline (given that benefits of other options areconstant).

Before we proceed to examine changes in the prerequisites forcorporatist exchanges, we must obtain a clearer picture of how andover what period corporatism has declined.

CORPORATISM IN SCANDINAVIA

Scandinavian corporatism worked as an exchange system duringmost of the twentieth century. Organized groups were compara-tively strong and, occasionally, the state even intervened in orderto strengthen interest groups – by encouraging centralization oftrade unions, for example.20 The purpose was to make organiza-tions capable of moderating members’ demands and to secureindustrial peace. In exchange, unions obtained comprehensive

20 N. Elvander, Skandinavisk arbetarrörelse, Stockholm, LiberFörlag, 1980; cf. Öberg,Särintresse och allmänintresse ; A. S. Nørgaard, The Politics of Institutional Control: Corporat-ism in Danish Occupational Safety and Health Regulation and Unemployment Insurance,1870–1995, Aarhus, Politica, 1997.

Table 1Required Properties for Trustworthy Partners in Corporatist Exchange

Prerequisite Descriptive definition

Government Interest group

Mandate(authority to makedecisions)

Control over policy atnational/centralgovernment level

Organizations withauthority to bargainwith centralgovernment

Unity(ability to act asunitary actor)

Strong governmentvis-à-vis parliament

Organizationalcohesiveness andrepresentationalmonopoly

Assets(exchange relevantresources)

Sufficient financialresources, controlof allocation ofprivileges

High membership,membership support(control of votes)

Intention(corporatist-friendlyattitudes)

Positive attitudeto corporatistactors/exchanges

Positive attitudes toparticipation incorporatist exchanges



welfare policies, protective measures and the right to collectivebargaining and to strike. Corporatist exchange was also evidentin Scandinavian agricultural policy. During the twentieth century,the state exchanged rationalization in the food business for exten-sive economic support to agriculture and the inclusion of farmingorganizations in policy-making and policy implementation.21 Similarstories can be told about other policy areas, notably public welfareservices.22

For a long period – especially during late 1940s to mid-1960s –consensus among Scandinavian political elites was that strengtheningrather than undermining particular interest groups was the best wayto gain political control. Numerous institutional forums were createdfor discussion and bargaining between high-ranking civil servants andinterest groups. During most of the twentieth century, such arrange-ments were important parts of the political process in Scandinavia.This practice changed after the 1970s, however.

Declining Corporatism Since the 1970s

The development of corporatism has not been the same across all theScandinavian countries. Focusing on selected reforms, Lindvall andSebring, and Anthonsen and Lindvall find declining corporatism inSweden, but not in Denmark.23 Compston argues that concertationand corporatism increased in Norway and Denmark in the late 1980sand early 1990s, but decreased in Sweden.24 Regini argues that inthe same period concertation continued in Norway, whereas both

21 F. Just, ‘Agriculture and Corporatism in Scandinavia’, in P. Lowe, T. Marsdenand S. Whatmore (eds), Regulating Agriculture, Abingdon, Davis Fulton Publishers,1995; A. A. Farsund, ‘Stabilitet og endring i norsk landbrukspolitikk’, RF-rapport 2004/072, Stavanger, RF-Rogalandsforskning, 2004; Öberg, Särintresse och allmänintresse.

22 B. Rothstein, ‘State Structure and Variations in Corporatism: The Swedish Case’,Scandinavian Political Studies, 14: 2 (1991), pp. 149–71; B. Rothstein, Den korporativastaten, Stockholm, Norstedts Juridik, 1992; T. Nordby, Korporatisme på norsk, Oslo,Universitetsforlaget, 1994; P. M. Christiansen and A. S. Nørgaard, Faste forhold – Flygtigeforbindelser, Aarhus, Aarhus University Press, 2003.

23 J. Lindvall and J. Sebring, ‘Policy Reform and the Decline of Corporatism inSweden’, West European Politics, 28: 5 (2005), pp. 1057–74; Anthonsen and Lindvall,‘Party Competition’.

24 H. Compston, ‘The End of National Policy Concertation? Western Europe sincethe Single European Act’, Journal of European Public Policy, 5: 3 (1998), pp. 507–26.



Sweden and Denmark experienced less concertation in labourmarket policy and the regulation of industrial relations.25

Although the picture is not totally unambiguous – because ofimportant disparities in how main concepts are defined, operation-alized and measured26 – there is ample evidence of decline inScandinavian corporatism since the 1970s.27 All these studies analysecorporatism across different policy areas over time, through com-parative case studies of policy-making and/or indicators of theinstitutional organization of policy-making in general. In terms ofdescription, they all reach roughly similar conclusions: corporatismhas declined in all Scandinavian countries since the 1970s.

Christiansen et al. have shown that corporatism in relation to thepreparation of policy has gone down in all three countries whereascorporatism in implementation processes are more varied.28 Figure 2is calculated from data published by Christiansen and colleagues,and shows the number of policy-preparing committees that includeinterest groups. Although not perfect, we consider it to be a reason-able indicator of corporatism, given the vast array of studies thatreach similar conclusions on the basis of different research designs.

25 M. Regini, ‘Between Deregulation and Social Pacts: The Responses of EuropeanEconomies to Globalization’, Politics and Society, 28: 1 (2000), pp. 5–33.

26 Christiansen et al., ‘Varieties of Democracy’, p. 24.27 Sweden: J. Hermansson, Politik som intressekamp, Stockholm, Norstedts Juridik,

1993; J. Hermansson, A. Lund, T. Svensson and P. O. Öberg, Avkorporativiseringoch lobbyism, Swedish government official report, SOU 1999:121; B. Rothstein and J.Bergström, Korporatismens fall och den svenska modellens kris, Stockholm, SNS förlag,1999; P. O. Öberg and T. Svensson, ‘Power and Institutions in Industrial RelationRegimes’, Worklife in Transition, 2005:12, Stockholm, National Institute for WorkingLife, 2005. Denmark: J. Blom-Hansen, ‘Organized Interests and the State: A Disinte-grating Relationship? Evidence from Denmark’, European Journal of Political Research,39: 3 (2001), pp. 391–416; Christiansen and Nørgaard, Faste forhold. Norway : Nordby,Korporatisme på norsk; H. Rommetvedt, ‘Norway: Resources Count, But Votes Decide?From Neo-Corporatist Representation to Neo-Pluralist Parliamentarism’, West EuropeanPolitics, 28: 4 (2005), pp. 740–63; see also P. Selle and Ø. Østerud, ‘The Eroding ofRepresentative Democracy in Norway’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13: 4 (2006),pp. 551–68; T. Tranvik and P. Selle, ‘The Rise and Fall of Popular Mass Movements:Organizational Change and Globalization – The Norwegian Case’, Acta Sociologica, 50:1 (2007), pp. 57–70. Norway and Denmark: P. M. Christiansen and H. Rommetvedt,‘From Corporatism to Lobbyism? Parliaments, Executives, and Organized Interestsin Denmark and Norway’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 22: 3 (1999), pp. 195–220.Scandinavia: Blom-Hansen, ‘Still Corporatism in Scandinavia?’

28 Christiansen et al., ‘Varieties of Democracy’.



Corporatist structures related to policy preparation have been weak-ened, but not dismantled since the 1970s.

In Denmark, corporatism peaked around 1980. An analysis ofgovernment-sponsored bills in policy sectors with strong traditionsof corporatism point in the same direction,30 and so do a numberof comparative case studies.31 Analyses of Norwegian corporatismthat use slightly different indicators also point to c. 1980 as the peak

29 Some would argue that the percentage of committees with representatives frominterest organizations is the most relevant measure. However, each committee repre-sents a decision-making opportunity in which interest organizations may or may notbe represented. If the ‘importance’ of the committees is constant, then the absolutenumber of committees with representatives from interest organizations is the bestmeasure of corporatism (i.e. the number of decision-making opportunities in whichorganized interests are allowed to participate). We believe that the substantial decreasein the number of committees with interest organization representation more thancompensates for a possible (but not documented) increase in the ‘importance’ of eachpublic committee with interest group representation.

30 Christiansen and Nørgaard, Faste forhold, pp. 106–8.31 J. Blom-Hansen and C. Daugbjerg (eds), Magtens Organisering: Stat og interesseor-

ganisationer i Danmark, Herning, Systime, 1999; P. M. Christiansen, A. S. Nørgaard andN. C. Sidenius, Hvem skriver lovene?, Aarhus, Aarhus University Press, 2004.

Figure 2Corporatism in Scandinavia, 1970–2005 (1980 = 100) a

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Norway Denmark Sweden Poly. (Sweden)

Note : a Corporatism is measured by the number of policy-preparingcommittees that include organized interests. Due to the lack of Swedishobservations we added a polynomic tendency line (R2 = 0.52).29

Source : Christiansen et al., ‘Varieties in Democracy’.



of corporatism.32 The turning point in Swedish corporatism ismore difficult to establish, due to a paucity of data points. WhereasFigure 2 suggests that Swedish corporatism has declined since the1970s (or even earlier), Hermansson’s analysis of 12 policy areassuggests that interest groups dominated policy-preparing com-mittees until around 1980;33 Rothstein and Bergström also pointto the early 1980s as a turning point, as does Lewin.34 The declinedoes not appear as dramatic in Sweden as in Norway and Denmark.In general, the pattern suggests that, whatever changes haveoccurred in the prerequisites for corporatist exchanges, they areprobably more dramatic and time specific (that is, taking placein the 1980s) in Norway and Denmark than in Sweden. Mightchanges in the properties needed for government and interestgroups to be trustworthy partners in corporatist exchange be partof the explanation?

WEAKENED GOVERNMENTS?

Mandate

Control over national or central government policy may be under-mined by three factors: sovereignty may have been transferred tothe international or European level; political power may have beendevolved to the local level; or the autonomy of governments mayhave decreased due to the internationalization or globalization ofthe economy. All factors have been highlighted in the literature.35

Central governments and democratic principals may ‘decide moreabout less’.36

32 Nordby, Korporatisme på norsk, pp. 71–2; Rommetvedt, ‘Norway’.33 Hermansson, Politik som intressekamp, p. 450.34 Rothstein and Bergström, Korporatismens fall, p. 152; L. Lewin, ‘The Rise and

Decline of Corporatism: The Case of Sweden’, European Journal of Political Research, 26(1994), pp. 59–79.

35 For example, B. Western, ‘A Comparative Study of Corporatist Development’,American Sociological Review, 56: 3 (1991), pp. 283–94; Compston, ‘The End of NationalPolicy Concertation?’

36 T. Bergman and K. Strøm, ‘Shifting Dimensions of Citizen Control’, Scandina-vian Political Studies, 27: 2 (2004), p. 89.



An important aspect of reduced state mandates is the integrationof national into European policy-making. Europeanization hasaffected the functioning of Scandinavian democracy, includingthe autonomy of national governments, albeit in different ways.37

Denmark was the early starter, as it became a member of theEuropean Union (EU) in 1973. Sweden’s and Norway’s bilateraltrade agreements developed into the European Economic Area(EEA) agreements in 1992,38 and Swedish membership of the EU in1995; Norway is formally still a non-member. Through the EEA, bothNorway and Sweden have been subject to increasing EU regulationsince the 1980s, just as Denmark has been. The influence of EUregulation increased with the surge in EU rules after the passing ofthe Single European Act in 1986. From the early 1990s, the pace ofrule-making in the EU levelled off.39

Decentralization of authority to local governments or inde-pendent state agencies may also weaken the authority of centralgovernment. Most salient are the increased independences of centralbanks. While e.g. the Swedish Central Bank, Riksbanken, was used asa monetary instrument until the mid 1980s, it is now ranked the mostindependent together with the European Central Bank.40 The evi-dence of local government autonomy during the period under inves-tigation is mixed, however.41 In general, decentralization and local

37 T. Bergman and E. Damgaard (eds), Delegation and Accountability in EuropeanIntegration: The Nordic Parliamentary Democracies and the European Union, London, FrankCass, 2000.

38 Ø. Østerud, ‘Introduction: The Peculiarities of Norway’, West European Politics,28: 4 (2005), p. 709.

39 J. Blom-Hansen and J. G. Christensen, Den europæiske forbindelse, Aarhus, AarhusUniversity Press, 2004, pp. 56–8.

40 T. Svensson, ‘Globalisation, Marketisation and Power: The Swedish Case ofInstitutional Change’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 25: 3 (2002), pp. 197–229;C. Crowe and E. E. Meade, ‘The Evolution of Central Bank Governance around theWorld’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21: 4 (2007), p. 72.

41 T. Tranvik and P. Selle, ‘State and Citizens in Norway: Organisational Societyand State–Municipal Relations’, West European Politics, 28: 4 (2005), pp. 852–71; J. G.Christensen, Delegation and Administrative Organization: An Overview of Danish RegulatoryAdministration 1950–2000, Aarhus, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University,2005; P. Lægreid, S. Opedal and I. M. Stigen, ‘The Norwegian Hospital Reform:Balancing Political Control and Enterprise Autonomy’, Journal of Health Politics, Policyand Law, 30: 6 (2005), pp. 1027–64; I. Elander and S. Montin, ‘Decentralisation andControl: Central–Local Government Relations in Sweden’, Policy and Politics, 18: 3



government autonomy in Scandinavia were probably at their highestin the 1970s.

Finally, with regard to economic globalization, all Scandinaviancountries are open economies, but further liberalization of capitalmay have left national governments with less political control. Eco-nomic openness creates exit options for firms and renders statesmore vulnerable; vulnerability makes it harder for state representa-tives to meet demands from interest groups. Indicators of capitaltransactions show an increase in openness among the three countriessince the 1960s.42 Capital flows were liberalized in Sweden during the1970s and 1980s, when Norway and Denmark were catching up, buta dramatic increase in liberalization took place in the 1990s in allcountries.

The development and consequences of decentralization are in-conclusive. However, Europeanization increased constraints on gov-ernment authority in the 1980s, as did economic liberalization in the1990s. Taken together, this indicates a weakened central governmentmandate.

Unity

Scandinavian governments are most often minority governments.43

In the period 1971 to 2006, Sweden had majority coalition govern-ments for three and a half years. In Norway, a majority coalition ruledfor a little more than two years between 1971 and 2005. Since 1971,Denmark has been ruled by a majority government for only one anda half years. Apart from Italy, opposition parties in Scandinaviahave the greatest influence on government policy among 18 WestEuropean countries, according to an expert survey.44

(1990), pp. 165–80; D. Feltenius, ‘Relations Between Central and Local Government inSweden During the 1990s: Mixed Patterns of Centralization and Decentralization’,Regional & Federal Studies, 17: 4 (2007), pp. 457–74; Svensson, ‘Globalisation, Marke-tisation and Power’.

42 D. Quinn, ‘The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation’,American Political Science Review, 91: 3 (1997), p. 535.

43 F. J. Christiansen and E. Damgaard, ‘Parliamentary Democracy under MinorityParliamentarism: Scandinavia’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 14: 1/2 (2008), pp. 48–50.

44 Christiansen and Damgaard, ‘Parliamentary Democracy’, p. 50.



It seems, furthermore, that governments have been weakenedvis-à-vis parliaments during the period under study. In 1970, therewere five political parties in parliament in each of the three countries;since then, the parliaments have become more fragmented. In 1973,the number of parties in the Danish Folketing doubled and remainedat 10–11 parties for the rest of the 1970s; in the 1980s and 1990s, 8–10parties were represented, and after 2000, 7–8 parties. In the 1973Norwegian election, two new parties gained representation and, sincethen, 6–8 parties have been represented in the Storting. In Sweden,a sixth party gained representation in 1988 and since 1991 sevenparties have been represented in the Riksdag.

Fragmentation does not equal conflict between governmentand parliament. Corporatism is a potential conflict-reducing mecha-nism,45 but government–parliament relations became more dissent-ing in Norway and Denmark during the 1980s, and parliamentaryopposition more assertive. It is true, though, that weak Danish minor-ity governments did not have long tenures during the 1970s, and thegovernment would always resign if it encountered legislative defeats.In the 1980s, Danish centre-right governments struggled to get thebudget passed, and, in some policy areas, ‘alternative majorities’passed laws contrary to government policy.46 Yet, the governmentdid not resign. In addition, in the late 1970s and especially fromthe 1980s onwards, the number of legislative agreements – forlig –increased significantly.47 The opposition parties, partners to theseagreements, were given the power to veto future policy changes.Analyses demonstrate that governments rarely make corporatistexchanges and forlig at the same time.48

The Norwegian Storting also became more assertive. Whereasgovernments of the 1970s were almost never defeated in parliaments,this happened more often during the 1980s and 1990s, especially

45 Rokkan, ‘Norway’; Lembruch, ‘Concertation and the Structure of CorporatistNetworks’.

46 E. Damgaard (ed.), Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries, Oslo, Scandina-vian University Press, 1992.

47 F. J. Christiansen, Politiske forlig i Folketinget, Aarhus, Politica, 2008.48 A. S. Nørgaard and R. Klemmensen, ‘Hvorfor stemmer oppositionen for reger-

ingens lovforslag? Korporatisme og parlamentariske forlig i Danmark, 1958–1999’,Politica, 41: 1 (2009), pp. 67–90.



on budget issues.49 Dissenting committee recommendations alsoincreased in this period. The fragmentation of parliament had animpact on government stability when the populist Progress Partybrought down the centre-right coalition in 1986. Since the 1980s,numerically fragile minority governments in Norway have reliedincreasingly on ad hoc coalitions and on ‘the favours of severalopposition parties at the same time’, and power ‘shifted from theexecutive to the legislative branch and the cabinet’s agenda controleroded’.50

Sweden did not witness the same increase in parliamentary asser-tiveness. Until 1976, and again from 1982 until 1991, Social Democratminority governments ‘could trust the Communist Party to keepthem in power without raising many specific demands for negotiatedpolicy concessions by the Social Democrats’.51 Without the fear ofbeing ousted, the government could form ad hoc coalitions with theopposition parties. As in the Danish case, the fact that a government,as a last resort, can use its block majority may lead to broad coopera-tion.52 The centre-right coalitions from 1976 to 1982 commandeda majority for most of the period, and were comparatively stronggovernments. Because coalition partners had different political pref-erences they crafted specific coalition agreements on governments’policy agenda,53 leaving cabinet and individual ministers withoutmuch room to manoeuvre. In sum, government unity has crackedsomewhat as parliaments have become more fragmented andassertive. Interest groups can rely less than before on governments’capacity to control what interest groups want in return in corporatistexchange.

49 H. Rommetvedt, The Rise of the Norwegian Parliament, London, Frank Cass, 2003;Rommetvedt, ‘Norway’.

50 K. Strøm, H. M. Narud and H. Valen, ‘A More Fragile Chain of Governance inNorway’, West European Politics, 28: 4 (2005), pp. 796 ff.

51 T. Bale and T. Bergman, ‘Captives No Longer, but Servants Still? ContractParliamentarism and the New Minority Governance in Sweden and New Zealand’,Government and Opposition, 4: 3 (2006), p. 432.

52 C. Green-Pedersen and L. H. Thomsen, ‘Bloc Politics vs. Broad Cooperation?The Functioning of Danish Minority Parliamentarism’, Journal of Legislative Studies,11: 2 (2005), pp. 153–69.

53 K. Strøm and W. Müller, ‘The Keys to Togetherness: Coalition Agreements inParliamentary Democracies’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 5: 3 (1999), pp. 255–82.



Assets

If a government has sufficient mandate and unity it does notautomatically imply that the government controls sufficient assetsto carry out exchanges with interest groups. Governments must havethe means to supply advantageous policies to interest organizationsto persuade them to engage in exchanges.

Like other Western countries, Scandinavia – especially Swedenand Denmark – experienced an economic downturn from themid-1970s in the aftermath of the first oil crisis. Growth continuedto decline during the 1980s in Denmark and Norway, whereas itincreased in Sweden until the dramatic downturn in the 1990s. Thepresence of North Sea oil has meant that growth has been consis-tently higher in Norway than in Denmark or Sweden,54 but economicstagnation did not curb governments’ public spending.

Declining growth was accompanied by rising unemploymentand strained public budgets, particularly in Denmark and Sweden.Figure 3 shows public debt as a percentage of GDP from 1970 to2004. In the early 1970s, Denmark and Sweden ran surpluses, but in

54 OECD, OECD Factbook 2009, Paris, OECD.

Figure 3Public Finances: Public Sector Net Savings, 1970–2004 (percentage of GDP)

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1970–74 1975–79 1980–84 1985–89 1990–94 1995–99 2000–4

Denmark Norway Sweden

Source: Handbook of Nordic Statistics, Nordic Statistical Secretariat, variousyears; National Accounts of OECD Countries, Paris, OECD, 1995–2006.



the late 1970s, continuous deficits implied dramatically increasedpublic debt, not to be reined in until the late 1980s. Apart from in theearly 1990s, debt has been brought under control in recent years: thedeficits in Norway decreased after the 1970s and, except for a briefperiod in early 1990s, budget deficits have not been a problem inNorway, due to the oil.

Scandinavian public sectors grew significantly in the 1960s and1970s. Growth in public expenditure continued at a slower paceduring the 1980s and early 1990s, since when the size of the publicsector as a proportion of GDP has been almost constant.55

Whether governments behaved economically irresponsibly in the1970s is not the issue here; for interest groups, there was definitelysomething to be gained through corporatist exchanges with govern-ments that continually increased spending in the face of stagnatinggrowth. In the 1980s and 1990s, assets shrank as deficits were curbedand the growth of public expenditure levelled out, except duringthe Swedish crisis in the early 1990s. As argued in the welfare stateliterature, the 1980s paved the way for a retrenchment agenda.56

Being involved in negotiations on deregulation and retrenchmentmay be of the utmost importance for interest organizations. Still, it issafe to say that the attainable slices of the cake have become smaller.

Intention: Attitudes Towards Corporatism

For corporatist exchanges to occur, means and opportunity are notenough. The government must also have the inclination and themotive. Scandinavian corporatism has been termed ‘left-handed’:social democrats and unions have been seen as responsible for cre-ating and maintaining corporatist arrangements.57 The traditional

55 Ibid., various indicators. The OECD has no comparable data on public sectorsize going back to the 1970s. Data exist on tax revenues as a proportion of GDP sincethe 1960s and data on public social and other welfare expenditure go back to 1980.The indicators suggest that public sector growth was high in the 1970s, moderate in the1980s and almost zero in the 1990s, with the exception of Sweden in the early 1990s,during the crisis.

56 P. Pierson, The New Politics of the Welfare State, Oxford, Oxford University Press,2001.

57 D. Cameron, ‘Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence and the Rep-resentation of Economic Interests in Advanced Capitalist Society’, in J. H. Goldthorpe(ed.), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984,



statutory connections between unions and party have come to anend, but strong informal ties persist in the form of recruitmentand representation, although more so in Sweden and Norway thanin Denmark.58 Assuming that social democratic preferences forcorporatism are stable over time and that centre-right governmentsare more hostile towards corporatism, weakened social democraticgovernment power indicates that governments have, for politicalreasons, become less engaged in corporatist exchanges.

Before 1970, social democratic parties had a remarkably stronggovernmental position in all three countries.59 The Danish party wasthe weakest of the Scandinavian social democratic parties and wasaccustomed to govern in various coalitions. The Norwegian partyhad a stronger electoral base and ruled in splendid isolation fordecades, but had to leave ministerial posts twice in the 1960s. In ahistorical perspective, a seemingly everlasting Social Democratichegemony in Sweden was broken when the first non-socialist gov-ernment in the post-war era was established in 1976 and stayed inpower for six years. In Figure 4, the strength of the social democratssince 1970 is measured in terms of the average proportion of left-wing cabinet seats.

The Swedish Social Democratic Party dominated governmenta little less than its Norwegian sister party in the 1970s, but it keptits relative strength during the 1980s, in contrast to the situation inNorway and Denmark. In Norway, the Social Democrats were out ofpower for five years in the first half of the 1980s (1981–86). Whenthey regained power, governing had become more difficult becausethe government had no stable majority support in parliament.60 Inthe early 1980s, the Conservative government declared explicitlythat it would downsize the corporatist apparatus in order to reduce

pp. 143–78; H. Heclo and H. Madsen, Policy and Politics in Sweden, Philadelphia,Temple University Press, 1987; Western, ‘A Comparative Study of CorporatistDevelopment’; D. Rueda, ‘Left Government, Policy and Corporatism. Explaining theInfluence of Partisanship on Inequality’, World Politics, 60 (2008), p. 385.

58 E. H. Allern, N. Aylott and F. J. Christiansen, ‘Social Democrats and TradeUnions in Scandinavia: The Decline and Persistence of Institutional Relationships’,European Journal of Political Research, 46: 5 (2007), pp. 616, 628.

59 Allern et al., ‘Social Democrats and Trade Unions in Scandinavia’; Christiansenand Damgaard, ‘Parliamentary Democracy’.

60 Rommetvedt, ‘Norway’; Strøm et al., ‘A More Fragile Chain of Governance’.



the power of interest groups.62 In Denmark, the Social Demo-crats were out of power for more than 10 years (1982–93). In the1990s, Norwegian and Danish Social Democrats regained some oftheir strength, but then the tide shifted again. Norwegian SocialDemocrats were out of office in 2001 and 2005, and the DanishSocial Democrats lost government power in 2001. As Figure 4 shows,the Swedish Social Democrats are still the strongest in Scandinavia,even though a centre-right majority coalition assumed power in2006.

There are good reasons for interest groups to question whethergovernments in Scandinavia have stable intentions to engage incorporatist exchanges. Governments are short-lived and formerlyreliable social democratic governments have to find ways to stayin power other than seeking allies among interest groups.

61 The average share of left-wing parties in government – see E. Huber, C. Raginand J. D. Stephens, ‘Comparative Welfare States Data Set’, Northwestern Universityand University of North Carolina, 1997; and D. Brady, J. Beckfield and J. Stephens,‘Comparative Welfare States Data Set’, 2004 (updated from E. Huber, C. Ragin andJ. Stephens, ‘Comparative Welfare States Data Set’) – equals that of the social demo-crats in all the Scandinavian countries because no other left-wing party has been ingovernment, except the Norwegian government 2005–9, which included SosialistiskVenstreparti.

62 Nordby, Korporatisme på norsk.

Figure 4Average Social Democratic Share of Cabinet Seats, 1970–2006 (%)

0102030 4050 60 7080 90

100

1970–79 1980–89 1990–99 2000-06


Source: Brady et al., ‘Comparative Welfare States Data Set’, and publicsources.61



WEAKENED INTEREST GROUP CAPABILITIES?

Mandate

In a liberal democracy, one precondition to enabling interest groupsto participate in public policy-making is that they have a mandate tospeak on behalf of their members. Focusing on the statutory author-ity of the confederations of labour market organizations over theiraffiliates – that is, the degree of centralization – an index combiningthe employer side and the union side shows little change since the1970s.63 The degree of centralization has consistently been lower inDenmark than in Norway and Sweden, but has not changed muchin any of the three countries.

Unity

An increasing number of unions and growing union fragmentationwould be two signs that there was less unity, and, consequently, theunions would be less reliable partners in corporatist exchange. Twoindicators are relevant, but they point in different directions (seeTable 2). First, the number of unions has decreased in all threecountries since the 1960s. Unions have merged to meet the rise ofnew occupations and a changing industrial structure. Since the 1970swhite-collar unions have become the largest unions in Scandinavia.64

Second, the number of confederations of labour market organi-zations has increased with the growth of white-collar and professionaland academic confederations of labour market organizations. Thus,the share of union members in LO, the blue-collar confederation,has decreased and trade union concentration has diminished. Thefigures for inter-confederate concentration have been falling sincethe 1960s (Herfindahl concentration index).65 In Sweden, the

63 K.-O. Lindgren, Roads from Unemployment, Uppsala, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis,2006. Cf. M. Wallerstein, M. Golden and P. Lange, ‘Unions, Employers’ Associationsand Wage-Setting Institutions in Northern and Central Europe, 1950–1992’, Industrialand Labor Relations Review, 50: 3 (1997).

64 Ibid.; B. Ebbinghaus and J. Visser, The Societies of Europe. Trade Unions in WesternEurope since 1945, London, Macmillan, 2000.

65 Brady et al., ‘Comparative Welfare States Data Set’. The Herfindahl index isH = S (Si)2. Si is the share of union members in confederation i and the sum includesall confederations. The denominator in the calculation of Si also includes union



concentration decreased most during the 1960s, but continued to fallduring the 1970s, after which it stabilized. In Norway and Denmark,a decreasing concentration was most pronounced during the 1970s,but continued during the 1980s. According to Ebbinghaus andVisser, who employ a slightly different measure, concentrationcontinued to drop in Sweden and Denmark during the 1990s, butstabilized in Norway.66 However, LO membership in Norway declinedcontinually from 83 per cent of the organized workforce in 1956 to51 per cent in 2002.67

In sum, the number of unions has decreased since the 1960s.Potentially, this may strengthen the unions’ capacity to talk with onevoice and engage in corporatist exchanges with government, butstronger and more consolidated affiliates may also weaken the con-federations’ capacity to talk on behalf of their members. Fragmenta-tion was significant during the 1970s and continued in the 1980s and1990s. Historically, blue-collar confederations of labour market orga-nizations have been the dominant partners in corporatist exchanges.With a diminishing working class and growing middle class, thedifference between blue-collar and white-collar organizations has

members who are not affiliated with a peak organization; cf. Wallerstein et al., ‘Unions,Employers’ Associations and Wage-Setting Institutions’, p. 383.

66 Ebbinghaus and Visser, The Societies of Europe. Cf. also Allern et al., ‘SocialDemocrats and Trade Unions in Scandinavia’.

67 T. A. Stokke, ‘Organisasjonsgraden på arbeidstakersiden’, Notat 1995:13, Oslo,Fafo, 1995; K. Nergaard and T. A. Stokke, ‘Organisasjonsgrader og tariffavtaledekningi norsk arbeidsliv 2004/2005’, Rapport 518, Oslo, Fafo, 2006.

Table 2Union Organizational Structure, 1960–90

1960 1970 1980 1990

Denmark Number of LO unions 53 45 33 30Number of confederations 2 2 2 3Inter-confederational concentration 67 64 53 50

Norway Number of LO unions 41 35 34 29Number of confederations 1 1 3 3Inter-confederational concentration 64 58 48 42

Sweden Number of LO unions 44 29 25 23Number of confederations 2 2 3 3Inter-confederational concentration 61 51 46 45

Source : Wallerstein et al., ‘Unions, Employers’ Associations and Wage-Setting Institutions’, pp. 381–5.



almost disappeared. Although the changes in the organizationallandscape did not take place at exactly the same time across Scandi-navia, governments have had to pay attention and speak to more andmore powerful organizations than they used to. Hence, interestgroups (at least unions) do not have the same control over a unitedmembership as in earlier times.

Assets

An interest group’s main asset in its exchanges with government isthe number of members it can persuade to accept the deals struckover public policies. Organized groups have to deliver support – or atleast tacit acceptance – to be a viable exchange party. In general, theinvolvement of citizens in organizations is high in Scandinavia,although it has been declining in recent years.68 However, not allorganizational membership is relevant to corporatist exchanges.Interest groups have to organize important groups. In addition to aunited membership, organizations may use electoral support – that is,members’ votes – in the exchange with governments. Focusing onthe role of unions, we analyse union density and the voting behaviourof union members as a proxy for the political asset that unionsexchange with governments.

Figure 5 shows ‘adjusted’ union density from 1970 to 2003. InDenmark and Sweden, union density increased in the 1970s andcontinued to grow in Sweden until 1995, after which it decreasedquite significantly.69 In Denmark, union density peaked in around1980 at 79 per cent. By 2003, it had dropped to 70 per cent. In bothDenmark and Sweden, the loss of members is most significant amongyoung people.70 Union density is still relatively high in all three

68 J. Goul Andersen, Et ganske levende demokrati, Aarhus, Aarhus University Press,2004, pp. 108–9; E. Amnå, ‘Associational Life, Youth, and Political Formation inSweden: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Trends’, in L. Trädgårdh (ed.), Stateand Civil Society in Northern Europe, New York, Berghan, 2007; Tranvik and Selle, ‘TheRise and Fall of Popular Mass Movements’.

69 J. Visser, ‘Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries’, Monthly Labor Review,January (2006), p. 45.

70 Goul Andersen, Et ganske levende demokrati, pp. 114–15; A. Fransson, M. Larsson,I. Goding and Å. Forsell, ‘Röster om facket och jobbet. Ungdomar och facket’, Rapport5, Stockholm, LO, 2007.



countries, especially in Denmark and Sweden, but it has fallen sig-nificantly in recent decades.

Unions – not to mention other organized interests – are moreattractive parties to a corporatist exchange if they can deliver politicalsupport in the form of votes or can threaten the opposite. Since the1970s, social democratic governments have been unable to rely onunions’ abilities to deliver their members’ vote.

Net electoral volatility – that is, interparty shifts in electoralsupport – has increased since the 1960s (Figure 6). In Norway andDenmark, volatility rose dramatically in the 1970s, only falling offslightly in the 1980s. In Sweden, volatility has increased since 1970,but at a slower pace. By the 1980s and 1990s, volatility levels wereconverging in Scandinavia.

With increasing volatility, the capacity of unions to deliver theirmembers’ votes to the social democratic parties also decreased. Theshare of Norwegian LO union members voting social democrat fell inearly 1980s, increased a little up until the mid-1990s, and decreasedsignificantly afterwards. In Denmark, the share of blue-collar socialdemocrat voters has fallen since the late 1970s.71 In Sweden, the social

71 J. Andersen, O. Borre, J. Goul Andersen and H. J. Nielsen, Vælgere med omtanke:En analyse af Folketingsvalget i 1998, Aarhus: Systime, 1999, p. 81.

Figure 5Union Density in Scandinavia, 1970–2003

50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95

100

1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2003


Source : Visser, ‘Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries’, Monthly LaborReview, January (2006), p. 45.



democratic share of LO votes has decreased since the 1980s.72 Unionmembers are no longer the only core constituency of social democratgovernments; salaried employees – notably in the public sector – havebecome equally important.

Trade unions, one main corporatist actor, are still comparativelypowerful in Scandinavia. However, union density and class-basedvoting have declined. Increasingly, Scandinavian governmentscannot take it for granted that interest groups control an asset that isan essential component in a corporatist exchange.

Corporatist-Friendly Attitudes

The decline in Scandinavian governments’ corporatist-friendlyattitudes is mirrored by attitudes among interest groups. Moreover,there are indications that the willingness to use the corporatistchannel when influencing public policy is decreasing: the traditionalparticipants in corporatist exchanges are less trusted and, instead,individualism is more widespread.

72 H. Oscarsson and S. Holmberg, ‘Swedish Voting Behavior’, Swedish ElectionStudies Program, Göteborg University, February 2007.

Figure 6Net Electoral Volatility, 1948–98

0

2

4

6

8

10 12 14 16

18 20

1945–59 1970–77 1979–901960–69 1991–98


Source: D. Arter, Scandinavian Politics Today, Manchester, ManchesterUniversity Press, 1999, pp. 125–6.



According to the World Values Surveys (1981/82, 1990, 1996,2000), citizen confidence in unions has been stable or increasingin Norway since 1980, whereas it fell significantly in Denmark andSweden in the 1980s, after which it stabilized.73 Perhaps the highmember density in Denmark and Sweden – not the case in Norway –explains the divergent development in union confidence.74 InSweden, unions are among the least trusted institutions, togetherwith parties and EU institutions.75

In common with citizens in many other countries, Scandinavianshave become more individualistic;76 comparative studies show thatScandinavia is among the most post-materialistic countries in theworld.77 Corporatist exchanges revolve around distributional andmaterialist conflicts that are organized collectively and hierarchically.The trade union is the archetype of this type of organization. Indi-vidualistic attitudes and post-materialistic values are not easily trans-formed into distributional policy exchanges or fitted easily into thestructure of interest groups and traditional party lines. A prominentexpression of this value change is that mass movements in Scandina-via are changing. New organizational types – single-issue organiza-tions, leisure groups, local mobilization and so on – are becomingmore important platforms for civic engagement.78 As argued by GoulAndersen with special reference to Denmark – although the pointalso applies to Norway and Sweden – the issue is not so much declin-ing organizational involvement per se, but that ‘part of what is lost in

73 O. Listhaug and M. Wiberg, ‘Confidence in Political and Private Institutions’, inH.-D. Klingemann and D. Fuchs (eds), Citizens and the State, Oxford, Oxford UniversityPress, 1995, pp. 304–5; J. Goul Andersen and J. Hoff, Democracy and Citizenship inScandinavia, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.

74 Goul Andersen, Et ganske levende demokrati, p. 115.75 S. Holmberg and L. Weibull, ‘Svenska trender 1986–2006’, Gothenburg,

SOM-Instituttet, 2006, p. 7.76 C. Welzel, R. Inglehart and H.-D. Klingemann, ‘The Theory of Human Devel-

opment: A Cross-Cultural Analysis’, European Journal of Political Research, 42 (2003),pp. 368–9.

77 R. Inglehart and W. E. Baker, ‘Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persis-tence of Traditional Values’, American Sociological Review, 65: 1 (2000), pp. 19–51.

78 Goul Andersen, Et ganske levende demokrati; Tranvik and Selle, ‘The Rise and Fallof Popular Mass Movements’; D. Wollebæk, ‘The Decoupling of OrganizationalSociety: the Case of Norwegian Voluntary Organizations’, Voluntas, 19 (2008),pp. 351–71.



terms of collective mobilization seems to be gained in terms of moreindividual political participation, including among workers’.79

Consequently, Scandinavian governments cannot trust that inter-est groups can rely on corporatist-friendly attitudes among theirmembers.

DISRUPTED CORPORATIST EXCHANGE INSCANDINAVIAN CORPORATISM

There have indeed been changes in the properties that arerequired of a trustworthy partner in corporatist exchange, as Table 3summarizes.

There is good reason to believe that changes in the prerequisitesof exchange have contributed to changes in the relationship betweengovernment and interest group in Scandinavia. The patterns revealedshow that the conditions for strategic calculations over whether toengage in corporatist exchange or not have changed. Althoughtiming differs and the factors involved are of different importance inthe three countries, the main pattern is the same.

In Denmark, corporatism declined during the 1980s for a numberof reasons: continuous decentralization to local government andincreasing Europeanization reduced government autonomy, and the

79 Goul Andersen, Et ganske levende demokrati, p. 205 (our translation).

Table 3Summary of Findings

Prerequisites fortrustworthy exchanges

Government Interest group

Mandate Declined No Change?(Europeanization) (Formally centralized)

Unity Declined somewhat Declined(Fragmentation) (Fragmentation)

Assets Declined Declined(Strained public budgets) (Electoral volatility)

Intention Declined Declined(Less social democracy) (Individualism)



opposition in the Folketing became more assertive. Cutbacks andretrenchment reforms in the 1980s implied weakened governmentcontrol over essential factors in corporatist exchange. At the sametime, fragmented unions, with declining member density, couldnot mobilize citizens to the same extent as they had previously. Evenwhen Social Democrat-led governments could have engaged in cor-poratist exchanges, they had little political incentive to privilegecorporatist actors. Interest organizations could not deliver what thestate desired in the exchange.

In Norway, corporatism also declined rapidly during the 1980s,although not because of increasing decentralization of authority. EUregulation also reduced government autonomy in Norway, but it wasnot as extensive as in Denmark. Rather, the government’s capacity tomake corporatist exchanges was weakened by the increasing asser-tiveness of the opposition in the Storting and by parliamentaryfragmentation. The economy deteriorated rapidly in the 1980s, butpublic budgets were never as strained as in Denmark and Sweden.Moreover, the centre-right governments from 1981 to 1986 wereideologically opposed to privileging corporatist actors in the policyprocess. The organizational landscape was changing, too. New typesof interest group were not able to discipline their members andcontrol politically relevant resources. The capacity of both govern-ment and interest organizations to make corporatist exchanges wasweakened.

In Sweden the story is somewhat different. Corporatism began todecline earlier, but not so abruptly and dramatically as in Norwayand Denmark. Still, compared to its heyday, corporatism is weaker inSweden too, according to most studies and indicators. Arguably, thegovernments of the 1970s and 1980s controlled fewer resources thatcould be used in exchange in corporatist bargains. Although uniondensity continued to increase until the mid-1990s, electoral volatilityhas increased consistently since the 1960s, and the Social Democratstronghold among organized labour has declined since the early1980s. Popular confidence in unions has also dwindled and newforms of organizational involvement have become more prevalent.Since the 1980s, organized interests increasingly do not controlthe resources that made them attractive partners in corporatistexchanges in the past.

It is important to emphasize that corporatist exchange developsover time within complicated institutional structures shaped by



former decisions and experiences. Ideological motives and strategicaction in the political arena should, of course, not be disregarded.In Norway and Denmark in the 1980s, the government, due toincreasing political and economic constraints, could not – and, forideological reasons, would not – make the exchanges that previoussocial democrat governments had. Decorporatization in Sweden was,to an important extent, driven by the employers’ confederation,which had close links to the ruling Conservative Party. However, inline with the exchange theory of corporatism, we have emphasizedthat growing fragmentation and parliamentary assertiveness make ithard for contemporary Scandinavian governments to meet disparatedemands from more diverse interest organizations. In order tohandle complicated parliamentary negotiations, it may be easier tokeep extra players out of the game,80 not least because organizedinterests and, notably, unions do not control the political assets thatoften made them inevitable parties to corporatist exchanges withgovernments in the past.

Changed costs and benefits associated with other means of poli-tical influence for interest organizations may, of course, influencethe exchange. These are omitted from this article, which treats theoutside options as constant. However, our guess is that an investi-gation of outside options would most likely leave our conclusionunchanged. For instance, growing lobbying has been an effect ofthe re-evaluation of corporatist exchange, rather than increasingpossibilities for lobbying.81

Thus, the core of corporatism is not ‘an alliance between the weakand the weakened’.82 Rather, corporatism presupposes actors thatcontrol the resources that are of interest to the exchanging partners.This means that, even if governments with strong ideological motivesto reinstate corporatism return to power, it will not be an easy task.

80 Nørgaard and Klemmensen, ‘Hvorfor stemmer oppositionen for regeringenslovforslag?’.

81 Rothstein and Bergström, Korporatismens fall; J. Johansson, SAF och den svenskamodellen. En studie av uppbrottet från förvaltningskorporatismen 1982–91, Uppsala, ActaUniversitatis Upsaliensis, 2000; Rommetvedt, ‘Norway’.

82 Baccaro and Simoni, ‘Policy Concertation in Europe’, p. 1342.



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