Differential Reproduction, Poverty and the dynamics of Inequality in Brazil (2010)

30 ETEORIA SOCIEDADE nº 17.2 - julho-dezembro de 2010

DIFFERENTIAL REPRODUCTION, POVERTY

AND THE DYNAMICS OF INEQUALITY IN BRAZIL

ABSTRACT

The goal of this article is to review and dis-

cuss the dynamics of poverty and income

inequality in Brazil emphasizing the role of

differential fertility, mortality and social mo-

!"!#$%&'(& )!*+#& *(,!(-& #.(&.!+#/*$&/)& !0(123-

lity in Brazil and discuss how the measures

and concepts of poverty and inequality have

been employed in the literature. Second, we

review the main socioeconomic mechanisms

generating an unequal distribution of inco-

me, paying special attention to the role of po-

pulation, and discuss how demography and

mobility are connected with inequality and

with each other.

Jeronimo Oliveira Muniz

PALAVRAS-CHAVE:

income inequality

demography

poverty

social mobility

Brazil

31DIFFERENTIAL REPRODUCTION, POVERTY AND THE DYNAMICS... - Jeronimo Oliveira Muniz

Brazil is a particularly interesting place to investigate the relationship be-

tween demography, poverty and income inequality because the country has gone

/,(*&+!40!5630#&7(8/4*39.!6&6.304(+&!0&3&+./*#&9(*!/7&/)&#!8(:& 2#&;(9#&*("3#!,("$&

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from 6.3 to 2.4, while life expectancy at birth increased from 53 to 67 years. These

!89*/,(8(0#+&-(*(&8/*(&+!40!5630#&)/*&#./+(&3#&#.(& /##/8&/)&#.(&!06/8(&7!+#*!-

bution than for the economic elites. During the same forty-year interval the Gini

!07(C&/+6!""3#(7& (#-((0&%DD&307&%?&EFGHIJKLGM&(#&3"&A@@@:&9%=NNO%&

P#&5*+#:&#.(+(&#*(07+&7(6(9#!,("$&+244(+#&#.3#&7(6"!0(+&!0&)(*#!"!#$&307&8/*-

#3"!#$&.3,(&3&-(3;&6/00(6#!/0&#/&!06/8(&7!+#*! 2#!/0&+!06(&#.(&(C9(6#(7&*(+2"#:&0(#&

of other factors, should be a reduction of income inequality as groups with differ-

ent incomes converge to similar levels of reproduction and become more homo-

geneous. The historical path of income inequality, however, points in the opposite

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reproductive convergence of the poorest and richest income classes affect inequal-

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The reason why declining fertility and mortality rates have not reduced

income inequality in Brazil is because income distributions are affected not only

by demographic trends, but also by structural forces changing the allocation of

income among distinct social classes (e.g. social programs, income taxes, envi-

*/08(0#3"&6.304(+O%&U.(& !06*(3+(&/)& !0)/*83"!#$& !0& #.(&<*3B!"!30& "3 /*&83*;(#:&

discrimination in remuneration, changes in assortative mating, educational ex-

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mortality on income inequality. As a result, it has been spuriously concluded that

demography does not matter or has had a very small impact on Brazilian poverty

and inequality (MEDEIROS, 2005, p. 42).

Conclusive arguments about the impact of demography on poverty and

inequality, however, must be able to disentangle the two components creating an

20(123"&7!+#*! 2#!/0&/)&!06/8(Q&#.(&5*+#&!+&#.(&3""/63#!/0&/)&*(+/2*6(+X&#.(&+(6/07&


is the allocation of people led by mobility and demographic dynamics. Demogra-

phy is only partially responsible for the movement of resources (e.g. income) be-

#-((0&6"3++(+&Y&3"#./24.&!#&83$&!0V2(06(&#.(&8/,(8(0#&/)&people (e.g. mobility)

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tion of income could change independently of changes in fertility and mortality,

and independently of changes in individual characteristics. This happens when

the distance between the rich and the poor narrows as a result, for instance, of

income transfer programs, progressive income taxes, bequests and remittances.

These processes are analogous to the mechanism of “boundary shifting” used in

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or in other words, mean income values, are what change across individuals and

social classes, not race.

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tirement, and all other life transitions associated with a change in individual traits

leading to a subsequent change in income status. This process is analogous to the

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The combination of rapid demographic transition, high income inequality,

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62++& #.(& +(93*3#(& !0V2(06(+& /)& 7(8/4*39.!6& 307&8/ !"!#$& *3#(+& /0& !06/8(& !0-

equality. Brazil is an interesting and extreme example combining high inequality,

a large proportion of poor people, and rapid demographic transition. Therefore,

it lends itself as an instructive case for this article and for any other context under

similar circumstances.

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shows empirical evidence regarding the dynamics of poverty and inequality in

Brazil. The third part discusses the mechanisms driving the dynamics of poverty

and inequality, emphasizing the role of population change, and the fourth section

concludes the article.


BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INCOME INEQUALITY IN BRAZIL

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inequality. In Brazil, assets and resources are concentrated in the hands of few and

this trend has persisted over time. At the macro level, structural forces such as in-

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and changes in dependency ratios have shifted the distribution of income. At the

8!6*/&"(,(":&"3 /*&83*;(#&7!+6*!8!03#!/0:&6.304(+&!0&)38!"$&+#*26#2*(&307&!06*(3+(7&

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changes in the income distribution of Brazil. Macro and micro factors, however,

are obviously connected and dependent on each other. In what follows, my goal

is not to isolate them or to establish their directional causality, but to analyze how

and when they were perceived as relevant for the distribution in income in Brazil

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to understand the mechanisms that have, or at least should have, altered income

inequality in the country. Much of what follows is based on the discussions offered

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Socioeconomic and Demographic Contexts After 1980

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participation of the service sector in the economy, which increased from 44 to 53

percent, and the increasing female participation in this same sector, which shifted

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occupational structure of the economy, the industrialization and expansion of the

economy increased the number of high status occupations and decreased the num-

ber of low status jobs, especially in agriculture. As a result, upward structural in-

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strategy based on minimum governmental intervention, privatization of public en-

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hand, opening the economy attracted foreign investment to modernize the economy

and improve the provision of services. On the other hand, it forced the modernization

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result of this change was the restructuring of production processes and the reorgani-

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the mechanisms of access to jobs and income. Average unemployment rates shifted

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percent in the largest metropolitan areas of the country during the same period.

Demography

The continued fertility and mortality declines were crucial to balance the adverse

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offset by the action of families to generate improvements in the distribution of family

income is uncertain, but there is reason to believe that if the demographic dividend was

not operating in the economy, the increase in poverty and income inequality would

have been more evident than it actually was (RIOS-NETO, 2005).

Income inequality

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52 percent during the same period. As a result, the Gini index of earnings shifted

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also became more concentrated in the Northeast region of Brazil during the period

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by the opening of the economy should have contributed to the increase of income in-

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their purchasing power and contributed to reduce the gap between those at the bottom

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Income inequality in Brazil could hardly be characterized as stable in the

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/)&,(*$&20(123"&+/6!(#!(+%&P#&#.(& (4!00!04&/)&#.(&A=st century small improvements

in income inequality could be detected, but by that time more than a third of the

population was still living in poverty with durable and institutionalized inequality.

This undesirable scenario of high poverty and inequality seems to be rooted to the

history of Brazil. The persistence of elevated inequality, despite multiple economic

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general conclusions about the trends and dynamics of inequality in the country.

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aW&#/&?N%N&9(*6(0#&E<PGI:&A@@W:&9%&WO%


THE DYNAMICS OF POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN BRAZIL: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

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of consensus about what variables would more accurately represent conditions of

need. In Brazil, the most common approaches to measure poverty use income and

6/0+289#!/0& 207"(+%&i(#:&6/0+(0+2+&.3+&0/#& ((0&*(36.(7&307&#.(&6/20#*$&+#!""&

"36;+&30&/)56!3"&9/,(*#$&"!0(%

J0&#.(&=>a@+&307&=>W@+:&#.(&0/*8&-3+&#/&2+(&#.(&8!0!828&-34(&3+&3& (06.-

83*;& )/*& 9/,(*#$& 307& !06/8(& 6"3++(+%& J06/8(& !0+2)56!(06$& -3+& 7(50(7& 3+& #-/&

minimum wage salaries per family or, alternatively, as half or one quarter of the

minimum wage per capita. The use of minimum wage is, however, contestable be-

632+(&!#&7/(+&0/#&*(V(6#&*(4!/03"&7!))(*(06(+&0/*&#.(&*(3"&6/+#&/)&8!0!828&"!,!04&

+#3073*7+%&J0&#.(&=>W@+&307&=>>@+:&6/0+289#!/0&+2*,($+&+#3*#(7&#/& (&6/0726#(7&

in the country and allowed new estimates based on food bundles and regional living

6/+#+%&U.(*(&-(*(&+!40!5630#&7!+6*(9306!(+& (#-((0&#.(&(+#!83#(+&+!06(&+9(6!3"!+#+&

7!7&0/#&34*((&/0&#.(&8!0!828&63"/*!6&!0#3;(&#.3#&+./2"7& (&6/0+!7(*(7&!0&#.(&63"-

62"3#!/0&/)&9/,(*#$&"!0(+&EI^eFP:&A@@@:&A@@NO%&

U3 "(&=&6/893*(+&<*3B!"!30&9/,(*#$&"!0(+&63"62"3#(7&366/*7!04&#/&7!))(*(0#&

8(#./7/"/4!(+&399"!(7&#/&#-/&*(9*(+(0#3#!,(&73#3&+(#+Q&#.(&=>>>&H3#!/03"&F/2+(-

./"7&M2*,($&EfHPgO&307&#.(&=>>?c=>>a&M2*,($&/)&]!,!04&M#3073*7+&Eff_O:&-.!6.&

)/""/-+&3& )/*83#&+!8!"3*& #/& #.(&P8(*!630&efM%&U.(&,3"2(+&3*(&(C9*(++(7& !0&=>>>&

Brazilian Reais per capita. The table shows an evident discrepancy between poverty

lines, even when the region of reference and the data set is the same. This is the case

-.(0&-(&6/893*(&#.(&(+#!83#(+& $&<3**/+:&S(07/0j3&307&M30#/+&E=>>>:&9%&AAdO&

307& $&b(**(!*3:&]30Z/2-&307&H(*!&EA@@@:&9%=@O&)/*&#.(&8(#*/9/"!#30&*(4!/0&/)&Mk/&

f32"/%&U.!+&"36;&/)&6/0+(0+2+&+./-+&#.3#&#.(&7!+62++!/0&3 /2#&-.3#&6/0+#!#2#(+&3&

relevant poverty line is still open.

Table 1

Poverty lines in Brazil according to different methodologies


M/2*6(Q&U*30+"3#(7&)*/8&S(7(!*/+&EA@@D:&9%&==DO

Using three standard poverty measures2:&b(**(!*3:&](!#(&307&]!#6.5("7&EA@@?Q&

=@O&(+#!83#(7&#.(&"(,("+&/)&9/,(*#$&366/*7!04&#/&30&P78!0!+#*3#!,(&f/,(*#$&]!0(&/)&

Il=@@&EDD%NLMg&/0&^6#/ (*&A@@aO%&b!42*(&=&+./-+&#.3#& (#-((0&=>W=&307&A@@d:&

9/,(*#$&-3+&83*;(7& $&29+&307&7/-0+:&-.!6.&"3*4("$&*(V(6#(7&#.(&836*/(6/0/8!6&

instability of the period. The decline in poverty incidence (e.g. headcount) from .3

to .2 was of 25 percent. The volatility of poverty was more pronounced during the

=>W@+:&-!#.&3&+.3*9&!06*(3+(&72*!04&#.(&=>W=cWN&(6/0/8!6&*(6(++!/0+&307&3&+2 +#30-

#!3"&7(6"!0(&72*!04&#.(&*(6/,(*$&#.3#&)/""/-(7& (#-((0&=>Wd&307&=>W?%&f/,(*#$&-3+&3#&

!#+&8!0!828&!0&=>W?&307&#.(0&!06*(3+(7&343!0&20#!"&=>WW:&3)#(*&-.!6.&9/!0#&!#&+#3*#(7&

#/&7(6"!0(&!0&3&+#(37$&)3+.!/0&20#!"&A@@d%&U.(&3 *29#&)3""& !0&=>W?&*(+2"#+&)*/8&#.(&

=>W?&e*2B37/&+#3 !"!B3#!/0&9"30%&g2*!04&#.3#&$(3*:&#.(&hgf&4*(-& $&a%D&9(*6(0#&307&

#.(&!072+#*!3"&*(3"&-34(+&*/+(& $&A@&9(*6(0#&EbGIIGJIP&(#&3"&A@@?Q&=@c==O%

Figure1

U.*((&8(3+2*(+&/)&9/,(*#$&!0&<*3B!":&=>W=cA@@d

H/#(Q&U.(&9/,(*#$&"!0(&!+&+(#&#/&Il=@@&9(*&9(*+/0&9(*&8/0#.:&!0&M(9#(8 (*&A@@d&,3"2(+%M/2*6(Q&b(**(!*3&(#&3"&EA@@?:&9%&>O

2&U.(&#.*((&9/,(*#$&!07!63#/*+&-(*(&+244(+#(7& $&b/+#(*:&h*((*&307&U./* (6;(&E=>WdO%&They became popular because of their conceptual and operational simplicity and be-

cause of their decomposability.


The measurement of income inequality is also controversial. This is espe-

cially true because how it is measured affects how its evolution is perceived over

time. Once there is agreement that income is a relevant indicator of inequality, the

0(C#&12(+#!/0&!+&-.3#&#$9(&/)&!06/8(&+./2"7& (&6/0+!7(*(7Q&3)#(*&#3C(+:& ()/*(&#3C-

es, income from labor, income from all sources or income from rent, interest and

9*/5#R&U.(&/#.(*&7(6!+!/0&*(43*7+&#.(&344*(43#!/0&"(,("&/)&!06/8(Q&./2+(./"7:&)38-

!"$:&!07!,!723"&/*&9(*&639!#3&!06/8(R&G36.&7(6!+!/0&$!("7+&7!))(*(0#&*(+2"#+%&U.(*(-

fore, they must be made a priori and with an analytical purpose in mind3%&'.(0&#.(&

analytical focus is on individual wellbeing, it is more appropriate to consider the

level of family per capita income since the members of the same family in general

share their total incomes among family members. The debate that follows refers to

indexes of income inequality calculated according to household income per capita.

The most common and straightforward measure of inequality is the Gini

index. It is easy to interpret, compare and relatively easy to calculate. These char-

36#(*!+#!6+&Z2+#!)$&!#+&2+(&307&83;(&!#&3& */37"$&366(9#(7&8(3+2*(%&J#&!+&!89/*#30#:&

however, to be aware of the analytical implications that the use of one or another

index might have on the establishment of general conclusions. One particular char-

acteristic that has called the attention of specialists in Brazil is the considerable

+#3 !"!#$&/)&#.(&h!0!&!07(C&+!06(&=>W@%&J0&=>W=:&#.(&h!0!&-3+&(123"&#/&%D>%&J#&*(36.(7&

!#+&9(3;&!0&=>W>&E%?dO&307&*(83!0(7&+#3 "(&20#!"&=>>>:&/+6!""3#!04&3*/207&%?@&E<PI-

I^M:&FGHIJKLGM&307&SGHg^HmP&A@@@Q&NWcN>O%&H(,(*#.("(++:& #.!+&3993*(0#&

stability could be a consequence of the scale used to measure income inequality

*3#.(*&#.30&3&*(V(6#!/0&/)&#.(&*(3"&6.304(+&/662**!04&!0&#.(&7!+#*! 2#!/0&/)&(3*0-

ings during the period. Although the Gini index has a standard that is similar to

other inequality measures, it has been suggested that it underestimates the inten-

sity of the variation in income inequality because of its insensitivity to changes in

#.(&299(*&307&"/-(*&#3!"+&/)&#.(&!06/8(&7!+#*! 2#!/0&EMJ]_P:&A@@N:&9%&ddNO%&U.!+&

observation is more easily perceived by comparing the ratio between the fractions

/)&!06/8(&.("7& $&#.(&*!6.(+#&307&9//*(+#&A@&9(*6(0#&/)&#.(&9/92"3#!/0%&J0&=>W=:&#.!+&

ratio was equal to 24, meaning that the 20 percent of the population at the top of

the distribution had a share of the total income 24 times larger than the share of 20

9(*6(0#&/)&#.(&9/92"3#!/0&3#&#.(& /##/8%&U.!+&542*(&!06*(3+(7&#/&Nd%d&#!8(+&!0&=>W>:&

which represents an increase of 43 percent. The Gini also increased during this

9(*!/7:& 2#&/0"$& $&W%D&9(*6(0#%&J0&=>>>:&#.!+&*3#!/&7(6*(3+(7& $&A=&9(*6(0#:&-.!"(&

3 Using income per capita as a reference measure increases the upper bound for ine-

quality since it depresses the income of the poor because of their larger family sizes and

lower total incomes.


#.(&h!0!&7(6*(3+(7& $&/0"$&?&9(*6(0#&E<PII^M:&FGHIJKLGM&307&SGHg^HmP:&

A@@@:&9%&NWcN>X&MJ]_P&A@@N:&9%&ddNO%&<(+!7(+&!#+&*("3#!,(&!0+(0+!#!,!#$&#/&,3*!3#!/0+&

in the extremes of the income distribution, the Gini index is also notorious for be-

ing hard to decompose. There are ways of decomposing the Gini into subgroups,

but the component terms of total inequality are not intuitively or mathematically

399(3"!04&E]JUeFbJG]g:&=>>>O%

P&9/92"3*&3"#(*03#!,(&#/&#.(&h!0!&!+&#.(&U.(!"&!07(C%&U.!+&8(3+2*(&+3#!+5(+&

the desirable axioms of good inequality measures4&307&*(V(6#+&8/*(&37(123#("$&#.(&

dynamics of income distribution than the Gini index. The Theil index shifted from

%?>&!0&=>W=&#/&%W>&!0&=>W>&E30&!06*(3+(&/)&A>&9(*6(0#O%&J0&=>>>&!#&7(6"!0(7&#/&%aA&E3&

7(6"!0(&/)&=>&9(*6(0#O%&U.!+&7$038!6+&!+&8/*(&6/893#! "(&-!#.&#.(&,3*!3#!/0&!0&#.(&

ratio between the richest and poorest described above than the temporal evolution

/)&#.(&h!0!&!07(C%&U.(&3993*(0#&+#3 !"!#$&/)&#.(&h!0!&!07(C& (#-((0&=>W@&307&A@@@&

!+:&0(,(*#.("(++:&826.&8/*(&3&9*/ "(8&/)&+63"(&#.30&8(3+2*(8(0#%&'.(0&h!0!&307&

Theil indexes are put next to each other with adjusted scales, they provide the same

6/06"2+!/0+&3 /2#&#.(&7$038!6+&/)&!0(123"!#$Q&3&+#(37$&!06*(3+(&)*/8&=>W=&#/&=>W>X&

3&.!4.&,/"3#!"(&9(3;&9(*!/7& (#-((0&=>W>&307&=>>NX&307&3&+#(37$&7(6"!0(&)*/8&=>>N&

#/&A@@d%&U.!+&#*(07&!+&+!8!"3*&-.(0&-(&"//;&3#&#.(&*3#!/&/)& !06/8(+& (#-((0&#.(&

richest and poorest shares of the population.

Figure 2 depicts trends in income inequality by comparing the Gini to two

variations of the Theil index. The indexes provide similar results in terms of vari-

ation of inequality once the scale of the Gini is adjusted. It is worth noticing that

!)&#.(&+63"(&/)&#.(&4*39.&-3+&6/0+#*3!0(7&#/&,3*$& (#-((0&@&307&=&E(%4%&8!0!828&

and maximum inequality boundaries of the Gini index) the evolution of inequal-

ity during the period would be perceived as much more stable and constant than

in the graph below. Figure 2 supports the conclusion that the temporal evolution

/)&!0(123"!#$&!0&<*3B!"&+!06(&=>W@&630&.3*7"$& (&6.3*36#(*!B(7&3+&+#3 "(:&*(43*7"(++&

of the indicator.

4&J0(123"!#$&8(3+2*(+&+./2"7&8((#&5,(&;($&3C!/8+Q&=O&f!4/2cg3"#/0&U*30+)(*&f*!06!-

9"(Q&*(12!*(+&30&!0(123"!#$&!07(C&#/&!06*(3+(&E/*&3#&"(3+#&0/#&)3""O&-.(0&!06/8(&!+&#*30+-

)(**(7& )*/8&9//*& #/& *!6.X&AO& J06/8(&M63"(& J07(9(07(06(Q& !0(123"!#$&8(3+2*(+&82+#&

be invariant to uniform proportional changes (e.g. when changing currency unit); 3)

f*!06!9"(&/)&f/92"3#!/0Q&8(*4!04&#/&!7(0#!63"&9/92"3#!/0+&+./2"7&0/#&3))(6#&!0(123"!#$X&

dO&P0/0$8!#$Q&!0(123"!#$&82+#& (&!07(9(07(0#&/)&!07!,!723"&6.3*36#(*!+#!6+&/#.(*&#.30&

#.(!*&!06/8(X&307&DO&g(6/89/+3 !"!#$Q&/,(*3""&!0(123"!#$&82+#& (&6/0+!+#(0#"$&*("3#(7&

#/&6/0+#!#2(0#&93*#+&/)&#.(&7!+#*! 2#!/0:&+26.&3+&+2 9/92"3#!/0+&7(50(7&366/*7!04&#/&

+9(6!56&6.3*36#(*!+#!6+&E(%4%&*36(:&+(C:&34(O&Ee^'G]]:&=>>DO%


Figure 2

U.*((&8(3+2*(+&/)&!06/8(&!0(123"!#$&!0&<*3B!":&=>W=cA@@d

M/2*6(Q&b(**(!*3&(#&3"&EA@@?:&9%&aO

The Gini index is found to satisfy the basic criteria of scale invariance, and

the principle of transfers, but it does not possess any special advantage over the

U.(!"& !07(C&EP]]JM^H:&=>aW:&9%&WaaO%&J0&#.(&0(C#&+(6#!/0&J&7!+62++&#.(&)/*6(+&3)-

fecting poverty and inequality, paying special attention to the role of demography,

mobility and their interrelationship.

MECHANISMS DRIVING THE DYNAMICS OF POVERTY AND INEQUALITY

This section describes the mechanisms behind poverty and inequality. It elabo-

rates on how demography and “other forces” generate changes in the size of social

classes and on how they affect the distribution of income. I begin with “the other

forces,” before analyzing the role of demography.

Inherited and ascribed characteristics

U.(*(&3*(&5,(&)/*6(+&4(0(*3#!04&30&20(123"&7!+#*! 2#!/0&/)&*(+/2*6(+&EbGIIGJIP:&

A@@@:&9%&=NDO%&J0&#.(&5*+#&4*/29&3*(&#.(&7!))(*(06(+& (#-((0&!07!,!723"+&-!#.&*(-

spect to their inherited and ascribed characteristics. This includes differences in

*36(:&+(C:& (32#$:& !0#(""!4(06(:&.(3"#.:&93*(0#+T&-(3"#.&307&*(4!/0&/)& !*#.%&U.(+(&

characteristics are perceived as soon as one is born and do not depend on indi-

,!723"&())/*#+&/*&/0&#.(&!0#(*36#!/0&-!#.&/#.(*&83*;(#&)/*6(+%&J0!#!3"&6.3*36#(*!+#!6+&

Y&!0!#!3"&-(3"#.&)/*&!0+#306(&Y&3*(&4!,(0%&U.($&3*(&!0.(*!#(7&3#& !*#.&307&!0V2(06(&


/0(T+&6.306(+&!0&"!)(%&U.!+&!7(3&+#(8+&)*/8&#.(&6"3++&303"$+!+&#*37!#!/0&366/*7!04&#/&

which individuals are born into distinct social classes, membership of which has

clear consequences for life-chances, values, norms, life-styles, and patterns of as-

+/6!3#!/0%&J0&#.!+&"!0(&/)&3*428(0#:&./-(,(*:&!#&!+&!89/*#30#&#/&36;0/-"(74(&#.3#&!#&

may not be the characteristic itself (e.g. sex or race) that delimits life chances, but

rather the prevailing social norms and cultural acceptance of certain traits. It is the

interaction between culture and individual characteristics that constrain or enables

7!))(*(0#&"!)(&#*3Z(6#/*!(+&#.*/24.&#.(&7(50!#!/0&/)&+/6!3"&*/"(+%&I36(:& (32#$:&4(07(*&

and even intelligence are not determinants of earnings by themselves; they are as-

cribed to individuals and depend on the perceptions and reactions of environmen-

tal circumstances to these characteristics to exert their direct and indirect effects

307&7(50(&./-&!06/8(&!+&4(0(*3#(7%&F(*!#3 "(&#*3!#+&3*(&+(0+!#!,(&#/&(0,!*/08(0#+%

Mobility rates by race, for instance, differ dramatically. In the United States

#.(*(&!+&(,!7(06(&+244(+#!04&#.3#& "36;+& /*0&#/&#.(& /##/8&123*#!"(&3##3!0&#.(&#/9&

123*#!"(&3#&/0(&.3")&#.(&*3#(&/)&-.!#(+&EFGIU`:&A@@AO%&J0&<*3B!":&#.(&8/ !"!#$&307&

(6/0/8!6&+#3#2+&/)& "36;+&!+&3"+/&826.&"/-(*&#.30&#.(&8/ !"!#$&/)&-.!#(+%&L0)/*-

#203#("$:&!#&!+&.3*7&#/&7(50(&./-&826.&8/ !"!#$& "36;+&)36(&!0&<*3B!"& (632+(&#.(&

(,!7(06(&!+&6/0)/207(7& $&#.(&())(6#+&/)&*36!3"&*(6"3++!563#!/0&3+&9(/9"(&-!#.&73*;(*&

+;!0&8/,(&29-3*7+&!0&#.(&+/6!3"&+63"(&EMeF'PIU`SPH:&A@@aO%&i(#:&#.(*(&!+&*!4-

/*/2+&(,!7(06(&6/05*8!04&#.3#& "36;+&.3,(&"/-(*&6.306(+&#.30&-.!#(+&/*&*(83!0-

!04&3#&299(*&6"3++(+&Ee^MUP&IJ<GJI^:&A@@?:&9%WDDO%&e/+#3&I! (!*/&3"+/&+244(+#(7&

that opportunities of social mobility are affected by race only at the upper strata.

F!+&6/06"2+!/0& !+& !89/*#30#& (632+(& !#& !07!63#(+& #.3#& #.(& !8936#&/)& *36(& !+&8/*(&

eminent at the top of the social hierarchy rather than at the bottom, where socio-

economic differences are more relevant than race.

J0&30/#.(*& +#27$:&b(**(!*3& (#& 3"& EA@@?:&9%=DO& 6/06"27(7& #.3#& *36!3"&7!))(*-

(06(+&(C9"3!0& (#-((0&==&307&=N&9(*6(0#&/)&#/#3"&!0(123"!#$:&307&399(3*&+#3 "(& (-

#-((0&=>>N&307&A@@d%&̂ #.(*&,3*!3 "(+&/)&!89/*#306(&!0&#.(!*&303"$+!+&-(*(&*(4!/03"&

7!))(*(06(+:&-.!6.&366/20#(7&)/*& (#-((0&a&307&=N&9(*6(0#&/)&#/#3"&!0(123"!#$%&g!)-

)(*(06(+& (#-((0&2* 30& 307& *2*3"& 3*(3+& 366/20#(7& )/*& D& 307& =a&9(*6(0#& /)& #/#3"&

inequality in their decomposition exercise, but they also report that these regional

variables have lost importance over time as a consequence of the convergence of

inequality across states and regions in Brazil. Age, sex and family structure did not

have explanatory power in their analysis.

Acquired and learned characteristics

The second force creating poverty and inequality is attributable to acquired indi-

vidual differences shifting individual productivities such as education, professional


(C9(*!(06(:&34(:&(8/#!/03"& !0#(""!4(06(:&8/*3"&,3"2(+&307&+/6!3"&0(#-/*;+%&U.(+(&

characteristics are acquired over the life cycle, but are obviously associated with

putatively innate individualities. The most important of these productive charac-

teristics is education. Studies have reported that differences in education explain

between one third and one half of the total inequality in Brazil, even after control-

ling for race, sex, region, experience and occupation (BARROS and MENDONÇA,

=>>DX&bGIIGJIP&(#&3"&A@@?:&9%&=DO%

Differences in education have also been associated to differences in ef-

56!(06$%&P07&)*/8&3&836*/&9(*+9(6#!,(:&!#&.3+& ((0&+244(+#(7&#.3#&()56!(06$&7!)-

ferences explain almost all variations between countries in income levels. In a

*(6(0#& //;&!0,(+#!43#!04&-.$&+/8(&+/6!(#!(+&3*(&8/*(&7(,("/9(7&307&8/*(&(123"&

#.30&/#.(*+:&h*(4/*$&e"3*;&6/06"27(7&#.3#&[#.(&6*26!3"&,3*!3 "(&!0&(C9"3!0!04&#.(&

+266(++&/*& )3!"2*(&/)& (6/0/8!(+& !0& #.(&$(3*+& =W@@cA@@@& !+& #.(&()56!(06$&/)& #.(&

9*/726#!/0&9*/6(++&-!#.!0&#.(&(6/0/8$\&Ee]PIn:&A@@a:&9%&ND=O%&J#&!+&*(3+/03 "(&

#/&(C9(6#&#.3#&93*#&/)&#.(+(&7!))(*(06(+&!0&()56!(06$:&/*&9*/726#!,!#$:&-/2"7&+#(8&

from differences in education.

I38/+&307&_!(!*3& EA@@@:&9%& =?dO&6/05*8(7&#.(&+!40!56306(&/)&(7263#!/0&

in the generation of inequality. They reported that education was responsible for

3 /2#&N@&9(*6(0#&/)&!06/8(&!0(123"!#$&/,(*&#.(&=>>@+&307&#.3#&!#+&6/0#*! 2#!/0&-3+&

higher than the contribution of other socioeconomic characteristics. The role of

education in explaining inequalities is also higher in Brazil than in the U.S. and in

/#.(*&]3#!0&P8(*!630&6/20#*!(+:&3"#./24.&#.!+&6/2"7&3"+/& (&#.(&*(+2"#&/)&3&*("3#!,("$&

larger educational gap. For instance, educational inequality in Brazil is about six

#!8(+&.!4.(*&#.30&!0&#.(&L0!#(7&M#3#(+&E]PS&307&]G_JHM^H:&9%=>>@O%

These studies did not examine, however, how much of the differences in

(7263#!/0&3*(&72(& #/& !003#(&307&3612!*(7& )36#/*+%&S/*(& "!;("$:& !0.(*!#(7&307&36-

12!*(7& #*3!#+& !0V2(06(& )2#2*(& !0(123"!#$& $& 7(#(*8!0!04& +/6!3"&8/ !"!#$& 307& *(-

production. In an effort to disentangle the effect of inherited and acquired char-

acteristics, Bourguignon, Ferreira and Menendez (2003) tried to disentangle the

!89/*#306(&/)&#-/&+(#+&/)&!07!,!723"&)36#/*+Q&6!*628+#306(&307&())/*#%&G))/*#&630& (&

understood as intergenerational mobility due to acquired characteristics, while cir-

628+#306(&-/2"7& (&*(9*(+(0#(7& $&*36(:&*(4!/0&/)&/*!4!0:&93*(0#+T&(7263#!/0:&+(C:&

34(&307&./2+(./"7&6/89/+!#!/0%&U.($&2+(7&73#3&)*/8&=>>?&fHPg&307&6/0#*/""(7&

$&$(3*&/)& !*#.&#/&!0,(+#!43#(&./-&#.(&!0V2(06(&/)&93*(0#+&307&+/6!3"& 36;4*/207&

(i.e. circumstances) has changed across cohorts and whether effort account for an

!06*(3+!04&/*&7(6*(3+!04&9*/9/*#!/0&/)&#/#3"&!0(123"!#$%&P8/04&/#.(*&507!04+&#.($&

highlighted that parental education plays the largest role in determining inequal-

!#$:&366/20#!04&)/*&ND&#/&da&9(*6(0#&/)&#.(&,3*!306(&!0&6.!"7*(0T+&+6.//"!04:&-.!"(&


())/*#&366/20#(7& )/*& =A&9(*6(0#34(&9/!0#+&/)& #.(&h!0!:& 6/0+!7(*!04&./2+(./"7& !0-

6/8(&9(*&639!#3%&J0&+28:&#.($&6/05*8(7&#.3#&#.(&7!+#*! 2#!/0&/)&#*3!#+:& !0.(*!#(7&

and acquired, is an important determinant of inequality. This distribution of traits

!+&[EoO&*(+9/0+! "(&)/*&3&;!07&/)&+/6!3"&7!+#*! 2#!/0&/)&8(0&-!#.!0&30$&4!,(0&+/6!(#$\&

EM^I^nJH:&=>?d:&9%&A=?O%&

Interaction between individual characteristics and the labor market

The third force generating inequality has to do with the mechanisms through

which individual characteristics are transformed into income. The main channel

/)& #*30+)/*83#!/0&/)& #.(+(&6.3*36#(*!+#!6+& !+& #.(& "3 /*&83*;(#:&-.(*(& !07!,!723"+&

3*(&*(820(*3#(7&)/*&#.(!*&-/*;&307&())/*#%&U.(&"3 /*&83*;(#&#*30+)/*8+&!07!,!723"&

differences into differences in income to create inequality. It is through the interac-

#!/0& (#-((0&(89"/$((+T&6.3*36#(*!+#!6+&307&(89"/$(*+T&,3"/*!B3#!/0&#.3#& !06/8(&

7!))(*(06(+& 3*!+(%& U-/&7!))(*(0#& 6.300("+& #$9!)$& #.!+& !0#(*36#!/0%&U.(&5*+#& !+& 7!+-

crimination. Discrimination occurs when individuals have identical occupations

and productivity, but their remuneration is distinct because of undervalued physi-

cal characteristics or social roles. The most common characteristics associated with

7!+6*!8!03#!/0&3*(&4(07(*&307&*36(%&G,!7(06(&+244(+#+&#.3#&#.(&(3*0!04+&/)& "36;+&

and browns (pardos) are less than half of those paid to whites. In the United States,

#.(&3,(*34(&!06/8(&/)& "36;&8(0&-3+&d@&9(*6(0#&"/-(*&#.30&#.(&3,(*34(&!06/8(&

/)&-.!#(&8(0&!0&#.(&=>?@+%&J0&<*3B!":&#.!+&9*/9/*#!/0&-3+&,(*$&+!8!"3*Q& "36;&307&

brown men were paid 40 to 45 less than whites and this proportion has remained

stable for the last 30 years. After controlling for occupational and productive char-

36#(*!+#!6+:&./-(,(*:&#.(&-34(&439& (#-((0& "36;+&307&-.!#(+&7(6*(3+(7&#/&a&9(*-

6(0#&!0&=>?@%&J0&=>W@&#.!+&439&!06*(3+(7&307&#.(&3,(*34(&-34(&/)& "36;+& (638(&=d&

percent lower than the average wage of white men, but the educational expansion

has offset increased discrimination by reducing the educational gap by more than

#-/&$(3*+&/)&+6.//"!04& (#-((0&-.!#(+&307& "36;+&E'/*"7&<30;&A@@dQ&D>O%&U.(&*/"(&

of racial discrimination in creating inequalities is overall very small. If racial dis-

crimination was eliminated, wage inequalities would decrease by only four percent

E<PII^M&307&SGHg^HmP:&=>>D:&9%&NWO%&

g!+6*!8!03#!/0&!+&(,(0&-/*+(&)/*&-/8(0%&J0&#.(&(07&/)&#.(&=>>@+:&-/8(0T+&

earnings were 70 percent of the value paid to men with the same productive charac-

#(*!+#!6+&EMJ]_P:&A@@N:&9%&dDDO%&P66/*7!04&#/&<3**/+&307&S(07/0j3&E=>>DQ&NaO:&./--

ever, this wage gap cannot be explained by gender discrimination. If differentials by

4(07(*&-(*(&)2""$&("!8!03#(7:&-34(&!0(123"!#$&!0&<*3B!"&-/2"7&*(726(& $&/0"$&5,(&9(*-

cent. The small importance of differences in gender and race in determining income

!0(123"!#$&!+&3"+/&6/05*8(7&!0&8/*(&*(6(0#&+#27!(+&EIPS^M&307&_JGJIP:&A@@@O%


The second most important channel creating inequalities in the labor mar-

;(#&E3)#(*&(7263#!/0O&!+&+(48(0#3#!/0%&U.(&"3 /*&83*;(#&!+&63""(7&+(48(0#(7&-.(0&

(123""$& 9*/726#!,(& -/*;(*+& *(6(!,(& 7!))(*(0#& 93$8(0#+& )/*& -/*;!04& !0& 7!))(*(0#&

/66293#!/0+:&*(4!/0+&/*&+(6#/*+%&'34(&7(#(*8!03#!/0&7!))(*+&)*/8&4*/29&#/&4*/29&

(632+(&/)&7!))(*(06(+&!0&-/*;&9/+#+:&0/#&!0&9*/726#!,!#$%&U.!+&!+&#.(&63+(:&)/*&!0-

stance, between individuals who have the same amount of human capital and the

+38(&9*/)(++!/0:& 2#&-./&-/*;&!0&7!))(*(0#&*(4!/0+%&U.!+&#.(/*$&.("9+&#/&(C9"3!0:&

)/*&!0+#306(:&-.$&9*/)(++/*+T&+3"3*!(+&,3*$&-!7("$& $&5("7&307&4(/4*39.!6&"/63#!/0%

<3**/+&307&S(07/0j3&E=>>D:&9%ADO&(+#!83#(7&#.3#&+(48(0#3#!/0& $&+(6#/*&/)&

36#!,!#$&!+&*(+9/0+! "(&)/*&3#&8/+#&=D&9(*6(0#&/)&-34(&!0(123"!#!(+&!0&<*3B!"%&U.($&3"+/&

discussed the contribution of regional segmentation and showed that if regional dif-

ferences were eliminated, wage inequality would be reduced by between 2 and 5 per-

6(0#&EMP_Gg^bb:&=>>@O%&U.(+(&*(+2"#+&3*(&6/05*8(7& $&I38/+&307&_!(!*3&EA@@@O%

Differences in access to resources

U.(&)/2*#.&4*/29&/)&)/*6(+&4(0(*3#!04&!0(123"!#$&*()(*+&#/&#.(&7!))(*(06(+&!0&366(++&#/&5-

0306!3"&307&"307&83*;(#+%&<(632+(&/)&!0)/*83#!/0&3+$88(#*$&307&/#.(*&83*;(#&)3!"2*(+:&

not all individuals have equal access to land, loans, insurance and credit. Because of im-

9(*)(6#!/0+&!0&366(++&#/&50306!3"&*(+/2*6(+:&#.(&!0+(*#!/0&/)&!07!,!723"+&!0&7!))(*(0#&/6-

cupations is affected, and so are the generation of income and, therefore, its distribution.

U.(& "307&7!+#*! 2#!/0& !0&<*3B!"&(C(89"!5(+&./-&20(123"&307& !0()56!(0#& !+&

the access to rural properties in the country. Only one-third of the total area avail-

able has been used by family-based farms, which employ 77 percent of the rural

"3 /*&)/*6(%&U.(&h!0!&!07(C&)/*&"307&7!+#*! 2#!/0&!0&<*3B!"&-3+&%W?&!0&=>>D:&-.!6.&

!+&+!8!"3*&!0&/#.(*&]3#!0&P8(*!630&6/20#*!(+%&J0&#.(&L0!#(7&M#3#(+&#.!+&!07(C&!+&%aD&

E'/*"7&<30;&A@@dQ&ANO%&J0&/*7(*&#/&!89*/,(&#.(&7!+#*! 2#!/0&307&()56!(06$&/)&"307&

2+(:&!#&.3+& ((0&+244(+#(7&#.3#&83*;(#&!89(*)(6#!/0+&!0&"307c"(3+!04&6/0#*36#+&307&

taxation must be eliminated. Policies should prioritize and target reduction of inef-

56!(06!(+& $&E3O&*()/*82"3#!04&#.(&"307&#3C&EImposto Territorial Rural) to create

disincentives for the non-agricultural use of land; (b) expanding the access to land

,!3&!89*/,(8(0#+&!0&#.(&"307&*(0#3"&83*;(#X&307&E6O&6*(3#!04&!06(0#!,(+&)/*&6//9-

erative formation, strengthening small farms, improving their competitiveness and

)36!"!#3#!04&#.(&!89"(8(0#3#!/0&/)&4*/29&"!3 !"!#$&9*/4*38+&+26.&3+&#.(&]307&<30;&

307&8!6*/"(07!04&E'^I]g&<PHn:&A@@d:&9%d>O%&

Family structure and demographic dynamics

The fifth and crucial force is demography and includes two sub-groups of fac-

#/*+Q& =O& )38!"$& )/*83#!/0:& -.!6.& (8 *36(+& 3++/*#3#!,(& 83#6.!04p83#!04:& 6/-


habitation, marriage and divorce; and 2) reproduction, which translates into

fertility, mortality and migration. I will first review the relevant literature on

sociology of the family and discuss why changing family arrangements might

impact poverty and inequality in Brazil. The role of reproduction is examined in

more detail in the next section.

Family formation is important because it dictates the division of individ-

23"&*(+/2*6(+&307&#.(&#*30+8!++!/0&/)&+/6!3"&307&4(0(#!6&#*3!#+&E(%4%&n3"8!Z0&=>>=X&

Schwartz and Mare 2005). In societies where the formation of marriages happens

between partners with similar characteristics (e.g. same education, income, occu-

pation, religion and race), the openness of social classes will be lower than in ex-

ogamous settings where the selection of partners from different classes, castes or

groups is the norm. Poverty alleviation and income equality are higher in contexts

-.(*(&#.(&+/6!3"&8!C!04&/)&!07!,!723"+&!0&#.(&83**!34(&83*;(#&!+&V(C! "(&307&3""/-+&

a more homogeneous distribution of resources than when individuals marry as-

sortatively. In a society where the rich marry the rich and the poor marry among

themselves, the distribution of income will be worse than in a society where the

rich marry the poor. Exogamous family formations have, therefore, a distributive

)206#!/0&/)&(89!*!63""$&6/05*8(7&!89/*#306(%&U*(07+&!0&3++/*#3#!,(&83#!04&!0&#.(&

L0!#(7&M#3#(+&ES3*(&=>>=X&K!30&307&]!6.#(*&A@@aX&M6.-3*#B&307&S3*(&A@@DO:&<*3-

B!"&EM!",3&A@@NO:&M/2#.&n/*(3&Ef3*;&307&M8!#.&A@@DO&307&!0&/#.(*&P+!30&6/20#*!(+&

EI3$8/&307&q!(&A@@@X&M8!#+:&L"#((&307&]388(*+&=>>W:&A@@@O&.3,(& ((0&*(9/*#(7&

in major sociology and demography journals. In the United States, homogamy

has increased, and the perverse consequence of this trend is that inequality has

also increased because assortative mating prevents upward mobility via marriage

Eh/"7+#(!0&307&n(00($&A@@=O%&P+&3&*(+2"#:&83**!34(&.3+& (6/8(&3&9(*9(#23#/*&/)&

!0(123"!#$&307&"(++&!89/*#30#&!0&7(#(*8!0!04&/0(T+&+/6!3"&8/ !"!#$%&J0&#.(&63+(&/)&

Brazil, trends in marital selectivity by education have been stable in the last 20

years, so the impact of assortative mating on income inequality is probably insig-

0!5630#&EMJ]_P:&A@@N:&9%&NaaO%

U.(&!0V2(06(&/)&)38!"$&+#*26#2*(&/0&6.!"7*(0T+&+/6!3"&/2#6/8(+&.3+&3"+/&*(-

ceived considerable attention among family sociologists. The impact of divorce, co-

.3 !#3#!/0:&307&+!04"(&93*(0#.//7&/0&6.!"7*(0T+&-(""& (!04:&+/6!3"&8/ !"!#$:&)38!"$&

!0(123"!#$&307&9/,(*#$&.3+& ((0&,3+#"$&7!+62++(7%&S2+!6;&307&S3*(&EA@@dO&3+;(7&

to what extent family structure has widened the socioeconomic gap between single

and two parent families. Their main conclusion is that the association between pov-

erty and family structure has declined over the last 30 years.

Other relevant studies have investigated the consequences of the second

7(8/4*39.!6&#*30+!#!/0&#/&6.!"7*(0T+&-(""& (!04%&S6]303.30&EA@@dO&6"3!8(7&#.3#&


7("3$(7&6.!"7 (3*!04&307&#.(&.!4.(*&93*#!6!93#!/0&/)&-/8(0&!0&#.(& "3 /*&83*;(#&

has contributed to increase the amount of resources in the family, while divorce

307&0/083*!#3"&6.!"7 (3*!04&.3,(&4(0(*3#(7&"/++(+&)/*&6.!"7*(0&307&-/8(0%&S6]3-

03.30&9/!0#+&/2#&#.3#&-/8(0&-!#.&8/*(&*(+/2*6(+&3*(&)/""/-!04&#.(&5*+#&#*3Z(6#/*$&

while women with fewest opportunities and resources are following the second tra-

jectory (divorce and nonmarital childbearing), which has contributed to increase

the inequality gap between families from different social classes and increased

7!+93*!#!(+& !0& 6.!"7*(0T+& *(+/2*6(+& 307& )2#2*(& +/6!3"&8/ !"!#$& EeFGI]JH:& =>>?O%&

The perverse consequences of divorce are concerning because as parents separate,

6.!"7*(0& +((& #.(!*& )3#.(*+& "(++& /)#(0& 307& 3*(& 3"+/& "(++& "!;("$& #/& *(6(!,(& 50306!3":&

affective and psychological resources from their fathers than children raised by

83**!(7&93*(0#+&EMG]U`GI:&=>>=O%&g!,/*6(&!+&/)#(0&366/8930!(7& $&9/,(*#$&/*&3&

+!40!5630#&*(726#!/0&!0&50306!3"&*(+/2*6(+%&U.!+&)36#/*&6/0#*! 2#(+&#/&!06*(3+(&#.(&

0(43#!,(&())(6#+&/)&7!,/*6(&/0&#.(&8/#.(*c6.!"7& )38!"$&20!#&307&/0&6.!"7*(0T+& "!)(&

6.306(+%&S/*(/,(*:&7!,/*6(&3"+/&.3+&0(43#!,(&9+$6./"/4!63"&())(6#+&/,(*&6.!"7*(0T+&

307&372"#T+&-(""& (!04%&[e.!"7*(0&/)&7!,/*6(:\&3+&-(""&3+&372"#+:&#(07&#/&+2))(*&)*/8&

7(9*(++!/0:&30C!(#$&307&/#.(*&(8/#!/03"&7!+/*7(*+%&g!,/*6(&*(726(+&6.!"7*(0T+&)2-

ture chance of social mobility by reducing their resources earlier in life. Because of

*(726(7&+/6!3"&8/ !"!#$:&!0(123"!#$&!+&8/*(&"!;("$&#/&!06*(3+(%&U.(+(&6/06"2+!/0+&630&

3"+/& (&(C#(07(7&#/&]3#!0&P8(*!630&6/0#(C#+&EeGfP]:&=>>N:&9%&WDc=@>O%

Another focus of attention in the American literature is cohabitation. It has

((0&7/628(0#(7&#.3#&6.!"7*(0& /*0&!0&6/.3 !#!04&20!/0+&3*(&8/*(&"!;("$&#/&)36(&

20)3,/*3 "(&/2#6/8(+&+!06(&#.(!*&93*(0#+&3*(&8/*(&"!;("$&#/&7!,/*6(&#.30&6/29"(+&

.3,!04&83*!#3"& !*#.+&E<LSfPMM:&IP]Gi&307&M'GGU:&=>>DO%&S/*(/,(*:&!06*(3+-

ing cohabitation is a concern for the propagation of inequalities over time since

“preferences” for cohabitation and divorce are transmitted between generations

EPqJHH&(#&3"&=>>dX&U./*0#/0&=>>=O%&U.(& (.3,!/*&/)&93*(0#+&6/06(*0!04&83**!34(:&

6/.3 !#3#!/0:& 20!/0& 7!++/"2#!/0:& 307& 377!#!/03"& 6.!"7 (3*!04& #(07+& #/& !0V2(06(:&

6/0+6!/2+"$&/*&0/#:&6.!"7*(0T+&)2#2*(& (.3,!/*:&7(,("/98(0#&307&9(*)/*8306(&EPK-

LJ]JH^:&=>>?X&<PI<GI:&A@@@O%

In Brazil, trends in family arrangements have not been much different from

what has been reported in the United States. Unions are becoming more unstable

over time and divorce and separation rates have increased. As a result the number

of female headed families has increased. Nuclear families – couples with children

– still are the most prevalent family arrangement in Brazil, but this type of fam-

ily structure has declined over time and given room to single parent families and

couples without children. Nuclear families accounted for 57 percent of all family

3**304(8(0#+&!0&=>W=%&J0&#.(&(07&/)&#.(&=>>@+&#.!+&542*(&.37&7(6"!0(7&#/&D@&9(*-


cent. During this same period, the number of female headed families with children

!06*(3+(7&)*/8&>%D&#/&=d%A&9(*6(0#X&307&#.(&9(*6(0#34(&/)&20!9(*+/03"&)38!"!(+&Y&

6/89/+(7& $&/0"$&/0(&9(*+/0&Y&+.!)#(7& )*/8&?%d& !0&=>W=& #/&W%?&9(*6(0#& !0&=>>>&

EFPMGH<P]h:&A@@NO%&U.(+(&*(+2"#+&3*(&U3 "(&A%

Table 2

g!+#*! 2#!/0&/)&)38!"$&3**304(8(0#+:&=>W=&#/&=>>>&<*3B!"&ErO&

M/2*6(Q&U*30+"3#(7&)*/8&F3+(0 3"4&EA@@N:&9%&?NO

The American literature suggests that female headed families usually have

"/-(*&!06/8(&307&3*(&8/*(&,2"0(*3 "(&#/&(6/0/8!6&+./6;+&307&9/,(*#$&#.30&02-

6"(3*& )38!"!(+%&<2#& !+& #.!+& 3"+/& #.(& 63+(& !0&<*3B!"R& J+& #.(*(&3&0(43#!,(&3++/6!3#!/0&

(#-((0& )(83"(& .(37(7& )38!"!(+& 307& !06/8(& !0& <*3B!"R&^0(&-3$& #/& 30+-(*& #.!+&

question is to examine the relation between family income per capita and family

arrangements presented Table 3.

Table 3

b38!"$&3**304(8(0#+& $&12!0#!"(+&/)&)38!"$&!06/8(&9(*&639!#3:&=>>>&<*3B!"&ErO

M/2*6(Q&U*30+"3#(7&)*/8&F3+(0 3"4&EA@@N:&9%&a?O


Table 3 shows an obvious economic advantage for families without chil-

7*(0&!0&=>>>&!0&<*3B!"%&L0!9(*+/03"&)38!"!(+&EIl?NAO&307&6/29"(+&-!#./2#&6.!"-

dren (R$475) have the best economic situation. The absence of children reduces

the denominator in the calculation of family income per capita (FIPC) and gives

to these families lower dependency ratios. This explains the higher incomes.

Moreover, the average income of these families is higher than in other family

3**304(8(0#+:&-.!6.&8(30+&3&.!4.(*&366282"3#!/0&/)&50306!3"&3++(#+%&U.(&)36#&

that families headed by mothers with children (R$234) are slightly better off than

6/29"(+&-!#.&6.!"7*(0&307&*("3#!,(+& EIlA=?%aO& !+&93*#!62"3*"$& !0#(*(+#!04%&b38!-

lies living with relatives have the worst economic condition, especially if they are

.(37(7& $&+!04"(&8/8+&E3,(*34(&!06/8(&/)&Il=>=%aO%&U.!+&(,!7(06(&+244(+#+&#.3#&

the presence of other relatives seems to have a larger negative impact on income

than the absence of a spouse. The presence of other relatives is not favorable to

#.(&366282"3#!/0&/)&62"#2*3"&307&(6/0/8!6&639!#3"&EFPMGH<P]h:&A@@N:&9%&aDO%

Contrary to what happens in the United States, the increased number of

female headed families in Brazil has not contributed to increased poverty and

inequality for four reasons. First, because the number of female headed house-

holds has increased more rapidly in the upper income strata than at the bottom

of the income distribution. For this group of women, living independently and

without a partner is much more the result of a conscious choice than of a pov-

erty trap. Second, the gains in education have been more relevant for those at

the lower quintiles of income than for those at the top, reducing the discrepancy

in earnings and inequality. Third, and as a result of educational investments

and increasing autonomy, the participation of females in the labor force has

4*3723""$&!06*(3+(7&+!06(&#.(&=>W@+%&M!04"(&8/#.(*+&.3,(&4*3723""$&8/,(7&)*/8&

a situation of vulnerability and dependency on their spouses to a condition of

financial autonomy and increased social status. Fourth, the decline in fertility

has been more accentuated for those at the bottom of the income distribution.

F3,!04& )(-(*& 6.!"7*(0& .3+& *(726(7& #.(& 7!++/"2#!/0& /)& *(+/2*6(+& 38/04& 9//*&

families. Summing up, the increase in single-parental-female-headed families

has been offset by rapid gains in education, female labor force participation and

by the reduction of children among single mothers at the bottom of the income

distribution. The convergence in education and fertility among poor and richer

families has been, therefore, an important force behind the dynamics of poverty

and inequality. The reproductive dynamics of individuals belonging to specific

+/6!/(6/0/8!6&6"3++(+:&!0&93*#!62"3*:&!0)"2(06(+&E=O&./-&)3+#&#.(+(&+/6!3"&6"3++(+&

grow; (2) how resources are distributed; and (3) how much mobility individuals

will face over their lives. I discuss these three points below.


How Fast Social Classes Grow

This section refers to the speed at which social classes grow as a consequence of

differences in mortality, fertility and migration. In a closed population, when the

difference between birth and death rates is large, natural growth is fast. In an open

population, where migration and social mobility between classes are allowed,

initial differences in fertility and mortality can be offset by interclass population

exchanges. If mobility is high, the impact of reproduction will be small since dif-

ferences in fertility and mortality can be offset by the homogenization of classes

,!3&8/ !"!#$%&P"#(*03#!,("$:&!0&"(++&V2!7&+/6!(#!(+:&#.(&"(,("&/)&)(*#!"!#$&307&8/*#3"!#$&

*3#(+&-!""& (&8/*(&!89/*#30#&!0&7(50!04&#.(&+!B(&/)&9//*&4*/29+%&J)&#.(&9//*& (3*&

more children than the rich, the only solution to prevent their faster growth is for

them to have higher mortality or mobility than other socioeconomic classes. The

speed of demographic growth among the poor depends not only on their own re-

productive rates but is also a function of the reproductive and mobility dynamics of

other social classes. Differences in fertility, mortality and mobility between groups

explain how social classes grow and change over time to create inequality. It is the

combination of fertility and mortality differentials that generates differences in the

+!B(&/)&+/6!3"&6"3++(+&307&9*/726(+&30&20(123"&7!+#*! 2#!/0&/)&*(+/2*6(+%&P+&M/*/;!0&

E=>?d:&9%&NDDO&.3+&92#&!#Q&“In spite of lower mortality the members of the higher

strata, owing to their lower fertility, increase often less rapidly than the members

of the lower ones.”

]38&E=>W?O:&S3*(&E=>>aO:&S2+!6;&307&S3*(&EA@@dO:&307&f*(+#/0&307&e389-

(""&E=>>NO&.3,(&837(&+!40!5630#&6/0#*! 2#!/0+&#/&7(8/0+#*3#(&#.(&+!042"3*&())(6#+&

of differential reproduction and mobility rates on various types of inequality (e.g.

(7263#!/0:&!06/8(&307&J%K%O%&<$&6/0+!7(*!04&*(9*/726#!/0&307&8/ !"!#$&3+&!07(9(0-

7(0#&)/*6(+:&#.(+(&32#./*+&.3,(& ((0&3 "(&#/&!+/"3#(&#.(&!0V2(06(&/)&7(8/4*39.$&

307&8/ !"!#$&/0&#.(&!0(123"!#$c/2#6/8(&/)&!0#(*(+#%&S3*(&E=>>aQ&AO&6/06"27(7&#.3#&

differential fertility by educational attainments have had small effects on educa-

tional trends, partly because of intergenerational mobility and partly because dif-

ferential fertility has not been “large enough” to have a large effect in the long term.

]38&E=>W?:&9%&===dO&(C38!0(7&./-&)(*#!"!#$&!8936#+&!06/8(&!0(123"!#$&!0&<*3B!"&!0&

the steady state and found “ambiguous” effects of differential fertility and popula-

tion composition on inequality.

The impact of fertility differentials on inequality has been empirically docu-

8(0#(7& $&g(&"3&e*/!C&307&g/(9;(&EA@@NO&307 Kremer and Chen (2002). Kremer

307&e.(0&(C38!0(7&#.(&6/**("3#!/0& (#-((0&#/#3"&)(*#!"!#$&*3#(+& $&-/8(0T+&(72-

63#!/03"&3##3!08(0#&307&h!0!&6/()56!(0#+&307&)/207&3&9/+!#!,(&6/**("3#!/0& (#-((0&

the two. They found empirical evidence that the fertility differential between edu-


cated and uneducated women is greater in countries with more income inequality.

P66/*7!04& #/& #.(8&#.(*(& !+& [3&+#3#!+#!63""$& +!40!5630#:&9/+!#!,(:&307&(6/0/8!63""$&

sizeable relationship between differential fertility and inequality” (Kremer and

e.(0&A@@AQ&AAWO%&M!8!"3*"$:&g(&"3&e*/!C&307&g/(9;(&EA@@NO&3"+/&)/207&#.3#&(6/0/-

mies with less equitable income distribution have higher fertility differentials, but

#.(!*&;($&*(+2"#&!+&#/&+./-&#.3#&)(*#!"!#$&7!))(*(0#!3"+&3*(&(++(0#!3"&)/*&4(0(*3#!04&3&

0(43#!,(&*("3#!/0+.!9& (#-((0&!0(123"!#$&307&(6/0/8!6&4*/-#.Q&[EoO&!#&!+&0/#&#.(&

overall population growth, but the distribution of fertility within the population

which is important. In other words, who is having the children matters more than

./-&830$&6.!"7*(0&#.(*(&3*(&/,(*3""\&EgG&]P&eI^Jq&307&g^GfnG:&A@@N:&9%&==@>O%&

How Resources are Distributed

The distribution of resources is a consequence of population growth. If resources in

each class grow at a slower rate than population, increasing the number of individu-

als in each social group will inevitably reduce the share of resources allocated to each

!07!,!723"%&G3+$&*(3+/0!04Q&!)&#-/&9/92"3#!/0+&.3,(&#.(&+38(&38/20#&/)&!06/8(& 2#&

#.(&5*+#&.3+&#-/&#!8(+&8/*(&9(/9"(&#.30&#.(&+(6/07:&#.(&9(*&639!#3&!06/8(&-!""& (&

/ ,!/2+"$&+83""(*&!0&#.(&5*+#&#.30&!0&#.(&+(6/07&9/92"3#!/0%&J)&#.(*(&3*(&8/*(&9(/9"(&

being born and surviving in the poor than in the rich class, the share of resources al-

located to the lower class will be smaller than the share of resources allocated to the

upper class. This is particularly true in modern societies where children are not seen

as sources of income for the family. Table 4 demonstrates the negative relationship

(#-((0&)38!"$&+!B(&307&!06/8(&!0&<*3B!"&2+!04&fHPg&73#3& (#-((0&=>W=&307&=>>>%&

Table 4

b38!"$&+!B(&307&028 (*&/)&6.!"7*(0& ("/-&34(&=D& $&12!0#!"(+

/)&)38!"$&!06/8(&9(*&639!#3&!0&<*3B!":&=>W=c=>>>&

M/2*6(Q&U*30+"3#(7&)*/8&F3+(0 3"4&EA@@N:&9%&aAO


Table 4 supports the inverse relationship between family size and family

!06/8(&9(*& 639!#3%& J0& =>W=& #.(&9//*(+#& )38!"!(+&-(*(& aa&9(*6(0#& "3*4(*& #.30& #.(&

families in the richest quintile. This is equivalent to 2.6 additional people in the

9//*(+#&12!0#!"(%& J0& #.(&(07&/)& #.(&=>>@+& #.!+&7!))(*(06(&7(6*(3+(7&3+&3& *(+2"#&/)&

the fastest decline of fertility in the poorest families. The poorest families were 64

9(*6(0#&"3*4(*&#.30&!0&#.(&*!6.(+#&12!0#!"(&!0&=>>>:&-.!6.&*(9*(+(0#+&3&7!))(*(06(&/)&

=%W&9(*+/0+&!0&)38!"$&+!B(& (#-((0&#.(&5*+#&307&"3+#&12!0#!"(+&/)&!06/8(%&U.!+&6/0-

,(*4(06(&!0&)38!"$&+!B(&*(V(6#+&#.(&7!))(*(0#!3"&7(6"!0(&/)&)(*#!"!#$&307&!+&6/05*8(7&

$&#.(&7(6"!0(&/)&#.(&6/()56!(0#&/)&,3*!3#!/0&)*/8&%DN&#/&%da& (#-((0&=>W=&307&=>>>%

U.(&7!))(*(0#!3"&7(6"!0(&/)&)(*#!"!#$&!+&3"+/&(,!7(0#&-.(0&-(&"//;&3#&#.(&028 (*&

/)&6.!"7*(0& ("/-&34(&=D& $&"(,("&/)&!06/8(%&<(#-((0&=>W=&307&=>>>:&#.(&028 (*&/)&

6.!"7*(0&!0&#.(&9//*(+#&12!0#!"(&+.!)#(7&)*/8&N%AW&#/&A%=>:&-.!6.&*(9*(+(0#+&3&7(6"!0(&

/)&NN&9(*6(0#%&J0&#.(&*!6.(+#&12!0#!"(:&#.(&028 (*&/)&6.!"7*(0&+.!)#(7&)*/8&%a?&#/&%d>:&

*(9*(+(0#!04&3&7(6"!0(&/)&ND%D&9(*6(0#%&U.(&(,/"2#!/0&/)&#.(&6/()56!(0#&/)&,3*!3#!/0:&

0(,(*#.("(++:&+./-+&#.3#&#.(&7!))(*(06(&!0&#.(&028 (*&/)&6.!"7*(0& ("/-&34(&=D&!0&#.(&

poorest and richest quintiles increased. Although family sizes are converging over

time, poorest families still have higher dependency ratios than those at the top of the

income distribution. Dependency ratios have declined for all income levels, but the

persistent and increasing discrepancy in these ratios between poor and rich groups

certainly affects income inequality. Moreover, the number of children in the family is

inversely related to the labor supply of married women. Consequently, the income of

larger families is often smaller than in families with fewer members.

The negative association between family size and income in Brazil, however,

should not be confounded with causation and neither extended to other geograph-

ic and historical socioeconomic contexts. There is no evidence that income alone

can explain fertility declines in modern high-income economies. For example, a

study for Canada, Finland, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United

M#3#(+:&+./-(7&#.3#Q

[EoO&)/*& /#.&=>W@&307&A@@@&#.(*(&-3+&0/&"!0;& (#-((0&./2+(./"7&!06/8(&

and fertility, measured as the number of children present in the households

of married women aged 30-42. (…) It is only in the course of the demographic

transition that we observe a negative relationship between income and fertili-

#$&36*/++&!06/8(&4*/29+&!0&3&+/6!(#$\&Ee]PIn:&A@@a:&9%&A>dO%

How Much Mobility Individuals will Face Over Their Lives

]The third point affecting the allocation of resources among people is social mobil-

!#$%&^0(&7(50!#!/0&/)&+/6!3"&8/ !"!#$&+#3#(+&#.3#&!#&!+&[#.(&9.(0/8(0/0&/)&#.(&+.!)#-

ing of individuals within social space”, where “social space is a kind of universe


composed of the human population of the earth”&EM^I^nJH:&=>?d:&9%&NcdO%&U.!+&

6"3++!6&7(50!#!/0&(8 *36(+&4(/4*39.!6&8/ !"!#$&307&7(8/0+#*3#(+&#.3#&!#&630&/,(*-

lap and complement social mobility. In migrating from a less to a more developed

region, one might also move in the social ladder as opportunities, living costs and

welfare policies change.

M/6!3"&8/ !"!#$&!+&#.(& 3"306!04&)/*6(&#.3#&83;(+&29&)/*&!0!#!3"&7!))(*(06(+&!0&

the composition of classes. Through social mobility individuals change their desti-

0!(+&307&83;(&#.(!*&)2#2*(&7!))(*(0#&)*/8&#.(!*&93+#%&M/6!3"&8/ !"!#$&!+&#.(&83#(*!-

alization of efforts, opportunities and misfortunes. It is the cause and also the con-

sequence of many inequalities, inherited, acquired and ascribed. The same forces

generating inequality also contribute to generate differences in social mobility.

f!#!*!8&M/*/;!0&+244(+#(7&#.*((&83!0&)36#/*+&/)&+/6!3"&8/ !"!#$:&/*&-.3#&.(&

8/*(&+9(6!563""$&63""(7&[,(*#!63"&6!*62"3#!/0\Q&[E3O&#.(&7!++!8!"3*!#$&/)&93*(0#+&307&

children; (b) a permanent change of environment, especially of the anthropo-social

(0,!*/08(0#X&307&E6O&#.(&7(8/4*39.!6&)36#/*\&EM^I^nJH:&=>?d:&9%&NaNO%&

a. Dissimilarity of parents and children

G3*"$&(,!7(06(&/0&#.(&3++/6!3#!/0& (#-((0&93*(0#+T&307&#.(!*&6.!"7*(0T+&(6/-

0/8!6&+#3#2+&)/207&3&-(3;&6/00(6#!/0& (#-((0&#.(&#-/&307&7!7&0/#&+299/*#&#.(&.$-

9/#.(+!+&#.3#&"/-&307&.!4.&(3*0!04+&3*(&#*30+8!##(7&)*/8&)3#.(*+&#/&+/0+&E<]PL&307&

gLHePH:& =>?aO%& I(6(0#& (,!7(06(:& ./-(,(*:& 3##*! 2#(+& #.(& 6/06"2+!/0+& /)& 9*(,!/2+&

507!04+&#/&8(3+2*(8(0#&(**/*+&307&+244(+#+&#.3#&-(3"#.:&*36(&307&+6.//"!04&3*(&+#*/04&

9*(7!6#/*+&#/&#.(&!0.(*!#306(&/)&(6/0/8!6&+#3#2+:& 2#&J%K%&!+&0/#&3&83Z/*&6/0#*! 2#/*:&

307&#.(&#*30+8!++!/0&/)&J%K%&!+&(,(0&"(++&!89/*#30#&E<^']GM&307&hJHUJM:&A@@AO%&

True as it may be, social economic status is not primarily hereditary. In-

herited traits and unfavorable circumstances are associated with above average

chances of ending up poor, but at least in the United States, there is still con-

siderable economic mobility from one generation to the next. There is as much

economic inequality among brothers raised in the same homes as in the general

9/92"3#!/0Q&[J0(123"!#$&!+&*(6*(3#(7&30(-&!0&(36.&4(0(*3#!/0:&(,(0&38/04&9(/9"(&

-./&+#3*#&"!)(&!0&(++(0#!3""$&!7(0#!63"&6!*628+#306(+\&EsGHenM&(#&3"&A@@=:&9%&d@?O%&

f3*(0#+T&(6/0/8!6&+#3#2+& !+&30& !89/*#30#&7(#(*8!030#&/)& #.(!*&6.!"7*(0T+&+/6!3"&

mobility, but this seems to be more important for families in the top of the in-

come distribution than for most families. Parent-offspring similarity may arise

from sources independent of any bequests or transfers, but from hard-to-mea-

+2*(& #*3!#+& +26.&3+&/*!(0#3#!/0& #/-3*7+& #.(& )2#2*(:& +(0+(&/)&9(*+/03"&()56!(06$:&

7!"!4(06(:&-/*;&(#.!6:&9(*+!+#(06(:& +6.//"!04&3##3!08(0#&307& *!+;& #3;!04& EFGI-

<GIU&307&hJHUJM:&A@@A:&9%&=WO%


In the case of Brazil, Pero and Szerman (2005) investigated the intergen-

erational persistency of income between sons and fathers using a synthetic sample

/)&[)3#.(*+\(0&)*/8&82"#!9"(&fHPg+%&U.($&)/207&#.3#&#.(&+/0T+&9*/ 3 !"!#$&/)&

achieving the highest income quartile given that his father was in the lowest quar-

tile was 4.7 percent. They also estimated that the probability of achieving the top

quartile of income when the father is in that same quartile was 55.4 percent. The

intergenerational persistence of income was higher in the upper quartiles than in

the lower ones, which according to them suggests that the “wealth trap” is stron-

ger than the intergenerational “poverty trap.” Children from rich parents were less

"!;("$&#/&8!4*3#(&#/&"/-(*&"(,("+&/)&!06/8(&#.30&,!6(&,(*+3%&H(,(*#.("(++:&#.(&+/0+&/)&

parents belonging to the poorest half percent had a 74 percent chance or remaining

in that group. In the U.S., this chance was 65 percent.

Another important contribution of Pero and Szerman was to show that in-

tergenerational mobility processes in Brazil reduce the Gini index by 20 percent-

age points, which is roughly equivalent to saying that about 65 percent of total

!0(123"!#$& +#(8+& )*/8& 7!))(*(06(+& !0& +/6!3"& 36;4*/207& 307& (6/0/8!6& +#3#2+& /)&

/*!4!0:&-.!6.&#.(&32#./*&63""(7&!0(123"!#$&/)&[/99/*#20!#!(+\%&f(*/&307&MB(*830T+&

(+#!83#(&6/0#*3+#+&-!#.&9*(,!/2+&507!04+&+244(+#!04&#.3#&/0"$&=A&9(*6(0#&9/!0#+&/)&

#.(&h!0!&3*(&72(&#/&7!))(*(06(+&!0&/99/*#20!#!(+:&-.!6.&*/24."$&6/**(+9/07&=D&#/&A@&

percent of household income inequality (BOURGUIGNON et al 2003). Moreover,

Bourguignon and colleagues found that parental education plays the largest role

in determining inequality, accounting for about 35 to 47 percent of the variance

!0&6.!"7*(0T+&+6.//"!04%&J0&30$&63+(:&307&7(+9!#(&#.(&8(#./7/"/4!63"&,3*!3#!/0+&/)&

#.(+(&+#27!(+:&#.(&!0V2(06(&/)&93*(0#+&/0&6.!"7*(0T+&8/ !"!#$&6300/#& (&0(4"(6#(7&

!0&#.(&63+(&/)&<*3B!":&(+9(6!3""$& (632+(&93*(0#+T&(7263#!/0&.3+&30&!07!*(6#&())(6#&/0&

6.!"7*(0T+&(7263#!/03"&3##3!08(0#&#.*/24.&./2+(./"7&+!B(&307&6/89/+!#!/0:&-.!6.&

also affect the distribution of household income.

b. The role of environment

J0.(*!#(7&307&3+6*! (7&#*3!#+&7(50!04&4*/29&8(8 (*+.!9&E(%4%&*36(O&.3,(&3&

bearing on the intergenerational transmission of economic status, but it is also im-

9/*#30#&#/&36;0/-"(74(&#.3#&.(*!#3 "(&#*3!#+&3*(&+(0+!#!,(&#/&(0,!*/08(0#+%&</-"(+&

307&h!0#!+& EA@@A:&9%& =aO&(+#!83#(7& #.(&+(93*3#(&6/0#*! 2#!/0&/)&-(3"#.:&(0,!*/0-

mental and genetic factors to the intergenerational transmission of income after

assuming some correlation between these three factors. They reported an intergen-

(*3#!/03"&!06/8(&6/**("3#!/0&/)&%d=:&/2#&/)&-.!6.&%A@&!+&72(&#/&#.(&(0,!*/08(0#:&%@>&

#/&4(0(#!6+:&307&%=A&#/&-(3"#.%&e/893*3 "(&+#27!(+&)/*&<*3B!"&3*(&0/#&9/++! "(&72(&


to the absence of longitudinal and twin data, although efforts have been made to

+(93*3#(&#.(&!0V2(06(&/)&6!*628+#306(+&307&())/*#&2+!04&#.(&6/06(9#23"&)*38(-/*;&

+244(+#(7& $&I/(8(*&E=>>WO%&U/&+2883*!B(& #.(&())(6#&/)&93*(0#+T& !0V2(06(:&307&

6.304(+&!0&#.(&(0,!*/08(0#&/0&+/6!3"&8/ !"!#$&307&!0(123"!#$:&!#&+2)56(+&#/&*(9*/-

726(&M/*/;!0T+&6/06"2+!/0&#.3#Q

“All conditions which contribute to an increase of innate heterogeneity of

a people, or to differences of their environment, or to an increase of anta-

gonisms among individuals or groups are conditions which facilitate an

increase !" #!$%&' #()&(%*$&(%!+. (…) All conditions which contribute to an

increase of similarity of the people, or to the similarity of their environ-

ment, or to their solidarity, facilitate a decrease !" #!$%&' #()&(%*$&(%!+”

EM^I^nJH:&=>?d:&9%&NdNO%

c. The demographic factor of mobility

The third factor of social mobility, the “demographic factor,” refers to fertili-

#$&307&8/*#3"!#$%&U.(&!0V2(06(&/)&#.(&[7(8/4*39.!6&)36#/*\&/0&9/,(*#$&307&!0(123"-

!#$&-3+&7!+62++(7&!0&#.(&9*(,!/2+&+(6#!/0%&i(#&#.(&!0V2(06(&/)&7(8/4*39.$&/0&+/6!3"&

8/ !"!#$&8(*!#+&6"3*!563#!/0%&'.(0&M/*/;!0&-*/#(&3 /2#&#.(&[7(8/4*39.!6&)36#/*+&

of vertical circulation” he included under this heading all forces that could affect

social mobility through fertility and mortality. According to him, differentials in

reproductive rates would create room for mobility from the class with higher repro-

duction to the class with lower. Since the “functions” performed by the class with

lower fertility or higher mortality are essential to society, they must be performed

$&+/8(/0(&("+(:&+/8(/0(&6/8!04&)*/8&6"3++(+&-!#.&8/*(&9*/"!56&*(9*/726#!/0%&

This would be especially the case of movements from the bottom to the upper sta-

#2+&6"3++(+%&J0&.!+&/-0&-/*7+Q

“Under this heading [demographic factors of vertical circulation] are meant all

forces which call forth sterility, lower differential birth rate, or higher mortality

of the upper classes. In the course of time they cause either an extinction of the

aristocratic families, or a decrease of their proportion in the total population of

3&+/6!(#$%&J0& /#.&63+(+&+26.&3&+!#23#!/0&6*(3#(+&3&;!07&/)&[+/6!3"&,36228\&-!#.!0&

the upper strata. As the performance of the functions carried on by the upper

strata continues to be necessary, and as the corresponding people cannot be re-

cruited any longer from a diminishing upper population, it is natural that this

[,36228\&82+#& (&5""(7& $&#.(&6"!8 (*+&)*/8&#.(&"/-(*&+#*3#3%&M26.&!0&(++(06(&

!+&#.!+&)36#/*&/)&,(*#!63"&6!*62"3#!/0\&EM^I^nJH:&=>?d:&9%&Nd?O%

['.3#(,(*&83$& (&#.(&6/06*(#(&632+(+&/)&"/-(*&)(*#!"!#$:&.!4.(*&+#(*!"!#$:&307&

an exceptionally high mortality (during some periods) of the upper social


6"3++(+:& #.(+(& 7(8/4*39.!6& 6/07!#!/0+&83;(& +/6!3"&8/ !"!#$& 0(6(++3*$& 307&

inevitable. And the greater the difference in the number of surviving chil-

dren of the upper and the lower strata, the more intensive the vertical circu-

lation caused by this factor will be\&EM^I^nJH:&=>?d:&9%&ND>O%

These two excerpts of Social and Cultural Mobility clarify how reproductive

differentials between social classes would operate to create imbalances in the social

structure and promote social mobility. The idea is that relatively lower reproduc-

tion creates a “social vacuum” that facilitates and fosters mobility from the more

9*/"!56&6"3++(+&#/&+2)56(&#.(&207(*+299"$&/)&+/6!3"&)206#!/0+&!0&6"3++(+&-.(*(&*(-

9*/726#!/0&!+&!0+2)56!(0#%&L0)/*#203#("$:&M/*/;!0&7!7&0/#&("3 /*3#(&30$&)2*#.(*&/0&

-.3#&-/2"7& (&#.(&"!8!#+&*(12!*(7&#/&6*(3#(&#.!+&+/6!3"&,36228%&F(&7!7&0/#&8(0#!/0&

whether the reproduction of one class would have to be below replacement in order

to attract people from other classes and neither the size of the reproduction gap

between poor and richer classes required to foster population exchanges via social

8/ !"!#$%&F!+&#.(/*$&-3+&4(0(*3"&(0/24.&#/&83;(&+(0+(&!0&8/+#&+/6!/c7(8/4*39.!6&

contexts, but without considering the occupational structure of the economy in re-

lation to population size and without empirical evidence to validate his theory, his

argument remains purely speculative.

Another theory considering the direct impact of demography on social mo-

!"!#$&9*/6(++(+&!+&6"/+("$&*("3#(7&#/&#.(&028 (*&/)&6.!"7*(0&!0&#.(&)38!"$%&U.(&<(6;(-

*!30&)*38(-/*;&+#3#(+&#.3#&#.(&+.!)#&)*/8&)38!"!3*&8/7(+&/)&9*/726#!/0&#/-3*7&3&

wage-earning economy creates a demand for more human capital and consequent-

ly a reduction in the number of children since there is a tradeoff between quantity

307&123"!#$&/)&6.!"7*(0&E<GenGI:&=>?@:&=>W=O%&U.(&7(6"!0(&!0&)(*#!"!#$&-/2"7&*(726(&

93*(0#+T&50306!3"&6/0+#*3!0#+&307&3""/-&#.(8&#/& !0,(+#&8/*(&307& (##(*&/0& #.(!*&

children and on themselves, facilitating their social mobility. In addition, more

(7263#(7&8/#.(*+&-/2"7& (&8/*(&"!;("$&#/&83**$&3++/*#3#!,("$&/*&29-3*7+&307&#.!+&

-/2"7&3"+/&!0V2(06(&#.(&38/20#&/)&(7263#!/0&3612!*(7& $&6.!"7*(0%&J0&+28:&#.(&()-

)(6#+&/)&8/#.(*T+&+6.//"!04&/0&#.(!*&/))+9*!04T+&(7263#!/03"&36.!(,(8(0#&307&)2#2*(&

social mobility would accrue through changes in family formation (marriage) and

)38!"$&+!B(&E)(*#!"!#$O&ESPIG&307&SPIP]PHJ:&A@@?O%

SUMMARY

U.(&4/3"&/)&#.!+&3*#!6"(&-3+&#.*(()/"7Q&#/& *!(V$&7(+6*! (&#.(&"(,("+&307&#*(07+&

/)& !0(123"!#$&307&7(8/4*39.!6&6/0#(C#+&!0&<*3B!"&+!06(&#.(&=>W@+%&U/&+2883*!B(&

the challenges involving the comparison and empirical measurement of poverty


and income inequality. And third, to discuss the theoretical mechanisms driving

the dynamics of poverty and inequality. Among these mechanisms we include the

!0V2(06(&/)& !0.(*!#(7:&3+6*! (7:&3612!*(7&307& "(3*0(7&6.3*36#(*!+#!6+:& #.(&*/"(&/)&

7!))(*(0#!3"&366(++&#/&*(+/2*6(+:&"3 /*&83*;(#&!0#(*36#!/0+&4(0(*3#!04&7!+6*!8!03-

tion processes, family structure and differential reproduction. The emphasis on the

theoretical relationship between demographic differentials and social mobility, in

93*#!62"3*:&*(9*(+(0#+&/0(&/)&#.(&6/0#*! 2#!/0+&/)&#.!+&3*#!6"(%&'(&3*42(&#.3#&#.(&7(-

8/4*39.!6&7$038!6+&/)&+9(6!56&+/6!/(6/0/8!6&6"3++(+&!0V2(06(+&#.*((&!0#(**("3#(7&

9.(0/8(03Q&./-&)3+#&+/6!3"&6"3++(+&4*/-:&./-&*(+/2*6(+&3*(&7!+#*! 2#(7:&307&./-&

much mobility individuals will face over their lives.

This article presented the results of previous analysis and explained the

concepts and processes generating poverty and inequality. It has been structured

3*/207&+(,(0&6*26!3"&12(+#!/0+Q

=&'.3#& .3+& ((0& #.(& 7$038!6+& /)& 9/,(*#$& 307& !0(123"!#$& !0& <*3B!"& +!06(&

=>W@R&f/,(*#$&+2*4(7&!0&#.(&(3*"$&=>W@+&72(&#/&(6/0/8!6&*(6(++!/0+&307&+2 +#30-

#!3""$&7(6"!0(7&3)#(*&=>Wd&3+&3&*(+2"#&/)&+#3 !"!B3#!/0&9"30+%&f/,(*#$&"(,("+&-(*(&3#&3&

8!0!828&!0&=>W?&307&.3,(&6/0#!02/2+"$&7(6"!0(7&+!06(&=>WW%&J0(123"!#$&.3+& ((0&

historically and comparatively high with few ups and downs. It increased in the

=>W@+& 307& (3*"$& =>>@+& (632+(& /)& #.(& *(4*(++!,(& 7!+#*! 2#!,(& ())(6#+& /)& !0V3#!/0&

307&(7263#!/03"& (C930+!/0%& J0(123"!#$&.3+&./-(,(*&7(6"!0(7&+!06(& =>>N& (632+(&

/)&!0V3#!/0&6/0#*/":&*(4!/03"&6/0,(*4(06(&/)&(3*0!04+& (#-((0&+/6!3"&4*/29+:&307&

because of improved social assistance transfers from the government.

A&'.3#&632+(+&!0(123"!#$R&J0(123"!#!(+&38/04&+/6!3"&4*/29+&3*(&6*(3#(7& $&

differences in reproduction, social mobility, inherited, ascribed and acquired social

attributes “due to the heterogeneity of environmental factors among which they

are born, grow, live, and work.” EM^I^nJH:&=>?d:&9%&NAAO%

N&F/-&7/(+&7(8/4*39.$&3))(6#&9/,(*#$&307&!0(123"!#$R&U.*/24.&)38!"$&)/*-

mation, population growth and social mobility. The rhythm at which these three

)/*6(+&/9(*3#(&7(50(+&./-&*(+/2*6(+&3*(&7!+#*! 2#(7&!0&3&+/6!3"&+$+#(8%

d&F/-&7/(+&9/92"3#!/0&4*/-#.&3))(6#&!0(123"!#$R&<$&!06*(3+!04&/*&7(6*(3+!04&

the number of individuals and subsequently shifting the distribution of resources

in each class. Ceteris paribus, more people will result in more or fewer resources.

If resources are constant, each person will inevitably have fewer resources in larger

families than in small ones unless the direct impact of differential growth on inequal-

ity is outweighed by its indirect impact on social mobility; or unless the resources

are not constant and actually grow when population grows. The relationship popu-

"3#!/0c*(+/2*6(&,3*!(+& (#-((0&+/6!3"&+936(+&307&/,(*&#.(&!06/8(&7!+#*! 2#!/0%&J(&

population reproduction as exogenous and assume that social mobility, income and

inequality variations are partially a function of demographic dynamics.


D&F/-&7/(+&7!))(*(0#!3"&9/92"3#!/0&4*/-#.&3))(6#&29-3*7&+/6!3"&8/ !"!#$R&<$&

creating a “social vacuum” within the upper strata and a surplus of potential mov-

ers within the lower classes. It also affects mobility by changing the opportunity

cost of having children. Fewer children can get a larger share of resources and in

doing so they improve their chances of upward mobility.

?&F/-&7/(+&+/6!3"&8/ !"!#$&3))(6#&!0(123"!#$R&<$&+.!)#!04&#.(&7!+#*! 2#!/0&/)&

individuals between classes and subsequently its distribution of resources. Social

mobility is an indirect means of population growth. Social mobility generates posi-

tive or negative growth not through natural reproduction, but through redistribu-

#!/0&/)&!07!,!723"+%&P&.!4.&9*(,3"(06(&/)&8/ !"!#$&!0#(0+!5(+&(123"!#$& $&./8/4(-

0!B!04&9/92"3#!/0&307&*(+/2*6(+%&]/-&8/ !"!#$:&!0&6/0#*3+#:&6/0+/"!73#(+&!0(123"!#$&

and confers to reproduction rates a more determinant role.

a&'.$&7/(+&7(8/4*39.$&83##(*R&<(632+(&7(8/4*39.!6&4*/-#.&.3+&3&7!*(6#&

(family size) and indirect effect (social vacuum and mobility) on poverty and in-

equality. Demography is the force shaping the allocation of people to resources and

to some extent the allocation of resources to individuals. Only by understanding

how distinct social classes reproduce themselves over time can we fully grasp the

origins and dynamics of poverty and income inequality.

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O objetivo deste artigo é revisar e discutir a di-

nâmica da pobreza e da desigualdade de renda

no Brasil, enfatizando o papel dos diferenciais de

fecundidade, mortalidade e mobilidade social. A

primeira parte do artigo apresenta um históri-

co da desigualdade de renda no Brasil e discute

como os métodos e conceitos de pobreza e de-

sigualdade têm sido empregados pela literatura.

A segunda parte discorre sobre os mecanismos

socioeconômicos que geram uma distribuição

desigual de renda, prestando particular atenção

i$K>A?bj>$?AEH?$T?@>IH<L<$?$@>V:J:T<T?$;>K:<J*

RESUMO

Income Inequality

Demography

Poverty

Social Mobility

Brazil

PALAVRAS-CHAVE:

Jerônimo Oliveira Muniz

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Professor Adjunto, Departamento de Sociologia e Antropologia, UFMG.

RECEBIDO EM

APROVADO EM

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Differential Reproduction, Poverty and the dynamics of Inequality in Brazil (2010)

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