Design Observations Regarding Public Safety Networks

Jane Fedorowicz Bentley University 175 Forest Street

Waltham, MA 02452 USA +1-781-891-3153

jfedorowicz@bentley.edu

Steve Sawyer Syracuse University

344 Hinds Hall Syracuse NY 13244 USA

+1-315-443-6147 ssawyer@syr.edu

Christine Williams Bentley University 175 Forest Street

Waltham, MA 02452 USA +1-781-891-2655

cwilliams@bentley.edu M. Lynne Markus

Bentley University 175 Forest Street

Waltham, MA 02452 USA +1-781-891-2312

mlmarkus@bentley.edu

Michael Tyworth Penn State University College of Information

Sciences and Technology Univ. Park, PA 16802 USA

+1-814-865-7724 mtyworth@ist.psu.edu

Dax Jacobson Bentley University 175 Forest Street

Waltham, MA 02452 USA +1-781-891-2041

djacobson@bentley.edu

Sonia Gantman Bentley University 175 Forest Street

Waltham, MA 02452 USA +1-781-891-2041

svilvovsky@bentley.edu

Martin Dias Bentley University 175 Forest Street

Waltham, MA 02452 USA +1-781-891-2041

dias_mart@bentley.edu

Arthur Tomasino Bentley University 175 Forest Street

Waltham, MA 02452 USA +1-781-891-2041

tomasin_arth@bentley.edu

ABSTRACT Through this paper we advance an initial set of 12 observations that will form the basis for developing design principles for public safety networks (PSN), and more broadly for inter-organizational systems within the public sector. A public safety network is an interagency collaboration focused on the development and use of information and communication technologies to support the information sharing and functional interoperability needs of public safety organizations engaged in law enforcement, criminal justice, and emergency response. Our goal in presenting this initial set of PSN design observations is to: (1) encourage improved PSN systems design through the development of design principles and (2) increase the attention paid, when designing and developing these forms of information systems, to the co-design of structures of governance and operation that PSN entail.

Categories and Subject Descriptors H.1.2 [INFORMATION SYSTEMS Models and Principles]: User/Machine Systems - Human Factors. J.1 [COMPUTER APPLICATIONS Administrative Data Processing] –

Government

General Terms Management, Performance, Design, Human Factors.

Keywords Interorganizational information sharing systems; design principles; digital government; public safety networks

1. INTRODUCTION Through this paper we advance an initial set of 12 observations regarding design principles for public safety networks (PSN). A PSN is an interagency collaboration focused on the development and use of information and communication technologies (ICT) to support the information sharing and functional interoperability needs of public safety organizations engaged in law enforcement, criminal justice, and emergency response. A PSN is a specific form of the broad class of inter-organizational information sharing systems (IOS) supporting information sharing among police and other public safety agencies. This suggests that these PSN design observations may also be more generally useful for the design challenges faced by a broader set of interagency collaborations [1, 2]. A design principle provides a fundamental idea that guides design [2]. Design principles provide assistance to designers, managers and policy-makers involved in the development, operation and uses of a PSN. Our goal in presenting this initial set of PSN design observations is to both: (1) encourage improved information systems design through the development of design principles and (2) increase the attention paid, when designing and

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developing these forms of information systems, to the co-design of organizational structures of governance and operation that PSN entail. The underlying premise of the development of these design observations is that information systems which are designed to support the sharing and uses of information across organizational boundaries must be seen as sociotechnical ensembles [3-5]. The technological aspects of the PSN are bound-up in organizational structures, decisions, and histories. Likewise, the design, form, and functionality of such systems are also shaped by social – and more focal – organizational issues such as the form of governance or decision-making, the involvement of users and other key stakeholders, and the need for resources [6, 7]. Evidence from our own work, hundreds of other studies and the personal experiences of thousands, if not millions, of people makes clear that, over time, both technological and social forces shape the development of systems [5]. Given the sociotechnical premise raised here and explained below, the best way to use this awareness for developing design guidance becomes a pertinent issue. It is addressed in the remaining four sections of this paper . In section two we provide a sociotechnical basis for developing design principles. In section three we summarize the empirical context and describe our study of PSN. In section four we present our initial set of 12 design observations and identify several candidates for consideration. In the final section (five), we discuss the se design observations relative to developing them into principles and outline additional work to be done.

2. SOCIOTECHNICAL BASIS OF PSN The sociotechnical perspective begins with conceptualizing a PSN as a set of material affordances and restrictions that are inseparable from their development and use contexts [4, 5]. Without taking seriously both technological and social aspects of PSN, the danger is that “the IT artifact itself tends to disappear from view, be taken for granted, or presumed to be unproblematic once it is built and installed”[3].

There are a number of different schools of sociotechnical research, many of which have been successfully applied to studies of ICT-based systems such as PSN, including the information infrastructure perspective, actor-network theory, structuration theory, social shaping of technology, social construction of technology, and institutional approaches.1 These specific theoretical approaches reflect Bijker’s [5] principles of sociotechnical change, which we use here to illustrate the generic goals of this approach and to discuss the theoretical tensions that exist in designing ICT-centered systems such as PSN (and IOS more generally). These tensions provide a range of possibilities for specific sociotechnical research efforts.

Bijker [4, 5] advances four principles that frame the sociotechnical perspective: the seamless web principle, the principle of change and continuity, the symmetry principle, and the principle of action and structure. The seamless web principle states that any socio-technical theory should not a priori privilege technological or material explanations ahead of social explanations, and vice versa. The principle of change and continuity argues that socio-technical theories must account for

1 A more detailed discussion of the variety of sociotechnical theories and approaches is beyond the scope of this paper.

change and continuity, not just one or the other. The symmetry principle states that the successful working of a technology must be explained as a process, rather than assumed to be the outcome of ‘superior technology’. The action and structure principle states that socio-technical explanations must address both the actor-oriented side of social behavior – with its actor strategies and micro interactions – and the structure-oriented side of social behavior characterized by its larger-scale focus on collective actions and institutionalized social processes. While Bijker’s principles provide a set of ideals for socio-technical research to strive for, in practice they illustrate tensions underlying the design of technologically (and, more specifically for us, ICT)-based systems such as PSN. Each specific socio-technically inspired theoretical approach, and each specific study, are only able to address aspects of the complexity of socio-technical change in its entirety. So, studies using the socio-technical perspective will vary depending on:

• The degree to which they focus on technological processes and technological features, versus social processes and social objects. (Seamless web)

• The degree to which they focus on processes of change, versus continuity with the past and maintenance of existing processes. (Change and continuity)

• The depth of description and explanation in the socio-technical change process, ranging from “thick” or “rich” descriptions of PSN, to relatively “thin” associations between PSN uses, outcomes and various success factors. (Symmetry)

• The degree of attention paid to action-oriented aspects of social behavior, such as actor strategies and interests, or structural aspects of social behavior such as institutional processes. (Action and structure)

The sociotechnical perspective provides the conceptual basis for this work. Public safety provides us with the empirical context to explore issues with institutionally relevant PSN systems design. This perspective makes clear that a PSN is more than a collection of ICT and data. And, as such, developing PSN design principles – and the observations that precede their development – requires attention be paid to the sociotechnical aspects of the system and its organizational elements and uses.

3. EMPIRICAL CONTEXT: PUBLIC SAFETY Public safety encompasses a wide range of public sector activities, from policing to criminal justice to emergency management to homeland security [8]. Public safety activities are supported at all levels of government. The United States’ federalist tradition is such that public safety is – and will be – an inherently cross-jurisdictional, multi-governmental, and institutionally complex activity.

One of the biggest challenges facing public safety agencies who seek to collaborate is determining how best to communicate and share information across federal, state, county, municipal and tribal lines. In addition, collaboration among public safety agencies requires previously independent functions such as police, fire, transportation, emergency medicine and the courts to communicate electronically.

Public safety collaborations typically span geographic boundaries, adding to the complexity of governing such complicated organizational and technological arrangements across fifty states, 3000 counties, and the many municipal, tribal and territorial boundaries each houses.

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To understand the magnitude of potential public safety collaborations, one need only consider that there are approximately 800,000 police officers belonging to almost 19,000 separate agencies among all levels of government in the U.S. These agencies can house federal (such as the FBI or national park police), tribal, county (sheriffs), or city police, illustrating that even a single public safety function may not reflect a common set of information needs2. Criminal justice activity also can involve multiple types of courts at each of the government levels, with about 280,000 civil and criminal cases heard annually in federal courts, and 27.5 million civil and criminal cases processed in state courts.

The nature of an information need or an incident may require that an individual user or agency access up-to-date data as diverse as automobile registrations or driver’s licenses, hazardous material handling instructions, criminal records, wants and warrants, maps of local roads or waterways, courtroom schedules, a listing of terrorist groups and suspects, hospital emergency room capacity, or the location of a power supply in a building or neighborhood.

This simple summary and examples help to show the inherent complexity and range of challenges faced by government agencies who seek to share information and collaborate across organizational and governmental boundaries.

3.1 The Public Safety Networks Study When multiple government agencies work together to communicate and share information in support of public safety, they form what we and others call a PSN. As noted above, a PSN always has a policing component and usually involves other public safety functions supported by related government agencies or private sector organizations. A PSN is both an ICT-based system and an organizational unit (a social institution) requiring a system of governance, a shared technology infrastructure, and funding sources. As such, PSN are a prime example of the complex sociotechnical system that encompasses inter-organizational collaboration.

A foremost goal of the National Science Foundation-funded Public Safety Networks project3 is to develop a set of PSN design principles. To do so, we designed our study of state and local-level PSN using multiple methods of field-based data collection. These include in-depth case studies of five public safety networks [9-13], a listing of almost 200 PSN at the state and local levels, a telephone survey interviewing key informants of extant PSN, and extensive secondary data collection of approximately 230 state and county demographics used to help frame the institutional settings incumbent in these two levels of government [14, 15].

The survey data collection was designed to create a data set such that we could use these data to detect patterns in PSN formation, use and performance. This analysis provides us with the means to identify a set of design principles. The data were collected in 2009-2010 by a professional survey research organization in semi-structured phone interviews with senior personnel (e.g., the CIO or PSN project manager). The resulting data set includes information on 80 PSNs from across the United States.

2 Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2007). Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2004. Retrieved from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/csllea04.htm. 3 Please visit www.PublicSafetyNetworksStudy.org for additional information.

The survey instrument was pre-tested by members of the research team, survey administration experts, and public safety organization representatives. It was then pilot tested with a small number of PSNs. The resultant instrument contained 95 questions and took approximately 45 to 60 minutes to administer. The questions cover a range of factual and perceptual topics, including PSN and respondent demographics, PSN features, goals and intended uses, operational maturity, user characteristics, funding, technology architecture, technology implementation, organizational and data governance, triggering events, and performance. While statistical analysis of the data is ongoing, preliminary results have been reported in [1, 16].

In the two sections that follow, we present an initial set of design observations that resulted from close examination of all three sets of data. We note the importance of the in-depth case studies for understanding how, when and why trends or patterns observed in the survey analysis are translated into design principles.

The initial set of design observations presented below was derived from the ongoing and iterative analysis of the PSN survey data and the detailed case studies completed to date. Rational choice and institutional theory factors served as the theoretical basis for identifying organizational characteristics and environmental conditions that influence PSN design. The socio-technical perspective as well as information infrastructure concepts served as the theoretical basis for specifying IOS features. Members of the research team explored particular aspects of the data using a broad range of descriptive and inferential statistics, both structured and axial coding of the case studies, and extensive discussion of the exploratory and interim findings produced from this work. These initial design observations reflect a synthesis of the discussions and should be seen as the basis for a more sustained and rigorous analysis of the data to both refine and further develop a future set of design principles.

4. INITIAL LIST OF DESIGN OBSERVATIONS The initial list of design-oriented observations presented here reflects a set of patterns detected in the survey data with corroboration from the in-depth case studies. We see these observations as providing the basis for developing PSN design principles. At this time, however, these observations are normative: design principles should be prescriptive. As with all research designs, there are underlying assumptions that must be taken into account; we first outline these.

4.1 PSN Design Assumptions Our first premise is that a PSN is a sociotechnical construction. Numerous information infrastructure findings support this view of ICT [17-19] - that is, a PSN comprises both a collection of technological elements (the ICT-based system) and social organizations in which the technological aspects are enmeshed. Therefore PSN design must cover both its technological and social elements. Second, PSN design for information sharing is situated - the larger environment in which PSN exist is political, federated and complex. Yang and Maxwell's review of public sector information sharing studies identified 11 factors interacting in complex fashion to influence success [20]. That is, while there are commonalities and patterns that PSN may share, each PSN is unique relative to its institutional setting, goals, functioning, membership and governance. A third design assumption is, by definition, that a PSN exists across overlapping jurisdictions so that there is no singular or clear line or chain of command through which it reports or acquires funding. That is, goal ambiguity

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results from the interaction of various internal and external stakeholders [21]. Given these three assumptions, PSN are hard to replicate entirely - so design observations and principles must be generalized. The below observations represent an attempt to generalize our findings contingent upon four different orientations by which ICT-enabled inter-organizational relationships might evolve.

4.2 PSN Design Observations We use examples from our in-depth case studies and survey results to help describe the initial set of PSN design observations. Given the space limitations of this paper, we refrain from providing extensive details about each..

The initial PSN design observations are presented in four groupings, reflecting whether they pertain to the collective socio-technical arrangement, primarily technical or organizational components, or use. Each observation is accompanied by a brief explication of its organizational and technical implications. The entire set of design observations is summarized in Appendix A.

4.2.1 Socio-technical design observations ST1: All PSN require a host organization. This host organization consists of more than the IT personnel that design and support the system as it will need to be concerned with such things as funding, user outreach, training and politics. The host organization has explicit governance responsibilities, its own budget and often operational mandates. It cannot be outsourced to a vendor although its development efforts may be.

The host organization may be formal (like a new department within an existing agency or a new unit that reports to multiple existing agencies). This host organization may also be semi-formal (such as a steering committee) or even an informal set of arrangements (such as an ad hoc group of like-minded CIOs who meet regularly to provide guidance and oversight). The host organization may arise solely to support and govern the PSN, or, it may be that the PSN becomes the ward or charge of a pre-existing organization.

Organizational implications: • Both the PSN itself and the host organization create governance

needs and structures that were not needed before the PSN came into being. Sharing data and a commonly accessible technological infrastructure across functions, jurisdictions and levels of government places unique governance and collaboration needs on the participating agencies and organizations. This means that all PSN are also inherently political given that these agencies, jurisdictions and levels of government each have their own reporting and funding structures that are designed to work independently.

Technological implications: • The origin, form and function of the host organization will

frame the ways in which technological decision-making is accomplished.

• Organizational stakeholders (e.g., state police or fire department representatives) become members of the governance structure and, perhaps to a greater degree than users or technologists, will be instrumental in deciding system parameters. This is particularly likely during the initial phases of PSN development.

• ST2: A PSN and its host organization need governance structures. Governance encompasses strategic, operational, budgetary, and design aspects of the system. The design of a

system necessitates the design of a governance structure to support that system. These will be always linked, even if at times, not well-matched.

Organizational implications: • If the PSN expands its functionality in ways that are not easily

governed, either functionality will be constrained or new governance processes must be developed to properly manage it.

• Often, governance structures trail behind the development and usage of the system.

Technological implications:

• Every aspect of the system will involve governance (data, devices, applications).

• Each aspect may not be governed in an integrated (coherent) fashion. Data governance is particularly difficult to achieve and the PSN may enter operation without proper data governance in place. Alternatively, some data access may be crippled pending the establishment of an acceptable governance agreement.

• Many rather mundane technical decisions may have substantial governance implications.

ST3: PSN design must respond to mandates. These mandates may contradict strategic goals or operational uses of a PSN. Given the federated and political nature of public sector operations, PSN design needs to reflect that they are subject to a steady set of exogenous forces. Mandates are often tied to funding or political approval and PSN leaders and uses often have little or no choice about whether or how best to meet them. Mandates have been known to dictate technology decisions (such as which cell phone company is to be used by a PSN’s users), development choices (such as whether to use an outsourcing vendor or whether the software developed would be proprietary or open source), organizational structures (where the PSN would be housed or governed), or its use (which agencies are authorized to or prohibited from joining the collaboration).

Organizational implications:

• Existing or potential PSN should attend to proposed mandates as they may provide opportunities to be leveraged as well as constraints that impinge on success.

• Mandates from different stakeholders may compete with one another. This may restrict access to sources of funding or which geographies can be served.

Technological implications: • PSN may suffer from inadequate design features or functions if

political or funding mandates require alternative design decisions.

• Mandates may provide opportunities to upgrade legacy systems either centrally or in participating organizations.

4.2.2 Technology-centered design observations Tech1: Architecture accretes. A PSN’s technology elements are developed over time, often by connecting existing systems, developing or purchasing applications that provide particular functions, and working to share data from multiple sources. This means the technological infrastructure of PSN is always heterogeneous and evolving. This infrastructure will build on what is made available and come to include a unique collection of legacy applications, devices and other arrangements.

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Organizational implications: • PSN governance and technology choices will be constrained by

both previous technology choices and the complexity of the current heterogeneous architecture.

• The heterogeneous architecture of a PSN will require constant attention and drive up operational costs.

Technological implications: • Legacy technologies will serve as a constraint to technology

design choices. • The architectural patterns and future technology plans will

reflect the structures of governance.

Tech2: Security drives access. Security concerns will vary depending on the sensitivity of the data being shared or the nature of the communication within an incident. Security and access are determined by the suppliers of data or by the participating organizations for a particular event or incident. Levels of access will also vary for participating organizations, as determined by the originator. Organizational implications: • Data sharing and communication may be restricted by

sensitivity, and may require significant local agreements be created to supersede existing prohibitions to share data across government levels, functions or geographies.

• Security limitations may preclude certain organizations from joining or contributing to the PSN.

Technological implications: • Security controls may be enforced at the expense of use. Some

participants will need to be banned from certain types or uses of data and communications, making tracking of access a very complicated system component.

• Security will be enforced both centrally and at source locations and therefore must be coordinated by the PSN.

Tech3: Individual agencies will retain control of their data/information. PSN data come from a wide variety of sources, some of which actively participate and use the system (such as police departments) and others who do not (like state registries or the Center for Disease Control). These sources are adamant about retaining control over the collection of and access to their data. Most data collected directly by a PSN in response to an incident or request are stored centrally outside of the source systems.

Organizational implications: • Each source will require creation of a separate governance

agreement reflecting access rules and security needs of its supplier that are in line with PSN usage requirements.

• A PSN must be aware of its responsibility for establishing ownership, governing and granting permissions for any data it collects or generates.

Technological implications: • Data quality of externally sourced data is critical yet hard to

enforce given that data are collected by organizations with no reporting relationship to the PSN, and for reasons specific to the supplying organization.

• Middleware or bridges will be needed in order to match up data definitions and formats from the many data sources feeding into the PSN.

• PSN generated data definitions and formats may be affected by the quality and availability of common data items.

4.2.3 Organizationally-focused design observations Org1: PSN designs are shaped by their funding models. Funding is a core concern for PSN. Many have unstable funding patterns and rely on an ever-changing mix of capital and operational funds. These sources have varying constraints. For example, federal money is often programmatic, stakeholder subscription fees are tied to these constituents receiving specific services. Very few PSN have a sole-source funding model. Those that do note that this is also dangerous as it becomes a single source of failure in years of reduced budgets.

Organizational implications: • The PSN leadership will devote substantial time and resources

to pursue and secure funding. This is often opportunistic and makes strategic planning difficult (or at least contingent).

• Most PSN will be chronically under-funded and may see substantial changes in their budget from year to year.

Technological implications: • Technology choices will often be driven by funding

availability. This might be opportunistic in that new things are considered, and it may be that funds needed for specific technologies or goals are not available.

• Funding for operations and maintenance will often be more difficult to secure than for developing new applications and services. This means that the PSN infrastructure is likely to be under-maintained.

Org2: PSN design reflects the complexity of its collective stakeholder constraints and needs. All the participating levels of government have legitimate leadership roles in the technical design of the PSN. Likewise, PSN which span multiple jurisdictions or involve agencies that serve different needs will be more complex than those which cover fewer jurisdictions or have more functionally similar stakeholders.

Organizational implications: • There is typically no single chain of command or distinct

decision-holder in PSN governance. A PSN’s governance is shared and often negotiated.

• Formalisms such as inter-state compacts, memoranda of understanding or agreement, or other instruments are important as they provide the governance and policy guidance for the PSN’s organizational functioning.

Technological implications: • Most PSN design decisions will require political, operational

and technological decision making to align.

Org3: Pre-existing relationships matter. Formal PSN connections and efforts arise from informal connections and efforts, especially prior successes. Pre-existing reservoirs of trust among individuals and agencies provide the basis for future collaborations.

Organizational implications: • Collaborating with trusted partners can reduce the costs

typically associated with safeguarding against potential betrayal and deviation from shared goals.

• Stores of social capital enable more efficient communication and information exchange through previously shared language and experiences.

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Technological implications: • PSN design decisions will exhibit a path dependency based

upon prior development process framework (constrained by legacy development method, not just legacy technology).

4.2.4 Use-oriented design observations Use1: Systems designed for routine use will be used in non-routine situations. The focus of non-routine events is to the event, not the technologies. This means that those PSN which are used routinely will likely be used in non-routine events. Multi-use PSN systems are more likely to be routinized (but in different ways).

Organizational implications: • Users will need to rely extensively on experience to effectively

engage systems as workarounds and unanticipated ways of using the system prevail.

• Formal training will decrease in effectiveness as unanticipated usage increases.

• Formal documented policies will increasingly diverge from actual use.

Technological implications: • Overlapping functionality among systems is very confusing for

users and may actually decrease usage of any one system.

Use2: Systems must be designed to reflect that there will be legitimate and multiple measures of performance. Each PSN is measured across a number of performance indicators. Each performance measure matters to some of the PSN’s stakeholders. It is not possible to be successful across all performance measures. This is likely to increase PSN goal ambiguity [21] due to the conflicting demands of key stakeholders.

Organizational implications: • The heterogeneous architecture of a PSN will require constant

attention and drive up operational costs. • Goal ambiguity makes it difficult to maintain legitimacy across

all the PSN’s stakeholders.

Technological implications: • Systems design must sometimes satisfy the collaboration’s need

to maintain legitimacy with key stakeholders and therefore might not align with goals for improvements in efficiency and effectiveness.

Use3: System usage is driven by behaviors of users in pursuit of performance goals. The users of PSN are pursuing their own goals. These goals typically reflect both explicit and implicit incentives. There is a distinct imbalance between the goals of many who use data provided by the PSN with the goals of those who often enter data into the PSN. For instance, crime analysts value the data that police officers provide in their reports. But, the police officer may not see (or receive) any direct benefit from this work. Since the value of entering data does not accrue to the person entering it, it may not be done, or done well.

Organizational implications: • Concerns for data quality will require PSN to devote

specialized resources to manage data entry and quality control activities.

• Incentives to enter data are important.

Technological implications: • Data quality will be an issue. • There will be a need for extensive administrative data access

and data control systems. That is, the administrative effort to

manage data will lead to developing internal-to-the-PSN data control and data management applications.

4.2.5 Additional Observations There are other design-related areas that have yet to be fully explored. Four of these are presented here, with a short discussion of our investigation plans for each area.

• Do patterns of architecture exist? Analysis is currently underway to determine if there are recognizable patterns in the design of more successful PSN or if there are particular features and functions that typically group together, perhaps in support of high-level categories of PSN use or complexity. Examination of the case studies indicates that this may be the case.

• Are these systems better if user-oriented? There is anecdotal evidence from the in-depth case studies that PSN are more likely to gain acceptance if their users perceive that their needs are given priority, and that the benefits of their use are clearly spelled out – either through performance gains (e.g., faster crime resolution) or productivity improvement (e.g., faster and more detailed information retrieval). There is also some evidence that user-oriented PSN achieve critical mass of both individual and organizational users. This speaks toward designing PSN explicitly for broader use rather than individual needs. The resolution of this tradeoff may reside in training, the importance of which received strong support from all interviewees.

• Should issues of data access, use and sharing be developed as distinct from technological and use principles? One observation is that, given the importance of data ownership and access policies to the design, governance and uses of PSN, we should develop a distinct set of data principles independent of the technology and use observations provided here. Certainly data access and use issues are relevant to several of our observation areas.

• What roles do standards play? While both hardware and data standards are seen as important, and receive great attention by PSN developers, managers and users, there is mixed evidence that their adoption leads to better design. Standards pertinent to public safety are known to evolve continuously. Moreover, there are often competing standards that make it difficult to agree on one to ease collaboration among public and private sector constituencies. Standards seem to work better for hardware (e.g., radio spectrums) than data (e.g., Justice XML). Sometimes standards adoption is mandated by funding sources and technical suitability or use may not be factored into design.

We further acknowledge that there may be other aspects of good design that we have yet to identify. For example, there are specific aspects of governance that may be critical to PSN. Examples of these aspects of governance for consideration include the development of trust mechanisms, the potential connections between providing resources and having a say in governance, and others. As we continue to analyze our data, we expect to adjust this set of observations to better reflect the nature of PSN best practice.

5. ADVANCING FROM DESIGN OBSERVATIONS TO DESIGN PRINCIPLES While this initial set of design observations is likely to change as more analysis provides us with deeper insight into the patterns of

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PSN design, it is important to move from observational and normative statements of design such as what we have presented towards prescriptive guidance. In Appendix A we summarize the initial set of design observations introduced in Section 4. Although all of these offer insights to PSN stakeholders, to be useful, they should provide specific guidance. For example, the observation embodied in Use1 (Design for routine use) may become the principle: “PSN must be designed to first support routine operations; with non-routine functionality being provided as part of the operational package.”

Second, we speculate that some of these observational insights are especially important for PSN to consider as core to successful design. That is, these observations – and the principles that may arise from them – form a core or necessary set of design guidelines. For example, we found strong evidence that PSN need some form of dedicated host organization that is capable of and focused on advocating for the PSN’s funding, usage, and design priorities [ST1]. A PSN will need to accommodate legacy technologies and standards used by its data providers and users, and build new functionality that works alongside these stakeholder constraints [Tech1]. We found strong support for data ownership remaining with the data’s originators. This, in turn, drives the importance and difficulty of working out data governance agreements among the PSN and its many data partners [Tech 3].

The take-up and ongoing use of a PSN post initial adoption is preconditioned on it being useful for both routine and non-routine incidents and events [Use1]. Moreover, each PSN has several mechanisms for measuring success, which correspond to the perspectives of its stakeholders and its sociotechnical intricacy [Use2]. However, individual users will view it through their own lens, and evaluate its usefulness based on their own productivity and performance metrics [Use3].

5.1 Implications for Practice and Research Given that public safety collaborations like PSN span many types of activities, governmental levels, functional domains and geographies, it appears appropriate to generalize our recommendations to other public sector collaborations. This is an important realization and contribution, as President Obama has made cross-agency communication and information sharing a federal priority [22]. While it is tempting to advance our observations – and the design principles to come – as useful for all forms of IOS, we hesitate to generalize beyond the scope of our empirical context. Instead, we opted to provide some basis for contingent generalization based upon the orientation of the collaboration’s IOS design evolution.

Our next steps will be to refine the set of observations and to construct a set of design principles to guide PSN development. The validity of the design principles will be evaluated using Bijker’s principles which espouse the sociotechnical perspective.

With a set of design principles in hand, PSN designers, managers and users will have better tools for evaluating PSN in development and in use. With consideration given to the specifics of a candidate PSN, the design principles can be adapted to the purpose and complexity of a particular sociotechnical arrangement, increasing its potential for enhancing public safety and the work life of its users.

Researchers are encouraged to examine the relevance of these observations in their own public safety and IOS research. Doing so will provide the means to both test the validity of such observations and enhance their completeness. In addition, these

observations can serve as normative guidance for research conducted by design scientists who build and evaluate similar systems [1]. We also encourage researchers to evaluate the generalizeability of our observations in related digital government domains.

6. Acknowledgements We are indebted to the many organizations and individuals who participated in the in-depth case studies and surveys.

This work is supported by National Science Foundation grants NSF-0852688 and NSF-0534877. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

7. References [1] Fedorowicz, J., Dias, M. , A Decade of Design in Digital

Government Research. Government Information Quarterly, 2010. 27(1): p. 1-8.

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APPENDIX A: IMPLICATIONS OF PSN DESIGN OBSERVATIONS

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