The De-Fanging of Nuclear Rivalries:

Potential Effects on India’s Strategic Relationships with China and Pakistan

Rajesh Basrur

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

2014-15

Abstract

India’s emergence as a nuclear power has produced tensions and crises in its relationships with

both its strategic adversaries. India and China show signs of replicating other nuclear rivalries –

witness the border confrontation of 2013. India and Pakistan have experienced a series of crises

(1990, 1999, 2001-02, and 2008) reminiscent of the Cold War. This paper will consider the

impact of denuclearization on these two relationships in the light of the general debate on the

strategic effects of disarmament. Post-nuclear relations, it will show, will be relatively stable in

both cases. The India-China relationship will stabilize because India will be able – through

internal as well as external balancing – to develop a rough equilibrium with China. The India-

Pakistan relationship will become less unstable because Pakistan will no longer have recourse to

the asymmetric strategy it has long employed from behind its nuclear shield.

Introduction

The central question that I seek to answer in this paper is: what kind of a post-nuclear strategic

environment is India likely to face? The question is interesting for Indian and other policy

makers because India has long had an interest in universal nuclear disarmament, but there has

been no discussion on the likely politics of a post-nuclear world. Before it developed nuclear

weapons, the question was less challenging; after nuclearization, it is far more so. Any state

which adheres to a strategy of nuclear deterrence must confront the argument: if nuclear weapons

provide security, will their absence not produce the opposite? The question also addresses the

broad theoretically informed debate on the viability of universal disarmament.

While proponents of disarmament hold that the risks associated with it will largely be dealt with

prior to the achievement of that desired end state, critics argue that the existence of nuclear

weapons cannot be undone and any effort to act as if it can will inevitably generate instability

2

and very likely war.1 However, as I will show in this paper, it is entirely possible that the de-

fanging of nuclear rivalries will produce a relatively stable environment between former nuclear

powers. In the India-China case, India’s capacity to deter China with conventional weapons is

sufficient to provide a balance in the relationship, while growing economic interdependence

pushes them toward cooperation. In the India-Pakistan case, India’s superior conventional

capability, combined with the changing internal dynamic in Pakistan, will ensure an enduring

balance. In both dyads, especially the latter, the scope for destabilization produced by the

stability/instability paradox – ubiquitous to varying degree in hostile nuclear relationships – will

be sharply diminished by nuclear disarmament.

In the next section, I will briefly review the theoretical and policy debate over the impact of

nuclear disarmament on strategic stability generally. I will show that the debate tends to create a

false binary (stability/instability) and that the reality is more complex. I will then go on to

analyze the India-China and India-Pakistan relationships separately and show that both are likely

to be relatively stable, though not for entirely the same reasons. The analysis will provide a

policy relevant prognosis and simultaneously contribute to the theoretical debate over the

question of stability in a post-nuclear world.

The Disarmament Debate

From a disarmament advocate’s standpoint, the objective of dismantling the world’s nuclear

weapons is both laudable and doable – the first because it will dispel the prospect of

Armageddon, the second because it is a matter of belief and political will. An integral aspect of

the first argument is that the claim that nuclear weapons produce stability is overrated. The “long

peace” was not the product of mutual deterrence, but of other factors; indeed, it could be argued

that nuclear weapons may not deter at all.2 The second part of the argument – that the objective

of universal disarmament is viable – has precedents to back it: the abolition of biological and

chemical weapons confirms that norms do matter. Moreover, the taboo surrounding nuclear

weapons, while not absolute, brings the prospect of abolition that much closer. Cast in the

vocabulary of international relations (IR) theory, the argument is a constructivist one that, at

1 The literature on the disarmament debate is considerable. Some useful writings are: Barry Blechman and Alex

Bollfrass, “5 Myths about Getting Rid of the Bomb,” Washington Post, June 27, 2010

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/25/AR2010062502157.html>; Neil Cooper,

“Putting Disarmament Back in the Frame,” Review of International Studies, 32, 2 (April 2006), pp. 353-376; James

E. Doyle, “Why Eliminate Nuclear Weapons?” Survival, 55, 1 (February-March 2013), pp. 7-34; Lawrence

Freedman, “A New Theory for Nuclear Disarmament,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 65, 4 (July/August 2009),

pp. 14-30; Charles Glaser, “The Flawed Case for Disarmament,” Survival, 40, 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 112-128; Dennis

M. Gormley, “Silent Retreat: The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons,” Nonproliferation Review, 14, 2 (July 2007), pp.

183-206; Michael MccGwire, “The Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” in John Baylis and Robert O’Neill, eds.

Alternative Nuclear Futures (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Michael Quinlan, “Abolishing

Nuclear Armouries: Policy or Pipedream?” Survival, 49, 4 (Winter 2007-08), pp. 7-16; and Keith B. Payne, “The

Continuing Roles for U.S. Strategic Forces,” Comparative Strategy, 26, 4 (July-September 2007), pp. 269-274. 2 John Mueller, “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security, 13, 2 (Autumn 1988), pp.

55-79; Ward Wilson, “The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in the Light of Hiroshima,”

International Security, 31, 4 (Spring 2007), pp. 162–79.

3

bottom, is a restatement of the by now hoary axiom that anarchy is what states make of it. From

a practical standpoint, disarmament is possible if we think it is.

Realists reject this position because they prioritize the material reality of power distribution in an

anarchic system of states. In what is essentially a self-help system, they believe, change has its

limits, as Rousseau asserted in rejecting the Abbé St. Pierre’s plan for perpetual peace.3 Any

effort to surmount these limits is not only doomed to fail, but is downright dangerous. Nuclear

weapons can be hidden and, moreover, cannot be disinvented. To act as if they can would be to

forgo the benefits of deterrence and invite nuclear blackmail, perhaps attack, from cheaters.

Furthermore, the elimination of nuclear weapons will heighten the probability of major

conventional war, which – given the destructive power of today’s conventional weapons – could

exact a toll far worse than that wrought by World War II.

The debate has elements of truth in it on both sides, but misses some important points. The

constructivist case fails to recognize fully that peace is not inevitable in the absence of nuclear

weapons. The realist position is overly optimistic about the “peace” nuclear weapons are said to

induce. The truth is that there are no guarantees on either side. A nuclear world can be and is

often dangerous, as we know from the history of nuclear confrontations. And a conventional

world can be relatively stable, for otherwise history would be filled with unceasing combat, and

we know that it is not. In this paper, I take the position that a conventional (i.e. post-nuclear)

world can be either stable or not. In an anarchic system, non-nuclear powers do not have to fight.

Some states will do so under specific conditions, but war and instability are not inevitable. Each

inter-state relationship must be analyzed for its potential to be either stable or unstable.

Conditions that impede war between states include the existence of well-developed democracies,

high-level economic interdependence, and conventional balances of power.

In addition, there are factors that produce high levels of tension between nuclear-armed states

that will be absent in a post-nuclear world. First, nuclear weapons threats engender qualitatively

higher levels of threat because of their incomparable capacity for immense as well as rapid

destruction. Even where there is no threat intended, the security dilemma operates at an extreme

and distinctive level between nuclear-armed states. Second, dissatisfied states can hide behind

their nuclear shields to generate what is known as the stability/instability paradox by means of

low-level provocations that are politically unacceptable to the target state. Third, as nuclear

powers strain at the leash of deterrence, they may in trying to demonstrate will or resolve

produce crises that could escalate and spin the relationship out of control. All of the above can

occur with conventional weapons too, but with the difference that the opportunities for avoiding

annihilation are far greater than is the case where nuclear weapons are involved.

3 Jean Jacques Rousseau, “Abstract of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace,” in M. G. Forsyth, H.

M. A. Keens-Soper and P. Savigear, eds., The Theory of International Relations: Selected Texts from Gentili to

Trietschke (New Brunswick: Aldine Transaction, 2009).

4

In the sections that follow, I will examine the India-China and India-Pakistan relationships in

some detail to bolster my argument. Both, it will be seen, are likely to be relatively stable in the

absence of nuclear weapons. Both are also good examples since they carry characteristics

conducive to “cold war” relationships: the possession of nuclear weapons, histories of war and

crisis, long-standing territorial disputes, differing political systems, and strong nationalist

sentiments fuelled by domestic political uncertainties. One would expect that, in the absence of

nuclear weapons, the tensions in both relationships would produce a greater proclivity for war,

but that is not the prognosis for either.

India and China

As mentioned above, the scope for conflict between India and China is considerable. Over the

last few years, tensions have risen for several reasons.4

The Border Dispute: The border between the two countries, over 4,000 km long, goes back to the

1950s. It resulted in war in 1962, followed by confrontations in 1967 (twice), 1986-87 (over

several months) and smaller frictions from time to time. The problem is accentuated by the lack

of an agreement between the two sides on the so-called Line of Actual Control (LAC) which

divides their troops. Inevitably, local pulls and pushes have from time to time led to face-offs,

most recently a fairly substantial one in April 2013, when the two forces confronted each other

with only some 100 meters’ separating them. Arguably, if the possession of nuclear weapons

restrains the two sides at present, a post-nuclear environment may well unleash conflict.

Domestic Politics: Internal tensions have impacted negatively on the relationship. The border

dispute has been particularly sensitive because it involves China’s weak underbelly, Tibet. While

India recognizes Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, it also hosts the Dalai Lama, who represents

Tibetan resistance to Chinese control. Tibetan separatism has grown over the last decade,

peaking just before the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and persisting till today with a large number of

protest self-immolations since 2011, including by Buddhist monks and nuns. As a result, the

Chinese position on the border dispute has hardened. On the Indian side, a slowing economy and

a weak and riven coalition government have led New Delhi to adopt a tough posture against

China.

Balance of Power Politics: With the end of the Cold War, China is widely regarded as the next

challenger to the global dominance of the United States. Hedging against a rising China,

Washington and New Delhi have sought to build a strong strategic partnership that encompasses

arms transfers, rapidly rising trade, and consultations on a wide range of strategic issues.

Notably, the United States has by-passed the nuclear nonproliferation regime it leads and

facilitated India’s engagement in civilian nuclear commerce with the Nuclear Suppliers Group –

4 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (University of Washington

Press: Seattle, 2001); Mohan Malik, China and India: Great Power Rivals (Boulder, CO: FirstForum Press, 2011);

Arpit Rajain, Nuclear Deterrence in Asia: China, India and Pakistan (Sage: New Delhi, 2005).

5

a concession China views as a balancing move. On its part, China has gained a firm foothold via

trade, investment and arms transfers among India’s neighbors (the so-called “string of pearls”

strategy). India has responded by strengthening economic and security links with Southeast Asia

(notably Singapore and Vietnam) and Japan. China has developed a maritime presence in the

Indian Ocean, India in the South China Sea.

Taken together, the developments have produced a strained relationship that is conceivably

disciplined only by the presence of nuclear weapons, or at least shows signs of a cold war-type

restlessness. As with all nuclear rivalries, the neighbors have been beset by a sense of

competition that shows signs of degenerating into a nuclear rivalry. There are no indications that

the tensions will dissipate soon. From a realist perspective, it is a logical expectation that if

nuclear weapons were to be removed from the scene, the competition would intensify since the

risk of nuclear conflict would be eliminated.

However, there are other facets of the relationship that leave room for a more positive view.

Economic Relations: Trade between India and China has grown rapidly from $133.5 million in

1988 to $65.8 billion in 2013.5 Similarly, Chinese foreign direct investment in India has risen

sharply from $0.15 million in 2003 to $180.08 million in 2011.6 Tensions notwithstanding, India

has called for more Chinese investment in India.7 Critics will balk at this argument: after all,

growing economic interdependence throughout the nineteenth century did not prevent World

War I from breaking out. But times have changed: the nature of interdependence – the

integration of production and the pace and complexity of cross-border investment today – are of

an altogether different order of magnitude.

The Military Balance: On the face of it, China’s military power is far ahead of India’s. Chinese

economic power is much greater, its military spending far higher. In 2012, China’s GDP stood at

$8.22 trillion, while India’s GDP was only $1.4 trillion.8 In the same year, China’s military

spending at $166 billion dwarfed India’s $46 billion.9 Yet there are a number of factors that

favor India’s capacity to deter China without the need for nuclear weapons. First, Indian air

power is well placed along the border because Indian airfields are closer to the border than are

China’s airfields.10

Second, Chinese naval forces, though much larger than their Indian

counterparts, are more or less bottled up in East Asia by the presence of the American and

5 India, Ministry of Commerce, via CEIC database.

6 China, Ministry of Commerce, via CEIC database.

7 Ronojoy Banerjee, “Govt Looks to Attract FDI in Roads from China, Seeks MoU,” Moneycontrol.com, August 26,

2013. 8 World Bank, Data <http://data.worldbank.org/country/china> and < http://data.worldbank.org/country/india >

(both accessed March 14, 2014). 9 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database> (accessed

March 14, 2014). 10

V. K. Bhatia, Air Power across the Himalayas: A Military Appreciation of Chinese and Indian Air Forces, Policy

Brief, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, December

2013.

6

Japanese navies. While China is widely viewed as the primary (though not necessarily the most

immediate) threat for India, China has bigger fish to worry about: the United States and Japan.

More generally, in a non-nuclear weapon world, military balances forged by alliances will

matter, whereas in a nuclear world, a state’s possession of the “great equalizer” means they do

not. Thus, India’s strategic partnerships with the United States and Japan (among others) place it

firmly on the stronger side where conventional forces are concerned. In such an environment,

Chinese power would be nicely balanced by India’s admittedly weaker military.

Taken together, these economic and strategic factors will mitigate the risks raised by the

abolition of nuclear weapons. In short, a post-nuclear relationship between India and China

would very likely be a relatively stable one. This is not to say that India-China relations will be

stress-free. The factors identified above will not disappear overnight and may well elevate

tensions from time to time. But these are manageable problems, not the kind that will invite

greater war proneness in the absence of nuclear weapons. Above all, it must be kept in mind that

China is not a revisionist power, whereas Germany before the two world wars was, as was the

Soviet Union during the Cold War. On the contrary, it is a beneficiary of the way the global

system functions. While it may seek a greater role and enhanced benefits from the system, it will

not seek system change. Nor is it likely to use an asymmetric strategy against India, say, by

supporting Indian insurgencies, both because it is not a revisionist power and because it is

equally vulnerable on this count. The real problem between India and China (and indeed between

the United States and China) will be how to manage the declining area of risk that is posed by

the security dilemma lying outside the sphere of interdependence.

India and Pakistan

The India-Pakistan relationship, often characterized as an “intractable rivalry,” has been

peppered with recurrent wars (1947-48, 1965 and 1971) and crises (1986-87, 1990, 1999, 2001-

02 and 2008).11

Notably, the advent of nuclear weapons in the region during the 1980s marked a

shift from war to crisis, which seems to bolster the realist case about the stabilizing effects of

nuclear weapons (at least in the sense of war avoidance).12

It follows from this perspective that if

there are no nuclear weapons to restrain them, the two countries might well opt to fight. The

factors that may press them to do so are as follows.

11

P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and A Peace Process: American

Engagement in South Asia (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007; Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending:

India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002); Sumit Ganguly and Devin T.

Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Oxford University Press,

New Delhi, 2005); T. V. Paul, ed., The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2005). 12

The 1999 Kargil conflict is sometimes treated as a war, but in my opinion was too limited in scope and scale to be

classified as such. See also V. R. Raghavan, “Limited War and Strategic Liability,” Hindu, February 2, 2000

<http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2000/02/02/stories/05022523.htm> (accessed March 14, 2014).

7

The Border Dispute: The tussle over Kashmir, divided between India and Pakistan since the

1947-48 war, is inextricably bound up with national identities.13

Pakistan, founded on the basis

of Muslim identity, views the Muslim-majority region of Kashmir as a natural part of itself.

India, established as a secular republic that exemplifies unity in diversity, claims with equal

vehemence that Kashmir is an integral part of its territory. Thus, the possession of all of Kashmir

is identified with the nationhood of each country. The one critical difference between the two

sides is that, India is a relatively status quo state: so long as all of Kashmir does not go to

Pakistan, its identity needs are met, since the Indian-held portion – the state of Jammu and

Kashmir – is a Muslim-majority area. Pakistan, in contrast, is a revisionist state that needs all of

Kashmir on its side since the founding of the Pakistani state was accomplished by incorporating

Muslim-majority areas within it. The breaking way of Bangladesh in 1971 might conceivably

have mitigated this problem, but instead made it worse. The predicament is exacerbated by

domestic politics.

Domestic Politics: Despite the blemishes produced by recurring social conflicts, the Indian

political system has steadily evolved into a relatively stable democracy in which political power

has become decentralized and regular elections have produced seamless transfers of power.14

Periodic episodes of secessionist violence have been met with force, but also with negotiations.

As a result, several violent movements resisting New Delhi’s authority have subsided, notably in

the states of Punjab and Assam. Others persist. Kashmir is a particularly difficult one, but that is

explained by its being bound up with inter-state politics (on which more below). Also notable is

that political participation has percolated to the poorest sections of Indian society. Huge

challenges remain – the embedding of democracy has not been accompanied by the distribution

of economic gain and political violence is endemic in Kashmir, the Northeast and the northern

heartland.15

None of these problems is likely to vanish soon, leaving the sense of vulnerability in

place and making any accommodation with Pakistan in their zero sum game over Kashmir

extremely difficult. On its part, the Pakistani state – a “hybrid” democracy at best – has teetered

between civilian and military control.16

Constant inner turmoil has led to the rise of a “jihadi

culture,” a civil war between the Taliban and the Pakistani state, the embedding of a militarized

and simultaneously kleptocratic elite, and the persistence of an economy that is heavily

dependent on assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the United States.17

While

13

Ashutosh Varshney, ‘India, Pakistan, and Kashmir: Antinomies of Nationalism,’ Asian Survey, 31, 11 (November

1991), pp. 997-1019; Sinderpal Singh, India in South Asia: Domestic Identity Politics and Foreign Policy from

Nehru to the BJP (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2013). 14

Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “Identity Politics in an Era of Globalization,” in A. Kelly, Ramkishen S. Rajan and Gillian

H. L. Goh, eds. Managing Globalization: Lessons from India and China (Singapore: World Scientific, 2006). 15

On the challenges facing Indian democracy, see Rajesh M. Basrur, ed., Challenges to Democracy in India (New

Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009). 16

On Pakistan as a “hybrid democracy,” see Rita Chowdhari Tremblay and Julian Schofield, “Institutional Causes

of the India-Pakistan Rivalry,” in Paul, ed., India-Pakistan Conflict. 17

Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” in Harvey W. Kushner, ed. Essential Readings on Political Terrorism:

Analyses of Problems and Prospects for the Twenty First Century (New York: Gordian Knot Books, 2002); Irm

8

democratic parties tend to “outbid” each other in mollifying conservative elements opposed to an

India-Pakistan entente, the army is prone to underscore the India threat in order to preserve its

dominant position in the political set-up.

Balance of Power Politics: The “enduring rivalry” between India and Pakistan has been – and

continues to be – characterized by typical balance-of-power behavior. As a relatively weak state,

Pakistan has sought to bolster its position on Kashmir by developing external sources of political

and military support, some bilateral (the United States, China), others multilateral (the United

Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference). It has also resisted close economic and

cultural links with India. In contrast, India, a relatively strong state, has sought to keep external

powers at bay and to cultivate stronger economic and cultural links with Pakistan. The two have

also engaged in arms racing, initially on conventional lines, more recently by the competitive

development of nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons provide Pakistan with the basic

security of knowing that it is no longer vulnerable to India’s conventional advantage, Islamabad

has tended to feel more insecure than ever because of the growing India-Pakistan security

relationship. Besides, the broad indicators of power are strongly tilted in India’s favor. India’s

GDP in 2012 was $1.84 trillion, while Pakistan’s was $225.10 billion.18

The gap in military

spending was similar: in 2012, the figure for Pakistan was $6.17 billion, while for India it was

$46.12 billion.19

In contrast with the India-China relationship, economic interdependence

between India and Pakistan is low. While recognizing the potential for economic gain through

enhanced trade and investment relations with India, Islamabad has been reluctant to reciprocally

grant India most favored nation status. The same applies to cross-border investment. Trade

remains at a relatively low level: while there has been a high percentage of growth between

2008-09 and 2012-13 (43.97%), the actual level in the latter year has been only $2.60 billion.20

The prognosis for the India-Pakistan relationship in a post-nuclear world appears less positive

than is the case with China, particularly since there is no significant economic interdependence

and the only current source of interdependence that militates against the possibility of war –

nuclear weapons – will be absent. But there is still room for optimism, though on grounds

different from the India-China case.

Changing Threat Perceptions and National Identity: Pakistan’s security concerns are no longer

completely India-dominated. Rather, they have in large measure shifted to the country’s western

Haleem, “Ethnic and Sectarian Violence and the Propensity toward Praetorianism in Pakistan,” Third World

Quarterly, 24, 3 (June 2003), pp. 463-77. 18

World Bank, Data <http://data.worldbank.org/country/india> and <http://data.worldbank.org/country/pakistan>

(both accessed March 14, 2014). 19

SIPRI Military Expenditure Database <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database>

(accessed March 14, 2014). 20

India, Department of Commerce, Export Import Data Bank <http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnt.asp> (accessed

March 14, 2014). One recent study estimates that the potential for growth is some tenfold. See Sujay Mehdudia,

‘India-Pakistan Trade Potential is $19.8 Billion: ICRIER,’ Hindu, 31 January 2013

<http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/india-pakistan-trade-potential-is-198-bn-icrier-article4365501.ece>

(accessed on January 31, 2013).

9

borderlands, where the challenge of the Taliban, compounded by the turbulence in Afghanistan,

has raised a huge new threat that has the potential to destroy the Pakistani state – an issue much

bigger than the matter of Kashmir and national identity. Initially, the Pakistan Army’s

preoccupation with India led it to neglect the western border and allowed the extremists to be

active close to Islamabad. That strategic error was rectified and India no longer dominates

Islamabad’s threat list. In short, the historical obsession with the India threat has receded (though

it has by no means disappeared). And, just as importantly, Kashmir is no longer the sole arbiter

of national identity. Nowhere was this better exemplified than in President Musharraf’s

willingness after 2004 to accept a “soft” Line of Control (the line that divides the two forces)

and, more remarkably, to allow that a plebiscite to decide Kashmir’s future is a non-starter.21

Changing Domestic Politics: Pakistan’s military-dominated politics shows signs of a slow but

distinct shift towards a genuine democracy. The Musharraf years (1999-2008) demonstrated yet

again that the military was incapable of stemming the rot in Pakistani politics. A popular upsurge

led to Musharraf’s downfall following a confrontation with an independent-minded judiciary led

by Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chowdhry. The Pakistan People’s Party government that

succeeded it was the first civilian government to serve a full five-year term and the subsequent

government under the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) showed signs of maturity in avoiding

conflict with the military and the judiciary. While South Asia is a long way from a “democratic

peace,” the trajectories of governance in India and Pakistan have never been more similar. The

focus in both countries is on managing domestic politics rather than on using hostility with the

other as ballast for consolidating domestic political power.

Denuclearization and the Asymmetric Option: Perhaps the most powerful strategic effect of the

advent of nuclear weapons in South Asia was the appearance of the stability/instability paradox:

the freezing of the strategic balance at the nuclear level was – as has often been the case –

accompanied by rising tension at lower levels that, so to speak, percolated upward.22

In

particular, Pakistan has been able to use the “asymmetric option” and sponsor cross-border

violence by political groups aiming at Indian targets.23

It has been able to do so because it is

secure in its knowledge that India’s capacity to utilize its superior conventional capabilities has

been neutralized by the risk of nuclear conflict. In a post-nuclear world, this strategy will no

longer be available to it. The growing economic and military gap between the two countries,

21

This position has been officially reversed since Musharraf’s ouster, but that it was made at all (recall that the

president was formerly the army chief) shows that “non-negotiables” are no longer that. 22

Michael Krepon and Chris Gagné, eds., The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in

South Asia, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, June 2001. For the original formulation of the concept, see

Glen Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in The Balance of Power, ed. Paul Seabury (San

Francisco: Chandler, 1965), pp. 194-201. 23

Shaun Gregory, “The ISI and the War on Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30 (2007), pp. 1013–1031;

S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamic Militancy in South Asia,”

International Security, 37, 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 111-41; Sebastian Rotella, “Pakistan’s Terror Connections,”

ProPublica (August 13, 2012) <http://www.propublica.org/topic/mumbai-terror-attacks> (accessed same day).

10

India’s rising conventional military strength, and India’s close defense and political links with

the United States, will mean the rapid dissipation of the “asymmetric option.”

In combination, the factors working against military conflict will very likely override those

working for it. As in the India-China case, this does not mean that the relationship will become a

warm and friendly one. The pressures and conflicting interests that keep the two apart will

remain for the foreseeable future. But the likelihood of war will be lower than many realist

interpretations of a denuclearized world will have it.

Conclusion

Nuclear disarmers and their opponents have tended to craft their arguments in general terms.

This paper has tried to bring the issue down to the level of specifics by looking closely at the

prospects for India-China and India-Pakistan relations in a de-fanged post-nuclear world – a big

assumption in itself, but one worth looking at precisely because the possibility is a desirable one

for many. From a policy perspective, the absence of nuclear weapons does not in itself induce

either higher or lower levels of conflict. Indeed, it is surprising that analysts have not revisited

the pre-nuclear era for insights into what a non-nuclear weapon world might look like. Such a

world might be characterized by regular conflict or by long periods of peace. What actually

occurs depends on the relevant conditions affecting a specific dyad at the time. The argument in

these pages has leaned toward the view that stability is a probable outcome of denuclearization.

But my argument is restricted to the two relationships analyzed. I do not claim that this will

always be so. It is perfectly possible that hostile dyads in a post-nuclear world will experience

escalation to higher levels of violence.

Theoretically, this paper makes the case that the dissipation of interdependence – in this context,

the strategic interdependence wrought by nuclear weapons – is not inherently dangerous. One

needs to be constantly aware that, while nuclear weapons do deter, they do not necessarily make

the world a safer place. In the absence of nuclear weapons, there are other factors that may

induce stability. Economic interdependence (present and growing in the India-China case) tends

to do just this. The capacity to offset strategic threats through internal balancing (by the

augmentation of conventional forces) and external balancing (alliances or strategic partnerships)

may play a vital role in determining the trajectory of a relationship. Specific circumstances will

shape specific outcomes. In a post-nuclear world, neither conflict nor peace is inevitable – a

reality with which history –mostly non-nuclear in content – is replete.

*