Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of) change in US counterterrorism policy...

AUTHOR COPY

Original Article

Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and

(the lack of ) change in US counterterrorism

policy from Bush to Obama

Richard JacksonDepartment of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, Ceredigion, Wales,

SY23 3FE, UK.

E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract This article explores the social and political construction of UScounterterrorism policy since the onset of the war on terrorism. The first part of thearticle focuses on the period of the Bush administration. It explores the culturalgrammar expressed in the language of the war on terror, as well as administrationattempts to ‘sell’ the policy to the American public. In addition, it explores the waysin which the war on terror has been institutionalised in counterterrorism practicesand institutions, and how it has been normalised and embedded in Americanpopular culture and linked by the national identity narratives surrounding ‘9/11’and the negative ideograph of ‘terrorism’, to American identity. Section two of thearticle explores the discourse and practice of the war on terrorism in the initialperiod of the Obama administration. It questions the extent to which counter-terrorism policy can be rewritten, given the degree to which it accords with the deepcultural grammar of American identity and is now a well-established ideograph, theextent to which it has been institutionalised in American political practice andembedded in American culture and the ways in which it is rooted in the political-economic interests of the American polity and empire. Finally, the article brieflyreflects on questions of change and identity in the construction of US foreign policy.International Politics (2011) 48, 390–411. doi:10.1057/ip.2011.5

Keywords: war on terrorism; US foreign policy; Obama; Bush; identity; 9/11

Introduction

There is little doubt that the election of Barak Obama to the United Statespresidency generated tremendous optimism about the possibility of substantivechange in US foreign and domestic policy, including the US-led global war onterror. A number of high-profile policy announcements and initiatives, and theaward of the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize to President Obama, seemed initially to

r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics Vol. 48, 2/3, 390–411www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/

AUTHOR COPY

vindicate such optimism. The purpose of this article is to critically assess theextent to which the Obama administration is both capable of, and willing to,enact major policy changes in respect of the global war on terror. It does solargely through an analysis of the discursive field which encompasses UScounterterrorism policy1 and which conditions its possibilities for action,including the potential for substantive policy change. Such an analysisnecessitates a focus on the role of cultural and ideational factors and theways in which the war on terror has been culturally and materially embeddedwithin US politics and society.

There are a number of theoretical lenses or frameworks that can be usefullyemployed to such a task. At the broadest level, constructivist approachesprovide analytical tools and a framework for excavating the discursive‘conditions of possibility’ for policy choices – the different ways in whichideas, norms, identities, language and other discursive practices act as powerfulsocial structures that constrain (and enable) the choices of actors (see Jacksonand McDonald, 2009). Within such an approach, the central analytical focusmoves from linear causal investigation to ‘how possible’ questions (Doty, 1993;Barnett, 1999). In this case, how was the enactment of a global war on terrorpossible? Is significant change in the counterterrorism approach possible?

Cognate frameworks within ethnography and social movement theory,among others, focus on the role of cultural ‘textual grammar’, social identityand collective action frames, particularly at moments of societal crisis orrupture, in structuring the rhetorical and policy responses of elites (seeJohnson, 2008). Such approaches demonstrate how all forms of organisedpolitical violence, including war and counterterrorism, are constructed andexpressed primarily through culture, exhibiting ritual and communicativeelements that express the underlying narratives, myths and identity – the ‘deepcultural grammar’ – of the society (Zulaika, 1984; Johnson, 2008). Particularlyin times of crisis, national leaders draw upon the ‘toolbox’ of cultural resourcesas both an interpretive framework for problem definition, and a resonantframe to legitimise or ‘sell’ policies to the collective.

More specifically, approaches to the study of political language, includingdiscourse analysis (see Milliken, 1999) draw attention to the ways in whichagents, particularly elites, use language and narrative deliberately andinstrumentally as a means of ‘selling’ policies to the public, a ‘politicaltechnology’ for the achievement of specific interests (Laffey and Weldes, 1997),a form of ‘rhetorical coercion’ (Krebs and Jackson, 2007) or ‘representationalforce’ (Mattern, 2001) for defeating alternative options, choices andperspectives, and as a means of maintaining a hegemonic ‘regime of truth’(Foucault, 2002) in society. Although recognising the enabling and constrain-ing role of structures in structuring the actual content of the narratives, suchapproaches draw attention to the deliberate actions of agents and their exercise

Culture, identity and hegemony

391r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics Vol. 48, 2/3, 390–411

AUTHOR COPY

of forms of discursive and ideational power within a given social structure inwhich some forms of knowledge and actions are rendered plausible, acceptable,conceivable and respectable – whereas others are not (Yee, 1996).

This article draws broadly upon these theoretical approaches in analysingthe construction of US counterterrorism policy since September 2001. It attemptsto make a fairly obvious but nonetheless important set of arguments: the waron terror, like the cold war and other militarised interventions before it, hasbecome institutionalised and normalised in policy practices and institutions, aswell as in American culture; it has in the years since 9/11 become a powerfulsocial structure (a hegemonic discourse) that both expresses and simulta-neously co-constructs US interests and identity. For this reason, and on theevidence of President Obama’s language and policy proposals to date, the waron terror will continue with only minor changes in form and practice into theforeseeable future. In consequence, it attempts to argue that, not only are therefar more continuities than differences in counterterrorism policy between theBush and Obama administrations, but the possibilities for significant policychanges, barring major unforeseen events which create a crisis or moment ofrupture, are highly constrained at the present juncture.

The Social Construction of the War on Terror

The war on terror is expressed through, and constituted by, first, a set ofrhetorical and ideational elements, and second, an array of material practices.These two elements are not separate ‘variables’ but are mutually constitutive ofeach other. First, the war on terror is socially constructed through the publiclanguage or linguistic representations expressed by political leaders andcounterterrorism officials, which provide the explanation, rationale, justifica-tion and necessary social consensus for the particular policies made and actionsundertaken. In addition, the public language is accompanied by a familiar setof symbolic and ritualistic elements, which provide narrative coherence andpublic legitimacy, such as flags, ribbons, medals, symbols, ceremonies, publicrituals and the like.

Second, the war on terror is co-constituted by its material practices andactions which thus far includes, among many others: military actions inAfghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Georgia, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere; a globalintelligence-gathering and terrorist suspect interdiction and rendition progr-amme; an international public diplomacy programme; the expansion ofmilitary assistance programmes; the enactment of major new domesticcounterterrorism legislation; the reorganisation of domestic security andintelligence agencies; the construction of a vast new public safety infrastruc-ture, including widespread surveillance and data-collection; vastly increased

Jackson

392 r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics Vol. 48, 2/3, 390–411

AUTHOR COPY

expenditures for the military and security agencies; and the funding ofcounterterrorism research and development programmes.

These two elements – the language and practices of the war on terror – areinterdependent and co-constitutive to the extent that language and narrativegives meaning to, and therefore ‘makes possible’, the material practices. Forexample, the articulation of the 9/11 attacks as an ‘act of war’ and the necessityto prevent its recurrence provides the logic and rationale for – and thus makespossible – the launching of an actual war against terrorists. Language andpractice thus shape each other in an ongoing dialectical manner and togetherform or constitute the war on terror ‘discourse’.

The narratives of the war on terror

There is by now a large literature that has analysed the central narratives,discursive formations, ideas and ideology of the war on terror (see, amongothers, Silberstein, 2002; Jackson, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009; Croft, 2006;Winkler, 2006; Krebs and Lobasz, 2007; Jarvis, 2008). Briefly, the centralnarratives of the war on terror present in Bush administration texts include,among others: the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were an ‘act of war’;terrorism is the most serious security threat of the new century; thecombination of terrorists, rogue states and weapons of mass destruction(WMD) poses a serious and ongoing threat; terrorists today represent a newkind of terrorism which is religiously motivated, and more lethal andunconstrained; the war against terrorism is necessary, legitimate, propor-tionate, defensive and just; the severity of the terrorist threat means thatAmerica must retain the right to attack pre-emptively to disrupt future attacks;and a major international effort led by the United States and a long-termcommitment will be required to win the war against terrorism.

It is important to recognise that this set of narratives was not necessarilyinevitable or natural, even if it was always highly likely given the existingstructures and character of American political culture and the interests of thepolitical elite. Administration actors retained their own agency and otherpossible interpretations and narratives were (and remain) available, includingthe ‘terrorism as crime’ narrative (which has been adopted by the EuropeanUnion, for example), the counter-hegemonic ‘oil politics’ narrative (which waslater adopted by the anti-war ‘no blood for oil’ campaign in the lead-up to theIraq war) or the ‘costs of empire’ argument (expressed by some left-wing criticssuch as Noam Chomsky and William Blum) – among others (Croft, 2006,pp. 113–116).

However, such alternative narratives were always unlikely to be eitheradopted by the Bush administration or find widespread acceptance in US



AUTHOR COPY

society because of the existing structures and interests of US politics, societyand media and the constraints (and opportunities) that this imposed onadministration actors. For example, there already existed in American societya well-established discourse about, and set of practices to deal with, ‘terrorism’that had its origins in the Reagan administration and earlier (see Winkler,2006; Zalman and Clarke, 2009). At the same time, every US administrationis an expression of the broader foreign policy consensus in US politics thataims to maintain American hegemony, and the Bush administration inparticular was linked by key personnel to oil interests and sections of themilitary-industrial complex. It is wholly unsurprising therefore that the Bushadministration narratives did not articulate these other (counter-hegemonic)narratives, but instead reproduced a set of narratives which were virtuallyidentical to the narratives and practices of the first war on terror enactedby the Reagan administration (see Wills, 2003; Jackson, 2006), and whichaccorded with previous responses to perceived foreign threats (see Campbell,1998).

The institutionalisation of the war on terror

The central elements of the war on terror discourse were deliberately embeddedin the institutions and practices of American government and security in theyears following 9/11. The Bush administration and its top officials worked toinstitutionalise the war on terror approach to counterterrorism at all levels ofnational and local government. For example, the primary assumptions, beliefsand narratives about terrorism were given concrete expression in, amongothers: the establishment of major new government departments like theDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS); new legislation such as thePATRIOT Acts; new security doctrines, action plans, strategic plans, officialreports, memos and operating procedures; the reorganisation and reform of thesecurity services, policing, the military, the justice system and the immigrationsystem to include counterterrorism as a core responsibility; the commonlanguage of political debate in the institutions of government; and the activitieslobby groups and advisory think tanks (see Croft, 2006; Jackson, 2009). Inother words, in their daily practices and activities and through the writtenand spoken texts they articulated, these governmental institutions and theindividuals within them through their words and related actions continuouslyreproduced and reinforced the core interpretations and narratives of thewar on terror, giving it a concrete external ‘reality’ and a sense of legitimacy forthe public.

In addition, institutions like DHS and the personnel within them havesubsequently acquired or reinforced concrete material interests linked to the

Jackson


AUTHOR COPY

maintenance of the war on terror in its present form (see Mueller, 2006) – justas occurred during the cold war. More than 180 000 employees in DHS, forexample, now have careers in counterterrorism that depend upon the continuedwidespread acceptance of the terrorist threat narrative and the ongoingcommitment of resources to its control. Agencies like the military, DHS andthe Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) moreover, depend upon counter-terrorism for large parts of their annual budgets, and the increased prestige andrecognition that goes with it. Beyond this, other actors like militarycontractors, private security companies who supply screening services andprotection and pharmaceutical firms who supply vaccines in preparation forbioterrorism, for example, also now have direct material interests inmaintaining the widespread acceptance of the core narratives of the war onterror. In all, a recent study identified some 1271 government bodies and 1931private contractor companies working on counterterrorism in the UnitedStates, employing nearly a million people and costing the taxpayer tens ofbillions of dollars (Pilkington, 2010). Over time therefore, the war on terrordiscourse has been institutionalised and embedded within the institutions,practices and material interests of American society and politics. It has becomea materially grounded, self-perpetuating structure of American society or a‘regime of truth’ in which the accepted truths about terrorism and its warappear as external and self-evident.

Interestingly, the process by which the war on terror has been embedded as aset of bureaucratic material interests suggests that the US foreign policyestablishment functionally requires an overarching threat narrative by whichto rationalise its practices, whether it be communism, rogue states, illegaldrugs or terrorism (see Campbell, 1998; Cox, 2004). It also implies that policychange would not necessarily be impeded by bureaucratic interests, so longas the change involved finding a replacement threat to ‘terrorism’. In thissense, the war on terrorism is just the latest manifestation of an ever-presentthreat narrative that functions to provide focus and coherence – an ideologicalmission – to the institutions of US foreign policy (see Dunmire, 2009, p. 217).

Last, it is important to recognise that the war on terror, as a social andpolitical-military system not unlike the cold war, extends beyond the UnitedStates to encompass other international actors who have since developed theirown embedded material and political interests (Keen, 2006, p. 102). Forexample, allied states like the United Kingdom and Australia have alsoinstitutionalised the war on terror discourse and embedded it within theirsecurity procurement programmes, whereas others have benefitted directlyfrom US military training and assistance programmes and counterterrorismcooperation. Yet, others have used the war on terror discourse to garnerinternational support for the suppression of internal opponents. As during thecold war therefore, the war on terror forms a productive and self-perpetuating



AUTHOR COPY

global system in which benefits accrue not only to US domestic actors but alsoto a wide range of regimes and interest groups who collaborate in its operationand lend support to its continuation.2

Embedding the war on terror in American culture

The discourse of the war on terror has not been limited to public institutions,but through a variety of means and processes it has also become an integralpart of American culture. For example, the terrorist threat narrative waslegitimated and given expression in the anti-terrorism measures which havesince been normalised across all aspects of daily life. Related to this, the retailsector launched numerous products designed to protect consumers fromterrorism, such as home WMD decontamination kits and radiation detectionkits. It also used parts of the war on terror discourse, such as the call topatriotic unity, as a means of advertising products (see Silberstein, 2002;Croft, 2006). All these activities have functioned to reinforce the centralnarratives of the war on terror, giving them a concrete external reality andsense of legitimacy. Moreover, they have become wedded to daily activitiesand the sense of identity associated with these activities.

The core narratives and representations of the discourse were also veryquickly reproduced, embedded, and normalised across a range of other socialinstitutions and practices (see Zalman and Clarke, 2009, pp. 106–109). In theacademy, for example, new study centres and degree programmes, sources ofresearch funding and literally thousands of new books and articles publishedannually have embedded the discourse of the war on terror in school anduniversity curriculums. The American news media, with daily stories andreports, editorials and documentaries, has been particularly important inreproducing the core counterterrorism narratives (see Spigel, 2004). Similarly,entertainment media and popular culture, including novels, films, televisionshows, video games, websites, cartoons and other texts, have reproduced andreinforced the core narratives. Other cultural institutions and practices likereligion, comedy, tattoos, art and everyday conversation have also beenimportant for reproducing and embedding the discourse within the broaderculture (see Jackson, 2005; Croft, 2006).

A particularly important set of practices and institutions are those relatingto memorialisation – the collective remembering and commemoration ofevents. Across America, in virtually every town and city, in the media andon nationally prescribed days, many of the core narratives of the war on terrorare rearticulated and collectively re-enacted through public ceremonies – and invisual reminders like public monuments or works of art, collectables,photographic books, songs, poems and the like. These acts and processes of

Jackson


AUTHOR COPY

remembrance have functioned to construct ‘9/11’ and its associated narrativesas another ‘foundational myth’ of American identity (Croft, 2006, p. 87).

Across American politics and society therefore, through these myriadsocial practices and sites, the language and narratives of the war on terror havetaken on a kind of material externality that creates a shared understanding ofthe new ‘reality’ of the threat of terrorism – a ‘grid of intelligibility’ (Milliken,1999, p. 230) – through which to interpret events, distinguish truth and falsity,and determine future courses of action. This circular system of knowledgeproduction in which a discourse is accepted as true and an interlockingcomplex of social institutions and processes then functions to make it true, canbe understood as a ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault, 2002, pp. 131–132). This sharedunderstanding not only provides a cultural resource which political elitescan ‘hail’ or tap into when trying to legitimise or ‘sell’ new policies andprogrammes, as well as a social structure which constrains the choiceselites have in articulating their policies, but is a form of power wielded byelites in itself. This is because the accepted knowledge about terrorism worksfor the interests of the elites who articulate and seek to normalise it (seeCox, 1981).

Of course, these sites and social practices are not monolithic or free fromcontradiction; they have also been the means through which the dominantdiscourse or truth regime has been resisted, contested, challenged anddeconstructed (see Croft, 2006). However, counter-narratives and discoursesexpressed through movies, books, jokes, protests and other texts have to dateremained relatively marginal in America’s broader culture and politicalsystem, or have been successfully incorporated into the dominant discourse.Certainly, they have yet to make a significant impact on counterterrorismpolicy, the proposed reforms of the Obama administration notwithstanding(see below) or on US political discourse about terrorism more broadly. Thereare very few national-level politicians publically arguing that terrorism is arelatively minor threat, that the United States has overreacted, that terroristsoppose US policies rather than its values, or that a ‘war’ on terror is amisguided and unhelpful response, for example.

The cultural grammar of the war on terror

There are several arguments regarding how the war on terror discourse becameso thoroughly embedded and dominant in American culture and politics,despite sources of opposition. First, it has been argued that the psychologicalimpact of the 9/11 attacks themselves, and the sense of rupture and crisisthey engendered, opened the necessary discursive space for an authoritativeactor like President Bush to articulate a militaristic counterterrorism discourse



AUTHOR COPY

(see Jackson, 2005; Jarvis, 2008). Whether or not a ‘crisis’ is itself discursivelyconstructed, the 9/11 crisis certainly provided the opportunity for a ‘decisiveintervention’ (Croft, 2006, pp. 65–66) by the Bush administration who quicklyasserted its narrative as the authoritative one among other possibilities.Related to this, the widespread and well-documented failure of both themainstream media and the political opposition to adequately challenge theadministration’s discourse, even from within its narrowly constrained liberalboundaries, was also a crucial factor in its successful embedding withinAmerican society (see Al-Sumait et al, 2009; Ryan and Switzer, 2009).

Second, the Bush administration and its supporters were extremelysuccessful in their efforts to deny, deconstruct and delegitimise alternativenarratives, such as the ‘no blood for oil’ campaign, over a long period (seeCroft, 2006; Krebs and Jackson, 2007). Challenges were countered throughpublic diplomacy campaigns, appeals to unity, the discrediting of opponents,deliberate media manipulation, and in particular, techniques of ‘rhetoricalcoercion’ (Krebs and Jackson, 2007) and ‘representational force’ (Mattern,2001), which made it difficult to counter the dominant narratives withoutappearing unpatriotic, disloyal, divisive or naive.

However, the most important reason why the war on terror discourse wasso successful, and why it remains hegemonic in the Obama administration, isthat it is rooted in, and fully expresses, American cultural grammar andidentity. That is, it is built upon, and infused with, the existing hegemonicpolitical culture and commonsense views of the society (Hughes, 2003; Croft,2006), and has thus merged into the durable structures of US politics andsociety. In the first place, the term ‘terrorism’ itself, and the discoursesurrounding it, has become in recent years a negative ideograph – a primarypurpose term for the central narratives of the culture (Winkler, 2006).Consequently, today the term expresses and reaffirms American values bynegation: terrorists are the opposite of Americans in that they hate everythingthat Americans love, such as liberty, democracy, peace, unity and so on. Usingthe term ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist’, whether in daily conversation or publicdebate, therefore, becomes an implicit act of reaffirming American identity andvalues.

In addition, the war on terror discourse is deeply infused with long-standingand widely accepted cultural notions of ‘American exceptionalism’, ‘ManifestDestiny’ and the ‘chosen nation’ (Hughes, 2003) – which can be thought of aspre-existing truth regimes in American society. Moreover, it makes extensiveuse of a range of other narratives and motifs common to American politicalculture, such as ‘innocence’, ‘heroism’, ‘unity’, good versus evil, divine calling,universal values, ‘justice’ and historical myths of the American roles in WorldWar II and the Cold War (Jackson, 2005). Expressed in terms of thispre-existing cultural grammar, the narratives of the war on terror come to be

Jackson


AUTHOR COPY

accepted as self-evident truths and commonsense. At the same time, therejection or questioning of the narratives naturally appears as disloyalty to orbetrayal of the community and its values (Mattern, 2001; Cramer, 2007).

Other aspects of American political culture also fed into the process andprimed both governmental institutions and the wider society to the receptionof the Bush administration’s war on terror discourse. For example, as DavidCampbell has convincingly demonstrated, the American foreign policyestablishment has long been characterised by an interpretive framework whichconstructs threats and the response to them in a highly militarised and reflexivefashion (Campbell, 1998; see also Cramer, 2007). Other studies reveal thatmost of the features we have witnessed thus far in the war on terror – includingwar and counter-insurgency, targeted killings, preventive detention, torture,military commissions and a demonising discourse of the enemy – werecommonly employed in America’s colonial wars against Native Americans andin the Philippines, and during cold war pro-insurgency in Vietnam and LatinAmerica (see Valentine, 1990; Rose, 2004; Stokes, 2004). The reflexivemilitarised response of the war on terror therefore is in many respects acontinuation of hundreds of years of (cultural) practice.

Related to this broader orientation is the specific genealogy of the Bushadministration’s war on terror discourse, which demonstrably has its origins inPresident Reagan’s first ‘war on terrorism’ in the 1980s (Wills, 2003; Jackson,2006). From this perspective, both the discursive and institutional architecturewas already in place for a similar but much more extensive war on terrorafter 9/11. In other words, US security institutions, as well as the wider publicwere already attuned to the central narratives regarding terrorism proposedby the Bush administration.

A final important factor is that the discourse of the war on terror bothreflected existing material interests associated with US hegemony internation-ally, and reinforced and embedded new material interests. US foreign policyhas always been directed towards the protection and maintenance of itspolitical and material interests and the maintenance of hegemony within theinternational system. The war on terror provided the impetus and justificationfor the promotion of the US hegemonic project through, among many otherthings: the penetration of new regions with military bases; the opportunityto control new and existing sources of oil; the expanded use of military andeconomic aid to co-opt and coerce elites in developing countries; and the useof international organisations and public diplomacy to promote US interestsand combat anti-Americanism (see Callinicos, 2003; Mahajan, 2003). Thesekinds of actions, based on the operation of hard power and justified in thename of the war on terror, were intended to provide security and expandedopportunities for influence, although in practice they did not always go exactlyto plan (Cox, 2004, p. 591).



AUTHOR COPY

At the domestic level, the war on terror has offered opportunities for corporateand institutional enrichment and empowerment not seen since the height of thecold war for the military-industrial complex, the private security industry andthe military, police and intelligence services (Mueller 2006; Zalman and Clarke,2009; Pilkington, 2010). In addition, the war on terror has directly empoweredgovernments by providing rhetorical and legal resources to curtail and suppresspolitical opposition and to promote other political projects only indirectly relatedto counterterrorism, such as immigration control, societal surveillance, financialregulation and the curtailment of political protest (Jackson, 2007).

In sum, the war on terror has been constructed and employed as a key toolof US hegemony both internationally and domestically, as well as a highlyprofitable industry for a great many powerful groups in the United States. Itnow reflects and accords with the logic, structures and processes of UScapitalism and politics, and reaffirms and reinscribes existing power structuresof the society. This explains in large part why so many powerful actors withinUS society vigorously fight to defend the war on terror, oppose its criticsand ensure its continuation. As a consequence of these processes, in everydaypolitical life, the central narratives and tenets of the war on terror discourseare rarely questioned, even by political opponents. Although the efficacy ofparticular strategies or tactics may be vigorously debated, no one doubts thereality of the terrorist threat or the need for large-scale investment incounterterrorist measures.

Of course, this is not to say that the war on terror discourse is immutable orcompletely hegemonic; the cold war discourse was also once materially andculturally embedded. Rather, it is to suggest that it is contingently hegemonicat the present juncture, while remaining open to contestation and destabili-sation. However, its dominance, and the extent to which it has been embeddedas commonsense within American politics and society means that it isextremely difficult to counter. Politicians, lobby groups or individuals whoattempt to contradict its central narratives and assumptions are likely to gainlittle purchase and may even risk their careers. Although opponents maycontest the specific strategies or tactics of the war on terror, they cannotchallenge its foundational ideas and narratives because they are now widelyaccepted as commonsense and daily practice. In addition, literally hundredsof thousands of jobs and careers (and the votes that go with them) now dependmaterially on the continuation of this war.

Re-writing the War on Terrorism in the Obama Administration?

A key question engendered by the election of Barak Obama to the USpresidency, particularly given his election under a mandate for bringing change

Jackson


AUTHOR COPY

to the direction of American policy, as well as his intention to refrain fromemploying the term ‘war on terror’, is: to what extent can and will he changethe core policies at the heart of the war on terror? Do his proposals or thelanguage they are expressed in indicate the articulation of a new war on terror,the end of the war on terror or any significant rewriting of it? Moreimportantly, could he make any significant changes to it, even if he acceptedthe necessity of changing course? Such questions speak directly to issuesof agency and structure, and the constraining (and enabling) influence ofdiscursive and cultural structures such as identity.

In this section, I wish to make two related arguments. First, on the basis ofthe analysis presented above, it would be surprising if President Obama didnot accept the broader war on terror discourse as commonsense, even if hedisagreed with certain strategies or rhetorical terms adopted by his predecessor.It would also be surprising if he did not recognise the utility of the war onterror for the promotion of US hegemony internationally and domestically,and the powerful interests now vested in its continuation. In other words, it isnot unreasonable to argue that the extent to which US counterterrorism policycan be rewritten or substantively changed by any actor within the US domesticsystem, including a new president, and absent a new crisis situation, is highlycircumscribed at the present historical juncture – given the institutionalisationand normalisation of the war on terror discourse, its intertwinement withdeeply rooted narratives of American identity and its reflection of new andexisting underlying material and political interests.3 In effect, the war on terroris now a powerful structure of American politics – a truth regime – and onewhich would be extremely difficult to change in the absence of a serious crisisor rupturing event (Croft, 2006; Zalman and Clarke, 2009) or without a majoreffort over a long period of discursive struggle.

However, my second argument is that the evidence of both PresidentObama’s recent policy initiatives and his language on the issue of terrorismclearly demonstrate his broad public acceptance of the core narratives ofthe war on terror and his intention to continue its prosecution, albeit with somedifferences in strategic direction and rhetorical packaging from his predecessor(Zalman and Clarke, 2009, p. 110). Recent policy initiatives related to thewar on terror which appear to signal major breaks from the previous Bushadministration include: the decision to ban torture as a tool for theinterrogation of terrorist suspects by US personnel; the decision to closethe Guantanamo Bay detention centre; and the decision to withdraw UStroops from Iraq.4 In addition, it has been suggested that the Obamaadministration will phase out the language of the ‘war on terror’.

Although some would argue that these represent major new policy initiativesin the area of counterterrorism or at least the beginnings of significant change,closer examination does not fully support this interpretation. For example, the



AUTHOR COPY

decision to close the Guantanamo Bay detention centre, apart from theongoing challenges of actually enacting this policy, was accompanied bythe decision to continue the preventive detention of individuals suspected ofbeing an ongoing threat to American security, and the continuation of theglobal terrorist interdiction and arrest programme. Similarly, the decision towithdraw troops from Iraq was accompanied by the decision to expand the waron terror in the Afghanistan–Pakistan region.5 As President Obama statedduring the election campaign, ‘the central front in the war on terror is not Iraq,and it never was. That is why the second goal of my new strategy will be takingthe fight to al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Obama, 15 July 2008).In any event, it is arguable whether a ‘withdrawal’ is an accurate descriptionof the decision to leave 35–50 000 troops in Iraq. It can be argued that thesepolicy decisions indicate disagreement over the strategies and tactics of the waron terror, not whether the threat of terrorism warrants or is best dealt with bya ‘war’, or whether the war on terror has failed to achieve any significant gainsand should be ended.

In terms of the public language of President Obama, the evidence is evenclearer that he publicly accepts the core narratives of the war on terror andis committed to its continuation, even if he has stopped using the phrase ‘waron terror’. In Table 1, I have compiled a few illustrative quotations frommajor speeches by President Obama over the past 3 years, which relate to thewar on terror and national security; they are a small sample of many dozensof examples where he expresses the existing widely accepted core narratives.At the most fundamental level, the Obama administration continues to employthe term ‘war’ in relation to ‘terrorism’ regularly in its public communication,describing acts of terrorism as ‘acts of war’ (thereby retaining counterterrorismwithin a war-based framework), for example.6 Beyond this, a comparisonwith the original narratives clearly demonstrates that President Obama acceptsmost, if not all of the central narratives of the war on terror, such as theargument that the 9/11 attacks were unprovoked and completely unrelated toany foreign policy actions by the United States, the essential justice andnecessity of a ‘war’ on terrorism, America’s historic call and duty to lead thewar on terror, the ‘new’ threat posed by WMD terrorism and rogue states andthe need for new tools to fight them, the duty to promote America’s universalvalues internationally, the right of pre-emptive action against terrorists, theneed to prevent the emergence of terrorist safe havens in collapsed and failedstates, the likelihood of a long war against terrorism and the inevitabilityof American victory – among many others. In other words, the ‘war on terrorcontinues to operate as the dominant framework of the Obama administration’(Parmar, 2010, p. 15).

In addition to the stated policies and language of the Obama administration,it is also important to interrogate the silences and omissions in the Obama

Jackson


AUTHOR COPY

Table 1: Selected quotations from the speeches of President Obama

Narratives of 9/11

The attacks of September 11 brought this new reality into a terrible and ominous focus. [y] But the

depth of this tragedy also drew out the decency and determination of our nation y Americans

were united – more united, even, than we were at the dawn of the Cold War. The world, too, was

united against the perpetrators of this evil act y (Obama, 15 July 2008)

Then, one Tuesday morning in 2001, everything changed. [y] It seemed all of the misery and all of

the evil in the world were in that rolling black cloud, blocking out the September sun. (Obama, 16

July 2008)

I remind everybody, the United States of America did not choose to fight a war in Afghanistan.

Nearly 3000 of our people were killed on September 11, 2001, for doing nothing more than going

about their daily lives. (Obama, 27 March 2009)

Through World War II, American workers built an Arsenal of Democracy that helped our heroic

troops face down fascism. Through the Cold War, the engine of the American economy helped

power our triumph over Communism. (Obama, 22 October 2008)

Narratives of the terrorist threat

Today, the dangers extend beyond states alone to transnational security threats that respect no

borders. These are threats that arise from any part of the globe and spread anywhere, including to

our own shores – dangers like y terrorism. (Obama, 16 July 2008)

y the challenges of a new and dangerous world. [y] Today’s dangers are different, though no less

grave. The power to destroy life on a catastrophic scale now risks falling into the hands of

terrorists. (Obama, 15 July 2008)

Now this generation faces a great test in the spectre of terrorism. And unlike the Civil War or

World War II, we can’t count on a surrender ceremony to bring this journey to an end.

Right now, in distant training camps and in crowded cities, there are people plotting to take

American lives. That will be the case a year from now, five years from now, and – in all

probability – 10 years from now. (Obama, 21 May 2009)

So let me be clear: Al Qaeda and its allies – the terrorists who planned and supported the 9/11

attacks – are in Pakistan and Afghanistan. [y] They have used this mountainous terrain as a safe

haven to hide, to train terrorists, to communicate with followers, to plot attacks y For the

American people, this border region has become the most dangerous place in the world. But this is

not simply an American problemy The safety of people around the world is at stake. (Obama, 27

March 2009)

y the terror and extremism that threatens our world’s stability. (Obama, 25 May 2009)

The terrorists who attacked us on 9/11 are still at large and plotting, and we must be vigilant in

preventing future attacks. (Obama, 22 October 2008)

Now, we worry – most of all – about a rogue state or nuclear scientist transferring the world’s

deadliest weapons to the world’s most dangerous people: terrorists who won’t think twice about

killing themselves and hundreds of thousands in Tel Aviv or Moscow, in London or New York.

(Obama, 15 July 2008)

We must always reserve the right to strike unilaterally at terrorists wherever they may exist. (Obama,

20 November 2006)

Narratives of the terrorist ‘other’

Our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred. (Obama, 20 January

2009)



AUTHOR COPY

Table 1 Continued

y terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can. [...]. an enemy that heeds

no borders or laws of war y [y] So make no mistake: al Qaeda and its extremist allies are a

cancer that risks killing Pakistan from within. [y] Our troops have fought bravely against a

ruthless enemy. (Obama, 27 March 2009)

y people who have no scruples and would willingly and gladly kill innocents. Al Qaeda is not

constrained by a constitution. Many of our adversaries are not constrained by a belief in freedom

of speech, or representation in court, or rule of law. (Obama, 20 April 2009)

y terrorists offer the injustice of disorder and destructiony [and] a hateful ideology. (Obama, 21

May 2009)

y folks who, with impunity, will kill innocent men, women and children. (Obama, 9 February 2009)

Let me repeat: I am not going to release individuals who endanger the American people. Al Qaeda

terrorists and their affiliates are at war with the United States, and those that we capture – like

other prisoners of war – must be prevented from attacking us again. [y] we must hold

individuals to keep them from carrying out an act of war. (Obama, 21 May 2009)

Narratives of the war on terror

After 9/11, we knew that we had entered a new era – that enemies who did not abide by any law of

war would present new challenges to our application of the law; that our government would need

new tools to protect the American peopley [y] Now let me be clear: We are indeed at war with

al Qaeda and its affiliates. We do need to update our institutions to deal with this threat.

(Obama, 21 May 2009)

y we need not sacrifice our security for our valuesy That, after all, is the unique genius of

America. [y] That’s what makes the United States of America different as a nation. (Obama, 21

May 2009)

y we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and

Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That is the goal that must

be achieved. That is a cause that could not be more just. And to the terrorists who oppose us, my

message is the same: We will defeat you. (Obama, 27 March 2009)

yover the long term, that is why I believe we will defeat our enemies, because we’re on the better

side of history. (Obama, 20 April 2009)

[W]e will use all elements of our national power to defeat al Qaeda, and to defend America, our

allies, and all who seek a better future. Because the United States of America stands for peace

and security, justice and opportunity. That is who we are, and that is what history calls on us to do

once more. (Obama, 27 March 2009)

yin an interconnected world, the defeat of international terrorism and most importantly, the

prevention of these terrorist organizations from obtaining weapons of mass destruction – will

require the cooperation of many nations. (Obama, 20 November 2006)

y part of what makes us, I think, still a beacon to the world, is that we are willing to hold true to

our ideals even when it’s hard, not just when it’s easy. (Obama, 29 April 2009)

As we stand at this crossroads of history, the eyes of all people in all nations are once again upon

us – watching to see what we do with this moment; waiting for us to lead. (Obama, 24 February

2009)

Source: Author’s own work. Emphasis added.

Jackson


AUTHOR COPY

administration’s language and practice of counterterrorism – the things thatare not said or done – particularly those things that could provide evidence of agenuinely new approach to the war on terror. Among a long list of possibilities,it seems significant that the new administration is not, for example, seeking toreassure the American public about the terrorist threat. The presentation of allthe evidence and arguments which show that the real risk of terrorism isextremely low by any statistical or empirical measures (see Mueller, 2006)might reassure the public, but it could also undermine the entire rationalefor the war on terror and open up the possibility of substantively changingpolicy direction. Nor is the administration engaging in public debate on, orquestioning, US foreign policies which might be provoking violent resistancein regions like the Middle East, the failures of war-based approaches topolitical challenges like terrorism, or the possible lessons from earlier terroristcampaigns. In terms of concrete policy action, the new administration isalso clearly not making moves or signalling its intentions to overturn thePatriot Acts, give terrorist suspects full legal rights within a criminal justiceframework, dismantle or re-task the DHS away from counterterrorism, opennegotiations with al Qaeda and its affiliates, end policies of militaryintervention against Islamist groups in the Horn of Africa, the Middle Eastand elsewhere, close down its network of forward military bases, end covertmilitary and intelligence counterterrorism operations or end policies ofconditioning aid to developing countries on counterterrorism cooperation –among many other things.

Interestingly, at the symbolic level, the new administration continues toaward the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal which wasestablished by the Bush administration in 2003 and which covers militarypersonnel serving on active duty in 67 distinct geographical areas around theworld including the Middle East, Central Asia, Colombia, North and WestAfrica and elsewhere (Zalman and Clarke, 2009, p. 110). In addition, keypersonnel appointments in the Obama administration indicate both symbolicand strategic continuity in the war on terror, such as Secretary of DefenceRobert Gates, Admiral Denis Blair as Director of National Intelligence andStanley McChrystal as military commander of operations in Afghanistan.

In short, it can argued that virtually all of the main policy planks of the waron terror put into place by the Bush administration are being continued inthe new administration (see Zalman and Clarke, 2009, p. 102), even if thereis perhaps a greater emphasis on wielding the ‘soft power’ tools of Americanhegemony as a way of correcting some of the negative consequences of theBush administration’s reliance on hard power (Golub, 2004, p. 781). From thisperspective, dropping the controversial term ‘war on terror’ from publiccommunications is part of a strategic realignment designed to shore up thediscourse, rather than evidence of a change in direction.



AUTHOR COPY

However, as I suggested above, it is doubtful that even if President Obamareally wanted to change the course of the war on terror or bring it to an end,and there is little evidence for this, that he could actually do it in the presentcontext. The war on terror is a powerful discursive and material structure,rooted in American identity and political culture and directly tied to hegemonicinterests and daily material practices, and consequently, a major constraintto change. Trying to change it would entail considerable political risks andrequire sustained discursive struggle over a long period. President Obamawould have to risk public ridicule, defeat in electoral contests and oppositionfrom powerful groups with vested interests in order to make significant changesto the war on terror. In any case, President Obama represents the interestsof the foreign policy establishment and ending the war on terror (without areplacement threat to focus on) would run counter to the material and politicalinterests of US hegemony, which entail, among other things, locking instrategic supremacy, maintaining power ‘beyond challenge’, securing unipo-larity and the like (Golub, 2004).

Of course, none of this is meant to deny agency to actors, but rather tohighlight the ways in which social, political and cultural structures constrainthe options and choices of agents. Although structures like identity are notfixed or immutable (they are subject to change and contestation), they can beextremely powerful constraints at a given juncture.

Conclusion: Change and Identity

There are two significant conclusions to be drawn from the preceding analysis.First, it can be reasonably concluded that, all things being equal, the actualpractices of the war on terror will continue along their current trajectoryunder the new administration with only slight tactical adjustments. Thestructures that constrain the administration’s choices in this area – its‘conditions of possibility’ – and the administration’s orientation as evidentin its public language and policy choices, strongly suggest continuity ratherthan significant change. Certainly, if there were another terrorist attack inAmerica, even a relatively small-scale attack, the evidence suggests that itwould be reflexively interpreted as proof of the dominant narratives and thewar on terror would be reconfirmed as the dominant, commonsensicalparadigm.

In this situation, where do the possibilities for change in US counter-terrorism policy lie? As Stuart Croft (2006) has ably demonstrated, it is inthe space opened up by a sense of crisis or rupture that the possibilityfor articulating a ‘new’ political discourse emerges – provided a willingagent, specifically a norm entrepreneur, is present to engage in a ‘decisive

Jackson


AUTHOR COPY

intervention’. Such a crisis can occur as the result of either a sudden set ofunforeseen events (such as an act of political violence) which appear to shatterexisting commonsense perceptions, or gradual change over a long periodbrought about by sustained resistance to the dominant discourse. That is, overtime counter-hegemonic opposition can destabilise and deconstruct acceptedknowledge, eventually leading to a crisis of credibility and the need for a newset of narratives. In this instance, it could conceivably be argued that a numberof recent crises – the setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, or the global financialcrisis, for example – could have provided the discursive opening for such adecisive intervention. The fact that Obama has not exploited theseopportunities to change the dominant discourse reaffirms my argument thatdespite popular expectations, he is not a norm entrepreneur determined tochange the war on terror, but is rather its guardian.

A second conclusion relates to the role of identity in foreign policy andsecurity. It is clear from the analysis presented here that identity – as expressedin political and cultural discourses – is a critical (although frequently ignored)variable in the construction of foreign policy. Neither fixed nor immutable,it nonetheless acts as an ever-present interpretive lens through which eventsand choices are viewed, a frame for constructing interests, a resource of elitepower and a general discursive structure which constrains and enables theactions of agents, particularly in terms of ‘selling’ policies to domesticaudiences. In this case, the particular narratives and structures of Americanidentity – notions of America as an exceptional nation called to lead, thegreatest force for good the world has ever seen, the source and protector ofuniversal values of liberty and democracy, the defender of the free worldfor over a 100 years, an inherently good and innocent nation, for example –functioned to both enable the construction of the war on terror (throughproviding an interpretive framework for the 9/11 attacks and the justificationfor enacting a global war against terrorism) and now constrain the possibilitiesfor major change in counterterrorism policy. The war on terror expresses(and thereby discursively produces and reproduces) American identity, whichis why it can now be considered a powerful constraining and enabling structureof American politics and society – a form of commonsense that functionsas a ‘grid of intelligibility’ for policymakers and the public, or a truth regime.In other words, as long as the war on terror remains interwoven with, andco-constitutive of, the central narratives of American identity and is functionalto American hegemony, its opponents will find it extremely difficult todismantle or challenge.

In this respect, it is also important that President Obama has attempted tore-narrate American identity as a way of overcoming the inherent contra-dictions in the Bush-led war on terror – the contradictions between America’sidentity as a force for good in the world and the upholder of universal values



AUTHOR COPY

versus the reality of occupation, torture, rendition and internment, forexample. In such an attempt, he has been forced to employ existing identitynarratives and myths, rather than suggest entirely new ones. Thus, in theannounced torture ban, the decision to close Guantanamo, and the attempt torebuild relations with the Islamic world, for example, he cannot escapeappealing to the very same narratives and cultural grammar that the Bushadministration had previously relied upon to narrate its own policies. Inthis re-narration, however, America is still an exceptional nation, but fordifferent reasons: because it has always opposed torture, it supports therule of law and it accepts people of all faiths. One consequence of thisre-narration is actually to make the war on terror a more robust meta-narrativein the context of American self-identity by minimising its internal contra-dictions.

In the end, however, no discourse, no matter how powerful or embedded,is ever completely hegemonic or immune from challenge. Whether the resultof counter-hegemonic struggle by opponents, crises or the intervention ofnew norm entrepreneurs, the war on terror will one day go the way of the coldwar. In the absence of an unforeseen rupturing event in the near future,however, we can be sure that it will not end any time soon.

Acknowledgements

For helpful comments and suggestions, the author is grateful to InderjeetParmar, Stuart Croft, Matt McDonald, Stephen Burman, Daniel McCarthy,J. Simon Rolfe, Andrew Priest and Nicholas J. Wheeler. The author benefitedfrom the opportunity to present earlier versions of this article at the 2009European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) General Conference,Potsdam Universitat, Germany and the International Politics Research Seminar,Aberystwyth University. All remaining errors belong solely to the author.

About the Author

Richard Jackson is Professor of International Politics at AberystwythUniversity. He is the founding editor of the journal Critical Studies onTerrorism. Recent publications include: Terrorism: A Critical Introduction(Palgrave Macmillan, 2011; co-authored with Lee Jarvis, Jeroen Gunning andMarie Breen Smyth); Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Cases(Routledge, 2010; co-edited with Eamon Murphy and Scott Poynting); andCritical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda (Routledge, 2009;co-edited with Jeroen Gunning and Marie Breen Smyth).

Jackson


AUTHOR COPY

Notes

1 The article does not directly address the constitutional and political structures that constrain

presidential power but nonetheless assumes that they are part of the broader structures which

condition the possibilities for policy change in the US political system.

2 Many programmes of cooperation with international actors pre-date the global war on terror.

However, for many, the continuation of these beneficial linkages have been directly tied to

counterterrorism cooperation, thereby constructing an in-built incentive to ensure that the global

war on terror continues.

3 In addition, as mentioned, the president also faces constitutional and political constraints, which

constrain (and enable) his room to manoeuvre. These types of structures and processes would

play an important role if, for example, he attempted to repeal the Patriot Acts or re-task DHS.

4 It could be argued that the administration’s new approach to Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, as well

as the new framework outlined in the Cairo speech, constitute substantive changes to the global

war on terror. I would argue, however, that although they may constitute the beginnings of

substantial changes to dealing with particular long-standing foreign policy issues – the Arab–

Israeli conflict and the question of Iran – they are not directly related to counterterrorism policies

or structures, which instead show all the signs of significant continuity. Moreover, it remains to

be seen whether substantive change will be possible in relation to Israel and Iran.

5 The greater emphasis on counter-insurgency in the Obama administration continues, and in

some ways, more deeply embeds, the essentially war-oriented counterterrorism approach because

it directly links a broader set of activities such as public diplomacy (‘hearts and minds’) and

development assistance to military activities in a holistic framework.

6 It is possible that the Administration’s abandonment of the public ‘war on terror’ language,

although still retaining the term ‘war’ in relation to ‘terrorism’, will be significant over the long

term; it could, for example, open up space for developing a new discourse based on other

narratives such as ‘crime’. However, in the context of the continuities in policies and other

narrative structures, as well as the embedded material interests of the overall discourse, the

significance of this change in the language should not be over-optimistically interpreted.

References

Al-Sumait, F., Lingle, C. and Domke, D. (2009) Terrorism’s cause and cure: The rhetorical regime

of democracy in the US and UK. Critical Studies on Terrorism 2(1): 7–25.

Barnett, M. (1999) Culture, strategy and foreign policy change. European Journal of International

Relations 5(1): 5–36.

Callinicos, A. (2003) The New Mandarins of American Power. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

Campbell, D. (1998) Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity,

Revised edn. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Cox, M. (2004) Empire, imperialism and the bush doctrine. Review of International Studies 30(4):

585–608.

Cox, R. (1981) Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations theory.

Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10(2): 126–155.

Cramer, J. (2007) Militarized patriotism: Why the U.S. marketplace of ideas failed before the Iraq

War. Security Studies 16(3): 489–524.

Croft, S. (2006) Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge

University Press.



AUTHOR COPY

Doty, R. (1993) Foreign policy as social construction. International Studies Quarterly 37: 297–320.

Dunmire, P. (2009) 9/11 changed everything? An intertextual analysis of the bush doctrine.

Discourse & Society 20(2): 195–222.

Foucault, M. (2002) Truth and power. In: J. Faubion (ed.) Power: Essential Works of Foucault

Vol. 3, Translated by R. Hurley et al, London: Penguin.

Golub, P. (2004) Imperial politics, imperial will and the crisis of US hegemony. Review of

International Political Economy 11(4): 763–786.

Hughes, R. (2003) Myths America Lives By. Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois

Press.

Jackson, R. (2005) Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counterterrorism.

Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.

Jackson, R. (2006) Genealogy, ideology, and counter-terrorism: Writing wars on terrorism from

Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush Jr. Studies in Language & Capitalism 1: 163–193.

Jackson, R. (2007) Playing the politics of fear: Writing the terrorist threat in the war on terrorism.

In: G. Kassimeris (ed.) Playing Politics With Terrorism: A User’s Guide. New York: Columbia

University Press, pp. 176–202.

Jackson, R. (2009) The 9/11 attacks and the social construction of a national narrative. In:

M.J. Morgan (ed.) The Impact of 9–11 on the Media, Arts and Entertainment: The Day that

Changed Everything? New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 25–35.

Jackson, R. and McDonald, M. (2009) Constructivism, US foreign policy and the “war on

terrorism”. In: I. Parmar, L.B. Miller and M. Ledwidge (eds.) New Directions in US Foreign

Policy. London: Routledge, pp. 18–31.

Jarvis, L. (2008) Times of terror: Writing temporality into the war on terror. Critical Studies on

Terrorism 1(2): 245–262.

Johnson, H. (2008) Ritual, strategy and deep culture in the Chechen national movement. Critical

Studies on Terrorism 1(3): 321–342.

Keen, D. (2006) War without end? Magic, propaganda and the hidden functions of counter-terror.

Journal of International Development 18: 87–104.

Krebs, R. and Jackson, P. (2007) Twisting tongues and twisting arms: The power of political

rhetoric. European Journal of International Relations 13(1): 35–66.

Krebs, R. and Lobasz, J. (2007) Fixing the meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, coercion, and the road to

war in Iraq. Security Studies 16(3): 409–451.

Laffey, M. and Weldes, J. (1997) Beyond belief: Ideas and symbolic technologies in the study of

international relations. European Journal of International Relations 3(2): 193–237.

Mahajan, R. (2003) Full Spectrum Dominance: U.S. Power in Iraq and beyond. New York: Seven

Stories Press.

Mattern, J. (2001) The power politics of identity. European Journal of International Relations 7(3):

349–397.

Milliken, J. (1999) The study of discourse in international relations: A critique of research and

methods. European Journal of International Relations 5(2): 225–254.

Mueller, J. (2006). Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security

Threats, and Why We Believe Them. New York: The Free Press.

Obama, P.B. (20 November 2006) A way forward in Iraq. Remarks Chicago Council on Global

Affairs, http://obamaspeeches.com, accessed 14 July 2009.

Obama, P.B. (15 July 2008) A new strategy for a new world. Washington, DC, http://www

.asksam.com/ebooks/releases.asp?file=Obama-Speeches.ask&dn=A%20New%20Strategy%

20for%20a%20New%20World, accessed 14 July 2009.

Obama, P.B. (16 July 2008) Summit on confronting new threats. West Lafayette, IN, http://www

.asksam.com/ebooks/releases.asp?file=Obama-Speeches.ask&dn=Summit%20on20Confronting

%20New%20Threats, accessed 14 July 2009.

Jackson


AUTHOR COPY

Obama, P.B. (22 October 2008) Remarks of senator Barack Obama: National security. Richmond, VA,

http://www.barackobama.com/2008/10/22/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_144.php, accessed 14

July 2009.

Obama, P.B. (20 January 2009) Obama inaugural address, http://obamaspeeches.com, accessed 14

July 2009.

Obama, P.B. (9 February 2009) Transcript: Obama press conference. The White House, http://

www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/02/10/politics/100days/main4789627.shtml?tag=contentMain,

accessed 14 July 2009.

Obama, P.B. (24 February 2009) Transcript: President Obama’s speech to a joint session of

congress, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/02/24/politics/main4826494.shtml?tag=content

Main, accessed 14 July 2009.

Obama, P.B. (27 March 2009) Remarks by the president on a new strategy for Afghanistan and

Pakistan. Room 450, Dwight D. Eisenhower Executive Office Building, the White House Office

of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-

on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/, accessed 14 July 2009.

Obama, P.B. (20 April 2009) Remarks by the president to CIA employees. CIA Headquarters,

Langley, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_

office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-CIA-employees-at-CIA-headquarters/, accessed 14 July 2009.

Obama, P.B. (29 April 2009) Text: Obama press conference on 100 Days. Washington, DC, http://

www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/30/politics/main4980232.shtml?tag=contentMain, accessed

14 July 2009.

Obama, P.B. (21 May 2009) Remarks by the president on national security. National Archives,

The White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/

Remarks-by-the-President-on-Memorial-Day/, accessed 14 July 2009.

Obama, P.B. (25 May 2009) Remarks by the president on memorial day. Arlington National

Cemetery, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/

the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-National-Security-5-21-09/, accessed 14 July 2009.

Parmar, I. (2010) Plus ca change? American foreign policy under Obama. Political Insight 1(1):

14–16.

Pilkington, Ed. (2010) America’s secret army: How the “war on terror” created a new industry. The

Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/19/us-spies-triple-since-2001, accessed 20

July 2010.

Rose, D. (2004) Guantanamo: America’s War on Human Rights. London: New Press.

Ryan, M. and Switzer, L. (2009) Propaganda and the subversion of objectivity: Media coverage of

the war on terrorism in Iraq. Critical Studies on Terrorism 2(1): 45–64.

Silberstein, S. (2002) War of Words: Language, Politics and 9/11. London: Routledge.

Spigel, L. (2004) Entertainment wars: Television culture after 9/11. American Quarterly 56(2):

235–270.

Stokes, D. (2004) America’s other War: Terrorizing Colombia. London: Zed Books.

Valentine, D. (1990) The Phoenix Program. Lincoln, UK: iUniverse.com.

Wills, D. (2003) The First War on Terrorism: Counter-terrorism Policy during the Reagan Admin-

istration. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Winkler, C. (2006) In the Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War

II Era. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Yee, A. (1996) The causal effects of ideas on politics. International Organization 50(1): 69–108.

Zalman, A. and Clarke, J. (2009) The global war on terror: A narrative in need of a rewrite. Ethics

& International Affairs 23(2): 101–113.

Zulaika, J. (1984) Basque Violence: Metaphor and Sacrament. Reno, NA: University of Nevada

Press.



Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of) change in US counterterrorism policy...

Documents

Transcript of Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of) change in US counterterrorism policy...