Beyond Active Response: An Operational Concept for Police Counterterrorism Response

New Criminologist : Beyond Active Response: An Operational Concept for Police Counterterrorism Response

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Countert err orism Re so ons eEy John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus

Operational art is essential for negotiating conflict spread over time and space. This

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--l:-:-- tlrL:lpaper iOOKS aI auapliirg mliilai-y concepts OI Opei'atiu-r-rai ai'i inio poiicing. wniie

specifically'focusing on counterterrorism, these concepts have broad application tocountering organized crime and insurgency - both classic and eriminal,

ln the 1970s, the Army faced the crucial problem of fighting off a massive Warsaw Pact

conventional force. One solution, adopted by Ceneral Trevor N. Dupuy, was toemphasize Active Defense - the mainly tactical concept aimed at winning "the firstbairie of the nexi war.' in ihe 1980s, ihe Army's nirlanci Battie approach

conceptualized an operational battlespace with simultaneous attacks and strikes in theenemy's cperational depth anC an o.verall eim cf disaggregating enemy second echelcnforces before they could be brought into play. A tactical problem - the Warsaw Pact

conventional challenge - triggered an operational response by the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO).

Today's poiice tace a range of tacticai challenges that, whiie not necessariiy new,

require an evolved operational response. Since the Algerian War's "Battle of Algiers,^paramilllary terroil515 ndve erilpruy rdLr.rLdl 5dr.urduuil du.dLKs uesrgileu [u slrur. uuwn

cii.les, wiiir rrrixeci success. ivir.rsi oi Iire -rirrre, iirey irirve ijeeu crusiieci by tire rnigiit -tfthe state',. police anC militanT forces. But as we have pre.;icusly written, the Mumbai-tt-?Lc ^vnacaA

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doctrine. ln part due to the attention focused on these problems, which (contrary topublic perception) do not stem solely frorn the organizational capacit-v of lndian police,

the tactical challenges of sustaining proficienry for counterterrorism police actions has

increased. The challenges of terrorism will continue to grow as technology increases

the potential sophistication of terrorist strikes as cities increasingly become vectors of

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conflict.

Just as Active Defense led to Airland Battle, we believe that police forces are capable ofdeveloping an operational approach to urban conflict that is both new in its scope butclassical in its conception. The purpose of this paper is to build on our previous

writings on the subject and elaborate an operational concept for police

counterterrori.srn response in more detail.

Evolution of Police Tactics and the Beginnings of an Operational Approach

The role of most police activities is not "operational" in the military sense. Police forces

are small, and with the exception of large metropolitan regions, barely comprise thestrength of a tactical military unit. Their role, however, is just as complex. Police have

the responsibility to keep the peace in complex and diverse multi-ethnic urbanenvironments, carry out counter-ganE operations, and protect a broad array of tarEets

from terrorists. Yet for most police doctrine has remained tactical in orientation.Additionally, the decentralized natl:re of Amerjcan policing-in marked contrast tomany European police services-limits the conceptual development of synchronized,operational responses.

Nevertheless, adapting the terms "tactical" and "operational" for police purposes is aviable use of the t€rms, provided they are properly "s€aled!' for police applications. lnmilitary terms, operational art is the skillful design of operations (a totality of tacticalactions joined together by an operational idea), nested within an oyerall campaign plan

arrived at by strategy.

As previously mentioned, most police operations occur on a vastly smaJler scale than

military operations, but are still compromised of numerous tactical functions. The

exceptions include respofise to multiple, simultaneous terrorlst attacks, r€sponse tolarge-scale disasters (e.9., the police response to Hurricane Katrina or a catastrophicearthquake which typically involve mutual aid from multiple agencies spread over a

wide area over multiple operational periods), and police response to criminal

insurgencies, such as Mexico's drug war. For more common operations, examples

include, a large-scale dignitary protection mission in a major city combines many

different tactical forces operating in concert accomplishing different tasks thattogether are joined by a common operational idea or concept. A long-term police

campaign against a gang, organized crime family, or terrorist group, can compromise

many different tactical operations nested together. ln adapting the operationallanguage to police purposes, we argue that the level of command is not whatdetermines whether something is tactical or operational per se, rather the purpose ofthe action or mission(s) determines the echelons needed for successful engagement.

As recounted by Lindsay Clutterbuck, the first shift in the expansion of policing's

outlook was the 19th century anarchist challenge, which created a pre-modern

network of police forces. Contacts among American and European police departmentswere forged, and police often maintained overseas branches to gain intelligence on

anarchist factions before they emerged in the US. The elimination of the pre-modern

"anarchist wave" of terrorism is a relevant (and hopefut) sign that today's terrorism

challenge is not insurmountable. This, however, would be the first of many advances in

police doctrine and functions in response to the challenges of the industrial era.

American policing also expanded in scope to face the tactical and operational

challenges of 1930s gangsters. As recounted in Public Enemies: America's Greatest

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Crime Wave and the Birth of the FBl, 1933-19j4, the tactical firepower (tommy gun)

and mobility (fast car) of the bank robber was enough to put poorly armed police with

limited mobility (physical and jurisdictional) in both small and large towns on thetactical defensive. The challenge was not purely tactical, however, as the lack of police

coordination and ability to pursue criminals across state lines gave bank robbery gangs

a kind of operational maneuver in their ability to jet across a patchwork of Midwestern

states and escape flat-footed lawmen. The law enforcement response to this problem

was the Federal Bureau of lnvestigation (FBl)'s creation of tactical mobile striking

Eroups comprised by hardered Ssuthwestern lawmen who had cut their teeth fightingagainst a complex array of adversaries in the dying days of the "Wild West" withexpanded operational reach across the totality. of the Midwest operational space, ln

concert with local police and strengthened by intelligence networks, the FBI's strikinggroups eradicated the safe havens and annihilated the gangs, often with excessive

force.

Campaign design against the 1930s tactical gangster patchwork also was balanced with

the design of larger operations against criminal syndieates, who posed operatioflal afld

strategic challenges more akin to the counterinsurgency problems we see today in

Mexico's drug war. Sitting on more contraband-earned money than theycouldeverhope to spend, served by a loyal array of mob hit men, and commanding large

syndicates with immense influence and reach, gangsters like Al Capone posed a grave

problem to public order. The fight to bring them to heel was not only bloody but also

frequently frustrating, as Capone's power, popularity, and political reach posed

significant problems for both local police and federal agents. Although law

enforcement campaigns succeeded in netting big-name gangsters and the end ofProhibition temporarily reduced the power of organized crime, the problem of large-scale organized crime persists today.

Police tactical doctrine changed again during the 1970s, when paramilitary terroristattacks exposed weaknesses in command and control and tactical response. Hostage

res€ue missions and heavily armed assaults became commonplace, with the glare of a

voracious media on any slip-up by police operators. Special tactical groups sprang up

in many different major cities. Some of them were extensions of police tactical .units

already formed for specialized missions like high-risk warrant service and rescue, like

the New York Police Department's Emergency Services Unit. Others, such as the

military-inspired SWAT units originating in Los Angeles under the direction of late

Chief Daryl Cates, were entirely new creations. Of a different character entirely were

military units such as Delta Force, and their paramilitary police counterparts the

Cerman GSG-9, and the French CIGN that could forward deploy to distant locations toexe€ute eomplex taetieal aetions. While the daring lsraeli fon*ard mission in Entebbe

grabbed headlines, equally noteworthy was the successful CSC-9 assault in Mogadishu

in 1977.

As tactical doctrine improved, the beginnings of operational command began tosurfaee, ln l-os Angeles County; the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD)

recognized the utility of formalizing training for managing emergent

multiorganizational networks (EMONs) as a means of improving the performance of the

temporary, ad hoc, organizations that emerge to handle a range of disasters. The

policing implications of this shift were chronicled in law enforcement tactical pioneer

Sid Heal's book Sound Doctrine, which applies military and sociological ideas about

command and control to the police tactical doctrine. The growth of the National

lncident Management System (NIMS) also provides the basis for operational unity of

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command in disaster situations. The current system we see evolving today is theproduct of apptying fire service lncident Command System (lCS) conceptr tomultidisciplinary, multiagency disaster response. ICS itself emerged from the lessonlearned in responding to catastrophic wildland, or campaign fires in California.

As we have written before, the Mumbai attacks showcased a weakness in police tacticalapproaches. Saturation attacks featuring heavily armed multiple teams in play in an

urban environment, guided by improved mobile command and control (C2)

technologies, pose a problern to tactical units that are used to only dealing with onemajor disturbance at a time. Although it is improving, police tactical approaches(analogous to doctrine, although there is no single "police doctrine" in the US) are

inherently reactive in scope, overcautious (although this is understandable given legaland public perception constraints), and typically focuses piecemeal on individualencounters.

Mumbai is not a wholly new situation - there is ample precedent for it in the urbanwarfare battles of the past, most notably the 1968 Vietcong p*sh into *rban areas suehas Saigon. However, there is something of a difference. Mumbai was mounted by aterrorist group (albeit a well-trained and potentially well-funded one) - not a guerrillaorganization with a network of cadres and an established national presence. Second,

unlike the previous wave of leftist terrorists, the Mumbai attackers fought with theintention of dying in battle rather than escaping. This willingness to die increased theirbody count substantially. From a more long-term perspective, as technology increases

the mobility and lethality available to attackers, the threat posed by urban paramilitaryterrorism may increase.

What Operational Art Means for Police

The concept of operational art involves both a conceptual and practical leap for thepolice service. lt involves adapting the military concept of operational art to the civilenvironment. So what does operatlonal thlnking necessar]ly mean for police command?

It means being able to conceptualize and direct the whole scope of the tactical.engagern€ntsoccurring within the operationa.l space according to a central operationalidea. This idea should seek to maximize the asymmetric advantage already possessed

by the defenders into play.

Although paramilitary terrorists might achieve local superiority in some areas due tosuperlority of firepow.er, they in an overall sense greatly weaker ifl fiafieuver,armament, and numbers. Police, in addition, can utilize organic "combined arms"

abilities through the cornbination of foot (dismounted) intervention, helicopters, and

taatical response teams (special weapons teams, bomb squads), including the use ofarmored rescue vehicles. lt is important to note that a complete suite of maneuver

units includes capabilities provided by public safety organizations other than thepolice. For example, the fire service typically play a key role in providing urban search

and rescue, emergency medical services, hazardous materials response, and firesuppression. Thes'e capabilities must be effectively integrated into the overall

operational formulatisn (csncept of operations) to achiere romplete operationalsuccess. The only advantages the terrorist attackers possess are that of surprise and

shsck effect. Yet these strong points can be foiled through a strong operational plan

and the rapid application of force designed to rapidly neutralize the opponent. So ifthis were so easy, where is the.problem?

The challenge of the defense is to fully form itself. The power of a police active defense

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New_Criminolqgist : Eeyond Active Response: An Operational Concept for Police Counterterrorism Response

derives from mass (combat power employed at the decisive point), simultaneous action(tactical strikes from different points and platforms), and dynamism (different platformsand weapons employed in a emergent pattern). Put together, the defense forms whatCarl von Clausewitz famously called a "shield of blows" that repels the enemyoffensively while soaking up his combat power. But the necessary components of eachpolice advantage start out dispersed in time and space. lt takes time for the shield ofblows to be fully formed.

Since the goal of the enemy is entirely negative - i.e., to trade his life for a kill countand media attention, he does not have to defeat the police directly to achieve victory.The enemy's objective, as described in William H. McRaven's "principles of specialoperations," is to dominate the initial period of action while the defense remains

dispersed and unready. McRaven's concept of relative superiority is instructive here. lnhis case studies of special operations warfare, McRaven identifies the point at which a

smaller special operations force gains a decisive advantage over a larger or otherwisesuperior enemy. lf this is achieved early in an engagement, it is easy to sustain untilthe accomplishment of the mission. The opposing force (opfor) does so through theuse of surprise, defined by Robert Leonhard as the delayed detection of action as longas possible. This necessitates one guiding element - applying ovenahelming combatpower against the adversary as soon as possible. However, due to the problem ofdispersed assets, this is not as easy as it appears. So how do we go about stopping theadversary?

The "Core Functions" as articulated by Ferdinand Foch and later elaborated in Britishmilitary doctrine are "find, fix, strike, and exploit." ln tactical doctrine, finding is

locating an opponent, fixing him is suppressing or holding him in place throughvarious means, striking him physically and psychologically hurts him, and exploitationtakes advantage of the strike's success. ln a purely military context, exploitation 1s

often the most difficult part of this step. ln World War l, for example, command and

control difficulties often frustrated attempts to exploit local successes. Due to thesmall size of the enemy force and the short length of the operation, exploitation is notlikely to be the overriding concern of the police commander. Rather, it is the process offixing and striking the enemy that is the most difficult, due to the dispersion of police

as sets.

ln counterterrorism, finding is an ongoing process that occurs constantly and is

enhanced during periods of crisis action. Because the opponent hides and forms his

attack (or completes the kill chain) right before the attack is executed, finding is adifficult process that has nevertheless has great importance on achieving surprise inthe attack. Fixing is the suppression of the adversary by tactically trained patrolpersonnel and the isolation of the opfor's mobile points. The strike is the action thatcloses with and eliminates the threat should the opponent continue resistance after he

is fixed in place. When striking, commanders balance protection and striking actions. ln

order to strike the enemy, one must make oneself vulnerable tothe enemy's defensive

during the maneuver to attack the target. Because of legal, political, and public

perception constraints, police approaches in the past has been largely reactive inscope. Exploitation builds on gains from striking, and like finding is an ongoingprocess. An exploitation ranges from pursuing retreating enemy elements to post-incident sealing off of the premise to data collection and interrogation.

The basic tactical building blocks of police units are a range of patrol units (foot,

mounted, motor, vehicle, K-9), static security units (force protection speclalirts, bomb

screeners, counterintelligence or countersurveillance teams), specialized tactical units,

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and aerial units that can act as observation points, static firing platforms, rescue and

reconnalssance units. The cooperation and synchronization among these units forms

the core of operational response. Different types of platforms and functions should

also be employed in a creative manner. Moreover, the tactical offense should seek todominate the opfor through a creative organization that presents the adversary with a

tactical dilemma. As mentioned before, all of these components are basic tactical

functions in military organizations. However, due to the unique role of police

organizations in the community, the execution of these tactical patterns in a

metropolitan operating environment requires implementation of operational command.

The requirements of operational command are real-time operational awarenessr

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Inte[]1gence, Survei]Jance and

Reconnaissance (C4|SR). This requires implementing a standing, active watch function

to provide operational synchronization across multiple, tactical focal points. Urban

warfare engagements tend to fractalize command and control because of the nature ofthe terrain and the tendenry to sector off engagement into individual squad actions

that frequently perform tasks out of contact with each other. An operational

commander within the emerging police operational paradigm would use technology to

visualize and synchronize the actions performed by individual maneuver elements.

Real-time (or near-real time) intelligence support and the knowledge of geosocial

factors about the operational space and its strategic context would idealty help the

commander (and command team of leaders) not only achieve situational awareness,

but apply situational understanding and knowledge to effectively address the suite ofoperational problems faced in the sequence of events that characterize the aftermath

of a terrorist attack (or any other complex police engagement).

The challenge, however, is to avoid the commander becoming a passive receiver ofinformation. The concept of the operation has to originate from the commander's

cognition and support the commander's intent, thus driving his or her consumption

and usage of information within and across operational periods. Additionally, as we

have previously noted, the conceptual shift in gaining an operational mindset is also

meaningful. First, decision-making and training must expand the prevailing force

protection mindset that dominates traditional law enforcement practice to achieve a

balanced capacity to address a range of in extremis situations. As both the Columbine

school shooting and the Mumbai attacks amply demonstrate, the key to effective

response to dynamic attacks is deftly and quickly stopping the kinetic momentum of

the attacker(s). Civing any ground to an attacker allows them to entrench themselves

and achieve relative superiority. Second, developing viable concepts of operations built

on synchronized operational approaches needs to become a focus of police

commanders and the police service as a whole. This will require balancing distributed

and centralized operations through an adaptive command and control architecture

supported by agile intelligence and nurtured through rigorous education and training

for all police sub-specialties at all ranks.

Conclusion

Creating an operational concept for police counterterrorism response is a worthyproject, lndeed to be effective, it needs to go beyond counterterrorism to address the

whole range of complex police responses. This includes emergency and disaster

response, counter-gang and counter-violence activities, organized crime suppression,

public order (civil disturbance and riot response), and wide-area crime control efforts

(pattern and series crimes). The need to mobilize and synchronized distributed police

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New-Criminolggist : Beyond Active Response: An Operational Concept for Police Counterterrorism Response

operations across and among metropolitan regions, and across jurisdictional and

disciplinary boundaries are essential to addressing complex disasters, complex criminal

networks, and terrorist attacks. The tools to do so are emerging. These include

information and communications systems that enable sharing "beat" awareness across

time and space. These tools include enhanced sensor networks that facilitate

information-sharing and collaborative planning and situation assessment. Optimally,

this will contribute fo the "co-production of intelligence" needed to interdict, mitigate,

and shape response to complex situations.

Police have intuitively applied concepts of "swarming" to address crime. Consider the

police response to bank robberies and fleeing felons. lndividual police units form anetworked response to contain and capture fleeing vehicles. This coordination was

facilitated by the radio and is deployed daily by police in squad or "radio cars." The

development of police operational art would build from this existing capability to

address more complex assaults on public order by buitding the capacity to respond toand influence operations in a synchronized manner pre-, trans-r and post-attack, as

well as over time and sPace.

John P. Sultivan is a career police officer. He currently serves as a lieutenant with the

Los Angeles Sheriff s Department. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center forAdvanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST). His research focuses on counterinsurgency,

intelligence, terrorism, urban operations, and post-conflict policing. He is co-editor ofCountering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network

(Routledge, 2006) and Global Biosecurity: Threats and Responses (Routledge, 201-0).

Adam Etkus is an analyst specializing in foreign policy and security studies. He is

currently Associate Editor at Red Team Journal and a contributor to the Threatswatch

project. His articles have been published in Defense Concepts, West Point CTC Sentinel,

Small Wars Journal, and other publications.

Sources

[l] See John L. Romjue, "The Evolution of the Airland Battle Concept," Air University Revian,

May-June I 9M, available at

iittr):,,,/r.l ,r.u.,.a:iryOtvel'.msx\\ell.af.mrl,rairchroniclesiauirrvieri/1984i1t;lv-.iun,,iomjriehtiril [2]JohnP. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, "Preventing Another Mumbai: Building aPolice Operational Art,"

United States Military Academy, West Point, Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, June 2009,

pp. 4-7. We have also elaborated on this concept in our 2009 papers "Police Operational Art for a

Five-Dimensional Operational Space," "Toward Operational Art for Policing" and "Postcard

from Mumbai: Modem Urban Siege." [3] Brigadier Justin Kelly and Dr. Michael James Brennan,

Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategt, Culisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute,

2009, pp.2-3.l4l See Lindsay Clutterbuck, "Developing a Counter-Terrorism Network: Back to

the Future?" in Peter Katon4 Michael D. Intriligator, and John P. Sullivan (ods.), Cowttering

Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network, Routledge, 2006, pp. 33-

51.[5]seeBryarrBurrough,PublicEnemies:America'sGrcatestCfimeWa"-eandtheBifihoftlxe

FBI, 1933-1934, New York: The Penguin Press, 2004. [6] The concept of EMONs--emergent

multiorganizational networks originates in the disaster studies research of Thomas Drabek. See

Thomas E- Drabek, "Managing the Emergency Response. " Public Administration Review, Vol. 45,

1985, pp. 85-92 and The Professional Emergency Manager: Stmctures and Strategies for Success.

Boulder, Colorado: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, 1987. U) Sid Heal,

Sound Doctine: A Tactical Primer,NewYork: Lantern Books, 2000, pp. 41-51. Before retiring

from the LASD, Commander Heal was an influential innovator in both tactical (SWAT) and

emergency operations, as well as a pioneer in the adoption of novel technology to law enforcement

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--.New-Criminologist : Beyond Active Response: An Operational Concept for Police Counterterrorism Response

operations. [8] The FIRESCOPE program originated in Sout]rem Califomi4 organized under the

acronym,'TirefightingResources of Southem Califomia Organized for Potential Emergencies" in

1972. EIRESCOPE is the foundation of ICS, NIMS, and multiagency coordination for wildfires

and other complex emergencies. Campaign fires are large wildland fires that are fought in

campaigns as understood in a military sense. Both civil firefighters and police agencies utilize

"operational" concepts of maneuver in these settings. [9] Carl von Clausewitz and Peter Paret

(tans.), On War, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 357-359. [0] See William H.

McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations lYarfare Theory and Practice,New

York: Ballantine Books, 1996. [11] McRaven, pp. 4-1.[12] See Robert Leonhard, "Surprise," at

http:r',$rvrv.jhuapl.eduiareas,iwarfare/papers/sr.rrprise.pdf [13] For a discussion of Foch's influence,

see William F. Owen, "The Mano"-uwe Warfare Fraud," Royal United Services Journal, Vol. 153,

No. 4, 2008, reprinted at http:/ismallu,arsjournal.comlblog2008i09i the-manceuvre-warfare-

tiaudi [14] See John P. Sullivan, "Terrorism Early Waming and Co-productisn sfCounterterrorismlntelligence," paperpresentedto Canadian Association for Intelligence and

Security Studies, CASIS 20th Anniversary

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Beyond Active Response: An Operational Concept for Police Counterterrorism Response

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