Conflict and Peace-building in a Fragile Region: Evidence from the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.

For Peer Review O

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Conflict and Peace-building in a Fragile Region: Evidence

from the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.

Journal: African Security Review

Manuscript ID: Draft

Manuscript Type: Feature Article

Keywords: Niger Delta, Nigerian State, Violent-non-state actors, Frustration-Aggression, Niger Delta Militants

URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rasr Email: [email protected]

African Security Review

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Conflict and Peace-building in a Fragile Region: Evidence from the Niger

Delta Region of Nigeria.

ABSTRACT:

The Niger Delta as a region within the Nigerian federation has drawn the attentions of both

domestic and international authorities with ferment interest. This arises from two factors, first, the

region is a home to the hydrocarbon deposits that provides much revenue to the Nigerian state and

multinational corporations, and secondly, the region is fraught with incessant conflicts that are

recently violently. The content and crux of the violent conflicts demonstrate the attempts seeking to

remediate the governance failure, overt adoption and practice of a faulty federalism, and its

attendant marginalization and exclusion manifestations. This has pitted the members of the region

against the Nigerian state, multinational corporations and even against themselves. However, with

particular focus on Niger Delta, this study seeks to examine the security challenges and its effect on

the nation state by these “violent-non-state actors” such as Niger Delta Militants. Furthermore,

this study adopted “Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis and discovered that actions of these various

militant groups have not only challenged the security of the Nigerian state but also collapsed the

economy of the nation. The study therefore recommends a thorough understanding of the

operational workings of the groups by policy makers and those that act on their behalf towards

curtailing their operations and above all, restore peace, economic growth to the region and Nigeria

state in particular.

Keywords: Niger Delta, Nigerian State, Violent-non-state actors, Frustration-Aggression, Niger

Delta Militants

INTRODUCTION:

There are two incontrovertible facts about the Niger Delta region of Nigeria: first, it is

a region of strategic importance to both the domestic and international economies. And it is a

region of great and troubling paradox-it is an environment of great wealth as well as inhuman

poverty. The Niger Delta lies over one of the biggest reserves of oil on the planet. Niger

Delta earth-about 34 billion barrels of oil and plays a phenomenal role in the health of the

global economy especially that of the most powerful nation on earth such as the United State

of America through the various oil Companies owned by their nationals (Robinson, 2006).

Presently, the hydrocarbon resources of the region have made Nigeria the largest oil producer

in Africa and the seventh largest in the world and the region is home to over 30 million

people and accounts for over 75% of Nigeria’s oil production with over 600 oilfields, 5,284

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oil wells, 10 export terminals, 275 flow stations and is the take-off point of over 7,000

kilometres of pipelines across the country (Aghedo, 2011; Ibaba, 2009). It is therefore less

surprising that the region’s security has become a major issue to the global community.

This is the reason why mere whisper of unrest in the Delta has normally sent global

oil prices spiralling upwards. The state of insecurity of oil exploration activities in the Niger

Delta is even more telling on the socio-economic and political stability of the Nigerian state.

The Niger Delta is the base of modern day Nigeria. The region has been the main financial

lifeblood of the Nigerian state for more than four decades. Oil and gas wealth produced in the

region have made the country and multinational oil companies (MNOCs) such as Chevron,

Shell, Agip and Exxon Mobil hundreds of billions of dollars (Ajanaku, 2008). Nigeria

currently earns more than US$3billion a month from oil which accounts for about 95 per cent

of its export earnings and 40 per cent of its GDP with its proven reserves mostly located in

the Niger Delta and currently stand at 35 billion barrels (Aghedo, 2013). There is no doubt

that oil has brought Nigeria to world reckoning. Since it was first exported in 1958, with oil

wealth, the country was able to build two capital cities of enviable standard Lagos and Abuja

respectively. But the bulk of the people of the Niger Delta still live in severe and visible

poverty (Robinson, 2006).

Secondly, another indisputable reality of the Niger Delta is that it is a region of stark

contrast. The dilemma of the region is that its wealth and riches has become a source of

poverty, squalor and curse to the people of the oil bearing communities. Despite being the

bearer of the nation’s rich mineral wealth, the region is one of the poorest and least developed

parts of the country. The majority of its inhabitants lack basic amenities such as the provision

of electricity, potable water, and health facilities. The region’s inhabitants relate this poverty

amidst wealth to marginalization by the majority ethnic groups whose leaders dominate

political power and privatize oil largesse (Aghedo, 2013; Suberu, 2006). In return for their

generosity and patriotism, Nigeria has unashamedly paid Niger Deltans back with severe

neglect and abandonment, political and economic deprivation, mindless looting of revenue

generated from the region, joblessness, biochemical poisoning through pollution, brutal

military assaults (as well as occupation) and extreme poverty. It is this grim reality of the

Niger Delta region, coupled with the unreasonable refusal of the Nigerian state to respond to

the peaceful and genuine agitations of the oil bearing communities that have created an

environment of frustration, anger and desperation in the region. Today, this has snowballed

into lingering and volatile restiveness and insurgency, resulting in the demand for local

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ownership and control of oil resources under a truly restructured federal system in Nigeria

(Ako, 2011).

CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Insurgency has existed as long as people have used violence to resist states and empires but

its strategic significance has ebbed and flowed throughout history, increasing when

conventional war between great powers was unlikely and states were ineffective at defeating

it (Metz, 2012: 32). But the case of Africa has been worse. African insurgents rather than

fighting to replace existing states with more efficient alternatives have disrupted political and

development orders and hollowed out the state (Reno, 2012:157).

Insurgency can be seen as a tactic of warfare or as a type of strategy to conduct war. It can

also be defined as a protracted military struggle in which one or more groups seek to

overthrow or fundamentally change the political or social order in a state or region through

the use of sustained violence, subversion, or social disruption, with the aim of occupying

power and completely or partially controlling the resources of a territory or state (Rich &

Duyvesteyn, 2012:11). Seeing insurgency this way hence the activities of the Niger Delta

Militancy group in Nigeria amount to insurgency.

The basis of the Frustration-Aggression hypotheses theory is found in the works of John

Dollard (a psychologist) and his associates. In their pioneering work on the subject (Dollard

et al., 1939), and in the later research work carried out by Leonard Berkowitz (1980-89),

Political Scientists who employed this approach as a general basis for the explanation of

political violence.

This theory presents the idea of relative deprivation as a perceived disparity between value

expectation and value capabilities. Or the lack of a need satisfaction defined as a gap between

aspiration and achievement (Gurr, 1969). Simply put, when there is a gap between the level

of value expectation and the level of value attainment, due to lack of capability to establish a

congruence between both levels, tension builds up due to the pressure of an unfulfilled

aspiration or an unsatisfied urge or need. This, when not arrested in time, leads to frustration

(Berkowitz, 1962).

Frustration, when it builds up, leads to the rising up of suppressed emotions of anger, which

is often directed against the party considered to be the source of deprivation of satisfaction.

This strong emotion finally finds an outlet through aggressive and invariably violent

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disposition towards the environment. Berkowitze (1962) demonstrated that men are most

inclined to aggress when subjected to unjustified frustration, and drew a distinction between

attitudinal aggression and behavioural aggression as direct results of sustained frustration. For

Gurr (1969) the potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope

of relative deprivation among members of collectively. If there is a significant discrepancy

between what they think they deserve and what they think they will get, there is a likelihood

of rebellion. Just as frustration produces aggressive behaviour on the part of an individual, so

does relative deprivation predicts collective violence by social groups and men who are

frustrated have an innate disposition to carry out violence actions in proportion to the

intensity of their frustration (Ibaba, 2004).

INSURGENCY: THE GENESIS IN NIGER DELTA REGION

Over the last twenty years, various political movements and activist have emerged in

opposition to the perceived injustices perpetrated upon the people of the Niger Delta by the

government and the oil companies. These were usually nonviolent; Ken Saro-Wiwa was the

most famous activist. Ken Saro-Wiwa was an Ogoni writer-turned-activist who was executed

by the Nigerian government in 1995 on what many believed to be deliberately false charges

with the aim of silencing his vocal opposition to the oil interests in Nigeria (Ikelegbe, 2011).

In Saro-Wiwa’s footsteps came others who having seen the government’s reaction to

nonviolent activism, advocated violence as resistance to what they regarded as the

enslavement of their people. Niger Delta agitation for a fairer distribution of oil revenues is

nothing new. As far back as February 1966, a former Police officer from the Delta named

Jasper Adaka Boro led a rebellion on behalf of the Niger Delta. Boro recruited 40 men into an

organisation known as the Niger Delta Volunteer Force. Boro gave his men training in the

use of firearms and explosives in the creeks and bushes. On February 23, 1966, the men

attacked a police station at Yenagoa, raided the armoury and kidnapped some officers

including the police officer in command of the station. They also blew up oil pipelines,

engaged the police in a gunfight and declared the Niger Delta an independent republic. The

revolt was suppressed and Boro and his men were sentenced to death (Ikelegbe, 2010).

On return to civilian rule in 1999, the expression of the ethnic angers that have been bottled

up for several years came to the fore (Ako, 2011). Thus in the Niger Delta, youths began an

armed campaign and demand for greater control of the oil resources from their land. Unlike

armed resistance movements in other countries such as Irish Republican Army (IRA) in

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Northern Ireland, the Niger Delta gangs are not one organisation operating under a common

leadership with unified ideology. There is no central chain of command like the IRA had or

clearly defined political ideal. Rather the gangs are a loose eclectic mix of several aggrieved

armed factions like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the

Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF). The gangs “modus operandi is reminiscent

of other armed groups and guerrilla armies around the world. They operate and place

themselves in the midst of heavily populated civilian area, making it difficult, dangerous and

inhospitable home terrain. Their shadowy nature is an asset and a hindrance. While their

mystique makes their detection and suppression difficult for the Nigerian security forces, it

has also made them faceless and prevented them form making political progress. They lack a

single articulate spokesperson who can speak for their cause such as a Gerry Adams or

Yasser Arafat. The multi-headed militant hydra is not easy for outsides to understand. This is

why the Niger Delta struggle is a peculiar struggle (Ikelegbe, 2011).

For a long time, the militants dared the Nigerian State through ceaseless attacks on persons,

facilities and institutions. The table below contains some of the insurgent actions.

S/No Event Date / Months

1 An executive with the United States-based oil company

Baker Hughes was shot and killed in the south-eastern city of

Port-Harcourt.

May 10th, 2006

2 A Norwegian rig offshore Nigeria as attacked and 16 crew

members were kidnapped.

June 2nd, 2006

3 10 MENDS members were killed by the Nigerian military.

The members were working on releasing a Royal Dutch Shell

hostage.

August 20th, 2006

4 10 Nigerian soldiers were killed off the shore of the Niger

Delta in their patrol boat by a MEND mortar shell. Earlier

that day a Nigerian/Royal Dutch Shell convoy was attacked

in the Port Harcourt region resulting in some people being

wounded.

October 2nd, 2006,

5 Nigerian soldiers attempted a rescue of kidnapped November 22nd, 2006

6 MEND attacked Chevron’s Oloibiri floating production,

storage, and offloading vessel off southern Bayelsa State

May 1st, 2007

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7 Three major oil pipelines (one is Brass and in the Akasa area)

were attacked, shutting down oil production and cutting

power to a facility run by Italian oil company Agip, part of

the ENI energy group.

May 8th, 2007

8 MEND militant attacked Shell operated pipelines in Nigeria,

forcing the company to halt 170,000 barrels a day of exports

of Bonny Light crude.

May 3rd, 20008

9 MEND naval forces attacked the Shell operated Bonga oil

platform, shutting down 10% of Nigeria’s oil production in

one fell swoop

June 20th, 2008

10 MEND inaugurated Operation Hurricane Barbarossa with an

ongoing string of militant attacks to brink down the oil

industry in Rivers State

September, 4th 2008

11 A week after declaring an oil war and destroying several

significant oil production and transportation hubs in the delta,

the group declared a ceasefire until “further notice” upon the

intervention of Ijaw and other elders in the region

September 27th

12 MEND called off its ceasefire January 30th, 2009

13 A military operation undertaken by a Joint Task Force (JTF)

began against MEND. It came in response to the kidnapping

of Nigerian soldiers and foreign sailors in the Delta region.

May 15th, 2009

14 MEND claimed they had blown up a Shell pipeline, as a

warning to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev who was

arriving to Nigeria the next day and to any potential foreign

investors.

June 18th, 2009

15 MEND carried out its first attack in Lagos. July 11th, 2009

16 MEND set on fire the Atlas Cove Jetty on Tarkwa Bay, a

major oil hub for Nigeria.

July 12th, 2009

Source: Compiled by author from several news media

ETHNIC C ONFLICT IN THE NIGER DELTA REGION:

One of the biggest security challenges facing states in the 1990s is the proliferation of small

arms and light weapons. This development calls for serious attention from states and regional

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organisations as it has increased tension, and escalated as well as prolonged intra-state

conflicts. In Nigeria, the trade in small arms and light weapons has fuelled ethnic clashes in

the Niger Delta, especially between the Ijaws and their immediate neighbours, the Itsekiri and

Urhobos, as events in Warri have shown in recent times (Agbo, 2011). The oil rich Niger

Delta remains the scene of recurring violence between members of different ethnic groups

competing for political and ethnic power, and between security and militia groups. This point

partly illustrated by the process of creating local government areas and locating headquarters

for such council area. In 1997, when General Sani Abacha created additional local

government areas, crisis erupted in Warri and its environs. The relocation of the headquarters

of Warri South Local Government from Ogbe-Ijoh to Ogidigben stirred a protracted war

between the Ijaw’s and the Itsekiri’s (Ikelegbe, 2010). The repercussions of this

administrative fiat persist till today. Conflict also erupted in Bonny (which delayed the huge

liquefied gas project there) including,Eleme, Okrika, Oleh and Odi. This crisis has been

aggravated by the theft of crude oil know as illegal bunkering and availability of light

weapons and Oil companies themselves have been affected by this crisis and at times have

contributed to it but like various scholars has copiously opined that Niger Delta Conflict in

recent years is not only of issues of environmental importance but also of some political and

nationalist motives (Adeola, 2011).

In January, 1999, a state of emergency was declared by the Federal Government of Nigeria in

Bayelsa State and heavily armed military personnel with armoured vehicles were deployed to

fight the Niger Deltans, especially the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) and Egbesu Boys of

Africa (Adebayo, 2009). Also in November 20, 1999, the Nigerian state through an operation

condemn Hakuri, embarked on one of its most sordid genocidal escapades in the Delta region

by using the army to invade Odi community, the second largest town inBayelsa state after

Amassoma; at least 1000 people were brutally murdered, several others were declared

missing, all houses except three were destroyed, the community was deserted, and property

worth millions of naira were destroyed (CLO, 2002).

In 2003, an army of occupation known as the Joint Task Force (JTF) codenamed Operation

Restore Hope was formed in 2003, for the consistent, persistent and aggressive suppression

of oil related protests in the Niger Delta. The JTF is made up of about 4,000 troops (Ikelegbe,

2011). In October 2005, Odioma was also invaded by the JTF, and at least 17 people were

killed, including a two year old child (ICG, 2009).

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However, in 2009 due to the unworkability of the counter-insurgency approach of

militarization, the government of Nigeria decided to adopt another approach. This approach

culminated in the granting of amnesty. The acceptance of the amnesty offer consequently

leads to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme. The DDR as

noted by the United Nations in 2000 is one of the most important ways of resolving conflicts

and managing post-conflict situation in the worldto ensure peace. This has been variously

used by the United Nations and other similar bodies as an instrument for achieving

sustainable peace (Ibaba, 2011). This was adopted by the Nigerian government in its amnesty

programme in the Niger Delta.

There are three phases tothe amnesty programme, viz, the Disarmament and Demobilisation

of militants; the Rehabilitation and integration of ex-militants and the final stage is the Post-

amnesty package of huge infrastructural development (FGN Amnesty Programme). The

disarmed militants were taken to designated collection points and caps in six Niger Delta

states with a promise of payment of N65,000 (appropriately $407 USD) monthly which

covers, for rent and offering of vocational training (Kuku, 2011). During the first phase

which has already been implemented, several militants turned in several arm and

ammunitions (Kuku, 2011). According to Kuku 2011, it was recorded that about 26,358 ex-

militants accepted the amnesty offer (first phase 20,192 militant representing those that

accepted the offer on or before October, 2009, while the second phase of the amnesty

programme that occurred in November, 2010 comprises 6, 166 militants representing those

that accepted the offer post October, 2009).

The Amnesty programme appeared to have reduced the incidence of conflict and the

accumulation and influx of arms by militants in the region. In addition, some rehabilitation

centres were provided for the second stage which was tailored to meet training needs of the

ex-militants. The trainings were to be done in batches as the centres could only accommodate

few numbers of registered ex-militants and it is expected that each batch will cover for moral

counselling and spiritual regeneration of the ex-militant (Akinwale, 2010). A survey of the

career aspiration of the ex-militants reveals a great preference for about ten (10) sectors

ranging from Oil/Gas, Maritime Services, Fabrication and Welding Technology, Exploration

and Production and Processing Engineering, which duration of training ranges is projected to

last between 3-18 months and those desirous and willing to go back to school for further

education was given the opportunity under the programme (Akinwale, 2010).

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THE PROSPECT AND CHALLENGES OF COUNTER INSURGENCY APPROACH

Reports from the government indicates that following the relative peace ushered in by the

cease-fire as a result of the amnesty declaration, the country’s oil output had risen to 2.3

million barrels a day from 800,000 barrels per day (in the 2006-2008 period) as a result of the

improvement in security in the oil region (Igwe, 2010). An increment of 1.5 million barrels

per day indicates 120.45 million dollars of revenue to national coffers every day; and it was

recorded that some companies also took the opportunity to repair some of their damaged oil

facilities to enhance their production capacity (Igwe, 2010).

Without doubt, the amnesty programme is expected to improve the human capital

development of the country which is presently low. Nigeria’s Human Development Index

(HDI) value (comprising three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy

life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living) for 2011 stands at 0.459,

positioning the county at 156 out of 187 countries and territories (UNDP, 2011).

Notwithstanding the achievements of the programme, reports from the panel set up in January

2010 to review the rehabilitation aspect of the DDR revealed some inadequacies thus leading

to calls by elders in the Niger Delta Region for the dissolution of the Presidential Amnesty

Committee. Some of these include the fact that about 80 percent of budget had gone on

payments of consultants and contractors, with 20 percent committed on rehabilitation of the

ex-militants; the over bloating of the numbers of registered ex-militants; the continued

detention of several militants; some of the training centres falling short of acceptable

standards and operating with inadequate facilities (Adebayo, 2009). Commenting on the

flaws of the amnesty programmed, Joseph (2010) stated that: Allowances ‘unpaid or not paid

regularly, huge disparities between payments made to foot soldiers and former militant

commanders, limited access to rehabilitation training and allowances for those who

surrendered weapons after the deadline, inappropriate training provision, limited employment

prospects, the absence of a broader political settlement involving the broader Niger Delta

population that has born the costs of conflict, and the politically motivated staffing of bodies

responsible for implementing and coordinating the amnesty programme, are among the

numerous flaws of the Amnesty.

The Federal Government in December, 2009 scrapped the Presidential Committee on

Disarmament and Amnesty for Militant in the Niger Delta, and in its place are five new

committees put in place to handle the post-amnesty programmes and fast-track development

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challenges in the region; these includes, the Presidential Monitoring Committee on Amnesty;

the Infrastructural Committee; the Disarmament and Reintegration Committee; the Oil and

Gas Assets Protection Committee; and the Environmental Remediation Committee (Adebayo,

2009).

One of the major challenges of the amnesty package is in the area of poor implementation.

The amnesty programme was not implemented as recommended in the report of the Niger

Delta Technical Committee. Rather than engage in open negotiations or a formal peace

agreement with the militants, the consultations were at the highest levels of federal

government, involving Niger Delta elites/elders and top government officials of Niger Delta

origin negotiating with the militant commanders (Dadem, 2009). This top down non-

inclusive approach, through the militant commanders who are only interested in what comes

into their pockets, or for their own personal aggrandizement in a serious challenge to the

amnesty programme as the militants on ground felt cheated and sidelined by the government.

It shows that Nigerian government has not really learnt any lesson from the previous failed

developmental programmes such as the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB), Niger

Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA), Oil Mineral Producing Area Development

Commission (OMPADEC), which failed to deliver on the basis of top-down approach (Igwe,

2010). For sustainable peace and development in the Niger Delta tobe achieved, there is need

for the adoption of bottom-up approach through the inclusion of elements of democracy,

accountability, equity and active public participation of all stakeholders including the

grassroots people, militants, youth organisations, women groups and civil society(Ako,

2011).

Furthermore, the total number of ammunitions/weapons handed in by the militants totalling

1,798 rifles, 1,981 guns of various types, 70 RPGs, 159 pistols, one spare and six cannons are

certainly low when compared with 26, 358 militants that registered for the amnesty

programme (Agbo, 2011). The region is still ridden with arms and this is evident in the

various attacks that have been carried out by militants even after the disarmament exercise

and therefore, it is important to state unequivocally that the disarmament programme needs to

be firmed because as long as many arms are still at large, the region remains very unsafe and

at risk of relapsing into violence (Joseph, 2010).

Importantly, the amnesty programme exclusively targets only militants without adequate and

due consideration for the victims of militancy and hostage taking in the region to the extent

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that mothers and children who had lost fathers and sons and homes and have been displaced

by the conflict were not included in the amnesty package at all (Akinwale, 2010).

The exclusion of grassroots organisations and the alienation of local knowledge from the

construction of peace-building process in the Niger Delta raise some questions on the

sustainability of the current peace in the region (Amaize, 2011). Ibaba (2011) posed the

questions thus: ‘Does the surrender of arms and renunciation of violence by militias bring the

frustration of the entire population to an end? Are the militias the only deprived and

aggrieved Niger Delta’s? Are the amnesty program and the attention given to the ex-

combatants not reinforcing the frustrations of those who did not take up arms against the

Nigerian State? My answer to the first two questions is no, but the answer to the third

question is in the affirmative. This brings us to the point that violence could reoccur in the

region if the frustrations which support insurgency are not resolved and resolving these

frustrations is therefore a requirement for peace-building in the region’ (Ibaba, 2011).

The empowerment policy of the government through the training programme and job

opportunities must not be limited to the militants. It must be extended to all the local

inhabitants in the region, otherwise, it could send a wrong signal to others who have been

excluded from the exercise that crime pays and may serve as a driving force for others to

want to take arms against the state for recognition.

Addressing the militants alone while neglecting the deplorable situation, the

underdevelopment and poverty, governmental and corporate miss-governance, all of which

led to the militancy and later criminality in the region will no doubt spell doom from the

amnesty programme (Brill &Haken, 2011). This is because the number of militants presently

being reintegrated under the programme constitute only a small percentage of the Niger Delta

population, which under the 2006 population figure is 31, 224,577 million people (Nigerian

News Census 2006). Efforts must be taken to remove the Niger Delta People from what

Dadem (2009) refers to as poverty trap; a situation in which degraded environment, poor

health, poor education, poor infrastructure and poor standard of living reinforce one another.

In addition, it was revealed that some of the rehabilitation centres and demobilising camps

are lacking in even the basic facilities for proper impartation of knowledge and skills;

shortages of bed spaces and these led to only few militants to be accommodated in some of

the centres (Ikelegbe, 2010). Also in compliance with the UN code on DDR, it is expected

that in the implementation of the DDR programmes, the ex-militants must be taken away

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from their natural habitats for transformation and reintegration purposes (Amaize, 2011). For

better coordination of the programme, it is suggested that the government agencies involved

in the programme need to draw on the experience and professionalism of similar exercises in

other countries, including those administered by the United Nations in countries like Liberia

and Sierra Leone and equally learn from some Nigerians that have helped in formulating and

administering similar programmes in other countries(Amaize, 2011).

Consequently, there is the urgent need for assistance and cooperation from international

communities in the area of technical assistance, capacity building, vocational training and

skill acquisition, among others. According to the Amnesty Office, more than 5000 ex-

militants have been processed for various vocational, entrepreneurship and educational

training in both local and offshore training centres (Federal Government of Nigeria, Niger

Delta Amnesty Programme). Aside from countries such as the United States of America,

Russia, South Africa, Ghana, Malaysia, India, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Israel, Benin Republic,

Poland Trinidad and Tobago, Cyprus, and the United Arabs Emirate (Dubai) that have

already given their support, similar support is still expected from other countries (Kuku

2011).

Within the framework of the EU 2011 Annual Action Plan for Nigeria, the EU approved

under the European Development Fund the sum of €478 million for the funding of about

eight projects. Out of this amount, €200 million was for the EU Niger Delta Support

Programme which overall objective is to mitigate the conflict in the Niger Delta by

addressing the main causes of unrest and violence, bad governance, provision of training and

employment of the youths, improve access to safe, adequate and sustainable water, sanitation

and hygiene (European Commission, 2012). Consequently, there is no gainsaying that more

of such initiatives and support by other developed countries will go a long way in

complementing the efforts of the government in the development of the region thus bringing

about lasting peace.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Beyond amnesty, the underlying economic, social and environmental problems that triggered

militancy in the Niger Delta needs to be addressed, as without this, it is doubtful if amnesty

alone could bring durable peace to the volatile region. The introduction of the amnesty

programme must be effectively backed up by socio-economic development of the entire

region. Amnesty alone will only bring a temporary peace to the region. Sooner or later, new

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and more dangerous groups may emerge in the region if nothing is done to adequately

address the root causes of the Niger Delta crisis. Interestingly, following the amnesty

proclamation, the President equally announced the relinquishment of ten per cent of the

federal government’s holdings and interest in the oil and gas resources directly to the oil

producing communities of the Niger Delta (Dadem, 2009). This could give the Niger Delta

communities as actual financial stake in the revenues derived from oil production, rather than

having the money flow primarily to the federal and state governments, and more often, to the

pockets of the individuals. If properly utilized, it will go a long way in enhancing the

development of the region regarding the development of infrastructure, human capital and the

protection of its environment, which could help to curtail the propensity to destroy oil MNCs’

facilities or disrupt oil production. However, there is need for machinery to be put in place to

ensure transparency and accountability regarding the use of the money at the local level.

There is also the challenge concerning the modality to be used in managing the funds, as

communities where oil is presently being explored may want to claim monopoly over the

monies to the detriment of the communities that oil is presently not being exploited (Dadem,

2009). This may lead to another round of hostilities and conflicts in the region of not properly

handled. Also, the skill acquisition package of the Amnesty programme promises a better

future for both the local populations and the companies if well managed. Upon the

completion of their training in oil-related skills, the companies should ensure that they are

recruited and engaged in the industry through the reservation of some employment quota for

the local inhabitants, thus making the local people to identify with the companies operating in

the region. As noted by Brill and Haken, the Nigerian economy must be producing jobs as not

to render the jobs training exercise for the ex-militants a mere formality with the result that

when eventually the allowances are stopped, they go back to the bush, which some have

begun to do (Brill &Haken, 2011).

In addition, the concept of community participation must be deeply entrenched inthe region.

The project supports activities such as the abolition of poverty, building local capacity, the

environment, the infrastructure and institutional capacity development.

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Conflict and Peace-building in a Fragile Region: Evidence from the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.

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