C U R S O S E C O N G R E S O SC U R S O S E C O N G R E S O S

Nº 2 1 7

Santiago de Compostela

18-20 July 2012

18-20 de julio de 2012

VII Conference of the SpanishSociety for Logic, Methodologyand Philosophy of Science

VII Congreso de la Sociedad deLógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España

EDITED BY

Concha Martínez VidalJosé L. Falguera José M. SagüilloVíctor M. Verdejo M. Pereira-Fariña

SCIENTIFIC COMMITEE/ COMITÉ CIENTÍFICO

Juan José Acero (Universidad de Granada) • John Corcoran (Buffalo University, USA) •Javier Echeverría (Ikerbasque/ Universidad del País Vasco) • Manuel García-Carpintero(Universidad de Barcelona) • María Manzano, Grzegorz Malinowski (Universidad deLódz, Polonia) • C. Ulises Moulines (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München,Alemania) • León Olivé Ordoñez (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid) • Stewart Shapiro(Ohio University, USA -St Andrews University, UK)

ORGANISING COMMITTEE/ COMITÉ ORGANIZADOR

Concha Martínez Vidal (Presidenta del Congreso, USC) • José Luis Falguera López(Secretario, USC) • Xavier de Donato (Vocal, USC) • José Miguel Sagüillo Fernández-Vega (Vocal, USC) • María José Frápolli Sanz (Vocal, Universidad de Granada,Presidenta de la SLMFCE) • Pierdaniele Giaretta (Vocal, Universidad degli Studi diPadova, Italia) • Stephen McLeod (Vocal, University of Liverpool, UK) • Sofía Miguens(Vocal, Universidade de Porto, Portugal) • Martín Pérez Pereira (Vocal, USC) • UxíaRivas Monroy (Vocal, USC) • Alejandro Sobrino Cerdeiriña (Vocal, USC) • Charles Travis(Vocal, King's College, UK/ Univerdidad de Porto) Juan Vázquez Sánchez (Vocal, USC)• Jesús Vega Encabo (Vocal, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid) • Víctor VerdejoAparicio (Vocal, USC) • Luis Villegas (Vocal, USC) • Inés Pan Espiñeira (Vocal, USC)

FIRST EDITION LULLIUS LECTURES / PRIMERA EDICIÓN CONFERENCIAS LULLIUS

PHILIP KITCHER

PROYECTOS COLABORADORES

FFI2009-08828/FISO, FFI2011-13481-E

Sociedad de Lógica, Metodologíay Filosofía de la Ciencia

Universidadede Santiago

de Compostela

publicacións

CURSOS E CONGRESOS DA UNIVERSIDADE DE SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA

Nº. 217

VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science

VII Congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España

VII CONFERENCE OF THE SPANISH SOCIETY FOR LOGIC, METHODOLOGY AND PHILOSPHY OF SCIENCE

VII CONGRESO DE LA SOCIEDAD DE LÓGICA, METODOLOGÍA Y FILOSOFÍA DE LA CIENCIA EN ESPAÑA

Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 18-20 July 2012

Santiago de Compostela, España, 18-20 de julio de 2012

EDITED BY Concha Martínez Vidal

José L. Falguera José M. Sagüillo

Víctor M. Verdejo M. Pereira-Fariña

2012 UNIVERSIDADE DE SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA

Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España. Congreso (7º. 2012. Santiago de Compostela) VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 18-20 July 2012 = VII Congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España, Santiago de Compostela, España, 18-20 de julio de 2012 [Recurso de internet] / edited by Concha Martínez Vidal, José L. Falguera, José M. Sagüillo, Víctor M. Verdejo, M. Pereira-Fariña. ─ Santiago de Compostela : Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, Servizo de Publicacións e Intercambio Científico, 2012 (Cursos e congresos da Universidade de Santiago de Compostela ; 217) Formato PDF Requisitos do sistema : Adobe Acrobat Reader Modo de acceso : Internet repositorio Minerva, http://dspace.usc.es/ (15-07-12) 1. Ciencias ─ Metodoloxía ─ Congresos I. Martínez Vidal, Concha, ed. lit. II. Falguera, José L., ed. lit. III. Sagüillo, José M., ed. lit. IV. Verdejo, Víctor M., ed. lit. V. Pereira-Fariña, M., ed. lit. VI. Universidade de Santiago de Compostela. Servizo de Publicacións e Intercambio Científico, ed. 001.8:061.3(461.11 Santiago de Compostela)

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INDEX / ÍNDICE

Preface ........................................................................................................................ 1 Prefacio........................................................................................................................ 3 Premio para Jóvenes Investigadores............................................................................ 5 Contributed papers / Comunicaciones ........................................................................ 1 1. LOGIC, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC / LÓGICA, HISTORIA

Y FILOSOFÍA DE LA LÓGICA ............................................................................ . 2

MARTIN ANDOR: Inferentialism and Expressivism about Logical Vocabulary in Frege 3 JOHN CORCORAN and JOSÉ SAGÜILLO: Information-Theoretic Approaches to Logical Relations ..….................................................................................................. 11 MANUEL CRESCENCIO MORENO GOMEZ: La Historia de la Lógica como la Historia de los Argumentos Ontológicos …................................................................ 16 JOAQUÍN DÍAZ BOILS: La Jerarquía de Grzegorzcyk por comprensiones categoriales 27 EMILIO GARCIA BUENDIA: Abducción y Derecho ….......................................... 46 PIERDANIELE GIARETTA and SILVIA GAIO: Gödel’s Syntactical Conventions 53 IGNACIO HERNÁNDEZ-ANTÓN, ENRIQUE SARRIÓN MORILLO and FERNANDO SOLER TOSCANO: Abducción y Semántica de Teoría de Juegos........ 60 JOHN KEARNS: First-person Logical Theories and Third-person Theories ........... 67 JOAN ROSELLÓ: Incompleteness, Undecidability and Platonism in the Work of Kurt Gödel …………………………………………………………. 74 ENRIQUE SARRIÓN-MORILLO, IGNACIO HERNÁNDEZ-ANTÓN and ÁNGEL NEPOMUCENO-FERNÁNDEZ: Tratamiento multimodal de contextos…........................................................................................................................ 81 JOSÉ PEDRO UBEDA RIVES: Una lógica epistémica bidimensional ................... 88 MARGARITA VÁZQUEZ: Tiempo y puntos de vista …......................................... 95

2. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, EPISTEMOLOGY /

FILOSOFÍA DEL LENGUAJE, FILOSOFÍA DE LA MENTE, EPISTEMOLOGÍA 101

JUAN JOSÉ ACERO FERNÁNDEZ and NEFTALÍ VILLANUEVA FERNÁNDEZ: Wittgenstein’s Anti-descriptivism ….......................................................................... 102 SILVIA ANDRÉS BALSERA: Unidad conceptual versus multiplicidad de grupos de deferencia ................................................................................................. 109 MARC ARTIGA GALINDO: The Singular Thought Strategy and the Content of Perception …...................................................................................... 114 ANTONIO BENÍTEZ and EMILIO GARCÍA BUENDÍA: El Modelo Animat en la Inteligencia Artificial bio-inspirada …….................................................................. 122 EDSON BERND, ANTONIO GAITÁN-TORRES and MANUEL DE PINEDO-GARCIA: Two Kinds of Second Person Authority ….................................................................. 132 ANTONIO BLANCO SALGUEIRO: ¿Fue Whorf un neowhorfiano? …................. 139 DAVID BORDONABA and NEFTALÍ VILLANUEVA: Lo que se dice y "decir lo mismo" …......................................................................... 147 FERNANDO BRONCANO-BERROCAL: Luck and Fortune, or Why Knowledge Requires Cognitive Control …................................................................................... . 155 GEMMA CELESTINO FERNÁNDEZ: It Is Not the Case that the Alleged Golden Mountain Exists …........................................................................................ 162

CRISTINA CORREDOR: Communicative Intentions and Joint Commitments in Speech Acts ………………………………………………………………………. 170 ANTONIO DUARTE: El arte del diagnóstico: falacias irónicas ….......................... 177 VICTOR FERNANDEZ: Metarepresentación y Dualismo en la Lectura de Mentes 184 LUIS FERNÁNDEZ MORENO: Nombres propios y términos de género natural: un examen de dos supuestas similitudes .................................................................... 191 EKAIN GARMENDIA: Boghossian’s Argument from Inference and Identity Belief Ascriptions ......................................................................................... 198 HEIMIR GEIRSSON: A Tale of Two Mary's …........................................................ 205 MARIO GÓMEZ-TORRENTE: On quotation and semantic structure …………… 212 EDUARDO GONZÁLEZ DE LUNA: Una noción dinámica de la representación mental en el marco de un realismo natural …............................................................. 216 JAVIER GONZALEZ DE PRADO SALAS: Inferentialism, Metaphor and Context 223

MANUEL HERAS-ESCRIBANO and MANUEL DE PINEDO-GARCÍA: Dispositions, Affordances and Mental Intentionality ….............................................. 230 MARTA JORBA: Concept-aspects and the Specification of Cognitive Phenomenology 236 MANUEL LIZ: Decisiones epistémicas y los límites del naturalismo .................... 241 MANUEL LIZ: "Yo soy George Kaplan". Tres tesis sobre la rigidez semántica....... 246 MIREIA LOPEZ AMO: ¿Es la tesis de la carga teórica de la observación incompatible con el dogmatismo? ............................................................................. 253 JANUSZ MACIASZEK: Metaphor: Meaning, Interpretation and Causation …...... 261 MANUEL PÉREZ OTERO: Argumentación racional sin transmisión de la justificación 269 PABLO RYCHTER: Presentism, Truthmaking, and Laws of Nature …........................ 274 UXÍA RIVAS MONROY: Creencia, conocimiento y verdad: el enfoque lógico-semántico de Frege y Russell y el pragmatista de Peirce y James ..................... 280 MARÍA ESPERANZA RODRÍGUEZ ZARAGOZA: ¿Qué hay detrás de un argumento? La distinción objetividad-subjetividad mostrada a través de la distinción entre desacuerdo perdido y desacuerdo legítimo ….............................................................................. 287 SERGI ROSELL: Voluntary Belief on a Strictly Epistemic Basis? …........................... 295 JONATHAN SUROVELL: Carnap's Principle of Tolerance: Rejection or Neglect of Language ............................................................................. 300 BARBARA TRYBULEC: Is Naturalism Normative? Some Problems with Naturalizing Epistemic Normativity ….......................................................................................... 308 VÍCTOR M. VERDEJO: Unbelievably Good Norms ….......................................... 316 IGNACIO VICARIO: El rompecabezas de la atribución de creencias …................. 324 JAVIER VILANOVA: La percepción del aspecto en las Investigaciones Filosóficas 331

3. PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE / FILOSOFÍA Y

METODOLOGÍA DE LA CIENCIA 339

ALBA AMILBURU: Natural Kind Thinking in Philosophy of Science: a Meta-theoretical Analysis …................................................................................... 340 LORENZO BARAVALLE: Extensión del dominio de la teoría de la selección natural: enfoques sincrónicos y diacrónicos del cambio cultural …....................................... 343 MARÍA CAAMAÑO: Las anomalías no refutatorias y el alcance del dominio teórico 350 EDUARDO CASTRO: Induction, Laws of Nature and Inference to the Best Explanation 358

GUSTAVO CEVOLANI, VINCENZO CRUPI and ROBERTO FESTA: A Verisimilitudinarian Analysis of the Linda paradox............................................... 366 GUSTAVO CEVOLANI and LUCA TAMBOLO: Underdetermination, Realism, and Truth Approximation …............................................................................................. 374 JUAN J. COLOMINA: The Feasibility of Determinables and its Relation to the Scientific Image .................................................................... 382 TIM DE CRAECKER: Causal Explanation in Theories of Probabilistic Causation 389 XAVIER DE DONATO-RODRIGUEZ: Actitudes cognitivas: el caso de la asunción, particularmente en ciencia ………………..….......................................................... 396 ALEX DÍAZ: The Müller-Lyer Visual Illusion: Tricking the Brain or Tricking the Scientist? 403 JOSÉ L. FALGUERA: De los géneros constituidos de Kuhn a los objetos abstractos de Zalta ………………………………………………………………..... 409 M. J. GARCÍA-ENCINAS: Reading "De Interpretatione" 9 ......................................... 417 ANDONI IBARRA and HANNOT RODRÍGUEZ: Gobernanza de riesgos de la nanomedicina: el caso europeo ….............................................................................. 424 MARIA JIMENEZ-BUEDO: Experiments in the Social Sciences: Rethinking the Hawthorne Effect ….................................................................................................. 432 VÍCTOR JOSÉ LUQUE MARTÍN: La Explicación en Biología: entre Leyes y Modelos Explicativos …............................................................................................. 437 ALFREDO MARCOS: Implicaciones filosóficas de la biología post-genómica … 444 IGNACIO MARTÍNEZ DE LEJARZA: Medidas probabilistas de apoyo evidencial: ¿pluralidad de medidas o pluralidad de relaciones? …............................................. 451 THOMAS MEIER: Un marco conceptual para el realismo estructural …................ 465 ELSA MURO and MARÍA CEREZO: Información biomolecular con contenido semántico. Una perspectiva sistémica ........................................................................ 473 VIOREL PÂSLARU: Conceptions of Mechanisms and Insensitivity of Causation 481 DIANA LUZ RABINOVICH: Medición en Psicología. Ponderación de las concepciones clásicas …............................................................................................. 489 ANDRÉS RIVADULLA: Theoretical Preduction and Computational Scientific Discovery ……………………………………………………………….. 497 CRISTIAN SABORIDO: La problemática naturalización de la normatividad natural. Organización y malfuncionalidad biológica …......................................................... 505

MARGARITA SANTANA: La discusión del positivismo lógico en la JAE: Blas Cabrera y Julio Palacios …................................................................................. 513 IÑAKI SAN PEDRO: Violation of Measurement Independence without Conspiracy 520 IULIAN TOADER: An Outline of Weylean Skepticism …....................................... 529 NICOLÁS VENTURELLI: Mecanismos, sistemas dinámicos y el Santo Grial de la explicación científico-cognitiva ….................................................................... 536 SUSAN VINEBERG: Indispensability and Mathematical Explanation …................ 544 ZENAIDA YANES ABREU: Verdades significantes: o cómo incluir lo político en la ciencia 552 EDUARDO ZUBIA: La lógica de las imágenes: retórica y argumentación en las prácticas científicas representacionales…................................................................................. 559 4. HISTORY OF SCIENCE / HISTORIA DE LA CIENCIA 567

CARLOS ALBERTO CARDONA Panofsky: el conflicto entre la perspectiva lineal y la perspectiva angular ….......................................................................................... 568 PABLO RUIZ DE OLANO: Apunte acerca de la filosofía de la ciencia de Blas Cabrera. El papel de Duhem in su defensa de la relatividad ............................................... 579 ALBERT SOLÉ: Three-dimensionalist Bohmian Mechanics: Does Newton Defeat Aristotle? ………………………………………………………………….. 587 Mª JOSÉ TACORONTE DOMÍNGUEZ: El planteamiento sobre la mujer: positivistas, krausistas y católicos ………………………………………………………………….. 595 5. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY / CIENCIA, TECNOLOGÍA Y

SOCIEDAD 603

IRENE DÍAZ GARCÍA: La nueva ley de la ciencia en España: una aproximación crítica al contrato social subyacente …....................................................................... 604 MANUELA FERNÁNDEZ PINTO: Aprendiendo de la ignorancia: la agnotología como nuevo enfoque en filosofía de la ciencia …....................................................... 611 BELEN LASPRA: Cultura científica y museos de ciencia: una historia paralela 618 JOSÉ LUIS LUJÁN, OLIVER TODT and JUAN BAUTISTA BENGOETXEA: Las reglas de inferencia como hipótesis empíricas. La información mecanística en la evaluación de riesgos ………………………………………………………….. 626 AMPARO ROMERO: El tecnofeminismo de Judy Wajcman. Alcance teórico y político 631

ANA ROMERO DE PABLOS: Las patentes, nuevas fuentes para la historia de la ciencia y los estudios CTS ……………………………………………………. 639 MIGUEL ZAPATA: Los imaginarios colectivos en la representación social de la ciencia 642

Symposia / Simposios …………………………………………………………….. 649 1. LOGIC, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC / LÓGICA, HISTORIA Y

FILOSOFÍA DE LA LÓGICA 650 JOSÉ FERREIRÓS and MARÍA JOSÉ FRÁPOLLI (coord.), CONCEPCIÓN MARTÍNEZ VIDAL, JOSÉ MIGUEL SAGÜILLO, VALERIA GIARDINO, RAYMUNDO MORADO: Prospects for Practice-based Philosophy of Logic .................................................... 651 ALEJANDRO SOBRINO and Martín Pereira FARIÑA (coord.), SANTIAGO FERNÁNDEZ, MARÍA NAVARRO: II Seminario Alfredo Deaño sobre Razonamiento Ordinario…………………………………………………………… 689 LUIS VEGA-REÑÓN (coord.), BEGOÑA CARRASCAL, XAVIER DE DONATO, HUBERT MARRAUD, RAYMUNDO MORADO, PAULA OLMOS GÓMEZ: Teoria de la argumentación: perspectivas y problemas …......................................... 726 LUIS VEGA REÑÓN (coord.), ENRIQUE ALONSO Y MIGUEL VIVANCO, LILIAN BERMEJO LUQUE, JOSÉ M. SAGÜILLO: La argumentación en la esfera pública del discurso ........................................................................................ 763 2. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, EPISTEMOLOGY /

FILOSOFÍA DEL LENGUAJE, FILOSOFÍA DE LA MENTE,

EPISTEMOLOGÍA 784

JUAN COLOMINA and MANUEL LIZ (coord.), FERNANDO CHARRO, DAVID P. CHICO MARGARITA VÁZQUEZ: Puntos de vista ….......................................................... 785 JESÚS VEGA ENCABO and VÍCTOR M. VERDEJO (coord.), LAURA ORTEGA CANO, MARÍA MUÑOZ-SERRANO: Semantics and Epistemology of Artifactual Kinds 801

3. PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE / FILOSOFÍA Y

METODOLOGÍA DE LA CIENCIA 831 ANTONIO DIÉGUEZ (coord.), PASCUAL MARTÍNEZ-FREIRE, ALVARO MORENO, JON UMEREZ, ARANTZA ETXEBERRIA: Mecanismos y modelos en biología y en ciencias cognitivas ….............................................................................................. 832 RODOLFO GAETA (coord.), NELIDA GENTILE, SUSANA LUCERO: Realismo y antirrealismo científicos: el caso de las leyes ........................................ 868

4. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY / CIENCIA, TECNOLOGÍA Y

SOCIEDAD 890 EULALIA PÉREZ SEDEÑO and MARÍA JESÚS SANTESMASES (coord.), ANA TOLEDO, CARMEN ROMERO, MARÍA GONZÁLEZ AGUADO, LORENA RUIZ MARCOS: Cartografías del cuerpo: biopoliticas de la ciencia y la tecnología I Simposio…....... 891 MARÍA JESÚS SANTESMASES and EULALIA PÉREZ SEDEÑO (coord.), MARÍA JOSÉ MIRANDA, ESTHER ORTEGA, SILVIA GARCÍA DAUDER , CARMEN ROMERO: Cuerpos en tránsito: biopolíticas de la ciencia y la tecnología II Simposio .............. 918

PREFACE

1

Preface

This book comprises the works accepted to be presented at the VII Congress of the Society of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of the Science in Spain (SLMFCE), celebrated in Santiago de Compostela, July 18th-20th, 2012. That is to say, it contains the contributions and symposia accepted for the different sections of the Congress. The volume incorporates a wide and representative sample of the research done in our country in the fields of logic, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, epistemology, history of science, and in science, technology and society. Besides, more than a third of the works received came from other parts of the world (Australia, United States and several countries in Latin America and Europe). This confirms the tendency to internationalization of the conferences of the SLMFCE, a tendency already initiated in previous editions. This is a good sign of the potential of these events to open and preserve communication between researchers of different countries.

All the proposals received were subjected to a process of blind refereeing. This process involved a good number of scholars from different countries and research interests as the composition of the Scientific Committee shows. The global rate of acceptance has been 74 percent, although this rate depended on the section and was lower in the sections of the congress with a larger number of contributions (Philosophy and Methodology of Science, and Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology).

A novelty in this seventh edition of the Congress of the Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Spain was the celebration of the first edition of a series of plenary lectures, the LULLIUS LECTURES. These lectures constitute an excellent tool by which distinguished philosophers can present their latest results to our Society. In this first edition the LULLIUS LECTURES have been honored with the presence of Professor Philip Kitcher, from the University of Columbia. Besides, and to encourage the work of young researchers, the SLMFCE summoned the second edition of the prize “FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR YOUNG RESEARCHERS”. In this edition, there were 17 applications.

The editors would like to thank the institutions whose financial support made this event possible: Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Universidade of Santiago de Compostela, and the Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Spain.

The editors would also like to show their gratitude to the rest of members of the Organizing Committee, and to those who collaborated in the refereeing process, including indeed the Scientific Committee. Finally, we would like to thank the members of the board of the Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Spain, for their advice and constant support, and all participants in the Conference for their contribution to its success. The editors Concha Martínez Vidal, José L. Falguera, José M. Sagüillo, Víctor M. Verdejo y M. Pereira-Fariña Santiago de Compostela, July 10th 2012

2

CONCEPTIONS OF MECHANISMS AND INSENSITIVITY OF CAUSATION

VIOREL PÂSLARU University of Dayton

vpaslaru1@udayton.edu ABSTRACT: Conceptions of mechanisms due to Glennan (1996; 2002), Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) have developed in opposition to the nomological approach to explanation. It is less emphasized, however, that these conceptions have also developed as alternatives to the causal perspective on explanation. In this paper, I argue that despite their distancing from the topic of causation, the mechanistic conceptions need to incorporate in their definitions of mechanisms the notion of insensitivity of causal relations that was examined by Woodward (2006). KEYWORDS: mechanism; causation; insensitivity.

1. Insensitivity of Causation

Woodward (2006) claims that a causal relationship ‘C causes E’ is sensitive if it holds in the

actual background circumstances Bi, but fails to hold in the circumstances Bii-n that depart in

various ways from the actual circumstances. A causal relationship is less sensitive, i.e., more

insensitive or stable, if it holds over a broader range of circumstances that depart in various ways

from the actual ones. Suppose Suzy throws a rock at a glass bottle and it shatters. The causal

relationship between Suzy throwing the rock and the bottle shattering is insensitive to various

changes in the background conditions in the sense that it will continue to hold even if the throwing

and the shattering occur in Boston while someone sneezes in Chicago, regardless of the color of

Suzy’s blouse and despite variations in environmental conditions (temperature, wind speed, etc.).

The bottle would have shattered had Suzy thrown the rock earlier or later, or from a different angle.

If departures from actuality alter the time and place of the causal relationship, this may affect the

identity of causal relata such that instead of a C-event and an E-event there will be a C-like and an

E- like event (Woodward 2006). This would probably translate into a case involving Jenny in

Chicago, instead of Suzy in Boston, throwing a metallic object, instead of a rock, at the bottle that

subsequently shatters.

Woodward’s proposal can be examined more specifically to suggest three types of

insensitivity to changes in the structure of a causal relation and two types of background conditions.

Componential insensitivity of a causal relationship obtains when the relationship is not affected by

Proceedings of the VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science Actas del VII Congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España

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changes in its relata. Suzy might throw a rock, or a brick, or a metallic object at the bottle and it will

break, preserving thereby the causal relationship. Organizational insensitivity characterizes the

causal relationship that is not altered by changes in the arrangement of its relata. Suzy might throw

the rock from various distances or under various angles, but the relationship will be preserved, since

the bottle will break. Interactional insensitivity characterizes the case when changes in how the

relata interact do not impact the causal relationship. Suzy could throw the rock more or less

forcefully, but this will not affect the relationship as long as the bottle breaks. However, if Suzy

throws the rock with a too small force and the rock does not reach the bottle, the relationship

breaks. It is sensitive to a throw executed with a small force.

The color of Suzy’s blouse and the Dow index are background conditions that do not and

cannot affect the causal relationship rock throwing – bottle breaking. Because of that, exploring

them will not provide important information about the relationship. By contrast, wind is an example

of background conditions that do not, but can affect the causal relationship. If wind blows with, say,

a 65 km/h speed, it can blow away the bottle, influence the trajectory of the rock, but the rock will

nevertheless strike the bottle. This illustrates background conditions that affect a causal relationship,

yet it still occurs, or is insensitive to influences from such conditions. Due to their potential to

influence causal relations, background conditions of the latter two types are relevant for

investigating causal relations.

2. Conceptions of Mechanisms and Insensitivity of Mechanisms

In light of the foregoing consideration of insensitivity, I turn now to examining the notions

of mechanisms and the examples of mechanisms that Machamer et al (2000), Glennan (2002),

Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) use to explain their conceptions of mechanisms and mechanistic

explanation.

Machamer et al claim that “[m]echanisms are regular in that they work always or for the

most part in the same way under the same conditions” (2000, 3). Yet they do not clarify in what

respects the conditions are the same. Their claim could be interpreted as indicating insensitivity of

mechanisms under background conditions that (a) do not change, or (b) change without affecting

the functioning of the mechanism. Version (a) does not seem to do justice to some mechanisms and

is, hence, problematic. Version (b) might mean that conditions could be the same in the sense that

conditions Bii of one neuron differ only by a small degree from conditions Bi of another neuron, or

even if they differ by a greater degree, they do not contain factors that might affect the mechanism

functioning. Conditions Bi and Bii could be the same in the sense that they both contain the same

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ions of Ca, Na, and Mg, but in different quantities. Moreover, the claim does not suggest whether

the conditions affect in any way the functioning of the mechanism. If my reading of “the same” is

correct, Machamer et al leave out the situation when the conditions are different. For example, Bii

could contain factors, say, molecules of Methylenedioxymethamphetamine, that Bi does not, and

these factors influence the production of phenomenon, but do not block it. Such cases show that

their description of background conditions is incomplete. That “[t]he organization of ... entities and

activities determines the ways in which they produce the phenomenon” (Machamer et al 2000, 3)

suggests that the phenomenon production is sensitive to changes in the organization of component

activities and entities, but they do not consider the case of organizational insensitivity, i.e., when a

mechanism produces a phenomenon despite changes in its organization. It seems, however, that

they admit componential insensitivity. Along this line could be read the claim “Activities usually

require that entities have specific types of properties” (Machamer et al 2000, 3), which leaves open

the possibility that any type of entity that has the relevant properties can execute the activity. The

examination by Machamer et al of mechanisms does not seem to engage interactional insensitivity.

The mechanisms of chemical transmission at synapses and depolarization illustrate the view

of Machamer et al on mechanisms. Examination of these mechanisms shows that they exhibit

multiple kinds of insensitivity and the characterization of mechanisms by Machamer et al should

explicitly consider them. The following analysis of these mechanisms is based on Levitan and

Kaczmarek (1997).

Calcium channels illustrate insensitivity to the influence of background conditions that affect

casual relations, as well as componential insensitivity. A subunit, α1, and one, or several, smaller

subunits β, γ, α2, and δ constitute calcium channels. α1 is sufficient to make a functional voltage-

dependent calcium channel. The smaller subunits are not necessary for channel activity, yet they

interact with the α1-subunit and modulate the kinetic properties of the channel. β subunit, when

expressed with α1-subunit, increases the rate of inactivation of the channel. Although the channel

inactivates at a faster rate, the β subunit does not block its functioning. The functioning of the

channel is thus insensitive to the presence of this subunit. The latter modulates the channel

functioning, but does not break it. Another case of insensitivity refers to the interaction between

neurotransmitters and receptors. Virtually every neurotransmitter interacts with more than a single

class of receptors (Levitan and Kaczmarek 1997, 236). Acetylcholine interacts with nicotinic as

well as muscarinic receptors. The insensitivity of the relationship between neurotransmitter and

receptors is limited; it breaks if the receptor is a different one, e.g., NMDA. Yet it is insensitive

because receptors do not interact with just one type of neurotransmitters. Sensitivity can be found in

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the relationship between transporter proteins and a particular neurotransmitter. The mechanisms of

neurotransmitter uptake involve distinct transporter proteins that are specific because they transport

a particular neurotransmitter (Levitan and Kaczmarek 1997, 220). The relationship between

transporter proteins as part of the mechanism of neurotransmitter uptake and neurotransmitters is

highly sensitive to the identity of the component neurotransmitter that it is supposed to transport.

Change the neurotransmitter, and the transporter protein does not take the neurotransmitter and the

uptake mechanism does not function.

Modulation of patterns of electric activity of cells due to the presence of certain chemicals in

the cell environment further illustrates insensitivity to changes in background conditions that affect

a causal relationship. Action potentials result from the activity of a population of ion channels.

Calcium channels contribute to the depolarizing phase of the action potential, while potassium

channels underlie the repolarization phase and contribute to determining the action potential shape.

The calcium and potassium channels, the ions, the cell membrane are the key components of the

mechanism responsible for action potential. The environment of the neuron comprises the

background conditions. A variety of neurotransmitters might be present in it. The neurotransmitters

might decrease the calcium or sodium currents, narrowing as a result the action potential, as it

happens for instance in the neurons of the chick dorsal root ganglion. Alternatively, introduction of

noradrenaline, or of other similar agonists, in the environment of cardiac muscle cells increases the

activity of calcium channels, which in turn prolongs significantly the cardiac action potential. The

neurotransmitters and the noradrenaline modulate the action potentials. The latter would have

occurred even if those substances were not present in the cell environment. Given that

neurotransmitters and noradrenaline do not break the relationship between ion channels and action

potentials, but modify it, the relationship is insensitive. The neurotransmitters and the noradrenaline

make up the background conditions that can change a causal relationship, and the relationship holds

despite changes in these conditions.

The foregoing neurobiological example does not illustrate organizational insensitivity, yet

Machamer et al need to consider it for their account of mechanism to be general.

Bechtel and Abrahamsen have recently offered this characterization of mechanisms:

A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism, manifested in patterns of change over time in properties of its parts and operations, is responsible for one or more phenomena (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2010, 323).

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The phrase in boldface is an augmentation of their earlier (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005,

Bechtel 2006) characterization of mechanisms. The purpose of augmentation is to extend the

mechanistic explanation to accounts of dynamics of mechanisms by means of computational

modeling. Neither the older nor the recent characterizations consider the behavior of mechanisms

when there is change in their background conditions or in their structure. However, Bechtel and

Abrahamsen’s discussion of homeostatic or autopoietic organization of organisms can be interpreted

as insensitivity to background conditions that can or do affect the mechanism. Homeostatic or

autopoietic organization occurs in living systems that “resist those environmental forces that

threaten them,” as well as in systems that simply maintain themselves even if not threatened by

environmental forces (Bechtel 2006, 45). These systems are insensitive to influences from

background conditions that can affect them. Bechtel and Abrahamsen do not examine mechanisms

that do not have the specific homeostatic or autopoietic organization and yet resist “environmental

forces that threaten them,” nor do they examine the case of insensitivity to structural changes. The

heart example that they use to illustrate their conception of mechanisms presents however sufficient

instances of insensitivity to changes in its structure and in its background conditions.

Hearts have features that escape Bechtel and Abrahamsen’s characterization of mechanisms.

The heart mechanism undergoes changes over time and yet its operations are stable and they

produce the phenomenon of blood circulation. The fetal heart shows a rate of 120 to 160 beats per

minute, that of an infant presents a rate of 120 beats per minute. The rate slows to 90 rates per

minute when the child is seven years old, and stabilizes at 70 rates per minute at age 18. Depending

on which activities one engages in, the heart rate would increase or decrease. If rate is an aspect of

organization, we have here an instance when the mechanism is insensitive to changes in its

organization. The mechanism does not break although the organization changes. Moreover, rate

changes mean differences in how components interact, suggesting interactional insensitivity. The

heart mechanism is also insensitive to a number of significant changes in its components. Until the

heart becomes of an adult, it is of a fetus, infant, toddler, child, and teenager. The components of the

heart change; they grow. There are also macromolecular changes in the heart tissue from birth to

adulthood. For example, there are changes in the expressed proteins, which affect muscle

contractility (Martinsen and Lohr 2005). Thus, the heart is developmentally insensitive to

modifications in its structure that occur over long and short periods of time.

A more radical change in the components of hearts presents replacement of defective valves

with mechanical ones (from titanium or ceramic), or biological ones (from human, porcine or

bovine tissue). Similarly, blocked arteries in some hearts are replaced with coronary bypass grafts.

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The functioning of the heart mechanism is insensitive to such changes in its components and

organization, and it produces the blood circulation phenomenon.

Transplanted hearts show insensitivity to changes in background conditions. Some of these

conditions in the recipient patient, like the thorax, do not affect the functioning of the heart and it is

insensitive to changes in thoraxes. Others, for example the immune system of the receiving

organism, can and do affect it by rejecting the donated organ. The functioning of the heart

mechanism can be, at least for some time, insensitive to changes in immune systems from donor to

recipient and to adverse reaction of the latter.

Fetal hearts present a different departure from the adult heart prototype. The interatrial

septum of a fetal heart contains the foramen ovale valve that allows the blood to be shunned from

the right (pulmonary) side to the left (systemic) side. The ligament of the inferior vena cava aids

this flow and the duct of the artery connects the left pulmonary artery and the aortic artery. These

specific features of the components of fetal hearts are required because fetal blood flows through

umbilical atria and arteries, and oxygenation occurs in placenta, as opposed to in the lungs. At birth,

the foramen ovale closes and the heart chambers are septated, the duct ceases its function, and blood

circulates as in adults (Weinhaus and Roberts 2005). In Woodward’s terminology, fetal blood

circulation is like adult blood circulation. Correspondingly, the structure of the fetal heart is like that

of an adult. Except for the foramen ovale, the ligament, the duct and the blood flow, the heart

mechanism is insensitive to changes from fetal phase to adult phase. Bechtel and Abrahamsen

(2005) somewhat capture this particular aspect of insensitivity when they claim that a mechanism

presents variations relative to a prototype, their focus being on componential insensitivity, but not

on the other types of insensitivity. What does not vary between the prototype and the variant is an

insensitive structure.

Glennan’s characterization of mechanisms does not show an explicit acceptance of any

version of insensitivity:

A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior by the interaction of a number of parts, where the interaction between parts can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations (2002, S344).

An important feature of mechanisms is that the arrangement of their parts is stable. Glennan

explains first stability of parts: “in the absence of interventions, their properties must remain

relatively stable” (Glennan 2002, S345). Stability in this sense is rather similar to the insensitivity

of Suzy’s throw and the shattering of the bottle given the color of her blouse. The relationship

between the throw and the shattering is stable because the blouse does not affect it. By contrast, the

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properties of parts could remain stable despite interventions, but Glennan does not consider such a

case. Watches, cells, organisms and social groups are mechanisms “consisting of stable

arrangements of parts” (Glennan 2002, S345). Given the foregoing clarification of “stable,”

mechanisms turn out to be stable because nothing intervenes on them. However, the mechanisms

that Glennan gives as examples suggest a different understanding of stability. A social group is

subject to social influences, a watch is subject to various mechanical stresses, and the immune

system of the recipient patient affects the heart, and yet all three maintain their stability, which

would amount to insensitivity to background changes that affect the mechanism. Since Glennan

uses the heart and cell examples as illustrations of his conceptions, the findings concerning these

mechanisms that I outlined above hold here as well. For the sake of brevity, I will not repeat them

here, but I will remind that they show that causal relations and mechanisms are insensitive to

changes in their components, interactions between them and their organization.

Glennan also states that the behaviors of these mechanisms “can manifest themselves at

more than one time and place”(2002, S345). This would be a case of insensitivity to changes in the

background conditions time and space. However, if the two conditions are not accompanied by

other conditions that can affect the functioning of the mechanism, then the capacity of a mechanism

to manifest its behavior at various times and places is a rather weak form of insensitivity.

Conclusion

The foregoing examination has shown that insensitivity is implicit to various degrees in the

conceptions of Machamer et al, Glennan, Bechtel and Abrahamsen. Their examples of mechanisms

are insensitive in many important ways and to different degrees. To account for these cases, their

conceptions of mechanisms need to incorporate the notion of insensitivity to structural changes and

to background conditions.

REFERENCES Bechtel, W., and Abrahamsen, A. 2010, ‘Dynamic mechanistic explanation: Computational modeling of circadian rhythms as an exemplar for cognitive science’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41, 321-333. Bechtel, W., and Abrahamsen, A. 2005, ‘Explanation: a mechanist alternative’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36, 421-441. Glennan, S. 1996, ‘Mechanisms and the nature of causation’, Erkenntnis 44, 49-71. Glennan, S. 2002, ‘Rethinking mechanistic explanation’, Philosophy of Science 69, S342-S353.

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Levitan, I.B., and Kaczmarek L.K. 1997, The neuron: cell and molecular biology, New York, Oxford University Press. Machamer, P, Darden L., and Craver C. F. 2000, ‘Thinking about mechanisms’, Philosophy of Science 67, 1-25. Martinsen, B., and Lohr J. L. 2005, ‘Cardiac development’, in Iaizzo P.A. (ed.), Handbook of cardiac anatomy, physiology, and devices, Totowa, Humana Press Inc., 15-23. Weinhaus, A. J., and Roberts K.P. 2005, ‘Anatomy of Human Heart’, in Iaizzo P.A. (ed.), Handbook of cardiac anatomy, physiology, and devices, Totowa, Humana Press Inc., 51-79. Woodward, J. 2006, ‘Sensitive and Insensitive Causation’, Philosophical Review 115, 1-50.

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