Commandant’s Note

At the outset let me wish all our readers a very ‘Happy New Year‘. I was happy to note that the previous theme based edition of the College Journal on China has evoked a very positive response from the readers. Keeping this in mind we will

continue to have a mix of theme based and non-themed editions.

Events over the past few months in the geo-political arena have been fast paced to say the least. Though the nature of conflict has remained the same, the character of the conflict is undergoing a rapid transformation with ideology, alliances and technology playing an even greater role. The rise of non-state actors and that of quasi-states is challenging the concepts of nation states as we know it. The scholar warrior will thus have to be, in addition to being alive to shift in conduct of warfare, conversant with nuances of diplomacy, a facilitator in conflict resolution and adept in absorbing and managing technology. Developments in South China Sea and West Asia are a reminder to us to keep our professional training tuned to multifarious threats. Towards this end scholarly reading on professional matters will pay an excellent dividend.

Happy reading

Jai Hind

Lt Gen SL Narasimhan, AVSM**, VSMCommandant

T his edition of the Journal carries a wide spectrum of articles from Strategy and Warfare to Internal Security and Human Resources Management. This edition is also unique as it carries articles by Commandants of all three Training

establishments at Mhow i.e. Army War College, Military College of Telecommunication Engineering and Infantry School, each bringing out his respective domain knowledge.

We also have articles by Prof Harsh Pant, an International relations and Security affairs expert, who is a well-respected Professor on the same subject at Kings College, UK and from Mr Mohan Guruswamy, a well-known security analyst and economist.

I as the Editor face two challenges. One that has been often repeated i.e. quality articles. These need to put forward viewpoints in an analytical and logical manner. The second challenge is to deal with seemingly mundane but important aspect of formatting of articles. I would like to once again re-iterate potential contributors to address the above.

Our next edition in Summer 2016 will focus on Land Centric Warfare. Suggested sub-themes on which articles would be welcome are given after the Contents page. These are not exhaustive and we would welcome any other analytical and informative writing on

the broad theme.

Happy Reading!

Col NP Singh Editor

From the Editor’s Desk

Commandant’s NoteFrom the Editor’s Desk

C o n t e n t s

Lt Gen SL Narasimhan, AVSM**, VSM Chairman

Maj Gen M Ramesh Babu, SM** Dean

Brig RPS Kahlon, VSM Director, FOS

Col NP Singh Editor

Editor i a l Com mittEE

Articles Author Page No.

India’s Hard Power Deficit Prof Harsh V Pant 5

India & China: A Relook Towards Differences and Realign for Stability in the Region

Lt Gen S L Narasimhan, AVSM**, VSM 10

Strategising for a Two Front War Lt Gen PG Kamath, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, SM (Retd) 17

NCW : Concepts and Challenges Lt Gen Ravindra Singh Panwar, SM, VSM 24

India-China Relations in a Changing World Mr Mohan Guruswamy 31

Resolution of Conflicts Maj Gen M Ramesh Babu, SM** 36

Approach to Formulation of a Comprehensive Military Doctrine and Military Strategy for the Indian Armed Forces for Future Conflicts

Brig RC Srikanth 44

India’s Role in Afghanistan Post 2014: Strategy, Policy and Implementation

Brig Rajeev Chaudhary, VSM 52

Operational Art in the Indian Context Maj Gen JK Sharma 59

PLAN : Effects of Modernisation on India’s Peninsular Security Cmde JS Shergill, NM 64

Internal SecurityEthnicity and Ethnic Conflict in India’s North East Lt Gen KH Singh, AVSM, YSM 74

Internal Security: Creating Counter-Terror Capability- Lessons from experience of Deputation with State Government/Police

Maj Gen KA Muthanna 81

Naxalism : Impediment to the Nation Building Process Brigadier Ram Niwas, VSM 84

Human resources ManagementHuman Capital Management Doctrine for the Indian Army – A Review

Lt Gen Mukesh Sabharwal, PVSM, AVSM**, VSM (Retd) 91

The Hand of Leadership Brig SM Ismail, SM 95

Relevance of Present Officers’ Selection System and its Efficacy for Future

Col Ravinder Kumar Gosain (Retd) Brig (Dr) P S Siwach and Cdr (Dr) G L Sharma

97

Book ReviewsTalking to Terrorists Lt Gen Subroto Mitra, PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM (Retd) 101The Pakistan Paradox Col NP Singh 103

Recommended Reading 105Guidelines for Contributors 107

Winter 2015 Volume 44 December 2015

Importance of Land Warfare in National Security

Land Warfare has been the dominant form of warfare since thousands of years and has been a decisive form of statecraft. While political, technological and ideological developments have changed the character of Land Warfare, Army’s unique characteristics of capturing and occupying terrain remains unchanged. The next edition of the Journal will be a theme based on “Land Warfare” and we would welcome contributions on the following subjects (articles on any other issue relevant to Land warfare are also welcome):-

• Evolution of Land Warfare in India - Lessons from Land operations post-independence

• Threat vs Capability based Capacity building for the Army.

• Changing forms of Land Warfare; Lessons from Worldover.

• A synergised Air-land battle with Indian Characteristics– a De novo look.

• Amphibious Operations in the Indian context.

• Development of a Land Warfare doctrine in Indian context.

• Role of Army in Military Operation Other Than War.

• Women in the Army.

• Leveraging Traditional, Electronic and Social Media in future conflicts by the Army

• Ethics and morals in future conflicts.

• Land Battles and the dangers of Maginot line mentality.

• Rethinking urban warfare.

• Dynamics and strategy for a short conflict.

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5 | December 2015

INdIA’S HArd PoWer defIcIt

On June 4 2015, tribal guerrillas, using rocket-propelled grenades and detonating improvised explosive devices, killed 20 soldiers and injured

several others, in an ambush when a military convoy was traveling to the state capital Imphal from the town of Motul in Manipur.1 This was one of the most serious attacks on Indian security forces in Manipur for some time. India has struggled to contain the unrest in Manipur despite granting its security forces sweeping shoot-to-kill powers in so-called “disturbed areas” under the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA).

India’s response to these attacks came five days later-on June 9, when the Indian Army attacked rebel camps inside Myanmar, destroying two camps and killing up to 15 rebels.2 Underlining India’s resolve to pre-empt terror threats, undeterred by borders, Para Commandos of the Indian Army carried out surgical operations deep inside Myanmar killing several militants in two rebel camps. The Army’s message was terse: “while ensuring peace and tranquility along the border and in border states, any threat to our security, safety and national integrity will meet a firm response.”3 Indian Army had “credible and specific intelligence” on the basis of which it carried out the attacks. The director of the office of Myanmar President Thein Sein, ZawHtay, confirmed a day later that Indian troops had entered his country’s borders. He said that there was “coordination and cooperation” between authorities but no Myanmar soldiers were directly involved.4

Responding to a query as to whether India can conduct such an operation inside Pakistan, Indian Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore said: “This should be a message to all countries and organisations who foster terrorism against India, including Pakistan.” This set off alarm bells in Pakistan, where sections of the media and defence officials suggested that the incident could set a precedent for more cross-border raids. Pakistan’s interior minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, warned India that “Pakistan is not Myanmar”-a fact all too obvious to most Indians.

By all accounts, the raid was well-planned and competently executed. The operation was important to lift the sagging morale of the Armed Forces, especially after attacks by

insurgents in Manipur. All sections of the government-the Intelligence agencies, the Armed forces, and the Ministry of External Affairs-worked as an organic whole under the leadership of the Prime Minister and the National Security Adviser. This is a rarity in Indian policy-making and should be recognised as such.

Though the Indian Army had conducted a number of cross-border raids in the past in collaboration with partner countries, the speed with which this attack was carried out after the initial terror attacks was not only unprecedented but also demonstrated a new level of confidence among India’s political authorities in wielding hard power.

Also, with this raid, a multi-layered border policy seems to be emerging. The Modi government has, from the very beginning, followed a policy of ‘disproportionate response’ to border provocations. Indian troops have been given greater operational autonomy to be aggressive in responding to ceasefire violations by Pakistan.5 The Indian military has been given the much-needed operational space to carve out a response which was swift, sharp and effective, underlining the costs of Pakistan’s dangerous escalatory tactics with massive targeted attacks on Pakistani Ranger posts along the border. What has worked on the border with Myanmar will clearly not work on the Western borders against jihadi groups and that contextualisation has been part of the Indian government’s response. Also, cooperation with like-minded states such as Myanmar and Bangladesh will be crucial to deny terror group safe havens across the borders. The government of Myanmar reportedly approved the Indian plan to send in Special Forces to attack insurgent camps into its territory. To justify its attack, New Delhi invoked the May 2014 border agreement with Myanmar which provides for a framework for security cooperation and intelligence exchange between the two states.

Despite this, a narrative emerged in the country which held that while the operation was well planned, the political communication was unnecessary and immature. Sections of the media, former diplomats, and armchair strategists converged in suggesting that the Modi government messed up a fine operation by talking about it. The argument went that covert operations by their very definition should not

Prof Harsh V Pant

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6 | Winter 2015

be talked about. Clearly, restraint should be the norm while discussing security operations but the Indian Army’s operation in Myanmar was important to be publicised. To say that the Indian government should have undertaken such a risky move with little or no publicity does not hold much water. It was imperative for the Modi government to send out a message in unambiguous terms that India retains the ability to hit back at the insurgents.

Signalling intent and demonstrating capabilities are key in establishing and strengthening deterrence in interstate relations. There is a reason why all major powers make a big deal when they resort to the use of their military instruments of hard power. In fact, rather than a junior minister, it would have been better for the National Security Advisor or the Prime Minister himself to speak directly to the people of India about the Myanmar raid and its implications. This is the norm in mature democracies. After all, the message is not simply for the domestic audience. It is also there to reassure allies and to deter adversaries.

With the raid, New Delhi was sending a clear signal to its adversaries-both state and non-state-that hostilities against India will not go on without a robust response. The Myanmar operation was a step towards restoring India’s credibility. But it is a long road ahead and the effectiveness of this doctrine will be known only over the long-term.

An evolving trajectory

A contrast needs to be made with India’s behaviour in recent past. In November 2008, the financial capital of India, Mumbai, was struck by terrorists who the Indian (as well as the American and the British) intelligence later confirmed had received extensive training from the Pakistan-based group, Lashkar-e-Toiba, or Army of the Pure. Given the sophistication of planning and execution involved, it soon became apparent that this was a commando-style operation that possibly had the involvement of a state actor. As physical evidence mounted in terms of satellite phone calls, equipments and boats used for the attack, Pakistan’s hand was seen as smeared all over the operation. Though India conceded that probably then newly installed civilian administration in Islamabad of Asif Ali Zardari was not behind the attacks, the Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were seen as the main culprit.6

The public outcry after the Mumbai attacks was strong enough for the Indian government to consider using the military option vis-à-vis Pakistan. But it soon turned out that India no longer had the capability of imposing quick and

effective retribution on Pakistan and that it no longer enjoyed the kind of conventional superiority vis-à-vis its regional adversary that it had enjoyed for the past five decades.7 This was a surprising conclusion for a nation that the international community regarded as a major global economic and military power, pursuing a multi-billion dollar worth of defence modernisation programme.

As India’s weight has grown in the international system in recent years, there’s a perception that India is on the cusp of achieving “great power” status. It is repeated ad nauseum in the Indian and often in global media and India is already being asked to behave like one. There is just one problem: Indian policy-makers themselves are not clear as to what this status of a great power entails. A significant constraint that India faces is its discomfort with the very notion of power and in particular its wariness of the use of “hard power.” All major powers throughout history have demonstrated an ability to skilfully use military as an effective instrument of national policy. India’s reluctance to evolve a more sophisticated understanding of power and of military power in particular will continue to underline the strategic diffidence that has come to be associated with Indian foreign and security policy.

Power and Interest

A fundamental quandary that has long dogged India in the realm of foreign affairs and that has become even more acute with India’s ascent in the international order is what has been referred to as India’s lack of an “instinct for power.” Power lies at the heart of international politics. It affects the influence that states exert over one another, thereby shaping political outcomes. The success and failure of a nation’s foreign policy is largely a function of its power and manner in which that power is wielded. The exercise of power can be shocking and at times corrupting but power is absolutely necessary to fight the battles that must be fought. India’s ambivalence about power and its use has resulted in a situation where even as India’s economic and military capabilities have gradually expanded, it has failed to evolve a commensurate strategic agenda and requisite institutions so as to be able to mobilise and use its resources most optimally.

India faces a unique conundrum: its political elites desperately want global recognition for India as a major power and all the prestige and authority associated with it. Yet, they continue to be reticent about the acquisition and use of power in foreign affairs. This ambivalence was expressed by a former Indian Minister of Commerce in a speech when he suggested that “this word power often makes me uncomfortable.”8 Though he was talking about the economic rise of India and

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the challenges that India continues to face as it continues to strive for sustained economic growth, his discomfort with the notion of India as a rising power was indicative of a larger reality in Indian polity. This ambivalence about the use of power in international relations where “any prestige or authority eventually rely upon traditional measures of power, whether military or economic”9 is curious as the Indian political elites have rarely shied away from the maximisation of power in the realm of domestic politics, thereby corroding the institutional fabric of liberal democracy in the country.

In what has been diagnosed as a “mini state syndrome,” those states which do not have the material capabilities to make a difference to the outcomes at the international level, often denounce the concept of power in foreign policy making.10 India had long been a part of such states, viewing itself as an object of the foreign policies of a small majority of powerful nations. As a consequence, the Indian political and strategic elite developed a suspicion of power politics with the word power itself acquiring a pejorative connotation in so far as foreign policy was concerned. The relationship between power and foreign policy was never fully understood, leading to a progressive loss in India’s ability to wield power effectively in the international realm.

Inability to Use force effectively

A nation’s vital interests, in the ultimate analysis, can only be preserved and enhanced if the nation has sufficient power capabilities at its disposal. But not only must a nation possess such capabilities, there must also be a willingness to employ the required forms of power in pursuit of those interests. Nehru envisioned making India a global leader without any help from the nation’s Armed Forces, arguing, “the right approach to defence is to avoid having unfriendly relations with other countries – to put it differently, war today is, and ought to be, out of question.”11 War has been systematically factored out of Indian foreign policy and national security matrix with the resulting ambiguity about India’s ability to withstand major wars of the future.

Few nations face the kind of security challenges that confront India. Yet, since independence military was never seen as a central instrument in the achievement of Indian national priorities with the tendency of Indian political elites to downplay the importance of military power. India ignored defence sector after independence and paid inadequate attention to its defence needs. Even though the policy-makers themselves had little knowledge of critical defence issues, the defence forces had little or no role in the formulation of defence policy till 1962.12 Divorcing foreign policy from

military power was a recipe for disaster as India realised in 1962 when even Nehru was forced to concede that “military weakness has been a temptation, and a little military strength may be a deterrent.”13

Marginalisation of the Military

Indian politicians after independence in 1947 viewed the Indian Army with suspicion as the last supporters of the British Raj and did their best to isolate the military from policy and influence. This attitude was further reinforced by the views of two giants of the Indian nationalist movement, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Gandhi’s ardent belief in non-violence left little room for accepting the role of the use of force in an independent India. It also shaped the views on military and defence of the first generation of post-independence political leaders in India. But more important has been the legacy of Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister who laid the institutional foundations for civil-military relations in India. His obsession with economic development was only matched by his disdain and distrust of the military, resulting in the side-lining of defence planning in India.14 He also ensured that the experiences in neighbouring Pakistan, where military had become the dominant political force soon after independence, would not be repeated in India by institutionalising civilian supremacy over the country’s military apparatus. The civilian elite also did not want the emergence of rival elite with direct access to political leadership.

Along with Nehru, another civilian who left a lasting impact on the evolution of civil-military relations was VK Krishna Menon, India’s Minister of Defence from 1957 to 1962. During his tenure which has been described as the most controversial stewardship of the Indian Defence Ministry, he heralded a number of organisational changes that were not very popular with the armed forces.15 Despite any military experience, Nehru and Menon were actively involved in operational level planning before the outbreak of Sino-Indian war of 1962. They “directly supervised the placement of individual brigades, companies, and even platoons, as the Chinese and Indian forces engaged in mutual encirclement of isolated outposts.”16 As a consequence, when China won the war decisively, the blame was laid on the doors of Nehru and Menon. Menon resigned while Nehru’s reputation suffered a lasting damage. It also made it clear, both to the civilians and the military that purely operational matters were best left to the military. Some have argued that since then a convention has been established whereby while the operational directive is laid down by the political leadership, the actual planning of operation is left to the Chiefs of Staff.17

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Stephen Rosen, in his study of the impact of societal structures on the military effectiveness of a state, argues that the separation of the Indian military from the Indian society, while preserving the coherence of the Indian Army, has led to a reduction in the effective military power of the Indian state.18 While India has been successful in evolving a sustained tradition of strict civilian control over the military since its independence, unlike its immediate neighbours, India has been unable to evolve institutions and procedures that would allow the military to substantially participate in the national security decision-making processes. This has significantly reduced the effectiveness with which India can wield its military as an instrument of national power.

Strategic Cultural and Institutional Deficit

A state can promulgate law and pursue strategy once it has not only achieved a legitimate monopoly on violence but also when it is free of the coercive violence of other states. 19It is no surprise therefore that India’s ability to think strategically on issues of national security remains at best questionable. George Tanham, in his landmark study on the Indian strategic thought, pointed out that Indian elites have shown little evidence of having thought coherently and systematically about national strategy. He argued that this lack of long-term planning and strategy owes largely to India’s historical and cultural developmental patterns. These include the Hindu view of life as largely unknowable, thereby being outside man’s control and the Hindu concept of time as eternal, thereby discouraging planning. As a consequence, Tanham argued that India has been on the strategic defensive throughout its history, reluctant to assert itself except within the subcontinent.20

A major consequence of the lack of any Indian strategic culture worth its name is a perceptible lack of institutionalisation of the foreign policy making in India. At its very foundation,

Indian democracy is sustained by a range of institutions from the more formal ones of the executive, legislative, and the judiciary to the less formal ones of the broader civil-society. It is these institutions that in large measure have allowed Indian democracy to thrive and flourish for more than fifty years now despite a number of constraints that have led to the failure of democracy in many other societies. However, in the realm of foreign policy, it is the lack of institutionalisation that has allowed a drift to set in without any long-term orientation. Some have laid the blame on Nehru for his unwillingness to construct strategic planning architecture because he single-handedly shaped Indian foreign policy during his tenure.21 But even his successors have failed to pursue institutionalisation in a consistent manner.

India’s friends and enemies have long stopped taking India seriously as a military power.22 A nation’s vital interests, in the ultimate analysis, can only be preserved and enhanced if the nation has sufficient power capabilities at its disposal. But not only must a nation possess such capabilities – there must also be a willingness to employ the required forms of power in pursuit of those interests. India’s lack of an instinct for power is most palpable in the realm of the military, where, unlike other major global powers of the past and the present, India has failed to master the creation, deployment and use of its military instruments in support of its national objectives. A state’s legitimacy is tied to its ability to monopolise the use of force and operate effectively in an international strategic environment, and India has lacked clarity on this relationship between the use of force and its strategic priorities. The Modi government has indicated that it willing to take some serious steps towards rectifying some of the problems identified above and to rethink the role of the military as an instrument of foreign and security policy. India’s rise as a major global player will depend on the success of the Modi government in implementing these changes.

Notes1Prabin Kalita, “Army launches massive hunt operation in Manipur against militants after deadliest attack in 33 years,” Times of India, June 5, 2015.2Niharika Mandhana, “Indian Army Attacks Militant Camps in Myanmar,” Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2015.3Ibid.4Ibid.5Harsh V Pant, “A Seismic Shift in India’s Pakistan Policy,” The Diplomat, August 25, 2015, available at http://the diplomat.com/2015/08/a-seismic-shift-in-indias-pakistan-policy/6Raj Chengappa, “The Real Boss,” India Today, December 11, 2008.7Shekhar Gupta, “No First Use Options,” Indian Express, January 17, 2009.

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9 | December 2015

About the AuthorProfessor Harsh V Pant is a Professor in International Relations in the Defence Studies Department, Kings College, London. He has been a Visiting Professor at the Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore; a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania; a Visiting Scholar at the Centre for International Peace and Security Studies, McGill University; and an Emerging Leaders Fellow at the Australia-India Institute, University of Melbourne.

His most recent books include The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process and Great Power Politics(2011); The Rise of China: Implications for India (2012); and The Rise of the Indian Navy: Internal Vulnerabilities, External Challenges (2012). He writes regularly for several media outlets including the Wall Street Journal, the Japan Times, the Straits Times, the National, and the Indian Express.

8The full transcript of this speech is available at http://www.iiss.org.uk/conferences/iiss-citi-india-global-forum/igf-plenary-sessions-2008/opening-remarks-and-dinner-address/dinner-address-kamal-nath9Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory (London: Routledge, 1996), p 7.10K Subrahmanyam, Indian Security Perspectives (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1982), p 127.11Quoted in PVR Rao, India’s Defence Policy and Organisation since Independence (New Delhi: The United Services Institution of India, 1977), pp 5-6.12K Subrahmanyam, Perspectives in Defence Planning (New Delhi: Abhinav, 1972), pp 126-133.13Lorne J Kavic, India’s Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947-1965 (Berkeley: University of Califirnia Press, 1967), p 192.14Stephen P Cohen, India: Emerging Power (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp 127-130.15PR Chari, “Civil-Military Relations in India,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 4, No. 1, November 1977, pp 13-15. 16Cohen, The Indian Army, p 176.17PR Chari, “Civil-Military Relations of India,” Link, 15 August, 1977, p 75.18Stephen P Rosen, Societies and Military power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp 250-53.19Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History (New York: Anchor Books, 2003), p 336.20George Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp, 1992).21Ibid., p 34.22For an overview of the challenges facing contemporary Indian defence policy, see Harsh V. Pant, Handbook of Indian Defence Policy: Themes, Structures and Doctrines (London: Routledge, 2015).

War College Journal

10 | Winter 2015

INdIA & cHINA : A reLooK toWArdS dIffereNceS ANd reALIGN for StABILItY IN tHe reGIoN

Lt Gen S L Narasimhan, AVSM**, VSM

Introduction

While analysing the India-China defence cooperation, one cannot diverse oneself from other factors affecting the bilateral relationship

because it is not a standalone aspect. The issue can be best understood by analyzing the divergences, convergences and the existing state of affairs in bilateral relationship. This will generate more ideas to enhance the bilateral cooperation between both countries. At present the divergences in the India-China bilateral relation is actually more than the convergences. Hence, there is a need to institute measures to enhance cooperation to bridge the existing gap.

Scope

The paper is laid out in following parts:-

• Part-I. Divergences.

• Part-II. Convergences.

• Part –III. Existing Cooperation.

• Part-IV. Suggested Measures.

Part-I : divergences

At the time of independence, the bilateral relationship between India and China was very cordial. India was the first country to recognize China when China became Peoples Republic of China (PRC) on 01 October 1949. India was also in the forefront to support the entry of PRC into UN General Assembly. The advent of Panchsheel which was jointly propagated by Mr Nehru and Mr Zhou EnLai brought both the countries further together. However, the relationship started souring from the time an Indian patrol discovered in 1954 that China had built a highway through Aksai Chin which India deemed as her territory. Thereafter, the bilateral relationship kept going downhill and resulted in the India China War of 1962. The relationship came to a complete standstill in the aftermath of the 1962 War. A thaw in the bilateral relations between India and China came about after the visit of Mr Rajiv Gandhi, then Prime Minister of India in 1988.Since then the India-China Relations have been like a yo-yo. Like any bilateral relationship, there are convergences and divergences in India-China Relationship also. This article

endeavours to see them in perspective and suggest ways and means to improve the bilateral relations.

divergences. The divergences in India-China relationship are as given below:-

• Boundary dispute. This is the single most important factor which is holding back India-China relations. It is strongly believed by many that once this is resolved, most of the divergences will automatically fade away.

• Sino-Pak Nexus. This aspect has been an irritant in India-China relations and needs no explanation.1 In the late half of 90s, India took a conscious decision of progressing India-China Relations independent of the China-Pakistan Relations. This has augured well for both the countries. However, proliferation of nuclear technology, military hardware and China’s lack of support for India’s efforts to curb terrorism from Pakistan have been a thorn in the flesh of India-China Bilateral Relations.

• tibet Issue. The perceived India’s support to Tibet cause has been worrying China unduly. Even though India has been maintaining that Tibet Autonomous Region is a part of China and has been curbing the political activities of the Tibetan Government in Exile China harbours the suspicion that India is covertly supporting the Tibetan Cause.2

• china’s competitive Interest in India’s Neighbourhood.3 It includes almost all the countries, namely Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Afghanistan and CAR. China is ready to step in to provide assistance to Nepal at any point of time. The recent assistance to Nepal in supplying fuel to ease out the perceived Indian blockade, is an example of competition in the neighbourhood. China has made deeper in roads into Myanmar which can be measured by the number of Chinese found in Mandalay. One is aware of military assistance provided to Sri Lanka by China for Eelam IV Operations to defeat Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Similarly, the investments made and defence equipment supplied to Bangladesh have

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made that country dependent on China. When India established Defence Attaché’s office in Maldives, China moved in to set up its embassy and Defence Attaché’s office as well. Moreover, Afghanistan is also becoming a platform for competition between India and China.

• competition for the resources. It is a well-known fact that both countries compete for oil, minerals and also markets. Competitive bidding for Oil and Gas in Myanmar, China’s sensitivity to India’s Oil Exploration efforts off the coast of Vietnam are examples of this. Moreover, China’s unending appetite for minerals and rare earth materials is increasing the competition in Africa and elsewhere.

• Regional Influence in South East Asia. There is always a sense of competition and competing influence in all regional forums such as SAARC, ASEAN, and ASEAN (+). India has been trying to get a permanent membership in Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. She is likely to get the membership in the near future with a caveat that Pakistan also will get the same. China has been keen on getting the membership in SAARC. Her bid has been actively supported by Pakistan and Nepal. She is likely to get membership of SAARC very soon. China has not been keen on India becoming a member of East Asia summit. She also opposed a Asian Development Bank loan for development of Arunachal Pradesh.

• competition in Indian ocean. India is concerned about Chinese submarines making foray into Indian Ocean in the recent past. Should India be worried? Even though, it is not a cause for worry this activity has ruffled many feathers in the Indian establishment. Moreover, China taking active part in the anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden has enabled the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy to increase her foot print in the Indian Ocean. India is sensitive to this development.4

• Acquisition in djibouti. On 26 November 2015, China confirmed it was in talks with Djibouti to construct its first overseas military base.5 This aspect must be taken note of because so far China did not have any policy of establishing any military base abroad. This may be a precursor for China establishing bases abroad. In addition, China is also developing port facilities at Hambantota,Chittagong and Sittwe.

• disaster relief. During the Tsunami in 2004, India was able to hold on its own and did not accept any aid from China. The neighbouring countries like Bangladesh and

Pakistan accepted the aid. Recently, provision of relief during water crisis in Maldives and Nepal earthquake6 highlighted the competition between India and China. Soon after the Indian aid landed in these countries, China also sent her aid to these countries. A competitive comparison was witnessed during these Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief Operations.

• one china Policy. Of late, India does not mention that she supports the ‘One China Policy’ in any Joint Communiqué and insists that the same be not included.7 China, however, insists upon the same. Earlier, the press releases used to be already prepared and kept, whether the visiting delegations said they supported the One China Policy or otherwise and released to Chinese media.

• UN Security council Permanent Membership. Although, China has been making supporting statements8 in respect of India’s aspiration for permanent membership in UNSC, they are ambivalent. One of the reasons could be that, India enunciated her bid along with a group of four countries to include Japan, Brazil and Germany. Since Japan figures in this group, China is ambivalent in supporting India’s claim.9

• freedom of Navigation in South and east china Sea. This is going to be a bone of the contention in future irrespective of USS Lassen’s Freedom of Navigation patrol in South China Sea to ensure freedom of navigation recently. Many countries are apprehending that China may impose restriction on movement by ships in South and East China Seas. India has called for resolving all disputes through international laws including United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).10

• Support to controversial regime.11 China believes in the policy of doing business with any regime of that is in power, whereas India was avoiding the same on moralistic grounds. However, India is moving towards a foreign policy based on realpolitik.

• dams on Brahmaputra river. There have been concerns with respect to construction of dams on Brahmaputra River (Yarlong Zangpo in China) by China and the likely restriction in flow of water into India. However, it must be understood that Brahmaputra River gets 60% water after entering India.12 Moreover, these are run of the river dams that does not involve storage of water.13

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• trade Imbalance. At present the trade imbalance is in favour of China. India-China bilateral trade for 2014 stood at US$ 70.25 billion. India’s exports to China were US$ 11.98 billion whereas China’s exports were US$ 58.27 billion, resulting in a trade deficit of US$ 46.29 billion. This has been a bone of contention between both the countries.14

• Perception. 83% of Indians feel that China is a threat, as concluded in a recently conducted poll.15

• Belt and road Initiative. Though India has not consented to its participation in BRI, surprisingly all the maps released by China show Calcutta as a part of this initiative. This is apparently included by China resulting in divergence.

Part-II : convergences

Notwithstanding the divergences enunciated above, there are number of convergences in bilateral relationship between India and China which are as given below:-

• economic ties. In spite of the imbalance, trade is increasing between both countries. Bilateral trade is expected to touch the US $100 billion mark this year. BRICS Bank and Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank have been established by close economic cooperation between them.

• climate change. India and China have been on the same page with respect to Kyoto Protocol. In the recently concluded Paris deliberations India and China have been on the same page.

• Anti-Piracy operations. India and China have similar views but operate differently. While China operates as part of the International task forces, India operates on her own. Moreover, China fields a three ship flotilla as against a single ship by the Indian Navy.

• energy cooperation. Though India and China have been competing for resources abroad, there have been instances of joint bidding for natural resources, thereby contributing towards enhanced cooperation. India and

China were able to acquire energy assets in Syria, Sudan, Colombia, Iran and Peru through joint bidding. The two sides are committed to making joint efforts to diversify the global energy mix and enhance the share of clean and renewable energy, so as to meet the energy requirements of all countries. GAIL has signed an agreement with China Gas Holdings Limited for a 10 percent equity stake in the Chinese company. The two companies plan to cooperate in the areas of operation and management of city gas pipeline networks, as well as the sale and distribution of natural gas.16

• defence cooperation. There are a number of agreements and frameworks already in place contributing towards defence cooperation between India and China. The same is being discussed in succeeding part.

• regional fora. Both the countries have been working closely in Regional Fora. However, it is prudent to highlight that China had objected to India’s entry into EAS, however India managed to become a member of same forum through Singapore in 2005.

Part –III : existing cooperation

After having analysed the convergences and divergences, it is prudent to understand the existing agreements and frameworks for co-operations in different fields. The joint Communiqué17 signed on 15 May 2015 during Indian PM’s visit to China is very comprehensive and highlights the mutual agreements between both the countries. The salient aspects are as follows:-

• Additional Consulates General are being established at Chengdu and Chennai by India and China respectively.Though it is a forward step in improving the bilateral relations, it is prudent to highlight that India wanted to establish additional consulate general at Lhasa.

• The first State-Provincial Leaders Forum was held on 15th of May in the presence of PMs of both countries.

• The enhanced military ties have also been embedded in the joint statement. It includes annual exchanges of visits between military headquarters of neighbouring military commands. However, the provision of hotline between India and China needs to be hastened up. Though the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement 2013 had the provision to establish hotline, the same has not been implemented so far. There seems to be some hurdle in establishing the same. The same can be measured when compared with prompt establishment of hotline between USA and India during US President’s visit to India.

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US $ 1.12 Billion

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• Exchanges between Border Commanders was initially proposed in 2004 to enhance confidence level between the troops facing each other. However, the same has not reached the desired level.

• establishment of Border Personnel Meeting Points. It started with establishing meeting points at Spanggur, Nathula and Bumla. Recently another meeting point has been established at Kibithu, iein the Lohit Valley in Eastern part of the Arunachal Pradesh. Such meeting points facilitate closer interaction and resolving various local issues.

• resolving outstanding differences including Boundary dispute. It is worth highlighting that till last year, there was a consensus amongst the leaders of both countries that boundary dispute is a problem left over from the history and the same should be left to the next generation to resolve. However, of late, there seems to be an increased resolve by the leadership of China to find a solution proactively.

• This document provides inputs about strengthening closer developmental partnership to give impetus to economic growth and prosperity. Joint measures to alleviate skewed bilateral trade are already on the cards.

• In order to enhance people to people contact, 200 students per year will be exchanged between both countries as part of Youth Exchange Programme.

• Chinese are very fond of traditional medicines and it is found in most places in China. Similarly, Ayurveda and homeopathy are commonly used in India. There can be cooperation in this field.

• Establishing India-China think tanks forum and high level media forum is something new and must be pursued. This will go a long way in improving bilateral relationship.

• Provision of flood season hydrological data by China to India will assist in emergency management. In 2004, there were concerns with respect to China holding back water when Pari Chu was in spate and likely to release it to wash away the downstream villages. However, China was sharing the data twice daily with the Indian embassy. The same agreement is in place and being effectively coordinated.

• There is enhancement in border areas cooperation wherein border trade and pilgrimage take place. The route to Manasarovar through Nathula is a positive trend.

• India’s permanent membership in SCO will come through but with a caveat that Pakistan also will get the permanent membership.

• The cooperation in BCIM and the strength in India’s link with ASEAN have been highlighted and agreed upon.

In addition to the above, there are certain mutual cooperation agreements in place, which are not commonly known. These are as follows:-

• An exhibition on Gupta Period is going to be held in China in 2016.

• As part of youth exchange programme:-

» Eight Chinese student get scholarships to study Hindi.

» 22 Chinese teachers teaching Chinese language in KVs.

» 12,000 Indian students are studying in China-mainly engineering and medicine.

» 2000 Chinese students are pursuing higher studies in India.

• In agriculture and food, India exports cotton, castor oil, frozen fish, beef and rice to China.

• Annual dialogue on counter terrorism is already going on since 2002.

• India and China have already agreed to collaborate in various facets of space research.

Part –IV : recommended measures

While there are a number of agreements and frameworks in place, there is still a need to undertake certain measures to bridge the gap in bilateral relationship. The suggested measures are listed below:-

• Strategic cooperation. This is the way forward and must be pursued vigorously at the highest level of leadership. Influence in regional and international organisation can be exerted very well provided both countries go together. It is mentioned in the joint statement that both the countries will have dialogues on major issues before taking them up in international fora.

• regional Architecture. All countries are involved in sub regional groupings like SAARC, SCO, EAS, ASEAN, ASEAN (+3) and so on. There may be a need to look in to a New Joint Security Framework for Asia enunciated by

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the then External Affairs Minister, Mr Pranab Mukherjee in 2006.18

• Energy security and complementary economic coop will improve the bilateral relationship. There is a need to induce increased investment in India by China mainly in infrastructure development. There was a hype prior to visit of Mr Xi Jinping to India with respect to likely investment worth US $ 100 bn. However, it turned out to be US $ 20 bn only. It is likely to go up in future.

• The industrial development, construction technology and manufacturing acumen of Chinese should be looked into. The amazing speed with which constructions take place in China is worth emulating by India. The techniques are very good as they employ the concept of pre fabrication elsewhere and erect the structure at designated location. It must be noted that every project gets completed in time and there is no scope for over shooting the timelines.

• The business integration has already been discussed above. Cooperation in agriculture needs further strengthening. There is need to look into sports diplomacy in detail because this is an ideal platform to deepen the cooperation.

• Population Policy. This is one aspect in which India can render assistance to China. Though the ‘One Child Policy’ has been lifted on 29 Oct 2015, to overcome old age bulge, the results of a recently conducted survey of approximately 1.7 lac Chinese citizens showed that 43% of them don’t prefer second child. India followed a path of educating people while China followed a policy by force. Similarly, others who were unaware of the recent change in the policy were ambivalent about the policy. India is in a position to assist China in this regard.

• HAdr. There is a need to evolve joint planning and operations in HADR by both the countries. Looking into recent incidents of HADR, i.e. Nepal earthquake and shortage of drinking water in Maldives, the Chinese assistance appeared to be competitive in nature. Hence there is a case to evolve combined effort instead of the competitive approach.

• training facilities. This aspect needs much deeper cooperation. The suggested courses/training facilities can be offered to the Chinese:-

» Vacancy in National Defence College and Higher Defence Management Course.

» English language courses earlier offered to the China and utilized at Army Education Corps Center and College, Pachmarhi. More such courses should be offered.

» Material Management Course at College of Material Management, Jabalpur.

» Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare Course.

• Joint training.

» The level of joint training needs to be raised. Both the countries have been undertaking Ex Hand-in-Hand, a company level joint training since 2007, with no sight of enhancement in near future. This needs to be upgraded to a higher level.

» Joint Air exercises. Joint air exercises can be started between both the countries.

» Joint Naval exercises. The scope for joint naval ex beyond Search and Rescue and PASEX should be explored.

• defence cooperation. Following would pay rich dividends:-

» Invite Chinese Defence Attache (DA) to witness own military exercises where other DAs are invited. The hesitation needs to be overcome as Indian DAs have been witnessing exercises in China since 2004.

» Visits by Medium / Junior Level Officers. There is a need to institute mechanisms to conduct visits at medium/ junior level officials. Because the rapport established during visits by senior officials is short lived, it lacks the longevity that is required. Hence it is recommended that visits at medium/ junior levels be conducted to ensure continuity and increase confidence level.

» Language courses in china. Though few officers have done Chinese language course in China, it lacks the focus it merits. There is a need to enhance cooperation in this aspect and ensure more number of officers do Chinese language Course in China. These officers should form a language experts pool to study relevant material in Chinese language.

» Border Management. As on date the number of meetings between defence forces of both the countries are fixed. There is a need to increase the same.

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» The decision to conduct meetings could be delegated to local military commanders to increase the frequency.

» friendly Sports Meet. The friendly sports meet between border personnel started at Nathula, Sikkim. Indian troops defeated Chinese in volleyball whereas Chinese troops won in table tennis. More such sports activities will pave the way for increased confidence level.

• Speed of Implementation. It has been seen that all agreements take a long time to materialize on ground and hence lose their value. This aspect must be addressed to enhance cooperation. A monitoring agency for implementation of agreements need to be established. This should be headed a nominee from Prime Minister’s Office and have representatives of Ministries of Defence, External Affairs, Culture, Education and Finance.

• Procurement of equipment. It is important to highlight that one of ex Indian Chiefs of Air Staff was considering importing K-8 trainer aircraft from China because of its quality and cost effectiveness. There is a possibility of cooperation in this regard. Being paranoid on security related to equipment made in China is not going to help. We need to initiate checks and balances to ensure security with respect to equipment imported from China and derive the benefits of better technology and cost.

conclusion

It is imperative that we come out of 1962 syndrome. The distrust needs to be reduced gradually. We need to think out of the box to find ways and means of increasing the cooperation between both the countries. In the end, it is important to ideate on more ways of integrating and increasing the cooperation.

Notes

1Sandeep Unnithan, Ananth Krishnan. Why Sino-Pak nexus alarms India. [ed.] Aroon Purie. India Today. July 10, 2015, 10 July 2015.2Garver, John. Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions. [ed.] Sumit Ganguly. India as an Emerging Power. London : Frank Cass Publishers, 2005, pp 118-119.3Pravaka Sahoo, Nisha taneja. China’s growing presence in India’s neighbourhood. www.eastasiaforum.org. [Online] February 05, 2010. [Cited: December 04, 2015.] http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/05/chinas-growing-presence-in-indias-neighbourhood/4China’s Naval Expansion in the Indian Ocean and India - China Rivalry. Pant, Harsh V. 18-4-10, May 03, 2010, The Asia Pacific Journal.5Brewster, David. China’s First Overseas Military Base in Djibouti. http://www.realcleardefense.com [Online] December 01, 2015. [Cited: December 05, 2015.] http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/12/01/chinas_first_overseas_military_base_in_djibouti__108741.html6http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/04/27/regional-power-and-the-nepal-earthquake/.http://www.the-american-interest.com. [Online] April 27, 2015. [Cited: December 05, 2015.] http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/04/27/regional-power-and-the-nepal-earthquake/7Panda, Ankit. http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/new-delhi-will-recognize-one-china-when-beijing-recognizes-one-india/. www.thediplomat.com [Online] September 09, 2014. [Cited: December 05, 2015.] http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/new-delhi-will-recognize-one-china-when-beijing-recognizes-one-india/8http://in.chineseembassy.org. [Online] April 12, 2005. [Cited: December 05, 2015.] http://in.chineseembassy.org/eng/ssygd/zygx/t191495.htm9PTI. Allying with Japan at Security Council is India’s ‘Biggest Mistake’: Chinese Media. Beijing, Beijing, China : NDTV, September 21, 2015.10Network, Times News. India seeks freedom of navigation in South China Sea. Times of India. Delhi, November 19, 2015.11Ikegami, Masako. Rise of China. [ed.] Cheng Yi Lin Hsin Huang Michael Hsiao. Abingdon : Routledge, 2009. p 27. ISBN 10 0-415-46882-5.12Bhaskar, Utpal. Brahmaputra river: India plans integrated river basin authority for strategic projects. The Mint. November 26, 2013.13Krishnan, Ananth. China Puts First Brahmaputra Dam into operation. India today. November 23, 2014, 23 November 2014. 14Embassy, Indian. http://www.indianembassy.org.cn/DynamicContent. http://www.indianembassy.org.cn [Online] 2015. [Cited: December 05, 2015.] http://www.indianembassy.org.cn/DynamicContent.aspx?MenuId=97&SubMenuId=0

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About the Author

Lt Gen SL Narasimhan, AVSM**, VSM was commissioned into the MADRAS Regiment in 1977. He has seen action in Op PAWAN in 1987 in Sri Lanka and has a vast experience in Counter Insurgency Operations, LAC and HAA environment. He has commanded a Brigade, a Mountain Division and a Corps in the Eastern Theatre. On staff, he hasserved as a Brigade Major of a Mountain Brigade, Defence Attaché in China, DDG Military Intelligence (East) and ADGPublic Information at the Army HQs. He has also been an instructor in Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare Schoolat Vairengte and in the Indian Military Training Team in Bhutan. He is well accomplished in the Chinese language and ispresently the Commandant, Army War College.

15Medcalfe, Rory. India Poll 2013. Lowy Institute for International Policy. Delhi : Australia India Institute, 2013. p 1.16Energy Security and India China Cooperation. Singh, B K. First Quarter 2010, s.l. : International Association for Energy Economics, 2010, pp 18-19.17affairs, Ministry of External. Joint Statement between the India and China during Prime Minister’s visit to China. http://www.mea.gov.in [Online] May 15, 2015. [Cited: November 17, 2015.] http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25240/Joint_Statement_between_the_India_and_China_during_Prime_Ministers_visit_to_China18Jacob, Jabin T. www.ipcs.org [Online] August 2008. [Cited: December 05, 2015.] http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/623680277IB80-Jabin-AsianSecurity.pdf

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StrAteGISING for A tWo froNt WAr

Introduction

Though the possibility of two front war was first experienced half a century back in the Indo-Pak War of 1965, it took us more than four decades to officially

recognise it. It was in 2008, that the Defence Minister gave an innocuous directive asking the Armed Forces to be prepared for a two front war.1 It did not surprise anyone and not in the least the Indian Armed Forces, who had already appreciated this possibility, couple of decades back. What was heartening was that the Ministry of Defence was taken on board on ‘two front war’. It is a moot point whether the Ministry understood its implications and preparatory actions required to overcome the threat. Needless to say, precious years were wasted as this input was not taken into consideration while allocating the defence budget. The situation did not improve even after 2008, as the defence budget as a percentage of GDP went on a decrease, let alone building military capacity to overcome the enhanced threat.

Geo-political environment

India has unresolved borders with both China and Pakistan. The Pakistan Occupied Kashmir including the so called ‘Northern Areas’ are under the illegal occupation of Pakistan and she further claims the remainder part of Kashmir from India. China also claims the entire Arunachal Pradesh and illegally occupies Aksai Chin and Shaksgam Valley, both parts of J & K. Between Pakistan and India there is an unresolved ‘Line of Control’ of over 770 Kms and between India and China there is an unresolved Line of Actual Control of 4056 Kms. There is also a 110 Kms long ‘Actual Ground Position Line’ at Siachen Glacier held by India with Pakistan holding the valley down below. Both China and Pakistan are allies with close political and defence relationship. Both of them are nuclear and missile powers with known history of proliferation and complete disregard to international obligations and have passed on nuclear technology to North Korea, Iran, Libya and Iraq.2

Tibet was invaded and assimilated by China in 1950. Unwittingly India signed the 1954 Trade and Protocol Treaty, in which, we accepted Tibet as a part of China without getting any strategic returns. It was a poor bargain by a guileless India.

She appeared naïve in the rough and tumble of real world geo-politic. This resulted in converting a resolved peaceful Indo-Tibetan Border into unresolved hostile Sino-Indian Border. Least that we could have done, while accepting Tibet as a part of China is to seek formal recognition of Indo-Tibetan Border as Sino-Indian Border. This could have avoided future conflicts. However it was not to be so. Decades have rolled but the borders have remained unstable and hostile.

There have been many armchair strategists and geopolitical think tanks, who have voiced that the present geopolitical environment has outgrown ‘conventional warfare’. Many invoke nuclear weapons as the greatest deterrent for prosecution of a conventional war. The proponents of this theory are many; one of them being Pakistan, who believes with nuclear weapons in its kitty, India dare not start a conventional war against them. They do not hesitate to flaunt their nuclear capabilities at every opportunity and indeed it serves the political purpose of Army’s dominance in the political hierarchy of the country, as the control of nuclear weapons lies with the Pakistani Army. Pakistan has also developed Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) with the help of China. It is Pakistan’s strategy; should the Indian Armed Forces adopt Cold Start Doctrine; they would not hesitate to use TNWs in their own territory against the advancing Indian Armed Forces. This would ensure that the international condemnation against the use of nuclear weapons would be limited. As also, they being tactical weapons of sub-kiloton yield, the area of contamination would also be limited; never mind the aerosol, weather, residual radiation, etc.

India published her Draft Nuclear Doctrine in 1999. She does not distinguish different yields in nuclear weapons for retaliation. The Doctrine merely states that India believes in ‘No First Use’, but however, reserves the right to punitive retaliation to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor. It implies that even if Pakistan were to use TNWs in Indian Territory or against Indian Forces in Pakistan territory; India would retaliate with nuclear weapons of whatever yield on targets and numbers of their choice. It could be credible minimum deterrence against any target such as weapon delivery systems, command and control centres or any other targets to cause unacceptable damage to the adversary. That

Lt Gen PG Kamath, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, SM (Retd)

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being a plausible scenario, can Pakistan really use her TNWs against India? The leadership in Pakistan could mock at India’s tardy decision making process as also reassure themselves that India being a responsible power would not be able to retaliate with nuclear weapons against their TNWs. These at best are only conjectures that neither reflect reality nor rationality but are adequate to cloud decision making in Pakistan.

There is a need to remind Pakistan that half a century back Pakistan, believing that India would never attack outside J & K, initiated an offensive in the state with impunity. Their convictions were belied when India attacked Lahore (Punjab) in retaliation to their thrusts towards Jaurian/Akhnur (J & K). It took them completely by surprise. Similarly, Pakistan’s strong belief that the nuclear weapons would become their insurance policy against Indian Conventional offensive needs to be revisited. Over the years, Pakistan after suffering defeat after defeat; losing half their country has still not learnt her lesson as to how to deal with India. To be fair to them they have professional Armed forces who have vowed to avenge her 1971 defeat. However their morbid hate combined with religion and Jihad whip up such emotional high stakes that most of the time their operational art loses track in emotional zest that ends up in mediocre or poor performance on the battlefield. Not to mince words, individual acts of bravery in tactical battles have been many, however strategically it has poor moorings leading them to a point of no return or complete defeat. The Kargil debacle is a case in point. So also the OP Gibraltar launched in Aug 1965; not to mention the 1971 war, where the country was dismembered.

Prognosis for two front War

China has not resolved the Border Dispute with India even after thirty five years of formal official negotiations. Let alone resolution not even their own version of boundaries has also not been given by them in both Western and Eastern Sectors. It is only in Central Sector, where the border perceptions have very little differences that they have given their claim lines. China wants the border question to hang like ‘sword of Damocles’, which she is free to dangle to browbeat India. Both during the visit of PM Li Keqiang in May 2013 and President Xi Jinping in Nov 2014; the border was activated by PLA to show her resoluteness on the border issue, notwithstanding the state visit of the highest two functionaries of their government.

Communist Party of China (CPC) supported Hong Kong based newspaper in an article entitled ‘Six Wars to be Fought by China in Next 50 years’4 cites; re-conquest of Southern

Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh) in 2035-40, as the mandatory wars, which China has to fight. If one observes the Chinese actions in establishment of M9 and cruise missile bases in Fujian Province against Taiwan, her aggressiveness in South China Sea, East China Sea and her frequent transgressions on Sino-Indian Border, it appears that she has already started sowing seeds for the four of the six wars. I would call upon Sinologists to observe in times to come as to how China would continue to exacerbate events in these areas of her core long term interest to keep the hostility alive, taking care to couch their intent in words of peace, cooperation and friendship. China is a practitioner of German Chancellor Hollweg’s Doctrine in The First World War that “treaties are scraps of paper”. Readers would remember the Panch Sheel signed in 1954 and subsequent events leading to Sino-Indian War. It is important to note the number of agreements signed with India on ‘peace and tranquillity’, CBMs, non- disturbance of settled population while resolving boundary issue; are only on paper and China has indiscriminately violated its provisions at abandon. The point that I wish to reiterate is; China has no compulsions in negating her treaty with any country in order to achieve her long term goals. India should not be reassured with these agreements with China and be prepared for war.

Turning to Pakistan; her future strategy is to launch an offensive in conjunction with China. All their military writings on 1965 Indo-Pak War rue the fact that they did not attack India in conjunction with China in 1962. They feel that they missed a golden opportunity as it was the ideal time to wrest the whole of J & K and share it between them. China could keep Aksai Chin and Shaksgam Valley and they could take the entire Kashmir valley and probably leave the Hindu dominated Jammu region sans Rajouri, Poonch and Naushera Districts.

During the 1965 Indo-Pak War, the actual ‘two front war’ was waged against India, when towards the end of the War, President Ayub Khan flew to Beijing for last minute consultation before the Cease Fire was agreed to, by Pakistan. China had also given several ultimatums to India of transgressing in Sikkim and had moved their formations to Tibet.6 India under the threat from China vacated Jelep La Pass which was promptly occupied by Chinese troops. China’s pressure on India also assisted Pakistan to a Cease Fire that avoided her complete capitulation.

If that was so; why then did China not intervene in Indo-Pak War of 1971? China was under great obligation of President Yahya Khan for initiating US-China rapprochement. Further it was Kissinger, who was goading China to attack India

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on her Northern Front to save Pakistan the humiliation of defeat.9 However China, in spite of pressure from an old ally and a new friend chose not to intervene: Why? One possible reason could be that China was still not a member of UN as the permanent seat in the Security Council was occupied by Taiwan. To be admitted into UN and then wrest the seat from Taiwan would be possible, only if China behaves as a responsible power. She did not want to stake her membership to the world’s body, by intervening in a thankless war. Secondly, she herself was in the midst of Cultural Revolution with Mao’s position weakened. It was not the time to splurge on a war at some others behest, while one’s own house is in turmoil.

Now analysing the intents of our two neighbours, one can safely conclude that both nurse hostility towards India. Both are long term allies. China’s support for Pakistan’s nuclear programme, missile programme, co-production of JF-17 Multi Role Fighter jet, development and operation of Gwadar Port, China-Pak Economic Corridor, export of defence equipment and continuous support to Pakistan in UN, including the recent blocking of the case against Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi; the mastermind of Mumbai carnage; are few of the instances out of many, where the two countries have found common cause against India.

It has been China’s strategy to arm Pakistan with nuclear weapons, missiles, aircraft and submarines in order to keep India, Pakistan centric. To some extent they have been successful as most of our general public believes Pakistan is a greater and immediate threat, while China is a distant threat. In the international interactions at UN most countries hyphenate India and Pakistan unwittingly. China has been fairly successful to keep India pegged with Pakistan focus. It was George Fernandez as our Defence Minister in 2003, who first pronounced that China was ‘Enemy No 1’. For decades our foreign policy mandarins were content in being called a South Asian power. Our focus on defence and foreign affairs all were pegged at the level of Pakistan thus locking the potential of our country to an abysmally substandard yardstick. We were able to come out of this limited vision just in the past decade, thereby setting our sights to the level of China. Globally, now we are being hyphenated with China.

A future war will be planned and executed both by China and Pakistan together. China would certainly help Pakistan in ensuring the troops in the Eastern Sector and Northern Front are not pulled out to reinforce our war on the Western Front. This would ensure that India would not have the strategic flexibility to switch forces from one front to the

other thus limiting our offensive capability on the Western Front; a situation not acceptable to our planners. It would put Pakistan almost at parity with India on our Western Front. How do we strategise for a two front victory?

Neutralising china factor in two front War against India

First and foremost; is to ensure that China is not able to partner with Pakistan for a two front war against India. There is need to neutralise China’s capacity to play mischief with us. The strength of Pakistan is rooted in fighting in conjunction with China. Pakistan can be dealt later at the time and place of our choosing. Our prime focus should be on China.

We need to target ‘Achilles Heel’ of China. China is like a glass crystal ball that has fallen off the table but has not shattered into smithereens but innumerable cracks have developed internally, ready to break apart at the slightest of impact. The internal force that is binding several parts in the crystal ball are due to coercion by CPC, PLA, People’s Armed Police, controlled press, a leashed social media, an obedient judiciary, curtailed expression, denial of dissent, authoritarian rule and a bottled human spirit. A single party rule with no opposition, enables CPC totalitarian control over the country and its people. The system is highly vulnerable as the minds of people cannot be leashed. It is most susceptible to new ideas and that is what threatens China.

Our strategy is to hold as many cards up our sleeve as possible against China. China should know in unambiguous terms our capacity to threaten her politically, ward off her threat militarily and throttle her economically. The most potent threat we can pose to China is political. China carries a gargantuan baggage of political vulnerability. China’s biggest worry is to keep the CPC supreme. Hence, the object of our psychological war should be to target the supremacy of CPC. In fact; the country called China is owned by the CPC. The preservation and perpetuation of the CPC is the main political vision of China. India needs to launch an information campaign that cuts CPC to size.

India in support with the West should continue to raise the human right issues in favour of the oppressed Chinese population, both Hans and other minorities. The nation wide resentment of the Chinese people would culminate in to the democratisation of China and diminishing powers of the CPC. A democratic China would be more tolerant and understanding as far as the geo-politics with its neighbours is concerned. Rather, it was Mao’s experiment in liberalism when he said “let hundred flowers bloom and hundred schools of

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thought contend” signifying difference of opinions should be there to promote arts and science.11 These protests should increase in number of people all across the country and in frequency and ultimately to result in a ‘climate of collapse’ across the country.

Finally, an implosion has to occur within the country resulting in fragmenting of PRC into independent countries of United Mongolia (combining Outer and Inner Mongolia), Xinjiang, Tibet (Comprising Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Inner Tibet), Guangxi and Taiwan. The actual China should be as it was during the Ming period comprising the core Han areas of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Chengdu. India should aim at democratisation of China through information warfare and, diplomatic and political support to the agitating populace. Let us not forget the support provided by China to insurgents in the North East India for well over half a century. China’s biggest scare is upholding her ridiculous political system and that should be our target to cause her dismemberment. It should be India’s long term goal.

The counter argument could be that China likewise can join the game and initiate similar activities against India. The answer is; that she is already at it. United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia was formed under the aegis of China combining Paresh Barua faction of ULFA with NSCN (K) and seven other militant organisations.12 She has been doing it for the past six decades in the North East. As also, Indian democracy with liberal institutions, pluralism and inclusiveness with constitutional federal structure is much more resilient to such splits. The strands that bind India have more elasticity and resilience than those that bind the Chinese provinces.

China has a strong central government which in fact; is its weakness. They have a homogenous population with nearly 92 % of its population being Hans. However the 8% minority are in two thirds of the area of China.13 The inner Tibet and TAR is one fourth of China in area. Xinjiang further accounts for 17 % of the area of China. Both the provinces are restive and resentment is growing in these regions.

In cyber terms India should be able to access the social media in China without the people knowing that these ideas have come from across the borders. It should gather support and spread to take the public by storm. In plain terms it can be termed ‘psychological warfare’ where we target the minds of people of our target country and force the country to behave as we want them to behave. This particular weapon to neutralise China would be the most potent one. It needs deliberate planning, selection of themes, persuasive writing

skills in Chinese and induct these themes and articles innocuously through cyber intrusion in to the Chinese social media.

Our intelligence agencies, writers, columnists, social media, newspapers, air waves and television need to work towards it. China should know that we have an ace up our sleeve and she would not be able to play any mischief with us. India should take on board US, Britain, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Vietnam, Australia, Mongolia, CARs, Russia and Tibetan Government in Exile (TGIE) and other like minded countries.

Next, India should enhance our military capacities to pose an effective deterrence against China. She should be in no doubts that should she attack India; she would lose face. We should have the military capacity to blunt her offensive and capture a viable objective in Chinese territory in our counter offensive. For this; the first and foremost task is to develop infrastructure on our borders to launch and sustain a Corps size offensive in all the three sectors; the Western, Central and Eastern Sectors. India is in the process of raising one Mountain Strike Corps which should be enhanced under the guise of defensive formations. Indian Air Force should be built up to its full strength of fifty five squadrons.14 Indian Naval strength should be enhanced substantially. Our Navy should be able to cut all Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) connecting Indian and Pacific Oceans. Our submarines should also be able to operate across the Eastern seaboard of China getting clandestine support from Japan, Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea and Vietnam. We should develop our capacities to throttle China’s oil life and sea trade through the Indian Ocean. We should exploit our naval air bases at Andaman Nicobar and have three carrier task forces to dominate the entry points to the Indian Ocean. Strategically we should enlarge our nuclear forces with fusion bombs of megaton yields with MIRV capabilities. Our Agni series of missiles should work on ranges up to 15000 Kms with Triad capability. China will not hear us till we develop our offensive military capacities. These capabilities take a long term to build and appropriate decisions should be taken at the earliest and required budgetary support should be allocated.

diplomatic Isolation

China by her own volition has been able to create enough enemies in the neighbourhood. Her innate policy of expansion, her arbitrariness in claiming over 90% of South China Sea has estranged most countries of South East Asia. China which has a penchant for use of force in the past six and a half decades, cannot be a benign power overnight. She

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will go into the same cycle of belligerence and expansion at the cost of weaker powers in neighbourhood. Like people, the personality of nations do not change.

Adequate ground exists to diplomatically isolate China in her neighbourhood. We need to plan and gradually isolate China ideologically and politically from East, South-East and Central Asian countries and Mongolia. At a later period of time, we should work on Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Maldives, Seychelles, Nepal, Afghanistan and Iran to isolate China. India should bring about rapprochement between US and Russia to distance the latter from China. We should work in conjunction with US and other European Powers in executing our long term plan.

An ‘Association of Lower Riparian States of Rivers Originating in Tibet’ should be formed under the aegis of India. The affected countries are Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Pakistan. Even if Pakistan is unwilling, eight other countries can exert pressure on China from diverting and damming the rivers originating from Tibet. The recent construction of Zangmu Dam on Yarlung Tsangpo is bound to reduce the water flow into Brahmaputra adversely affecting India and Bangladesh. Many such river projects have been planned by China without reference to any of the lower riparian states. This association would further help in diplomatic isolation of China.

Indian ocean; an extreme Vulnerability

One of China’s greatest vulnerability is Indian Ocean. Her energy lifelines from Middle East and her trade to Europe, Africa and bulk of Asia cross the Indian Ocean. To enter Indian Ocean through the South China Sea, she has to perforce pass through the Malacca Straits. It is straddled with Indian island chain of Andaman and Nicobar to its West. The SLOCs have to further pass through the Ten degrees Channel that is completely dominated by the Island chain. It is suffice to say China is most sensitive to a threat to her oil life lines from Middle East through Indian Ocean. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor linking Kashgar to Gwadar through POK is being executed specifically to find an alternative route for the energy supplies from Middle East. Even the Kunming-Kyaukpyu (Myanmar) oil pipeline is basically to bypass Malacca straits and have a direct oil link from Bay of Bengal to China. Her ‘string of pearls’ strategy to contain India also protects her SLOC. It implies China has to have Blue Water naval presence in Indian Ocean to safeguard her energy supplies and trade routes, which are essential to sustain her export oriented economy.

The alternatives to Malacca are Sunda, Lombok, Makassar and Ombai Straits through Indonesia. Indian Navy should build up her capacity to dominate and control all the shipping passing thorough the region. Task Forces comprising surface ships, aircraft carriers and submarines should be capable to be deployed at short notice at all the five straits. India should build her capacity to bottle up the Chinese naval assets already present in Indian Ocean and sever contact with home bases and thereafter destroy them. With her naval assets depleted and her trade throttled, China may have to sober down her intent of posing a threat to India.

Again, I am not suggesting India need to take all these offensive actions against China. However we need to develop our capacities to call the shots. It would deter China from joining a ‘two front war’ against India in conjunction with Pakistan. China has already developed her strategic capabilities in Tibet to concentrate over thirty divisions in acceptable period of time to wage war against India. There is a need for India also to develop her strategic capabilities to restrain Chinese intent turning hostile: Weakness invites war and strength deters wars.

If there is one country that is unable to make use of her strategic strengths; it is India. Even seven decades after our independence, India still does not have a ‘National Security Doctrine’. Hence we do not have strategic milestones to be reached in medium and long term. How do we increase our CNP and achieve our strategic goals in a very dynamic geo-political environment? Probably no one knows.

What strategic power of coercion we need to have against our potential adversaries and also with our friends? What cards we need to hold against super powers so that no one is able to arm twist the country in adopting a policy that is inimical to our national interests? A country needs to have a variety of strategic leverages to safeguard our national interests.

We need to have such leverages against China. India is host to over a lakh of Tibetan refugees, who are thirsting for their independence. The spiritual God of the entire Tibetan diaspora, HH Dalai Lama has been our guest for over half a century. We also host the ‘Tibetan Government in Exile’. It is in our national interest that Tibet becomes an independent country so that the unresolved hostile Sino-Indian Border becomes a resolved stable and peaceful Indo-Tibetan Border, as it was, before the Chinese Invasion of Tibet in 1950.

It is in our national interest to ensure that the fire continues to burn in the stomach of the Tibetans, both in India and TAR. Planning needs to be done to manage post Dalai Lama

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phase, so that the freedom movement of Tibetans does not lose its momentum in the absence of his charismatic persona. Tibetans need to find an incarnation in Tibet and the child needs to be smuggled out of Tibet into India and anointed as HH the fifteenth Dalai Lama. A responsible regent need to be appointed till the time the child attains maturity to handle Tibetan Affairs. This move would automatically gain the loyalty and support of Tibetans in TAR and Inner Tibet besides the entire Tibetan diaspora in the rest of the world. No doubt; the Chinese would appoint their own version of Dalai Lama as they had done to Panchen Lama. It is ridiculous as to how a Communist government has divine powers to appoint a spiritual head? Will such a person let alone having any divine powers; be ever accepted by the Tibetan diaspora as their ‘living God’? Hence Chinese efforts would end in vain and the real Tibetan power centre would continue to be in India.

Indian Government should continue to have an intent to support the Tibetan cause and develop necessary international convergence of diplomatic, political and financial support for the Tibetan freedom struggle. No scruples need to be attributed to it as most of the arms with our insurgents in the North East are of Chinese origin. Several batches of Naga rebels have been trained by Chinese to wage war against India. We are just letting the Chinese have a taste of their own medicine.

It is only by exploiting Chinese weaknesses that we can neutralise her from being a threat to us. We should develop our capacities to target China and accentuate her weaknesses and regulate her behaviour. It needs strategic thinking, planning, allocation of resources and sagacious execution.

conclusion

The measures suggested are for long term planning. China needs to be conveyed that ‘people in glass houses should not throw stones’. China with so many chinks in her armour

should not act brazenly against India. She has to be told unambiguously that our behaviour towards her will be compatible with her behaviour towards us. This can only happen between equals and India need to build her CNP. By exploiting the leverages that we have vis-à-vis China, we would have obviated the possibility of a two front war.

Without China’s support Pakistan ceases to be a force to reckon. We should not take one’s adversary lightly; however it would not be difficult to deal with Pakistan sans the Chinese support. Pakistan is currently in a degenerative phase and all we need to do is to nudge her towards her self-destruction. There have been many pseudo intellectuals who propound the theory that a stable Pakistan is good for us. This cannot be farther from the truth. Pakistan in the throes of sectarian violence, insurgency, terrorism, chaos and insecurity is best for our country. We have been foolish in the past trying to appease Pakistan by our goodwill. The return of 93,000 Prisoners of War after the Indo-Pak War of 1971 is a case in point. The return of captured territories after Indo-Pak War 1965, is again a sad example of display of our goodwill to the undeserving.

Ultimately Pakistan due to their DNA will continue to replay their ‘Hate India Ideology’ for years to come. It is understandable, as this ideology alone can keep her together. It is the question of her existence. To quote MJ Akbar “Pakistan as a nation state will not collapse but will become a kind of toxic jelly state that would not melt away but quiver all the time, toxic to itself and the region”. We should watch out for Pakistan and allow them to brew in the soup they cooked.

On a long term basis I hope leaders with vision and wisdom will bring peace and prosperity in the region and to their people. Nations have perished, when they abandoned the use of force as an instrument of state policy. We need to pursue peace with strength and mastery in statecraft.

Notes1Sandeep Unnithan: ‘The Chi Pak Threat’, India Today: 23 Oct 2010.2Akhilesh Pillalamarri, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapon Programme; Five Things you need to Know’ National Interest Magazine; http://nationalinterest.org/feature/pakistans-nuclear-weapons-program-5-things-you-need-know-12687?page=23Rahan Joshi: China, ‘Pakistan and Nuclear Proliferation’ in ‘The Diplomat’ Feb 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-pakistan-and-nuclear-non-proliferation/4Wen Wei Po, Hong Kong Daily; 08 Jul 2013. ‘The six wars to be fought by China in next 50 years’.5Asian Expansions: The Historical Experiences of Polity Expansion in Asia by Geoff Wade page 23-24 (historical records of Chinese territory beyond the modern PRCs territory).

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About the AuthorLt Gen PG Kamath, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, SM (Retd) was commissioned into the MADRAS Regiment. and has held the prestigious appointment of Commandant Army War College before he retired in Mar 2013. As a part of his command assignments, he commanded his battalion and brigade on the LC and an Infantry Division. He is a graduate of DSSC, HC and NDC courses. He has also held many prestigious instructional and staff appointments to include OC Training School (IMTRAT) at Bhutan, DS SC Wing, BGS (Operations) of a Corps, Additional MS at AHQ and COS at Command. He has also held the appointment of Defence Attache at Malaysia. He holds an MSc (Defence Studies) degree from Madras University and an M Phil (Defence Management) from DAVV Indore. He can be reached at pgkamath11@yahoo.com

6Shruti Pandalai; ‘Resilience in War, deftness in diplomacy’; The Hindu’ 3 Sep 2015.http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/1965-indo-pak-war-resilience-in-war-deftness-in-diplomacy/article7608385.ece7Sinh Randhir; ‘A Talent for War; The Military Biography of Lt Gen Sagat Singh’ Vij Books Pvt Ltd, New Delhi; 2013, pp 74-75.8‘Indo Pakistani War of 1965’ Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1965#Involvement_of_other_nations

9Bass J Gary; ‘The Blood Telegram; India’s Secret War in East Pakistan’ Random House Group Limited, London; 2013. P 16510‘Cultural Revolution’ http://www.history.com/topics/cultural-revolution. (Death toll during the Cultural Revolution varies and only a conservative estimate has been taken from the website) 11‘Hundred Flowers Campaign’ Wikipedia; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simplified_Chinese_characters12Gurmeet Kanwal; ‘Manipur Ambush: Why Army Saw the Worst Attack in Twenty Years’ in http://www.dailyo.in/politics/manipur-attack-nscn-k-meitei-northeast-india-act-east-myanmar-isi-ulfa-afspa/story/1/4196.html13Hsu-Mei ling: ‘The Growth of Chinese Minority Populations’ Geo Journal July 1993; Volume 30, Issue 3.14Bharat Verma; ‘Indian Defence Review’ Oct-Dec 2011; Lancer Publishers, New Delhi; 2011.P 89.

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NetWorK ceNtrIc WArfAre : coNcePt ANd cHALLeNGeS

Lt Gen Ravindra Singh Panwar, SM, VSM

Introduction

Information has been at the core of military operations through the ages. Throughout history, military leaders have recognised the key role of information as a

contributor to victory on the battlefield. As a result of this enduring characteristic of war, military organisations have been designed to deal with the lack of available information, i.e., how to deal with the fog of war. Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is an emerging theory of war which has a very high potential for reducing the fog and friction of war and can have profound implications for military operations. With a quantum improvement in our defence networks having taken place over the last few years, and given the next generation Army networks which are currently being rolled out, the feasibility of operationalising the NCW concept in our context has immensely improved. The time is ripe, therefore, to re-visit the concept with a view to adapting it to our best advantage.

This paper attempts to give an insight into the concept of NCW and also lists some counter views to this theory. It goes on to give a brief overview of the status of net-centricity in the Indian Army (IA) and suggests certain measures to hasten our march on the road to becoming a network-centric Army.

origins of the NcW concept

NCW can trace its immediate origins to 1996 when Admiral William Owens introduced the concept of “system of systems” in a paper of the same name.1 Owens described the evolution of a system of intelligent sensors, command and control systems, and precision weapons that enabled enhanced situational awareness, rapid target assessment and distributed weapon assignment.

As a distinct concept, however, NCW first appeared publicly in an article written in 1998 by Vice Admiral A K Cebrowski and co-author John Garstka, titled Network Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future.2 Drawing from a combination of the writings of Information Age futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler3 as well as complexity theory, Cebrowski saw transformational changes in the Information Age having similar effects on economics, businesses as well as warfare. Cebrowski stated that the world was in the midst of a Revolution in Military

Affairs (RMA). He said that it has been called “a fundamental shift from what we call platform centric warfare to something we call Network Centric Warfare,” and that it will prove to be the most important RMA in the past 200 years. He observed that revolutionary changes were taking place in the underlying technologies and business models in modern economies, and went on to ask the rhetorical question, “How can the military not change?”

development of the concept

The development of the intellectual foundation of NCW originated from Department of Defence (DoD), USA. A series of books were published by the DoD Command and Control Research Program (CCRP), which brought out the evolution and development of NCW.

The first book in this series, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority by Alberts, Garstka and Stien4, provided the first detailed articulation of the tenets that link a robustly networked force to dramatically increased combat power. It also described how information, coupled with changes in command and control (C2), could transform military organisations. Two additional volumes completed the three-volume set, Information Age Anthology: Understanding Information Age Warfare5 and Information Age Transformation.6

Another important book published by the CCRP, Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis and War 7, explored the link between network centric organisations and processes and mission outcomes.

NCW-Broad Definition

There are various definitions of the term NCW, although all agree that the basic precept of NCW is the use of networked technology to provide an advantage on the battlefield.

As per Cebrowski, NCW is the military expression of the Information Age. It refers to the combination of strategies, emerging tactics, techniques and procedures, organisations and technologies that a networked force employs to create a decisive warfighting advantage. As an organising principle, NCW accelerates our ability to know, decide, and act by linking sensors, communications systems, and weapons systems in an interconnected grid.8

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As per Alberts, NCW is applicable to all levels of warfare and contributes to the coalescence of strategy, operations, and tactics. It is transparent to mission, force size and composition, as well as geography4.

tenets

The four tenets of NCW, given out below, help us understand the enhanced power of networked forces and how the NCW concept, if practiced, acts as a source of warfighting advantage:-

• A robustly networked force improves information sharing.

• Information sharing enhances the quality of information and shared situational awareness.

• Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronisation, and enhances sustainability and speed of command.

• These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness.

the Power of NcW

The source of increased combat power associated with NCW lies in the combat power of “platforms” or “nodes” operating in a stand-alone mode. In order to successfully engage a target, the target must be detected, identified, decision made to engage the target and the weapon aimed and fired. Associated with a particular engagement is a time budget and engagement range. The consumption of time depends upon effective ranges of the sensors and weapons, their kill radius, time required to communicate and process information and decision-making time.

Platform-centric engagement envelope. In platform centric engagement, i.e., when the sensor, decision maker and shooter are all on the same platform, the Effective Engagement Envelope, or E3, is the area defined by the overlap of engagement quality awareness and the weapons maximum employment envelope (Figure 1). The instantaneous combat power for a platform-centric engagement is proportional to the E3. As is apparent from the diagram, in platform-centric operations combat power is often marginalised by the inability of the platform to generate engagement quality awareness at ranges greater than or equal to the maximum weapons employment envelope, thus limiting the effective engagement range to less than its weapon range. For example, in the case of a non-networked fighter aircraft, this range would be limited to the visual identification range of the pilot, which

may be as low as 2-3 kms, while the weapon range would be typically much higher (25-30 kms).

figure 1: Platform centric engagement envelope

Non-Networked Sensors and Shooters. Figure 2 (a) compares a case that portrays two platform-centric shooters operating in close proximity, supported by an external sensing capability that can provide identification information (such as an AWACS, range depicted by the dashed circle), but these are not networked, thus not facilitating real-time sharing of information. In this operational situation, real-time engagement information (sensing plus identification) cannot be shared effectively and combat power is not maximised.

figure 2 : NcW Value Added combat Power

Network centric operation. In contrast, Figure 2 (b) portrays the value-added combat power associated with a network-centric operation. In this mode of operation, near real-time information sharing among nodes enables potential combat power to be increased. The robust networking of sensors (AWACS and aircraft radars) provides the force

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with the capability to generate engagement quality shared awareness. The overlap of this increased awareness zone with the weapons ranges gives the increased E3. The potential increase in total combat power associated with a network-centric operation is represented by the increased area of the E3. This simple example illustrates the application of Metcalfe’s Law to military operations.

Self-Synchronisation

Self-synchronisation is perhaps the ultimate in achieving increased tempo and responsiveness. Self-synchronisation is a mode of interaction between two or more entities. Figure 3 portrays the key elements of self-synchronisation: two or more robustly networked entities (agents), shared awareness, a rule set (rules or guidelines for operation) and a value-adding interaction. The combination of a rule set and shared awareness enables the entities to operate in the absence of traditional hierarchical mechanisms for command and control. The rule set describes the desired outcome (eg, commander’s intent and rules of engagement) in various operational situations.

figure 3: Self Synchronised Interaction

Self-synchronisation may be used to advantage when, for instance, a group of fighter aircraft engages enemy aircraft. Achieving coordination amongst combat groups from different formations in a projection area battle would be another example. An area where the application of self-synchronisation has significant potential is a class of warfighting activities providing supporting services, such as logistics, fire support, and close air support. In platform-centric operations, the supported agent typically requests support, often via voice. Self-synchronisation provides a mechanism for making combat processes time-efficient.

“Power to the edge” and “Agility”

Alberts and Hayes explained the idea of the inherent benefits of sharing information in a networked environment in their book titled, Power to the Edge: Command and Control in the Information Age9... The book argues that current command and control relationships, organisations and systems are just not up to the task of executing warfare in the Information Age

It is critical to push essential decision making information out to the “edges” of the organisation. “Power to the Edge” is about changing the way individuals and organisations relate to one another and work. It involves the empowerment of individuals at the edge of an organisa tion (where the organisation interacts with its operating environment to have an impact on that environment) which, in the case of military organisations, would translate to the tactical domain.

The concept of “Power to the Edge” is an extension of NCW, where the ubiquitous nature of IT through robust networking makes the application of this concept in military organisations feasible. The transition from strictly hierarchical organisational structures to flatter ones needs to be hastened in order to reap the full benefits of NCW. The power of the network has provided new and innovative approaches to command and con trol of organisations. Such responsive organisations are also expected to lead to greater “agility” in reacting to complex, Fourth Generation type of warfighting scenarios.

effects-Based operations (eBo) and NcW

EBO is not a new form of warfighting, nor does it displace any of the currently recognised forms of warfare. Throughout history, decision-makers have sought to create conditions that would achieve their objectives and policy goals. Edward Smith gives a straightforward definition of EBO, as under10:-

“Effects-based operations are coordinated sets of actions directed at shaping the behaviour of friends, foes, and neutrals in peace, crisis, and war.”

The objective of an effects-based strategy is not to win a military campaign or a war through the physical attrition of the enemy but to induce an opponent to pursue a course of action consistent with our security interests. The question of will is fundamental to both the symmetric and asymmetric models of conflict but in different ways. In a symmetric, attrition-based conflict, the destruction of the enemy’s physical capacity to wage war is the objective. In an asymmetric conflict, the destruction is aimed at creating the desired psychological or cognitive effect.

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EBO is primarily about focusing knowledge, precision, speed and agility on the enemy decision makers to degrade their ability to take coherent action rather than conducting combat operations for more efficient destruction of the enemy. The knowledge, precision, speed and agility brought about by NCO provide the necessary ingredients for EBO.

In summary, the combination of network-centric capabilities and an effects-based approach provides commanders and planners with a new potential for attacking the elements of the enemy’s will directly, thereby avoiding, or at least diminishing, our reliance on sheer physical destruction.

NCW and the Domains of Conflict

To successfully implement the emerging theory of war and NCO, the four domains of warfare, ie, physical, information, cognitive and social, needs to be understood, as well as the areas of overlap between the domains.

Figure 4: NCW vis-à-vis Domains of Conflict

As illustrated in Figure 4, the domain intersections represent important, dynamic areas and their relationship to the NCW concept11. The precision force so vital to the conduct of NCO is created at the intersection of the information and physical domains. Shared awareness and tactical innovation occur at the intersection between the information and cognitive domains. Since many battles and campaigns are actually won or lost in the cognitive domain, this intersection is enormously important. The intersection between the physical and cognitive domains is where the time compression and “decision lock-out” phenomenon occur, where tactics achieve operational and even strategic effects, and where high rates of change are developed. Better shared awareness and cognitive

advantage also result in better “collaborative decisions” in the social domain. NCW exists at the very centre where all four domains intersect.

Figure 5 brings out in a self-explanatory manner the relationship between the NCW tenets (brought out above) and the four domains. An understanding of this relationship leads us to an understanding of the core principles of NCW and how these lead to mission accomplishment.

figure 5: relationship between NcW tenets and Domains of Conflict

the entry fee: High Quality Infostructure

The essential pre-requisite or entry fee for NCW is an infostructure that provides all elements of the warfighting enterprise with access to high-quality information services. This infostructure is required to deliver different qualities of service for different requirements. For example, target engagement requires high data rates and low latencies, tactical command and control can tolerate delays of the order of seconds, while logistics requirements are not very time sensitive.

Further, there is the need for a high level of integration of computing elements and communications into a single infostructure, catering for reliability and security needs for different types of operational requirements.

“technology” vis-à-vis the “Human dimension”

the data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom (dIKW) Hierarchy. The DIKW hierarchy12 is a knowledge management structure that helps people make data become meaningful for decision making. In simple words, collated raw data may be termed as “information”, while analysed information is “knowledge”. Information Systems (IS) are used for efficient conversion of data to information to knowledge. “Wisdom”, however, is the application of a commander’s intuition to accumulated knowledge.

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coup d’oeil. The 19th-century seminal work by Clausewitz on military theory, On War13, provides the elements that military commanders can use to bind an IS, people and the DIKW hierarchy together for NCO. The elements are coup d’oeil and determination.

• coup d’oeil. This is the ability of a military commander to quickly make sense of battlefield activity and come to a tactically sound conclusion.

• determination. Being determined, or resolute, is the courage to accept responsibility and act once a decision is made.

figure 6: relationship between a commander, coup d’oeil and an Information System (IS)

commander, coup d’oeil and IS. Coup d’oeil and determination together link the DIKW hierarchy to competent, informed tactical decisions in battle and the leader’s will to act. The figure given above illustrates the relationship between a commander, coup d’oeil and an IS in the DIKW hierarchy. The transformations from data to information and from information to knowledge occur with use of the IS. The transformation from knowledge to wisdom only occurs when a commander has a well-formed, mature coup d’oeil to apply to knowledge during operations.

the Importance of Good decision Making. The implementation of NCW is first of all about human behaviour as opposed to information technology. While “network” is a noun, “to network” is a verb. Thus, when we examine the degree to which a particular military organisation is exploiting the power of NCW, the focus is meant to be on human behaviour in the networked environment. NCW theory provides a framework for military leaders to take full advantage of technology. However, the success or failure of operations is based primarily on the quality of a commander’s action, and the importance of good decision making must not be under-estimated.

counterviews to the NcW theory

Many military strategists have stated that it is irregular and unconventional conflicts, rather than confrontations with standing armies, that will dominate military operations across the globe for the foreseeable future. Some observers question the utility of NCW in urban combat operations

and for counterinsurgency operations, and ask whether the proponents of NCW place too much emphasis on high-technology. Some of the questions which are often raised by critics on the efficacy of NCW are as under14:-

• NCW theory remains scientifically untested.

• Overconfidence on the effectiveness of NCW could be counter-productive

• There is reduced effectiveness of NCW in counter-insurgency operations.

• Information overload is a challenge which needs to be addressed.

• NCW is leading to Increasing complexity of military systems.

• Military software and data induces additional vulnerabilities.

• Similarly, military equipment is vulnerable to electronic warfare.

the IA communication Networks

The IA has been working since the mid-1980s to usher in a networked environment, in strategic, operational and tactical scenarios. The first networks to be fielded were the Army Radio Engineering Network (AREN) and the Army Static Communication Network (ASCON), the former for tactical communications and the latter for operational/ strategic scenarios.

Over the years, the strategic networks evolved, driven primarily by increasing data communication requirements projected by the users. The Army Wide Area Network (AWAN) and the Army Intranet came up in similar time-frames in the 1990s. Subsequently, in order to optimise resources, these two geographically congruent networks were merged and renamed as the Army One Network. The Network for Spectrum (NFS) along with ASCON Phase IV is currently under implementation as the Next Generation Network (NGN) for upgrading the Army One Network.

The next generation Tactical Communication System (TCS) was first envisaged to be inducted in the year 2000, and was thus named TCS 2000. TCS has now been taken up as a “Make” project and will take five years or so to be inducted.

A large number of VSAT terminals have been installed in the Northern and Eastern Theatres to cater for remotely deployed troops. Large VSAT (LVSAT) terminals provide communications to important isolated logistic nodes as well as back-up communications to formation HQ. The

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Mobile Cellular Communication Network (MCCS) has been deployed in two corps, and is now planned to be inducted in several others over the next few years.

For joint operations, the Defence Communication Network (DCN) will shortly become operational for facilitating inter-Services communications.

Figure 7: Tactical C3I System Architecture

The IA Tactical C3I Systems

To achieve net-centricity at the tactical level, the IA is developing a number of Tactical C3I Systems, as under:-

• Command Information and Decision Support System (ClDSS)

• BattlefieldSurveillanceSystem(BSS)• Artillery Combat Command and Control System

(ACCCS)• Electronic Warfare (EW) Systems• Air Defence Control & Reporting System (ADC & RS)• BattlefieldManagementSystem(BMS).

The Tactical C3I System architecture is depicted in Figure 7. The inter-communication amongst the systems is to be provided by Communications and Data Network System (CDNS), a generic name given to various means of communication which will be utilised for this purpose. All these systems are under various stages of development.

Conclusion

This paper has discussed the NCW concept in brief. It has emerged that, given the ever-evolving and increasing role that technology plays in warfare, achieving net-centricity is crucial to ensure that forces have the information, intelligence and situational awareness they require to achieve their objectives.

It is also clear that technology cannot replace the essential and historically significant aspects of traditional militaryleadership. However, the integration of NCW theory with the DIKW hierarchy and coup d’oeil provides commanders and soldiers with unparalleled opportunities for achieving enhanced combat effectiveness in an information-rich environment.

A heavy reliance on technology is problematic, as technology may fail, or as discussed earlier, may be targeted by an enemy toreduceownwarfightingcapability.AsNCWbecomesmorepredominant, steps must be taken to safeguard technology intensive systems from malicious action. It is also imperative to ensure that forces can operate in a fall-back mode without the NCW advantage, if required of them.

NCW is seen to be an essential element of modern military operations. All technologically advanced armies are spending a major portion of their defence funds on implementing NCW, including the US, UK, Australia, NATO, China and Russia. The IA, too, needs to take urgent steps to adapt and implement this concept as best suited to its own requirements.

Notes

1Owens, Admiral W, Emerging System of Systems, Military Review, Vol 75 No 3, May-June 1995.2Cebrowski AK and Garstka John, Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future, US Naval Institute Proceedings, Annapolis, Maryland, January 1998.3Toffler,AlvinandHeidi,WarandAnti-War,WarnerBooks,London,1993.4AlbertsDS,GarstkaJJ,andSteinFP,NetworkCentricWarfare:DevelopingandLeveragingInformationSuperiority,2ndedition(revised). Washington, DC, DoD CCRP, Feb 2000.5Alberts DS, Garstka JJ, Hayes RE, and Signori DA, Understanding Information Age Warfare, Washington, DC, DoD CCRP, 2001.6David S. Alberts, Information Age Transformation: Getting to a 21st Century Military (revised), Washington DC, DoD CCRP, June 2002.

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About the Author

Lt Gen Ravindra Singh Panwar, SM, VSM, an alumnus of the National Defence Academy and recipient of the President’s Gold Medal, was commissioned into Corps of Signals on 13 June 1976. He is presently Commandant Military College of Telecommunication Engineering, Mhow.

He has commanded an Armoured Division Signal Regiment, an Electronic Warfare Group and a Sub Area. He has served as Colonel MS (CR Policy and Lib), as Chief Signal Officer at Headquarters Northern Command and as Major General in charge Administration at Headquarters Central Command.

He is a graduate of the DSSC, LDMC, and NDC courses and has attended a special Cryptology Course at Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi. The officer has been awarded M Tech and Ph D degrees, both in Computer Science and Engineering, from the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay as well as a degree in Master of Management Studies from Osmania University, Hyderabad.

7Edward A Smith Jr, Effects-Based Operations: Applying Network-Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis and War, Washington, DC, DoD CCRP, 2002.8Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, Office of Force Transformation, November 2003, pp 28.9Alberts, DS and Hayes, RE, Power to the Edge: Command … Control … in the Information Age, Washington, DC, DoD CCRP, 2003.10Edward A Smith Jr, Effects-Based Operations: Applying Network-Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis and War, Washington, DC, DoD CCRP, 2002.11Cebrowski A K, The Implementation of Network Centric Warfare, Office of Force Transformation, US DoD, 05 Jan 05.12Tunnell, Col HD, Network-Centric Warfare and the Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom Hierarchy, Military Review, May-Jun 2014, pp 43-50.13Clausewitz, General Carl von, On War, Translated by Colonel J J Graham, Project Gutenburg Ebook, released Feb 2006.14Clay Wilson, NCO: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, 15 Mar 07.

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INdIA-cHINA reLAtIoNS IN A cHANGING WorLd

the changing Nature of War

The nature of war is directly related to the technology of the times and the resources available. But how we can fight and how long we might fight increasingly

depends on the willingness of the world as a whole to allow it. War between countries and particularly war between major powers will not be without consequences to the ever increasingly inter-dependent world and hence international pressure to terminate conflicts before they expand and/or spiral out of control is only to be expected, especially when the nations in conflict are armed with nuclear weapons. How many nuclear weapons a country may have does not matter. For the world outside the use of even one will not be without huge collateral consequences. Considering this, this may be a good time and place to ponder over the future nature of war and how this would impact India.

Given the destructive power available with the major powers and the costs it imposes on both sides, the world will never again witness a general war. All the wars fought since the surrender of Germany and Japan in May and September of 1945 have been limited wars, with the application of force limited to the theatre of conflict and/or the limited use of available resources.1 Even while Vietnam fought an all out war with all its available resources, for the USA it was a limited war with only a fraction of its available power and resources deployed.

Probably the closest thing to a general war we have seen in recent times was the Iran-Iraq war where both countries mobilised all resources and strained every sinew to win, but even here they observed restraints on attacking civilian centres and oil installations which were critical to pay for their futile war. Since independence India has been a participant in five major conflicts, but all of them were very limited wars. In 1948 even as the Indian Army was battling with Pakistani forces, trainloads of weapons were being shipped to Pakistan as per the partition agreements. In 1999 during the Kargil war air services and border crossings at Wagah were as usual, and diplomacy on all tracks too was as usual. Despite the use of airpower by India, it unilaterally imposed restraints upon itself such as not crossing the LoC and restricting the use of force to the Kargil sector, thereby severely impeding the IAF’s effectiveness, prolonging the war and costing many more lives. While to do so was a national decision it was not independent of consideration of international ramifications

and the fear of escalation, given that the two countries have recently unsheathed their nuclear weapons by testing them.

Kargil was India’s first living room war2 where controlled electronic feeds lit up emotions in homes nationwide that fostered a groundswell of jingoism. While it would be rather difficult to award points like in a boxing match, India clearly emerged as the winner in terms of perceptions, despite greater losses in men and material. Since modern wars are usually militarily indecisive and inconclusive, perceptions are much more important than costs. Nothing illustrates this better than the reported conversation in April 1975 between an American Colonel, visiting Hanoi to finalise modalities of the US withdrawal from Vietnam, and a Vietnamese Colonel.3

Wars between nuclear powers, if they happen, will be constrained by the need to limit the escalation to short of use of nuclear weapons, tactical or strategic. Since the war cannot cross this threshold the perception of victory must be created by being dynamic in the use of weapons and tactics. Since time is the other constraint there will be no room for wars of manoueuvre. Victory will be a matter of perception. There will be no time and place for strategic victories. The sum of tactical victories will be the ultimate perception of victory. Like in Vietnam. Like in Kargil. We have seen how soon air power came to be deployed over Kargil. The terrain and array of forces on both sides of the India-China border suggests that air power will come into play fairly early to score the wins that will influence perceptions.

defending the National Mood

This century has been good for India, so far. Its economy has been bounding along finally reflecting a closer correlation between promise and performance. The demographic trends have never been so propitious. Given current trends and informed forecasts India’s GDP is expected to double every seven or eight years. It is climbing closer to US$ 2 trillion now. Thus by, say 2050, we could be looking at a GDP in real terms of over US$ 40 trillion.4 If the current trend were to do slightly better and keep it up, by 2050 or even earlier, India could conceivably emerge with the world’s largest GDP. While this potential may not be realised by India’s ever squabbling, petty minded and greedy elite, many knowledgeable people abroad seem fully aware of it.5 Some almost certainly would be contemplating tripping us up on the way to this tryst with destiny.

Mr Mohan Guruswamy

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How we fare during these next crucial decades depends a great deal on how we perceive ourselves. This psychological factor is critical to sustained economic growth. Economics thinkers now seem to have come full circle in their reasoning. Classical economics was linked closely with psychology. Adam Smith’s other great work was “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” and dealt with the psychological principles of individual behaviour. Jeremy Bentham contemplated a good deal on the psychological underpinnings of utility. It was the neo-classical economists who distanced themselves from psychology and sought explanations for economic behaviour with what passed off as scientific and rational methods. It is not as if the switch was complete. Many great economists like Vilfredo Pareto, John Maynard Keynes and Joseph Schumpeter continued to base their analysis on psychological explanations. In more recent times this school of economics has been given greater importance and is reflected in the award of Nobel Prizes to behavioural economists like Herbert Simon and Gary Becker.6 Every politician worth his salt knows that national mood and perceptions are decisive in determining national outcomes. Thus defending India physically implicitly implies defending its national mood.

Will China provoke a conflict?

One need not emphasise the interplay of time, technology and perception in our preparations to defend India. India now has no say in the choice of its neighbours. Pakistan came into being in 1947 and China was given Xinjiang by the USSR in 1948 and it occupied Tibet in 1951.7 Pakistan’s animosity and China’s adversarial attitude is a reality that is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Compounding these are troubled conditions within all our neighbours and even within India. Counter insurgency, counter terrorism and combating unconventional warfare are manpower intensive and have potentially debilitating consequences if not acted upon firmly and swiftly. India has been a laboratory for all these forms of warfare and now has well-honed tactics and trained and experienced manpower to deal with them. While we must continue to pay close attention to these threats we must not take our eye off the external challenges that persist in dogging us.

While 1962 will still be the seminal year for Sino-Indian relations, it was in 1967 when Indian and Chinese troops last clashed with each other at Nathula. Nathu La at 14200 feet is an important pass on the Tibet-Sikkim border through which passes the old Gangtok-Yatung-Lhasa Trade Route. Although the Sikkim-Tibet boundary is well defined by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 17 March 1890, the Chinese were not comfortable with Sikkim being an Indian protectorate with the deployment of the Indian Army at that time. During the 1965 War between India and Pakistan, the Chinese gave an ultimatum to India to vacate both Nathu La and Jelep La

passes on the Sikkim-Tibet border. On October 1, 1967 this event repeated itself at Cho La when 7/11 Gurkha Rifles and 10 JAK Rifles were tested by the PLA and similarly not found wanting. The lesson of 1967 has been well learnt by China, just as the lesson of 1962 has been absorbed by India. Not a single shot has been fired across the border since then and even today the Indian Army and the Peoples Liberation Army stand eye-ball to eye-ball, but the atmosphere now is far more relaxed and the two armies frequently have friendly interactions.

In 1971 as Pakistani armies in the east as well as the west were crumbling, Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State met China’s ambassador at the UN, Huang Hua at a CIA safe house in Manhattan. William Burr, a Senior Analyst at the National Security Archives, has gathered the transcripts of the secret talks, which were only recently declassified and against Kissinger’s wishes, in a just-published book. In them Kissinger told Hua: “The President wants you to know that it’s, of course, up to the People’s Republic to decide its own course of action in this situation, but if the People’s Republic were to consider the situation in the Indian sub-continent a threat to its security, and it took measures to protect its security, the US would oppose efforts of others to interfere with the People’s Republic.” The Chinese declined the invitation.

Now we come to the question that bother many Indians. Will China provoke a conflict with India or even vice versa? On the face of it, it does not seem so. Both countries are now well settled on the actual positions held. In Ladakh, China is pretty much close to what it desired pre-1962, which is along the old Ardagh Line, which British India hastily abandoned after being spooked by reports of Soviet Russian presence in Xinjiang. This line, long favoured by Whitehall, was dispensed with and in 1942 British India reverted back to the more forward Johnson Line that encompassed the Aksai Chin as Indian territory. In the eastern sector, India pretty much holds on to the alignment along the McMahon Line. Thrice in the past the Chinese offered to settle this vexatious issue on this as is where is basis, but India baulked because the dynamics of its domestic politics did not allow it, as they still do. In his last conversation on this with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Chairman Deng suggested freezing it as it is and leaving it to history to resolve. Good and sagacious advice, if the dynamics between the two countries did not change.8

the changed circumstances

In the mid 1980’s when the two leaders, Rajiv Gandhi and Deng Xiao Peng met, China and India’s GDP’s were about the same. Since then China has grown to become more than three times as big as India. Its rapid economic ascent has now

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more or less conferred on it the role of the world’s other superpower, the USSR having demised in 1991. China today is also a technology powerhouse and has built a modern military industrial complex, far bigger and superior to India’s. India’s ascent is a more recent story and there are still some decades to go before it can aspire to be once again on par with China.

China’s rise has now seen the manifestation of a visible and more strident nationalism. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently said, it is China’s growing assertiveness that is causing concern.9 We see newer manifestations of this assertiveness in its conduct with Japan over the Senkaku Island chain, now in Japan’s possession; and its claims in the South China Sea, to effectively make it a Chinese backwater. In doing so China has stirred up concerns among all the littoral ASEAN states, and even in more distant India which has had oil assets there since the early 1990’s. The entire international community with interests in the region, with the possible exception of North Korea, has insisted that China’s bullying is unacceptable. Yet China persists with its tone and forward postures. While India has made its position clear in that it considers the South China Seas an international commons and passageway, and that it will not be deterred from oil exploration in Vietnamese waters, there are concerns that still find resonance in New Delhi’s dovecotes.

In the recent years China has built as many as eighteen forward airbases in Xinjiang, Tibet and Yunnan that put most Northern and Eastern Indian cities, industrial centers and military targets within striking range of its new generation fighter-bombers like the JF10 and JF17.10 By contrast most Chinese cities and industrial centers are deep within and not easily reached by Indian aircraft. It is somewhat ironical that Tibet, which India throughout history had seen as a buffer protecting it from China, has become a buffer the other way around. The Chinese military build up has been unprecedented and quite unnecessary also. Yet China has built a huge military infrastructure and of a kind that would be quite redundant against the threat that freedom loving Tibetans may pose to its control over their motherland. This is the kind of power you need to assert your will over a neighbouring country. India has taken note of this, and has sought to suitably counter it with a build up of its own. But build ups also lead to more build-ups and put you on an ascending spiral of mistrust.

India has for decades had good reason to distrust China and see’s its malevolence manifested in its increasing close military relations with Pakistan and its constant supply of nuclear weapons technology and an array of missiles. Every Pakistani missile threatening to deliver nuclear weapons on distant Indian cities is of Chinese origin. India draws the logical conclusions from this.

Conditions for conflict

Conflicts are generally the result of a serious military asymmetry or by misjudging intentions or by local conflicts spiraling out of control or when domestic failures require a diversion of attention or when domestic dynamics make rational discourse impossible. In 1962 we saw the last two at play. After the colossal failure of the Great Leap Forward and after over 30 million died of starvation between 1959 and 1962, Chairman Mao desperately needed a diversion to assert his control of the CPC and the PLA. His great rival, the popular Marshal Peng Duhai was still in Beijing after being purged by Mao. Many speculate that anticipating a putsch against him by the reformers opposed to the personality cult, Mao busied up the PLA in a low cost-high return, limited war. On the Indian side the escalation of attacks on Jawaharlal Nehru by the Opposition, and from within the Congress party, forced the government to adopt a strident note and embark of the ill-fated Forward Policy. This was despite advice by its Northern Army Commander, Lt Gen Daulat Singh, that a policy without the military means to support it would have grave consequences.11

As Indian and Chinese forces jostled for space on the narrow ridges of the eastern Himalayas, India’s declaratory policy and Chinese realpolitik clashed and the die was cast. As wars go, it was a small war. In all three Indian divisions and maybe a few more PLA divisions took part. But the dramatic Indian debacle in the Tawang tract led to a panic that had the nation cowering in fear and its leaders flopping around like headless chicken. When Bomdila fell, Nehru went on AIR and effectively announced the abandonment of Assam by saying his heart went out to the people of the state in their moment of dire peril. Members of his coterie embarked of theatrical ventures like seeking to raise a guerilla army and fight behind the now expected Chinese lines in Assam. But Mao was made of wilier stuff. After administering a quick and telling blow, he ordered the PLA to withdraw back to pre-conflict positions. Fifty years later India still hurts with the rankling memory of those dark days never allowing the wound to quite heal. Neither India nor China is now ruled by imperious Emperors, like Nehru and Mao were. In their place we have timid bureaucrat politicians, vested with just a little more power than the others in the ruling collegiums. Collegiums are cautious to the point of being bland and extremely chary of taking risks.

As for serious asymmetry, it does not occur now. India’s arms build up and preparations make it apparent that a conflict will not be confined to the mountains and valleys of the Himalayas but will swirl into the skies above, on to the Tibetan plateau and the Indian Ocean. In 2012 both countries have sufficient arsenals of nuclear weapons and standoff weapons to deter each other. But above all, both countries have evolved into

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stable political systems, far less naïve and inclined to be far more cautious in their dealings with each other. This leaves a local conflict rapidly spiraling out of control, or another Gavrilo Princip incident where a single shot at the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand, plunged the western world into WW1, highly improbable. After 45 years of not shooting at each other, and not even confronting each other by being at the same contested space at the same time, local commanders have evolved a pattern of ritualistic behaviour and local bonhomie that is very different from the rigid formalities of international politics. Both sides have invested enough to have a vested interest in keeping the peace and tranquility of the frontier.

Higher GdP’s leads to higher military budgets

While this should not be a cause of friction, it actually does cause some. Higher GDP’s means bigger military budgets. With bigger budgets both nations will inevitably sense greater threats. That’s the nature of such things. The Economist succinctly poses the problem for us. “Commensurate with China’s economic growth, the rise of its military outlays too has been quite extra-ordinary, not only causing concern to its immediate neighbours, which include the four of the top five global nations namely USA, India, Japan and Russia.” According to SIPRI, a research institute, Chinese annual defence spending rose from over US$ 30 billion in 2000 to almost US$ 120 billion in 2010. SIPRI usually adds about 50% to the official figure that China gives for its defence spending, because even basic military items such as research and development are kept off budget. Including those items would imply total military spending in 2012, based on the latest announcement from Beijing, would be around US$ 160 billion. America still spends four-and-a-half times as much on defence, but on present trends China’s defence spending could overtake America’s after 2035.

All that money is changing what the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can do. Twenty years ago, China’s military might lay primarily in the enormous numbers of people under arms; their main task was to fight an enemy face-to-face or occupy territory. The PLA is still the largest army in

the world, with an active force of 2.3 million. But China’s real military strength increasingly lies elsewhere. The Pentagon’s planners think China is intent on acquiring what is called in the American jargon A2/AD, or “anti-access/area denial” capabilities. The idea is to use pinpoint ground attack and anti-ship missiles, a growing fleet of modern submarines and cyber and anti-satellite weapons to destroy or disable another nation’s military assets from afar.”12

While the growth of China’s military expenditure so far is worrisome enough, the future trajectory should cause even more concern. It is predicted by SIPRI and others that China’s military expenditures will overtake those of the US within the next few decades.

According to CSIS, in 2011, Beijing spent US$ 25.8 billion on new weapons and related research and development, up from US$ 7.3 billion in 2000. China’s total defense budget grew from US$ 22.5 billion to US$ 89.9 billion between 2000 and 2011, citing official figures from the Beijing government. However SIPRI estimates Beijing’s 2011 defense budget at US$ 142.2 billion. India’s defense spending grew 47.6 percent over the decade, reaching US$ 37 billion in 2011. Japan’s military budget rose from US$ 40 billion to US$ 58.2 billion. Total defence spending in the United States grew by twice as much during 2000 to 2005 (7.2%) as it did between 2005 and 2011 (3.6%). While understandably in Europe, total defence spending declined from 2001 to 2005 at-1.4%, and declined at an even faster rate (-2.5%) between 2006 and 2011.

While China has ratcheted up its show of assertiveness in the recent years, India has been quietly preparing for a parity to prevent war. Often parity does not have to be equality in numbers. The fear of pain disproportionate to the possible gains, and the ability of the smaller in numbers side to do so in itself confer parity. There is equilibrium in Sino-Indian affairs that make recourse to force extremely improbable. Both modern states are inheritors of age-old traditions and the wisdom of the ages. Both now read their semaphores well and know how much of the sword must be unsheathed to send a message. This ability will ensure the swords remain concealed and for the plowshares to be out at work.

Notes1A war in which the weapons used, the nations or territory involved, or the objectives pursued are restricted in some way, in particular one in which the use of nuclear weapons is avoided. - US Military Dictionary2Vietnam was the first “television war.” The medium was in its infancy during the Korean conflict, its audience and technology still too limited to play a major role. The first “living-room war,” as Michael Arlen called it, began in mid-1965, when Lyndon Johnson dispatched large numbers of US combat troops, beginning what is still surely the biggest story television news has ever covered. What was the effect of television on the development and outcome of the war? The conventional wisdom has generally been that for better or for worse it was an anti-war influence. It brought the “horror of war” night after night into people’s living

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About the AuthorMr Mohan Guruswamy is the author of several books on policy issues the latest being ‘Chasing the Dragon: Will India Catch-up with China?’ He is a frequent commentator on matters of current interest in the print and electronic media; and has held senior positions in government and industry. He can be reached at mohanguru@gmail.com

rooms and eventually inspired revulsion and exhaustion. http://www.museum.tv/eotvsection.php?entrycode=vietnamonte3Vietnam was a defeat for American foreign policy and for its political goals of containing Communist expansion and maintaining a free and independent South Vietnam. And it was a defeat for the ill-conceived plans and strategies of the Pentagon’s senior military and civilian leaders. But America’s fighting forces did not fail us. ‘You know, you never beat us on the battlefield,’ I told my North Vietnamese counterpart during negotiations in Hanoi a week before the fall of Saigon. He pondered that remark a moment and then replied, ‘That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.’ In a narrow strategic sense, he was right. Whether they defeated us on the battlefield or not, they did win the war. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (1982). By Col Harry G Summers, Jr Novato, California: Presidio Press. 1982. Xiv, 224 pp. 4“Our baseline projections for India’s potential output growth show that the economy can sustain growth rates of about 8 per cent till 2020, significantly higher than the 5.7 per cent that we projected in our original BRICS paper,” Goldman Sachs said in a new economic paper. “The implications of projections are that India will overtake the G6 economies faster than envisaged in our earlier BRICS research,” it added. The report forecasts that India’s GDP will surpass Italy, France and the UK by the middle of next decade (around 2015). It will then overtake Germany, Japan and finally the US before 2050, to emerge as the second-largest economy after China. From 2007 to 2020, India’s GDP per capita is likely to quadruple, the report said. The higher growth rate would imply huge demand in the country, as Indians will also consume about five times more cars and three times more crude oil. Ten things for India to achieve its 2050 – Global Economics Paper No 169, www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/ten-things-doc.pdf 5YoY growth rate: 8.0%: GDP in 2050: US $86 trillion (#1 in the world). India will be the largest economy in the world by 2050, but it has to improve its overall infrastructure and extend education to lower castes as well as females in rural areas. Projections provided by Citi. GDP in 2050 (PPP) was given by Citi or estimated using growth rate. http://www.businessinsider.com/fastest-growing-economies-2011-2?op=1#ixzz2KVf43NKp6Economics traditionally conceptualises a world populated by calculating, unemotional maximisers that have been dubbed Homo economicus. The standard economic framework ignores or rules out virtually all the behaviour studied by cognitive and social psychologists. This “unbehavioural” economic agent was once defended on numerous grounds: some claimed that the model was “right”; most others simply argued that the standard model was easier to formalise and practically more relevant. Behavioural economics blossomed from the realisation that neither point of view was correct. The standard economic model of human behaviour includes three unrealistic traits—unbounded rationality, unbounded willpower, and unbounded selfishness—all of which behavioural economics modifies. -The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Behavioural Economics by Richard H Thaler and Sendhil Mullainathan7India China Relations: The Border Issue And Beyond by Mohan Guruswamy and Zorawar Daulet Singh Viva Books, New Delhi; ISBN: 81309119578“Defining moments” by N Ram in The Frontline, September 12-25, 1998. http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1519/15190100.htm9“India has taken note of assertiveness by China: PM.” The Indian Express, 24 Nov ‘09; http://www.indianexpress.com/comments/India-has-taken-note-of-assertiveness-by-China-PM/545558/310Will India and China fight a war again? | Hardnews; Mohan Guruswamy; www.hardnewsmedia.com/2012/10/5666?page=211“India China Relations: The Border Issue and Beyond” by Mohan Guruswamy and Zorawar Daulet Singh: New Delhi, Viva Books Pvt Ltd., 2009: Pages: viii + 217; Price: Rs. 79512China’s military rise; The Dragon’s new teeth; A rare look inside the world’s biggest military expansion; April 7th 2012; http://www.economist.com/node/21552193

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reSoLUtIoN of coNfLIctSMaj Gen M Ramesh Babu, SM**

Introduction

The conflicts of yore were fought in a battle field, with soldiers to wage the war for the purpose they believed in with the weapons provided for by the state or in

possession of those soldiers. This classic understanding of war had its dynamics thrown in of ambiguity, uncertainty,

causing stark fear and anxiety within the realms of fog of war. However conflicts of 21st century have encompassed other realms of social, cognitive and information domains apart from the physical domain .

Kautilya in his political treatise “Arthsashtra” around 300 BC talks of state craft , types of enemies to the nation state and methods of handling them to reduce conflict and threat to nation state by using the four upays or approaches to realise the aim or objectives as have existed since the period of the epics, sama- dana- bheda- danda :conciliation, gifts, rupture and force. The upayas have a wider application, being useful in securing the submission of anyone in conflict1. While Dan Smith expert on conflicts and resolution commented that civil conflict “resembles a slow torture . . . they simply continue. More than half the wars of the 1990s lasted more than five years, two-fifths lasted more than ten years and a quarter more than twenty.”2

In South East Asia many of the armed rebellions have gone on for many years, for e.g the Muslim separatist movements in Southern Thailand, Southern Philippines, and Aceh. The Mindanao civil war involving Muslim separatists and the Philippine armed forces, a conflict that broke out in the early 1970s resulted in 100,000 casualties and 500,000 refugees. The Karen and other ethnic rebellions in Myanmar started

at the end of World War II and went on for more than 50 years. The Rwanda conflict was savage, with the loss of life totaling 500,000. Nearly 25% of insurgencies/conflicts in the

“Fight the enemy’s strategy, not his forces. At this stage, if things are proceeding well, the insurgents will go over to the offensive. Yes, the offensive, because you have created a situation so dangerous to the insurgents (by threatening to displace them from the environment) that they have

to attack you and the population to get back into the game.”– Sun Tzu

Casualties in Intl Armed Conflicts

20%

WW I WW II

80%

20%

MilCiv

50%50% MilCivCiv Civ

PRESENT DAY CONFLICTS

15%

PRESENT DAY CONFLICTS

85%

MilCiv

S i l

Expanded Conflict Space

Battlefield Soldiers

Social

Ambiguity

PhysicalCognitiveConstant factors of

Anxiety Uncertainty

factors of warfare

Weapons PurposeStark Fear Fog

Information

T i

Border disputeNation State Insurgency

Terrorism

SUB REGIONALISM

INTERNAL (INTERNAL ABETMENT)

THREATS

( )

EXTERNAL(EXTERNAL ABETMENT)

Poverty

THREATS

EXTERNAL, WITH INTERNAL ABETMENT

INTERNAL, WITH EXTERNAL ABETMENT

PopulationPIRACY

DEMOGRAPHY

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past century overthrew the existing political or social order; another 16%, while not gaining all their objectives, forced settlements that addressed at least some of the underlying issues. However the conflicts from 19th to 21st century had deadly consequences for both military and civilian casualties with increased burden on the unarmed men and women/children in 21st century.

Causes of conflict

The persistence of various causes which lead to societal issues or gaps are exploited by political leaders to further the cause of ones grievance. The absence of measures over sustained period to allay these fears of the suppressed have tumultuous affect on the cycle of violence leading to conflicts. Some of the reasons could be :-

• Separatist movements due to ethnic, tribal and cultural differences as seen in Eritrea, East Timor, South Sudan, former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Nagaland, Mizoram, Baluchistan.

• Religious fundamentalism due to fear of loss of identity viz Punjab, J&K, Sinkiang, Tibet.

• Poor governance leading to corruption, economic deprivation and discrimination viz Cuba, Haiti, Bolivia, Venezuela, Brazil and Latin American countries.

• Unresolved border/sectarian/ethnic disputes, maritime disputes, resource competition, freedom of navigation, threat of extremism/terrorism, transnational terrorist links, insurgent threat and long-term stability challenges.

ootW (operations other than War)

The warfare seen now is what is occurring in “post conflict” Iraq, Afghanistan and in recent years in Syria. Such conflicts are mostly non-international in character where non State actors employ asymmetric means against State military forces and supporting forces. The environment in which this warfare is undertaken is one of mixed peace and war which may draw the world powers for and against ISIS and others.

The deployment of armed forces in such conflicts is difficult and is forced upon to stabilise the situation. Such conflicts are described as, OOTW or Military OOTW and involve peacekeeping and peace enforcement in low intensity conflicts.

These conflicts do not take place on the field of battle, but in a complex civilian environment, nor are they a primarily military contest but a war of ideas, the battle for perception, and the key battleground is in the mind of the population which is the COG (centre of gravity), and the minds of regional and world opinion. Counterinsurgency expert David Galula’s estimation of effort in battling an insurgency as “twenty percent military, eighty percent political is a formula that reflects the truth.”3 This perspective is highlighted by counter insurgent specialist David Kilcullen when describing the operational modus operandi of Al Qaida in Iraq as one that relies upon provocation, intimidation, protraction and exhaustion, and drawing the majority of its strength from the “backlash engendered by counter insurgent over reaction rather than genuine popular support.”4

Conflicts of 19th and 20th Century

The operations conducted by the British in the Boer war and the French in Algeria consisted of series of actions, counteractions, and reactions which affected the population and thus their legitimacy to rule as no Operations are conducted in a vacuum. Col C E Callwell who fought in Boer war in 1878 brought out a classic book “Small Wars” which talked of adopting to the situation, flexibility, initiative by leaders and planners to run a successful campaign instead of set book conventional operations which British followed in successful campaigns earlier in India.5 Lenin opted for a strategy based on careful cultivation of cadre of revolutionaries and subversion of the existing political and social power structure

Operations Other Than War

SUB CONVENTIONAL OPSLOW INTENSITY CONFLICT SUB CONVENTIONAL OPSLOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

NONCOMBATOPS

TERRORISMPROXY WARGUERILLA WAR

INSURGENCY

MILITANCY

Conflicts in the 19th and 20th CenturiesConflicts in the 19 and 20 Centuries

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before successful insurgency. This was built around urban workers with strategy of quickly overthrowing the ruling elite after exhaustive political preparations to undermine it without long wars of attrition. Mao followed three phased approach from political order, mobile warfare to conventional war after exhausting the enemy by political, social and military actions. Ho Chi Minh modified Mao’s approach by using terrorism and combining insurgent and conventional operations into a political-military strategy anchored on the support of the rural population and integrated military units able to move between guerrilla and conventional warfare. Castro and Che Guevara, did not opt for political and social mobilisation before conducting military operations but emphasised on violence as a precursor to popular support, inciting an uprising once the weaknesses of the government became apparent. In West Asia and first in Algeria in the 1950s and later in Palestine a similar strategic approach emerged but one that sought to influence world opinion in hope of gaining international support and thus force the occupying forces to withdraw. In all these conflicts the support of the common populace was with the insurgent due to the nature of conflict and how it was packaged to look attractive and correct. During each of these conflicts various methods were used to control the conflict by segregation, relocation, population control and use of overwhelming force despite heavy costs to the population and armed forces.

Conflicts of 21st century

The conflicts of modern era are likely to be fought for resources, rights, race and religion, perceived injustice, failed states with non state actors leading with violent and bellicose ideology. Wars were conceived in modern era as large scale, inter-state conflicts waged between massed professional

armies but the present era perceives conflict as “war among the people” with technological advantage, massive firepower

or manoeuvre counting for little. These conflicts can be as deadly and as strategically significant as conventional warfare and hence small-scale intra-State conflicts are increasingly becoming the norm. The conflict zones of 21st century range from Afghanistan to Nigeria and Mali to West Asia with ISIS in deadly conflict with friends and foes or vice versa with conflicting and congruent line between the two. The bringing down of Russian aircraft by Turkey/NATO and rebels operating in Syria brings to focus the deadly game of mass scale deaths and destruction.

operational environment

The rise of China and its behaviour as a responsible power will dictate managing of conflicts in the near future. The environment of 21st century has wide spectrum of potential threats, challenges and thus we need to have large number of contingencies to address the unknown and unexpected challenges. With enduring fault lines in Middle East and Africa, central Asia will remain a source of threats and challenges along with North Korea, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Transnational terrorists, insurgents, and criminal organisations with drug and mafia wealth will remain common

Ongoing Conflicts

Essential Elements of the Complete Environment

• Multitude of independent Actors.• Threat Malicious and Natural Friendly Actors

CharacteristicsCharacteristics

• Threat Malicious and Natural Friendly Actors.• Technology Enables Effective action – Violent

and Nonviolent – and Rapid Adaption.• Lack of Effective Governance of Rule of Law.

EndsEnds• Wealth• Resources• Political authority

• Lethal• Well Armed• Technology Proliferates

to ManyThreatsThreatsPolitical authority• Influence• Sovereignty• Identity• Legitimacy

to Many• Non-linear Relationship• Between Economic and

Military PowerPersistentPersistent

ThreatsThreats• Terrorist • Paramilitary • State Action

• Criminal • Militias • Irregular• Legitimacy

WaysWays• Competition• Cooperation

fl

PersistentPersistent• Victory ill defined• Blurred Transitions(Conflict to post –conflict)

U d F i i

Malicious ActorsMalicious Actors

• Radical ideologies • Criminals

• Opportunists • Competitors• ConflictMeansMeans

• Attack the ‘Will’• Complexity-Chaotic

• Unexpected FrictionAsymmetricAsymmetric

• Deny ISR and Strike options

• Opportunists • Competitors

“Naturalists” and Friends“Naturalists” and Friends• Media • Population• NGOs

Conditions-Anti-Access• Asymmetry

• Exploit Cyber• Unforeseen effects

from Actions

• NGOs • Partners

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features of the strategic and operational environment. Many crises will be ambiguous threats and may only be clear after situation has evolved and deteriorated and Armed Forces must be prepared to operate in a full range of complex environments. Terrorists retain the objective of spectacular and destabilising attacks while confrontational approach of rogue nations threaten regional stability. The spill over of the events in Syria and ISIS problem to other regions is a cause for alarm. A wide spectrum of shared threats and challenges exist today with West Asia and Afghanistan at the centre of an unstable region. In 2005 the World Bank had identified 30 ‘low-income countries under stress’ or fragile states, including Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Burma, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikstan, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe which are prone to conflicts and collapse.

While the conflicts of 19th and 20th century could be handled with Clauswitzian counter insurgency model of Napolean times as media and international players were restricted, however operations of 21st century need a coherent formulation and execution of policy to manage the external environment. The Diamond model or Mystic diamond developed by Dr Gordon Mc Cormik of Naval post graduate school has a fourth leg of international actors forming the external environment which is crucial for the successful handling of conflicts across the globe.

The Systems operating in Conflict Zone

Todays conflicts use violence as advocated by Carlos and Shining path of Chile to gain world attention and mobilise population and exploit deep seated issues and the complex interplay between them. Conflicts are redressed by addressing underlying causes for the conflicts. The theatre of operations has both internal and external inputs which has affect across

the theatre of operations. while the Government with its security apparatus including armed forces has to orchestrate its operations against the aggrieved and conflicting groups and media, both national and international, to address the three pillars of counter insurgency successfully namely security, political and economy to bring normalcy. The ability of the government to bring normalcy will dictate the effect outside the theatre of operations including refugees, propaganda and trained fighters who pour out of the conflict zone as seen in Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, Yemen and so on.

Methods of Resolution of Conflicts

• Resolution of conflict by gun or physical defeat of insurgents is occasionally successful in ending violence but requires overwhelming force and employment of extreme measures against insurgents and population leading to human right violations but the cause leading to conflict may still not have been addressed as shown in Sri Lanka recently despite the decimation of LTTE. The ultimate strategy of counter insurgency is lasting stability but not one which is imposed and maintained by

The Conflict Ecosystem

Theater ofOperations

Open / PorousSystem boundaries

Supporting

Foreign Recruits PropagandaInternational

Media

Supportingagencies

Equipment, Weapons & ammo

/

NGOs

InternationalOrgani ations

Localmedia

Ethnic militia

LocalPolice

TerroristCells

Funds

Trained / radicalizedfightersSmugglers Businesses

Organizations

RefugeesInsurgentGroup A

InsurgentGroup B Frontier

Refugees / DPsSympathy &support

Ethnic group

Tribe Clan

Mafia

Tribal

Group A Group Binfiltrators

Tribe fighters

Conflict Ecosystem in Sri Lanka

Theater ofOperations

Sri LankanGovt

Sri Lankan SF IPKF

Open / PorousSystem boundaries

International agencies& MediaSinhala

IPKFLTTE and othertrained militants

Propaganda against S i L k G t & I di

Smugglers

Localmedia

Community

Tamil Community

Equipment & Weaponsfrom Abroad

Sri Lankan Govt & India

T il P liti l

LTTE & otherMilitant Groups

Businesses

F d f T il

Trained / radicalizedFighters

Buddhist Tamil and

Tamil PoliticalParties

Funds from Tamil Community and non state actors

for the militants Refugees/ DPs withinSri Lanka & in IndiaBuddhist, Tamil and

Muslim Religious GroupsInternational & local Sympathy &

Support to the cause

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force or repression. The Sri Lankan conflict is a legacy of unresolved aspirations of Tamils in Sri Lanka which may raise its ugly head again unless political leaders and majority community shows the sagacity to address the aspirations of Tamils.

• Resolution of conflict by redrawing boundaries has been a recurring phenomenon across the globe be it in former Yugoslavia, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Sudan and in war of Liberation of Bangladesh in 1971. Despite the turbulence during and post bifurcation the aspirations of majority have been addressed.

• Resolution of conflict by accommodation has been the endeavour of every mediator, however it has to be to the satisfaction of all parties without one claiming victory and jubiliation at the cost of the other party. This tries to resolve conflict in all its dimensions with aim to establish lasting stability in a state or region by reducing violence and subversion to levels manageable by local security agencies, build political, economic and social institutions to deal with structural problems while transforming hatred, mistrust and prejudices that started the conflict. Case of Mizoram is a classic example of successful

resolution of conflict by bringing peace to the region and democratic elections to choose their own leaders. Even in Punjab and Northern Ireland the conflict has been resolved by accommodation, bringing militant groups overground and in democratic process.

Principles of Conflict Transformation

To resolve conflicts one must be prepared for long haul and patience while following some of the fundamental rules of engaging all the parties to the conflict. One needs to understand that conflict is not an isolated event that can be resolved or managed, but is an integral part of society’s on-going evolution and development. Conflict transformation goes beyond merely seeking to contain and manage conflict, instead seeking to transform the root causes themselves. It is a long-term, gradual and complex process, requiring sustained engagement and interaction. Conflict transformation is always a non-violent process, which is fundamentally opposed to violent expressions of conflict. For conflict transformation to occur, tensions between parties to the conflict must be overcome. It stresses on the human dimension reminding opposing parties of the compatible nature of their needs, instead of emphasising their opposing interests while it shuns processes where unilateral decisions and action, particularly those representing a victory for any one are highlighted. It involves a third impartial party, in order to help alter the opposing parties cognitive and emotional views on each other.

Conflict Resolution in India

The Indian Army’s counterinsurgency practice in Jammu and Kashmir included development of road opening parties, use of a counterinsurgency grid system, covert apprehension technique, use of ikhwans or captured militants in counterinsurgency and creation of a special counterinsurgency force, the Rashtriya Rifles. The culmination of several years

•3 million Killed, Ethnic cleansing•7 Million Refugees fled to India•East Pakistan Severed from•East Pakistan Severed from West Pakistan•Bangladesh Created in Dec 1971

• Two Decades of Insurgency

• Mizoram Accord was signed between MNF & Govt of India in 1986Govt of India in 1986

• Accord returned Peace to the states

• MNF Leader Laldengabecame Mizoram State’s first CM

• Govt reached out to the Insurgent gp & includedInsurgent gp & included them in the democratic process

» Commenced in Jul 1983 » For over 25 years caused significant hardships

for the population, environment and the economy of the country, with an estimated 80,000-100,000 people killed

» LTTE finally militarily defeated on 17 May 2009. » Sri Lankan government claimed Sri Lanka as the

first country in the modern world to eradicate terrorism on its own soil(through Military means)

» Government appointed ‘Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission(LLRC)’

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of experience was visible in the Indian Army Doctrine and the Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations which limits the use of force in non-conventional operations, establishes a relationship between military and civil, and seeks to guide military priorities in resource allocation, equipment acquisitions and training activities. Operations Sadhbhavana in J&K and Samaritan in North-East are significant steps in the evolution of the Indian Army’s counterinsurgency practices. Operation Sadhbhavana is indicative of organisational innovation and operational learning over time. The Rashtriya Rifles realised the importance of the innovation and therefore learnt how to blend Sadhbhavana with counter insurgent operations. The doctrine of sub-conventional warfare of the Army gives a central place to WHAM through civic action which also included encouraging tourism, industry and cultural activities. It aimed at achieving two goals:

• To wrest the initiative from the terrorists.

• To reintegrate the population to the national mainstream.

Indian approach to militancy

The experience of Indian Army since 1950s in North-East has created a wealth of knowledge, thus enabling modification of procedures and policies for subsequent conflict situations in J&K, Assam, Punjab and Sri Lanka.6 The policy of Government of India in conflict resolution revolved around the following basic principles:-

• Demands for secession or independence from the Union are put down firmly and not accepted. India is willing to wear down the insurgents until this demand is dropped or modified. Need to firmly resist any attempt to break up the Union.

• Importance of military - police cooperation and relentless counter insurgency operations to bring down the level of violence and training of Police and CAPF to take on responsibility and reduce the foot prints of Army.

• Need for anti-terrorism legislation and a transparent fearless judiciary to enforce law.

• Need for pre-emptive and speedy action before the situation deteriorated to unacceptable levels. Importance of accurate, actionable intelligence and well trained specialised forces like Rashtriya Rifles.

• Respect for religious sentiments of local population, preparing them psychologically and taking pre-emptive action for containing expected fallout in case of any action at the religious places.

• Alleviating grievances through political accommodation without leading to more demands and challenges especially when politicians and religiously motivated insurgent groups help anti national cause.

• Indian approach has been a mix of political accommodation, economic development and the use of force. India is willing to talk to separatist groups and its neighbours even though they support cross border terrorism and insurgency.

• While India is willing to create new states within the Union to accommodate ethno-nationalist aspirations and tribal boundaries, it is not willing to create additional states based solely on any one religion.

• India has been very particular not to use indiscriminate force, aerial bombardment and heavy firepower despite its conventional superiority in the region. Despite proof of external support, India has conducted its operations within its own borders.

• Operations in Kashmir have been very particular to minimise the impact on India’s 170 million moderate Muslims.

• India’s approach follows the strategy of ‘an iron fist in a velvet glove,’ adopting an aggressive military approach towards hard-core insurgents and a humane face towards the local population. India’s operations approach has been aimed at using the security forces to create conditions for a political solution to restore normalcy in the insurgency affected area.

• Human rights and weaning the population away from supporting the insurgents is the major plank of India’s Counter Insurgency operations. To achieve this a multi-dimension approach to include, people-centric civic action programs, economic development, perception management programs, cultivating a responsible media, training of troops for operations, force modernisation, good governance, the rule of law, accountability and transparency, diplomatic and international cooperation and support, and a functioning corruption free democracy has been adopted.

• India has the capability to stay the course and fight an insurgency in a protracted low intensity conflict to wear down the insurgencies and its supporters however, it prefers to resolve the legitimate grievances and welcome its population into the democratic process as quickly as possible.

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• In Kashmir, the Indian approach has been based on three major thrust lines to wean away Kashmiri support to the insurgency and restore normalcy; first, cut off the insurgents from their support base in Pakistan and destroy them within India to provide security to the state, improve the socio-economic structure of the state by increasing development projects, ensuring good governance, and improving the daily life of the people ravaged by decades of insurgency and terrorism, psychological initiatives to win the hearts and minds of the people and initiate a genuine dialogue with all parties to the conflict, restore India’s credibility within Kashmir and arrive at a just resolution within the Union.

Lessons learnt from conflicts and insurgencies7

• Most of the insurgencies are a legacy of exploitation and colonial rule along with super power rivalries in the great game, most visible in Syrian crisis and ISIS.

• There is no pure military solution, a political problem needs a political solution, even in Sri Lanka, the Tamil population grievances will need to be addressed politically.

• Cannot stop the violence without talking to the armed insurgent, the example of Mizo Insurgency, Naga insurgency, IRA, Nepal. The insurgents are unlikely to surrender. Nepal Maoists were accommodated but did not surrender. IRA refused to hand over weapons amounting to surrender.

• Insurgents need a narrative to explain to their support base that the struggle was worth it.

• Conditions need to be created for talks. Both sides need to reach a point where they understand that they cannot win militarily. Peace is a process and not an event, once it is up and running it must not be allowed to stall.

• Need for political leadership on both sides as in the Mizo Accord, with Laldenga providing leadership to militants and Brig Sailo from the government.

• Lasting settlement is only possible if both sides can break through the political zero-sum game. This has been exemplified by the simmering Naga insurgency despite the ceasefire.

• Third parties and use of religious heads and teachers is an option which be employed for successful conflict termination.

conclusion

21st century is one of ongoing conflicts due to deprivation, discrimination, suppression of rights, race and religion but with increasing hostility between the Islamic and Western worlds in the last quarter of the Twentieth and the first decade of the Twenty-first century with conflicts across the globe despite rapid development in technology and inter twined economies. The long list of incidents with intensifying tension between the Muslim and Western worlds over the past few years and the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan, Syria, the savagery in Rwanda and the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians are examples of a global state of affairs whose ramifications extend to even the very local and regional levels. One of the most important contributions made by the Western world to the global culture is the concept of modernity, itself which is said to be in conflict with other regions and religions. There is a need to educate the masses to understand this conflict.

Media plays an important role during conflicts and one of the truly corrosive effects of sensationalist media with profits as aim does serious harm to the cause of world peace by stoking the flames of hatred, fear, and bigotry in the minds of ordinary people leading at times to conflicts. There is a need to ensure dignity of individuals with a sense of fair play and order to overcome suspicion and hatred to resolve conflicts for a better world. The employment of security forces and methods to bring in normalcy have to be in consonance with human rights and within the ambit effective legal system.

Notes1The Arthashastra, Kautilya, Penguin, Oct 20002Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict, Dan Smith, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management - Edited version Aug 2004 http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2576/pdf/smith_handbook.pdf3Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, David Galula, 19644The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, David Kilcullen, Oxford University Press; Reprint edition (15 April 2011)5Small Wars Their Principles and Practice, Colonel C E Callwell, Book Jungle; March 20096The Indian Approach to Counterinsurgency Operations,Colonel Behram A Sahukar7‘Restoring normalcy’: The evolution of the Indian Army’s Counterinsurgency Doctrine, Rajesh Rajgopalan, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Volume 11, Issue 1, 2000

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About the Author

Maj Gen M Ramesh Babu, SM** was commissioned into Infantry in 1978. An alumnus of NDA he is a graduate of TSOC, LDMC and NDC courses. He has had a varied exposure in challenging terrain and has tenanted a number of critical staff, instructional and operational appointments including instructor at NDA, Kharakwasala, Infantry School, Belgaum and Col Q (Ops) and Brig Q of Mountain Corps in HAA. He commanded his Battalion in highly active CI grid in J&K, Brigade in Southern Command and was GOC CIF Delta in J&K before his present appointment as Dean, Faculty of Studies, Army War College.

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APProAcH to forMULAtIoN of coMPreHeNSIVe MILItArY doctrINe ANd MILItArY StrAteGY for tHe INdIAN ArMed

forceS for fUtUre coNfLIctS Brig RC Srikanth

Henry Kissinger once stated that the purpose of a doctrine was to translate power into policy.1 Doctrine2

is widely understood as a philosophical avowal, appraising the ‘best practices’ from the conduct/lessons of ‘yester’ conflicts/campaign with the ‘unknown’ and ‘amorphous’ content of the anticipated future. It may also be elucidated as a conceptual document that ‘shows the need’ but ‘not the path’, that indicates the ‘challenges’ but ‘not the means to overcome’, that ‘identifies the priorities’ but ‘not how to go about chasing them’. Doctrine encapsulates the generalised suggestion of ‘how a military perceives’ it needs to combat current and future military challenges. Because of its rather ‘open ended’ construct, it remains relevant at all levels-tactical, operational and strategic, is open to intelligent interpretation and needs regular revisits to keep it updated/relevant.

Strategy on the contrary details the more specific application of resources/capabilities to achieve a set of objective(s). It is the integration of ‘Means’ - ‘Ways’ - ‘Ends’. While ‘Ends’ are generally very well defined, the art of ‘generalship’ lies in identifying the optimum mix of ‘Means’ and ‘Ways’ to realize the objectives. Strategy formulation tends to be largely a product of ‘individual, ‘organisational’ ‘societal’ and ‘cultural biases/influences. The doctrine tends to guide the application of military power bound in a strategic framework.

The predictability of outcomes has a significant bearing on generation of strategy alternatives, thus risk assessment and risk management forms an intrinsic part of evolving a

strategic framework. Additionally, strategy imagines a coherent application of resources (means) along multiples lines of operations (ways)-invoking the necessity of coordination, synergy, coherence and ‘single mindedness’ in applying capabilities. The most challenging aspect of translating strategy from its ‘theoretical conception’ to its ‘successful application’ is the unity amongst all components of national power. The unity amongst various branches/power centres in the government as well as armed forces has always been less than desired under most circumstances, and even more so while approaching a conflict/crisis situation. Thus any strategic concoction evolved at any level stands out as a minimal compromise between various branches at the grand strategic level. At the military strategic level a similar image replicates itself owing largely to the dogmatic incoherence amongst various services and branches of the armed forces.

Geo-Strategic framework and doctrine formulation The domains of conflict and its manifestations have changed decisively in the last two decades. From being largely an inter-state phenomenon, the conflicts have acquired intra state and transnational tinge with or without conventional state support. Yemen, Syria, Nigeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan etc amplify the emphasising role of actors that may be or are beyond the realm of conventional parties to the conflict. The ability of these organisations to morph seamlessly from unconventional to sub-conventional and from sub-conventional to conventional domains, conduct operations ceaselessly over prolonged durations, invoke the support of multiple ethnicities from across the globe, obtain the best weapons, undertake offset strikes to continually modulate the proportions of battle space, deny a visible strategic centre of gravity to its adversaries, exploit the securities offered by democratic societies and optimise the vulnerabilities of weak states/nations have enabled these Non-states/quasi state actors to keep the international order to ransom. In the Indian context their impact on the societal make-up and inter-religious harmony is deliriously profound. The Non-state actors have added to the escalating internal stress in Indian societies that gets exacerbated with the shrill/sensationalised media exposure afforded to these entities.

International organisations and pressure groups in economic, religious, political, social and/or cultural arena have added to the complexity of ever evolving conflict

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matrix in the grand strategic sense. They have the muscle and stamina to prevail over minor economies, alter the dynamics of medium economies and impact the confidence in larger economies. The pan-global religious/social organisations and their funding architecture have also tended to groom strong pressure groups within societies with less than noble motives. Besides being camouflaged as benign philanthropic bodies these organisations attempt to generate long term dependencies amongst many communities altering their view points/ideas at the cost of national character/identity.

the perception of total peace within states in the regional context has largely eroded, with governance focusing on ensuring minimal levels of violence and strife in the society. The internal dissonance on various issues has magnified and new vistas of conflict have emerged in addition to the existing ones. The divergence is not only exaggerated in traditional areas like regionalism, religious intolerance, casteism or ethnicity but is rapidly expanding to new zones like militant middle class, demand for better governance, demand for rights etc. The concept of peace has thus been replaced with a tolerable level of violence which does not adversely affect the societal or economic make of the nations. In the Indian perspective concomitant to the simmering border disagreements with Pakistan and China, the exaggerated cleavages in the internal dynamics aggregate the fissiparous tendencies impacting the ‘Unity in Diversity’ concept. This cocktail of external and internal threats alters the security dynamics in Indian context seeking greater attribution towards evolving security architecture for the country that develops a suitable balance between the need for exalted impetus towards sustaining internal peace while ensuring territorial sovereignty of the nation.

The inter-regional rivalries between major nations in the Indian neighbourhood-namely Pakistan and China contribute to general sense of unease for India. The ever increasing economic-strategic commonality between China and Pakistan and the centripetal influences that China is exercising over the states in the South Asian, Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean Littoral adds to the challenges of formulating an Indian Strategic outlook. The enunciation of Chinese supremacy over ‘South and East China Sea’, creating presence and influence in the Indian Ocean, developing terrestrial economic/energy and strategic corridors across the Eurasian landmass and getting a decisive say in all regional forums less SAARC-China has largely been able to hedge its bets, influences and alternatives. In addition, it has been able to circumscribe Indian role in the region by outbidding it economically and strategically despite Indian steadfast assertion to the contrary. This jostling of strategic space would continue and will force Indian strategic choices.

exploitation of ‘Ideas as Weapons’ and ‘Media as a force Projection instruments’ has gained disproportionate pre-eminence due to their unique appeal and pan-global reach. It is not the quality of life that the state affords its citizens that matters now rather it is the dwindling identification of populace with the ‘Idea of Nation’ that stands out. This ‘Idea’ now is tending to extend well beyond the national territorial boundaries and pan-global religious/ideological affinities have evolved into a unique glue to attract disparate nationalities against common enemies. This trend appears to pre-dominate the geo-strategic security calculus at the international, regional, national and sub-national levels. The states with multi-ethnic, multi-religious societies like India are particularly susceptible to these influences. The characterisation of ‘Enemy’ in this security scenario has been very imaginatively constructed and is decisively digital in its depiction. The ‘Idea’ is thus emerging as a critical and cogent threat to national sovereignty from within as far as India is concerned and a viable counter-narrative to contest it in ‘perceptual’ domain does not seem to be gaining requisite traction in the Indian context.

‘finlandization’ (economic, social, cultural and military)3 has been a preferred choice of stronger nations to modulate their immediate strategic space and squeeze out competition. The unilateral action of Russia in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, the dominant Chinese assertion in East and South China Sea, the American hegemony in Caribbean and Middle East and the perceived Indian domination of the Arabian and Bay of Bengal Seas are all indicative of this trend/aspiration. The smaller nations having scarce military and economic resources, lack the will and the ability to contest these claims and are increasingly relying on security guarantees from bigger nations to prop them up. The encroachment of a ‘major power’ into the backyard of status quo power, generates potentials for conflict that not only embroils the contesting nations and their proxies into skirmishes but also regresses the region in to instability.

The ‘Means of War’4 have metamorphosed into unimaginable weapons, many of them still in the realm of unthinkable - from unmanned robots to cyber weapons, space to environmental weapons, from weapons with global reach to economic decapitation of nations etc. The availability of means to impose one’s will on nations have become multifarious and apparently benign.5 These means enable the undeclared war to be conducted by nations in the Non Contact Domain or Non Contact War.6 The Non-Contact capabilities are duly complimented by even more lethal conventional capabilities. Another critical variation to conventional understanding of means of war has been the receding influence of Nuclear Weapons to sustain global order, however, its impact on regional conflicts remains exaggerated especially in the India-Pakistan equation and less so in India-China construct.

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Strategic thinking and its Impact on Military doctrine Politico-Military Intent The application of force draws its strength from the political/strategic thought. As our strategic, military, economic and diasporic interests expand around the globe, our vulnerabilities also escalate. The political intent to tackle these threats must form the first stepping stone for doctrine formulation. Various commentators have debated on whether a clear political statement exists guiding the current Indian Armed Forces doctrine or whether it is a standalone document lacking political backing.7 While the opinions are divided, any doctrine that guides the form and content of armed forces needs to have political concurrence for it to retain its currency as a foremost article mandating planning, force organisation, force creation, force generation, inter-services linkages and its synergised application. Political clarity/unanimity in laying down long term strategic positions has not been ardently articulated in the Indian context leading to its cascading atavistic impact on doctrine and strategy evolution.

Where to Fight and Where to Contain?8

Deciding the arena of contest, cooperation and/or fighting is pivotal to doctrine formulation. The components of national power are many (apparent and amorphous); however, their exploitation in our case is hesitant as we ourselves are not very clear about their predictive impact on conflict outcomes. In essence we lack the requisite wherewithal to impose our will on our adversaries and friends to the extent desired.9

Additionally, we also seem to vacillate on our stand on many strategic issues where our interest in normal course would not be negotiable. Having fought multiple territorial wars and being in the midst of ‘Proxy Wars’, there is a need to redefine where and how the armed forces are to be employed and to what end. An obsessive desire to maintain the sanctity of international borders, LC and LAC (till its final resolution) has led us to evolve a resource dense approach that is attritionist in its outlook and does not afford requisite deterrence against internal and/or external threats. Further, the distinction between internal and external security is blurring with external influences impacting internal peace dynamics and internal disturbances impacting border management, this facet also needs to be factored in evolution of coherent archetype for tackling hybrid threats.

Structures and Processes The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) with National Security Advisor (NSA) are the apex level of all security level decision making in the nation. The cohesion, however, ends here; from here on the processes take on. These processes are biased towards ‘coordination and cooperation’ centric rather than ‘Task Force Based’. The processes also tend to be single ministry or single

service predominant without a mandated apex structure to deconflict domain issues. The CCS additionally tends to be a reactive body responding to incidents and actions rather than delegating such activities to empowered structures that evolve options for predictive and preventive environment management approaches. The predictive component of threat appreciation is less apparent and axiomatically our intelligence capacities are too fragmented to enable viable scenario generation and response formulation.

force Structuring Conceptually a threat in today’s environment knows no boundaries, but our force structures are highly compartmentalised, lack 360 degree orientations, are bound by dated constitutional references/Rules of Business and organised to defeat threats whose dimensions are largely visible and predictable. Therefore, when faced with opaque, malignant but less obvious perils that generate effects across multiple firmaments, the Armed Forces tend to fall short in evolving cogent responses. This gets further aggravated by the fact that each ‘Contact Capability’ of nation has a niche approach to tackling threat without organic inter-operability. Armed Forces themselves have different concepts on forces structures-while Navy and Air Force have a ‘Capability based Approach’ to force structuring, Army has a threat based approach. The dichotomy in the approaches to Force constitution creates dissonance at the military strategic levels that may translate in to one service creating effects for facilitating success of other sometimes but these capabilities are never totally fused.

Synergy between Armed forces, Para Military forces and central Police forces The distinct differentiation in roles and tasks assigned to each type of force has ensured that there is little or no overlap in conceptual, organisational and capability quotient of these forces to work together in Peace, NWNP and conflict environment. With threat boundaries dissolving from ‘external to internal’ domain, it should become increasingly apparent to planners that overlap between these forces would be a necessity and a critical imperative to generate decisive effects on the identifiable and non-identifiable foes. The events of 26/11 clearly indicate that internal policing infrastructures are grossly inadequate to handle precise terror threats and similarly the incorporation of Indian Navy as the principal coordinator for maritime surveillance is a pointer towards the necessity of overcoming the dogmatic barriers between various armed organs of the state. Thus there needs to be a doctrinal bridge between all armed components of the state to fuse together to supplement and augment each other’s capacities without reservations.

Non contact capacities Robotics, cyber, info, space, non – lethal weapons, perception modulation, global strike

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capabilities, nuclear weapons, terror organisations and other asymmetric abilities are evolving into norms for conducting offensive/defensive operations against adversarial nations in disparate arenas. These capacities afford unique opportunities for achieving strategic victories outside the conventional military demesne. Strategic signaling and messaging have thus acquired new meaning. The kinetic dimension of non-contact abilities have also appropriated greater lethality and it is more and more likely that Non Contact Capabilities in both Contact and Non Contact domains would be brought to bear to achieve grand strategic objectives without recourse to war. An example that stands out currently is the Greece economic impasse, wherein the economic might of EU is leveraging its clout to subdue Greece and force it accede to its terms on economic revival and thereby sub serving its economic sovereignty to a trade bloc and Greece trying to respond by mobilising its populace against it. In our context, the exploitation of Non Contact capacities as part of doctrine formulation is still in its infancy. Doctrinally we need to evolve structures and capacities to deter, mitigate and defeat these threats across domains.

resource Impact Uneven or unpredictable availability of resources and technologies adversely impact the formulation of implementable doctrines. In the Indian context, despite the growth in GDP numbers, the resources genuinely available for meaningful modernisation are insufficient thus bringing into question the capability accretion of armed forces in doubt as well skewing the balance between what the armed forces desire and what they get. This becomes further accentuated due to heavy reliance of Indian Armed Forces on foreign vendors/nations. A unique dimension of resources exploitation is the cumbersome acquisition process that is highly linear, epitomises lack of trust between the buyer and seller and is loath to urgent disposal of procurement cases; leading to capital budget being not spent or less optimally utilised.

determinants of Joint Military doctrine Defining Security in the Current Paradigm Understanding and evolving a uniform explanation on ‘Security’ should form the first step in Doctrine formulation. Evidently, the cognitive appreciation of security is either compartmentalized into internal or external or into differing verticals-economic, social, political, territorial, maritime etc, intra-regional or inter regional arena or as cyber, robotics, space, proxy wars or other threats. The sulphurous combination of all the above threats is a much greater possibility today and in future than each of them impinging separately. The fusion of security architecture and thought needs to respond aggressively to this amalgamation. A national security doctrine is therefore key pre-requisite to formulation of Joint Military doctrine10.

Identifying Interests and objectives For a reformist and emerging power like India, the ‘Interests and Objectives’ are more likely to be incremental and may become crystallised with passage of time. Thus the challenge for Armed Forces would perennially be to interpret them intelligently and excogitate a doctrine. Recourse to a regularly reviewable White Paper having 15-20 years perspective on Defence will ease security establishments and the armed forces lucidity in conceptualising a doctrine. A White paper will also enable developing a rational basis for assessing security forces requirements as well as effectively positioning them within the national plan for tackling the myriad hybrid threats, external or internal security challenges and provocations impacting the nation.

Doctrinal Review - War and War fighting The conventional understanding of war is rapidly giving way to a more nuanced application of national comprehensive power to promote and protect national interests. The linear extrapolation of tension from Peace through conflict to War is decidedly obsolete; instead, war today should be understood as an omnipresent phenomenon - amongst states, trans-state as well as intra-state, though with differing emphasis11. Our campaigns against Proxy War as well as the much vaunted Global War on Terror only go to highlight this aspect further. The omnipresence has also mandated requisition of military and Para-military forces on a continual basis to combat these threats in the physical, moral, mental and psychological spheres. Further, the emergence of Cyber, Information and other dimensions of warfare that address the nation in an indirect manner has altered the existing paradigm of defining war and developing means to deter or win it. Most critically these nontraditional capabilities can decapitate a nation’s kinetic combat capabilities before they can be brought to bear on the battlefield. the conceptual redefinition of war necessitates a reordering of priorities of how we structure our armed forces and what capabilities military and/or non-military need to form part of such an armed force and how we fuse our overall combat capabilities to include Para Military forces as well central Police forces to augment it.

Arena of decision Making The grand strategic decision making powers are vested constitutionally in the empowered committees. These structures are formed into three principal verticals, besides others-economic, political and security12. With cross pollination of threats more a norm than an exception, is this decision making structure optimum, is there a need to review the decision making impinging on the national security of the country, especially when these threats are likely to be more in the Non Contact domain than in Contact domain? The National Security Doctrine as highlighted earlier would be the apt document that could address this shortcoming. Another critical area of focus

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should be the integration of Armed Forces in the overall security architecture of the country at the Grand Strategic Level, not merely as a ‘Special invitee’ but as a ‘Stake holder’ in the national security decision making.

the Joint Military doctrine India’s Joint Services Doctrine publications have succeeded single service doctrine enunciations. The evolution of Service specific doctrine must conform to the doctrinal prescription outlined in the Joint Military doctrine13. In addition, the lack of enforcing ability at the HQ IDS has also reduced the significance of these doctrine to document status rather than a planning and execution guideline. Further, the lack of any joint structures at the field Army level have put paid to any worthwhile Jointness /integration of even those components that have significant inter-services overlap like Air Defence, Communications, Logistics, Intelligence, Special Forces, Amphibious, Air Borne operations etc. An empowered HQ of Integrated Defence Staff with a Chief of Defence Staff or an equivalent appointment would provide the necessary weight to evolution and exercising of Joint Military Doctrine in the Indian context. On another plane the Joint Doctrine also needs to address as to how would the armed forces integrate their efforts with capabilities that lie outside their ambit (Information Warfare domain) but is critical to be added with the overall military effort? Invariably all doctrine approaches have not adequately addressed the core issue of developing a hybrid approach to warfare. The Hybridisation of War is a reality and may not just be restricted to the employment of ‘Proxy War’ elements but may include much more expanded abilities that have not seen combat in sub continental or regional context.

responsive Armed forces Structure “The functioning of the COSC has, to date, revealed serious weaknesses in its ability to provide single point military advice to the government, and resolve substantive inter-Service doctrinal, planning, policy and operational issues adequately. This institution needs to be appropriately revamped…”14. The threats to the country in the conventional domain are perceived to be more pronounced than in the sub-conventional domain, where apparently there is comfort in having brought the intensity of these challenges to ‘within tolerable levels of violence’. In the conventional realm, Jointness in structures, planning, organisation and execution is the standard around the world. This becomes all the more critical since the ‘Art of War’ has transcended from the arena of ‘Brawn’ to a more potent ‘Brain + Brawn + Technology’ mix. Therefore, the armed forces may need to graduate to a more Joint Task oriented organisation approach rather than ‘Single Service’ bias that is receptive to selective cooperation based on the preference of various Services rather than the task at hand. In the sub-conventional domain also, the concept of Unified HQ has brought together all the ‘Stake holders’ on

the same strategic page, but in the operational and tactical domain, schisms remain pronounced and interoperability is seriously limited. review of Armed forces structures and organisations is an urgent necessity and principally we must go in for composite force structures based on ‘Security contingency’ at hand. Some of the suggestions could be as under:-

• Appointing a permanent Joint chiefs of Staff with possibly a permanent secretariat coupled with an empowered HQ IDS to forcefully implement the Jointness agenda.

• Permanent service representation in the NSC at the level of Permanent Joint Chiefs of Staff.

• A balanced military – bureaucratic interface that is equated and provides access to political decision making.

• transition to ‘task force/theatre based multi-service joint and composite force structure concept for executing offensive and defensive operations akin to the structures followed for amphibious or expeditionary operations.

• Addressing gap in specialist capability within the Armed Forces for executing strategic Intelligence, Special Forces operations, cyber offence and defence, integrated exploitation of space based weapons, focused military diplomacy etc.

formulation of Military doctrine

A Joint Military Doctrine for the Armed Forces should provide the basic guidance on the organisation, inter-operations, planning process, equipping, concept of employment, training and many other facets of Jointness. In addition, it should also inspire radical sensitisation of strategic thought and cultural biases and feed off it.

In the Indian context since independence each service has preferred to plough their own furrows often at cross purposes as far as Jointness is concerned, proving beyond doubt that Jointness is not a natural constituent of Armed Forces genetic makeup. This has been further goaded to a large extent by a dominant civilian bureaucracy who have played on the fears of Services (Navy and Air Force) being subsumed by much larger Army, inept, shortsightedness and less than statesmen approach by members of Armed Forces and finally an ill informed polity that has singularly failed the Armed Forces for not forcing Jointness as a political directive in the larger national security interest.

Thus the conceptualisation of a common implementable doctrine would need to firstly, overcome the distrust that permeates amongst services, secondly emerge as a concept

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that benefits each service to optimise its capacities, thirdly contribute effectively to synergised war fighting in all domains, fourthly be felt as a necessity rather than a compulsion by the Armed Forces and finally demand exceptional levels of statesmanship and maturity from Armed Forces. The aforesaid pre-requisites are critical to developing a realistic military philosophy that would address the imperatives of Jointness while keeping individual services interests also in mind. The Joint Doctrine generation is therefore recommended to be addressed in the following steps:-

• Step 1 - clarifying Arenas Admiral Arun Prakash in his essay on “India’s Higher Defence Organisation”15 opines that in order to engender a sense of mutual confidence amongst the Armed Forces, the Chiefs could consider signing Memoranda of Understanding clarifying roles, missions and other areas of ambiguity. Such clarification would go a long way in creating common spaces for Joint Operations.

• Step 2 - Setting up Institutionalised and empowered Structure for Joint doctrine evolution and revision Having de-conflicted the turfs/ domains the process of Doctrine Formulation needs to be undertaken by an empowered Committee headed by Vice Chiefs of respective Services authorised to evolve the contours of Joint Military Doctrine. The structures so evolved also needs to have linkages with all the other stake holders that have a role in ensuring national security in general and employment of Armed Forces to further the cause of national security in particular.

• Step 3-developing common Understanding of National Security and role of Armed forces in it The Army has predominantly a Territorial role in Indian context, likewise the Air Force primary role remains ensuring sanctity of Indian Air Space while the Naval role relates to protection of Indian maritime space. However with capacity accretion, each service is looking at expanding its frontier of operations, with Indian Air Force acquiring capabilities that may permit it to dominate the Arabian and Bay of Bengal air space and the Navy single mindedly pursuing the ‘Blue Water’ Capability that has significant overlap with Air Force vision of expansion and requires combat capabilities from Army to realise its largely ‘expeditionary’ orientations. The respective roles/perceptions dictate the world view of the three Service on their configuration and National Security. The expansion has been driven purely by service specific enlargement of roles rather than a centralised joint view on evolving capacities and capabilities. These differing perceptions/proclivities need deliberate harmonisation to promote a

common doctrinal view point of their organisation and interoperability.

• Step 4-developing doctrinal Imprint of Jointness in Armed forces Once the equation between the National Security and Armed Forces has crystallised, then a common doctrinal imprint needs to be evolved that should answer the following questions:-

» What Joint Structures and staffing are needed to effect joint operations at military strategic/theatre levels, how will they be organised and how will a joint military advice afforded to the appropriate authority arrived at?

» What methodology needs to be evolved to fuse the Services into joint structures at strategic, operational and tactical levels in keeping with the prevailing and anticipated National Security priorities?

» How individual arms, services and branches amalgamate-in terms of organisations, equipment, operational philosophy, tactical and technical training, service priorities, administration/logistics etc and how will they integrate in operations that are land centric, air centric, maritime oriented, expeditionary, out of area contingency, operations other than war?

» Would we have joint theatre commands or do we wish to exploit commonality of equipment/ operating procedures that allow us to operate together on a ‘Case to Case basis’ or selective task based Jointness? If theatre commands is the way forward, then are they to be formed at the front and back end and should the option of case to case jointness is to be implemented then what structures, organisations and staffing needs to be engendered to facilitate it?

• Step 5-Admixing Para Military forces, central Police forces and other Security forces in Military doctrine. The Para Military Forces, Central Police Force and other Security Forces have a role in augmenting the capabilities of Armed Forces in multiple spheres. The cultural linkages, roles, equipping, command and control, training and interoperability necessities of these forces require to be defined in the Military Doctrine with a view to achieve 360 degrees integration of Security architecture in the country.

does the formulation of Joint Military doctrine must always relate to a National Security doctrine

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or enunciation of grand – strategic design? The grand strategic bias of a nation dictates its security architecture and in that sense logically its dissemination becomes a pre-requisite for formulation of Military Doctrine. On the contrary however, intelligent assessment of constitutional role of Armed Forces would clearly suggest the direction of the Military Doctrine. The ideals of Peace, Secularism, Sovereignty, territorial integrity, religious freedom etc denote the unquestionable pillars of Indian nationhood/core values. Although the means to promote and protect them are not demarcated in unambiguous detail leading to some sense of disconnect in the evolution of Joint Military Doctrine. In spite of this the grand strategic intent is patently apparent, though the path of its application is not as well elaborated and the means to achieve it have not been thought through in detail.

engendering Jointness

“It seems clear that India became a prey to foreign conquest because of the inadequacy of her own people and because, like the British, the invaders represented a higher and advancing social order. The contrast between the leaders on both sides is marked; the Indians for all their ability, functioned in a narrow, limited sphere of thought and action, unaware of what was happening elsewhere….”16. Each component of Armed Forces has evolved separately and same goes for the Para Military and Armed Police Forces. The uniqueness in their evolution plus the consistent contest for resources has imbibed a supreme sense of self-preservation in the services in addition to an exaggerated need for self projection. This is further accentuated as Army dwarfs the other two services with its physical size and apparent primacy. Therefore any process, procedure or thought that contests the current paradigm on structure, planning and application of air and naval power is viewed as an attempt to subdue the smaller services. thus doctrinally each of services want to retain independence from a joint structure and develop mechanism that have a ‘case by case’ approach to operational or tactical situation and in no way subsumes them to a Joint force Structure. Approach to Jointness in the Indian context cannot ignore this reality. Bottoms up approach to Jointness affords incremental accumulation of experience in transiting towards Jointness, however, does not address the root cause of lack of natural integration-that places service interests before joint interest. A top down approach needs a political push which remains a challenge for the lack of adequate institutional arrangements. Organic Jointness that we aspire for in the Armed Forces could be enhanced by following:-

• reviewing the lessons on Jointness of the only Tri-Service Joint Command at Andaman and Nicobar and

Strategic Forces Command and imbibing them at various theatre commands.

• Evolving a joint staffing pattern up to Corps or equivalent levels in selected branches.

• Undertaking Joint Planning exercises at bi-service and tri-service levels where applicable.

• Integrating Joint training and operations in areas that have commonality and for which in principle agreement exists between services viz Air Defence, Communications, Cyber and Information Warfare, Space Warfare, Intelligence, Air Borne and Air Transported operations, Leadership etc

• Inter-services joint exercises at tactical and operational level with a task force based for organisation.

• common approach to Human resource Development, Equipment Management and inventories.

• Standardise basic training norms and nominate training institutions akin to NDA or NDC for enhanced commonality in training syllabi of the services. A similar approach could be undertaken with Para Military and Central Police Forces as well.

conclusion

The universal truth about the necessity of a workable military doctrine is well understood. The fact that many militaries around the world have imbibed the essence of its in their structure and military philosophy has also been well documented. The logic of having a common approach to war fighting is decidedly appealing but despite this irresistible logic there is a serious dithering amongst services to embrace Jointness.

In the Indian context our historical baggage of conflicts, role the armed forces played in each of them, their satisfactory outcomes (?) with the existing structures, the commitment of large part of forces in Proxy War, widely differing perceptions of respective services on national security, war fighting and war outcomes and a HQ IDS that has limited impact on service doctrinal preference have had a debilitating impact of any meaningful evolution of common military doctrine. All the above have been further accentuated by the lack of political direction in engendering Jointness.

In an environment such as this the approach to evolving a common military doctrine has to be the next logical step to generate greater efficiency in defence planning, resource optimisation and successful outcomes in all contingencies. The approach has to be gradual with incremental outcomes culminating in larger Jointness at all levels.

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Notes

1Henry A Kissinger, ‘Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, Harper and Row, 1957)pp 7. 2“A belief or set of beliefs held and taught by a Church, political party, or other group”- A Military Doctrine provides a common frame of reference across the military. https://www.google.co.in/?gfe_rd=cr&ei=D46cVdO4JMv08weD6LeoDA&gws_rd=ssl#q=doctrine+meaning accessed on 08 Jul 15. 3Ideas as Weapons – Influence and Perception in Modern Warfare, edited by G J David, T R Mckeldin, Pentagon Press,, pp 1. 4Wired for War – The robotics revolution and conflict in the 21st Century by PW Singer, Penguin Press, 20095Unrestricted Warfare - Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999)6Seeing The Internet As An ‘Information Weapon - http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130052701 accessed on 07 Jul 15 – “Each year since 1998, Russia has introduced a resolution at the United Nations calling for an international agreement to combat what it calls “information terrorism.” Russian leaders worry that the Internet makes it so easy for people to communicate that a government could use the Internet to challenge another country’s political system. Some Russian diplomats have actually revived an old Soviet term — “ideological aggression” — to describe what governments could do to each other via the Internet”.7‘Puzzling inability of the Indian state to generate sufficient military power to alter its strategic position vis-à- vis Pakistan,’ and ‘the astounding lack of political direction in Indian efforts at military modernization.’ Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2010), pp xii.8“Since independence, the Indian Army’s posture has been fundamentally defensive and attritional in orientation. This is not to imply that the army has only been employed defensively, but rather that its training and organisational outlook has traditionally favored fighting on the defensive or undertaking carefully pre-planned offensives against fixed positions that seek to attrite the enemy’s strength through tactical engagements” The challenge of changing Indian military doctrine by Walter Ludwig III, http://www.india-seminar.com/2009/599/599_walter_c_ladwig_iii.htm accessed on 04 Jun 15. 9Arun Sahgal and Vinod Anand, ‘Revolution in Military Affairs and Jointness,’ Journal of Defence Studies 1/ 1 (Aug. 2007),pp 114.10National Security: The Need for a Doctrine, Observer Research Foundation, Feb 2014, Issue 4, www.orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/modules/issuebrief/attachments/specialreport_4_1392021784765.pdf, accessed on 04 Jul 1511“Firstly, these threats are omni-present. Weak governance or the absence of governance in some littorals has allowed the state to lose its ‘monopoly on the use of legitimate force…..” Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS), Admiral D K Joshi, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, NM, VSM, ADC addressing the IDSA Seminar on Role of Navy in maintaining Peace in Indian Ocean Region. www.idsa.in/keyspeeches/RoleofIndianNavyinMaintainingPeaceinIndianOceanRegion_CNS12http://cabsec.nic.in/files/archive/cabinet_committees_30.08.2011.pdf accessed on 29 Jun 15.13“The problem is that military doctrines cannot be developed in a vacuum. In the absence of strong political guidance as to the nation’s strategic goals and the conditions under which the armed forces would be employed, the armed services are being forced to improvise – which can strip doctrine of many of its useful functions if they lack inter-service coordination and develop ways of fighting that are incompatible with the political objectives of the country’s leadership” The challenge of changing Indian military doctrine, Walter c. Ladwig III, http://www.india-seminar.com/2009/599/599_walter_c_ladwig_iii.htm accessed on 07 Jul 15. 14GOM report as quoted in the article by Adm Arun Prakash file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/jds_1_1_aprakash.pdf15India’s Higher Defence Organisation: Implications for National Security and Jointness,Adm Arun Prakash, Journal of Defence Studies • Volume 1 No. 116Discovery of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, http://varunkamboj.typepad.com/files/the-discovery-of-india-1.pdf accessed on 01 Jul 15.

About the Author

Brig RC Srikanth was commissioned in Mar 1988 into Army Air Defence. An alumnus of OTA, Chennai, he has served in CI Ops in J&K and Punjab. The Officer has been GSO 1 of a Mountain Division and Instructor at Army AD College, IMA and at SC Wing, Army War College. The Officer has been a Military Observer in Ethiopia/ Eretria as well as a member of the first Indian Military Training team in Uganda. He is currently commanding an Air Defence Brigade after completing Higher Command Course and a tenure at the Army War College.

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INDIA’S ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN POST 2014 : STRATEGY, POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION

Historical Perspective

Afghanistan’s written history could be traced back to 500 BCE when the region was under the Achaemenid Empire. However evidences tell us that an advanced

urbanised culture had existed in this area since 3000 BCE. After conquering Persia, Alexander the Great arrived to what is now Afghanistan in 330 BCE. His army fought very tough battles in the Afghan tribal areas. This bitter experience compelled him to comment that Afghanistan is “easy to march into, hard to march out of.”1

The Aryans came to Afghanistan in 20th century BCE, and left their languages that survived in the form of Pashto and Dari. Since then, many empires have established capitals inside Afghanistan, including the Greco-Bactrians, Mauryas, Kushans, KabulShahi, Saffarids, Samanids, Gaznavids, Ghurids, Timurids,Mughals, Hotakis and Durranis.2 Subsequently the Arabs invaded and influenced the culture of Afghanistan, as its Zoroastrian, Macedonian and Buddhist past had long vanished. Turkic empire-builders such as the Ghaznavids, Ghurids and Timurids shaped the region into present day Afghanistan.

Central Asian Roundabout and Gateway to India

Afghanistan has always been a location of strategic importance throughout history. The land also acted as a gateway to India, impinging on the historic Silk Route, which bolstered trade from the Mediterranean to China. Situated on many trade and migration routes, Afghanistan has been better known as the ‘Central Asian roundabout’ since passages converge from the Far East via the Tarim Basin, from the Middle East, from the adjacent Eurasian Steppe and from the Indus Valley through the passes over the Hindu Kush.3

Mirwais Hotak and subsequently Ahmad Shah Durrani unified Afghan tribes and founded the last Afghan Empire in the early 18th century CE.4 Afghanistan held its sovereignty

during the Anglo-Afghan Wars, the 1980s Soviet war, and the 2001-present war by the country’s many and diverse people: the Pashtuns, Taziks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Aimak, Baloch and others. Zoroastrianism prevailed as the religion in the area and its influence is even noticed in the names of the months in the modern Afghan solar calendar. Other religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism thrived later, leaving a deep imprint in the region. Gandhara is the name of an ancient kingdom from the Vedic period and its capital city located between the Hindukush and Sulaiman Mountains (mountains of Solomon).5 These cultural links make Afghanistan and India as natural allies.

Great Games In Afghanistan

“The Great Game” symbolised the strategic rivalry and conflict between the British and the Russian Empires for domination in Central Asia. The typical Great Game period extended from the Russo-Persian Treaty of 1813 to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. A less intensive phase followed the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. In the post-Second World War post-colonial period, the term has described the geopolitical intrigues of the Great Powers and regional powers as they strived for geopolitical power and influence in the region.6

Great Game-I : British Invasions and Afghanistan Independence

From the British viewpoint, the Russian Empire’s extension into Central Asia endangered to obliterate the “jewel in the crown” of the British Empire, India. The British were apprehensive that Tsar’s troops would suppress the Central Asian khanates (Khiva, Bokhara, Khokand) one by one. The Emirate of Afghanistan then would become a staging point for a Russian conquest of India.7 In May 1921, Afghanistan and the Russian Soviet Republic signed a Treaty of Friendship resulting in waning of British influence in Afghanistan. British Empire shrunk and subsequently collapsed.

“Afghanistan needs to protect itself in the region and needs to secure itself within the country. Afghanistan needs to develop its forces and needs to provide stability to the people. Afghanistan is a country in real need. There could be no better ally than India to understand these needs and help Afghanistan to

achieve all this...”Hamid Karzai

Brig Rajeev Chaudhary, VSM

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Great Game – II : Soviet misadventure, Mujahideen and taliban

Second World War resulted into a new era of geopolitical realignment which left USA and USSR as two superpowers with deep economic and political differences. This era was coined as Cold War or Great Game-II by some scholars,8 because it never featured any direct military action. The USSR discovered the same harsh truth through its 1979 misadventure in Afghanistan as the British had established in the 19th Century, and withdrew its last troops from the so-called “Graveyard of empires”–Afghanistan9 in 1988. The Great Game-II culminated with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The significance of the Great Game-II is evident in the terminal years of Mohammad Najibullah, the last Soviet-backed President of Afghanistan. During his 1992-96 asylum in the UN compound in Kabul, he engaged himself by translating Peter Hopkirk’s book The Great Game into his mother tongue, Pashto. A few months before his execution by the Taliban, he quoted, “Afghans keep making the same mistake,” reflecting upon his translation to a visitor.8

Great Game –III : United States and its op enduring freedom. Post 9/11, the United States invaded Afghanistan to assist Afghan rebels of the Northern Alliance in eliminating the Taliban regime which had permitted al-Qaeda to establish training camps within Afghanistan. By the end of 2001 the Taliban regime had lost control of most of the territory it had held and its leadership had crossed the border into Pakistan’s tribal areas. United States forces and their NATO allies supported the regime of President Hamid Karzai. Many commentators have either compared these political plottings to the Great Game as played out by the Russians and British in the nineteenth century, or described them as part of a continuing Great Game, and has become prevalent in literature about the region, appearing in book titles,11 academic journals, news articles, and government reports.

After the death of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, the Pakistani-Afghan border skirmishes intensified and many large scale attacks by the Pakistani-based Haqqani network took place across Afghanistan. This led to the United States warning Pakistan of a possible military action against the Haqqanis in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The U.S. blamed Pakistan’s government, mainly Pakistani Army and its ISI spy network as the masterminds behind all of this. While energy resources and military bases are mentioned as part of the Great Game-III, so is the continuing jostling for strategic advantage between great powers and between the regional powers in mountainous border regions in the

Himalayas. In the 21st century, the Great Game continues.12 The external player is getting ready to quit soon as has always happened in the past.

“Afghanistan-where empires go to die.”

-Mike Malloy

Indo-Afghan relations

Historical and cultural Links. Relations between the people of Afghanistan and India go back to the Indus Valley Civilisation. Following Alexander the Great’s brief occupation, the successor state of the Seleucid Empire controlled the region known today as Afghanistan. In 305 BCE, they ceded much of it to the Indian Maurya Empire as part of an alliance treaty.13

“Alexander took these away from the Persians and established settlements of his own, but Seleucus Nicator gave them to Sandrocottus(Chandragupta), upon terms of intermarriage and of receiving in exchange 500 elephants...”

—Strabo, (64 BCE – 24 CE)

The Mauryans brought Buddhism from India and inhabited the area South of the Hindu Kush. Their decline began 60 years after Ashoka’s rule ended, leading to the Hellenistic reconquest of the region by the Greco-Bactrians. Much of it soon broke away from the Greco-Bactrians and became part of the Indo-Greek Kingdom. The Indo-Greeks had been defeated and extruded by the Indo-Scythians in the late 2nd century BCE. Much of Afghanistan has been influenced by Buddhist, Hindu and Zoroastrian cultures until the arrival of Islam in the 7th century. But despite many Afghans accepting the message of Islam, the Muslims and Hindus lived side by side.

“Kábul has a castle celebrated for its strength, accessible only by one road. In it there are Musulmáns, and it has a town, in which are people from Hind...”

—Istahkrí, 921 CE

Between 10th century and mid 18th century, Northern India was attacked by a number of invaders based in what today is Afghanistan. Amongst them were the Ghaznavids, Ghurids, Khiljis, Suris, and Durranis. During these eras, especially during the Mughal period (1526–1858), many Afghans began immigrating to India due to political unrest in their regions.

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Khan Sahib were well-known leaders of the Indian independence movement and active supporters of the Indian National Congress. Although the NWFP became part of the Muslim state of Pakistan in 1947, active Pashtun support for the Indian freedom struggle led to

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great sympathy in India for the cause of Pashtun autonomy and freedom.

diplomatic relations. Diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and India have traditionally been strong and friendly. India assisted the overthrow of the Taliban and became the largest regional provider of humanitarian and reconstruction aid to Afghanistan. Indians are part of various construction projects towards Afghanistan’s rebuilding. India also has four consulates in Afghanistan located in Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kandahar and Jalalabad.

Relations between Afghanistan and India heightened in 2011 through a strategic partnership agreement, Afghanistan’s first since the Soviet invasion of 1979.14 According to a 2010 Gallup poll, Afghans prefer India’s leadership over that of the US and China, with 50% expressing approval, the most positive rating of India for any other surveyed Asia-Pacific country.15 India assisted Afghanistan to become the eighth member of SAARC in 2007. Three MOUs for reinforcing cooperation in the fields of rural development, education and standardisation between the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) and Afghan National Standardisation Authority were signed between Afghanistan and India in April 2006.16

economic ties. After the overthrow of the Taliban, India established economic ties with the newly formed democratic government, provided aid and participated in the rebuilding efforts. India plays a critical role in Afghanistan and has committed US$ 2 billion in development assistance since 2001 (only four countries have provided more). Newly formed government under Mr Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai in Sep 2014 has desired that it wants India’s presence to deepen in Afghanistan.

India has donated US$ 650–750 million in humanitarian and economic aid, making it the largest regional provider of aid for Afghanistan. India’s support and partnership extends to rebuilding of air links, power plants and investing in health and education sectors as well as assisting to train Afghan civil servants, diplomats and police. India also seeks the upgradation of supply lines of electricity, oil and natural gas. India constructed a major road in 2009 in the remote Afghan province of Nimroz, connecting Delaram to Zaranj. This has proved a viable alternative route for the movement of goods through the Chabahar port in Iran to Afghanistan.

India pursues to expand its economic signature in Afghanistan as NATO forces withdrawal begins by end 2014. Especially, it wishes to improve transport connectivity and economic cooperation with countries in Central and South Asia. The ‘Heart of Asia’ initiative by India to draw global finances and investments for Afghanistan presents one such opportunity.

India has already invested US$ 10.8 billion in Afghanistan as of 2012. More such projects are likely to come up after NATO’s withdrawal. These includes setting up Iron ore mines, a 6 MTPA steel plant (by SAIL—Steel Authority of India Limited), an 800 MW power plant, Hydro-electric power projects, transmission lines, roads etc. India and Iran are set to ink a transit agreement on transporting goods to landlocked Afghanistan. The Indian government is investing more than US$ 100 million in the expansion of the Chabahar port in South-Eastern Iran which will serve as a hub for the transportation of transit goods.17

Stable Afghanistan is in India’s Interest

After months of US-Afghan collabration, an American withdrawal from Afghanistan has finally become inevitable. Washington’s “zero option,” however, does not represent the end of international engagement in Afghanistan. At this critical juncture, India should assume a more responsible role to ensure a stable post-2014 Afghanistan and to reduce the risk of terrorist resurgence.

India should make extensive efforts for deepening its economic and security links with Afghanistan. India should also consider providing technical assistance in sectors like mining, textiles and information technology that could expand employment and foreign investments in Afghanistan. India’s increased role in reviving Afghanistan’s economy can assist the country in becoming an integral part of a Central Asian trading corridor.18

Increased Military cooperation. Beside economics, new government in India headed by Mr Narendra Modi is aware of the larger security landscape. A complete pullout of American and NATO forces would leave a vacuum to be filled by Pakistan-backed militant groups, which would jeopardize India’s internal security. To avoid this, India can consider strengthening its military cooperation with the Afghan government. This can be done by providing Afghan forces with

• Military hardware.

• Artillery and armoured vehicles.

• Training Afghan intelligence operatives in gathering technical intelligence.

• Bolstering the ability of the nascent Afghan Air Force by supplying necessary spare parts to operate its small fleet of helicopters.

• Deploying advisory teams to train the technical and maintenance personnel of the Afghan forces.

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India’s assistance would be aimed at sustaining the Afghan government to stay operational after 2014 and to ensure regional stability. India’s assistance will go through the Afghan government, and not through any Afghan factions, leaving little room for suspicions.

After effects of US drawdown on India

India had a spike in terrorism in the early 1990s after the Soviets left Afghanistan. A resurgence of terrorism in Afghanistan could again impair India. It’s a trying moment, but full of opportunity as well – a chance for India to ensure sovereignty and stability for Afghanistan, in the interest of both nations.

“Pakistan is alarmed by the rising Indian influence in Afghanistan, and fears that an Afghanistan cleansed of the Taliban would be an Indian client state, thus sandwiching Pakistan between two hostile countries. The paranoia of Pakistan about India’s supposed dark machinations should never be underestimated by India...”

-- Salman Rushdie

In William Dalrymple’s article “Forget NATO v the Taliban. The real Afghan fight is India v Pakistan”, published in The Guardian, the author describes that besides the Taliban/al Qaeda vs NATO/US forces, the Afghan conflict is actually a fight between two nuclear-armed regional powers, India and Pakistan. He mentions that “some Indian hawks argue that by taking on a more robust military role in Afghanistan, India could fill the security vacuum left by the US withdrawal, advance its regional interests, compete with its Chinese rival for influence in the country, and thwart its Pakistani enemy at the same time.”19

Even as Prime Minister Narendra Modi was cautioning Americans in New York against any precipitate withdrawal, Afghanistan was preparing for a significant change in Kabul. Mr Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai was taking over as Afghanistan’s President from Mr Hamid Karzai, who had ruled Afghanistan for 12 tumultuous years. Despite efforts to malign him and destabilise his Government by a vicious propaganda barrage from Pakistan, President Karzai succeeded in establishing a measure of effective governance in Afghanistan. He also skilfully brought together the country’s fractious ethnic groups, to deal with the challenge posed by the Pakistani-backed Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network, together with their Islamist allies, including the Al Qaeda.

Within 24 hours of the assumption of power by President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah, Afghanistan and the US inked a security agreement, which will result in the US stationing 9,800 troops in a training and counter-insurgency role in Afghanistan, beyond 2014. By the end of

2015, that number will be cut again, by about half, and by Jan 2017, all US troops will be out of Afghanistan except for a small number assigned to the US embassy in Kabul.20 A ‘status of forces agreement’, giving immunity to foreign forces against prosecution in Afghan courts, was also inked. The agreements will also allow the Americans to retain air bases across Afghanistan.21

Such a modest force would be powerless to address the range of factors that could hasten Afghanistan’s descent into deeper violence-from Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan that Islamabad refuses to eliminate, to fragile Afghan security forces vulnerable to militant infiltration. This modest residual force would also be powerless to avert a worst-case scenario: An intensified insurgency; heavy refugee flows and other spillover effects into the tinderbox nation of Pakistan; and, most ominously, a ratcheting up of India-Pakistan tensions as the nuclear-armed nemeses try to deepen their influence in Afghanistan, and as anti-India fighters active in Afghanistan (such as Lashkar-e-Taiba) turn their guns back on India.22

Such scary scenarios certainly aren’t inevitable. But a post-2014 force could neither prevent Afghanistan from falling into this abyss, nor save it if it takes this plunge. Additionally, the insurgency thrives because it enjoys sanctuaries inside Pakistan, which regards the Taliban as a hedge against Indian influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan will dismantle Taliban havens on its soil only if the Pakistani military softens its view of India as an existential threat - a view that has long justified the institution’s outsized role in Pakistani politics, and most likely will not change anytime soon.

According to South Asia expert Harsh V Pant, “India expects anarchy to intensify in the North-Western subcontinent, as insurgents in Afghanistan have been repeatedly successful in undermining local and international confidence in the viability of extant political structures in Kabul amidst the withdrawal of Western forces.”23 The power vacuum resulting from the departure of Western troops opens up the possibility that Afghanistan would resume its role as the battleground for continued warfare by forces backed by Pakistan. Should Pakistan decide to back an all-out Taliban offensive aimed at establishing a Taliban government in Kabul, India could consider being a key component of an anti-Taliban alliance which may include Iran and Russia.

Should the Pakistan military determine that it must take concerted measures to win “strategic depth,” by putting the Taliban back into power, it will find that conditions have changed since 2001 and it will no longer be so easy to “fish in troubled waters.” With the exception of the Pashtun group, which is the principal component of the Taliban, Afghans

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generally maintain a positive image of India and Indians. Indian cultural interaction with Afghanistan dates back centuries. Afghans’ fascination with India’s Bollywood film culture is just the latest manifestation of these cultural ties.

recommended Indian Initiatives

New government in India believes that democracy and development are the key instruments to ensure that Afghanistan becomes a source of regional stability. India has played a significant role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan, reflecting an abiding commitment to peace, stability and prosperity in Afghanistan during this critical period of transition in security and governance. Afghanistan has made considerable political and socio-economic strides since 2001. A democratic constitution is in place. This might change post 2014. The US troop “withdrawal” is being accelerated. While the Afghan National Army (ANA) is becoming increasingly capable, the security situation in Afghanistan continues to show worrying trends, with the Taliban able to wreak violence at will. Afghan security forces, though strong and capable, will need equipment, training and leadership support to take on the Taliban, post 2014.

Political changes have taken place in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has come to power, and has promised resolution of Pakistan’s myriad problems including repairing relations with India and with Afghanistan. The Afghans remain highly sceptical of Pakistan’s motivations, role and agenda in Afghanistan. Tensions between the Afghan government and Pakistan could escalate in the post 2014 scenario. In Iran too, a new President has been elected. President Rohani has spoken of “moderation” in foreign policy; but this has been more in the context of Iran‘s nuclear policies. Iran will continue to wield sizeable influence on Afghanistan. Its influence will increase as the American forces begin to withdraw. There is danger that the international community might lose interest in Afghanistan, once the ISAF forces leave the country. This would also lead to reduction of doses of economic assistance.

It is against this backdrop of rapidly changing internal and external factors that India will have to craft its policies towards Afghanistan. India has signed a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan, thereby signalling that it will stand by the Afghan government. However, a deteriorating security situation and political uncertainty in Afghanistan could put practical constraints on what India can do. Thus, India will have to continue to deal with potential instability in Afghanistan. It will also need to find adequate resources, and put in place an institutional infrastructure, to sustain its ties with Afghanistan.

extend all Military Support short of Boots on Ground. If India has to stay relevant in Afghanistan, it must do all to bolster the national forces of Afghanistan. This can be done by combining India’s considerable soft power with that of other regional countries, and pool together diplomatic, political, and military resources with other countries to support Afghanistan’s war against disruptive forces. Unfortunately till date, India has proclaimed to limit its assistance to non-lethal military operations. At this critical juncture when the strategic scenario is fast changing in Afghanistan, India should seriously consider extending much needed military support and assistance (short of putting boots on the ground) that will strengthen Afghan National Security Force.

train and Strengthen Afghan National Army. The peace and stability in Afghanistan are of vital national interest for India. As an aspiring, though reluctant, regional power, India must stand up and be counted as a genuine rising power that is willing to discharge legitimate regional responsibilities. At the very least, due to the Indian Army’s immense experience in counter-insurgency operations and cultural affinities that make it easier to train new recruits, India could be invited to train ANA personnel in Afghanistan itself. India can also station Indian troops around Indian and Indian-built institutions.

Joint functional Strategy with central Asian States. Many analysts perceive that India should evolve a joint functional strategy with the Central Asian States to counter both the Taliban and Pakistani influence in Kabul. However, this has the grave disadvantage of being perceived as anti-Pakhtoon in Afghanistan’s fractured ethnic mosaic. Similarly, any coalition with Iran is likely to be perceived as anti-Sunni by the dominant sect in Afghanistan. In addition, considering the current state of US-Iran relations, any relationship with Iran has a risk of running afoul of the USA. The best option for India is to bank on the ANA and pro-India politicians in Afghanistan. India must not allow it to be side-lined on Afghanistan as was done in the Turkey and London Conferences. The ‘New Silk Route’ initiative proposed by the US to make Afghanistan a bridge for trade and transit between South, Central and West Asia offers a great opportunity for India.24

enhance engagement on Security, Political and economic fronts. With change of guard and Mr Ashraf Ghani taking over as President, it is clear that a new phase in Afghanistan is going to begin from 2015. Within this context, most analysts and international reports indicate that, in the post-2014 phase, the country is going to face major challenges in three major areas: security, political and economic.

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Enhanced Indian engagement in Afghanistan could help the country meet the difficult challenges in all these areas during its decade of transformation (2015−2024).

convergence of Interests with Like-Minded countries. India has to keep in mind the protection of its interests in line with the convergence of interests with like-minded countries such as Russia and Iran. Iran stands to be India’s best option, particularly in the context of connectivity and transportation. At the same time, India will need to build further relations with Russia to check the growth of Chinese influence in Afghanistan. While not banking upon it, India should also be a part of the multilateral efforts of the SCO, CSTO, NATO, etc. so that it is in the know of things, as well as prevent anyone else from taking advantage should it be absent from any of these fora.

India Should Hold the course. As the Afghan war is far from over, India must take a long-term view of developments in its turbulent North-Western neighbourhood. Based on certain assumptions about the likely course of the Afghan war, it is often argued that India may soon have to revisit its policies and priorities in Afghanistan. However, given the constraints and prevailing uncertainty, India may not be in a position to bring about any radical shift in its Afghan policy, at least not in the short-term. The Afghan situation is extremely fragile at the moment in view of the fragmented nature of its polity, overlapping transitions, and strong external dimensions to the conflict, all of which do have a direct impact on India’s security and, at the same time, restrict its options.

A big challenge for India could be how to sustain the momentum of its engagement in post-ISAF Afghanistan. India’s continued involvement in Afghan reconstruction depends largely on local security conditions. The following factors could be considered as critical here:

• Sustenance of the current political system.

• Orientation of Mr Ashraf Ghani’s government.

• Nature and level of Western engagement in the post-transition period.

• The strength of India’s ties with various Afghan factions.

Among these, Afghan perceptions about India’s role, and the presence and the sensitivity of the political set up led by Mr Ashraf Ghani in Kabul to India’s concerns are of critical importance. Depending on developments both within Afghanistan and Pakistan, either new opportunities could open up for India to strengthen and further widen its engagement or it might have to contend with a more restricted role in the future.

“Remember the rights of the savage, as we call him,Remember that the happiness of his humble home.Remember that the sanctity of life in the hill villages of Afghanistan, is as inviolable in the eye of Almighty God, as can be your own...”

-- William E Gladstone

conclusion

For most Afghans, the most attractive thing about India is that it is not Pakistan. Pakistani meddling in Afghanistan has included support for the obscurantist and fanatical Islam propagated by the Taliban and its Salafist backers from the Middle East. The Taliban attempted to aggressively coerce the Afghan people to abandon their moderate Islam, heavily influenced by Sufism, for a harsh and intolerant form of Islam totally foreign to the region. India, by contrast, is a secular state, which does not interfere with religious practice. While Salafi Muslims proselytize actively in the country, the Indian government takes a hands-off approach and Salafis have made little headway there. As a result, the vast majority of India’s Muslims continue to practice moderate Islam. This stands in stark contrast with Pakistan. Likewise, Pakistan’s Shia Muslim minority faces growing persecution from Sunni hardliners and attacks by Sunni terrorists. Shia Muslims in India practice their religion unhindered. This makes India more attractive to Afghanistan’s Muslim population, both Sunni and Shia.

India is gradually becoming conscious of its status as the South Asian regional power and has aspirations to win recognition as a global power. It cannot make this step, however, if it cannot establish security in its own region. With BJP returning to absolute power and Mr Narendra Modi taking over the moods of larger populace of resurgent India, there is a strong possibility for India to play an assertive role in the South Asian region and internationally. Pakistan’s international position continues to slip and it faces growing internal governance and economic problems. Would it be in any position to risk its future survival to pursue an ill conceived and increasingly out of date Afghan policy? Pakistan cannot revitalize its economy as long as it is committed to support terrorism.

This new government has made all the right moves within four months of taking office to engage almost all major players on the global stage and in a dexterous stroke rendered Pakistan ineffective and insignificant player in regional matrix. With its credibility on the line, it could be expected to take a hard stance and provide strong backing for the Afghan government to counter the Taliban threat. India could also redefine and expand its relationship with Afghanistan into an active military alliance. While India is unlikely to commit

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About the Author

Brig Rajeev Chaudhary, VSM was commissioned in Dec 1983 into Bengal Sappers. He has commanded an Independent Field Company, an Engineer Regiment and an Engineer Brigade.He is qualified on DSSC, SC, HC and NDC Courses. He has published numerous articles in various Journals and is presently posted with College of Military Engineering, Pune.

Notes1Adamec, Ludwig W, Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan. Scarecrow Press, p. 1, 2011.2Coll, Steve, “Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the Cia, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001”, p. 333, 2004.3Hopkirk, Peter, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, p. 1, 1992.4Louis Dupree, Nancy Hatch Dupree, and others, “Last Afghan empire” , Encyclopædia Britannica Online Version.5Nancy Dupree, An Historical Guide To Afghanistan, Chapter 3 Sites in Perspective, 1973.6Rashid, Ahmed, “Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia,” 2000.7W. Vogelsang, “Gandahar”, in The Circle Of Ancient Iranian Studies.8Walberg, Eric, “Postmodern Imperialism: Geopolitics and the Great Games”, Retrieved 22 August 2012.9Ba-rbara Robson, Juliene G. Lipson and Robson. “The Afghans - Their History and Culture”. United States: Center for Applied Linguistics (CAL). June 30, 2002. 10Harish V. Pant, India’s Changing Afghanistan Policy: Regional and Global Implications, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, December 2012.11Rajeev Aggarwal, Post-2014 Afghanistan: Policy Options for India and Iran, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Mar 2014.12Adam Bennett, Reconstructing Afghanistan. International Monetary Fund. p. 18, 15 April 2005, Retrieved 10 January 2012.13Farndale, Nigel, “Afghanistan: the Great Game, BBC Two, review”, telegraph.co.uk, 30 May 2012. 14G Parthasarthy, After Effects of US Draw down on India, The Pioneer, 10 Oct 2014.15Jaswant Singh,”China and India: the great game’s new players”, The Guardian (London), 25 September 2010. 16Javid Ahmad, Afghan Stability is in India’s Interest, New York Times, 05 March 2014. 17Michael Kugelman, Afghanistan stability: A pipe dream? on Al Jazeera, Last updated: 18 Jan 2014. 18Stephanie Gaskell, Will Afghanistan Become the ‘Forgotten War’ Again? http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2014/10/will-afghanistan-become-forgotten-war-again/95921/?oref=defenseone_today_nl, 06 Oct 2014.19William Dalrymple,“Forget NATO v the Taliban. The real Afghan fight is India v Pakistan”, The Guardian, 26 June 2013.20“India Plans Shipping Afghan Goods via Iran”, The Gazette of Central Asia (Satrapia), 24 March 2013.21“India, Russia and China in Race to Expand Influence Over Afghanistan; Preventing Re-Talibanization After 2014”, The World Reporter. Retrieved 30 March 2013.22“Kingdoms of South Asia – Afghanistan (Southern Khorasan / Arachosia)”, The History Files, Retrieved 2010-08-16.23“India to Boost Commando Presence in Afghanistan”. http://www.tolonews.com/, Retrieved 15 October 2014.24“When Will the Great Game End?”, orientalreview.org, 15 November 2010.

armed forces to Afghanistan, it would vastly expand its support to the Afghan army, including the provision of weapons, ammunition, and training. In a conflicting situation, India could expect strong support from the international community, including reactivation of its alliance with Iran

and Russia. Robust Security alliance through extensive Military cooperation with Afghan National Army would remain the master key to collaborations in the fields of Political, Diplomatic, Economy, Education, Cultural, Trade and Strategic domains.

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oPerAtIoNAL Art IN tHe INdIAN coNteXtMaj Gen JK Sharma

Introduction

Mankind has, since advent, dealt with ambition, conflict and survival. In his reflex for self- preservation and assertion, fuelled by growing

awareness and needs with the progress of civilisation, the hunt for the perfect weapon has been quintessential. This perfect weapon, when wielded with sufficient aptitude, focus and cunning, yielded the desired outcome with minimum effort, cost and in minimum time. The cunning, focus and the aptitude constituted the strategy, the method of use the tactics and the end result was the aim. Thus, the science and the art of warfare has been second nature to man from the beginning.

With modern warfare evolving into a multi-faceted, multi dimensional and integrated national effort, the importance of perfecting the science and the art of warfare is even more evident as encapsulated by Kautilya in his Arthashashtra, when he says, “war must be conducted by the armed forces but much more important than the force of arms is the skill which saps enemy’s morale, disrupts his forces and takes him to the verge of collapse before attack.”

The dawn of the twenty-first century has brought a new reality of what future war may look like. In the Indian context, the complex nature of dynamics on the subcontinent necessitates a deeply researched, thoroughly war-gamed, comprehensive and optimised application of military power. A rising power must have its military capable of operating across the full spectrum of operations by outlining other asymmetric threats facing the country that its Armed forces must prepare for, such as terrorism, cyber-attacks and rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction. The expanded use of the military for operations across the full spectrum of conflict demands that the force be ready to react and integrate into the strategic setting needed to shape the country’s foreign policy. However, the prevalent trends raise the question whether or not our current military structure and its imbedded command and control apparatus are capable of rapidly responding to these needs. That essentially is the basis of this study.

operational Art- An overview

the contours of operational ArtOperational art can be best understood by analysing the genesis of modern conflicts (refer figure 1), to which it is quintessentially linked. Modern conflicts result from a series

NEGOTIATION/ RECONCILIATION

COERCION

ESCALATION

DECISION TO PROSECUTE

GRAND STRATEGY

MILITARY STRATEGY

OPERATIONAL ART

Figure 1- The Conflict Cycle

of actions/reactions which cascade into a military clash; likelihood of a blink-of-an-eye war is very slim. This translates into a frame of reference for management of military operations to achieve the desired end state.

Simply put, operational art is “employment of military forces to accomplish the military end state in a campaign/theatre/war.” This clearly highlights the following essentials:-

• Operational art deals with a military end state, and therefore, must involve use of military force.

• It also denotes a minimum level-that of a Corps. However, it can be applied to a Zone, a Theatre, a Front or a part of globe.

• A definite end is to be achieved in finite time, which requires optimisation and customisation in application of forces.

“More glaring than poorly trained troops as a first battle problem is the weakness of command and control…. inadequate preparation of commanders and staffs for the real world of combat.”

– John Shy in First Battles

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A Historical Perspective

Historically, a change in the method of warfare has always succeeded a defining technological leap. From the use of horses in war to rifles and canons, to automatic weapons, tanks, aircraft, communications, nuclear power, space and cyber space, each threshold has moulded war into a more complex, more lethal, more intense and impacting endeaviour.

For most part of history of warfare, the single point strategy of decisive battle was the dominant one. According to this strategy, the general, who was a political and, at the same time, the military leader, led its army to a predefined place, at a predefined time, to meet the whole of the enemy army in one decisive battle, whose outcome also produced a decision for the war. The actual plan and execution of the battle was the realm of tactics.

The single point strategy of the decisive battle survived, in one way or the other, until the Napoleonic wars. The cataclysmic changes in warfare of this era led to subsequent changes in strategy. The enormous increase in the number of armies the nation-states were able to field and the improvement of the European road infrastructure led to important changes in the way the strategic commander conducted the war. Instead of the army moving in one column, it was divided in Corps, which, led by a lesser general, was sustained and moved independent towards the place chosen by the strategic commander to meet the enemy for the decisive battle. Even so, the strategy remained “the use of engagements for the object of the war” as defined by Clausewitz. Eventually, the corps not only moved independently, but started fighting a series of battles for the purpose of the war independent of the rest of the army. This series of battles fought by parts of the army was called operations, and the art of conducting them operational art. The strategic commander, instead of planning and executing battles for the purpose of the war, now started planning and executing operations. With this new development, the war was planned and executed at three levels, the strategic, the operational and the tactical level.

The first modern understanding of coherent management of military operations dawned on the Soviet planners while enunciating deep operations and deep attack theory, which they termed as Operational Art. It developed in the 1920s and 1930s, based on the experience of the Red Army from First World War, the Russian civil war and the often forgotten Russo-Polish war of 1919-1921. It focused on use of force for effect (shock) rather than destruction, entailing adaption of war-fighting to modern circumstances. For the first time, terms such as depth, continuity, synergy and synchronisation were given form.

The drawdown of the German forces after World War I, with the attendant superiority in technology, catalysed the Blitzkrieg, which also depended on shock action for out-of-proportion dividends.

The modern concepts of operations and their management, in the form known today, were heralded with the US Air-land Battle, augmented by net centricity in operations. The extension of reach of the aircraft by sea borne overseas platforms and carrier battle groups facilitated the aerial campaign in the Gulf War, permitting a rapid culmination of the land campaign in just a hundred hours.

In the Indian context, the 1971 Campaign, “Liberation of Bangladesh” is a classical case of application of Operational Art.

overall framework

The role played by operational art in the national conflict management context will be clear if the measures undertaken to safeguard national interests are hierarchically examined. In figure 2, operational art figures between strategy and

figure 2- the Hierarchical framework

Tactics, once the conflict of interest transforms into a possible military clash. Operational Art can also be described as the mosaic of individual battles, woven into one campaign by the Operational Commander.

concepts Necessary for Application of operational Art. While the theoretical aspects of operational art such as non-linearity, synergy, synchronisation and tempo are well known, the concepts of centres of gravity, culminating point and lines of operation form the basis of implementation of operational art in any campaign.

• centre of Gravity. It describes a point of vulnerability, against which a successful attack is likely to cripple the enemy’s war waging abilities. At the strategic level, the Centre of Gravity could be the national leadership, key production facilities, civil and military war waging infrastructure or even the ‘national will’ of the enemy.

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• culminating Point. Culminating Point is the climax of combat potential. The essence of a successful offensive action is to secure the objective before reaching own Culminating Point. In defence, the aim must be to bring the attacker to his Culminating Point earlier than his own and then strike when enemy is at the end of his tactical reach.

• Lines of operation. These define the directional orientation of a force in relation to enemy, connecting it with its base on one hand and its objective on the other. The interior lines are advantageous to a inferior but more mobile force, capable of shifting effort laterally and more swiftly.

the dynamics of operational Art

Operational Art is a multi-faceted concept facilitated by a robust command structure and directive style of command, hinging on an integrated planning infrastructure. The essentials of Operational Art can be well defined from components to application. Amongst the components, while the command and control structure forms the architecture, the operational planning and coordination is the staff processes which generate options and offer the best option to the operational commander. The direction and control of the operation level of war then falls in the domain of the commander. The Centre of Gravity, Line of Operations and Culminating Point remains the central considerations of operational art as explained above.

The application of operational art is guided by certain inviolable principles of joint and integrated operations, directive style of command, manoeuvre warfare, battle field transparency and real time intelligence picture. This in nutshell give meaning to Effect Based Operations – Targeting the Centre of Gravity of the enemy.

However, this effect would translate physically on ground only if the forces are well trained and battle ready and fight integrated in the theatre of operations. The operations need to be well synchronised, simultaneous, non-linear and successive with availability and recreation of reserves.

The management of operations is also governed by the principles of jointness, delegation, manoeuvre, simultaneity and operations for effect, which result in optimised force application in terms of time, space and quantum.

coordination of operational factors

Operations are governed by the three major operational factors of force, time and space, all inter-related and at a premium. While, one may be chosen over others with some

penalty (refer figure 3), their interplay and optimisation can mitigate lack of any one factor. For example, accelerated time of operations can mitigate a lack of force, while force multipliers can balance a lack of time.

figure 3-examination of operational factors

forcing the enemy to capitulate

Frequently, Sun Tzu is quoted on inducing capitulation of enemy without bringing him to battle as being the acme of operational art. Extrapolated to modern times, this will be extremely challenging to accomplish, as due to internal compulsions, a nation is unlikely to succumb without giving battle. Therefore, a military end state, the achievement of which is the aim of operational art, is unlikely to be achieved without prosecuting operations.

Numerous precedents exist of such behaviour by a weaker adversary in face of much superior opposition, like the Indo-China War or 1962, the Indo-Pak Conflicts, the Vietnam War and the Gulf Wars; winning without fighting may no longer be feasible.

Part 3 : operational Art In the Indian context

The Glossary of Military Terms defines operational art as “the art of conducting operations and employment of military forces at Corps/Field Army level. It is the link between strategy and tactics and translates military strategy into operational execution for the successful accomplishment of military aims and objectives.”

The definition emphasises the concepts outlined earlier in this paper.

the Indian Military theatre

The Indian Military Theatre has three distinct regions- the Pakistani Front, the Chinese Front and the Indian Ocean Region (refer figure 4).

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figure 4- the Indian Military theatreIn dealing with Pakistan, India, being a superior power, follows a strategy of restraint, while retaining punitive offensive capability. The escalation control lies in Indian hands. However, with China, India has a defensive strategy and is looking at long term politico-economic solutions to bilateral issues.

Additionally, the IOR contains strategic sea lanes which have bred rivalry between USA, China and India. The increase in Chinese presence, the Maritime Silk Route and cultivation of littoral states by China will ensure that IOR remains a proxy battleground.

Indian Western front Strategy

On the Western Front, India can choose between two aims- to grab territory or to destroy the war waging potential of Pakistan. In contemporary dynamics, territorial gains are transient in nature and will only assist in depicting victory on the bargaining table; lasting peace will only be possible with a degradation in Pakistan military capability, which could, therefore, be the military aim. To achieve this, destruction of Pakistan’s combat potential is the key.

Initiating the operations

Initiating operations at the correct time and place is the most critical process in operational management.

In 1971, when the situation in Eastern India became unbearable, the human rights violations at a gigantic scale and the resultant migration from East Pakistan provided India with a “justifiable” trigger, which continued to manifest from March 1971 till December 1971, providing time to the political hierarchy to shape the environment and to the armed forces to prepare for war. Thus, a trigger is critical not only to commence operations, it also initiates the preparatory period. It has to be sustained through the preparatory period, or a separate trigger could be required to commence operations once own forces are ready.

Integration of operations on the Western front

The operations n the Western Front will involve synergistic employment of all three services, and within the ground forces, all commands. The command and control of this

figure 5- roles of respective Stakeholders in operations on Western front

campaign and the integration between Army, Navy and the Air Force will define success in such operations, with each formation and service playing a definite role, contributing to the overall tempo (refer figure 5).

the Need to Look Beyond the Western front

Building additional capacity and capability on the Western Front also has a direct relation with the situation on other Front, as to develop operations beyond the operational depth, a surge by certain additional formations/forces is a qualifying factor. To achieve this surge, the management of the operations on the Eastern Front is critical to keep them below a certain threshold, so that the additional forces are available for application.

The long term solution to manage the threat on the Eastern borders lies in integration with China to an extent so as to make any conflict prohibitive and detrimental to Chinese interests. Simultaneous development of dissuasive capability is also essential to ensure that the threat, if any, is managed and Western Front Operations are not jeopardised.

Application options

The application of forces can be synchronised in terms of time, force and space, or a combination or any of these factors. Many options are available in terms of an early or

OPTIONS

TIME

FORCE

INCREMENTAL CONSOLIDATED

OPTIMAL SUB OPTIMAL

COMPLIMENTARY NONCOMPLIMENTARY

SPACE

figure 6- time Space and force options

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delayed, or incremental or consolidated launches, or in application of the full or part of the combat potential, as also in terms of stand alone or complementary, i.e., co-effect application (refer Figure 6). While it is difficult to predict the option in advance, these are war gamed and trained for, to be executed at short notice.

Within each methodology of prosecution, by selecting one factor, multiple variations in terms of varying the other two factors are feasible; operational art assists in selection of the option that optimises force application and achieves the aim with minimum effort, in shortest time with least cost.

Recommendations for Imbibing Operational Art in the Indian Armed Forces

In the Indian context very little attention has been paid to this important aspect of war fighting at the operational level. The reasons can be many. However the long term issues which need urgent attention to imbibe this, in the order of priority, are as follows:-

• A review of the higher defence organisation is urgently required to theaterise and integrate a Tri-Service Front Headquarters, suitably staffed and structured to accomplish the campaign objectives.

• Mitigation of the capability voids through procurement and indigenisation, coupled with infrastructure development.

• Formal teaching of operational art from Staff Course (DSSC) onwards.

• Instituting a more flexible, less vertical and more lateral intelligence collation and dissemination capability.

• A White Paper on Indian strategic orientation, highlighting the national stance on relevant issues, could also be published periodically to remove ambiguity and misgivings in the sub-continent.

• An annual/biannual Army Wargame involving all commands and a Joint Wargame involving all three services will assist in continuous review of plans and synchronisation.

A lesson can be taken from early recognition of the importance of operational art as being central to campaign

planning immediately after World War 1 by the Western armies. The training of officers in the United States for Staff, Command and General Staff of Divisions, Corps and then Armies was greatly influenced by the War and starting from 1919, it continued to mature till 1922. A one year course at Fort Leavenworth was devoted to the study of Brigades and Divisions, from which officers were selected for a course in the General Staff School, focussing on higher direction of war and on Corps and Army operations. Thereafter, a course in strategy was also included, which supplemented the study of large scale operations. Thus, a holistic and broad based approach to conduct of operations at higher levels assisted in early and comprehensive absorption of concepts and in their implementation. Similar curriculum can be instituted in Indian defence training establishments.

Similarly, if an appraisal of the recommendations of the previous Committees on defence reforms is made (Krishna Rao Committee, Kargil Committee, Arun Singh Committee and Naresh Chandra Committee), progress is evident. However, while the capabilities have improved, equipment voids and reach and mobilisation limitations exist, meriting further effort. These, coupled with a revamped command structure and re-structured Theatre Commands, will assist in optimised force application by own forces. Cyber and information warfare capabilities are other domains where a lot needs to be done to achieve the desired levels of preparedness.

Conclusion

Operational art has been a quintessential endeavour of Generals and soldiers since the advent of warfare. Instinctively, adversaries attempt to achieve their military goals with minimum effort. Therefore, formal teaching and adoption of this important tool of warfighting will hone this instinct of the Indian Army mid and senior level officers. Certain variables, which need assessment and quantification prior to commencement of operations, will also require analysis and quantification. While much has been achieved in development of military strategy in India, as much is required to be accomplished and institutionalised to prepare future commanders for future conflicts.

About the Author

Maj Gen J K Sharma, is an alumnus of Indian Military Academy and was commissioned into and commanded MECH INF. He has attended various prestigious courses including DSSC, SC, HDMC and NDC. He has also commanded an Armoured Brigade and 21 Sub Area at Pathankot. He has been DAQMG of an Infantry Brigade in Op Meghdoot, GSO-1 in MO Directorate, Director in FP Directorate Army HQ and Col GS (Ops) of a Corps. He has been instructor at OTA, Chennai and has served with the UN Mission at Angola. He is presently commanding a Division on the Western Front.

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64 | Winter 2015

PeoPLe’S LIBerAtIoN ArMY NAVY (PLAN) : effectS of ModerNISAtIoN oN INdIA’S PeNINSULAr SecUrItY

Introduction

China has enhanced her overseas interests and is building a blue water fleet to conduct ‘far seas operations’, as brought out in the recently released White Paper titled

‘China’s Military Strategy’. Even though the document does not specifically mention ‘India/Indian Ocean’, the reference to the Indian Ocean ‘Sea Lines of Communications’, on which more than 80 per cent of China’s energy supplies travel, can easily be inferred. In other words, Indian Ocean is slated to become an active area of operations for the PLAN in times to come. For peninsular India, the new Chinese Military strategy is a cause for concern, simply because it illustrates China’s ‘expansionist’ mind-set. The Indian Peninsula, after all juts more than 1000 miles strategically into the Indian Ocean besides sitting astride the vital ‘Sea Lines of Communications’ of the world. Over the past 15 years, China’s ambitious naval modernisation program has produced a more technologically advanced and flexible force.1 The PLAN remains in the forefront of the military’s efforts to extend its operational reach beyond East Asia and what China calls ‘Far Seas’.

The Article seeks to bring out the effects/implications of PLAN’s modernisation on India’s Peninsular Security. Towards this end, the Paper, broadly seeks to address the following aspects -

• Meaning of ‘Peninsular Security’.

• PLAN’s Modernisation Plan/Analysis.

• PLAN’s Strengths/Weaknesses, Deployment pattern etc along with the analysis.

• Strengths of Indian Navy.

• Possible Effects/Implications on India’s ‘Peninsular Security’.

There is a growing realization, today, that ‘Security’ cannot be viewed through a prism of ‘military presence’, ‘peninsular/coastal security’ or ‘geo-political influence’, alone. It is all ‘inclusive’/‘all encompassing’ and has to take into consideration ‘Human Security’ also.2 ‘Human Security’ includes ‘Food/Economic’, ‘Water’, ‘Health’, ‘Education’, ‘Energy,‘ ‘Environment’ etc which will impact/impinge on

the Security/Military Security of the Peninsula. Accordingly, the ‘Peninsular security of India’ would imply the ‘Energy Security/Security of Energy’, ‘Food/Economic Security’, Information/Cyber Security in addition to the ‘Physical Security’ of the peninsula/coast-line.

Perceived objectives of PLAN’s Modernisation Plan

The Chinese Naval modernisation programme is possibly driven by four primary objectives, namely the conflict potential within the Taiwan Strait; Territorial/Sovereignty issues in South and East China Seas; increased threat posed by the significant US naval presence in the Western Pacific Ocean; and the desirability to develop a “blue water” fleet to secure its Sea Lines of Communication { qualified as ‘Strategic Sea Lines of Communication’ in their latest White Paper on Military Strategy}, passing though the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Insofar as the Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean are concerned, there are complex geo-political and strategic drivers for China wanting to expand its presence into the same. As China’s growth hurtles at 8% or so, it needs to gather vast resources to fund the growth and Beijing has huge appetite for resources from wherever they can be garnered. In pursuit of resources, many natural barriers have been virtually erased as the Chinese and its Navy push towards India in the Indian Ocean Region.3 Observed in conjunction with the latest strategic developments in South/South East Asia like the ‘re-balancing strategy’ of US Navy from the West to the East and the emergence of the Indian Navy as a ‘Net Security Provider’ in the Indian Ocean Region, the new Chinese White paper outlines a more assertive Chinese ‘far-seas strategy’-particularly the possibility of greater PLAN posturing in the Indian Ocean Region. Interestingly, china does not mention ‘India’ or ‘Indian ocean’ as a threat in their White paper or for that matter even in the body of their entire Paper.

Modernisation Plan of PLAN

It would only be logical to throw light on the PLAN’s modernisation plan and deployment pattern prior to arriving at the possible effects/implications. Scrutiny of the procurement trends/modernisation plan of the PLAN in respect of various naval assets/other sea-going assets has revealed:-

“To be secure on Land, we must be secure at Sea!”Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

Cmde JS Shergill, NM

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Surface fleet. China is rapidly retiring legacy combatants in favour of larger, multi-mission capital ships, equipped with advanced anti-ship, anti-air, land attack and anti-submarine weapons and sensors. Additionally, the PLAN is starting to expand its capabilities for power projection and expeditionary warfare.

Landing Platform deck – Amphibious Warfare Ship

Sub-Surface. The country has also increased its submarine strength, both nuclear and conventional (with increased ranges of Anti-ship and Land-attack Missile capability) over the past decade which stands at about 60 today with some under construction.

Unmanned Underwater Vehicles. On 27 August 2010, the Chinese authorities announced that a domestic submersible called ‘Jiaolong’ had reached a depth of 3,759 meters (with a designed depth of 7,000 meters). The other three nations with deep diving technology are USA, France and Russia. This would give the Chinese access to 99.8 per cent of the world’s ocean floor and the capability of harnessing the lode of mineral wealth, especially oil, besides capability of viewing and examining submarine cables that carry other nations communications and objects of intelligence value that were hitherto unreachable.

Jiaolong

tactical Air cover. During the year 2014, China focused on integrating ‘Liaoning’ with its J-15 aircraft. Although ‘Liaoning’ is serving, in what officials describe as an “experimental” capacity, they also indicate that China will build additional Carriers possessing more capability than the ski-jump-configured ‘Liaoning’. Such Carriers would be capable of improved endurance and of carrying and launching more varied types of aircraft, including electronic warfare, early warning, and anti-submarine, thus increasing the potential striking power of a PLAN’s “Carrier Battle Group” in safeguarding China’s interests in areas outside its immediate periphery along with power projection.

Liaoning

PLA Naval Aviation. PLAN Aviation has made “great strides,” albeit from a low baseline. To support operations further from shore, the PLAN is deploying increasing numbers of specialised aircraft for maritime patrol, airborne early warning, and surveillance. They, however have a small fleet of maritime patrol craft with limited endurance restricted to patrols in South and East China Seas. Additionally, “China operates a growing array of reconnaissance satellites, which allow it to observe maritime activity anywhere on the earth.”

PLA Marines. PLA Marines are at present a relatively small amphibious assault force, numbering just two brigades with roughly 6,000 men each. Nevertheless, they are reinforced by naval and air power, amphibious artillery and armor. While they were originally designed to be a much larger invasion force, they have quickly evolved into a rapid deployment invasion force, specifically tasked for assault operations.

recent deployment Pattern in the Indian ocean and vicinity – operational flexibility

• Search of Malaysian Airlines Flight (MH 370).

• Rim of Pacific Ocean exercise near Hawaii.

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• Maiden two submarine deployment, demonstrating its increasing familiarity with operating in that region.4

• Naval Exercises by PLAN’s flotilla consisting of amphibious landing craft ‘Changbaishan’ and destroyers ‘Wuhan’ and ‘Haikou’.

• Multinational anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

An Analysis of Pace of Modernisation, Strengths/Weaknesses and deployment Pattern

The pace of Chinese naval modernisation can be gauged from the fact that the per cent of modern units in the Chinese submarine force increased from less than ten per cent in the year 2004 to about 50 per cent in the year 2011 and that of surface combatants, increased from the same quantum in the year 2004 to more than 30 per cent in the year 2011. The recent addition to their inventory is the “Liaoning” aircraft carrier - even though equipping the Carrier with its permanent air wing may take some time. The Chinese have now openly declared that its Navy is in the process of making preparations for forming its first Carrier Task Force.

The major elements of naval modernisation involve the Anti-ship Cruise Missiles, Land Attack Cruise Missiles, Submarines, Destroyers Frigates, Patrol craft, Amphibious ships and above all, the Aircraft Carriers. It may however, be noted that given the PLAN priorities closer to home, the pace at which aircraft carriers, large deck amphibious ships (power projection tools) and its Anti-Submarine capabilities are bolstered, will be an indication of the priority PLAN places on being able to sustain ‘Far Seas operations’ that can involve high intensity combat operations.

Insofar as weaknesses are concerned,‘Anti-Submarine Warfare’ and ‘Power projection’ in contested environments remain weaknesses for China. PLAN does not have any capability to ensure ‘Sea Control’ or ‘Air Superiority’ in the Indian Ocean. While the PLAN’s capabilities have increased, a report points out that they still lack a “massive amphibious (air/sea) lift capacity that a large scale invasion of a country like Taiwan, situated in their immediate vicinity, would require.” PLA Marines are a small but growing part of the PLA’s overall strategic and tactical planning operation. Tactical air power and maritime reconnaissance by patrol air craft is also a weakness. They are, however, rapidly developing this capability as part of overall Chinese military strategy.

The foot-prints/inroads into the Indian Ocean are only ‘infant steps’, as of now insofar as deployment pattern in the Indian

Ocean is concerned. The PLAN’s ability to impinge upon the security of India is modest but growing as it gains more experience operating in distant waters and acquires larger and more advanced platforms. In the longer run, however, a sustained maritime presence in the Indian Ocean Region will not only allow Beijing to strategically dominate the region, it will also take the regional security initiative away from India. To compound matters, a strong PLAN presence in the Indian Ocean would challenge the Indian Navy’s primacy as a ‘Net Security Provider’ in the region and erode its strategic influence.5

other Limitations/constraints of china/PLAN

China is surrounded by inimical neighbours, and has territorial/sovereignty issues on the maritime front in South/East China Sea, Yellow Sea etc. with most countries. PLAN, therefore, may not be able to divert resources continuously, at the cost of dilution of it preparedness for these challenges.

Unlike India, ‘maritime geography’ also does not appear to favour China. It is constrained by responsibilities of protection of long coastline/vicinity strewn with multitude navigational hazards/obstacles like straits, islands, islets, corals, reefs, rocks etc. ‘Strategic Reach’ is an all-important attribute of any naval force and the odds are stacked against PLAN.

‘Logistics’, a vital Principle of War, is a weak area for PLAN in the Indian Ocean.6 ‘String of Pearls’ (now rechristened as ‘Maritime Silk Road’ initiative, the maritime component of One-Road One Belt initiative) are only ‘Places’ as of now and it will take quite some time before they graduate to ‘Bases’.

PLAN has not seen any ‘action’ and this lack of ‘operational experience’ would definitely impinge on formulation of Concepts/Doctrines/Strategies. In absence of validated doctrines, their strategists at sea/ashore would have to take decision without a point of reference or guidance thereby impairing their decision-making. It is pertinent to mention that even though the PLAN has had nuclear submarines since the 1970’s, the same could leave the territorial waters for the first time only very recently. Submarine training, both ashore and at sea, has historically been a cause of concern in the PLAN.7 The total operational experience for the entire submarine force is only 67 patrols in 28 years, averaging about 2.4 patrols per year.8

Intelligence, yet another Principle of War also remains a key obstacle in respect of the Indian Ocean Region.

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Strengths of India/Indian Navy

India, on the other hand, is singularly blessed in terms of ‘maritime geography’. The far flung Andaman and Nicobar islands towards the east are her ‘strategic border and staging outposts’.

Maritime Geography

The strategic importance of Indian peninsula and the Indian Navy (spearheaded by two Aircraft Carriers, a Nuclear Attack Submarine, Long Range Maritime Patrol aircraft, modern Surface Fleet, etc) in ensuring stability, safety and security in the region as a ‘Net Security Provider’ is well understood in the world.

INS Vikramaditya

Net-work Centric Operations/Warfare is another strong point of the Indian Navy and ‘Maritime Domain Awareness’ and ‘Information operations’ will play a crucial role in tomorrow’s, if not today’s war. Cyber warfare is, however the biggest threat to national security which will render even

the Intercontinental ballistic missiles insignificant as a security threat, said former Indian President and eminent scientist APJ Abdul Kalam.9

effects/Implications for India – An Assessment

Currently, the Chinese Navy is not in a favourable tactical position to maintain a dominant position in the Western Pacific Coast (leave alone the Indian Ocean Region) as the Japanese, Korean, American and Vietnamese are all operating in the same area. Their Navy, a ‘brown water one’ as yet, is in the process of ‘spreading their wings’. Therefore, as of now there is no immediate cause for concern to the Indian Navy/Peninsular security of India. The possible effects/implications of PLAN’s naval modernization, intentions etc (direct and indirect, the

latter due to possible alliance with our Western neighbour), on India’s ‘Peninsular Security’ can be ‘bothersome’ as also potentially ‘benign’ in future. The implications on India can, therefore be divided into two:-

effects/Implications

Bothersome Benign

direct Indirect

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PLAN’s threat

Likeli-hood effect (s) on our Peninsular Security Action/remarks

direct effects

Ballistic missile carrying Nuclear Submarines (SSBNs).

No • Considering the geographical proximity to land and the fact that China has a significantly large arsenal of land-based nuclear missiles, the possibility of Chinese Ballistic Missile carrying submarines being deployed against India in the Indian Ocean appears to be remote.

• In any case, SSBNs are usually the ‘last leg’ of the nuclear triad as also both countries follow the basic tenet of ‘No First Use’.

• Furthermore, SSBNs are noisy, with low speeds etc.

Nuclear Attack Submarines (SSNs).

Yes • Whether the Chinese SSNs operate alone or as part of the Carrier Battle Group, their presence will definitely affect the operational pattern of the Indian Navy. The availability of maritime space for operations, exercise and training for Indian Navy could be severely constrained.

• With a clear role envisaged for the conventional submarines, the Attack Submarines are currently the only units capable of undertaking unassisted offensive deployments in the Indian Ocean Region with effective patrols of 1 - 45 days in the Arabian Sea and 5 - 50 days in the Bay of Bengal, depending on the choice of transit route.10

• The two sets of recent Chinese submarine forays into the Indian Ocean (Colombo and Karachi) are likely to be ‘trial balloons’ for operational deployments of Chinese submarines in the region.

• The Indian response to increasing Chinese submarine forays in the Indian Ocean lies in developing effective air, ship and submarine based Anti-Submarine Warfare capabilities including sub-surface Maritime Domain Awareness.

Large scale amphibious invasion.(Very often the question is asked as to the possibility of an amphibious invasion on the Indian peninsula by the PLAN !)

No • Complicated and difficult military operations whose success depends upon air and sea superiority/control, rapid build-up and sustainment of supplies on shore/uninterrupted support.

• China does not appear to be building the conventional amphibious lift required to support such a campaign.11 It conducts modest size training exercises in coastal regions.12

• However, we need to keep a Rapid Reaction Task Tri-Service Force ready for deployment at all times. It has to be ‘threat cum capability based’.

Bothersome effects

Firstly and obviously, the bothersome threats (wherever applicable) the PLAN can pose in coming years are brought out, as tabulated:-

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PLAN’s threat

Likeli-hood effect (s) on our Peninsular Security Action/remarks

direct effects

Development of Gwadar Port – a potential staging – post for the modernized PLAN and a crown jewel in a new ‘silk noose’ around the Indian peninsula.

Yes • With other strategic sites in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Maldives forming part of a broader network of PLAN’s presence, China could soon be ‘chipping away’ at India’s regional maritime influence besides capable of surrounding/choking the Indian peninsula, enforce ‘blockade’/’maritime quarantine’, ‘missile attacks’, ‘mining’, monitoring of shipping especially choke points etc to force capitulation.

Information Security /Maritime Cyber attacks on Maritime Infrastructure.

Yes • Operations of ship-based computers and servers, ports, vessels, marine facilities, fishing vessels (‘eyes and ears’ of coastal security and fitted with electronic Automatic Identification Systems), and other elements of maritime transportation system will be hampered.

• Our Cyber cables laid on the ocean floor will be susceptible to unauthorized Access/Alteration/Destruction by Midgets/Unmanned Underwater Vehicles carried on submarines/merchant ships.

• Today is the world of ‘information’. India is the third largest user of Internet. Regular patrols and Intelligence sharing with friendly nations (ie increased Maritime Domain Awareness) will ‘hold the key’.

• Adoption of Cyber Security practices.

Threat to our ‘Energy Security’ – ‘Hormuz Dilemma’ (including Security of Energy) by missile attacks, cyber attacks etc by submarines, underwater vehicles, remotely operated vehicles etc

Yes • 80 percent of our energy supplies come from the Gulf region. Already, Chinese presence in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea (by deploying ships and submarines in the region) is creating a ‘Hormuz Dilemma’ in the strategic Indian imagination, akin to the ‘Malacca dilemma.13

• Serious efforts are being made by India to identify and develop alternate sources of energy like shale oil, biogas, solar and wind energy apart from most significant source, atomic energy.14

• Need for constant surveillance and protection of these assets needs no emphasis.

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Gulf of Hormuz

PLAN’s threat Likeli-hood effect (s) on our Peninsular Security Action/remarks

direct effects

• Offshore oil fields and Sea Lines of Communication are our national assets of vital importance and any interdiction/disruption in production or distribution of oil/gas will have a long-term adverse effects on the national economy.

• The Indian Navy has a dedicated force namely ‘Sagar Prahari Bal’ for protection of the assets on ‘round the clock’ basis.

Threat to ‘Economic/ Food’ Security by direct attacks/ maritime cyber attacks by ships, submarines, aircraft, Special Forces etc.

Yes • 90 percent of trade by volume and 70% by value between the countries travels on seas. Any disruption of this traffic will adversely affect the Economic/Food Security on land.

• This has potential of disruption of the economic growth of the country thereby subverting National/Peninsular Security.

• Need for constant surveillance and protection of these assets needs no emphasis.

Indirect effects –Sino – Pak Nexus

Possible alliance/joint operations with Pak Navy.

Yes • An augmented Pakistan Navy can launch attacks on Indian territory/peninsula with impunity.

• Cognizance of this fact will need to be taken when planning our maritime mission profiles, operational doctrines and tactical plans.

Movement of PLAN Ships/submarines to and fro in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the Arabian Sea/Bay of Bengal during peace.

Yes • It will result in limiting the availability of maritime space for the Indian Navy and restrict its area of influence. Its operations, exercises, intentions and movements would be open to monitoring. In fact, the very capability to operate freely would be compromised.

• The presence of Chinese ships will boost the morale of our Western neighbour, howsoever notionally.

• The capacity of the Indian Navy to exercise Sea control or Sea denial, if the need ever arises, will also be severely restricted, as it will have to factor in the presence of Chinese naval ships in the vicinity, their capabilities as also whether they can synergise their efforts with that of Pakistan Navy, and to what extent.

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PLAN’s threat Likeli-hood effect (s) on our Peninsular Security Action/remarks

direct effects

Sino-Pak collaboration in joint warship building

Yes • The delivery of ‘Zulfiqar’ class frigates (‘Jiangwei’ in China)and the impending delivery of ‘Yuan’ class diesel-electric submarines to Pakistan and subsequent associated technical, professional and tactical interactions will only serve to bolster China-Pakistan maritime cooperation and keep the anxiety levels high amongst the Indian security establishment.

effects - Benign

It may also be quite possible that expanding regional maritime combat capabilities may ultimately offer benefits to regional security and stability in ways that until recently were almost inconceivable. For example, as regional maritime forces become more proficient in such areas as sustained expeditionary operations and force projection, it could have a positive effect in terms of disaster relief, peacekeeping, anti-piracy and counter-proliferation patrols, and security and stabilization operations. Naval modernization need not in itself constitute a dangerous state of affairs. Technology is neutral - how it is used, determines its ‘benevolence’ or ‘ill will’. It is not too early to start considering the positive impact and implications of the expansion of maritime combat capabilities in the Asia-Pacific. Not surprisingly, the Indian Navy had extended an invitation to PLAN to participate in the International Fleet Review at Visakhapatnam in February 2016 which has since been accepted.

recommendations

We should continue to build a ‘five dimensional Blue Water Navy’ in order to achieve a credible strategic deterrence with special emphasis to the following -

• Cyber Security/Warfare.

• Anti-Submarine and Underwater Warfare.

• Special Forces.

• Rapid Reaction Task Forces with Tri-Service Components.

• Coastal Security.

The Andaman and Nicobar and Lakshadweep Islands need to be developed ‘militarily’ as well as for ‘tourism/eco-tourism/health tourism’ purposes. We need to shed a ‘false

sense of security’ as fast as possible by developing these strategically placed islands. It is pertinent to mention that China’s underground nuclear submarine base at Hainan is in the close vicinity of famous tourist spots of the country.

Even while all the three Services have their Doctrines/Joint Doctrines in place, there is a need to ‘integrate’ them further. Doctrine/Strategies need to be prepared in an ‘integrated and comprehensive manner’ and not in ‘water-tight compartments’, which appears to be the case now. Even our Strategic Forces Command should be involved in such a process. We will need to fight every war/conflict in an integrated and synergistic manner.

• The Indian Navy should remain committed to the concept of ‘Self-reliance’ and ‘Indigenisation’. While indigenisation is a major goal of the Indian Navy, it must occasionally yield to the imperatives of combat readiness. Hence, specific operational requirements may require us to exercise the import option in a limited manner.15

• Identify alternate sources of Energy to overcome the ‘Hormuz Dilemma’.

• The ‘moves’ of China into the Indian Ocean need to be carefully watched, to understand the nuances of its policy of encirclement of India.16

A close cooperation/synergy between the Ministry of Defence, External Affairs and the Indian Navy needs to be further strengthened/consolidated.

• India should continue to engage China economically as is being already resorted to. India and China need to take advantage of the factor of geographic contiguity. Hithertofore geo-political compulsions have prevailed at the cost of geo-economic objectives.17 Geo-economics after all should drive Geo-politics/Geo-strategy.

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• South China Sea is presently a ‘secondary area of interest’ of the Indian Navy and we need to continuously show our ‘Presence’ in the area. It is also our Gateway to the ‘Act East Policy’.

• Pursue our ‘Act East Policy’ and ‘Project MAUSAM’ relentlessly. India’s support to various Association of South East Asian Nations in their territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea dispute reflects Indian desires to build ‘Presence’ in the latter’s backyard to counter its presence in the Indian Ocean Region.18The speculated Indian plans to build a naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam is a case in point.19

• An early setting up of a Maritime Commission and a Parliamentary Committee on Maritime Affairs. We also need to have a National Security Advisor (Maritime).

conclusion

The Chinese Navy is not yet a ‘blue water Navy’ and needs to develop for nearly a decade before serious incursions can be made into the Indian Ocean. The primary weaknesses are

the lack of long-range projection, amplified by the absence of an operational Carrier Battle Group, lack of Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities and major Logistical support. Without Logistical support, China cannot sustain any military operation in South Asian waters for any prolonged period of time and is liable to be outsmarted and outmaneuvered by the Indian Navy. Furthermore, PLAN has ‘enough on its plate’ in waters closer home which will continue to keep them fully engaged for quite some time to come. For India, the new Chinese military strategy is a cause for concern, simply because it illustrates China’s ‘expansionist mind-set’. Till some time ago, the PLAN’s stated distant-seas strategy was one of benign cooperation, but that no longer appears to be the case. The new White paper’s reference to ‘open-seas protection’ hints at a more robust military posture in the Indian Ocean Region, and lends credence to recent speculation about China’s effort to establish a naval Logistics base in Djibouti. In the end, PLA-Navy does not constitute a threat to India in the near term, but it would not be prudent for Indian Navy ‘not to constitute adequate precautionary measures’.

Notes1Annual Report to Congress-Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2015.2Pradeep Kaushiva and Abhijit Singh, Indian Ocean Challenges-A Quet for Cooperative Solutions ( New Delhi : KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2013 ), p xxvii.3Ibid, p164Annual Report to Congress-Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2015 p 41.5Abhijit Singh, ‘ China’s Maritime Bases in the Indian Ocean Region’ : A Chronicle of Dominance Foretold Strategic Analysis May -Jun 2015, p 297.6Annual Report to Congress-Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2015 p 41.7KK Agnihotri, ‘ The Chinese Navy’s Submarine Arm : Lynchpin of Active Defence’, Maritime Affairs, Winter Edition 2012, p 106.8Ibid.9SP’s Military Year Book-2014-15, p 275.10KK Agnihotri, ‘ The Chinese Navy’s Submarine Arm : Lynchpin of Active Defence’, Maritime Affairs, Winter Edition 2012, p 114.11Annual Report to Congress-Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2015 pp 59.12Brig Sukhdeep Singh, Integrated Force Projection by India, pp 62.13Melisa H Coney Tyler and Aakriti Bhutoria, ‘ Diverging Australian and Indian Views on the Indo-Pacific Art’ Strategic Analysis May-Jun 2015, p 229.14Freedom to Use the Seas; India’s Military Maritime Strategy-2007, p 48.15Freedom to Use the Seas; India’s Military Maritime Strategy-2007, p 116.16Sudhir Singh, India in Emerging Asia, p 32.17B Saroja, Threat to India’s Security-China and Pakistan, p 59.18C Raja Menon, ‘Drawing Lines in the Water’ THE HINDU, 14 Jul 2014.19David Brewster, India’s Ocean, No 45, p 93.

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About the Author

Commodore JS Shergill, NM was commissioned into the Executive Branch of the Indian Navy on 01 Jan 1986. An alumnus of the Naval Academy, Gunnery School, Defence Services Staff College and Naval War College, the officer has commanded two Warships and has been Second-in-Command of Aircraft Carrier Indian Naval Ship Viraat. He is a recipient of Nau Sena Medal and Commendations by the Chief of the Naval Staff and General Officer Commanding in Chief, ARTRAC. A prolific writer on contemporary issues, the officer holds a rare distinction of having thrice won prizes in the prestigious Commodore Nott Memorial Prize Essay competition of the Indian Navy.

BibliographyBooks/documents

1. SD Muni and Vivek Chadha, Asian Strategic Review 2015 ‘ India as a Security Provider’.2. Uttam Kumar Sinha, ‘Emerging Strategic Trends in Asia’.3. Jayant Baranwar, ‘SP’s Military Year Book 2014-2015’ 42nd Issue.4. Brig Sukhdeep Sangwan, Integrated Force Projection by India, 2011.5. B Saroja, ‘Threat to India’s Security China and Pakistan’, 2013.6. Sudhir Singh, India in Emerging Asia, 2015.7. South Asia Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Threats, 2015.8. Shekhar Adhikari and Amardeep Athwal, ‘China-India Relations Contemporary Dynamics, 2008.9. Narinder Kumar, Challenges in the Indian Ocean Region – Response Options, 2011.10. Indian Maritime Doctrine – 2009.11. Freedom to use the Seas : India’s Maritime Military Strategy – 2007.12. Pradeep Kaushiva and Abhijit Singh, ‘Indian Ocean Challenges A Quest for Cooperative Solutions’

Journals

1. Strategic Analysis Volume 39 Number 3 May-June 20152. United Services Institution January-March 2015.3. Maritime Affairs Vol 8 No. 2 Winter 2012.

reports/Papers

1. Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015.2. China’s White Paper – China’s Military Strategy, released by the Chinese Ministry of Defence on 26 May 2015.

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74 | Winter 2014

etHNIcItY ANd etHNIc coNfLIct IN INdIA’S NortH eASt

Lt Gen KH Singh, AVSM, YSM

Introduction

Ethnicity as a term indicates a sense of collectiveness, which could be based on common language, history, culture, race or religion (or some combination of

these).1 Sometimes, ethnicity and religion clash (East and West Pakistan pre 1971, Kashmiri Hindus and Muslims, Irish Protestants and Catholics, black and white American Christians). A nation implies bringing ethnicity and statehood together. “Nationalism therefore, becomes a principle that the political and the national unit should be congruent (Gellner 1983).” This congruence may be achieved by devolution of powers; accommodating aspirations of the constituents, a federal arrangement. In some cases, it may take extreme form of secessionism and demand for sovereignty.

Dispersed ethnic groups typically demand affirmative action (preference in jobs, education, political representation) and protection of language, religion and culture.2 Demands for sovereignty or federalism normally come from territorially concentrated ethnic groups (Kashmiris, Sri Lankan Tamils, Ethnic groups in India’s North East).

Causes of Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic conflict is defined as any episode of sustained violent conflict in which national, ethnic and religious or other communal minorities challenge government to seek major changes in status (Bates et al 2003). The following conditions are likely to be fertile grounds for ethnic conflicts3 :-

• religion. Religious composition of the population affects the likelihood of ethnic conflict within a nation-state. “Nagaland for Christ” is the manifesto of NSCN (IM). An article written by JP Rajkhowa, a former Chief Secretary of Assam established links of NSCN (IM) with World Council of Churches.4 National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) is strongly backed by Christian Missionaries.5 Religion has been shown to be an issue in many worldwide conflicts. Religious diversity is a significant factor in determining how likely a state is to experience ethnic conflict.

• Presence of Armed Conflict. The presence of armed conflict in neighbouring states increases the likelihood that conflict will also be experienced within a nation’s borders. (North East India, Kashmir). In Myanmar, there are over 20 large and small ethnic insurgent

groups operating in the country. Recently, the Myanmar Government signed peace agreement with seven such groups. However, the powerful KIA, UWSA and SSA have declined to join ceasefire.

• cultural faultlines. Samuel Huntington (1993) states that “conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating civilisations.”6Increased ease of global communication leads to more interactions between people of different cultures, thus intensifying civilisation consciousness. This increased civilisation consciousness makes the differences between civilisations more apparent and will invigorate animosities leading to conflict (Huntington 1993). Differences in culture seem to be a reasonable cause of ethnic conflicts. Mukti Bahini of the then East Pakistan (1971) was perhaps one such ethnic group borne out of cultural faultline.

• economic Inequality. (Natural resources and ethnic conflict). It is assumed that when a nation-state is dependent on primary commodities including both agricultural produce and natural resources, it is much more prone to internal violence. Conflict is explained by greed or grievances where there are feelings of ethnic or political marginalisation as one group is disadvantaged by another group in terms of access to natural resources (Humphreys 2005). Land is one of the most important issues in modern times.

• Political Power. When political power is centralised and highly dependent upon one’s social group membership, such as religion, caste, haves and have notes, then collective violence is also highly likely. Bangladesh war of 1971 is an example where unequal power sharing paved the way for large scale ethnic war.

• Language and Miscellaneous. The environment surrounding a nation-state plays an integral role in determining whether a state will or will not experience ethnic conflict. Language differences among ethnic groups, perceived sense of superiority or inferiority among them and geographical distribution of the groups play a significant part in ethnic tensions. Assam has had a history of worse ethnic conflicts based on ‘language issues’ in the past. In Manipur, many tribals don’t subscribe to Manipuri language as official language in the state.

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North east India

North Eastern India – a region made up of seven sub-national states7 - has seen high level of violence, stemming mostly from ethnic and separatist conflicts. The present States of Nagaland, Meghalaya and Mizoram constituted a district each of Assam at the time of independence of India, whereas Arunachal Pradesh, (then NEFA) consisted of several ‘frontier tracts’ administered by the Governor of Assam. The States of Manipur and Tripura were princely States which merged with India in 1948. Naga, Mizo and Manipur insurgencies were the first signs of severe political crisis in the form of nationalist movements. They have mushroomed into a string of separatist movements and inter-group ethnic conflicts that have become the enduring feature of North East politics. Separatist rebellions broke out first in Naga Hills district of erstwhile Assam State, to be followed by similar armed movement in the Lushai Hills district of that State. Soon secessionism overtook Assam proper, in Tripura and Manipur. Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh are characterised by unstable and violent atmosphere, though these cannot be termed secessionists. Besides separatist violence, inter-group ethnic clashes have been frequent and have taken a heavy toll of life and property.8 Sixth Schedule has, to some extent, satisfied tribal ethnic groups aspirations and has thus prevented many conflicts. Ethnic violence exists alongside inter-ethnic contestations over resources and opportunities, in which the state finds itself pulled in different directions, with little ability to provide solutions. Consequently, politics in the region has moved to protests, ‘public curfews’ and blockades by public organisations, many with active support of armed groups.

Identity Wars

The process of integration of the North East region into the Indian ‘mainstream’ during the period of Independence has been abrupt and violent. Awareness of the cultural differences between the Indian ‘mainland’ and the collective entity called the North East and region’s significantly higher levels of ethnic and linguistic fractionalisation compared to the rest of India9 have contributed to the ethnic unrest from Independence till date10.

Ethnic violence and secessionism in the North East exist alongside the many experiments with self-rule and political autonomy for the region’s peripheral communities. Competitive mobilisation by each of the groups; big or small, have contributed to a sense of relative deprivation. This has resulted in mutual friction that fuels intensification of conflicts and violence.

Political and Administrative Approach to the North east

The North East has seen an unending cycle of violent conflicts dominated by ethnic based insurgencies with demands ranging from outright sovereignty to greater political autonomy. Insurgency has taken a toll of thousands of lives, both of security forces and citizens, as is clear from the statistics below11 :-

The central government has responded to the ‘ethnic’ challenge through a variety of means: use of force against rebel groups; accommodation of aspirations of different communities through changes in institutional arrangements and by transferring large resources for the economic upliftment of the region. Along the way, various peace agreements have been negotiated between Central and State governments and rebels groups to bring the armed movements to a close. But as it evident, peace continues to elude much of the region, at serious costs to local societies and to its citizens, with serious impact on the character of the Indian state.

Of the seven states, Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura have shown the greatest propensity to separatist and ethnic violence. On the whole, though violence has shown a tendency to abate in the region as a whole, in Manipur violence levels continue to remain very high. The State has also been known for its frequent and bloody ethnic clashes and breakdown of governmental authority. The other State that stands out positively is Mizoram. Secessionist violence has largely been absent in that State for the past two decades. Inter-group contestations between various ethnic groups also appear to be better managed and so are demands that society makes on the system.

Showering ‘economic largesse’ has been a staple response of the Centre to the violent challenges it faces in the North

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East. Integrative capability of national/state leaders have also not proved very helpful for peace in places like Manipur or Nagaland. Questions that arise are; Why is there ethnic cohesiveness of Mizo society? And what accounts for the synergy between political leaders and social organisations in the State to work for peace? Why is it that society in Manipur is so fragmented on ethnic lines?

Preservation of Identity or Exclusivity?

In terms of Foreigners (Protected Area) order 1958 by the MHA, entire state of Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Nagaland and parts of Sikkim and Manipur are declared “Protected Areas”, where no foreigner shall enter without authorisation from Central Govt. We need to review such laws in order to bring the area closer to the mainstream.

Plethora of Acts and Laws pertaining to ethnic and other social issues have been in force since the British Raj days and almost all of them continue to be operative in the North East. Why in the first place, the Britishe chose to keep almost the entire North East except some parts of Brahmaputra Valley under “Excluded Category” is difficult to guess. Was it for ease of proselytization into Christianity to establish a Christian state in the North East? Was it for security concerns?

All Insurgent groups are on ethnic lines

The roots of insurgency in the North Eastern region are results of geography, history and a host of socio-economic factors. Ninety-eight per cent of the borders of the region are international borders. While the population share is a mere three per cent of the national population, its rate of population growth has exceeded two hundred per cent between 1951-2001, generating great stress on livelihoods and adding to land fragmentation.

Conflicts in the region range from insurgency for secession to insurgency for autonomy, from ‘sponsored terrorism’ to ethnic clashes, to conflicts generated as a result of continuous inflow of migrants from across the borders as well as from other States12. Conflicts in the region can be broadly grouped under the following categories13 :-

• ‘National’ conflicts: Involving concept of a distinct ‘homeland’ as a separate nation and pursuit of the realisation of that goal. These are based on broad ethnic identities.

• Ethnic conflicts: Involving assertion of numerically smaller and less dominant tribal groups against the political and cultural hold of the dominant tribal group. In Assam, this also takes the form of tension between local and migrant communities.

• Sub-regional conflicts: Involving movements which ask for recognition of sub-regional aspirations and often

come in direct conflict with the State Governments or even the autonomous Councils. Kuki, Hmar groups in Manipur are of this kind.

Besides, criminal enterprise based on critical economic considerations, of late, acquired the characteristics of a distinct species of conflict14. It has been aptly observed that:

“The conflicts in the North East have some peculiar characteristics: they are asymmetrical; they are ambiguous, making it difficult to differentiate a friend from an enemy; they are fought in unconventional modes, deploying political and psychological means and methods; and the conflicts eventually tend to escalate into prolonged wars of attrition. Violence in the region is also caused by the failure of the State administration to provide security. This has led to the creation of alternative forces of ethnic militia for provision of security. From the perspective of its ethnic constituency, a private ethnic militia is considered a more reliable provider of security when it is threatened by another ethnic group that is armed with its own militia. This is usually the context in an ethnically polarised situation in which the State administration fails to provide security and the actions of the Army are seen as partisan.”15

State Specific Conflict Profiles

General. Undivided Assam had the longest history of insurgency. Naga and Mizo insurgencies were the earliest to flare up while the territory was part of Assam. These insurgencies were confined to ethnic Naga and Mizo dominated areas. Subsequently, both achieved statehood within the Indian Union. However, the insurgency/ extremism in some form remained in Naga dominated areas. The Mizo ethnic group is largely confined to Mizoram and the Mizo Accord largely fulfilled their aspirations. Naga Tribes extend beyond the boundary of Nagaland in Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and in Myanmar. Hence, the political aspirations to unite/integrate under Naga umbrella persisted.

While the region as a whole displays a variety of ethnic conflicts, these are state specific conflict situation and profiles. A short ‘conflict profiles of the region’ in a state specific manner is discussed below :-.

Arunachal Pradesh: Conflict in the state is mostly confined to Tirap and Changlang districts where certain groups have been somewhat assimilated to Pan Naga identity which has been built up by NSCN (IM) over decades. The State has remained somewhat peaceful after the cease-fire with NSCN (IM) which was active in Tirap District. The policies initiated under the guidance of Verrier Elwin (a noted anthropologist) in the 1950s have resulted in considerable cohesion in the area with Hindi emerging as its lingua franca. There was some ethnic disquiet with the settlement of relatively more enterprising Chakma refugees from Bangladesh in the Chenglang and Tirap District of the State in large numbers which appears to have subsided for now. The Noctes, Singpos, Konyaks, Tangsas and a number of other smaller

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tribes and sub-tribes reside in these areas. However, efforts of NSCN (IM) to enforce Pan Naga Identity on these tribes have partially succeeded.

Assam: A wide variety of ethnic conflicts prevail in the State for e.g; agitations against ‘influx of foreigners’, perceived inability of the Government to deport them; occasional tensions between religious/linguistic groups and escalating conflicts involving tribal communities who seek local autonomy etc.

The major ethnic conflict in the State is the grievance against the perceived influx of ‘foreigners’ i.e; people with a language and culture substantially different from the Assamese from across the border (i.e; Bangladesh). The ‘foreigners’ agitation’ of 1979-85 brought Assam to the brink of state collapse. The problem can be traced to the early years of the last century when the landless from the neighbouring overpopulated districts of East Bengal started arriving in the fertile and then substantially fallow Brahmaputra valley. Following communal rioting in East Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s, there were further waves of migration from the minority community of

that country into Assam. With the fear of being culturally and politically ‘swamped’, resentment built up among the Assamese and escalated into one of independent India’s most prolonged and vigorous agitations.16The Assamese-Bengali speaking ethnic tension remains a volatile situation till today. United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and Muslim United Liberation Tigers (MULTA) have the propensity to escalate the violence. The Bodo insurgent groups remain active even today. They are fighting for full-fledged statehood after having been given the Bodo Autonomous District Council in 2001. The DHD operating in the area Karbi Anglong, Cachar and Mikir Hills adjoining Nagaland were raised on ethnic lines presumably by NSCN (IM) to expand their operations in Assam. Karbis, Dimasas, Hajongs and other tribes form part of the group. The Koch Rajbongshis in Western part of Assam and in North Bengal, have occasionally resorted to violence in search of identity of Kochs. Their demand include demand for separate Kamtapur state in the region.

Manipur: Currently, it is the ‘most insurgency and violence ridden’ State with about fifteen violent outfits representing

Ser No State Major Insurgent Groups Major Ethnic Affiliation remarks

1. Assam (a) ULFA Assamese (Ahom) Hindu (Non Tribals)(b) NDFB Bodos Mostly Christian(c) KPLT Karbis Hindu and Christian(d) DHD Dimasas Mostly Hindu

2. Arunachal Pradesh NSCN (I) and NSCN (K) Nocta/Konyak/Singpos Mixed Christian/Buddhist/Hindu

3. Manipur (a) UNLF, PLA, PREPAK, KYKL

Meiteis Hindu (Non tribes)

(b) NSCN (IM) Tangkhuls and other Naga tribes

Christian

(c) KNO Kukis Christian(d) HPA Hmar Christian(e) ZRA Zomis Christian(f) PULF Valley Muslim Muslim(g) ZRF ZeliangRongs Christian and Naga Religion

4. Nagaland (a) NSCN (IM) Tangkhul, Sema dominated Christian(b) NSCN (K) Konyak Christian(c) NNC Angamis Christian

5. Mizoram No Active Militant Group6. Tripura NFLT Tripuris Mostly Christian7. Meghalaya GNLA and ANVC Garos Christian

Ethnic Affiliations of the Insurgent/Terrorist Groups

(Source : Newspaper/Periodicals)

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different tribes/communities active in the State and has become a self-financing extortion activity. Development funds were believed to be easily siphoned off to finance various unlawful and disruptive activities.17 The Government employees are also divided on ethnic lines in their support for various ethnic groups.

One seventh of Manipur (which is the valley), is home to more than sixty per cent of its population which predominantly consists of the culturally distinct Hindu Meitei community. After Independence, with the tribals coming into the forefront largely because of policy of reservations and other benefits and protection, the Meiteis (Hindus) have felt sidelined. Tribal population accounts for approximately forty per cent of the State’s population and broadly belong to Naga, Kuki-Chin and Mizo groups. The ‘cultural distance’ of tribals from the Meiteis widened with almost all the tribes coming under the Christian fold by the 1930s.18 There is considerable tension among the tribes over land and boundaries and violence between Nagas and Kukis took a toll of more than 2000 lives during the 1990s. Large scale protests by Zomi groups against the majority Meiteis erupted in Sep 2015 on the issue of Land Bill.

The cease-fire between the Union Government and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) has reduced violence in Naga areas but has given rise to fresh tensions as the NSCN insists on a greater ‘Nagalim’ which could include four districts of Manipur. This is strongly resisted by the Meiteis and upto some extent by the Kukis in the State and had caused a very violent agitation in 2001. In the southern parts of the state Hmars, Paite and other tribes have been waging violent struggles partly for local hegemony and partly for their own enclave in the form of a Union Territory called “Zomi”. Most of the tribal communities want their areas to be brought under the Sixth Schedule. This demand is vociferously opposed by those in the Valley. In short, Manipur continues to be an active arena for a multiplicity of ethnic violent conflicts.19 The ethnic divide in political, economic and social arena has resulted into a situation where people of Manipur have been one of the worst affected by law and order issues.

Meghalaya: The State is by and large free from violence of the intensity that prevails in many other parts of the region. Violence against ‘outsiders’, particularly the Bengali speaking linguistic minority, continues sporadically. Increasing inter-tribal rivalry has led to formation of Garo ethnic armed groups demanding their share of power in the State. Emerging tensions due to infiltration from Bangladesh particularly in the Garo Hills has also led to ethnic clashes in the State20.

Mizoram: The State with its history of violent insurgency and its subsequent return to peace is an example to all other violence affected States. Mizo Accord 1986 and conferment of statehood the next year has ensured peace and harmony in Mizoram. The State is recognised as having done a commendable job in the implementation of development programmes and making agriculture remunerative. Bru (Reangs) Chakmas who are resident of Mizoram in certain pockets, have been given certain administrative powers. This has ensured inter-ethnic tranquility so far.21 These Chakma and Reang tribes are mostly Buddhists and have been target of Mizo majority violence in the past.

Nagaland: ‘Naga’ is a term coined by outsiders. There is no such term as Naga race. Each of the 35 Naga tribes have different languages which cannot be understood by each other. These tribes fought each other for centuries. Of the 35 Naga tribes, 17 are common in Nagaland and remainder spread in Manipur, Myanmar and Arunachal. Following the cease-fire with the NSCN (IM), the State is free from overt violent unrest. However, it is widely known that the cease fire ground rules are broken randomly by the insurgent groups which continue recruitment of more insurgents, extortion from various sources and targeted killings when required. These are carried out through various front organisations which may or may not be armed. The lingering issue of a final political settlement including the demand for ‘Greater Nagaland’ is causing disquiet in the neighbouring areas of Assam, Arunachal and Manipur. Sixteen major tribes in Nagaland have their ethnic affiliations towards insurgent groups. While Semas are aligned with NSCN (IM), Konyaks and Aos are aligned with the NSCN (K) and Angami tribes have their affinity towards NFG/NNC.

Sikkim: The state has a balanced ethnic and socio-economic structure. Constitutional balance between Lepchas, Bhutiyas on one side and Nepalis on the other has also prevented emergence of major ethnic conflicts. The Nepalese origin form approx 60% of the population and Bhutias, Lepchas etc form approx 20%. There appears to be peace and harmony. However, any linkages of Nepalese origin Sikkim residents with Nepal to leverage ethnic issues should be discouraged to prevent unrests in the future.

tripura: The State’s demographic profile was altered since 1947 when mass migrations from the newly emerged East Pakistan converted it from a largely tribal area to one with a majority of Bengali speaking population. Tribals were deprived of their agricultural lands at throw-away prices and driven to the forests. Major violence and widespread

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terror erupted with the tribal dominated Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) emerging as one of the most violent extremist outfits in the North East. Proximity to Mizoram also fuelled that insurgency. However, effective decentralisation in the ‘non-scheduled areas’, bringing tribal areas autonomous ‘Sixth Schedule’ Council and successful land reforms have contributed to considerable conflict reduction.22 It is assessed that with adequate economic development, the state may see continued peace in the years ahead.

Way Ahead to Address the ethnic/Identity crisis

Editorial page of the Hindu (15 Oct 15) states “It is time that Govt paid right kind of attention to the NE Region, that stunning and strategic locales that ‘Mainland India’ often does not understand and routinely tends to ignore ……………….. New Delhi needs to deal with the region with a broader political response than a few intelligence officers. Securitising the entire challenge is not the way to go.”23

The above sums up the approach that perhaps is the need of the hour. To this end, the recent “peace deal” between NSCN (IM) and Government of India is considered to be a beginning. What needs to be progressed further is accommodation of the aspirations of other ethnic groups and their associated militant groups also. The fractured nature of the ethnicity, religion, culture and language demands that maximum stake holders be simultaneously addressed to avoid playing one against the other.

Non-inclusive development in the North East Region has further accentuated the ethnic divide and throws a challenge to the very idea of India. Development in terms of economic activity to cover maximum ethnically divided geographical areas is the key. Half-cocked globalisation, which has created deep crisis of identity among the various ethnic groups (more than 300 or so dialects are known to be in the region) in the North East need to further progress towards true mainstreaming. Strategies to address issues at the grass root level in a broad based manner in order to ensure that benefits of growth and development reach out to various strata of the society without any discrimination based on ethnic, religion or tribe/caste lines is the key. Given the nature of reservation of jobs and protection provided to the tribals, it is bound to be a tightrope walk for the policy makers. It is then that the NGOs and public discourses need to play greater role in the social issues of the region.

There is a concern about ignorance of tribals in matters of governance and developmental issues in certain quarters. However, in the North East, it is a fact that there are far more number of tribals in IAS, IPS and other All India Services than the non-tribals. The literacy rate does not show any deprivation of education to tribals either. However, it is social attitude and caste-divide (such as untouchability), a norm a hundred years ago, that still lingers in the minds of certain groups.

Ethnic divide must be addressed by political and social means. De-communalise and de-tribalise polities. Deter over ground groups/workers to set the agenda for the secessionist and other militant groups. Equitable opportunities for all must be ensured. Connectivity of roads to pass through areas with variety of ethnic groups will ensure inter-dependence in economic activities.

conclusion

Identity wars/conflict resolution attempts and economic upliftment will need to be balanced. To some extent, identity wars have given way to economic upliftment in Mizoram, Sikkim and Tripura. However, it simmers in Manipur, Assam, Nagaland and Meghalaya. It is felt that “Look and Act East Policy” of the Government shall soon be an instrument of economic progress in the region. This, in turn, shall partially address the issue of connectivity and economic upliftment of the region. The process of economic upliftment should endeavour to avoid playing the ethnic divide and should be all inclusive. Identity wars/conflicts between the ethnic groups are remnant of age-old feuds between ethnic groups, biases and perceived deprivations of one group at the cost of the other. Therefore, in the final analysis, ethnic conflicts are bound to give way to economic development if all ethnic groups are encouraged and allowed to co-exist with ‘respect’ in the traditional term. “Take away respect and humanity loses its very sanity. No one wants to live sans respect and none wants to die without honour”.24 The Indian State has a huge stake in bringing about peace in the region due to varied geo-political and security challenges that exist there.

Notes

1Ashutosh Varshney : Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict : Chapter 12, Page 274, available at http://ashutoshvarshney.net/wp-content/files_mf/varshneyethnicityandethnicconflict.pdf

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About the Author

Lt Gen KH Singh, AVSM, YSM, an alumnus of Sainik School, Goalpara and the National Defence Academy, was commissioned into the RAJPUT Regiment in 1978. He has held varied command, staff and instructional appointments. He commanded his unit during OP VIJAY in Turtuk Sector in Siachen and has commanded a Division and a Corps on the Line of Control in J&K. His staff and instructional appointments include Battalion Commander at National Defence Academy, Colonel Administration of a Mountain Division, Deputy Military Secretary in the Command Headquarters/Army Headquarters and Chief of Staff of a Strike Corps. The General successfully participated in an expedition to Kedarnath Dome in 1980 and Kanchenjunga expedition in 1987. He is presently posted as Commandant Infantry School.

2Ibid.3 Bates R 1974 : Ethnic Competitions and Modernisation in Africa, Page 457.4The Sentinel, 12 May 2008, Guwahati Edition5http://swarajmag.com/2015/01/07:terrorinthenameofchrist6Huntington : Clash of Civilisation, Page 1.7 Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura –with a total population of 38 million.8 Some prominent ones being the Naga-Kuki (1992-96) and the Kuki-Paite (1997-99) clashes in Manipur; Hmar-Dimasa violence in Assam (2003); Tribal-not tribal violence in Tripura (1979-80 and subsequently) and the ongoing inter-tribal conflicts in Nagaland.9 The North East makes up a mere 4% of India’s population. Yet it accounts for 58 of the 114 languages and 100 of the 600 tribes listed by the Census of India. (Census of India, 2001)10 M Sajjad Hassan, Understanding the breakdown in North East India : Exploration in state society relations, P-2 Published in May 2007, available at www.lse.ac.uk/depts/destin.11Source : Annual Report of Ministry of Home Affairs 2013-2014)12 Archana Upadhyay, “Terrorism in the North East : Linkages and Implications”, Economic and Political Weekly, December 2, 200613 Annual Report Min of Development for NER, Conflicts in the North East : Capacity Building for Conflict Resolution, Chapter 12, Page 144, available at www.mdoner.gov.in/sites/defalt/files/ARC_7thReport_ch12.pdf14op cit, Archana Upadhyay15ibid16 Annual Report Min of Development for NER, Conflicts in the North East : Capacity Building for Conflict Resolution, Chapter 12, Page 145, available at www.mdoner.gov.in/sites/defalt/files/ARC_7thReport_ch12.pdf17Ibid, P 14718Ibid.19ibid.20 ibid, P 14821ibid.22ibid23 The Hindu :Editorial, Delhi Edition, 15 Oct 2015.24Hejang Misao (a Kuki tribal from Manipur) in Kanglaonlino.com, Sept 13, 2015, In the Aftermath of Ethnic Tension in the State of Manipur.

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INterNAL SecUrItY : creAtING coUNter-terror cAPABILItY LeSSoNS froM eXPerIeNce of dePUtAtIoN WItH StAte

GoVerNMeNt/PoLIce

Introduction

India has been combating terrorism in many forms since its Independence in 1947. Recent attacks have got more audacious and heinous, adversely impacting on the public

perception of the Internal Security of the Nation. This in turn impacts on the investor climate, tourism, increased Security Related Expenditure (SRE) and ultimately on the economy.

The Mumbai attacks on 26 November 2008 (26/11) exposed the lack of counter-terror capability, preparedness and coordination and served as a reality check for central and state governments and law enforcement agencies. States that have been fighting terror such as Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, the North Eastern States, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand and the then united Andhra Pradesh have created different levels of counter-terror capability supported by Army deployment as also CAPF deployment. Most of these capabilities were in the jungle and counter-insurgency mode. Urban counter-terror operations with room intervention and hostage rescue remained the purview of the special federal counter-terror agency, National Security Guard (NSG).

By and immediately after 26/11 many states commenced the process of creating their integral (urban) counter-terror capability. It is in this context that in March 2009, Karnataka Government requested Ministry of Defence for the services of a senior serving officer of the rank of Brigadier, on deputation, to assist them in creating a counter-terror capability. After volunteering for the assignment, I was selected by the Army Headquarters and Ministry of Defence and directed to report to the State Government in October 2009. After a four month hiatus, due to miscommunication between Ministry of Defence and the State, my candidature for deputation was finally accepted by Karnataka state in February 2010.

The Government asked me to report to the DG, the Head of State Police Force, who in turn asked me to report to the Additional DG of the newly created Internal Security Division. I was initially told to commence training for the police ‘commandos’, a term I later came to realise was used for any policeman specially trained in weapons and tactics.

The following account is a gist of the lessons I learnt from my stint on deputation with the State Police.

clarity in tasking. After an analysis of the threats and needs of the state and a discussion with the DGP it was decided to develop counter-terror capability in the state in two ways. First was to create a counter-terror training facility to impart training to the personnel of the state police at two levels i.e. firstly, for personnel of the armed police who would be the special response force in various police districts, and secondly, for personnel from the police stations who would be the first responders in any terror situation. Second was to raise a permanent urban counter-terror special response team, on lines of NSG. This clarity in tasking enabled us to develop short and long term solutions and led to the creating of the training facility (Centre for Counter-Terrorism/CCT) and a special urban counter-terror force (Garuda Force). The counter-naxal capability was already being addressed by a 500-man strong standing Anti-Naxal Force (ANF) deployed in a grid in the major naxal affected areas. ANF conducted area domination actions and functioned in support of the district SPs who were responsible to keep their respective districts free of naxal incidents. CCT conducted counter-naxal (jungle oriented) training for personnel of ANF and for Anti-Naxal Squads (ANS) of the naxal affected districts. Role clarity, especially of the Garuda Force was defined through an evolving process to ensure that they were not employed in routine police preventive deployment.

training. State police training essentially consists of basic training which is perfunctory to say the least. In service training consists of practical field attachments and on the job training. Personnel are expected to be self-aware. Special forces type of training where all ranks involve themselves, is virtually unheard of. CCT’s team of police trainers were put through a two-week ‘Training of Trainers’ with an Army Special Forces Unit. This training was invaluable in that it exposed the police personnel to physical and mental endurance and weapons and tactics required for urban and jungle counter-terror operations. Syllabi were decided upon, study material was collected from various sources, and need-based training programs developed. Cross and joint training with special police units of other states and NSG was vigorously pursued and conducted. Separate programs were conducted to ensure that officers of the ranks of Inspector to Additional SP were also trained/exposed to counter-terror capabilities. Regrettably senior officers of the rank of SP and

Maj Gen KA Muthanna

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above, especially direct IPS were dis-inclined to undertake any such exposure leading to repeated observations from constables about the capability of their officers being able to conduct and lead good counter-terror operations.

Allocation of funds and Procurement cycle. Once an idea/proposal is accepted and budgetary allocation is made, it is possible, with a little bit of pushing, to complete the entire procurement process in one financial year. Heads of unit are also responsible for their respective budgets. This ensures that police special forces are equipped with state of art weapons and equipment. Tight networking amongst the IPS/IAS cadre in the state, which is quite personalised, facilitates timely decisions and approvals.

Supremacy or domination of elected representatives over Police (Lack of Autonomy). Over the years the role of the elected representative in police transfers had evolved into his becoming the selection authority for police functionaries in his constituency, making the Police Establishment Board (PEB), as required by the Supreme Court (in the Prakash Singh case), a rubber stamp for the politically initiated transfer lists. This makes functioning of police a very big challenge for both subordinates and superiors. Both are not sure how long the other will remain in the post. Subordinates with requisite clout move at their own convenience, often to the detriment to the organisational interests. As a result senior officers find the necessity to issue detailed written orders to ensure that they can elicit the desired response from the recalcitrant subordinates, a practice that does not behove for counter-terror operations. Further, since accountability is very well defined, there is great aversion to risk taking to the point of inaction. This is compounded on backing out from verbal decisions and punishing subordinates for perceived dereliction of duty, even if some action is taken in good faith.

tenure-based Personalised Styles versus Institutionalism. The police system places direct responsibility on the concerned officer who is directly answerable to Head of the Department and more often than not to the political masters. Further, most state police forces mandate a minimum tenure of one year, the Supreme Court ruling on Mr Prakash Singh’s PIL notwithstanding. This has led to short tenures and a preference for more personalised styles of functioning as opposed to an institutionalised system. Thus, one officer’s proposal and order are most likely to be placed on the backburner once he demits office. This virtually rings the death knell on long term counter-terror capabilities.

Preference for (civil) executive Posts (directly responsible for law and order and crime or traffic). With the power that

emanates from executive posts vis-a-vis other non-executive posts such as intelligence, internal security, training, etc; most officers serve in non-executive posts under duress, often accepting such assignments as limited tenure promotion cases.

civil and Armed cadre. Some states have separated civil and armed cadre to the extent that the civil cadre look down upon the armed cadre. Personnel from the civil cadre cannot comprehend the need for small team/unit training as required for counter-terror operations, especially in today’s environment where the terrorists operates at near military level of coordinated functioning. Most armed cadre personnel are used to be employed in subordinate roles to civil cadre officers. Senior armed cadre officers do not go out into the field as their personnel/sub units are placed at the disposal of civil cadre officers.

Inability to exploit Lateral (counter-terror) Skill Induction from Military and cAPf Veterans. Recruitment rules and reluctance to absorb military and CAPF veterans with counter-terror skills into State Police Special Forces are main hindrances in lateral induction of these experts. Very few states, Tamil Nadu being one, have created special posts to induct military veterans into specialist counter-terror units/assignments.

Leadership in counter-terror Units. Leadership in counter-terror units is best suited to be based on military lines where the leaders are fully involved and lead in the military style i.e. “follow me” style. Most police units have a leadership model that is more “assigned and delegated” style. Some states have organised their counter-terror special units under the direct leadership of dynamic IPS officers; Maharashtra’s Force One and Unified Andhra Pradesh’s Octopus, are two good examples. These organisations have developed into fine counter-terror units. However, in most of the states there is a marked reluctance in the political and police hierarchy to assign direct IPS officers to counter-terror special units. Karnataka has opted to avail of the services of a senior serving officer (of the rank of Brigadier) to assist them. Unified Andhra Pradesh opted to appoint a military veteran of the rank of Colonel in the post of DIG in its counter-terror organisation. Chattisgarh has opted to appoint a military veteran of the rank of Brigadier in the rank of IGP as dean of its Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare College. Odisha has utilised the services of a military veteran of the rank of Brigadier to run their training set up as did Jharkhand.

recourse to Written response. The Police Forces place great importance on written communication. In case of

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receiving any orders/instructions that need cancelling or modification the best option is to place the dissent and recommendations on record in writing. More often than not the contentious order is not repeated.

Preventive and reactive response to terror. US federal and state law enforcement agencies have hundreds of active duty personnel operating under-cover and in penetrated positions of identified terror capable organisations which have gone a long way in preventing terror attacks on US soil post 9/11. That India continues to be hit by terror attacks is an indicator of the lack of preventive capability, especially in terms of intelligence operations and penetration of terror outfits. Lack of long term assignment to counter-terror intelligence and operational units hinders the development of much needed continuity of institutional memory. Multi-tasking of law and

About the AuthorMaj Gen KA Muthanna was commissioned into the Garhwal Rifles. He has served in mountain and insurgency/terrorism affected areas and IPKF as platoon, company, battalion and Rashtriya Rifles Sector commander. His staff assignments include BM of a Mountain Brigade, AMS in MS Branch, GSO 1 (Ops & Trg) IMTRAT (Bhutan) and Director of Foreign Training the Army HQs. As a Senior Research Fellow at USI his research work was published as a book titled “Enabling Military-To-Military Cooperation as a Foreign Policy Tool – Options for India Cooperation”. In his previous assignment he was deputed by the Ministry of Defence to Karnataka (State Police) to assist in enhancing the counter-terror capability of the State. As Director of the State Police’s Centre for Counter-Terrorism, he set up counter-terror training centre for the state police and created the state’s special counter-terror response force, GARUDA Force. Presently he is Additional DG NCC for Bihar and Jharkhand.

order units/officers with counter-terror intelligence and operations usually results in short term actions which do not cater for the required long term preventive type of actions.

conclusion

In the present terror environment where strikes can occur almost at any place at any time, the first responders i.e. state police, at the police station level and the armed units level, must be re-oriented to be counter-terror capable in terms of manpower, weapons and equipment, tactics and procedures, training; and command, control and decision making. Present police procedures are not fully suited for these roles and must be changed/modified suitably. A healthy combination of military and police styles of functioning will meet the requirements of challenges that counter-terror operations throw up.

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NAXALISM : IMPedIMeNt to tHe NAtIoN BUILdING ProceSS

Brigadier Ram Niwas, VSM

Introduction

The ‘Lal Salam’ (Naxal) armed movement has challenged the nation since more than 40 years. It is based on Maoist ideology and gains its strength

through mobilising the poor, underprivileged, discouraged and marginalised, especially in rural India. The Naxalism movement is a serious threat for the Nation. They are now active in 223 districts in 20 states with armed cadres estimated between 10,000 and 20,000. Due to the Naxal control over certain areas and their armed fight against the state security forces, they are challenging the inherent ideals of the state, namely sovereignty and monopoly on the use of force.

Even though India is challenged by several conflicts, the Maoist insurgency can be regarded as one of the most serious threats, in terms of the level of violence, the amount of embattled territory as well as its complexity. In addition, India’s other conflicts, namely Kashmir and the North East are located in its periphery, the Naxalism one is being fought in its heartland.

Though there is slight decline in violence level, knowing the history of Naxalism, temporary break in casualties is no indication of containment of deep rooted ideological menace. The tentacles of Naxalism are still spreading all over the country and the day will not be far when this problem will engulf the whole of the nation if corrective measures are not taken with right earnest and sincerity. There is an emergent need for the central government to start looking for pragmatic and practical solutions to the problem. The areas which are the stronghold of Naxals are the poorest and there is anger, frustration and resentment against the government and its institutions. These people are looking up to the Naxals to get rid of their miseries and forced to take path of violence.

the history and causes of the movement

According to Maoist official statements they are fighting for peasant’s marginalisation and exploitation which dates back to late Moghul time when the rulers began restructuring the agrarian sector. Under British Raj restructuring was continued and intensified in order to meet the economic requirements of the Empire. The land of the peasants was taken and handed over to the landlords and revenue collectors. The new large landowners generally did not have any knowledge concerning efficient agriculture management. The peasants

that lived mainly from subsistence farming were now forced to bonded labour on their formerly self owned land. In addition the introduction of “commodity market” along the lines of western capitalism destroyed existing traditional social structures. As a consequence of the concentration of the agricultural land in the hands of a few rentier land-owners, 110 violent peasant uprisings took place between 1783 and 1900.

Due to the popularity of the non-violent independence movement, the Communist Party of India (CPI), founded in 1920 in exile, restrained initially from violent resistance during the pre-independence phase. However, they expanded their support base in the most backward areas of the former princely state of Hyderabad which culminated in a peasant uprising that turned violent in 1946. By July 1948, 2,500 villages in the south were organised into ‘communes’ as part of a peasant movement which came to be known as Telangana Struggle.

In 1964 CPI (M), which had split from CPI, decided to participate in elections, postponing armed struggle over revolutionary policies. Communist leader Charu Majumdar wrote various articles based on Marx-Lenin-Mao thought during the period, which later came to be known as ‘Historic Eight Documents’ and formed the basis of naxalite movement.

The year 1967 marks a turning point in terms of the revolutionary armed struggle in India. In 1967 CPI (M) participated in polls and formed a coalition United Front

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government in West Bengal with Bangla Congress. This led to split in the party with younger cadres, including Charu Majumdar, accusing CPI (M) of betraying the revolution. On 25 May 1967, the rebel cadres led by Charu Majumdar launched a peasants’ uprising at Naxalbari in Darjeeling district of West Bengal after a tribal youth, who had a judicial order to plough his land, was attacked by “goons” of local landlords. Tribals retaliated and started forcefully capturing back their lands. The CPI (M)-led United Front government cracked down on the uprising. The Congress government at the Centre supported the crackdown. The incident echoed throughout India and Naxalism was born. The Naxalite movement spread throughout the country, especially in West Bengal, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, accompanied by a high grade of violence. The period from 1970 to mid 1971 represents the peak in violence against the state.

In the background of Bangladesh war, the Army crushed the ultra-left movement in West Bengal. In 1972 almost all top leaders of the movement were imprisoned due to the crackdown measures by law enforcement agencies. Charu Majumdar was also arrested in Calcutta in July 1972. He died in Lal Bazar police lock-up on 28 July 72. Revolutionary struggle suffered a serious debacle due to this.

The changes within the Communist Party of China (CPC) after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 also had a direct effect on the Naxal movement there was a split in the party. One part stayed loyal to the rulers in Beijing, another split off the main party called CPI Marxist-Liberation (ML) demanded a course correction. The emergency declared by Indira Gandhi in 1975 resulted in the ban of all Naxal organisations. Around 40,000 cadres were imprisoned. It was a major setback for the Naxal movement. In 1977 when the emergency was lifted, the CPI (ML) reviewed its strategy. They left the underground and opted for going the peaceful path and participating in parliamentary elections. But this event did not mark the end of violence. In April 1980 Mr Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, a former CPI (ML) leader formed the CPI (ML) People’s War Group (PWG). Strategy and tactics of the PWG still represent the dominant line of the Naxal movement today. PWG gave Maoism in India a new life and new characteristics.

Security concerns

The violence level due to Naxalism has gone down in last few years, however, this reduction in casualties cannot be taken as containment of the four decade old LWE insurgency. The LWE insurgency has to be seen from a long term perspective and not short term fluctuations in violence profile.

Naxalism in its present form failed to follow the origional ideology i.e., working with an aim of establishing social equality. The merger of MCC (I) and PWG has resulted in the consolidation of their military and political wings. Today, the Naxals are following the policy of coercion and elimination. It is forcing the other LWE groups to either join CPI (ML) or be prepared to be eliminated. CPI (ML) presently has emerged as the dominant LWE group with its clout and influence extending over a sizeable portion of the country. It is proclaiming itsself as the sole representative of the oppressed, poor and landless people. The Naxals are trying desperately to find a voice and sympathisers in international forums in order to get worldwide recognition and acceptance.

The leadership of Naxals generally consists of students and middle-class intellectuals and recruits are the tribals and poor masses of the society. Most of the young recruits are illiterate tribal people who have never read Mao. These people get affected by a different ideology of governance and thus start losing faith and confidence in democratic institutions and the government. This indoctrination is going to have serious ramifications, aiding the Naxalites in fulfilling their agenda of establishing Communist order in this democratic country.

It is estimated that the consolidation of Naxal groups has increased the cadre strength from 7,000 to approx 14000. Even if 25% of these are capable of armed struggle, then also the strength goes up to 3500 to 4000 which is much larger than the number of terrorists at any time in J & K. Numerous groups with Left Wing Extremist lineage are active in many parts of the country. The aim of these groups is to overthrow the elected government of the country which is against the very fundamentals of the constitution.

The Naxalite affected area of the country is much more than J&K and NE States. Today the Naxalites are dreaming of establishing a red corridor and are putting all their energies to fulfillment this goal. The comparative data of incidents and fatalities in J&K, NE States and Naxal affected areas are as under:-

The Naxal cadres and even people under their influence are openly challenging the writ of the government. The Naxals are collecting taxes, redistributing cultivable land and extorting money from the rich. Apart from dispensing justice through Jan Adalats, kidnapping and killing of government officials has become routine. Today the Naxals have become so powerful that they are carrying out indiscriminate attacks on police forces and CAPFs. This is also resulting in large scale destruction of public and private property.

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The States of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and Bihar are considered severely affected. The States of West Bengal and Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh are considered partially affected. The States of UP and MP are considered slightly affected. There is major improvement in Andhra Pradesh, which was considered severely affected earlier.

Socio-economic concerns

The regions which are seriously affected by Naxalism are very rich in natural resources. However, the pace of development and true exploitation of these resources has not materialised to its fullest owing to the Naxal menace. Indirectly, this is going to have a negative impact on the economy of the country. A lot of Investors from foreign countries as well Indian corporate houses are reluctant to exploit this mineral rich area due to security concerns. This has also led to

deterioration of living conditions in the area due to poor economic opportunities.

The Maoists wish to keep the population in their strongholds cut-off from the mainstream milieu. The schools are attacked because education promotes a spirit of enquiry among the local population and also equips children with skills for alternative sources of livelihood. These developments are looked upon by the Maoists as potential threats to their very existence and their outdated ideology. The Maoists also destroy infrastructure like roads and telecom network to keep populations isolated from mainstream India.

Naxal affected districts are predominantly covered with dense forests. According to the Forest Survey of India Report 2003, about 60% of the forest cover of the country and 63% of the dense forests lie in 187 tribal districts. The control of the Naxals on these areas has serious ecological implications.

The main support for the Naxalite movement comes from dalits and adivasis. Dalits and adivasis comprise about one-fourth of India’s population. Most of them (80 percent of Dalits and 92 percent of Adivasis) live in rural areas. High levels of rural poverty therefore, are likely to indicate high distress. Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar

Pradesh and West Bengal are the states with highest rural poverty, and they also account for a high proportion of SC and ST poor. Seventy percent of the SC poor are in these five States, whereas only 55.8% of the SC population of the country is in these five States. In addition; they suffer from oppression and denial of justice, social, legal and political rights. Poverty does create deprivation but other factors like denial of justice and human dignity cause alienation resulting in the conviction that relief can be had outside the system by breaking the current order. Large areas, inhabited by

Year J&K Ne States Naxal Affected States

Incidents Civilian Killings Incidents Civilian

Killings Incidents Civilian Killings

2009 NK NK 1297 264 2258 591

2010 NK NK 773 94 2213 720

2011 340 31 627 70 1760 469

2012 220 11 1025 97 1415 301

2013 170 15 732 107 1136 282

2014 222 28 842 212 1096 222

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bhils and some other tribals where the situation is seemingly peaceful may face this problem with the spread of awareness and consciousness.

Today the government has to spend enormous amounts of funds to fight the menace of Naxalism. The amount averages to 12% of the state expenditure considering all the affected areas put together. This money could have been diverted to other developmental schemes if not used for fighting Naxalism.

Today, large finances of the government are being funneled towards security forces which are operating in these areas to control Naxalism, resulting in development activities taking a back seat. Ultimately, the time and energy of the government is diverted towards security issues as against more important issues of development and social progress.

Normal activity in the agricultural sector has come to stand still due to the tactics of ‘land redistribution’ adopted by Naxalites. While the Naxalites make the landless tillers to occupy the redistributed land, they are seldom cultivating this land due to fear of police action and at the same time, the landlords are abandoning the area and settling in urban areas due to Naxalite terror.

central government initiatives

Security related Measures. To effectively deal with the LWE insurgency, Central government is facilitating capacity building of the State forces. Central government is implementing schemes related to strengthening of security set up in the state. 93 Battalions have been deployed in affected States and four battalions have been earmarked as reserve. 10 Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA) have been raised from 2008 to 2011 and nine battalions have deployed in effected states. Every year all affected states are provided financial assistance for various security related expenditures. In 2014-15, Rs 207.08 Cr were released to 106 districts of 10 affected states up to 31 December 2014. 400 Police Stations have been fortified @ Rs 2.0 Cr per Police station in 10 affected states (centre and state share of expenditure 80:20). Rs 542.16 Cr have been released since 2010 to 2014-15 for fortification of police stations. The schemes for special infrastructure have been 100% funded by Central government. Rs 445.82 Cr have spent during 11th Five Year Plan for upgrading of existing roads/tracks, camping grounds, helipads in inaccessible areas in affected states. Rs 122.13 Cr have been spent up to 31 December 2014 during 12th Plan for the same. 36 Indian Reserve Battalions and one Specialist Indian Reserve Battalion (SIRB) have been raised for 10 affected states. 10 additional SIRBs have

been sanctioned for affected states. 15 Counter Insurgency and Anti Terrorist Schools (CIAT) have been established in affected states during 11th Plan. Three CIATs are being established during 12th Plan.

development related Measures. On the development front, an Integrated Action Plan (now called Additional Central Assistance to LWE affected districts) aims at providing public infrastructure and services and is under implementation since 2010. Planning Commission has been monitoring various developmental programmes through MIS and video conferences. Rs 9059 Cr have been spent till January 2015 on various programmes. Rs 19.30 Cr have been spent under Civic Action Plan. Large number of schemes has been launched to project human face of the CAPFs. Media plans have been launched to create awareness of local masses on socio-economic developmental projects, their rights and entitlements. A rehabilitation package which includes Rs 2.5 lakhs for high ranking individual and Rs 1.5 lakhs for middle and low ranking LWE cadre surrendree has been launched. The amount will be kept as fixed deposit for three years and will be released subject to their behaviour. Central Government provides 100% reimbursement to effected states. Rupees three lakhs is released to NOK of the victim in addition to exgratia of Rupees one lakh.

Suggested measures to arrest the growing menace

The complexity of the causes of the Naxalite problem as well as its implications both for internal and external security demand a solution that is multi-dimensional and calls for a synergy between the central government and the states. In order to comprehensively arrest the Naxalite threat, the government has to address its root causes through a multi pronged strategy. The strategy must take into consideration various aspects like political, social, economic, psychological, environment, cultural, civil actions, law enforcement etc.

Currently, the main instrument employed by the government to address the Naxalite threat is the increasing use of the security forces. To wipe out a well-established insurgency

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through military means alone, is not practically possible. While some security forces are still needed to combat against the Maoist guerrillas, it should not be the only solution. By only addressing the issue by brute force, government risks alienating civilians who are caught in the middle. Coercion of the state will only encourage people to rally against it.

A corrupt government that is incapable of winning the hearts and minds of its people even in peaceful parts of the country is unlikely to be able to accomplish any miracles in parts of the country that are in open rebellion against the government. Naxalism has long presented the greatest threat to the country’s security and has also highlighted the underlining weakness of the Indian government, which has failed to establish refined political institutions and have failed to provide sound socio-economic structures. The presence of Naxals in the country also reveals the loopholes in the law and order of the country which has failed to curb the menace.

Insecure livelihood and unemployment in the areas have left the people with no option but to join the Naxals. The youth in the area demand for reservation in almost all sections of employment. If we are actually thinking of ways to arrest Naxalism, we’ll first have to provide the people of the area with proper employment opportunities as this will wean the youth from getting involved in Maoist’ activities.

Economic disparity and the growing distance between rich and the poor widening by the day is one of the biggest problems that India confronts, and according to many experts, it is also one of the main problems that has contributed to the growth of Naxalism in the country. This distance needs to be bridged to arrest growing Naxalism. Economic integration of Naxal affected regions with the rest of India must be the priority of the Government. Basic infrastructure projects need to be undertaken on war footing in Naxalite affected areas. States have to play a major role because they are the one who have to deliver on the ground.

As brought out earlier, one of the major reasons for unrest is the exploitation of forest and lands of the tribal people for industrial purposes. The loss of land and the lack of basic facilities like education, freedom, sanitation and food have further escalated strife between the government and the tribals giving them a reason to support the Naxalism. Thus in order to arrest Naxalism, it is essential to provide access to these basic facilities to every ordinary citizen of the affected areas.

India has grown both culturally and politically over the years, but what remains unchanged is that the weaker sections of

the society, the Schedule Casts and Schedule Tribes still face discrimination from the upper classes. These downtrodden sections don’t enjoy equal participation in the political process, which drastically hampers their progress and representation, making them soft targets of Naxals. There fore in order to arrest Naxalism, it is essential to stop the political marginalisation of weaker sections of these states.

The socially backward tribals form the major support base for Naxalites as they suffer with rebellious instincts and unrest because of inequality, illiteracy and lack of opportunities. Besides being the core support groups for the Naxalites, the dalits and tribals are often manipulated by the Naxals for their own gains. These downtrodden sections of our society inadvertently become soft targets for both the Naxals and the security agencies. Therefore, to prevent these people from falling in the Naxal trap, Government should take immediate steps for welfare of these people.

India has numerous law enforcement agencies most of which, according to the nature of the constitution of India, are subject to state control. Many agencies are under the command of Union Ministry of Home Affairs, which support the states in their duties. CAPF have produced fairly good results in the last four years. Better synergy among the CAPF and the state police, unity of command, human intelligence and coordination is a must to deal with the Naxal problem holistically, because the implementation on ground would primarily be achieved by the states. The central government should make inroads into these disturbed states to ensure that law enforcing agencies are well trained and well-equipped with modern weapons and equipment.

It was easy for the government to set up mining grounds, irrigation areas, industries, etc., in the area without any provision for the resettlement of the displaced people. This has only added to the woes of the poor, who are left with no alternative but boycott the government and its policies and support the Naxals. Therefore, to prevent these people from falling in the Naxal trap Central Government should pay immediate attention to rehabilitation and resettlement of the displaced people.

The government should initiate sincere dialogue with these marginalised groups, the Naxalites and state leaders. The popularity of Naxalites with the adivasis is a reflection of the fact that the government has been unaware or “unapologetically indifferent to their plight”. By communicating and starting a dialogue between these stakeholders, these groups will feel that they being listened to. By opening dialogue, the government can give opportunity for the rebels to join the mainstream by showing them that solutions can be created

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Notes

• Aiyar, Mani Shanker; Talk: Only solution of Naxalism; NDTV- Opinion; 14 Mar 2014; http://www.ndtv.com/opinion/mani-talk-the-only-solution-to-naxalism-553930

• Chadha, Vivek; 2005: Low Intensity Conflicts in India – An Analysis; New Delhi.

• CPI (Maoist); 2001: Urban Perspective; www.bannedthought.net/India/CPI-Maoist-Docs/UrbanPerspective.pdf

• FICCI 2009: Task Force Report on National Security and Terrorism; New Delhi; www.ficci.com/SPdocument/20032/terrorism-report.pdf

• Gaikwad, Rahi; 2009: Manmohan: naxalism the greatest internal threat; http://beta.thehindu.com/news/national/article32290.ece

• Joshi, P.C.; 2006 (5th edition): Land Reforms in India; Mumbai.

• Kaur, Sarabjit; 2010: Towards understanding Naxalism; http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1953.html

• Keith, J. Harnetiaux; 2008; The Resurgence of Naxalism: How Great a Threat to India?; http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a483734.pdf

• Lalwani, Sameer; Understanding India’s Counterinsurgency Strategy against theNaxal Threat; Center for the Advanced Study of India; July 14, 2014

• Mainstream; 2008: The State’s Response - Report of expert group on “development issues to deal with causes of discontent, unrest and extremism; http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article760.html

• Marwah, Ved; 2009: India in Turmoil; New Delhi.

• Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA); 2015: Annual Report 2014 – 2015; http://www.mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/AR%28E%291415.pdf

• Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA); 2015: Jammu &Kashmir Division; http://www.mha.nic.in/J&k_new

• Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA); 2015: Left Wing Extremism Division; http://www.mha.nic.in/naxal_new

• Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA); 2015: Left Wing Extremism Divisions, Frequently Asked Question; http://www.mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/LWE_FAQS_061015.pdf

• Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA); 2015: North East Division; http://www.mha.nic.in/NE_new

• Ohja, Jai Prakash; 2014, The Biggest Internal Security Threat Resurfaces: Naxal Violence and the State Today; http://www.youthkiawaaz.com/2014/12/naxalism-in-chattisgarh/

• Rana, Rajbala; Report onTalk by Lt Gen V K Ahluwalia (Retd.) on “Future of the NaxaliteMovement”; IDSA; June 05, 2014; http://www.idsa.in/event/FutureoftheNaxaliteMovement

• Report of an Expert Group to Planning Commission, Government of India New Delhi on Development Challenges In Extremist Affected Areas;2008; http://planningcommission.gov.in/reports/publications/rep_dce.pdf

• Singh, Amit Kumar; 2008; The Rising Tide of Left Wing Extremism in India and Implications for National Security; Manekshaw Paper; No.8,2008; http://www.claws.in/images/publication_pdf/1233141171Manekshaw%20Paper%20No.8%202009.pdf

• Sinha, Harsh Kumar; 2009; Naxalism: A Threat to India’s Internal Security; http://www.cdsrd.org/userfiles/Dr_%20Harsh%20Kumar%20Sinha.pdf

together with the government, by being part of the political system in a legitimate way. They no longer need to resort to violence to get the state’s attention.

conclusion

The roots of naxal revolution in India come from oppression of a land tiller by the landlord in rural districts of India. These conflicts go back to the failure of implementing the 5th & 9th Schedules of the Constitution of India. In theory these Schedules provide for a limited form of tribal autonomy with

regard to exploiting natural resources on their lands and ‘land ceiling laws’, limiting the land to be possessed by landlords and distribution of excess land to landless farmers and labourers. There is a huge gap between the rich and the poor. This is a strong subject Naxalites use in their training to compare the lives of the rich and the poor. Therefore, this issue needs to be addressed by the Government with all seriousness. Also the development should not be centered to urban areas but to move them to rural areas to include decentralisation of power, stopping mass exodus to urban areas, acceptability to facilities, irrigation facilities etc.

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About the Author

Brigadier Ram Niwas, VSM was commissioned into 2 RAJPUT in 1985. He has wide ranging experience in command, staff and instructional appointments. He commanded 16 RAJPUT and a Mountain Brigade in J&K. On staff, he has served as a Brigade Major of an Infantry Brigade and at Directorate General of Rashtriya Rifles in Delhi. He has been an instructor at the Infantry School and is presently posted as Directing Staff at the Senior Command Wing of the Army War College.

• South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP); Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI Maoist); http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/CPI_M.htm

• Swadesh M Rana; 2010; The Academic Council on the United Nations System, Informational Memorandum; No.82; http://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/GravestThreattoIndia.pdf

• Yadav, Yatish; Police Vs Maoists: Are Indian Security Forces Strong againstNaxals? IndianExpress 26 Apr 2015.

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HUMAN cAPItAL MANAGeMeNt doctrINe for tHe INdIAN ArMY – A reVIeW

Introduction

A military doctrine lays down the fundamental principles and a set of guidelines for preparation for war in all dimensions. It tries to establish the

framework of understanding the approach to warfare by providing a basis for its practical application. The key lies in the manner and seriousness of its implementation.

The Indian Army Doctrine was first shared in open domain in 2004 and later reviewed in 2010. Review is a constant feature and need not have a fixed periodicity. The review is necessitated by factors related to geo-strategic environment and other determinants of doctrines. India’s ever changing security calculus owing to shift in global power balance and regional security threats also includes collusive and collaborative challenges in the near future. The proxy war continues unabated and state sponsorship of terrorism is a reality that does not seem to ebb. The nature of conflict is undergoing a change where fresh challenges are emerging driven by technology and ideology. Modern weapons, equipment, cyber space and social media have added yet another dimension to the concept of war fighting.

Management of human resources in the Army is an extremely complex issue, given its size, spread and diversity. The key ingredient in the organisation despite all the technological upgrades still remains the soldier, who is the man behind the weapon and the enabler of its strategy. It is therefore, vital that adequate care be taken to ensure that the morale of the solider be maintained at the highest level at all times.

Being the last bastion, the Nation invariably looks towards the Army with a lot of expectation, not only for safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also at times of internal strife and during crisis situations. For the soldier to stay motivated and give his best, both the Government and the Army are making a conscious effort to ensure that the basic needs and aspirations of the soldier are met at all times-yet there are miles to go!

As long as we consider our work force that is our officers, JCOs, jawans and defence civilians as merely a resource, we will be failing in our duty to recognise their potential. Only when we view them as human capital, will be appreciate their significance. To value their potential and understand their

infinite contribution, we have to go a step further and invest in this human capital so that it grows and out performs its potential.

Take the case of a weapon platform or equipment that needs to be maintained and taken care of as a precious resource. It performs efficiently for a period of time, then it is downgraded, becomes obsolescent and when aged beyond utility or is beyond economical repair, it is back loaded. Human resource on the contrary is entirely a different cup of tea. The difference between the two is quite evident but suffice it to say that a soldier is a living being who improves with age, given the necessary training. He gains experience and if given due respect, dignity and motivation, he can easily perform beyond his designed capacity. Putting it differently, one can say that he can achieve results far in excess of his estimated optimal capabilities. It is the need of the hour for the Army to recognise the significance of the available human capital, change its mind set and emphasise it in the doctrine.

Preview

The article will attempt to highlight the challenges to managing human capital in the Army; induction of adequate and quality resources; in service management of human resources; and taking care of veterans.

The subject is being discussed in three segments as follows:

• Pre Recruitment/Pre Commissioning

• In Service

• Post Service/Retirement

Pre recruitment/Pre commissioning

enhancement of educational Standards. Undoubtedly, the future scenario will showcase an enhancement of technology in the context of weapon systems, equipment, communication, intelligent platforms and knowledge based operating environment. Keeping that in view, enhancement of education standards is really a “no brainer”. It needs to be done both at the entry level and later during service. We have to break shackles of our minds that think the Infantry and other combat arms can do with their equivalent of Bhoop Singhs who will happily follow orders. For those who feel that adequate 12th standard school students may not be readily available, it will come as a surprise that

Lt Gen Mukesh Sabharwal, PVSM, AVSM**, VSM (Retd)

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almost half the recruits lining up to join the combat arms these days are 10+2 qualified. The thought of gradually upgrading educational standards must not be lost sight of and an endeavour should always be to select the best material available.

enhancing the technical threshold. The introduction of the Technical Education Scheme or the TES about a decade back has turned out to be master stroke. The dividends have been unbelievable. When it started, candidates to be eligible had to score at least 72% marks in their 10+2 exams. For the Jan 2012 TES course, about 20,000 candidates applied. Only 6,500 could be called for the interview due to lack of time and capacity at the Service Selection Boards. Each one of them had scored above 82% marks, which was well over the laid down criteria. Although the vacancies are only 170, many more qualify in the SSB. A total of 232 officers were trained in the Cadet Training Wings located at CME Pune, MCEME Secunderabad, and MCTE Mhow which have turned out to be superb centres of excellence. At the IMA, 20 per cent of candidates for the Non-Technical or Direct Entry course are engineers. The result is a higher threshold of officers with an engineering background in combat arms and services. The idea therefore should be to reinforce the success of the TES and modify it to make it applicable to the NDA entry through the UPSC. The proposal to have B Tech for all at NDA could be revisited appropriately to suit the future scenario.

An effective Support cadre. The Army needs to be agile, modernised and be prepared for future conflicts. For this, it is mandatory in the long run, to have a smaller regular cadre and a larger support cadre, preferably in the ratio of 1:1.1. Lateral absorption recommended by Pay Commissions and Ajay Vikram Singh Committee (AVSC) has not been agreed to by various ministries of the Government. A draft Cabinet note that talks of making Short Service Commission (SSC) more attractive and also proposes certain peel factors for an exit policy is awaiting sanction since 2008. Looking at it objectively, one realises that the Army has been focusing at the problem purely from the organisational point of view. To overcome the officer shortage at the service bracket of 1-15 years, the terms and conditions for SSC were raised from 5 years to 10 years and an extension up to 14 years. Correspondingly, no thought was given to the individual officers’ needs and aspirations. What does he do after 10/14 years when he is in his mid-thirties with a family to support? No jobs are easily available and there is no support system to fall back on. Thanks to the warped logic based on incorrect facts presented by the Armed Forces Medical Services, the MoD has ignored recommendations of Service

headquarters and not entitled ECHS facilities to the SSC officers. Graded pension is another idea that has not found favour.

Women in the Army. The common view is that the services of half of the nation’s workforce remain unutilised by not absorbing women in the Army in larger numbers. There are debates aplenty to induct women to perform combat roles as well. The position taken by the Services in this respect is very sound and reasonable and has been accepted by the Government. Unfortunately it has not been articulated in an appropriate and forthright manner for the public and the media to be convinced. The reasons are obvious but no one admits it. It is a sensitive issue and no functionary at any level wants to be singled out. The media and the self-styled gender equality specialists are just waiting for an opportunity and ever eager to strike at anyone who does not toe the line they would like to hear. Basically, everyone wants to be politically correct. The answer lies in the institution making their views transparent, include it in the Army doctrine and then present it from a position of strength, accuracy and comfort.

In Service

transparency. The Army is a fine institution which is widely respected. Considering the challenging environment that prevails today, it is performing very creditably. However, there exists a feeling of dissatisfaction among several quarters. Part of this discontent stems from a lack of transparency. Personnel become aware of situations from unofficial sources and tend to be affected by the uncertainty, giving rise to unnecessary anxiety. The Right to Information Act or RTI is a new avenue that has been discovered that leads to apprehension and concern. The personnel management systems (Adjutant General and Military Secretary Branches) are still fairly closed and not easily approachable to Army personnel at large, despite their efforts to open up and reach out. Policies are not disseminated widely and urgently. At times, policies are changed abruptly, without much consensus and are perceived to favour a few, thereby causing heartburn. Very often adequate time is not catered for, to put the fresh policy into effect, which in turn leads to a perception of subjectivity and seemingly changing of goal posts. In the 21st Century, objectivity and transparency are absolutely mandatory and must reflect in the Army doctrine.

Justice System. There is a well-established system of redress of grievances but it has some inherent drawbacks. The foremost being the absence of any kind of opportunity for personal hearing afforded to satisfy the aggrieved complainant. Increase in litigation is a natural fall out. The justice system,

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be it the Judge Advocate General (JAG) Department or the Discipline and Vigilance (DV) Department, needs a fresh examination. The Army Act and Army Rules too need a review recognising the changing times. There is no existing platform for investigation. The Corps of Military Police (CMP) and Military Intelligence (MI) are employed on an ad-hoc basis without any statutory authority. The argument put forward is that the CMP does not have police powers. The question is the necessity. If the Army is convinced then even if it requires the Act to be amended by invoking Parliament, it should be progressed actively. Currently, senior commanders adjudicate maintenance allowance cases with little or no inquiry, based primarily on the applicant’s plea alone or at best a reply to the show cause notice to the personnel. This aspect of justice within the Army needs a doctrinal shift.

empowerment. To say that the Army of today is not the same that took shape soon after Independence would be to state the obvious. 1962 was a debacle and a wake-up call but the victory in 1971 restored the Army’s confidence. India as a country has grown in stature and become economically stable. Meanwhile, the Army has instituted various reforms in the past three to four decades that holds it in good stead.

Institutions. Wise leaders of the Indian Army have created a number of institutions of far reaching import, such as the Army Group Insurance Fund (AGIF), Army Welfare Education Society (AWES), Army Welfare Housing Organization (AWHO), Army Welfare Placement Organization (AWPO), Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health scheme (ECHS) and some others. Most of these have been nurtured well while some have been neglected. The moot point is that these institutions should be used to empower the Army much more as they have more than adequate latent potential to cater for the needs of Army personnel both serving and retired. The applicability of none of these has been suitably infused in our doctrine.

Army Military education Programme. With the intake for recruits raised to 10th class, the need for the Army Certificate of Education has reduced considerably. What is urgently needed is to institutionalise certification of graduation by affiliating to Universities, with an effort to recognise “in-service” training as part of the curriculum. Not only will this raise the education standards but enhance the confidence and morale of Army personnel. It will also give a boost to the “In Service” entries like the ACC and SCO, thereby increasing the support cadre. Similarly there is a requirement to look at the officers’ education programme, popularly called ‘study leave’, which does not do sufficient justice to the concept of higher education. It is being used more as a management tool by

the MS Branch to balance the numbers of Colonel vacancies in order to suitably manage the cadre, which is one of its greatest challenges. The Army should utilise this facility to partly train officers on subjects that the organisation needs and partly to permit officers obtaining from a wider service bracket to select subjects of their choice. The exercise could also be used to leverage talent to overcome mediocrity by introducing a competition for a few open seats.

terms and conditions of Service. By and large, terms and conditions of service have been taken for granted. Discussing pay and allowances has generally been scoffed at, a kind of ‘taboo’. All along there has been an attitude of “the system will take care” or “there is someone looking after your interests”. What is shown in the pay slip or statement of account is very rarely self-audited or challenged, mostly because of ignorance and misplaced trust. Terms and conditions of service must now be examined afresh. Measures must be taken to ensure implementation of what already exists and what needs to be reviewed or modified. An accurate calculation of what is entitled must be undertaken and not accepted at face value, by an exclusive section nominated within appropriate departments. Demanding what is rightfully due should not be viewed as questioning the establishment but should be undertaken as responsibility towards the officers and men of the Army.

Post Service/retirement

Veteran Welfare. To look after the welfare of veterans is the responsibility of the Service and should not be left entirely to the Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (DESW). To ensure that the ex-serviceman (ESM) receives his due entitlement is again a service responsibility and the personnel department should be entrusted with a modicum of accountability for neglect on this score. It is also the duty of the Army to take care of its personnel and their families post invalidation or post disability. Welfare is quite often carried out as if it is a favour being done or an act done due to sympathy. A doctrinal shift in attitude is essential to consider welfare as an obligation and a duty.

Veteran vis-a-vis eSM. Both these terms are interchangeable. ESM is the frequently used term in official documents for purposes of accounting and legal description. Veteran is a more all-encompassing term and includes the larger community. Veteran does not only signify the “age”. It includes ESM who have fought battles and war and boarded out thereafter. They are experienced soldiers in war-fighting. Veterans also include the Next of Kin (NOK) and dependents. Families of soldiers are an extension of the veteran community. The camaraderie of this community is a sterling example to society at large.

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Doctrine must include the philosophy that veterans are an integral link of service community and that this umbilical cord must not be allowed to be broken or weakened.

Leadership Philosophy

The Indian Army derives its leadership doctrine from the philosophy of the Chetwodian adage :“The safety, honour and welfare of your country comes first always and every time. The honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command come next. Your own ease, comfort and safety come last, always and every time”.

It is indeed an ethos that the Army is proud of and has largely lived up to it. However, there are strains visible in the officer men relationship. Some say it has shattered but the optimist recognises that these are only chinks in the armour and make a case to rectify it. The existing doctrine is substantive as regards leadership is concerned, yet a few issues need to be highlighted.

Senior Leadership. The perception is that senior leadership leaves much to be desired, and it is this perception that is a cause for concern. The ethos of the Army has remained unchanged but the intransigence of a few is worrisome. Setting a personal example is most significant and this must be addressed and emphasised in the Army doctrine.

Subordinate development. Development of junior team members is a key command responsibility. The JCOs, NCOs and Young Officers are the cutting edge and must be given a free hand to take decisions. What is important is to bring in inclusiveness, by including the JCOs and NCOs not only in training but allowing them to participate in the policy and organisation of training. We should not let the language (English) come in the way but find means to overcome it.

Subedar Majors should not remain ceremonial attachments but should be empowered to assume a more active role. Enabled and confident JCOs will also help in partly solving the problem of shortage of officers.

Social Media. Managing social media is a big leadership challenge. One should ignore it at one’s own peril. The advantages of social media need to be exploited while balancing its negatives with appropriate firewalls. Resisting change in this respect is in advisable. In fact management of change will assume greater significance.

conclusion

Transformation of the Indian Army has been an on-going process for over a decade but consideration to human capital management has been scarce. It is well known that:

“… institutions do not transform, but people do; platforms and organisations do not defend the country but people do; units and formations do not sacrifice and take risks for the nation but people do …”

We must overcome the notion that our troops are ‘becharas’, are naive and need to be insulated. There should be an attempt to make personnel aware both of their constitutional rights and service duties.

44 years have passed since 1971; 28 years since the IPKF in 1987; 16 years since the Kargil conflict in 1999; the counter insurgency and counter terrorist operations are continuing but waning; it is 12 years since the ceasefire on the Line of Control in 2003. The point being made is that the cutting edge combat leaders will gradually lack in combat experience. Hence grooming and development of junior leaders should be the prime focus.

Finally, the Army must emphasise in its human management approach that change is welcome and one must not cling to traditions and the status quo.

About the Author

Lt Gen Mukesh Sabharwal, PVSM, AVSM**, VSM (Retd) former Adjutant General of the Indian Army and erstwhile Corps Commander of the sensitive 15 Corps in Kashmir, has extensive experience in counter insurgency operations in J&K and North East India. Do follow him on twitter @MaiKyaJi and visit his blog http://mukeshsabharwal.wordpress.com

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95 | December 2015

tHe HANd of LeAderSHIP

Background

In his professional memoir “In the Line of Duty - A Soldier Remembers”, the late Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh says that he was very reluctant to write his memoirs,

maintaining with disarming humility that his views were, after all, personal and based only on his own experiences. He was finally persuaded though by his Regiment, and put it all down very simply, yet readably. The book was published only after he passed away.

Gen Harbakhsh lived much of our recent history. He joined the Army as one of the early Indian officers and fought against the Japanese in Malaya, where he was wounded. He was a prisoner of war in Singapore, where a lot of his contemporaries joined the INA. He did not, though he is not judgmental of the varying motivations of those who did join and maintained good relations with everyone.

Soon after the War, he found himself at Srinagar airfield in October 1947, when Pakistani regulars and raiders had almost reached Srinagar and the Maharaja had finally, only in the face of imminent disaster, acceded to India.

It is because of the resolute leadership of this one man, a Lt Col at the time, often in the face of confusion and dithering from those above and around him, that the whole Kashmir Valley did not fall to the Pakistanis. It was only because an incompetent brigadier (LP Sen) came in above him half way, when he was pushing the chase beyond Baramulla that we ended up with the Cease Fire Line where it was. Another week with Harbakhsh in command of operations would have seen Muzaffarabad in our hands.

Later, as Western Army Commander in the 1965 War, it was Harbakhsh who refused point blank to obey a direct order from the then Chief, General Choudhary, to withdraw East of the Beas. He was vindicated by history as we would have lost Amritsar and much else besides if he had “followed orders”, but it cost him becoming Chief, something he had virtually been promised by the Defence Minister at the time.

A Study in Military Leadership

Harbakhsh, throughout his military career, led from the front in very difficult situations. There are many lessons in military leadership to be learnt from his story, yet very few officers have read it. This book is unlikely to become one of the “prescribed” books for any of our promotion exams, as this old soldier doesn’t pull his punches and has not very flattering things to say about several contemporaries he served under.

In drawing lessons, it is important to get to the root, to identify bedrock issues. All too often, too many lessons are drawn. In books and training pamphlets on leadership there are at least eighteen attributes listed. Long lists are eminently forgettable – indeed, too much is too little, and less is more.

I have given careful thought to the essential ingredients of remarkable military leadership-the sort of outstanding leadership displayed by Harbakhsh.

The first essential pre-requisite of good military leadership has to be taking complete responsibility. As the leader, all that is good, bad, possible or impossible in the situation is yours to make the best of. There are no ifs and buts in military leadership in battle, and fortune favours the brave. Leadership is needed precisely because there is confusion and uncertainty and there are no obvious answers.

The leader has to feel he owns the situation. He cannot be looking over his shoulder for guidance or permissions or encouragement. In this sense, I feel that modern communications have made us too used to constant reporting and transparency, which at times leads to confusion and denies the leader isolation that often spurs one to bold and resolute action

Effective leadership is like a Hand that guides the turn of events. Imagine an open hand; the palm, four fingers and thumb, and the wrist below the hand that gives rooted movement to the whole hand, besides carrying its nerves, tendons and blood supply.

The palm, the root and anchor of the thumb and fingers epitomises INTEGRITY; integrity in Thought, Word and Action; integrity in the sense that these three vital ingredients

Leadership lessons from the Professional life Of Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, VrC, Padma Bhushan, Padma Vibhushan

Brig SM Ismail, SM

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must be aligned and without any contradiction. A leader who hopes to be rewarded for his work lacks this integrity, because while he may obviously show that he is acting in the larger good, his thoughts are not in harmony with his words, nor, perhaps, with his actions.

Harbakhsh displayed integrity of leadership as a junior and middle leader. Though later in the book he is guilty of rancour at not being given a particular award and, according to him, being sidelined and not being made Chief.

The Thumb is the Hand’s most important digit. In a leader, the Thumb represents INTENTION, which is very closely linked to the Palm of INTEGRITY.

In battle, confusion reigns supreme and leaders on the ground do not have the luxury of information and hindsight that analysts can use later. They are also short on sleep and burdened with uncertainty. Above all, the military leader is responsible for outcomes and, unlike in other spheres, there is never an opportunity to take corrective measures or try something different, if at first he doesn’t succeed or makes a mistake.

INTENTION in good military leadership has always got to be aligned to the Military Aim, whatever it is, not to anything else.

Leadership is not Management, and Managers are not necessarily leaders. Management is about directing effort, while leadership inspires effort. Leadership has, therefore got to be about the led, not about the leader.

A Military Leader with INTEGRITY and the right INTENTION, must then rely on the Four Fingers of COMPETENCE, INSIGHT, BOLDNESS and CHARISMA to inspire faith in those he leads.

COMPETENCE comes from experience and study. It enables the military leader to clearly understand his own and the adversary’s capabilities and limitations and relate them to the situation and operational environment.

INSIGHT is partly a gift, yet it can be honed with experience. Insight is essential for the military leader to be able to home onto critical points and opportunities in battle, in order to exploit them, or to compensate for his vulnerabilities.

BOLDNESS is essential for the military leader to take decisions in the absence of complete information and, with no certainty of the outcome, seize opportunities and retain initiative in battle.

Finally, to bring it all together in the eyes of the led, the Military Leader must, through a combination of his personal and professional traits, possess CHARISMA; the ability to inspire faith and willing effort from those he leads, in the face of confusion, fear, death and destruction.

I have spoken of the HAND as a metaphor of leadership. What of the Wrist I mentioned earlier?

The WRIST embodies the leader’s VALUE SYSTEM and CHARACTER QUALITIES that show him which way to go in a Dilemma, when he has to make difficult choices, each attended by dire consequences. It also connects the leader to the whole, the larger organisation and endeavour, the Body as it were.

conclusion

In this, the Golden Jubilee year of the 1965 Indo-Pak War, the metaphoric HAND I have described is a fitting salute to the military leadership of Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, an unsung soldier, who walked the talk and walked tall in very challenging military situations.

We would do well to remember that in the confusion of war, the day is carried by the side that has leaders who take full responsibility and can inspire troops and units under them to deliver despite the odds. It has to be inspiration, for when the chips are down everything else will fail the test.

CHARACTER & VALUES

CHARISMA

BOLDNESS

INSIGHT

COMPETENCE INTENTION

aligned to Mil Aim

INTEGRITY of Character

CHARACTER & VALUES

CHARISMA

BOLDNESS

INSIGHT

COMPETENCE INTENTION

aligned to Mil Aim

INTEGRITY of Character

CHARACTER & VALUES

CHARISMA

BOLDNESS

INSIGHT

COMPETENCE INTENTION

aligned to Mil Aim

INTEGRITY of Character

CHARACTER & VALUES

CHARISMA

BOLDNESS

INSIGHT

COMPETENCE INTENTION

aligned to Mil Aim

INTEGRITY of Character

CHARACTER & VALUES

CHARISMA

BOLDNESS

INSIGHT

COMPETENCE INTENTION

aligned to Mil Aim

INTEGRITY of Character

CHARACTER & VALUES

CHARISMA

BOLDNESS

INSIGHT

COMPETENCE INTENTION

aligned to Mil Aim

INTEGRITY of Character

About the AuthorBrig SM Ismail, SM was commissioned into 2/1 GR in June 1988 and commanded the same in Op. RHINO. He has served in Counter Insurgency Operations in J&K and Assam and extensively in high altitude, including in North Sikkim and two tenures in Op MEGHDOOT. A graduate of DSSC, he has served in MO Directorate, HQ Southern Command and Deputy Commander of Headquarter 9(I) Mountain Brigade. He is presently Commanding a Mountain Brigade.

CHARACTER & VALUES

CHARISMA

BOLDNESS

INSIGHT

COMPETENCE INTENTION

aligned to Mil Aim

INTEGRITY of Character

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97 | December 2015

reLeVANce of PreSeNt offIcerS’ SeLectIoN SYSteM ANd ItS effIcAcY for fUtUre

Introduction

“In the Olympics, the difference between the first and the second is marginal, but the first is remembered and the second is forgotten.” Similar is the case

during interviews, the first one is selected and the second is rejected.

The Indian Army is the largest component of the Indian Armed Forces. The primary mission of the Indian Army is to ensure national security and unity, defending the nation from external aggression and threats, and maintaining peace and security within its borders. It conducts humanitarian rescue operations during natural calamities and other disturbances, and can also be requisitioned by the government to cope with internal threats. Thus, Service Selection Board(SSBs) have been entrusted the most difficult task of selecting such officers who are capable of leading their men in to war, motivate them to a level that they are ready to sacrifice their lives for the nation, and if the need be so, the officers themselves must lead by sacrificing their own lives. It is an established fact that the Armed Forces officer’s selection system of India is unique in its process spanning over five days. No other organisation in the world follows this kind of elaborate selection system. However, to achieve these objectives, the SSBs have to be constantly modernised, suitably structured, equipped and trained. The officers in the armed forces play a major role in achieving the above objectives which demand the officer to be extremely capable, smart, responsible and motivated to shoulder greater responsibilities. Therefore, the selection criteria of the officers at the various SSBs should be such that they are able to assess the potential candidates accurately who have the traits and personality to become an officer.

History shows that different countries have adopted different yardsticks for selection of officers in the defence forces based on their mission and military doctrine, a national requirement. Some of these are:-

• development of different roles. Since the end of cold war many new roles have been assigned to the defence forces, e.g. peace keeping missions, aid to civil authorities

including maintaining of law and order etc. The focus has shifted from high intensity conflicts to low intensity conflicts necessitating different kind of behaviour from officers due to new type of tasks. Also, the officers may be required to perform in multicultural and multilingual ad hoc forces on foreign soils and hence different qualities are needed.

• Officers Performance due to Downsizing of Forces. Due to downsizing, and continuous commitment of forces, a higher proportion of officer jobs are becoming critical and, as a consequence, there is less tolerance for poor officer performance.

• Social factors. Social concerns like equal opportunities for males and females, urban and rural representation, different castes, representation of minority groups directly affect the qualities required in an officer. This in turn affects the minimum acceptable standards required in an officer.

• training Standards. Though more sophisticated weapons are available which are easy to operate and extensive knowledge of the weapons is no longer required. Nevertheless, officer candidates are expected to possess basic technical skills to operate them. Hence, officers with more technical knowledge may be the requirement of the future.

• defence expenditure. Almost all countries want to cut the defence budget as more and more money is required for other developmental activities. Thus, requirement of lesser and better officers assumes importance thereby forcing selection norms to be modified accordingly.

• technological Advancement. Operations now-a-days, are faster, more integrated and more complex; they require fast thinking, outstanding information processing and superior communication skills. The new weapon systems will necessitate a fresh look at the quality of officers needed for the Armed Forces.

• economic factor. Changes in world economy have changed the officer’s expectations. Higher pay and perks

“Selection can be viewed as a very complicated game involving great number of variables and requiring many decisions at appropriate points”

John Von Newman (1947)

Col Ravinder Kumar Gosain (Retd), Brig (Dr.) P S Siwach and Cdr (Dr.) G L Sharma

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in the corporate sector have adversely affected the quality of officers. The defence forces are forced to either raise the pay scales to match the private sector or do with lesser officers, either way compromising on the effective combat strength of the Armed Forces officers.

Therefore, there is a need to provide an overview of the qualities of an officer considering both the pragmatic, hands-on opinion of the selector and trainer and also informed, scientific analysis taken from various studies over many years. Due to modernisation of most of the armies, it is pertinent to assume that officers also need good management skills too, particularly when employed in low intensity conflicts and in aid to civil authorities.

Qualities of an Officer as a Leader. Thompson and Bailey in their book, “The Qualities of an Officer,”2 said that over the years, every military organisation concerned with leadership training and development has developed its own list of leadership qualities. Different countries adopt different qualities. Opinions vary as to qualities needed by a military leader and the particular emphasis placed on them. Clearly, the ‘great’ leader would have most of the qualities in substantial strength. However, most leaders will be short of some of them. It can be seen that some qualities are common to nearly all lists, and they are the fundamental requirements for the military leader, to a certain extent regardless of rank. Field Marshal Lord Harding, a British commander in World War II, listed the qualities he regarded as essential in a leader in the following simple terms:

• Absolute Fitness• Complete Integrity• Enduring Courage• Daring Initiative• Undaunted Willpower• Knowledge• Judgement• Team Spirit

However, Ned Mills, in his book, “The qualities of becoming a successful Army Officer”3 says that leadership, discipline, loyalty, intelligence, integrity, organisation, dedication and bravery are the fundamental qualities a military leader must possess. Where-as Marshall Moore4 wrote that commissioned officers in the United States Army have one of the toughest jobs in the entire country. He says, as managers of the Army, officers are in charge of leading enlisted soldiers into battle and protecting them from unnecessary harm while taking on responsibility for completing the mission at hand. In order to ensure its officers achieve these goals, the Army expects many qualities in its officers when selecting them for commission.

The officer must thus have certain essential qualities such as Intelligence, Self- Discipline, Confidence, Physical Fitness and Respect. Contrary to above, Gen Alexander M. Patch in his book, “The Foundation of Leadership Character”5 emphasises on value based leadership. Field Manual 22-100 of USA outlines mental, physical and emotional attributes to describe more completely Army leaders’ nature. As per Langholtz H in his book, “Peace and Conflict”7, officers are assessed more thoroughly in character and competence than non-officer candidates. However, Dandekar’s, views are different. He, in “The Over stretched Military”8 mentions about societal changes impacting the leadership qualities. He refers to prevailing changes in society which have played an important role. For example, technological knowledge has made it possible to make the large scale selection procedures more efficient, but a lot of societal changes have also resulted in a different view on the relevant competencies with regard to the military.

In India, every year, the Officers Training Academy at Chennai and the Indian Military Academy (IMA) at Dehradun jointly turn out more than 1,200 officers. In the last few years, the profile of most of the new officers has a strikingly common strand-they belong to small towns and villages. Many are the sons of naiks and havildars-noncommissioned officers, who spent a lifetime serving under commissioned officers. Almost 80 per cent of the officers joining up today are from a lower middle class or middle class background. Is the Indian Army becoming more meritocratic? Time was when the army was considered the exclusive domain of erstwhile royalty and families who prided themselves on a tradition of soldiering. Observers say the changing demographic in the officer ranks indicates the increasingly heterogeneous nature of the world’s second-largest army. However, Atul Sethi has a different interpretation. He wrote in Times of India9 that clearly, the Indian Army is becoming more inclusive but some analysts complain its talent pool is shrinking. It is seen that a number of officers join the army as a last resort. Attracting and more important, retaining talent has been a problem for the Army for several years. Mc Munn Richard in “How to Pass the Army Officer Selection Board”10 says that the army literally invests lacs of rupees in the candidate to make him an officer, develop his career, and therefore army would like to make sure that the candidate passes every stage of training. In order to assess the potential, the army checks the candidate against a series of qualities and competencies. The qualities needed to be demonstrated at the SSB are determination, resoluteness, persistency, unwavering, steady, and able to overcome most difficulties, strong willed. As per Blackhurst Rob “The morality of killing is a big question for people. Amazingly some people don’t think about this until they get here.” This is indeed one major quality an officer must possess to lead his men in war.

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The analysis of above brings us to the point that the whole purpose of the Service Selection Board is to determine whether or not the candidate has the potential to become an army officer. If he has the quality, then there is a greater chance of his passing the SSB interview.

But, with so many qualities expected of an officer and regular and fast changes in the environment around, one needs to find out if our system is living up to the expected level of selection of such officers and is it adequate enough to select officers for the future. The present officer’s selection system in the Indian Army is based on age old British system which relied upon certain traits which “must or should” be possessed by the candidate to be a military leader. The implementation of the British model produced limitations as it was to fulfil British requirements and not suited for Indian environment as the concept of military leadership was not clearly defined. Members of the selection board based their evaluation on their individual concepts of military leadership. Disparity in the standards of assessment was noticed and standards of selection were not uniform and were subjective.

The present selection system based on Morgan and Murray’s principle of projective hypothesis lasts five days. The projective technique is a method wherein the candidate is expected to demonstrate skills and abilities under standardised conditions. The expected level of 15 Officer Like Qualities (OLQs) is judged through three different techniques, namely: personal interview, group tests and psychological tests. Each candidate is checked for OLQs and his/her potential capabilities to become a useful leader. It is based on a triad system of evaluation.

In this system, since three different techniques are applied to check and confirm the qualities of a candidate and applied and tested by three different trained experts, the results are expected to be similar. It also helps in ensuring transparency, fairness and prevents doctoring of results by anyone. No doubt that when applied correctly it is the most accurate, inclusive and trustworthy method being used anywhere in the world. But here one needs to know whether this age old system is still relevant to meet present day and future requirements keeping in mind that the society has undergone a tremendous change due to socio-economic changes and technological advancement. In other words, the battle field environment has changed completely.

With a view to study the relevance of present officers’ selection system and its efficacy for future. (say in 2030), approximately 1600 officers were sent a questionnaire to be filled up which had multiple choice questions. Only 449 officers from Captains to Brigadiers, some of whom have served in SSBs at various levels, responded. The data so

collected was analysed with the SPSS system, the details of which are given in succeeding paragraphs.

findings - 1

The officers were asked that keeping futuristic trends in mind, do you think it is necessary to have a relook at the present selection process. They were asked to rate their views from “most necessary” to “not necessary” and “no response”. The result obtained is appended below in the form of a frequency table.

Need to relook at selection system for future

frequency Percent cumulative Percent

No response 9 2.0 2.0Not necessary 84 18.7 20.7

Necessary 205 45.7 66.4Just necessary 67 14.9 81.3

Most necessary 84 18.7 100.0Total 449 100.0

As is evident, counting necessary and above only, 79.3% officers recommended that there is a need to have a relook at the present selection system keeping futuristic trends in mind. Since overwhelmingly officers suggested relook at the present selection system, another question about efficacy of the present system was asked as given in finding number 2.

findings - 2

To further confirm the above observations, the officers were asked whether the present system of officers’ selection in army meets the present and future requirements. This time the data collected has been put through ANOVA test and the findings are as given below:-

Present Selection System Meeting Present and future requirements

ANoVA

Sum of Squares df Mean

Square f Sig.

Present system meeting present

and future requirements

Between Groups

239.658 4 59.914 31.033 .000

Within Groups 857.206 444 1.931

Total 1096.864 448

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Notes1John Von Newman, “Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour,” Second Edition, Princeton University Press, Princeton, USA, (1947)2Thompson Robert W RAF & Bailey M, “The Qualities of an Officer,” eHow Publishers, New York, (1993)3Ned Mills, “The Qualities of becoming a Successful Army Officer” (1995).4Marshall Moore, “What are the Qualities as Expected of an Army Officer” (1996).5General Alexander M. Patch, “The Foundation of Leadership Character” (1998).6Morgan and Murray, “A Method for Investigating Fantasies, The Thematic Apperception Test,” Archives of Neurological Psychiatry, (1935)7Langholtz H, “Peace and Conflict”, Praeger Publishers, West Port City, USA, (1998).8Dandeker, “The Overstretched Military”, Oxford University Press, (2000).9Sethi Atul, “Times of India”, (May 1, 2011),10McMunn Richard, “How to Pass the Army Officer Selection Board ( AOSB)”, How 2 become Ltd 303, Burnfield Road, Thorliebank Glasgow, Great Britain, (2012).11Blackhurst Rob, The Telegraph , (20 Nov 2012)12PriyadarshiShivam, Scientist “D,” “Manthan” Impressions, Allahabad (2013)

Here, the F is 31.033, but at 95% confidence level, the table value is 1.96. Since, F≥α, it rejects the idea that present selection system is meeting the present and future requirements.

findings - 3

30 Senior officers (Major General and above) were also asked their views in the form of an interview about the suitability of present selection system for present and future requirements. 26 of them suggested that there is a difference between past, present and future requirements of officers. They also said that there is a need of officers who can fit in to technologically advanced battle field environment and also adapt to various cultural settings as more and more officers are likely to be deployed in multi-lingual and multi-cultural countries. Regarding present system, they feel that present selection system needs refinement and the whole selection process needs to be changed.

Inferences

When, the result of findings-1 and 2 is combined, it is evident that majority of officers feel that though the present system is good, still there is a need to have a relook at the selection process.

• Finding 3 by senior officers clearly supports the findings-1 that the present system needs refinement.

conclusion

While the advent of 21st century concepts and modernisation have changed the face of the armed forces but that has not made SSBs to compromise on quality. However, the present and future requirements are different. With the changes in socio-economic conditions in the environment and technological advancement, there is a need to have officers who can match the future requirements of a battle field scenario. The officers are expected to understand and take a quick decision in case of war, with changing environment, the need of such officers will increase further. Every organisation evolves its own selection system as per its needs. So long as the candidate fulfils their requirement, the system is considered as successful. The Indian Armed officers selection system is very elaborate, scientifically designed after carrying out lot of research on these methods. The candidate is given a fair chance to compete with others and project his/her talent on number of occasions. Therefore, the system as such is successful but there is a need to study and modify it further keeping the futuristic requirements in mind so that Indian armed forces remain battle-worthy in future too.

About the Author

Col Ravinder Kumar Gosain (Retd) was commissioned into KUMAON Regiment in June 1976. He has held various staff appointments including Staff Captain of a Brigade, GSO-3 (Ops) of National Security Guards and DAA & QMG of an Infantry Brigade. He has commanded a KUMAON Battalion in peace and is presently pursuing his Doctorate from JECRC University, Jaipur.

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tALKING to terrorIStSLt Gen Subroto Mitra, PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM (Retd)

This book spread over 11 chapters by Jonathan Powell, the former British Chief Negotiator on Northern Ireland, draws on his wealth of over two decades on

the practice of negotiating with terror groups. The author is also presently engaged in live negotiations between terrorist organisations and governments through an NGO he has set up. Powell argues that it is essential to engage and follow up with the hindsight of past experiences, for ensuring peace as governments change frequently whilst leaders of secessionist movements stick around for much longer. He opines that while prosecuting a military Counter Terror (CT) campaign “ talking to armed groups ” is essential, especially those with a significant political base. Difficulties in establishing contact with armed insurgents is dwelt with in great detail in “ Making contact with the Enemy”. He brings out the requirement of

establishing trust as a precursor to breaking the ice. Meeting between PW Botha, then President of South Africa with Nelson Mandela in July 1989, which ultimately paved the way for the end of apartheid, and rise of ANC as the dominant political party, was crafted in a most subtle manner, in a veil of secrecy, given the political fallout if the truth would then emerge. Powell elaborates on the belief that governments often face political censure, if seen to be engaged in talks with terror groups, consequently in democracies, a change in government could lead to stalling a dialogue, especially if the incoming leadership has little stake in the policies and practices of its predecessors. Eric Solheim’s interactions with the LTTEs Prabhakaran, showed how a neutral party could be gainfully utilised for making the first forays towards parleys between a legitimate government and an armed group. However, there is a danger of third parties themselves dragged into the conflict, especially if they have stakes in the outcome, due to geopolitical compulsions-the Indian experience in Sri Lanka from 1987-90 being a prime example.

Successes of UN as a mediator organisation in El Salvador, Guatemala and Namibia – Powell opines, were but a “brief dawn”. Stressing that India has always been “robust” against third party intervention in Kashmir, it had also kept outside interference to the minimum during the Maoist insurrection in Nepal. This he feels is a natural course for governments to keep out foreign presence/meddling from internal conflicts. Qualities necessary in a successful mediator are dealt with in great detail with lucid examples, the best being Jaswant Singh’s advice to the Norwegian envoys in Sri Lanka brokering peace with LTTE to exercise patience, or else they would “ mess this place up”. The art of negotiation gets particular attention nowadays from the boardrooms to hostage negotiations, with a battery of back up teams to deliberate upon the ramifications of finer nuances and contentious issues that emerge during talks. Difficulties faced during negotiations between different groups holding differing and diametrically opposing stances was possibly best highlighted by the late Richard Holbrooke who described the Balkan negotiations as “simultaneously

( London, THE BODLEY HEAD ), pp 408. Price UK £13.99. ISBN 978-1-84792-230-4

Jonathan Powell

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cerebral and physical, abstract and personal, something like a combination of chess and mountaineering”. Powell also lucidly brings to focus the transformational changes in the lives of young fighters who join the movements against established Governments and the respect and riches it brings about in their young impressionable minds, which, once peace looms, they are unwilling to give up.

Security of demobilised fighters and their rehabilitation, back into society are aspects that Governments have to therefore factor during peace talks and follow up on subsequently. Issue of granting blanket Amnesty to terrorists has its own pitfalls-opposition from the law enforcement agencies, being one and legal provisions, in the International Criminal Court (ICC), functional at The Hague from 01 July 2002, making such remissions open to scrutiny, another. Strict provisions of the ICC are likely to impede peace processes as those “ undefeated armed groups ” would unlikely surrender to a process which sees them being incarcerated for any period of time. Powell also brings out various issues, aspects and modalities of different dialogues /talks, particularly on Northern Ireland

and South Africa, in detail. What emerges is the ability of the interlocutor to combine qualities of intelligence, tenacity, patience, self-restraint and total discretion, despite adversities and personal discomforts, besides the backing and confidence of the Government and in gaining the trust of the opposing party. In so far as dealing with the current crop of fourth wave terror groups from Al Qaeda, Taliban and now ISIS is concerned, Powell opines that “we should be willing to talk even if they are not ” – may not cut much ice with many nations and their negotiators, considering the uncompromising global and religious ambitions of these groups, so far. Advances in technologies and its availability, coupled with increasing number of techno terrorists is likely to make the business of terrorism, a continued and more resilient process. globalisation, impact of television and the advent of the social media, have become game changers.

A useful read for students of conflict negotiations and international relations, the book draws on the wealth of experience of the author in handling complex parleys between governments and armed opposition factions.

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103 | December 2015

tHe PAKIStAN PArAdoX : INStABILItY ANd reSILIeNce

Col NP Singh

A s the title suggests the book aims to understand the basic paradox of Pakistan nation-state i.e that despite of indications to the contrary, it has

survived as a nation in the past seventy odd years. Inspite of chronic instability, Pakistan has shown remarkable resilience and proved doomsday prophets predicting its future, repeatedly wrong. The book looks at this paradox through three underlying contradictions.

First are the centrifugal forces at work in Pakistan and those resisting them on behalf of Pakistani nationalism and provincial autonomy. Mohajirs dominant in business and administration and Punjabis in military dominated early Pakistan. Both wanted a unitary structure but were opposed by Bengalis and Sindhis who favoured federalism. The struggle between the Punjabis and Mohajirs was also the reason

Pakistan did not have a constitution for almost a decade and even when it did come about, was always contested. Keeping 67 subjects with centre and 35 with the provinces in the first draft and later attempts at a One- unit scheme proved to be a disaster leading to its split into Bangladesh.

The second contradiction is the interplay between domestic forces and the concentration of power among elites. These elites have changed form over the years. In fact the author suggests that the country itself was formed because of denial of status to these ‘Ashraf ’ from the Mughal era by the British. These elites under the leadership of Syed Ahmed Khan first sought a separate electorate for themselves and then in early 20th century turned this into a demand for a separate nation for Muslims.

Interestingly these elites came from the Muslim dominated pockets of non-Muslim provinces of undivided India like the United Provinces (present day Uttar Pradesh). The demand for a separate nation was never strong from the Muslim majority provinces like Bengal and Sind because Muslims there did not suffer from a sense of insecurity.

These elites have transformed over the years. The initial core i.e the Urdu speaking Mohajirs were soon eclipsed by the land owning Punjabi clans like Qizilbashs, Noons, Tiwanas and Legharis. To preserve their status these changed into industrialists and then to a cozy mix of generals and politicians. These formed a self perpetuating; self-balancing clique opposed only by Judiciary (at times), civil society movements (including students and media) and surprisingly Islamists.

The third contradiction is the role of Islam. It has been the raison d’être for the creation of state and in recent times the reason for so much strife. Syed Ahmed Khan and Jinnah looked for ‘parity’ with the Hindus and a high degree of affirmative action towards representation in legislatures. Jinnah’s views on multi culturalism continued to prevail till 1970’s when Islamist parties (who had never won electoral majority either in the provinces or centre) began to assert themselves. This rise was first exploited by Bhutto to further

Random house India 2015 (first published in French as le syndrome pakistanais in 2013, Translated by Cynthia Schoch 2015)

Hardcover, 670 pages, Rs 799/- ISBN 9788184005745Christophe Jaffrelot

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his political ideology and later by Gen Zia to legitimise his hold over power. The country is suffering the disastrous consequences of this dangerous mix of religion and politics today. The section also covers in detail the persecution of minorities like Ahmadiyas and Shias as well as the rise of the radical Islam.

The book is accordingly divided into contradictions as listed above. Since the sections are not in chronological order, there tends to be a repeat of certain issues.

Overall the book is an exhaustive, well researched work on Pakistan. Since the history of India and Pakistan are so

closely inter-twined, it also becomes an interesting study on socio-cultural and religious developments of pre-partition India. The book attempts to determine the glue that keeps this nation together. It’s a difficult call and even more difficult to prophesize.

The only jarring aspects to this book are the numerous spelling mistakes which have resulted from poor proof reading. These however should not distract the reader from this comprehensive piece of research. A must read for all those who wish to attempt to see the paradox which is Pakistan.

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recoMMeNded reAdING

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