China’s Choice: Multilateral-Lite Partnerships and

Asian Security

Raymond Kuo

University at Albany, SUNY

Abstract

For 20 years, China has pursued regional security engagement through“multilateral-lite” partnerships like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Shang-hai Cooperation Organization. Although these bodies lack the institutionalrestraints found in NATO or other U.S.-aligned alliances, policy makers andconstructivist scholars claim that they will socialize China into an “Asian way”of security cooperation: Consensus-based, mutual and amicable resolution ofdisputes, but with strict regard for state sovereignty.

However, since 2010, China has increasingly asserted its political and geo-graphic claims in the Asia-Pacific region. This has led to recurring naval con-frontations in the South China Sea, economic coercion against Japan throughthe embargo of industrially-critical rare earth metals, and the shielding of NorthKorea from provocative military and nuclear actions. Yet statesmen continueto tout the importance of multilateral-lite partnerships in stabilizing regionalsecurity relations.

This article asks: Do these multilateral-lite bodies reduce regional conflictand stabilize security relations? Leveraging quantitative methods and a longerhistorical framework, I argue that these organizations used to successfully struc-ture interstate military relations and prevent conflict in the past. Now, how-ever, they are ill-equipped to handle the complex challenges facing Asia and thePacific. States should instead pursue strongly institutionalized alliances, evenwith sovereignty costs, if they expect to foster a stable and effective regionalsecurity regime.1

1The author would like to thank Alexander Lanoszka, John Ikenberry, Paul Poast, and advice

1

Since 2010, China has increasingly and aggressively asserted its political and geo-

graphic claims in the Asia-Pacific region. Its unilateral declaration of an Air Defense

Identification Zone, bellicosity over the South China Sea, and diplomatic shielding

of North Korean intransigence have left most regional actors – including the United

States – wondering just how far Beijing will push its policies, including through the

use of military force. By contrast, China claims that its actions are peaceful, that

it is merely taking positions commensurate with its growing economic and strategic

prerogatives, as well as “historical facts.”

This uncertainty about intentions and capabilities exacerbates security tensions.

Asia is searching for a regional architecture to enhance its limited security coopera-

tion and complement its dense trade and investment networks. But unlike Europe,

the area lacks formalized intelligence sharing and military coordination mechanisms

tying together the major states. Such institutions do exist among American allies,

creating a “hub and spokes” alliance system held over and adapted from the Cold

War. However, China refuses to participate in these bodies of this kind, typically

citing sovereignty concerns.

Instead, over the past two decades, it has pursued a “New Security Concept” fo-

cusing on “multilateral-lite” security organizations. These bodies incorporate many

regional states, but avoid strong political commitments and extensive structures.

Instead, these organizations emphasize consensus decision-making, limited coordina-

tion, and thin institutionalization, the better to protect a strict conception of state

sovereignty and non-interference. These organizations include the ASEAN Regional

from the 5 University Conference. Please send any questions or comments to prof.raymond.kuo@

gmail.com.

2

Forum (ARF), the Six-Party Talks, the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (SCO), as well as a number of less formal and Track II

diplomatic venues, like the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Mea-

sures in Asia (CICA) and the Shangri-La Dialogue.

Both government officials and scholars like Kishore Mahbubani, Amitav Acharya,

and Iain Alistair Johnston argue that these multilateral-lite fora stabilize security

relations. But these bodies do so in an entirely different way than Western mili-

tary institutions, where states sacrifice sovereignty to bind themselves in clear rules

and constant coordination. Instead, the authors contend that this “Asian Way” of

dialogue and consensus decision-making gradually socializes states into norms of coop-

erative security behavior. This softer, less institutionalized approach will eventually

foster a positive strategic environment while attending to the sovereignty concerns of

regional members, especially China.

However, recent events suggest that these bodies may not in fact stabilize regional

order. Since 2010, China has increasingly asserted claims to the South China Sea,

and regional navies have squared off over territorial incursions. In 2012, for the

first time, ASEAN failed to release a joint conference statement, evidently due to

acrimonious disagreement between the members over China’s conduct in the South

China Sea. Tensions between China and Japan have escalated over disputed islands,

with Beijing restricting exports of rare earth elements in 2010, crippling Japan’s

technology industry. And the Six-Party Talks have failed to disarm North Korea’s

nuclear program, as well as prevent it from shelling a South Korean island and possibly

sinking an ROK Naval ship. In total, these events have led to concerns that the era of

China’s “peaceful rise” is over, causing many Asian states to seek closer security ties

3

with the United States. That said, statesmen nevertheless maintain that multilateral-

lite partnerships are essential to regional security.

Clearly, Asia is searching for an interstate architecture to enhance its limited se-

curity cooperation and complement its dense trade and investment networks. But

do these “multilateral-lite” bodies reduce regional conflict and stabilize security rela-

tions? This article presents systematic evidence testing this central question. Sec-

tion 1 elaborates on China’s New Security Concept and the role that these bodies

play in reassuring neighboring countries about Beijing’s rapidly increasing military

might. The section will pin down the exact institutional configuration embodying the

“Asian Way” of security dialogue. Section 2 reviews recent theoretical work debating

how these bodies can reduce conflict and facilitate cooperation while lacking costly

institutional signals of commitment and concrete coordination mechanisms. The sec-

tion also situates multilateral-lite security organizations within a broader historical

context. Once a common – even dominant – feature of interstate security, these or-

ganizations have steadily dwindled. By 2003, only a handful of states participated in

two of these bodies.

This broader, historical perspective offers greater analytical leverage to assess

whether multilateral-lite pacts have stabilized security relations. In particular, Sec-

tion 3 presents quantitative evidence suggesting that these bodies have disappeared

from interstate relations because they fail to stabilize strategic relations and prevent

conflict among their members. Interestingly, their failure is a recent phenomenon.

During the 19th century, states regularly turned to these organizations to structure

their security ties. Currently, however, they are unable to effectively handle complex

security dynamics.

4

That China and its Asian neighbors are increasingly turning to this type of security

dialogue only reinforces the urgency of this puzzle. Section 5 examines the argument’s

policy implications. China’s approach to multilateralism is insufficient to credibly

assure neighbors of its peaceful intentions. As discussed by Gil Rozman, “a facade of

multilateralism [cannot] hide the reality of an organizational vacuum in the region.”2

ASEAN, APEC, the Shangri-La Dialogue may have achieved some success in building

interpersonal trust among regional leaders. But broader trends suggest that they are

ill-equipped to handle the increasingly complex security challenges facing the Asia-

Pacific region.

1 Chinese Foreign Policy and Multilateral-Lite Part-

nerships

Since the Communist revolution, China has tended to avoid multilateral commit-

ments on security issues. Bilateral engagements better allowed Beijing to leverage

its relative political, economic, and military strength to gain more favorable deals

with neighbors. In addition, this approach aligned with China’s guiding foreign pol-

icy philosophy, the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence:” a concern for strict

sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference, the creation of mutual benefits as the

basis for foreign relations, and “peaceful coexistence” with ideologically opposed coun-

tries. Consequently, out of a concern for sovereignty and freedom of action, the CCP

constructed a web of bilateral, thinly institutionalized, and relatively weak security

commitments, the aim of which was to stabilize relations with nearby neighbors. Since

2Rozman (2011, 311).

5

1950, China has participated in 24 formal security partnerships, the majority of which

were bilateral agreements (20). All but one were non-aggression pacts, which were

typically concluded with Russia or neighboring states in Central Asia. In addition,

only two had any formal coordinating bodies whatsoever. As a result, Beijing’s secu-

rity architecture has been fairly loose, employing limited non-aggression treaties to

structure relations with nearby states with which it does not have extensive cultural,

trade, or geostrategic ties.

For example, the central article of 1960 Chinese-Burmese agreement states, “There

shall be everlasting peace and cordial friendship between the Contracting Parties

who undertake to settle all disputes between them by means of peaceful negotiation

without resorting to force.” Similarly, a year later, China and Ghana pledged “to take

the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual

non-aggression, non-interference in each others internal affairs, equality and mutual

benefit...The (parties) will settle all disputes between them by means of peaceful

negotiation.” This pattern has extended into the post-Cold War order. In 1993, China

and Kazakhstan agreed that “they should settle any disputes by peaceful means,

and will by no means use any form of force or threat of force, nor take actions

possibly constituting a threat to the opposite side.” (This pact was later generalized

into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.) In keeping with the concern for non-

interference, the participants of all these pacts guaranteed that outside parties would

not be allowed to use their territory to harm the partners’ interests or sovereignty.

Even the apparent exception to this framework – the defensive alliance with North

Korea – has served in part to preserve Chinese autonomy against foreign powers.

Unlike the other pacts, this treaty formally commits the parties to each other’s defense

6

in the event of outside attack. Through the alliance, Beijing gains a critical buffer

state against South Korea and, by extension, the United States. Beijing is one of

the Hermit Kingdom’s few international interlocutors, providing China with a strong

strategic position as a restraint on further North Korean aggression. As a result,

China obtains a security client hostile to and disruptive of outside powers, at relatively

little cost to its burgeoning economy.

For decades, this framework was sufficient for Chinese security purposes, as the

country concentrated on domestic concerns, particularly economic growth. But as

China has grown in stature and power, this limited security architecture proved in-

sufficient. China could no longer follow Deng Xiaoping’s injunction to “hide bright-

ness, cherish obscurity,” as its economic and political weight in the region led to

concerns about Beijing’s intentions. Given their proximity and trade dependence,

the ASEAN states were perhaps most interested in gaining certainty about Beijing’s

strategic concerns. As Iain Alastair Johnston recounts, the ASEAN members used

China’s interests in trade and investment to bind it into an institutionalized dialogue.

However, given their limited military capabilities – even in aggregate – the Southeast

Asian countries could not coerce China into accepting a deep coordinating partnership

as found in NATO. Instead, they accepted Beijing’s traditional concerns regarding

sovereignty, although the Southeast Asian states desired a multilateral platform to air

the views of all regional members. Balancing these concerns, they created the ASEAN

Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, an offshoot of the parent organization directly focused

on security affairs. While multilateral, this body is only thinly institutionalized. Or-

ganizational staff primarily handle logistics and administration for meetings between

officials and leaders. In addition, the ARF does not entail military commitments,

7

but rather focuses on confidence-building measures and the gradual and eventual de-

velopment of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution mechanisms. Above all,

“[t]he ARF should not move ‘too fast for those who want to go slow and not too slow

for those who want to go fast’.” The body would operates by consensus, allowing

every state to exercise a veto over decisions.3 According to Johnston (1999), these

minimal commitments ensure Beijing’s participation, with the hope that that very

participation will regularize relations and enmesh China in non-conflictual norms of

behavior.

Beijing has come to embrace this approach to foreign policy, with the ARF serving

as a model of “multilateral-lite” partnerships. China’s foreign policy doctrine – first

the New Security Concept, then the Peaceful Rise – both emphasize security dialogue

through these fora, complementing increased diplomatic and economic ties within

the region. As a result, Beijing has gradually shifted away from its tight preference

for bilateral cooperation while maintaining principles of mutual non-interference and

strict sovereignty. Moreover, until 2010, this approach appeared to work, with schol-

ars and pundits praising the effectiveness of China’s charm offensive. While the U.S.

was diverted to two Middle Eastern wars, Beijing seized the opportunity to strongly

engage with Northeast, Southeast, and Central Asia. Multilateral-lite partnerships

were an integral component to this strategy. China played a critical role in mediating

successive North Korean crises through the Six-Party Talks, and there was even hope

in 2007 that it could be transformed into a long-term “Peace and Security Mecha-

nism” to promote regional stability and strategic cooperation. China’s participation

in the ARF helped to stabilize disputes over the South China Sea, while the Shang-

3of Southeast Asian Nations (2002, Para. 21).

8

hai Cooperation Organization (SCO) formalized Central Asian security relations in

a multilateral-lite format. This body works within a “Shanghai spirit” of consensus,

non-alignment, and non-interference. In addition, Beijing has taken the lead in estab-

lishing or participating in the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Asian Pacific Economic

Forum (APEC), and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Mea-

sures in Asia (CICA).4 It has also assisted in the development of Track 1.5 or Track 2

security networks to complement these official venues. For example, the Shangri-La

Dialogue brings together scholars and officials to discuss Asian security affairs.

Official and delegate statements emphasize the effectiveness of these institutions.

The ARF Chairman stated in 2001 that the organization’s work “would lay a firm

ground for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific.”5 China has praised the SCO as

a successful example of regional security engagement,6 and observer states such as

India and Mongolia have lauded the organization’s “ constructive and valuable role in

promoting peace and prosperity in our region.”7 Meanwhile, Turkey commended the

CICA as “a milestone of paramount importance for peace, stability and cooperation

4Admittedly, both the SCO and CICA possess coordinating bodies. However, these two orga-nizations still fall into the multilateral-lite category. Their staff are quite limited and have littledelegated authority beyond logistics and basic research. They do not resemble the deep coordina-tion and planning found within the OSCE, NATO, or even institutions like the OAS and SADC. AsJurgen Haacke contends with regard to the SCO, “the institutional structures put in place cannotper se be regarded as a guarantee for members delivering on the SCO agenda.” Haacke (2006, 148)Other readers might object to the inclusion of the Six-Party Talks, but for the opposite reason.While it does not possess any formal bodies, the Talks do meet Keohane’s definition of an insti-tution as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioralroles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.” The Talks possessed a defined set of participantsoperating under broad rules of dialogue, with the expectation (or at least the hope) that this wouldlead to a mutually agreed North Korean disarmament process. Indeed, the body possessed sufficient“solidity” and rules that the UN attempted to unofficially rename it.

5Chairman’s Statement of the 8th ASEAN Regional Forum Ha Noi, 25 July 2001 (2001, Para.36).

6of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2002).7of External Affairs (2014, Para. 3).

9

in the CICA region and beyond.”8

However, since 2010, these multilateral-lite partnerships appear increasingly un-

able to restrain or manage regional security tensions. China has made more assertive

claims to nearby waterways, the South China Sea in particular. China, Vietnam, and

the Philippines have had multiple confrontations in that area. Though often involving

private actors like fishermen, these spats have escalated to naval posturing and lim-

ited political and economic sanctions. In response, regional states like Malaysia and

Vietnam have embarked on military modernization campaigns and sought closer se-

curity ties with the U.S. In August 2014, American diplomats remarked that tensions

in the region were at an “all-time high.”9

Similarly, in Northeast Asia, China blocked the export of rare earth metals to

Japan in 2010 in retaliation for the arrest of an allegedly drunk Chinese fisherman who

rammed two Japanese coast guard vessels. In November 2013, Beijing unilaterally

announced the establishment of a East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone

encompassing islands claimed by South Korea and Japan, sparking official protests by

Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington. In addition, Beijing continues to provide Pyongyang

with diplomatic cover for its actions, including the shelling of a South Korean island

and the suspected sinking of an ROK Naval cruiser in 2010.

Nevertheless, regional actors have continued to support multilateral-lite partner-

ships as a critical means to foster regional security and stability. In 2013, Chinese

Premier Li Keqiang stated, “On the question of the South China Sea, China and

ASEAN countries have had many in-depth discussions and reached consensus. As

8Davutoglu (2014).9Wroughton and Mooney (2014).

10

long as we stay committed to this consensus and act in accordance with mutually-

agreed principles, the South China Sea region will stay peaceful and stable.” He also

pushed for increasing security cooperation based on the ASEAN principles of non-

interference and mutual gain. Moreover, questions about these organizations’ role

and effectiveness are only increasing in importance. Chinese President Xi Jinping has

proposed the creation of a new Asia-Pacific security body which excludes the U.S.

Speaking in May 2014, Xi stated: “It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of

Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia.”10

Consequently, the central question for this paper is: Do multilateral-lite security

partnerships reduce regional conflict and stabilize security relations? The following

section will review theoretical takes on this problem and formalize the competing

hypotheses analyzed in Section 3 and Section 4.

2 Theoretical Perspectives on Multilateral-Lite Se-

curity Partnerships

The literature on the rational design of institutions would suggest that multilateral-

lite security partnerships should not enhance credibility and have only a minimal

stabilizing effect on security relations. Lacking robust coordinating mechanisms and

possessing only limited commitments, these bodies impose few constraints on mem-

bers and therefore cannot reliably restrain regional conflict. Gilbert Rozman is per-

haps the most critical. Reviewing the broad scope of Beijing’s foreign strategy, he

10Xi (2014).

11

argues: “China envisions new Six-Party Talks with a much-revised agenda, narrow

trilateralism with economic goals but no sense of community, and a nominal East

Asian Summit unable to address security concerns in the region. All of these ob-

jectives are consistent with its resistance to multilateralism that has a substantive

noneconomic agenda and insistence on bilateralism as a way to maximize the lever-

age of the dominant state in the region.”11 China participates in multilateral-lite

organizations because it has little reason not to. Thin institutions do nothing to con-

strain it, and the socialization process lauded by other scholars reflects nothing more

than “cheap talk.” Asia faces an “organizational vacuum” on security issues. But

these bodies merely provide a multilateral veneer for Chinese power politics, doing

little to normalize relations and to manage or prevent crises.

Shaun Narine makes a similar argument.12 Specifically referring to the ARF, he

contends that the body’s members lack common interests and the political will for

cooperation, composed as it is of both small states and a regional power (China).

Moreover, the organization lacks the institutional mechanisms to effectively handle

substantial policy disagreements. As a result, while ASEAN has functioned well in

economic issues, its structure is a poor fit for both the membership and conflict in-

herent to regional security issues. T.J. Pempel also argues that regional cooperation

on economics is driven by fundamentally different dynamics than those affecting se-

curity. In the latter, the institutional design of these bodies “reflect the underlying

wariness of their members about one another as well as their collective reluctance to

surrender substantial national sovereignty to such regional bodies. East Asian gov-

ernments have approached the new regionalism as tentatively as the cautious man in

11Rozman (2011, 311).12Narine (1997).

12

the Korean admonition that “one should tap even a stone bridge before crossing.”’13

But while admitting that these bodies have achieved no major policy break-

throughs, Pempel remains optimistic about the role that multilateral-lite bodies can

play in regional security. He joins a constructivist argument that rejects the material

or institutional basis for security stabilization argued by Rozman and Narine. Instead,

restraint is theorized to emerge from a gradual socialization process. Iain Alastair

Johnston, for example, points out that materialist accounts of institutions start by as-

serting that the security environment matches are particular game form. States then

design institutions to address the particular challenges the game presents. For Asia,

however, “States did not know if they were in an n-person prisoners’ dilemma, an as-

surance game, a coercive suasion game, or some issue-specific combination. But even

a weak institution, supporting sustained interaction among senior officials, could pro-

vide information to clarify and change estimations about intentions.” 14 Multilateral-

lite institutions – thin as they are – nevertheless provide greater certainty about the

underlying nature of security relations in this context, as well as each members’ inten-

tions. More robustly, these bodies allow members to shape the game form, fostering

more cooperative security environments, and not simply affecting behavior.

As a result, multilateral-lite partnerships have fostered a particular security cul-

ture, an “ASEAN Way” or “Asian Values” approach to strategic management. Ac-

cording to Acharya, we can identify four distinct principles underlying this approach.

The first is informality and an avoidance of institutions. Interpersonal contact, rather

than extensive decision-making and delegation rules, structure security relations, al-

13Pempel (2010, 230).14Johnston (1999, 290).

13

beit very loosely. The second is consensus, understood as states identifying areas of

common ground and basing decisions on those points. “Consensus building [. . . ] is an

attempt to create a common understanding of the problem, without necessarily pro-

ducing a common approach to problem-solving. It is about agreeing to disagree rather

than allowing disagreements to cloud and undermine the spirit of regionalism.”15 Ty-

ing these two principles together is a third, non-confrontation. At least outwardly,

members generally leave contentious (and especially bilateral) security issues off the

agenda and do not use these fora to denounce other partners. Reinforcing all this

is a fourth principle supporting strict sovereignty and non-interference in perceived

internal affairs.

Johnston admits that some of these principles were developed by necessity. As

mentioned, the ASEAN members were too weak in aggregate to force China in ac-

cepting greater levels of institutionalization as the price of admission. Beijing may

also have lacked the ability to credibly commit to stronger institutions that would

constrain its behavior towards small states. As a result, the “Asia-Pacific” approach

is the result of a functional compromise. Nevertheless, Johnston argues that this

approach can gradually socialize partners – and China especially – into cooperative

norms of security behavior. At the limit, this process of creating inclusive consul-

tation networks should foster smoother, more predictable, and less violent relations.

Kishore Mahbubani goes so far as to claim that this approach “is forcing Beijing and

Washington to behave rationally toward each other.”16

This debate suffers from two general shortcomings. First, scholars focus ex-

15Acharya (1997, 333).16Mahbubani (1995, 108).

14

clusively on relatively recent Asian alliances. This is unsurprising given Acharya

and Mahbubbani’s attempts to articulate a particular “Asian” approach to inter-

national relations and security. However, countries in other regions – particularly

fully or semi-authoritarian ones – are looking at Chinese security relations and its

economic/political processes as a model for their own security and development. Fur-

thermore, we can profitably ask whether past multilateral-lite bodies can provide any

insight to this paper’s central question or demarcate the conditions under which these

bodies are effective. Expanding the discussion’s temporal and geographic scope will

help determine whether Asia is truly unique or whether these partnerships have been

used and flourished in other geographic areas and historical periods.17

Second, the debate suffers from a lack of systematic, empirical testing. Supporters

of these organizations develop theories for how socialization could work, but provide

little evidence that it actually does. Detractors point to apparent signs of Chinese

defection. But given the opacity of Beijing’s decision-making process, the problem

of multiple, independent bureaucratic actors, and how recently these actions have

occurred, it is difficult to definitively reject their opponents’ theoretical claims. Con-

sequently, the central policy question remains: Do multilateral-lite security bodies

stabilize and pacify military and political relations? Can thinly institutionalized or-

ganizations socialize powerful states and induce more cooperative security behavior?

Or are the critics correct that these pacts cannot constrain rising powers, leaving

considerable uncertainty and anxiety about their intentions?

17Indeed, the very concept of a thinly institutionalized security dialogue mirrors the realist un-derstanding of alliances. Strategic flexibility is essential to maintaining the balance of power, andmultilateral-lite bodies allow for fluid realignment while simultaneously providing a modicum ofcertainty about state intentions. John Mearsheimer famously called formal and strongly institution-alized alliances mere “scraps of paper,” preferring instead flexible and fluid alignments which didlittle to constrain states’ freedom of action.

15

Given these uncertain predictions, this paper tests two paired and opposed hy-

potheses regarding multilateral-lite security bodies and interstate stability:

Hypothesis 1: Multilateral-lite security institutions reduce partnership failure and

the onset of interstate conflict.

Hypothesis 2: Multilateral-lite security institutions increase partnership failure and

the onset of interstate conflict.

By partnership failure, I mean a condition where a member fails to uphold a

security guarantee it had previously committed to and where the security partner-

ship terminates as a consequence. Such an action should clearly signal a rupture

of interstate security relations, both within the partnership and outside of it. By

conflict onset, I mean the initiation of a militarized interstate dispute between any

two countries. The following section presents quantitative evidence suggesting that

the critics have a more accurate assessment of these multilateral-lite institutions than

their supporters. However, the models do not specifically support an institutionalist

interpretation, as further elaborated in the conclusion.

3 Quantitative Analysis

This section presents statistical evidence that multilateral-lite security organizations

do not stabilize security relations. By concentrating intently on organizations with

Chinese participation, the previous scholarly and policy analyses have explored micro-

level political dynamics through process-tracing, as well as offering plausible theoret-

ical reasons for the socialization process. However, they face three empirical chal-

16

lenges: First, most of these organizations were only established after 2003. Second,

the Chinese foreign policy-making process is notably opaque. In combination, these

two challenges make it difficult to determine how accurate these assessments are,

and whether they adequately address the reservations made by Rozman and Pem-

pel. Third, if these partnerships are to serve as models of security cooperation (as

Mahbubani suggests), it is important to determine the conditions under which these

organizations are successful and whether other regions have found them effective as

well.

To address these issues, we must widen the temporal and geographic scope of the

data. This may appear problematic, as the arguments about Chinese integration fo-

cus on Asia. However, the socialization and institutional constraint theories should

be broadly applicable to other states and strategic circumstances. Great and rising

powers have turned to these institutions in the past (particularly during the Bismar-

ckian and Interwar eras). Moreover, smaller states have confronted the problem of

restraining powerful neighbors throughout history and across multiple regions. In-

deed, a systematic study – including, but not limited to, Asia – can enhance the

analytical power of these theoretical approaches by providing more cases and more

rigorous tests of their arguments.

I use Leeds’ Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) as the underlying

dataset for the statistical analysis. It is perhaps the most comprehensive quanti-

tative catalog of security pacts available. ATOP’s temporal scope (1815–2003) and

geographic inclusiveness incorporate cases with a wide variety of political, military,

and economic conditions to better determine the specific circumstances under which

multilateral-lite pacts have an effect on security behavior. In addition, the dataset in-

17

cludes many indicators for partnership formalization, institutions, and purpose, which

are needed to formalize the multilateral-lite variable. As we are examining security

dynamics between states, the unit of observation is the non-directed security dyad.

That is, all pairs of states which participated in an alliance together from 1816-2003.18

Thus, a multilateral security partnership is broken up into every possible constituent

pair, and each enters the dataset as a discrete observation.

The primary independent variable of interest is an indicator of a multilateral-lite

security partnership (ML as a shorthand) existing between the dyad. I use two mea-

sures, one more restrictive than the other to better isolate the effects of different

component variables. The first is an indicator for a multilateral and thinly institu-

tionalized partnership. If, between the states, there exists a security pact with more

than two members and it possesses – at most – regular meetings, the observation

receives a 1, 0 otherwise. The second measure adds an additional component to

the first: whether the partnership includes only a consultative and/or non-aggression

provision. Pacts with additional defensive, neutrality, or offensive obligations are not

included in this multilateral-lite category.

We can use these codings to gain a broader picture of multilateral-lite alliances

through history. Figure 1 traces dyadic, multilateral-lite ties as a percentage of all

dyadic security relations from 1815–2003. ML’s were strongly prevalent in the latter

half of the 19th century (roughly 1863–1897). But despite a small spike around World

War 2, these bodies have been a declining presence in international security relations.

This paper’s primary task is to determine the relationship between multilateral-

18The inclusion of additional variables and particularly the matching technique will truncate thisdataset somewhat.

18

Figure 1: Multilateral-Lite Ties as Percentage of All Partnerships, 1815–2003.

lite partnerships and regional security. Specifically, if scholars like Acharya and Mah-

bubani are correct, we should see – first – more stable security relations among partic-

ipants and – second – fewer instances of interstate conflict. If the critics are correct,

then multilateral-lite organizations should encourage the opposite tendencies.

In this section, I deal with the first dependent variable. I code a Partnership

Failure variable capturing whether participants fail to uphold commitments they had

previously pledged, and the partnership terminates as a consequence. This can re-

sult from intra-allied policy disagreements, military conflict, betrayal, or even policy

disputes occurring outside the organization. In all cases, a member’s defection led

19

to clear, adverse consequences for the pact. Constructivists would suggest that these

incidents should be rarer in the presence of multilateral-lite bodies, while their critics

claim the reverse. Importantly,this condition distinguishes alliance failure from cases

where allies successfully accomplished their goals and subsequently ended their part-

nership, or where the casus foederis was never invoked. Between 1815 and 2003, there

were 512 alliance failures out of 3876 dyadic security ties, leading to a failure rate of

13.21 percent according to the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP)

dataset.19

Several controls are included to capture the effect of material factors on the de-

pendent variable, reflecting the realist approach. Siverson and King (1980) and Leeds

(2003) find that greater state power is positively associated with alliance failure. More

powerful countries require less outside assistance to balance against threats, and they

therefore suffer relatively fewer costs from defection. To capture this, the Correlates

of War’s CINC score is included, as well as their measure of major power status

(Major).20

In addition, as Kissinger (1994) argues, dyads with greater common interests are

more likely to form robust and lasting alliances. Although international anarchy

prevents a complete guarantee (and, according to Snyder (1984), this may not be de-

sirable), similar national interests and threats should promote more credible security

pacts. To capture this effect, Rival is a count of the mutual, long-term adversaries

19Leeds et al. (2002).20Although these measures are strongly correlated (ρ=0.74), including both helps to better stress

ML by demanding that it have the expected effect beyond the great powers. In addition, becausethe alliance decisions of great powers form a core component of the modal formation hypotheses(covered in the qualitative case studies of NATO and the Bismarckian alliance system), includingMajor better isolates the effect of emulation.

20

a dyad shares, drawn from Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006). It should possess the

opposite effect from MIDs, which captures the number of ongoing disputes between

alliance partners that involve the use of force or outright war. A higher incidence of

conflict should indicate more divergent interests, therefore increasing the probability

of alliance failure.

Several scholars have examined the effects of military technology on alliance pat-

terns, most notably Christensen and Snyder (1990). Shifts in the offense-defense

balance, for example, can make certain alliances more or less credible, as states face

different costs for upholding their commitments. Unfortunately, very few quantita-

tive measures exist that can proxy advances in weapons and logistics systems over the

time period of this study. In addition, these measures may not be able to capture the

discontinuous effect of certain technologies, like aircraft carriers or nuclear weapons,

which revolutionized war-fighting21 and should have some expected effect on alliance

failure. That said, weapons systems have increasingly become more energy and pro-

duction intensive, reflecting the shift from mass conscription, to industrialization, to

a focus on information technology. As a result, the Correlates of War’s primary en-

ergy consumption measure (Energy), as well as industrial production (Production),

are included to capture shifting military technology.

Research by Mattes (2010) and Crescenzi et al. (2009) has explored the role of

reputations on alliance formation and termination. States should be wary of partner-

ing with countries with a recent history of defection. If reputation truly reflects an

underlying “untrustworthiness,” then this variable – Defect – should have a positive

effect on alliance failure. Moreover, Siverson and King (1980), Siverson and King

21Boot (2006).

21

(1980), Siverson and Emmons (1991), and Leeds et al. (2002) find that democracies

make for more reliable partners. The standard Polity measure from the Polity IV

data is included to account for government types.

Finally, bilateral trade ties are an additional control proxying the degree of dyadic

interaction. As Wallander and Keohane (1999) discusses, partners facing greater

“issue density” are more likely to formalize their security relations. In addition,

greater economic ties should raise the costs of alliance failure and defection, as Gartzke

and Gleditsch (2004) discusses. This factor, Trade, is defined as the logged total sum

of exports and imports between the two countries in the dyad, and it should be

negatively associated with Alliance Failure.22

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Primary Variables.

Mean SD Min. Max.

Alliance Failure 0.117 0.321 0 1ML 0.387 0.487 0 1CINC 0.034 0.074 -0.031 0.502Major 0.263 0.527 0 2Energy 9.864 2.985 0 15.547Production 5.284 3.979 0 12.402Defect 0.02 0.14 0 1Polity 0.298 11.847 -20 20MID 0.329 1.349 0 19.5Rival 0.129 0.377 0 4Trade 5.699 2.23 -2.302 12.509

Descriptive statistics for these variables can be found in Table 1, and the standard

estimation model is:

22The dataset this variable is drawn from begins in 1870, while the other variables are traced backto 1815. The models below were run without Trade to incorporate this additional data, and theresults are substantively and statistically similar.

22

Alliance Failureij = α + β2(Multilateral-Lite)ij + β3(CINC)ij + β4(Major)ij +

β5(Energy)ij + β6(Production)ij + β7(Defect)ij + β8(Polity)ij + β9(MID)ij +

β10(Rival)ij + β11(Trade)ij + εij

Table 2: Regression Results: Raw and Matched Data. Pooled data indicates that the model usesall data within the ATOP dataset. Pre-1945/Post-1945 models use data from before 1946 and after1945, respectively.

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5Baseline Model, Baseline with Matched Data Pre-1945, Post-1945

Pooled Data Controls with Controls Matched Matched(Intercept) −2.09∗ −1.32∗ −4.50∗ −10.93 −4.10

(0.06) (0.30) (1.98) (6.54) (3.18)ML 0.17 1.42∗ 1.18∗ −1.49∗ 2.22∗

(0.10) (0.15) (0.22) (0.54) (0.37)CINC 3.11 −12.88 39.88 −3.97

(1.77) (7.12) (22.21) (16.16)Major 0.47∗ 1.23∗ −6.88 2.18∗

(0.21) (0.36) (4.46) (0.72)Energy −0.13∗ 0.18 −1.05 0.40

(0.05) (0.16) (0.58) (0.30)Production 0.25∗ 0.12 1.01∗ 0.01

(0.04) (0.07) (0.50) (0.12)Defect −0.32 −4.28∗ −8.94∗ 15.65

(0.41) (1.39) (3.22) (920.54)Polity −0.07∗ −0.07∗ −0.10 −0.11∗

(0.01) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02)MID −0.15 0.86 8.36 0.39

(0.18) (0.69) (4.93) (0.80)Rival 1.24∗ 0.75∗ 1.37∗ 2.10∗

(0.19) (0.31) (0.58) (0.52)Trade −0.28∗ −0.25∗ 0.26 −0.72∗

(0.04) (0.08) (0.32) (0.12)N 4388 2533 772 142 579AIC 3162.53 1614.91 653.01 141.93 361.50BIC 3213.62 1871.74 876.17 283.81 570.85logL −1573.26 −763.45 −278.51 −22.97 −132.75Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05

23

The analysis begins with a relatively sparse model, following Ray (2005) and Achen

(2005), to ensure that the estimated effects are not an outgrowth of over-fitting the

model. A simple bivariate model (Model 1) displays no correlation between insti-

tutional form and security partnership failure, unsurprising given that we are using

observational data, where a variety of biases could be skewing the results. Model

2 adds the controls described above, and it appears to provide confirming evidence

for the institutionalist camp. The multilateral-lite form has a positive association

with Failure, as do Major power status and, surprisingly, a higher degree of com-

mon Rivals. If this is the case, however, we might ask why states would ever create

multilateral-lite partnerships. If these ties are organizationally unstable, how effective

can they be in achieving their goals?

The results could be sensitive to the use of observational data. We could be violat-

ing key assumptions about the data-generating process that underlie the statistical

models. While there is no way to fix this problem directly, I describe three corrections

for common sources of bias in the following three subsections. First, I use matching to

“pre-process” the data and better ensure that extreme values on particular covariates

are not driving the lack of correlation, as presented in Section 3.1.

Second, the frequency of multilateral-lite bodies displayed in Figure 1 suggests that

the international system may have fundamentally changed between the late-19th and

mid-20th centuries. This organizational used to be a widespread feature of security

relations, accounting for in some years 70 percent of all partnerships. However, since

World War 2 if not before, they have been a negligible component of the international

system. ML’s effect on Failure could be conditional upon these broad historical

epochs, as Kuo (2014) suggests. Consequently, Section 3.2 divides the dataset to

24

test how this relationship may have changed over time. Perhaps multilateral-lite

partnerships used to be organizationally stable, accounting for their prevalence in the

past, but are no longer.

Finally, the data clearly violate the assumption of unit independence. The failure

of one security dyad should negatively affect its other security relations, either because

they are in the same alliance or due to reputational concerns generated by the defec-

tion. Accounting for these spillover effects will better isolate the main relationship of

interest, and Section 3.3 uses spatial analysis to address this problem.

3.1 Matching

By its very nature, observational data prevents random assignment to treatment

and control categories, leading to “unbalanced” samples possibly correlated along a

number of observed and unobserved variables. For example, more powerful states may

prefer multilateral-lite bodies, as other states cannot easily coerce them into adopting

institutional constraints. This can confound the estimates, as extreme values on these

other variables – if correlated with ML – could in fact be driving the findings on that

variable. I therefore use matching in an attempt to correct this problem, an algorithm

used to “clean up” the data so that both samples – those emulating the dominant form

and those which do not – possess similar values on a host of theoretically relevant

covariates (i.e. those presented above). In addition, matching avoids parametric

assumptions that other methods must employ to achieve the same end goal, ensuring

that results are derived from the data itself, and not from restrictions on the model

form. In so doing, we can ideally obtain a clearer estimate of the main explanatory

25

variable’s effects, better ensuring that extreme values on other covariates are not

driving the results.

Specifically, the tests employ nearest neighbor matching with replacement, using

ML as the treatment variable. Figure 2 displays the standardized bias in the pre- and

post-matching data (i.e. the extent to which those dyads participating in multilateral-

lite bodies and those which do not share equivalent average values for the covariates

described above). Prior to balancing, states participating in multilateral-lite bodies

tended to be more connected to trade networks, faced greater interstate conflict,

possessed more energy intensive economies, and were slightly more democratic. Those

participating in other alliance forms faced histories of defection and tended to be more

powerful. The matching process shows general improvement across all the variables,

with the standardized bias for the matched data moving closer to zero. This suggests

that, within the processed data, the treated and control samples have significantly

less variation on all covariates except ML, helping to isolate the effect of this variable

on Failure.

Running the logistic regression on this new set of matched data (Model 3 in Table

2), ML maintains the statistically significant and positive association with Failure,

although the effect is substantively weaker than in Model 2. Extreme values on some

covariate accounted for some of the association in the earlier model, but the relation-

ship still holds. This provides further evidence that the institutionalists are correct:

The multilateral-lite form weakens partnership reliability, encouraging member de-

fection and calling into question China’s motives.

26

Figure 2: Improvement in Standardized Bias from Matching Process, Allied Dyads, All Periods.Standardized bias equals the difference between treated and untreated sample means divided by thestandard deviation multiplied by 100.

3.2 Period-Specific Effects

But the puzzle remains: Why would states accept a multilateral-lite design given a

higher likelihood of defection? Indeed, realists particularly prize just this alliance

27

institutional form: thinly institutionalized with vague commitments to better allow

for fluid balancing to prevent conflict. Yet, if these bodies are unreliable, it is unclear

what benefit states can obtain from them. More pointedly, Figure 1 suggests that

something may have fundamentally changed about security partnership design. While

the 19th century saw a proliferation of multilateral-lite bodies, they have steadily

and rapidly fallen out of favor after the first World War. This occurred despite the

dramatic increase in the number of alliance-dyads and states over time, as seen in

Figures 3 and 4 respectively. Consequently, it is necessary to ensure that the findings

from Model 3 are consistent across time periods. In other words, might the reliability

problems of multilateral-lite partnerships be even stronger now than they have been

in the past?

I run separate analyses on the data before 1945 and after, as seen in Models 4

and 5 on Table 2, respectively. For brevity, I present the “full models” only, using

matched data and including all controls. ML has differential effects across these

periods. Prior to 1945, these partnerships strongly reduced member defection and

led to more credible and robust security cooperation. By contrast, multilateral-lite

bodies after 1945 have the opposite effect, significantly increasing the incidence of

partnership failure and member defection. Substantively, ML reduces Failure by 29.9

percent prior to 1945, while it increases it by 9.5 percent afterwards, on average.

3.3 Unit Interdependence

As a final robustness check, I employ spatial econometrics to account for interdepen-

dence between units. The unit of analysis – the partnership dyad – best captures the

28

Figure 3: Number of Alliances, By Year, 1815–2003.

security relationship between states and whether it features a multilateral-lite orga-

nization. However, because of this research design decision, many of the units within

the dataset are directly correlated with one another, violating the independence as-

sumption. For example, units from the same multilateral partnership obviously expe-

rience failure directly and simultaneously. Similarly, for units with one or even both

members in common, a partnership failure may signify deeper problems with state

credibility. Were, for example, the U.S. to hypothetically renege on its commitment

to NATO, all other American partners would likely be concerned about the reliability

of their alliances, even if they are members of a non-NATO treaty.

29

Figure 4: Number of States, By Year, 1816–2008.

To address this challenge, I employ Klier et al’s spatial logit model, where the

estimation equation is:23

y∗ = ρWy∗ +Xβ + ε (1)

ε ∼ MVN[0, I] (2)

23Klier and McMillen (2005).

30

yi =

1 if y∗i > 0;

0 if y∗i <= 0.

(3)

X is a matrix of covariates, β is a vector of coefficients, and ε is an error term. The

key component is the spatial lag term, ρWy∗, where ρ is the coefficient for this term

and y∗ is the dependent variable. W is an NxN row-standardized square matrix,

recording the relationship between the units of observation.

A substantive example will clarify the role of the W matrix. When SEATO col-

lapsed, this failure had both direct effects on the pact’s members, as well as indirect

effects on outside states. Certainly, SEATO’s failure signals that security guarantees

among its partners lacked credibility. But SEATO’s failure caused wider ripples of

concern over the reliability of American commitments more generally. Consequently,

we might think that alliance failure by one country would affect all of its other secu-

rity relations. The W matrix directly incorporates these unit interdependencies. An

alliance failure within one dyad will therefore influence the potential for alliance fail-

ure in 1) observations which are in the same alliance and 2) observations which share

one or both states. I use separate matrices and models reflecting both dependencies.

However, the results were not substantively different, so I only present results from

the latter for brevity’s sake.

Using matched data from all years, the spatial models reinforce the pattern iden-

tified in earlier tests. That is, ML is negatively associated with Failure when using

observations from all time periods, as seen Model 6 in Table 3. But unlike its non-

31

Table 3: Regression Results: Spatial Logit Models with Matched Data. Pooled data indicates thatthe model uses all data within the ATOP dataset. Pre-1945/Post-1945 models use data from before1946 and after 1945, respectively.

Model 6 Model 7 Model 8Spatial, All Years Spatial, Pre-1945 Spatial, Post-1945

(Intercept) −2.01∗ 1.04 −0.17(0.60) (0.77) (0.83)

ML −0.25 −1.51∗ 2.03∗

(0.18) (0.34) (0.4)CINC −4.27 −3.54 1.4

(1.52)∗ (2.1) (4.4)Major 0.69∗ 1.23∗ 1.22

(0.31) (0.5) (0.68)Energy 0.07 −0.04 −0.35∗

(0.05) (0.09) (0.1)Production 0.08 −0.08 0.22∗

(0.04) (0.11) (0.08)Defect −1.43∗ −0.75 1.54

(0.46) (0.57) (1.19)Polity −0.05∗ 0.008 −0.14∗

(0.01) (0.017) (0.03)MID −0.26∗ −0.05 2.49∗

(0.07) (0.05) (1.27)Rival 1.39∗ 0.59∗ 2.24∗

(0.22) (0.25) (0.72)ρ 0.52∗ 0.68∗ 0.6∗

(0.18) (0.19) (0.15)N 2255 1367 592Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05

spatial counterpart (Table 2, Model 3), that association is not statistically significant,

suggesting that relatively few, interconnected partnerships were driving the earlier re-

sults. Once we correct for that interdependence, ML’s effects disappear.

That said, spatial analysis confirms ML’s differential effects before and after 1945.

ML is associated with a significant reduction in Failure prior to that year, while

32

it has a positive relationship after it. That said, the substantive effects in Models

7 and 8 are slightly smaller than in their non-spatial counterparts (Models 4 and

5, respectively). Moreover, this decrease extends to most of the covariates in the

pre-1945 analysis, suggesting that spillovers drove a significant portion of Failures.

Indeed, the ρ coefficient is both positive and significant in Model 7.

In the post-1945 analysis, however, the inclusion of the spatial lag does not affect

the variables uniformly. Major power status increases in effect (and is significant

at the 0.07 level), while CINC decreases. Those factors capturing the security re-

lationship – MID and Rival – see their effects enhanced.24 Although ρ is of similar

magnitude compared to the pre-1945 data, unit interdependence appears to restrain

coercive power, at least within these models, but increase the effects of political rela-

tions.

Finally, I conduct a 1000-trial simulation to examine how adopting multilateral-

lite alliances specifically affects China’s reliability in security partnerships. Holding

the other variables at China’s 2006 level (the latest year available and common to

all the variables), participation in a single multilateral-lite partnership results in a

39.8 percent increase in China’s rate of defection. Figure 5 tracks these effects as the

number of bodies China participates in increases, in the counterfactual. As seen, the

probability of defection quickly jumps to around 73 percent when Beijing engages in

at least three of these partnerships.

In sum, the statistical analysis initially suggested the institutionalist predictions

were correct. The multilateral-lite form appears to reduce the stability of security

24Strangely, possessing common rivals – which would indicate similar security interests – appearsto increase Failure.

33

Figure 5: Simulation of Failure Rates with Different Degrees of Multilateral-Lite Participation.Other variables held at 2006 Chinese values.

relationships, compared to other types of partnerships and designs. This result held

after correcting for the use of observational data through the matching process. How-

ever, separating the data by time period – justified by the pattern seen in Figure

1 – suggested that the post-World War 2 international system is characterized by

34

fundamentally different dynamics. Prior to 1945, ML had a strong, negative effect on

Failure, whereas, following the war, it increases the risk of Failure by 8.9 percent, on

average. Spatial analysis reinforced these temporal findings, and a simulation using

China 2006 values determined that greater Chinese participation in these bodies was

associated with significantly higher rates of partnership failure.

4 Conflict Onset Models

This brief section supplements the previous statistical analysis. It examines ML’s

effects on Onset, the initiation of interstate conflict between two countries. This vari-

able is drawn directly from the Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset. The unit of

observation is the dyad-year, incorporating all states within the international system

(according to the Correlates of War database) from 1870–2004. Constructivists would

expect that ML would have an negative association with Onset, while the institution-

alists would expect the opposite. I include an additional variable – Ally – to control

for whether the state-dyad possessed any other security ties in a given year.

Table 4 replicates the models found in Table 2 but using this new data and depen-

dent variable. As seen, ML fails to find significance in any of the models, suggesting

that neither of the theoretical approaches is correct. The presence of multilateral-lite

partnerships has no effect on restraining or promoting interstate conflict, whether

through a socialization process or because it lacks strong institutional commitments.

In addition, subsetting the data before and after 1945 – as in Models 9 and 10, re-

spectively – reinforces the impression that security dynamics fundamentally changed

during World War 2. Although ML is not significant, ML’s point estimates in both

35

models are strongly negative prior to the Cold War, and positive (though substan-

tively small) afterwards.

Table 4: Regression Results using Onset as Dependent Variable. Raw and matched data. Pooleddata indicates that the model uses all data within the ATOP dataset. Pre-1945/Post-1945 modelsuse data from before 1946 and after 1945, respectively.

Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13Baseline Model, Baseline with Matched Data Pre-1945, Post-1945

Pooled Data Controls with Controls Matched Matched(Intercept) −4.43∗ −9.21∗ −588.80 −4.33∗ −10.27∗

(0.07) (0.55) (1102.91) (2.09) (1.83)ML 0.08 0.47 0.02 −2.08 0.40

(0.11) (0.30) (0.50) (1.67) (0.41)Ally 0.21 −0.16 −1.17 0.36

(0.33) (0.59) (1.37) (0.60)CINC −2.21 −17.21 −14.01 −5.56

(4.20) (15.81) (15.20) (14.63)Major 0.37 1.17 −4.05 1.15

(0.38) (0.88) (2.21) (2.17)Energy −0.00∗ −0.00∗ −0.00∗ −0.00∗

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)Production 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)Defect −0.29∗ 0.23 −0.32

(0.10) (0.49) (0.51)Polity 0.02 −0.00 −0.03 0.03

(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)MID 10.00∗ 587.49 11.23∗

(0.54) (1102.93) (1.07)Rival −0.17 0.85 1.24 −1.36

(0.22) (0.91) (0.83) (1.22)Trade 0.00∗ 0.00∗ −0.01 0.00

(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)N 31576 26365 16322 369 15804Robust standard errors in parentheses∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05

36

5 Conclusion

In total, the empirical evidence suggests that multilateral-lite alliances used to ef-

fectively stabilize security relations, but no longer do so. Current support for these

organizations is misplaced: they are unlikely to reduce conflict and promote peace

in Asia. In fact, since 1945, they have significantly increased member defection and

partnership failure compared to other security partnerships. In addition, they appear

to have no association with conflict onset. While this is an important consideration,

the relative unreliability of these organizations suggest that policymakers should not

turn to them to help stabilize security relations in Asia. Unless Xi’s proposed regional

security institution abandons the multilateral-lite approach, Asian states should turn

towards more robust bodies and relationships, as they have been doing since 2010.

Moreover, whatever socialization effects these organizations might have, they are

evidently swamped by these reliability issues. But while the analysis presented above

helps to settle the policy debate, it does not necessarily bear out an institutionalist

explanation. The models control for common measures of interdependence, includ-

ing trade, common rivalries, and MIDs. In addition, the spatial analysis directly

accounts for the density of security connections between units. As discussed, ρ, the

spatial component, was positive, statistically significant, and of similar magnitude in

both sets of historical periods. This suggests that ML’s effects are driven less by in-

terdependence, as institutionalists would expect,25 but rather the institutional form

itself. Moreover, the models using pre/post-1945 data reinforce this puzzle. Why

were multilateral-fora only popular during such clearly defined periods. What is it

25Wallander and Keohane (1999); Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001).

37

about past periods which caused these bodies to be effective then but ineffective now,

and apart from security interdependence?

This question will be tackled in a future paper based on my prior research.26 I

argue that alliance design – particularly that outside the core security network – is

driven by emulation of the institutional standard established by the great powers.

As Waltz claims, the great powers are the primary actors within the international

system, because their actions set the conditions for all other states. I contend that

we can see a similar effect on institutional design, although not for realist reasons.

Instead, the core security partnership establishes a standard of alliance form, which

signals credibility and sets the strategic and status goals for most other states within

the system. In addition, this argument unifies the institutionalist and constructivist

approaches. While the great powers create core security networks to manage interde-

pendence and lower transaction costs, other countries emulate the institutional form

due to ideational pressures and incentives. The fundamental shift in the international

environment picked up by the models is driven by these changes in international stan-

dards and the credibility effects they have.

Regardless, the policy recommendation is clear: Asian states cannot rely upon

multilateral-lite bodies to structure their security relations. These bodies perhaps

serve a critical role in providing regular opportunities for official and unofficial dia-

logue. However, these discussions are unlikely to lead to substantive changes in state

behavior nor to pacify security dynamics in a highly interconnected and strategically

volatile region. Moreover, Xi’s proposal – to create another multilateral-lite body ex-

cluding the U.S. – only exacerbates this issue. Instead, states serious about fostering

26Kuo (2014).

38

credible and stabilizing security networks should shift even further towards the NATO

model: Dense, heavily institutionalized military and political relations which, at the

very least, commit states to clear obligations and conflict restraint mechanisms.

39

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