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CHAPTER 7

THE SECURITIZATION OF MUSLIM CIVIL SOCIETY IN CANADA

Fahad Ahmad

ABSTRACTPurpose – This chapter highlights how counter-radicalization, as a manifesta-tion of diffuse securitizing, impacts the work of Muslim civil society organiza-tions (CSOs) in Canada.

Methodology – The author presents how Muslim communities and their civil society representatives experience and adapt to the pressures from counter- radicalization policies. Data for the analysis are drawn from 16 semi-structured, anonymized interviews with managers and board members of prominent Muslim CSOs that are based in urban centers in Canada with high density of Muslim populations.

Findings – Though counter-radicalization policies are advanced under the rubric of community-orientedness and risk governance, security discourse and practice constructs radicalization as a problem within Muslim communities treating them as suspects who are “potentially radical.” Despite this fram-ing, Muslim CSOs are cooperating with state security agencies in counter- radicalization efforts but are doing so cognizant of the immense power the state exerts over them in such “partnerships.” CSOs are raising questions about the selective nature of security practice which views Muslims as dangerous and violent but fails to fully acknowledge their reality as victims of Islamophobic violence. CSOs are using anti-racism, anti-oppression, and rights-based frames to call out the discriminatory treatment of Muslims under national security.

Originality/Value – The author’s study contributes to a community perspective in counterterrorism and counter-radicalization research that is dominated by

Radicalization and Counter-RadicalizationSociology of Crime, Law and Deviance, Volume 25, 115–133Copyright © 2020 by Emerald Publishing LimitedAll rights of reproduction in any form reservedISSN: 1521-6136/doi:10.1108/S1521-613620200000025007

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analyses from “above.” By sharing the experiences of Canadian Muslim CSOs under counter-radicalization, the author illustrates the practice of “diffuse secu-ritizing” and how it limits the work of civil society in liberal democracies.

Keywords: Securitization; national security; radicalization; counter-radicalization; civil society; liberal democracy

INTRODUCTIONThe events of 9/11 marked a watershed moment with respect to the widespread proliferation of security practices across society. Terrorism was deemed as an exis-tential threat and, in response, states adopted draconian counterterrorism laws and policies, the scope of which went beyond the security and military domains. The War on Terror saw an enemy in “extremist” Islamic ideology and legitimized practices of surveillance, torture, detention, and prosecution, specifically targeting Muslim communities (Ismail, Shah, & Prasow, 2014; Kundnani, 2012). The focus on domestic terrorism and radicalization by the mid-2000s led to the development of a set of counter-radicalization policies across western nations (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018; Silva, 2018). Counter-radicalization policies view radicalization as a process that leads individuals from normalcy to committing an act of terrorist violence. This understanding of radicalization has justified security-led interven-tions in social, cultural, and community spaces in order to disrupt the radicaliza-tion process and avoid the possibility of a future terrorist attack. At the same time, counter-radicalization policies continue to be informed by the simplistic idea that “extreme” Islamic beliefs prepare individuals to commit violent terrorist acts (see Pisoiu, 2013). In effect, this frames Muslims as “suspect communities” all of whom have the potential to be radicalized (Abbas, 2019; Ragazzi, 2016). Counter-radicalization views Muslims residing in the west through the lens of risk (Heath-Kelly, 2013). It normalizes surveillance and security practices at the community-level, becoming the latest mode of securitizing Muslims in the west.

Just as Muslim communities are impacted through counter-terrorism laws and counter-radicalization policy, so are their civil society representatives. The social, cul-tural, and political spaces animated by Muslim civil society organizations (CSOs) – non-profits and charities that serve Muslim communities – become a domain of interest of security agencies. As Muslim CSOs are interlocutors between the com-munity and state institutions, they are routinely approached by state security actors in order to assist in advancing counter-radicalization objectives. The aim of this chapter is to sketch the impact of securitization on Muslim CSOs in Canada. In particular, I pay attention to “diffuse securitizing,” the proliferation of technologies of surveillance and practices of security in everyday life, enabled through counter-radicalization policies (Huysmans, 2014). This chapter contributes to the literature on the securitization of CSOs brought about through benign acts of security that include partnerships, outreach, and support for community programs.

Tracing the contours of counter-radicalization in Canada poses its own set of challenges. Until very recently, Canada did not have a national strategy for

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counter-radicalization unlike the well-defined policies in the UK and other European countries. Though it has been noted that Canada is a late adopter of counter-radicalization policies (Jacoby, 2016), the fact remains that counter-radicalization (or countering violent extremism) policies have been developed by federal agencies, particularly the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Public Safety Canada (PSC), in varying degrees since the mid-2000s. Even though counter-radicalization policies in Canada are scattered and vary across government jurisdictions, they are largely informed by the logic that the develop-ment of extreme (Islamic) beliefs is problematic and dangerous, even though the link between extreme beliefs and violent action is tenuous (Schuurman & Taylor, 2018). This leads to Muslim communities being the primary target of counter-radicalization efforts.

In this chapter, I show how Muslim CSOs are experiencing and adapting to counter-radicalization policies in Canada. The analysis is based on 16 semi-structured, anonymized interviews with managers and board members of Muslim CSOs in urban centers across Canada. Muslim CSOs are addressing grievances within the community arising from harms caused by security practices that assign suspect status to Muslims and subject the community to surveillance. Based on the coding of interview data, I present my analysis along four themes that emerge: security partnerships and power relations, security practices and the construction of suspect communities, impact of “top-down” framing of radicalization, and CSO strategies to manage securitization.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section dis-cusses securitization theory and reviews how “exceptionalist” and “diffuse” secu-ritizing (Huysmans, 2014) as part of the War on Terror has impacted Muslim communities and civil society. The succeeding section outlines how counter- radicalization policies, an instance of diffuse securitizing, enable the securitization of civil society in Canada. Following that, I present my research approach and data analysis regarding how Muslim CSOs in Canada are responding to securitizing due to counter-radicalization. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of the all-encompassing nature of securitization. It has become a container for discourses of racial othering and discrimination. Securitization exposes the inherent contradic-tion of security efforts in liberal states, which claim to secure liberal values but do so by illiberal means (Goold & Lazarus, 2019). My study demonstrates how this contradiction is manifest in the structure and discourses of counter-radicalization policies that claim to use community-centered approaches, but ultimately control and constrain the work of civil society and expand state power.

UNDERSTANDING SECURITIZATION AND ITS IMPACTPopularized by international relations scholars in the 1980s and 1990s, securitiza-tion theory emerged by drawing attention to the expansion of security logics and actions in non-security domains of society (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998; Wæver, 1995; Williams, 2003). With the waning of the Cold War, the notion of security was extended past military relations between states. Security became a motivating

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principle to understand a wide range of transnational social and political issues, such as immigration, climate change, and global health (Buzan et al., 1998; Huysmans, 2011). Securitization theory scholars argue that security is hardly an objective con-dition; securitization is a political process through which states socially construct the contours of an existential national security threat that can only be addressed by extraordinary measures (Huysmans, 2014; Williams, 2003). More precisely, securiti-zation is enabled through political discourse and action or a “speech act”:

“What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard “security” as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, nam-ing a ship). By uttering “security” a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it. (Wæver, 1995, p. 55)

Securitization justifies state action to institute a set of exceptional, coercive measures where democratic norms and processes are suspended and security decisions are removed from the public domain (Wæver, 1995). Once the issue is framed as potentially jeopardizing national security, it also serves to limit any democratic and political questions about the widening of security into social and political realms of society. This widening of security is institutionalized through the formation of new bureaucracies and modes of security control in non-security realms (Buzan et al., 1998; Howell, 2014).

The attacks of 9/11 ushered a new era of securitization. The perpetual War on Terror legitimates the continuous need for exceptional practices such as coercive counter-terrorism laws, rendition for torture, extrajudicial incarceration, and other state-driven violence (Aradau & van Munster, 2009). Huysmans (2014) conceptual-izes these set of activities as “exceptionalist securitizing,” brought about by invok-ing a “state of exception” (Agamben, 2005). The discourse behind securitization, while arguing for the expansion of security also serves to make the security problem tractable by specifying the source of the national security threat (Huysmans, 2014). Securitization, thus, reanimates a nationalist project that articulates the boundaries of the nation, who legitimately lies within, and who are the dangerous outsiders against whom the nation must be secured (Dhamoon & Abu-Laban, 2009).

Distinctions of race, culture, religion, and place have been invoked to cast Muslim countries and communities as national security threats (Bahdi, 2003; Sivanandan, 2006). The discrimination and targeting of Muslims as part of the War on Terror has yielded insightful scholarship (Cainkar & Selod, 2018; Kundnani, 2014; Mamdani, 2004). In Canada, particular attention has been paid to the securitizing of immigration law to target Muslims for detention and deportation (C. Bell, 2006; Razack, 2008). Recent scholarship has also highlighted community perspectives on the impact of securitization. Nagra (2017) documents the securiti-zation of Canadian Muslims through Orientalist discourse and practices of security governance that result in their unequal citizenship experiences. Jamil (2014) high-lights how South Asian Muslim families in Montreal cope with profiling related to terrorism and radicalization. She finds that it heightens anxiety, vulnerability, and fear specially for women and girls who can be visibly identified as Muslim.

While exceptionalist securitizing is manifest in coercive actions of the state, Huysmans (2014) draws attention to a subtle yet insidious social restructuring

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brought about by a more opaque process of securitization. The future risk of terrorism is deemed so great that it has given rise to everyday practices of security and technologies of surveillance, informed by a logic of risk management, pre-caution, and pre-emption (Amoore & de Goede, 2008). This transition has been accompanied with a converging of governance of internal/external threats and police/national security activity (Bigo, 2000). In contrast to the dramatic modes of action that associated with exceptionalist securitizing, Huysmans (2014) captures the shifting boundaries of security within everyday social and political interac-tions through the concept of “diffuse securitizing.” These practices are presented in the technical and liberal language of risk governance and community resilience making them more palatable but also more pervasive (see Huysmans, 2014, p. 74). Counter-radicalization policies are an instance of “diffuse securitizing” that rely on the discursive assumption of Muslims as “suspect communities” (Abbas, 2019; Ragazzi, 2016). An associative logic is applied to cobble together racial/religious identity and political/cultural expressions of Muslims to confirm their riskiness (Huysmans, 2011; Monaghan & Molnar, 2016). Looking to manage and govern this risk, security agencies seek to partner with Muslim CSOs. This is how polic-ing and security activities make their way into social, cultural, and political spaces where Muslim CSOs operate.

Scholarship has examined the securitizing of CSOs through exceptionalist anti-terrorism legislation that constrains their projects, monitors their financial activity, and subjects them to onerous accountability requirements (Howell & Lind, 2010; Sidel, 2010). However, limited work exists that examines how eve-ryday practices of diffuse securitizing impact civil society. Most empirical stud-ies have highlighted cases outside Canada (Howell, 2014; Rosenow-Williams, 2014). Underrepresented in the securitization literature is the examination of counter-radicalization practices as an instance of diffuse securitizing that enables surveillance modalities to target CSOs. In the following section, I illustrate how counter-radicalization policies shape the agenda of Muslim CSOs and intensify control of Muslim communities.

SECURITIZING CIVIL SOCIETY THROUGH COUNTER-RADICALIZATION

Counter-radicalization policies target entire communities ostensibly to “protect, strengthen, and empower these communities so they become resilient to extrem-ism” (Bipartisan Policy Centre, 2011). But, informed by a logic of pre-emptive risk management, counter-radicalization normalizes early and pre-crime intervention by state security in the social realm (Silva & Deflem, 2020). Counter-radicalization policies take the shape of community outreach, countering “extremist” narra-tives, and support for community-based social and cultural programs that are thought to steer individuals away from radicalization (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018).

On the surface, state agencies approaching Muslim CSOs to seek support for counter-radicalization initiatives seems benign. A deeper examination, however, reveals that counter-radicalization has implicit conceptions of Muslim “riski-ness” and opens an avenue of control and surveillance over Muslim CSOs and

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their constituents (Heath-Kelly, 2013). In Canada, counter-radicalization efforts have mainly been led by security and policing agencies and characterize diffuse securitizing in their scattered, uneven approaches across provinces and munici-palities. This section provides an overview of counter-radicalization policies across Canada before proceeding to discuss how Muslim CSOs in Canada inter-act with these policies.

I start with a brief discussion of UK’s counter-radicalization policy, Prevent, which provided inspiration for Canada’s approach (Monaghan & Molnar, 2016). Prevent has been a strand of UK’s counter-terrorism strategy since 2006. Though Prevent has undergone revisions since inception, fundamentally it assumes radi-calization to be a process of developing extreme beliefs versus exhibiting violent behavior (Kundnani, 2015). Under Prevent, the government has sought to chal-lenge “extremist” ideologies by engaging in a “battle of ideas” through training and outreach, leadership programs, de-radicalization, and supporting ideological counter-narratives (O’Toole, Meer, DeHanas, Jones, & Modood, 2016; Thomas, 2010). Prevent has been criticized for its emphasis on extreme beliefs without clarifying what “extreme” constitutes (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018). It has led to casting Muslims in the UK as “suspect communities,” and state intervention in theological and cultural realms (Abbas, 2019; Hickman, Thomas, Nickels, & Silvestri, 2012; Kundnani, 2012). Since 2015, workers in the education, health, and social work sector have a statutory duty to report on signs of radicalization. This requirement has raised reasonable concerns about impact on free speech and dissent and, significantly, represents a sharp move in securitization (Busher, Choudhury, & Thomas, 2019; Heath-Kelly & Strausz, 2019; Ragazzi, 2017).

With an objective to “build stronger partnerships with communities, civil soci-ety groups,” (HM Government, 2018), Prevent has shaped the policy environ-ment for Muslim CSOs in the UK. In light of the criticisms of Prevent, Muslims CSOs remain divided about the extent to which they should participate in Prevent initiatives. Prominent umbrella organizations such as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) have expressed concerns about Prevent (Versi, 2015). The govern-ment has responded to the criticism poorly suggesting that Muslim CSOs, such as the MCB, are opposed to Prevent because of sympathies for Islamist groups (Ragazzi, 2016). Prevent has, thus, fostered securitization using state discourse around extremism and radicalization to legitimize security interventions in the social realm and circumscribe acceptable modes of engagement by Muslim CSOs.

Turning to Canada, we see that the national counter-terrorism strategy, “Building Resilience Against Terrorism,” also has a “Prevent” element (PSC, 2013). Even though the contours of counter-radicalization in Canada are less pronounced, the logic of early intervention at the community-level matches that of UK’s Prevent. Canada’s counter-terrorism strategy uses the language of “com-munity resilience” to radicalization and places importance on combatting “violent extremist ideology” (PSC, 2013). To this end, the government seeks to build com-munity partnerships and work closely with local partners. In its earliest efforts, Public Safety Canada (PSC), a federal agency, established the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security in 2004 to engage community representatives in dialogue on matters of national security (Roach, 2006). The scope of Roundtable was not

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very clear, which concerned Muslim communities but, as such, the Roundtable had little direct impact on Muslim CSOs (Government of Canada, 2011).

Canada’s federal police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has a prevention measures mandate to strengthen community resilience and enlist com-munity support in preventing terrorism (Edwards, Jeffray, & Pantucci, 2015). Building trust with the Muslim community has been challenging as counter-terrorism efforts have unfairly targeted Muslims through the use of detention and torture, and deployment of immigration law to detain Muslims (Macklin, 2008; Pither, 2008; Razack, 2008). Muslim CSOs provided testimony before the O’Connor Commission of Inquiry on the rendition and torture of a Syrian Canadian, Maher Arar, stressing the harms of discriminatory national security practices on the community (Government of Canada, 2006). In 2006, the RCMP launched the National Security Community Outreach Program (NSCOP) to respond “to the threat of radicalization leading to violent extremism through local initiatives” and repair relations with Muslim communities (Hanniman, 2008; PSC, 2013). NSCOP, based on a community-policing model, is thought to have ben-efits of fostering trust but also advances securitization by framing radicalization and terrorism as a problem within the Muslim community and by legitimizing policing in community and social spaces (Nguyen, 2019). The RCMP and PSC periodically approach Muslim CSOs to hold town-hall style workshops about radicalization where the community is invited to come forward with useful infor-mation. Separately, and problematically, the RCMP and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Services (CSIS) continue unannounced visits to homes and workplaces of Canadian Muslims to inquire about community members (Nasser, 2019). Such practices suggest that the Muslim community is still viewed as “risky” and is secretly under investigation.

Since 2014, the shootings of Parliament Hill in Ottawa and the moral panic around Canadian youth leaving to join Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (and returning as extremists) have reinvigorated counter-radicalization efforts. Federally, the Trudeau Liberals have established the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence (hence-forth, the Canada Centre) to coordinate national counter-radicalization efforts. The Canada Centre has released a national strategy that prioritizes knowledge and awareness building, addressing online radicalization, and funding counter-radicalization interventions (PSC, 2018). Though the emphasis on ideology/ beliefs remain central to the conceptualization of radicalization, effort has been taken to decenter the focus on Islamist ideology. In parallel, the RCMP has expanded its Counter Terrorism Information Officer training for first responders and private security firms to increase awareness regarding radicalization (PSC, 2019). Such counter-radicalization trainings deputize non-security actors to become eyes and ears of security agencies; they also heighten suspicion and surveillance of Muslim communities (Nguyen, 2019). At the provincial and municipal level, too, a number of counter-radicalization initiatives have been developed representing an intensification of interactions between police and community organizations (Silva & Deflem, 2020).

Even though the widespread institutionalization of counter-radicalization in Canada is recent, there has been significant activity across jurisdictions.

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The logic and structure of these activities have viewed Muslim communities and spaces as potentially risky and expand security practice into community inter-actions (Monaghan, 2014). Muslim CSOs have been interfacing with counter-radicalization efforts in various ways. Through my interviews, I learned that the RCMP and PSC periodically approach mosques and grassroots organizations for community outreach. Muslim CSO representatives are approached by PSC, the RCMP, and even CSIS for informal consultations and meetings (Hanniman, 2008). Particularly, with concerns about extremist returnees, there has been an intensification of such meetings. Imams are called upon to assist police in prison de-radicalization (Cobb, 2014). The Canadian Council of Imams recently announced its own de-radicalization initiative (S. Bell, 2016). Muslim CSOs are being encouraged to apply for federal funding for programs and invited to partici-pate in workshops about radicalization (e.g., Mohamed, Sarfaroz, & Yusuf 2015). Such efforts continue alongside the unannounced RCMP and CSIS visits which are stigmatizing and frame state–Muslim relations in security terms. The specter of the dangerous, at-risk-of-radicalizing Muslim is confirmed through the main-streaming of right-wing rhetoric in political discourse. The recent passage of Bill-21 in Quebec banning public sector employees from wearing religious symbols including the hijab continues the post-9/11 portrayal of Muslims as incompatible liberal subjects. Recent Canada Revenue Agency action to revoke the charitable status of the As-Salam mosque in Ottawa for inviting an “extremist” speaker, sug-gests that Muslim CSOs face deeper scrutiny when engaging in theological activi-ties (Kupfer, 2018). Overall, Canadian counter-radicalization efforts represent an avenue to govern “risky” Muslim subjects. Enlisting civil society in these efforts moves the boundaries of the security control into the community level, character-izing a type of diffuse securitizing.

HOW MUSLIM CSOs EXPERIENCE SECURITIZATIONFor the purposes of this study, I use the conceptualization of civil society as the social arena outside states, markets, and families “where people deliberate upon and organize around shared, collective purposes” (Howell & Lind, 2010, p. 3). More specifically, I pay attention to formal civil society, that is, non-profit organizations and charities that act as key agents in connecting communities to state policies and institutions (Chaudhary & Guarnizo, 2016). There are over 170,000 non-profits and charities in Canada that serve communities through delivering various services, fostering religious or cultural expression, and enhanc-ing democratic participation (Hall, 2009). Among these are hundreds of Muslim organizations – CSOs that are either Muslim-led or serve Muslim communities – including mosques, cultural organizations, social service agencies, charitable foundations, poverty reduction charities, educational institutions, civil rights and advocacy groups, and various associations.

The experience of CSOs is important as, in the context of securitization, CSOs become sites where “different, values, ideas, and political visions are debated, con-tended and struggled over” (Howell & Lind, 2010, p. 3). As securitization shifts the

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boundaries of security into the social domain ordinarily enlivened by CSO activity, it leads to a power contestation. CSOs are impacted by the constraints and demands emanating from counter-radicalization policies, but how the CSOs view their roles and exert their own power informs how policies and practices play out in prac-tice (Howell, 2014). Perspectives from CSOs help contribute to current literature in counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization research, which is dominated by analyses from “above” narrated by counter-terrorism experts, policy-makers, and academics. “Communities” sit at the heart of counter-radicalization efforts, yet little emphasis is placed on the community view in research (Spalek & Weeks, 2017). To draft effective policy, it is important to center the voices of communities that bear the “costs of security” (Goold & Lazarus, 2019, p. 10) and analyze how communi-ties “understand and experience questions in relation to human security” (Spalek, 2012, p. 10). Perspectives from Muslim CSOs provide an opportunity to hear how representatives of the community most impacted by counter-radicalization under-stand the policy environment and adapt to the various pressures placed upon them (Rosenow-Williams, 2012). Finally, my research complicates the prevailing policy approach that favors “simplifying, merging, and combining complex social identi-ties” of communities (Spalek, 2012, p. 31) to advance security goals. I highlight the diversity of perspectives among Muslim civil society in Canada.

Between fall 2018 and spring 2019, I interviewed representatives of Muslim CSOs asking how counter-radicalization policies have impacted their work. The analysis that follows is based on 16 semi-structured, anonymized interviews with managers and board members of Muslim CSOs who are based in urban centers in Ontario, Alberta, and Manitoba with high density of Muslim populations. Interviewees belong to prominent organizations who have had experience inter-acting with state security agencies in counter-radicalization efforts and national security matters. The interview samples are not statistically representative but offer insights about the views of Canadian Muslims and their civil society rep-resentatives. I present the results along the following themes that emerged from analysis and coding of my interview data:

1. Security Partnerships and Power Relations2. Security Practices and the Construction of Suspect Communities3. Impact of “Top–Down” Framing of Radicalization4. CSO Strategies to Manage Securitization

Security Partnerships and Power Relations

Canada’s national strategy on countering radicalization emphasizes partnerships and collaboration with CSOs (PSC, 2018). The RCMP also prioritizes commu-nity outreach and partnerships to build community resilience and to encourage communities to assist in national security investigations (Edwards et al., 2015). Despite the security discourse that frames the Muslim community as suspect, Muslims CSOs cooperate with the RCMP and PSC routinely. CSOs participate in investigations and help government institutions to organize workshops with Muslim communities across Canada.

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Efforts of state–CSO “partnerships” for national security are expressed in neutral terms as if to imply that the state and CSOs are on equal power footing. This, however, masks the immense power the state exerts over CSOs, whose autonomy is already compromised under neoliberal governance practices of fiscal constraints, market reliance, and burdensome administrative requirements (Evans, Richmond, & Shields, 2005). A nod of legitimacy from the state or, conversely, an act of repudia-tion, can have significant consequences for the ability of Muslim CSOs to fulfill their mandates. As has been pointed out elsewhere, community engagement in national security is informed by essentialist security discourses that place Muslims into “good” (pro-western/liberal) versus “bad” (radical/violent) categories (Kundnani, 2014; Mamdani, 2004; Ragazzi, 2016). The power to designate an organization in these categories is an expression of state power in national security partnerships as the case of the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM) demonstrates.

NCCM is a respected Muslim civil liberties organization that uses a litiga-tion strategy to challenge discriminatory laws and policies that harm Canadian Muslims (NCCM, n.d.). In 2014, a senior official from the Conservative Stephen Harper government falsely accused NCCM of having ties to a terrorist organi-zation (Todd, 2014). During the Bill C-51 parliamentary hearings to update national security laws, a Conservative MP, once again raised this baseless accu-sation against NCCM (Bill C-51 Evidence Hearing, 2015). NCCM is a high-profile organization that was able to file a defamation suit against the official in the Harper government, but such actions make the community very aware of the how tenuous partnerships with the state can be. Muslim CSOs are cognizant of the delicate power relationship that has to be navigated in such partnerships. Thus, when presented with a partnership opportunity, my data show that Muslim CSOs generally cooperate. The default framing that every Muslim is at the risk of radicalizing pressures Muslim CSOs to seize every opportunity to exhibit the “good”-ness of their community members.

Security Practices and the Construction of Suspect Communities

Security discourse in conjunction with mainstream media coverage of ISIS and “foreign fighters” feed into the moral panic around radicalization. Political rheto-ric reinforces the idea that Muslims and “radical” Islam are the source of domestic terrorism threat facing Canada (e.g., Prime Minister Harper claimed “Islamicism” is the biggest threat to Canada; see CBC, 2011). Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate are significant matters of security facing Canadian Muslims. The national security focus on Islamist extremism flies in the face of research that has identified over 100 active far-right extremist groups in Canada (Perry & Scrivens, 2016). This aligns with the general observation that securitization “prioritizes some people and some interests over others, with no necessary match between the extent of potential harm and selected priorities” (McCulloch & Wilson, 2016, p. 11). There has been disagreement between PSC and CSIS about the extent to which right-wing extremism should be treated as a national security priority (S. Bell, 2018), though this position appears to be shifting (Bronskill, 2020). State–Muslim rela-tions in Canada are shaped by this political milieu.

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The Muslim community is keenly aware of the discriminatory application of national security law and policy against Muslims. Nagra (2017) finds that young Canadian Muslims view this as unequal citizenship construction and use “the sym-bolism of multiculturalism” to make claims of equal citizenship and to “redefine what a Canadian identity is supposed to look like” (p. 14). National security investigations still entail unannounced visits by the RCMP and CSIS to people’s homes and places of work. The mere fact of being visited can be stigmatizing and traumatizing. This practice continues despite the community having expressed concerns to the RCMP about how harmful such action can be (Hanniman, 2008). Muslim CSOs I interviewed confirmed that this practice continues and they play a major role in addressing com-munity grievances arising from such visits. Individuals in the community are afraid of ostracization if it were to become known the RCMP or CSIS had approached them. The unannounced visits continue to imply that the community is under suspicion and surveillance. This practice confirms the “radical Muslim” imagination of security dis-course. As the director of a national advocacy organization noted:

The accusation of radicalization …. Our community faces this sort of constant potential of being stigmatized as radical or potentially. We’re always already potentially radical. (Participant 7)

All my interviewees had a personal experience of being visited by the RCMP or CSIS and knew members of their community who had experienced the same. In 2019, there was high profile media coverage of the RCMP and CSIS visit-ing the Muslim Students’ Association at University of Toronto to inquire about student members (Nasser, 2019). Overall, the perception among Muslim CSOs remains that the community is under surveillance and that the community con-tinues to face harm at the hands of national security practice. At the same time, the security concerns of the Muslim community (e.g., anti-Muslim hate) do not receive the same level of scrutiny and importance.

Impact of “Top–Down” Framing of Radicalization

The official and public understanding of radicalization is shaped by security dis-course. The definition of radicalization remains contested (Ahmad & Monaghan, 2019) and in some sense, it is a catch-all term representing “disaffection, youth alienation, radical dissent, religious fundamentalism, propensity to violence” (Kundnani, 2012, p. 9). While expanding the boundaries of security governance, securitization also specifies who or what the security problem is. As indicated earlier, security discourse advances the problematic idea that every Muslim is “potentially radical” because of the risk of exposure to extreme Islamist ideology.

Through my interviews, I sought to understand how CSOs and Muslim com-munities view the problem of “radicalization” and the extent to which issues of “radicalization” and “extremism” surface within the community. My interview data complicates the framing of radicalization being a problem in the Muslim community. When I asked the Imams I interviewed to list the top concerns their congregants approached them with, radicalization/extremism was not among them. Issues of faith, family, and other socio-cultural matters were most pressing in the community. In the words of the director of a faith-based organization:

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If you were to … on the scale of one to ten, let’s say, in terms of agency and frequency … Radicalization and extremism were definitely not on top …. It was not a high priority because we don’t frequently encounter it, but when we do encounter it, it is of course concerning and alarming. (Participant 12)

Radicalization is, therefore, a “top-down” issue that is constructed through securitization and that the community has to respond to. This was further evident in the reflection of a former board member of an Ontario mosque who engages with government and police officials on matters of security and radicalization:

I don’t know if they [the community] are concerned of the radicalization of youth because they are concerned about the radicalization of youth, or if they are concerned about it because people are telling them it’s a problem. (Participant 6)

Workshops in the community that security agencies conduct as part of counter-radicalization outreach also affirm the top-down security discourse on radicaliza-tion. I was informed that government officials who guide the workshops employ a strict security frame in discussing the problem of radicalization. It has been noted widely how recent conceptions of radicalization tend to be narrow and often bracket out broader concerns of politics and foreign policy (Kundnani, 2012; Walklate & Mythen, 2018). In sharing the experience of an RCMP-led workshop, a board mem-ber of an Ontario mosque recounted that an attendee wanted to discuss Canada’s foreign policy with respect to Israel but that concern was set aside. One interviewee suggested that the top-down security frame in workshops tends to reinforce the notion that the problem lay within the community. Workshops are perceived to be patronizing as they do not acknowledge community agency and knowledge. Plus, workshops do not sufficiently speak to the concerns of the Muslims community about their own security concerns (i.e., Islamophobia and anti-Muslim violence).

Security discourse that views the Muslim community through the lens of being susceptible to the risk of radicalization also demands that the community needs to take action to address this problem. However, radicalization and extremism do not appear as actual issues facing the community. The fact that Muslim CSOs, neverthe-less, must respond to the constructed problem of radicalization and extremism reflects the power of state-led securitization. Though this stresses their limited time and resources allotted for matters of real importance to the community, Muslim CSOs do actively cooperate in government counter-radicalization efforts. However, there is a recognition that more attention is paid to violence by Muslim perpetrators than by others. My interview respondents consistently reminded me about the extent to which Islamophobic violence poses a real threat to the security of Muslim communities. Based on hate-crime statistics (Statistics Canada, 2018), the 2017 Quebec City mosque shooting, and prejudicial discourse against Muslims (Kanji, 2018), it is evident that Muslims are not the source but rather the victims of political violence in Canada.

CSO Strategies to Manage Securitization

Muslim CSOs face a challenging environment of securitization that limits and con-strains their strategic responses. With the expansion of counter-radicalization, my interviews indicate that CSOs generally choose to cooperate with state security and policing agencies. I discerned a few reasons for this. First, engagement is pursued

The Securitization of Muslim Civil Society in Canada 127

with the belief that CSOs will be able to exert influence and reduce the harms that national security policy inflicts upon their communities. Second, CSOs see coop-eration as the best way to deploy their limited organizational capacity. Finally, as discussed earlier, Muslim CSOs respond favorably to partnership requests of security agencies as they understand the implied power dynamic in such a request. Interestingly, maintaining the right balance in a partnership arrangement with the state is also why organizations are tentative about applying for government fund-ing. The organizations I interviewed either chose not to apply for government funding or applied for funding only on a case by case basis for limited projects. Organizations feel it is important to maintain distance from the government, so their constituents do not see their personal or institutional independence as com-promised. In reality, until the establishment of the Canada Centre, federal funding from PSC for counter-radicalization has mostly gone to support research projects.

My interviews show that Muslim CSOs use the language of Charter protected rights when raising the discrimination Muslims face. They show solidarity with other forms of discrimination based on race, religion, or culture and use anti-racism and anti-oppression frames when underscoring Islamophobia. Studies in other national contexts also find that Muslims CSOs adopt civil, political, social, and human rights frames to articulate concerns about the securitization of Muslim communities (see Brown, De Londras, & White, 2019; Rosenow-Williams, 2014). Egregious practices such as the RCMP and CSIS targetting Muslim student asso-ciations in universities provide an opportunity to highlight the exclusionary logic of security that leads to unjust treatment of Muslims in Canada. In August 2019, the Institute of Islamic Studies at University of Toronto launched a hotline for students to call in case of unsolicited visits by the RCMP and CSIS (Nasser, 2019). It was accompanied with a media release and op-ed in the Toronto Star (Hasan & Emon, 2019). This strategy was not only beneficial to students but also effective for increasing public awareness about the securitization of Muslims.

Most of the Muslim CSOs I interviewed seemed to believe that showcasing their community members as good, law-abiding citizens was the best approach to counter the essentialist portrayal of Muslims as dangerous others. An Imam of an Ontario mosque was very proud of their Canada Day event where they invited local police and the RCMP. However, the director of an advocacy organization reflected more critically: “how does a Muslim prove that they are a good liberal citizen?” (Participant 7). This is a very important question because it highlights how Muslim citizenship and subjectivity is determined by securitization. Security discourse affirms the riskiness of Muslim communities. Though they may try to overcome this security framing by showcasing themselves as “liberal” or “non-extreme” subjects, these are ultimately politicized, unspecific, and flexible concep-tualizations shaped by security discourse.

CONCLUSIONThis chapter contributes to our understanding of securitization and its impact on civil society in liberal democracies. I have explained how counter-radicalization,

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as a manifestation of diffuse securitizing, impacts the functioning of Muslim civil society in Canada. In contrast to exceptionalist securitizing that invokes a state of exception to usher extraordinary and undemocratic security measures, diffuse securitizing accomplishes this by normalizing the everyday practices of security. With counter-radicalization policies, actions of diffuse securitizing use liberal and technical language of community empowerment and risk governance to jus-tify the expansion of security in the social realm. Despite these characteristics, security discourse is used to frame which members of society present the threat, usually articulated along racial, cultural, and political lines. In sum, counter-rad-icalization advances discourse and practice that result in othering and exclusion of Muslims communities casting them as suspects who are “potentially radical.”

My study shows that strategies of Muslim CSOs in response to counter-radi-calization are limited by the political power exerted by the state. Security agencies approach Muslim CSOs to support counter-radicalization efforts. CSOs enter into “partnership” with the state recognizing the immense power the state has over them. The state can deem an organization a worthy ally or, conversely, of having “terrorist” ties or promoting “extremist” ideas, which can be detrimen-tal to their work in the community. Most Muslim CSOs choose to cooperate with security agencies on matters of national security so they might influence policy and reduce the immediate harms facing the Muslim community, such as the RCMP and CSIS visits to people’s homes and workplaces. Muslims CSOs also take on the additional burden of showcasing their community in positive (liberal) light. However, as my analysis highlight, the enterprise to demonstrate good liberal citizenship has limits. The exclusionary logic of securitizing is fluid and politicized as we see in recent moves that have sought to expand counter-radicalization policies to manage other forms of political activity that the state has deemed “extreme” including environmental activism and Indigenous protests (Crosby & Monaghan, 2018).

Securitization scholars conceptualize “de-securitization” as the process of shifting security questions “out of emergency mode and into the normal bargain-ing processes of the political sphere” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 4) and by contextual-izing them “in a wider social, economic, and political problematique expressed in everyday practices” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 588). Just like securitization is a political process that legitimizes logics of exception and exclusion, de-securitization has to be a political undertaking that challenges the contradiction inherent in security logics within a democratic society. De-securitization is a struggle for “emanci-pation” that seeks to decenter security and reanimate the democratic principles of equality and inclusion for all members of the polity (Aradau, 2004). Within this framework, the discriminatory practices of counter-radicalization need to be called into question.

My study finds that Muslim CSOs are pursuing such de-securitization strate-gies by highlighting the disproportionate harms Muslim communities experience through securitization. They are using anti-racism and fundamental rights frame-works to highlight the othering and exclusion of Muslim communities. By asking questions about the selective targeting of imagined Muslim violence over actual right-wing violence, CSOs are effectively pointing to the inconsistent logic of

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security which views Muslims as dangerous others but fails to acknowledge their reality as victims of Islamophobic violence. These claims are a way to re-situate the security question into broader dynamics of political and social relations.

Civil society in liberal democracies upholds democratic values and princi-ples. Exceptionalist securitizing renders the coercive security actions visible and, therefore, leaves open the potential for CSOs to challenge these actions. Diffuse securitizing, such as engendered by counter-radicalization, is far more insidious. By arguing for security as a means to address social and political problems, dif-fuse securitizing embeds security logics into the everyday and organizes “social and political relations around enemies, risks, fear, and anxiety” (Huysmans, 2014, p. 14). Security becomes the dominant framework of governance in social and cultural domains where civil society is active. This, together with the immense power the state holds over CSOs, makes desecuritization struggles immensely challenging. It is within this context that counter-radicalization policies and their impact on CSOs have to be understood.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to Dr. Frances Abele and Dr. Jeffrey Monaghan for providing helpful comments on previous drafts of this chapter.

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