Chapter 5 from 'Managing Organisations in Africa' (1992, 2011)

Part 3: Managing the Work Setting

Chapter 5: Organisations as Sociotechnical Systems

Kurt Lewin's assertion that 'there is nothing so practical as a good theory' is particularlyappropriate for this chapter. Understanding organisations, one of man's most complexcreations, is both essential and difficult This is demonstrated particularly in relation toformal organisations in Africa: such is the dearth of reliable information that we cannotmake confident statements about how African organisations function or how their man-agers might best be helped to develop their managerial skills. We have noted that much ofthe literature on African organisations and their management is unsatisfactory because itis anecdotal ('when I was in') and/or prescriptive. What we urgently need is description.However, when we are attempting to describe something as complex as organisationalbehaviour and to understand it, we need a conceptual framework within which we cananalyse and compare our findings. In this chapter we look at the evolution and applica-tions of a particularly powerful and productive tool for organisational analysis: sociotech-nical systems theory.

Studying organisations from a sociotechnical systems point of view began in earnest inthe early 1950s in England. The approach differs from earlier ones, such as scientificmanagement and human relations, in that it is not biased towards either the technical orthe social aspects of work and organisation, but gives emphasis to both, and theirinteraction with the environment. In other words, the organisation is perceived as an opensystem, susceptible to external influences, and interdependent with its environment.Regarding an organisation as an open system means that it is seen as possessing similarattributes to a biological organism. Organisations, like their biological analogues, take infrom the environment, and modify, matter, energy and information with the aim ofachieving stability and survival. More concretely, factories and other organisations take astheir inputs, people, information and materials; productive work is carried out within thesystem to transform these inputs, and a finished product or service eventually emerges.This cycle of activity can only be maintained by a continuing intake of energy from theenvironment which in its turn depends on the continuing production of an output. A motorvehicle assembly plant, for example, clearly has to sell its products in order to buy rawmaterials and pay wage labour. Sociotechnical systems theorists have incorporated thisview of an organisation as an open system into their thinking.'

From a methodological standpoint, sociotechnical systems theorists are idiographic -that is to say, their research tends to be conducted on one, or a small number, of

1 For a more detailed exposition of organisations as open systems see Katz and Kahn (l 966: 14-29)and Barko and Pasmore (1986).

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88 Organisations as Sociotechnical Systems

organisations at a time and they are not much concerned with scientific method. Rarely dowe see sophisticated statistical techniques applied to the data collected by sociotechnicalsystems theorists. Moreover, sociotechnical systems theorists are likely to work jointlywith members of an organisation on a problem or problems, a method which has beentermed action research. This method allows the members of an organisation to acquireinsights and solutions which are of use to them, and at the same time allows researchers togather data of scientific value (Chems 1972; Cummings 1986; Peters & Robinson 1984;Sommer 1987). According to Button's (1972) dimensions, action research includeselements of'conceptual (scientific) interest', 'fundamental applicability' and 'short-termusefulness or topicality'.

This chapter traces the development of sociotechnical systems theory from its founda-tions, in the coal-mining study of Trist and Bamforth (1951), through applications in Indiaand Norway to the present (see Barko & Pasmore 1986). The historical account revealsthat "attempts to maximise efficiency of the technical system, if social and psychologicalneeds are not also satisfied, lead to sub-optimal performance" and that "the converse isalso true" (Miller 1975: 350). The expressed interest in the Optimisation' of performancehas been interpreted by at least one critic as a means of increasing productivity through theintensification of labour (Kelly 1978). This, together with a number of other criticisms,will be reviewed in the concluding part of this chapter, as will the value of sociotechnicalsystems theory for African students interested in organisations and their management (seeKiggundu 1986).

5.1 British Coal-Mining StudiesThe pioneering study in this field was conducted by members of the Tavistock Institute inthe coal mines of Durham in the north of England (Trist & Bamforth 1951). The studytook the form of a natural experiment which evaluated the social, psychological andorganisational consequences of a change of work methods brought about by the introduc-tion of more advanced technology, a mechanical coal-cutter. The change entailed theeffective destruction of the traditional 'hand-got' system of coal mining and its replace-ment with a 'long-wall' system. As we shall see in greater detail below, despite itstechnological superiority, the new method caused many problems which were reflected inhigh levels of stress and absenteeism among the miners, and in low productivity norms.The problems were overcome by introducing a system of mining which attended to boththe social and the technical aspects of work underground. Nowadays this might seem tobe a fairly obvious and commonsensical remedy, but at the time the state of knowledgewas such that there were few precedents, and no clear guidelines as to how problems ofthis nature might be solved. The dominant methods of work in the early 1950s were stillderived largely from the factory and were not suited to the vastly different circumstancesof underground mining. Trist and Bamforth (1951) emphasise this point themselves:"a complicated, rigid and large-scale work system (was) borrowed with too little modifi-cation from an engineering culture appropriate to the radically different situation of the


British Coal-Mining Studies 89

factory" (p. 367). The findings made by Trist and Bamforth (1951) supplied a modelwhose ramifications have since been felt by many organisations, and those who work inthem, study them and design them. We shall now consider each of the major phases oftheir study.

5.1.1 The Traditional, Hand-got System of Coal Mining

The traditional, hand-got system of mining relied on small, semi-autonomous workgroups underground. The groups comprised three interdependent pairs of miners with theoccasional addition of one or two extra men. Each pair of miners worked on a separateshift All of the miners had the skills necessary to perform every task required of them inpreparing and getting the coal and transporting it to the surface. This meant that each shiftwould proceed with its work at its own pace, and succeeding shifts would simply take upwhere previous ones had left off.

Other characteristics of the traditional system included the fact that the groups wereself-selected. That is to say, if for some reason a member of the group dropped out, hisreplacement was selected by the remaining members of the group. This factor, togetherwith the hazardous working conditions underground where high levels of mutual trust anddependence were necessary, helped to produce highly cohesive groups. Such cohesive-ness was reinforced further by kinship affiliations, the maintenance of social relationshipsin the wider community, and the fact that all members of the group were paid the samewages, based on the productivity of the group as a whole. Finally, work groups in thetraditional system required no direct supervision. Trist and Bamforth (1951) described thesituation like this:

"A primary work organisation of this type has the advantage of placing responsibility forthe complete coal-getting task squarely on the shoulders of a single, small, face-to-facegroup which experiences the entire cycle of operations within the compass of its member-ship. For each participant the task has total significance and dynamic closure... Leader-ship and 'supervision' were internal to the group, which had a quality of responsibleautonomy. The capacity of these groups for self-regulation was a function of the whole-ness of their work task ...A whole has power as an independent detachment, but a partrequires external control" (pp. 345-6).Nevertheless, earning a living using the traditional hand-got method was far from easy.The dark, the cramped working conditions and the dangers of roof collapse or floorbuckling, combined with the variable accessibility of coal on different faces (some coalwas soft and easier to work), all told heavily on the miners: "to earn a living under hand-got conditions often entailed physical effort of a formidable order, and possession ofexceptional skill was required to extract a bare existence from a hard seam with a badroof (Trist & Bamforth 1951: 347). In order to maintain a random distribution of goodand bad faces, a lottery system, known as cavilling, was used periodically. This helped toensure that in the long run all groups would have an equal share of good and bad faces,and that earnings would be roughly the same. And although the 'struggle was harsh', the



traditional system was comprehensible to the miners, and seen as being fair. They had aclear overall picture of the scheme of things in the mine, which was largely destroyed withthe advent of the new technology. The hand-got system "contained its bad in a way thatdid not destroy its good" (Trist & Bamforth 1951:349), and this balance was maintaineddespite the unusually difficult working conditions, the often meagre rewards, and at timesbitter rivalries between different groups of miners.

5.1.2 Mechanisation and the Conventional Long-wall Method

As a result of advances in mining technology, new, mechanised coal-cutters and convey-ors were introduced into some of the Durham coal mines. Mechanisation made it possibleto work a single, long face instead of a series of short faces as had been the case under thehand-got system. The long faces measured about 75 metres whereas the short faces hadbeen about 5 to 10 metres in length. Along with the move to greater mechanisation came afairly strict division of labour which entailed splitting the three phases of the coal-miningcycle between three shifts. Each shift specialised in one of the three phases of the cycle:the first shift prepared the coal by undercutting the face with the mechanical coal-cutterand drilling holes in the face for explosives, which were fired by a shot firer at the end ofthe shift. The second shift was the 'ripping' shift responsible for ensuring that the roof wasadvanced and supported safely, and that the conveyor was assembled in its new location atan appropriate distance from the face. The third shift was involved with 'filling', orbreaking the coal up into manageable sizes and loading it on to the conveyor. The shiftswere manned by 40 to 50 workers plus a number of supervisors and other supportpersonnel. Problems associated with the new methods of working included:

1. Morale was adversely affected by the disbanding of the small, cohesive, multi-skilled,autonomous work groups and their replacement by large impersonal groups withspecialised skills.

2. Owing to the increased length of the face, the dark and the difficult working conditions,communication and coordination among men on the shift was poor.

3. It therefore became necessary to introduce direct supervision which contravened thetraditional role of the underground supervisor who formerly had acted simply as asafety monitor, and provider of other necessary services.

4. The interdependence of the shifts meant that if one shift encountered difficulties on itspart of the cycle and was unable to complete its work, then the next shift could not carryout its tasks satisfactorily, and the whole mining cycle was thus disrupted.

All this led to high levels of stress among the men, the setting of low productivity norms,and a general increase in intergroup and interpersonal conflicts. Trist and Bamforth notedthat the strain of controlling the cycle of activities involved in the long-wall system "tendsto produce a group 'culture' of angry and suspicious bargaining" (1951: 366), and leads tohigh levels of tension and anxiety among all those involved.


British Coal-Mining Studies 91

5.1.3 The Composite Long-wall Method

The composite method drew on the advantages of the hand-got and conventional systems.It restored to the workers underground some of the autonomy they had had in thetraditional system by creating forty-man self-selected groups which spanned three shifts.Once again, as in the hand-got system, an incoming shift began work where the previousshift had ended. Although individual miners no longer needed to be able to perform all thetasks likely to be encountered underground, each shift had to have all the necessary skillsspread among its members so that any stage of the mining cycle could be tackled. Therewas therefore a blend of job variety and job specialisation in the composite systembecause all members rotated through a number of different jobs during the course of theshift, but were not required individually to have a complete range of mining skills. Partlyas a result of such multi-skilling, an incentive pay system was introduced to reward groupproductivity, and this, in conjunction with self-selection and more harmonious interde-pendencies between shifts, significantly reduced the levels of absenteeism and the amountof time lost due to stoppages. Moreover, group cohesiveness was considerably enhanced,and because direct supervision of the shifts was no longer necessary, anxiety and frustra-tion among the supervisors lessened significantly. A summary of some of the results ispresented in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.

Table 5.1: Absence Rates (per cent of possible shifts) (Trist et al 1963)

Reason for Absence Conventional CompositeLongwall Longwall

No reason givenSickness and otherAccident

Total

4.38.96.8

20.0

0.44.63.2

8.2

To sum up, the composite long-wall method was a compromise between earlier systemsof mining and those thought initially to be suited to higher levels of mechanisation. Itconstituted a joint optimisation of the social and the technical systems. The majorimplication of the study was fairly clear: namely, that if one system, say the technical,were maximised at the expense of the other, then the result would lead to decreasingmorale, performance, attendance, and so on. The results of this study also suggested thatfor a given technology a number of methods of organisation were possible whichdepended on several other factors - for example, social and cultural considerations andthe physical characteristics of the work setting - as well as the technology itself. Thisobservation led to the idea of organisational choice. That is to say, the coal-mining stud-



ies showed the limitations of earlier approaches which had implied that there was one bestway to organise work. Instead, Trist and Bamforth (1951) concluded that differentmethods of work may be used according to the extent to which they satisfy the require-ments of the tasks to be performed and the social and psychological needs of the workers.The form of work organisation most suited to the Durham coal mines was the autonomouswork group. Such groups were multi-skilled so that they could perform all the tasksnecessary for the completion of a whole piece of work, required little or no directsupervision, and were able to make decisions regarding the allocation of work and, insome cases, the selection of work mates. Later in this chapter, and in the next, we shall seehow the autonomous work group has become an appealing, popular and in many in-stances effective method of organising work and overcoming worker dissatisfactionwhich continues to be applied in modern organisations throughout the world (e.g.,Cordery, Mueller & Smith 1991). We shall also see, however, that in doing so it may havetaken on some of the characteristics of the approaches it was meant to have superseded; inother words, that it too may now be regarded by some as being the one best way toorganise work.

Table 5.2: State of Cycle Progress at End of Filling Shift (per cent of cycles) (Trist et al. 1963)

State of Cycle Progress Conventional CompositeLongwall Longwall

In advance

NormalLagging

All cycles

03169

100

2273

5

100

Table 5.3: Productivity as a Percentage of Estimated Face Potential (Trist et al. \ 963)

Conventional CompositeLongwall Longwall

Without allowancefor haulage systemefficiency 67 95With allowance 78 95


Indian Weaving Studies 93

5.2 Indian Weaving Studies

Shortly after the publication of the Trist and Bamforth (1951) study, another member ofthe Tavistock Institute, Rice (1953, 1958), conducted an experiment based on sociotech-nical systems theory at the Calico Mills in Ahmedabad, India. He made explicit theconnections between sociotechnical systems theory and his investigation of work organ-isation at the textile mills.

"Attempts were made to take into account both the independent and interdependentproperties of the social, technological and economic dimensions of existing sociotechni-cal systems, and to establish new systems in which all dimensions were more adequatelyinter-related than they had previously been" (Rice 1958:4).

Rather like the problems encountered in the coal mining study, the major difficultyconfronting management in the textile mills had to do with the introduction of a newtechnology consisting of automatic looms. The new looms had failed to provide theexpected increases in productivity. In terms of both quality and quantity, production wasno better than it had been with the old, manually-operated looms. To accommodate thenew technology, management had restructured the organisation so that it looked likeFigure 5.1. Twelve highly specialised roles had been created and these were distributedamong a group of 29 workers whose work was highly interdependent, but whose patternsof interaction were complicated and confused. The new system did not include any formof individual or group incentive payment scheme.

Rice analysed the tasks being performed and found that they could be split into twomain types: weaving and those activities connected with 'gating' (fitting new warp-yarn),and loom maintenance. This meant that it was possible to include all of the skillsnecessary for textile production in small, relatively autonomous groups. Rice suggestedtherefore that the work be reorganised to allow a group of workers to be responsible for agroup of looms. The proposed structure, which was accepted by management, is set out inFigure 5.2. The proposals were also accepted with enthusiasm by the workers themselves,and before long four experimental semi-autonomous work groups had been set up. Afteran initial settling-down period, the new system resulted in marked improvements inquality and quantity. With respect to the latter, cloth production averaged 95 per cent ofestimated potential as compared to 80 per cent before the redesign.

Similar successes were achieved in the non-automatic loom-shed experiment, con-ducted in 1954. Once again, the basis of Rice's redesign proposals was the creation ofsmall semi-autonomous work groups responsible for carrying out all of the tasks ofmaintenance and weaving on groups of forty looms. This meant that a semi-autonomousgroup of 11 workers was able to perform the work of the 22 workers who had beenrequired under the previous system. In addition to the restructuring, minimum rates of paywere increased and bonus payments for both quality and quantity were introduced. At theworker's request, the bonuses were paid according to group as opposed to individualperformance.



Erection Top Humidificationsupervisor supervisor fittero-

Assistantjobber Jobber

Work supervisor Feeler motion fitter AssistantJobber jobber

G GaterBC Bobbin carrierW WeaverBF Battery fillerΟ Oiler Smash hands

S SweeperCC Cloth carrier

Figure 5.1: Structure of Ahmedabad Textile Weaving Shed Before Reorganisation (Emery & Trist1981)

Erection supervisor Top supervisor Humidification fittero o o

Group leader

ΫWork supervisor

Group leader

SLR Senior loom runnerALR Assistant loom runner

SLM Senior loom maintenanceALM Assistant loom maintenance

Figure 5.2: Structure of Ahmedabad Textile Weaving Shed After Reorganisation (Emery & Trist 1981)


Indian Weaving Studies 95

Apart from some understandable adverse reaction in the community to the reducedmanning effects of the new system,2 it was well received and had the desired effects oncloth quality and productivity. Other results included a 59 per cent reduction in damagesto machines and a 55 per cent average increase in earnings per group. All this enabledRice to conclude that:

"The immediate practical result of the experiment has been to demonstrate that in theCalico Mills the breakdown of the 'whole' task of weaving into component operations,each performed by a different worker, and the reintegration of the workers into aninternally structured work-group that performs the 'whole' task on a group of looms, canbe accomplished in one process provided that permissive and collaborative relationshipscan be built up between all those concerned... The conclusion was reached that theacceptance of the new system and the determination to make it work were due to itsproviding more opportunities for effective task performance and for the building of stableand secure small workgroup relationships" (Rice 1958:166).

A follow-up study conducted by Miller in 1970 indicated that the group system ofworking which had been instituted by Rice more than 15 years earlier had evolved in avariety of ways. In one part of the mill the group system still operated as it had when Ricefirst introduced it. Workers displayed high levels of cooperation and identified stronglywith their work groups. Their place of work in the mill had retained the name 'experimen-tal shed', and more than half of the workers who had participated in the original groupswere still there. The cloth woven was basically the same as it had been before, and "normsof performance seemed to have persisted for 14 years. It was as though the shed had beenheld within a kind of stasis - a monument to the original experiment" (Miller 1975: 377).

In other parts of the mill, however, the group system established by Rice had deterio-rated badly, and in some cases had reverted back to the methods used before Rice'sintervention. The breakdown of the group method of working was explained by Millerlargely in terms of factors operating in the organisation's external environment Thepressures on output and quality brought about by the company's attempts to enter newmarkets, and its inability to obtain crucial spare parts, affected different parts of theorganisation to varying degrees. Miller observed a correspondence in 1970 between aweaving shed's sensitivity to these external contingencies and the level of degeneration ofthe group system: the greater the experienced pressure to produce more and of betterquality, the more was expected of machines and workers. As a result, the machines brokedown more frequently and as the parts needed for their repair were unavailable, there werecontinual production problems. Managers of the sheds so affected, in their attempts toimprove production, reverted to close supervision and specialised work roles, thus de-

Employees in the experimental shed were seen as supporting the reduced levels of employment, andwere consequently subject to picketing from members of the local community to prevent them fromworking; their families were threatened, and there was one instance of a worker being stoned.



stroying the autonomous group method of working. It was also suggested that the survivalof Rice's autonomous groups depended partly on the number of original experimentalgroup members still working in the sheds. Miller supposed that: "to the extent that(surviving) group members had internalised this method of working they could beexpected to be better able to maintain resistance and to resist incoming disturbances"(1975:303).

Rice's experiments in India have, nevertheless, been regarded by most observers as apowerful corroboration of sociotechnical systems theory. To begin with, they showed thatthe sociotechnical approach was not limited to a particular cultural setting or type oftechnology: there were clear and substantial differences between the Indian and Britishstudies in these respects. In the second place, Rice demonstrated that it was possible usingsociotechnical systems theory to intervene actively and change the way an organisationfunctioned. The coal mining studies, remember, had been primarily a natural experimentwhich had simply monitored developments in mining as they had taken place. Third, theexperiments were also taken as confirmation of the principle of organisational choice andthe general applicability of autonomous work groups (Cummings & Srivastva 1977).Autonomous work groups also featured prominently in work experiments conducted inNorway in the early to mid 1960s, and these constitute our last examples of the applicationof sociotechnical principles to the analysis and design of organisations.

5.3 Norwegian Studies

The third series of experiments whose results we shall review in this chapter wereconducted by Emery and Thorsrud (1964,1975) in a number of Norwegian organisations.These studies differed from those carried out in the British coal mines and the Indiantextile mills in a number of respects. First, they were instigated and sponsored by nationalemployer and labour organisations in Norway, and were intended, if successful, toprovide working models to facilitate the diffusion of the new methods of work toorganisations throughout Norwegian society. In Norway, "a (sociotechnical) project isdeveloped not just because management is interested in more effective organisationalfunctioning, but also because of the strategic importance of developing a more democraticsociety" (Eiden 1986: 246). Second, although the theoretical foundations of the studieswere still provided by sociotechnical systems theory, a noticeable shift in emphasisoccurred - away from a focus on autonomous work groups alone, and towards a focus ona combination of work group and individual job design considerations. The latter resultedin a set of basic job design criteria which were regarded as necessary to satisfy the generalhuman requirements of work. Third, the researchers were more explicit in their treatmentof organisations as open systems, and to that extent anticipated some of the problemsencountered in India and identified by Miller (1975) in his follow-up study of Rice'swork. Emery and Thorsrud (1975) emphasised the point that the task of management wascontinually to maintain as close a correspondence as possible between the actual and


Norwegian Studies 97

potential capacities of the organisation and the actual and potential requirements of theenvironment "In other words, the primary task of management is the boundary control ofthe enterprise" (Emery & Thorsrud 1975:4).

To assist with the process of dissemination, the experiments were conducted in anumber of prestigious firms in various industries (e.g., metal working, paper pulp andchemical). The researchers' overall objective was to design work in such a way that itlessened the alienation of the worker from his productive activity, but did not adverselyaffect productivity and profitability. On the whole, the experiments managed to achievethe desired reductions in alienation, as well as improvements in productivity, via thecreation of semi-autonomous, multi-skilled work groups and the design of individual jobsin accordance with certain psychological requirements of work. This led to the develop-ment of detailed principles for the redesigning of jobs at both the individual and grouplevels. According to Emery and Thorsrud (1975), work should be designed in such a waythat it satisfies the following psychological conditions.

5.3.1 At the Level of the Individual

1. 'Adequate elbow room': the feeling that workers have control over their own activi-ties, but not so much as to prevent them from knowing what to do next.

2. Opportunities for continuing learning on the job: this requires reasonable goal-settingand prompt feedback of results so that behaviour can be corrected quickly.

3. Recognition and appreciation of one's work, and conditions which are conducive torespect and help from work mates.

4. Optimal levels of variety and challenge: workers should be able to vary their activitiesso as to minimise fatigue and boredom. "The optimum level would be that whichallows the operator to take a rest from a high level of attention or effort or a demandingactivity by working at another related but less demanding task and, conversely, allowshim to stretch himself and his capacities after a period of routine activity"(Emery & Thorsrud 1975: 13).

5. A sense that one's work makes a meaningful contribution to social welfare: meaning-fulness in work includes both the quality and worth to society of a product, and havinga perception of the whole product. "That is, not something that could as well be doneby a trained monkey or an industrial robot machine" (Emery & Emery 1975: 2).Having a perception of the whole product is easier where tasks, which may requirevarying levels of attention and effort and different types of skill, are interdependent -so that performing one activity leads to another and makes its performance easier orimproves it in some way. This enables the worker to develop methods of workingwhich are appropriate, and to relate his own job to those of others. In addition, the tasksto be performed should wherever possible include factors - skills, knowledge, etc. -which are respected in the community.



5.3.2 At the Level of the Group

6. Allowing for interlocking tasks, job rotation or physical proximity where there is anecessary interdependence between the output of one group and the input of another.At the very least, this facilitates communication, and lessens friction, recriminationsand scape-goating.

7. Allowing for interlocking tasks, job rotation or physical proximity where high levels ofstress are associated with the job. Stress can arise, as we shall see in a later chapter,from role ambiguity and role conflict, but it may also be caused by what might appearat first sight to be fairly innocuous factors such as boredom, concentration, isolation orthe physical demands of the job if these are maintained for long periods.

8. Allowing for interlocking tasks, job rotation or physical proximity where the job inquestion does not make a clear contribution to the usefulness of the end product.

9. Where jobs are connected through job rotation or interlocking tasks, workers shouldalso have the freedom to set standards and maintain some control over boundary tasksthose tasks which entail some degree of interaction or dependence on groups, re-sources or individuals outside of the group. Provision should also be made for per-formance feedback or knowledge of results. Finally, there must be "some semblance ofan overall task which makes a contribution to the social utility of the product"(Emery & Thorsrud 1975:14).

The Norwegian studies provided strong confirmation of the effectiveness of the socio-technical systems approach to organisational analysis and design through its successfulapplication in yet another cultural setting. They also gave considerable impetus to workerparticipation programmes in a number of countries in the 1970s. The roots of neworganisational forms in Sweden, Australia, Canada, the USA, Denmark and Germany(Cordery et al. 1991; Eiden 1986; Kolodny & Stjemberg 1986), for example, can betraced directly to the studies conducted by Emery and Thorsrud, and others, in Norway;and, as we shall see in Chapter 8, Thorsrud has also been involved with the developmentof new forms of work organisation in Tanzania. Sociotechnical systems theory hastherefore become closely identified with new forms of work organisation which havegiven to those at lower levels in the organisation greater autonomy and decision makingpower. According to Emery and Thorsrud (1975):

"The Sociotechnical approach implies a radically different view of the organisation.Indeed, it emphasises, not the sharp differentiations between jobs, but the interdependen-cies among tasks. With this as a point of departure, we can take care that the authority tocontrol an activity is placed where control can most effectively be carried out - atwhatever level in the organisation. This central idea of the Sociotechnical system can be adetermining factor in shaping the structure of the organisation and the levels it maycontain. The organisation thus becomes task-oriented rather than person-oriented. Thepsychological job demands we have discussed, as well as the requirements of thetechnology itself, seem to indicate that the influence which has traditionally been placedhigher up in the organisation should be moved much further down and quite oflen right


Organisational Choice in Africa 99

down to the shop floor. In principle, this is what has been called 'delegation of responsi-bility'. What is new in the field experiments is that they seem to give more systematicknowledge of the technological and social conditions necessary for such delegation ofauthority. A decisive element is the fact that the reallocation of responsibility provides, onthe whole, better control of the system - its boundary conditions as well as its internalvariations - without requiring the human beings involved to be controlled by coercion "(p. 121).Critics of sociotechnical system theory, however, have argued that it simply providesmanagement with another set of tools for increasing worker productivity. Kelly (1978),for example, has suggested that "the achievement of sociotechnical theory has been todiscover the limiting conditions - high product or process uncertainty - beyond whichcertain tenets of scientific management cease to be economically effective" (p. 1083). Weshall consider this and one or two additional points of criticism later.

5.4 Organisational Choice in Africa

Few managers of enterprises in Africa seem to regard them as open sociotechnicalsystems subject to the idea of organisational choice. On the contrary, it appears insteadthat decision makers in many African organisations are still persuaded by the One bestway' view: essentially the bureaucratic model. There is therefore very little autonomy anddecision making power to be found at the lower levels of the majority of public andprivate enterprises in Africa (Blunt 1978: Elkan 1960; Henley 1973; Jones 1988a). Thispicture is supported by a study in Kenya by Nicholson, Ostrom, Bowles and Long (1985),reported by Kiggundu (1988). In its description of 'a typical government agency' thestudy, as is so often the case, found it to be too large overall, mismanaged, and with a poorsense of direction. More significantly for our present discussion, it was found that it was inthe lower ranks where people had little to do while senior managers were overworked: atypical indication that managers are not willing to delegate any autonomy of action. Forthe organisation this is likely to result in "a debilitating unwillingness to take independentaction" (Kiggundu 1988:225).

5.4.1 Zambian Copper Mines

Even in the mining industry where, as we have just seen, there are striking examples of theappropriateness of the sociotechnical systems perspective, there has been little deviationfrom strict, hierarchical controls which effectively prevent workers from developing newskills and using their initiative. Burawoy (1972), for example, explicitly compared thesystems of work operating in the Zambian copper mines with those found to be the mostefficient by Trist, Higgin, Murray and Pollock (1963) in the British coal mines. Twentyyears after the original study by Trist and Bamforth (1951), Burawoy observed:



"Despite the development of the labour force in many areas, management has intensifiedrather than relaxed the division of labour, close supervision and the disciplinary code...The contradiction between the maturation of the labour force and the fossilisation of asystem of industrial organisation based on an intensive division of labour has inevitablypromoted frustrations amongst those workers who are not content with a job which leaveslittle room for initiative and responsibility. For others the job becomes a mechanicalprocess devoid of meaning except as a source of income. The system inevitably discour-ages any interest in efficiency or productivity" (1972: 270).Burawoy suggests that the trouble with introducing a more adapted form of workorganisation, based, say, on semi-autonomous, multi-skilled work groups, was that man-agement, as well as government bodies in Zambia, subscribed to the 'myth of workerindolence'. Naturally, if it is widely believed that workers are lazy and will not expendeffort voluntarily, then strict disciplinary systems and forms of control become the basisof work organisation. What was needed, therefore, Burawoy argued was for governmentand management to place greater faith in the abilities and willingness to work of theZambian worker.

According to Austin (1990), perceptions about the intrinsic worth of people, whetherthey are regarded as mainly good or evil or neutral, are socially and culturally based.Austin notes the following implications for managers:

"A belief that humans are basically good and trustworthy will lead to looser controls; aview that they cannot be trusted will call forth tighter controls and supervision. Wheretrust is low, delegation of authority tends to be low and decision making more autocratic;relations tend to be more adversarial and less collegial" (1990: 64-65).

5.4.2 Sudan Railways

A more recent investigation of organisational choice in Africa has been conducted byKetchum (1984) in his sociotechnical analysis of the Sudan Railways. The study wasconducted at the request of the World Bank who were considering making a loan to theSudanese Government in order to establish a new railway workshop, and wanted toexplore the viability of designing a working environment along sociotechnical lines withthe aim of improving both productivity and quality of working life.

The existing Sudan Railways workshops suffered from many of the problems encoun-tered in developing countries generally: delays, lack of spare parts and tools, an abnormal-ly high incidence of accidents (see Blunt & Popoola 1985), poor worker managementrelations, high absenteeism caused by shortages of basic foodstuffs and consumer goods(workers would leave their jobs in order to queue for scarce commodities), complaints ofbias in promotion, selection, and reward, and low productivity. Ketchum (1984) felt thatsome of these problems were soluble using sociotechnical systems principles. However,his report is concerned only with the redesign of the workshop at Sennar. No data arepresented on the effects of the new design on the performance criteria mentioned earlier.


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Also, we cannot help but feel that at least some of the enthusiasm for sociotechnical ideaswhich Ketchum ascribes to Sudanese workers and managers - working, as he admits, "inan environment where pay is at or just above subsistence level" (1984: 152) - derivedfrom the fact that the sociotechnical ideas were closely bound up with the loan packagefrom the World Bank. There was also the not inconsiderable incentive associated with theprospect of "the entire team ... (undergoing) intensive training in the United States"(Ketchum 1984:152). As we shall see later in this book, concerns about the materialincentives associated with new working arrangements are by no means confined toworkers in developing countries. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that workerseverywhere are all too aware of the possibility that managers may be looking for greaterreturns, or increased productivity, at no additional cost. It is therefore more than a littlefanciful to suppose that the 'romance* of greater job variety or meaning can make up forbasic need satisfaction. The lesson is surely that in conditions of hardship and poverty, inorder to reap the full potential of sociotechnical or any other form of job or structuralredesign, attention must also be paid to the material rewards associated with any reform.

5.5 Criticisms of Sociotechnical Systems Theory

There has been little detailed critical analysis of sociotechnical systems theory, particular-ly as it might be applied in Africa. Kelly's (1978, 1982) appraisals are some of the fewclosely argued critiques of sociotechnical systems theory in general. The points he makesare of importance because they show that it is possible to read the written accounts ofstudies informed by sociotechnical systems theory in a manner other than that intended bythe authors, without doing violence to, or reading too much into, the evidence theypresent In other words, it is not difficult to find plausible alternative explanations of thedata to those put forward by the sociotechnical systems theorists themselves. The thrust ofKelly's analysis suggests, once again, that workers may be getting less - in terms ofimproved quality of work - than they have been led to expect.

We know that in the industrialised nations of the West worker suspicion of manage-ment and organisational designers and other experts is widespread, and in many casesquite justified. And even in Norway, in one of a number of carefully selected organisa-tions, Emery and Thorsrud (1975) encountered considerable resistance to their activities:

'"Die initial agreement had been reached in an atmosphere of considerable suspicion andmistrust... Thus the collaboration of union officials and management seemed strange andaroused suspicions; the presence of research people involved the more familiar image ofmanagerialty oriented consultants; the meetings, votes and requests for volunteers smeltof manipulation in a process traditionally governed by dictates or voting with one 's feet;the challenge to a working method apparently dictated by technological necessity justseemed quixotic" (p. 47).



There is no reason to suppose that similar reactions would not be likely in Africa, and it istherefore necessary that organisational designers, and others, be aware of the conflict-creating potential - no matter how slight - of the approaches they adopt. Safavi's (1981)review of management education in Africa concludes that organisational theory andbehaviour courses in many of the management education programmes of 43 countriesgive insufficient consideration to the attitudes of workers, and that as a result Africanmanagers are insensitive to the needs and feelings of workers. In a similar vein, Msekwa(1975) has explained the occurrence of a number of Tanzanian strikes in terms of thedisrespectful behaviour of managers towards workers.

More recently, Kiggundu (1986) found that applications of sociotechnical systemstheory in developing countries, including Africa, had been "spotty and limited in scope"(p. 341). His view is that the theory itself is robust, but that its application in developingcountries has been limited by the 'prevailing conditions' in developing countries, theoperating methods of Western change agents in those countries, the potential for change-oriented action by local managers and stakeholders, and the quality of partnershipsbetween Western change agents and local role players. Kiggundu (1986) asserts that, incontrast to the principles of sociotechnical systems theory which espouse open systemsand democratic values and practices in the workplace, organisations in most developingcountries are bureaucratic, mechanistic and autocratic. He lists the factors which, heclaims, cause problems in attempting to apply sociotechnical systems thinking in devel-oping countries, including:

"Organisations in developing countries exhibit dysfunctional modes of conflict manage-ment, closer social and emotional interactions, intergroup rivalry, little capacity foropenness, trust, and the rational expression of feelings, and well established hierarchicaland social status barriers" (Kiggundu 1986: 343).

The problem with this line of reasoning is that aspects of organisational life like thosedescribed above are surely familiar to all of us as common realities in organisations, orparts of organisations, everywhere. To designate them as true only for developing coun-tries is to ignore the reality of organisational life the world over. In fact, what he isdescribing, on the basis of very little empirical evidence, are more likely to be variationson a universal theme rather than attributes of Third World organisations only. This pointis reinforced by Ketchum (1984) who found the feelings and reactions of Sudan Railwayworkers and managers to be "similar to those of their counterparts in industrialisedcountries" (p. 135). Moreover, Ketchum is decidedly sanguine about the usefulness ofsociotechnical systems in developing countries, based on his experience in the Sudan. Inanswer to the question, "Are the (sociotechnical) principles yielding superior economicand social outcomes in developed countries feasible in developing countries?" his re-sponse was "a tentative, but hearty, yes" (1984:136).

Kiggundu's argument that sociotechnical systems theory is limited in its usefulness indeveloping country contexts appears to rest on his apparent assumption that the theorywas developed as a strategy for organisational change rather than as an explanation of theconsequences of organisational change. Hence, we should not conclude, with him, that


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special arrangements need to be made in order for sociotechnical systems thinking to befruitful in Africa (and other developing regions). We would argue that sociotechnicalsystems theory is singularly equipped to acknowledge variations in organisational behav-iour and environmental change. What needs to be done before we can make suchconfident assertions about 'most' developing countries is to identify reliably what thesevariations actually are.

Some major general criticisms of sociotechnical systems theory have been made byKelly (1978,1982) and these are set out below.

5.5.1 Economic Considerations are Given Precedence over Worker Autonomy

Despite the expressed commitment to autonomous work groups, much of the workredesign in India, Britain and Norway actually entailed significant curtailments of work-er autonomy, with precedence being given instead to economic considerations. Kellypoints out that in one of the Norwegian experiments, conducted in a wire-drawing mill,the creation of autonomous work groups led to fewer men being employed. The re-searchers felt obliged to insist on this because it was "difficult to see how (the workers)would make effective use of the time saved" (Emery & Thorsrud 1975: 30). In otherwords, autonomous work groups were only regarded as viable so long as they were ableto improve efficiency. Kelly provides similar instances from the weaving and miningstudies, and concluded that the "three studies indicate the necessity (in sociotechnicalterms) for the prefixing of 'responsible' before the word autonomy, for where auto-nomy clashed with the employer's economic demands ..., or was giving them noadvantage... it was curtailed. In all cases economic imperatives were uppermost"(1978:1080).

5.5.2 Sociotechnical Design Results in the Intensification of Labour

Rather than affording equal emphasis to the social and technical systems, Kelly arguesthat the technical systems in Britain, India and Norway were taken as given, and thestudies were actually concerned with adapting the social systems to them. In practice, thisturned out in every case to involve the intensification of labour, that is, an increase inworkload per man and/or a faster pace of working. As we have seen, in one of the Indianweaving sheds manning was reduced by 50 per cent, and Rice (1958) himself reports that"there were many complaints of tiredness caused by so much extra walking ... At allconferences they said that they worked much harder than in the other sheds" (pp. 146-7).Similar evidence was produced by Kelly in relation to the Durham coal mining study andthe Norwegian studies.



5.5.3 The Positive Effects of Sociotechnical Design Could be Due in Part to PayIncentives

There is some evidence to suggest that Sociotechnical systems theorists have underesti-mated the significance of pay as an explanatory variable in their studies. For example, oneof the major complaints about the conventional long-wall method was the fact that owingto the complex system of payments certain tasks which were carried out undergroundwent unrewarded. This had effects such as the following: "Minor maintenance, forexample, if not the responsibility of Group A, would not be carried out by them since itwould only consume time without simultaneously yielding a financial reward" (Kelly1978:1088). The composite system overcame this problem by ensuring that all tasksnecessary for the extraction of coal were rewarded. Moreover, there had been a longtradition of pay bargaining in the Durham coal mines, both in the hand-got and conven-tional systems, and this too indicated the significance of pay to the miners.

Rice may also have been guilty of underemphasising the significance of pay. Membersof the autonomous weaving groups which were set up received increases in their basicmonthly pay ranging from nil, for a small number, up to as much as 44 per cent. Anincentive payment system was also introduced, so that each worker received a small risein pay on attaining a predetermined production target of 85 per cent of full potential. Theobserved increases in loom efficiency - from 80 to almost 90 per cent - were hardlysurprising, therefore, and could well have been as much due to the payment schemes asthey were to changed methods of work. Miller (1975) acknowledges this possibility byallowing for the "possible relevance" of the "diminishing 'bite' of the bonus system"(p. 381) in explaining the situation which prevailed in the textile mills some fifteen yearslater. Arguments like the above can also be advanced in relation to the Norwegian studies,and to other experiments, conducted in the USA, by Trist, Susman and Brown (1977).

How did this evidence affect the status of Sociotechnical systems theory and the claimsof its proponents? More than anything else, perhaps, it provided a healthy correction to thetendency to regard the autonomous work group as the new panacea. Like job enrichment,and other management fads before it, there was a danger of claiming too much too soon.The idea of organisational choice which had been the cornerstone of early Sociotechnicalwork was becoming lost in a series of studies which seemed to be saying that autonomousgroup working was the best way to achieve organisational and employee goals. Butalthough Kelly's points introduced a note of caution and promoted a more balancedappreciation of Sociotechnical systems theory, they did not on their own falsify its majorclaims, since:

"The evidence in these cases is not unequivocal,... many other changes took place in paylevels and incentives. It is theoretically possible then that the payment changes did notcause the performance changes, but resulted from them, and that performance improve-ments stemmed from other factors, such as increased job challenge" (Kelly 1978:1072).


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5.6 Conclusion

Treating organisations as open sociotechnical systems is still a dominant perspective inorganisational theory. It is to be found, for example, in the 'quality of working life'movement which is preoccupied with the humanisation of work through sociotechnicaldesign. Cherns and Davis (1975:6) propose that "far from imposing economic costs",humanising work through sociotechnical design "yields societal, personal, and economicgains".

As we have seen, systems thinking, in the form of sociotechnical systems theory, hasbeen applied to formal organisations for several decades. A recent development insystems thinking concerns the notion of 'hard' and 'soft* systems theory. According toCheckland (1981), who is perhaps the preeminent soft systems thinker, methodologieslike systems engineering and systems analysis "assume that problems can be formulatedas the making of a choice between alternative means of achieving a known end. The beliefthat real-world problems can be formulated in this way is the distinguishing feature of all'hard' systems thinking" (p. 15). Checkland suggests that the concept of'human activitysystem' is profoundly different from the concepts of 'natural' and 'designed' systemsbecause the perceptions of the human actors infuse human activity systems with manyalternative meanings. In Checkland's (1981) view, this makes it impossible to constructtestable objective accounts of organisational life.

Checkland remarks on some similarities between the soft systems approach and that ofthe sociotechnical systems movement. He notes that Warmington, Lupton and Gribbin(1977), using sociotechnical systems thinking, deliberately neglected the concept oforganisational goal because it was seen as contributing little of value to attempts to assessorganisational performance. Thus, Checkland notes, "their core paradigm is ... one oflearning rather than optimisation and that is where lies the resemblance to soft systemsmethodology" (1981:258).

Using this paradigm in relation to the African situation, it can be asserted that onlythose organisations which become learning communities have a chance of surviving andperforming in an era of accelerating and complex change. We shall return to this notion -of the learning community - in later chapters.

The meeting between new technological systems and old social systems is probablynowhere more evident than it is in Africa, yet there appear to have been relatively fewserious attempts made to address the issues involved. Where attempts have been made,with one or two exceptions they have been hampered by the absence of a clear theoreticalframework which serves to make the data intelligible and comparable with studiesconducted elsewhere (e.g., Okediji 1965), and they have failed to give equal prominenceto the social and technical aspects of organisational life. As Brown (1989) observes, "thesystems perspective in studies of Third World management tends ... to be a ratherqualified phenomenon" (p. 371). Sociotechnical systems theory provides a framework forthe development of an understanding of such issues in Africa, and for urgently neededempirical research.



Jones (1990b), for instance, claims that the application of the basic systems model,described at the beginning of this chapter, can demonstrate the importance of two majorfactors in considering questions of organisational performance in the context of Africanpublic administration. First, the serious effects of the common tendency in African publicorganisations to focus almost exclusively on inputs - 'the vast increases in spending onhealth, education, housing and so on' - whilst neglecting to consider Outputs/outcomesachieved in terms of quantity, quality, service, and client satisfaction*. As Jones (1990b)points out, "no useful judgment of performance is possible unless inputs and outputs areconsidered together" (p. 59). The second factor is the rapid, and frequently turbulent,nature of change in African environments. Sociotechnical systems concepts are invalu-able in understanding such developments and for initiating, monitoring and managingcomplex change in the organisation's environment.

Moreover, the utility of systems theory has been evaluated in a number of culturalsettings with favourable, though not unequivocal, results. Trist (1975), and Cherns andDavis (1975), all leading 'elders' of the Sociotechnical systems school of thought, haveadvocated it as a valuable approach to organisational analysis and design in developingcountries. They argue that the chance is there for developing countries to profit and learnfrom the mistakes made in the industrialised nations of the West. Rather than taking theWestern pattern as an inevitable consequence of industrialisation and progress, develop-ing nations should aim from the beginning to attend to the social repercussions of rapidindustrialisation and change. This is consistent with the Sociotechnical systems point ofview, as expressed by Cummings (1986):

"Sociotechnical systems theory has come a long way from the British coal mines,spreading across diverse nations and industries.... developed numerous concepts andpractices, and... produced a rich set of applications. What will continue to hold thefleldtogether and make Sociotechnical systems powerful are a shared set of values as to howpersons should be treated in the workplace and a deep-seated belief in the importance oforganisational choice" (p. 360).This reinforces the need in Africa to question the (Western) norms and values which areimported together with advanced technologies: "Without this Sociotechnical assessmentthe developing countries are importing the quality of working life of their people alongwith the imported technology" (Cherns & Davis 1975: 24). Many parts of Africa todaystand on the brink of rapid industrialisation, and there will be no better opportunity thannow exists to direct development in a manner which benefits the social and technologicalneeds of its people. Tragically, the signs are that the Western agenda of industrialisationalong with widespread alienation, the destruction of family structures and values, andugly urban growth, is being repeated in Africa. Much is said about social considerations indevelopment planning, but all too little gets done.

One of the problems is that quality of working life considerations are seen as being lessurgent, politically, than other social issues. When compared with the desperate need inAfrican countries to create employment, quality of working life is regarded as a barely


Implications for Managers and Management Development 107

affordable luxury. Chems and Davis (197S) reveal the fallacy in this line of reasoningnicely:

"This generally held notion is, however, a misreading based on false historicism. Becauseindustrialisation was accompanied in the past by a widespread decline in the quality ofworking life, it has become accepted that the price of industrialisation is alienation aswell as dense urbanisation. Yet neither of these consequences is an inevitable concomi-tant of industrialisation. Furthermore, the currently present symptoms of dissatisfactionin advanced countries appear to be largely associated with, and more than partially theoutcome of, steps taken to advance the efficiency of work organisations. Again the ills areseen as part of the cost of efficient operation. Costs they are, but paradoxically uncosted:necessary costs they are not. Newly industrialising countries need no more follow theroad of 'scientific management' than they need begin their industrialisation with theJames Watt steam engine" (p. 22).

5.7 Implications for Managers and Management Development

It is not only the academics who are interested in finding some answers to puzzlingquestions about African organisations and how they work. African managers are them-selves daily confronted by such questions; trained primarily in Western managementtheories and practices and frequently having Western managers as their only role models,how are they to answer such questions? More importantly, how are they to developmanagement practices which are appropriate to African, rather than Western, contexts?

Systems thinking is not difficult. By this we mean that it is not difficult to incorporatethe fundamental notions of systems thinking into one's framework for thinking aboutorganisational and managerial issues. Perhaps the most urgent task for African seniormanagers is to breathe life into the failing bureaucracies which they inherited at independ-ence. To do this they will need an understanding of organisational alternatives and of thechanges occurring in their organisations' environments. Sociotechnical systems theoryoffers a practical tool for understanding; the critical - and all too frequently missing -prerequisite for initiating and managing change.

The implications of this for management development are not that African managersmust be necessarily educated in the details of systems theory, but that managementeducation strategies and methods could usefully encourage managers to think in systemsterms, within a systems framework. However many times it has been said, many manag-ers still do not act in a way which acknowledges the critical starting point of systemsthinking: that all parts of the organisation, internally and in their interaction with theenvironment, are interdependent All too frequently we observe changes being made inAfrican organisations for example, some of the reforms being recommended and imposedunder the structural adjustment programmes mentioned in Chapter 1 which fail becausethey ignore this fundamental reality.


Chapter 5 from 'Managing Organisations in Africa' (1992, 2011)

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