Chapter 1 “A People's War” against the Gang of Four

Ending Political Violence Making and Unmaking Perpetrators of the Cultural

Revolution in Post-Mao China

Inangural-Dissertation zur

Erlangung der Doktorwürde

der Philosophischen Fakultät

der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität

Freiburg i. Br.

vorgeleget von

Man Zhang

aus Jiangsu, China

WS 2020/21

Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Daniel Leese (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg)

Zweitgutacterin: JunProf. Dr. Lena Henningsen (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg)

Vorsitzender des Promotionsausschusses

der Gemeinsamen Kommission

der Philologischen und der Philosophischen Fakultät:

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Bernd Kortmann

Datum der mündlichen Prüfung: 11. Mai 2021

i

Abstract

Following the arrest of the Gang of Four on October 6, 1976, local authorities across the

country immediately arrested a large number of former rebels, accused them of being

followers of the Gang of Four, and designated them perpetrators of the Cultural Revolution.

Drawing on in-depth analysis of Jiangsu Province, the location of early measures designed to

address Cultural Revolutionary violence and injustices, and mainly based on first-hand

archives and oral history interviews, this dissertation examines the processes of designating,

defining, and punishing perpetrators of the Cultural Revolution. The study of Jiangsu shows

that the designated followers and local cadres continuously challenged, questioned, and

resisted central policies on the designation of perpetrators. The campaign-style approach

further undermined the legitimacy of the designation. In the early 1980s, faced with local

challenges and the complex issue of responsibility, the central leadership redressed a large

number of its previous designations of perpetrators and focused on eliminating the legacy of

the Cultural Revolution within the Party leadership, thereby securing its future rule.

The study further explores how the CCP legitimized its claim to power, how it succeeded

in launching political and social transformation in post-Mao China, and how the attribution of

accountability impacts current debates within Chinese society. Despite the CCP’s concerted

effort to close the book on the Cultural Revolution, it lives on today, both as a symbol of

historical injustice and, perhaps unexpectedly, as an object of nostalgia. The Cultural

Revolution continues to resonate in the present. The question of who was accountable for

the Cultural Revolution and whether designated perpetrators should be punished remains a

controversial topic in contemporary Chinese society. Various groups compete to narrate their

own past, often posing counternarratives to the official narrative outlined in the 1981

Resolution. These diverse interpretations of the Cultural Revolution reflect an unsettling past.

ii

Table of Contents

Abstract ............................................................................................................................ i

Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. ii

Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................... iv

List of Figures .................................................................................................................. vi

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1

Perpetrators of the Cultural Revolution .................................................................................... 5

Accountability and the Issue of Legitimacy ............................................................................... 9

Transitional Justice and Unsettling Accounts........................................................................... 16

A Local Perspective on the Post-Mao Transition ...................................................................... 21 Working with Archives ................................................................................................................................ 21 Oral History Interviews ............................................................................................................................... 23 Local History in the Transition .................................................................................................................... 26

Structure of the Thesis ........................................................................................................... 29

Chapter 1 “A People’s War” against the Gang of Four: Defining Perpetrators in Jiangsu Province ......................................................................................................................... 32

1.1 Locating Gang of Four Followers in Jiangsu ........................................................................ 34

1.2 Collecting as Mobilization: Searching for Evidence of Crimes ............................................. 43

1.3 Emotional Mobilization: Public Denunciation of the Gang of Four Clique ........................... 49 1.3.1 The Organization of Criticism Meetings ............................................................................................. 51 1.3.2 Roles and Performativity .................................................................................................................... 53 1.3.3 Small Group Meetings ........................................................................................................................ 57

1.4 Self-criticisms or “Clarification Meetings”? Local Attempts at Reconciling Victims and Perpetrators .......................................................................................................................... 61

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 69

Chapter 2 Categorizing Perpetrators, Resistance, and Challenges to Party Legitimacy ..... 72

2.1 “Locked Horns” (顶牛): Study Classes and Resistance of the Investigated ........................... 76

2.2 “Our Political Stance was Correct”: Resistance of Cadres ................................................... 82

2.3 Inconsistent Standards: Categorizing Perpetrators in Jiangsu and at the Party Center ......... 88 2.3.1 The Jiangsu Standard for Categorization ........................................................................................... 88 2.3.2 The Central Standard for Categorization ........................................................................................... 92 2.3.3 Inconsistent Standards between Jiangsu and the Center .................................................................. 96 2.3.4 Recategorizing Local Followers .......................................................................................................... 99

2.4 Dealing with Violent Perpetrators ................................................................................... 102

2.5 “The Campaign was Wrong”: Challenges to Legitimacy .................................................... 108

Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 113

Chapter 3 Reversing the Positions of Perpetrator and Victim: Correcting Injustices and Making Perpetrators Accountable ................................................................................ 115

iii

3.1 From Counterrevolutionary to Hero: “Solely Opposing the Gang of Four” ........................ 119

3.2 Jiangsu’s Early Reviews of Cases in 1977 ......................................................................... 126

3.3 Responding to Central Policies on Case Reversals in 1978 ................................................ 134

3.4 A Model of Reversing Counterrevolutionary Cases .......................................................... 141

3.5 Dealing with Perpetrators of Cultural Revolutionary Injustices ........................................ 145

Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 150

Chapter 4 Exclusion and Inclusion: Punishing, Purging and Redressing Perpetrators (1979-1987) ............................................................................................................................ 153

4.1 Trial Preparation in Jiangsu ............................................................................................. 157

4.2 Jiangsu’s Gang of Four Followers on Trial ........................................................................ 163 4.2.1 Follower Trials in Nantong ............................................................................................................... 164 4.2.2 The Limits of Criminal Trials ............................................................................................................. 172

4.3 Exclusion and Inclusion of Perpetrators (1980-1982) ........................................................ 177 4.3.1 Recategorization in 1980-1981 ........................................................................................................ 179 4.3.2 De-categorizing Perpetrators and Redressing their Cases in 1982 .................................................. 187

4.4 Clearing out the “Three Types of People” (1980-1987) ..................................................... 193

Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 200

Chapter 5 Narratives and Voices of Cultural Revolution “Perpetrators” ......................... 202

5.1 Denial and Amnesia ........................................................................................................ 206

5.2 Heroism and Nostalgia.................................................................................................... 213

5.3 Betrayal ......................................................................................................................... 217

5.4 Remorse......................................................................................................................... 222

Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 228

Conclusion: Making and Unmaking Perpetrators .......................................................... 230

Appendixes................................................................................................................... 240

Appendix 1 .......................................................................................................................... 240

Appendix 2 .......................................................................................................................... 241

Appendix 3 .......................................................................................................................... 242

Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 246

Archival Materials ................................................................................................................ 246

Interviews ........................................................................................................................... 261

Newspaper and Website Articles .......................................................................................... 262

Books and Articles ............................................................................................................... 265

iv

Acknowledgments

Six years ago, I met Professor Daniel Leese over dinner in Nanjing as I was completing my

MA studies. Apart from being surprised that the professor could be so young, his research

project, “The Maoist Legacy,” caught my interest. The European Research Council funded the

project. I was fortunate enough to become a research member of this project and began my

doctoral study in Chinese Studies at the University of Freiburg under Daniel’s supervision. At

first, it was challenging, sometimes painful, to balance and bridge the gap between research

methods and writing on historical topics in Chinese versus English. But it was also through this

exploratory process that I found the right balance and settled on a study of the perpetrators

of the Cultural Revolution.

None of this would have been possible without my supervisor Daniel’s support. Daniel has

been incredibly supportive and encouraging throughout my doctoral studies. During the

writing of my dissertation, he was always available at the right moment to provide valuable

guidance and advice on my research and writing. Whenever I wrote a chapter, he would

organize a project meeting to give feedback on the chapter. Daniel always provided thorough

and insightful critiques and advice in both project and individual meetings, chapter by chapter.

His feedback has not only profoundly benefited my thesis but also my future academic

research. In the latter stages of the project, Daniel also provided continuous advice on my

career path. He encouraged and supported me in my job applications on many occasions. I

owe a debt of gratitude to him.

I am also deeply grateful and indebted to my colleagues in the Maoist Legacy project team.

Amanda Shuman has always helped me with language problems in my writing. In her busy

schedule, she has been generous with her time to read and comment on various chapter

drafts. Puck Engman, Song Guoqing, and I began our doctoral studies together. We

accompanied each other along the journey. I have significantly benefited from our daily

conversations. Puck Engman has always been patient in helping me with my everyday

research problems, offering ideas and recommendations for books and articles related to my

research. Song Guoqing and I have known each other for almost ten years, and he always

helps me when I need it. Special gratitude must also go to colleagues Wang Baigulahu and

v

Thomas Kaiser. When I first came to Germany, they were always friendly and helped me

integrate into my new environment, both in life and at work. Without their help, I would not

have started my studies and work smoothly in Freiburg. Damian Mandzunowski and Tabea

Mühbach have always helped me in every way without reservation.

I must also thank colleagues and friends who helped me during the writing of my

dissertation. I am very grateful to Prof. Lena Henningsen for agreeing to be my second

supervisor. Lena has been very supportive, not only by commenting on my thesis but also by

inviting me to participate in her project and teaching activities from time to time. In the early

stages of writing, Elisabeth Forster was kind enough to read the first draft of each chapter and

provide many insightful comments. Yang Yuyu also provided me with valuable advice during

the revision phase and sharpened my thinking when I encountered a bottleneck. All of them

have been incredibly supportive in writing and refining my dissertation. I would also like to

thank Prof. Dong Guoqiang, Prof. Nicola Spakowski, Prof. Timothy Cheek, Prof. Shao Qin, etc.,

for their insights at different stages of my study. Many other colleagues have commented on

my chapters at various conferences and workshops. I am indebted to them all.

Special mention must also be made of the people who helped me in my oral history

interviews and archival research in China. My interviewees were kind enough to tolerate all

the questions I asked and allow me to use their stories in my research. Some of my

interviewees passed away, and I dedicate this research to their memorials. Many archives

staff members kindly assisted me in searching for and reading their archives. Special thanks

go to, but are not limited to, the following archives: the Nantong Municipal Archives, the

Suzhou Municipal Archives, the Huai’an Municipal Archives, the Xuzhou Municipal Archives,

and the Jiangsu Provincial Archives. I am also incredibly grateful for the generous financial

support of the European Research Council for my research and fieldwork throughout the

Maoist Legacy project led by Daniel.

Last but not least, I want particularly to thank my parents and siblings. Without their

selfless support and encouragement, I could not have made it this far. They have always

looked after me. No matter where I go, they are always my strongest support and warmest

harbor.

vi

List of Figures

Figure 1: "Jiangsu was not chaotic enough" by Ma De 11 Figure 2: Jiangsu Provincial Public Security’s Release Decision 124 Figure 3: Jiangsu Provincial Public Security Bureau's Reversal Decision 125

Table 1: Labeled Key Followers in Jiangsu 35 Table 2: Jiangsu’s Suggestions for Categorizing Gang of Four Followers 90 Table 3: The Central Standard for Categorization 95 Table 4: Information on Gang of Four Follower Trials in Nantong 165 Table 5: Revision of Categories and Punishment in Nantong in 1980 182

Chart 1: Hierarchy of Alleged Jiangsu Followers 39 Chart 2: Measures Towards 153 Targets in Suzhou 77

file:///C:/Users/04.004%20PC%20II/Desktop/Dissertation%20draft/2021%20Revision%20After%20Defense/20201215_Ending%20Political%20Violence_Zhang%20-%20Copy.docx%23_Toc75449539

Introduction

On February 18, 2013, 81-year-old Qiu Riren1 (邱日仁) stood trial at Huangshe Village,

Zhejiang Province, charged with an intentional homicide committed 46 years prior. 2

According to Qiu’s own testimony in 1970, his superior had ordered him, along with three

accomplices, to kill a local villager by the name of Hong.3 Hong was a village doctor with a

family background of “landlord” – a political label that marked him as a constant target for

persecution during the Maoist era.4 On December 12, 1967, Qiu and one accomplice had

strangled Hong to death and hastily buried him in an unmarked grave that the other

accomplices dug. The Rui’an County Revolutionary Committee started to investigate the

death of Hong in 1969 and reached a verdict in January 1973 that exempted all involved

parties from criminal punishment, subjecting them only to “criticism and education” (批判教

育). Qiu’s involvement in the killing of Hong did not bar him from the Chinese Communist

Party (CCP), which he successfully joined in July 1980. The Rui’an authorities investigated the

death of Hong again in 1986. While his superior and accomplice were convicted and

sentenced to seven years and one and a half years’ imprisonment, Qiu was absent from the

trial.5 Only in 2013, nearly five decades after the crime, the local court put Qiu on trial and

sentence him to three and a half years’ imprisonment.

The trial attracted significant public attention and evoked a heated discussion in Chinese

media. 6 The crux of the debate related to the attribution of accountability for a crime

1 I have kept the real names of all those mentioned in this dissertation. However, at the time of the dissertation’s publication, I will use pseudonyms. 2 Considering Qiu’s advanced age, the Rui’an Municipal People’s Court conducted the trial at Huangshe Village rather than in the municipal court. 3 Liu Chang, “Shenpan Wenge yi’an” 审判文革遗案 [Hearing a Lingering Case of the Cultural Revolution], Southern Weekly, February 28, 2013, http://www.infzm.com/content/88391. 4 Gao Hua, “Jieji shenfen he chayi: 1949-1965 nian Zhongguo shehui de zhengzhi fenceng” 阶级身份和差异：1949-1965年中国社会的政治分层 [Class Identity and Stratification: 1949-1956], in Zai lishi de fengling dukou (Hong Kong: Shidai guoji chuban youxian gongsi, 2005), 297–362; Yang Kuisong, “Xin zhongguo tugai beijing xia de dizhu funong wenti” 新中国土改背景下的地主富农问题 [The Politics of Landlords and Rich Peasants within the Context of Land Reform in New China], Shilin, no. 6 (2008): 1–19. 5 At the trial in 1986, Qiu was too charged with intentional homicide, but he had already left the village in 1984. Due to Qiu’s absence from the trial, he did not receive a verdict. The other two accomplices who had dug the grave were exempted from criminal punishment. 6 Among others, the newspaper Southern Weekly followed and reported the trial when it took place, see Liu, “Shenpan Wenge yi’an.” The report was shared on a variety of such influential media platforms as xinhuanet.com and news.ifeng.com. On March 11, 2013, the TV program “Quanmin xiangdui lun” (全民相对论) of the Phoenix TV operated a special episode to discuss the trial. Its guests included Zhang Sizhi, a famous lawyer who defended

Introduction

2

committed in the political context of the so-called Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (无

产阶级文化大革命 , hereafter Cultural Revolution). The Cultural Revolution is officially

considered to have taken place between 1966 and 1976 and often termed the “ten years of

chaos” (十年动乱).7 A survey carried out by a TV program on the trial of Qiu in 2013 found

that almost 90% of the respondents thought people should be held accountable for crimes

committed during the Cultural Revolution.8 Villagers in Huangshe, however, suggested that

such killings were rather common during the Cultural Revolution and thus considered it

unnecessary to try this 81-year-old man for a crime that he had committed decades ago.9 As

for judicial cadres of the Rui’an Municipal Court, they repeatedly emphasized that the trial

was merely intended to deal with the matter of criminal responsibility and had no bearing on

questions related to the Cultural Revolution.10 The diverging views on the trial illustrate how

questions of responsibility and punishment for actions committed during the Cultural

Revolution remain controversial in Chinese society today.

These conflicting public opinions result from the complexity of the historical background

against which the killing took place. The political nature of Cultural Revolutionary violence

and injustices complicated the addressing of responsibility. During the Cultural Revolution,

the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, relying on a charismatic form of

mobilization, called upon the youth, officially termed Red Guards, to overthrow the Party-

state bureaucracy that he and his fellow leaders had established.11 The year 1967 witnessed

for the Gang of Four in 1980-81, Xu Youyu, a Cultural Revolution expert, and Tao Siliang, the daughter of Tao Zhu who was Vice Premier of the State Council at the initial stage of the Cultural Revolution. They considered that individuals should be responsible for their actions during the Cultural Revolution, see “Wenge zhenghouqun” 文革症候群 [Confessions of the Cultural Revolution], television broadcast, Quanmin xiangduilun, March 11, 2013, https://www.roseluqiu.com/tv-radio-film. Xinmin Weekly published a commentary on August 21, 2013, and called upon the state to settle accounts with the crimes committed during the Cultural Revolution, see “Jinyou liangzhi de shenpan gou ma?” 仅有良知的审判够吗？ [Is It Enough to Only Have a Trial on Conscience?], Xinmin Weekly, no. 98 (August 21, 2013), http://www.xinminweekly.com.cn/zhuanlan/lsfy/2013/08/21/2844.html. Sohu.com transmitted this article, see “Dui Wenge zhong zuoezhe jinyou liangzhi de shenpan shi bu gou de” 对文革中作恶者仅有良知的审判是不够的 [It Is Insufficient to Only Put the Conscience of Perpetrators of the Cultural Revolution on Trial], sohu.com, August 29, 2013, http://cul.sohu.com/20130829/n385348972.shtml.. 7 Yan, Jiaqi and Gao, Gao, Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution, trans. D. W. Y. Kwok (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996). 8 “Wenge zhenghouqun.” 9 Journalist Liu Chang shared his observation when being interviewed in the TV program. See “Wenge zhenghouqun.” 10 Liu, “Shenpan Wenge yi’an.” 11 Leese, Daniel, Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China’s Cultural Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Bu Weihua, “Zalan jiushijie”: wenhua dageming de dongluan yu haojie 1966-1968 「砸爛舊世界」

Introduction

3

widespread violence across the country, or, in Mao’s words, “all-round civil war” (全面内

战).12 The Cultural Revolution comprised continuous political campaigns, in which a large

number of people fell victim to various forms of violence, including killings, beatings,

imprisonment, excruciating interrogations and forced confessions, torture, sexual assault,

confiscation, and public humiliation.13 In Jiangsu, the focus of this study, a published history

of the province counts over 30,000 deaths caused by Cultural Revolutionary violence.14

Nantong Prefecture in Jiangsu alone reported over 2,700 deaths, 1,578 people sustaining

lifelong injuries, and 100,000 households raided during the Cultural Revolution. In total, over

150,000 people fell victim to Cultural Revolutionary violence in Nantong.15 At the national

level, according to a 1978 estimation by Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦 ), who was in charge of

rehabilitation and case reversals in the immediate post-Mao period, the Cultural Revolution

subjected around 50 million people to some form of political persecution.16 A year later,

文化大革命的動亂與浩劫, 1966-1968 [“Smashing the Old World”: Havoc of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966-1968], The History of the People’s Republic of China 6 (Hong Kong: Xianggang zhongwen daxue dangdai zhongguo wenhua yanjiu zhongxin, 2008). 12 On December 26, 1966, Mao gave a toast “To the unfolding of nationwide all-round civil war!” See Zheng Xiaofeng and Shu Ling, Tao Zhu zhuan 陶铸传 [Biography of Tao Zhu] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2008). According to Wang Li, Mao toasted on this occasion the unfolding of “nationwide, all round class struggle.” See Wang Li, Wang Li fansi lu 王力反思录下 [Wang Li’s Memoirs Part 2], 3rd ed. (Hong Kong: Beixing chubanshe youxian gongsi, 2013), 460. 13 On the issue of mass killings during the Cultural Revolution, see Su, Yang, Collective Killings in Rural China during the Cultural Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Interrogation and forceful confessions often led to thousands and thousands of suicides. For the accounts of imprisonment, torture and suicide, see, for example, “Petition communiqué” Editorial Officie, Chunfeng huayu ji 春风化雨集 [Annals of Spring Breezes and Rain], vol. 2 (Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 1981); “Petition communiqué” Editorial Officie, Chunfeng huayu ji 春风化雨集 [Annals of Spring Breezes and Rain], vol. 1 (Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 1981). Scholarship and literature works have suggested the prevalence of rape and sexual abuse of sent-down youth during the Cultural Revolution. See Honig, Emily, “Socialist Sex: The Cultural Revolution Revisited,” Modern China 29, no. 2 (April 1, 2003): 161–64; Song Yongyi, “Guangxi wenge juemi dang’an zhong de datusha he xing baoli” 广西文革绝密档案中的大屠杀和性暴力 [Massacres and Sexual Violence in Guangxi Top Secret Archives Regarding the Cultural Revolution], Huaxia wenzhai 1073 (April 3, 2017). 14 Dangdai Zhongguo bianzuan weiyuanhui, Dangdai Zhongguo de Jiangsu 当代中国的江苏 [Contemporary China: Jiangsu] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1989), 121. 15 Zhonggong Nantong diqu weiyuanhui, “Ji Yuan tongzhi zai diwei zhaokai de qingcha ding’an chuli gongzuo zuotanhui shang de jianghua” 季元同志在地委召开的清查定案处理工作座谈会上的讲话 [Ji Yuan’s Speech at the Prefecture Committee’s Symposium on Investigation, Verdicts, and Punishment], 1979, 108, D101-121-0139, NMA. 16 According to Hu Yaobang, three million “cadres detached from production” (脱产干部), five million “cadres not detached from production” (不脱产干部), and millions of ordinary people were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. Including their family members, as Hu Yao estimated in October 1978, there were 50 million people whose cases needed to be addressed. See Hu Yaobang, “Hu Yaobang tongzhi zai ba sheng shi zizhiqu nongcun jiceng ganbu luoshi zhengce gongzuo zuotanhui shang de jianghua” 胡耀邦同志在八省市自治区农村基层干部落实政策工作座谈会上的讲话 [Hu Yaobang’s Speech at the Forum on Fixing Policies for Rural

Introduction

4

Marshal Ye Jianying (叶剑英 ) estimated there were 100 million victims of the Cultural

Revolution.17 The wide impact of the Cultural Revolution – the sheer number of victims and

perpetrators – has complicated questions of accountability.

The issue of accountability further complicated by the fact that the Cultural Revolution

was a state-organized political movement. Early scholarship on the Cultural Revolution

focused on the violence perpetrated by Red Guards, but more recent studies demonstrate

that actions sponsored by military and civilian authorities caused the majority of the deaths.

Andrew Walder’s study on state repression estimates that between 1.1 and 1.6 million people

died at the hands of official authorities during the Cultural Revolution.18 It is important to

note that, in this period of fierce political contention, state authorities were far from a

monolithic block. In fact, in their research of the Cultural Revolution in Jiangsu, Dong

Guoqiang and Andrew Walder have shown that regional military forces and local civilian

leaders were themselves divided against one another, exacerbating and prolonging local

conflicts throughout the Cultural Revolution.19 Thus, in the immediate wake of the Cultural

Revolution, the CCP regime faced the problem of how to come to terms with the political

violence committed by agents of the state.20

Drawing upon in-depth analysis of Jiangsu Province, the location of early measures

designed to address Cultural Revolutionary violence, this dissertation investigates how the

CCP dealt with its recent violent past, how it legitimized its claim to power, and how it

succeeded in launching political and social transformation in post-Mao China. The disastrous

Grassroots Cadres in Eight Provinces, Cities, and Autonomous Regions], October 13, 1978, 260, HB979-10-333-7, HPA. 17 Feng Wenbin, “Feng Wenbin tongzhi zai quanguo jingwei gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua” 冯文彬同志在全国警卫工作会议上的讲话 [Feng Wenbin’s Speech at the National Security Guard Work Conference], Gong’an jianshe 659, no. 3 (December 26, 1979): 20. 18 Andrew Walder demonstrates that the repression exercised by military and civilian authorities between 1968 and 1971 resulted in far more casualties and political victims than any period of time during the Cultural Revolution. See Walder, Andrew G., Agents of Disorder: Inside China’s Cultural Revolution (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, 2019), 172–94; Walder, Andrew G., “Rebellion and Repression in China, 1966–1971,” Social Science History 38, no. 3–4 (2014): 513–39. 19 For the roles of the military in local conflicts in Jiangsu, see Dong, Guoqiang and Walder, Andrew G., “Local Politics in the Chinese Cultural Revolution: Nanjing Under Military Control,” The Journal of Asian Studies 70, no. 2 (May 2011): 425–47; Dong, Guoqiang and Walder, Andrew G., “Forces of Disorder: The Army in Xuzhou’s Factional Warfare, 1967–1969,” Modern China 44, no. 2 (2017): 139–69. For more information on how civilian leaders regained power and marginalized rebel leaders, see Dong, Guoqiang and Walder, Andrew G., “Nanjing’s ‘Second Cultural Revolution’ of 1974,” The China Quarterly 212 (December 2012): 893–918; Dong, Guoqiang and Walder, Andrew G., “Foreshocks: Local Origins of Nanjing’s Qingming Demonstrations of 1976,” The China Quarterly 220 (December 2014): 1092–1110. 20 Walder, Agents of Disorder, 172–94.

Introduction

5

consequences of the Cultural Revolution posed severe challenges to the maintenance of the

CCP’s legitimacy as a ruling party. The leaders who managed to take control over the Party in

the month after Mao’s death first responded to this crisis of legitimacy by attributing blame

for past violence to a designated group of offenders. Mark Osiel has noted that, in cases of

post-conflict justice initiated following a domestic leadership transition as opposed to justice

enforced by a foreign power, new rulers tend to prefer a doctrine of “superior responsibility,”

whereby superiors alone are held accountable for the unlawful actions of subordinates,

because this allows them to limit the prosecution to a select group. 21 Employing such a

strategy, the post-Mao leadership attributed past violence to a conspiratorial group, thereby

ensuring that the Party was not collectively blamed for past wrongs, and responsibility was

confined to a few individuals who were designated as perpetrators.

Perpetrators of the Cultural Revolution

On October 6, 1976, Hua Guofeng (华国锋), Mao’s successor, and Marshal Ye Jianying,

secretly arrested four members of the Politburo, including Wang Hongwen (王洪文), Zhang

Chunqiao (张春桥), Jiang Qing (江青), and Yao Wenyuan (姚文元), who in the following

months became known to China and the world as the Gang of Four Clique. The central

leadership soon announced that the Gang of Four was an anti-Party group (反党集团), which

was later replaced by the even more serious charge of counterrevolution (反革命). Alongside

them were Lin Biao (林彪) and his allies, who were implicated in an alleged attempt to

assassinate Mao Zedong in 1971.22 The post-Mao leadership later termed these two groups

the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Cliques (林彪、江青反革命集团) and held them responsible for

the Cultural Revolution. Hua Guofeng later announced that the downfall of the Gang of Four

not only officially marked the end of the Cultural Revolution but was also a necessary measure

to establish the legal system that was a significant component of political transformation in

post-Cultural Revolution China.23

21 Osiel, Mark, Making Sense of Mass Atrocity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4. 22 Lin Biao’s alleged allies referred to military leaders Huang Yongsheng (黄永胜), Wu Faxian (吴法宪), Li Zuopeng (李作鹏), Qiu Huizuo (邱会作), and Jiang Tengjiao (江腾蛟). They had been imprisoned since the Lin Biao Incident in 1971. For more details about the incident, see Jin, Qiu, The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1999). 23 Hua Guofeng, “1979 nian Guowuyuan zhengfu gongzuo baogao-1979 nian 6 yue 18 ri zai di wu jie quanguo

Introduction

6

Following the downfall of the Gang of Four, local authorities across the country

immediately placed a large number of people under arrest and accused them of being

followers of the Gang of Four. The search for Gang of Four followers in the provinces

manufactured a conspiracy at every level throughout the nation. Followers mainly included

former rebel leaders who had been heavily involved in the Cultural Revolution. Between the

late 1970s and the early 1980s, according to the Deputy Head of the Central Organization

Department at the time, Cao Zhi (曹志), the post-Mao leadership investigated over 480,000

alleged followers and subjected 210,000 of them to criminal, Party and administrative

sanctions for their actions during the Cultural Revolution.24 Among them, over 20,000 stood

trial for various charges, including inciting subversion of state power (颠覆国家政权罪),

counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement (反革命宣传煽动罪), murder, assault and

criminal injury, false accusation, rape, etc. Between October 1976 and 1987, the Jiangsu

leadership identified 6,889 people who were considered to have made mistakes or

committed crimes during the Cultural Revolution.25 In official accounts, they were assigned

to the broad category of followers of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Cliques. The post-Mao

leadership thus blamed them for the violence, wrongdoing, and deaths that had occurred

during the Cultural Revolution. In this sense, the members of the cliques became the official

perpetrators of the Cultural Revolution.

The verdict against the Gang of Four is the most famous example of the allocation of

responsibility in the years after Mao’s death, but it was neither the beginning nor the end of

this process. When it comes to individual roles, the reality is often complicated, as in the case

of Yang Jun, who was a student rebel leader at Suzhou Middle School. In April 1968, Yang

renmin daibiao dahui di er ci huiyi shang” 1979年国务院政府工作报告——1979年6月18日在第五届全国人民代表大会第二次会议上 [1979 State Council Government Work Report - June 18, 1979, at the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress], June 18, 1979, http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_200759.htm. 24 Gao Guangjing, “Qingli ‘sanzhongren’ de qianqian houhou” 清理“三种人”的前前后后 [The Ins and Outs of Cleansing the Three Types of People] ( 第十二届国史学术年会 , Nanning, 2013), http://www.hprc.org.cn/gsyj/yjjg/zggsyjxh_1/gsnhlw_1/d12jgsxslw/201310/t20131019_244911.html. A former investigator reported that 177,780 people were investigated during this period. See Wang Wenfeng, Cong Tong huai zhou dao shen Jiang Qing 从童怀周到审江青 [From Tong Huai Zhou to Interrogating Jiang Qing] (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 2004), 171. 25 The author compiled this number by drawing upon two main sources, see Zhonggong jiangsu shengwei dangshi gongzuo bangongshi, ed., Bo luan fan zheng Jiangsu juan 拨乱反正·江苏卷 [Bringing Order out of Chaos: Volume on Jiangsu] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1998), 87; Jiangsu sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, ed., Jiangsu shengzhi: zhonggong zhi 江苏省志中共志 [Chronicle of Jiangsu: Volume on the Chinese Communist Party] (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2003), 198–99.

Introduction

7

became deputy director of the Suzhou Middle School Revolutionary Committee. He was then

imprisoned without trial in August 1968 for alleged involvement in a shooting leading to the

death of a teacher.26 While still in prison, Yang fell victim to the campaign to Ferret out May

16 Counterrevolutionaries (清查五一六) in the years 1970-72, a campaign that was primarily

intended to suppress rebels nationwide.27 Yang’s fate was similar to that of thousands of

rebels in Jiangsu, experiencing harsh interrogation and physical torture.28 While the majority

of purged rebels were officially rehabilitated in 1974, Yang was kept in prison until 1977. On

June 1, 1977, after nine years’ imprisonment, Yang received a verdict from the Suzhou Public

Security Bureau, which officially announced that the investigation into his case had been

completed. The verdict stated that Yang bore certain responsibility for the shooting, and thus

the investigation had been necessary. The bureau decided not to punish Yang and to “release

him after education” ( 教育释放 ). 29 At the same time, the Suzhou Middle School

Revolutionary Committee issued Yang a notification of rehabilitation, stating that it had been

wrong to investigate him as a May 16 Element ( 五一六分子 ). The committee thus

rehabilitated him and restored his reputation.30

Yang’s case illustrates several major issues in terms of Cultural Revolution perpetrators.

The first relates to individual responsibility for violence committed during a political

movement launched by the state. Yang, alongside thousands of millions of students, workers,

and cadres, took part in seizing power in the years 1967-68. Although it is difficult to pin down

some single explanatory model of what motivated hundreds of millions of people to get

involved in the movement, Mao Zedong’s “to rebel is justified” was certainly one crucial

factor.31 Central and military support of the overthrow of local authorities and power seizures

26 Along with Yang, another three students were also accused of killing Shi Xiyuan (石锡垣), a teacher at the Suzhou Railway Driver School. One student, by the name of Sun, was a rebel leader at the Suzhou Railway Driver School. The other two students, Chen and Qiang, were accused of shooting Shi. 27 For details on how the military authority in Jiangsu purged rebels out of power by using the May 16 campaign, see Dong and Walder, “Nanjing’s ‘Second Cultural Revolution.’” 28 Dong and Walder briefly described the purges and sufferings of rebel leaders during the campaign to Ferret out “May 16 Elements” between 1970 and 1971, see Dong and Walder, “Foreshocks,” 1095–97. The purged rebels mostly received rehabilitation in 1974 when the military was under attack by civilian cadres. 29 Suzhou shi gong’anju, “Guanyu dui Yang Jun bu yu chuli de juding” 关于对杨军不予处理的决定 [Decision on Not to Punish Yang Jun], June 1, 1977. Mr. Yang provided the document after the author requested. 30 Suzhou shi di jiu zhongxue geming weiyuanhui, “pingfan tongzhi” 平反通知 [Notice of Rehabilitation], June 27, 1977. 31 “Wenhuibao” bianjibu, “Geming zaofan youli wansui, Shanghai ‘Wenhuibao’ yi yue liu ri shelun” 革命造反有理万岁，上海《文汇报》一月六日社论 [To Revolution and Rebel Is Justified, Shanghai Wenhuibao’s Editorial on January 6], People’s Daily, January 19, 1967.

Introduction

8

by rebels also influenced those like Yang.32 The argument that they were following the orders

of their superiors became a prominent part of many perpetrators’ defense in terms of

individual responsibility. Many rebels, including Yang, argued in the post-Mao period that

they had merely followed and carried out orders, thus they should not, at least not mainly,

be held responsible. As this dissertation shows, this argument came up repeatedly when the

post-Mao leadership designated perpetrators, and it has continued right through to the

present, a clear indication of how the Party’s official narrative remains deficient for this

segment of the population.

Secondly, under the circumstances of the Cultural Revolution, individual roles were fluid.

Someone could, at different times and sometimes at the drop of a hat, flip between victim

and victimizer, tortured and torturer.33 Yang participated in armed struggles as a rebel, but

also fell victim to political campaigns during the Cultural Revolution. Yang’s case was not

unique, and was instead rather common during the Cultural Revolution. Former rebel leaders

of mass organizations could be victimizers, victims, both victimizers and victims, or neither.34

When dealing with the violent past, the question of how to define and categorize perpetrators

was a difficult issue for the post-Mao leadership. Central and local criteria and categorizations

for perpetrators fluctuated. Therefore, the term “perpetrator,” when used in this study,

mainly refers to those officially held accountable for the violence and injustices that occurred

during the Cultural Revolution.

The third question that Yang’s case raises is the responsibility for violence authorized or

even ordered by the military and civilian authorities. In Jiangsu, large-scale violence occurred

in a series of political campaigns under the Jiangsu Revolutionary Committee that had been

in power since March 1968. For example, during the campaign to Ferret out May 16

Counterrevolutionaries between 1970 and 1972, alongside Yang, over 260,000 individuals

were subjected to various forms of violence and over 130,000 of them were investigated as

32 Dong, Guoqiang and Walder, Andrew G., “Nanjing’s Failed ‘January Revolution’ of 1967: The Inner Politics of a Provincial Power Seizure,” The China Quarterly 203 (September 2010): 680–83. 33 Qiu, Jin, “Victim or Victimizer: The Reconstruction of the Cultural Revolution through Personal Stories,” in Historical Injustice and Democratic Transition in Eastern Asia and Northern Europe: Ghosts at the Table of Democracy, ed. Christie, Kenneth and Cribb, Robert (London; New York: Routledge, 2003), 13–23. Friedman, Edward, “Modernity’s Bourgeoisie: Victim or Victimizer?,” China Information 11, no. 2–3 (July 1, 1996): 89–98. 34 Ding Dong, “Zhuisui Mao Zedong de ‘fangeming’ - chongfang yuan shoudu gaoxiao ‘hongweibin’ lingxiu” 追随毛泽东的“反革命”──重访原首都高校“红卫兵”领袖 [The “Counterrevolutionaries” Who Followed Mao Zedong: Revisiting Former “Red Guard” Leaders at Universities in the Capital], in 文化大革命: 历史的真相和集体记忆上册, ed. Song Yongyi (Tianyuan chubanshe, 2007), 120.

Introduction

9

May 16 counterrevolutionaries; of them 2,540 people died and over 3,400 suffered sustained

lifelong injuries.35 The responsibility of military and civilian authorities for the violence was a

matter for debate when dealing with the violent past. This was even more so the case when

the designated perpetrators were primarily comprised of former rebel leaders who had fallen

victim to the violence. The selective allocation of responsibility was also at the risk of sparing

the majority of perpetrators in military and in high-ranking positions, which further

complicates today’s discussions about the Cultural Revolution.

Finally, there is life-long political stigma attached to designated perpetrators, especially

former rebels. Even though the post-Mao leadership has excluded former rebels from holding

positions of power, the state continues to place them under close surveillance as a potential

threat. In the case of Yang, his record of having been a rebel leader has continued to haunt

him throughout his later life. Yang only realized this when his college application was rejected

in 1978. In 1995, nearly two decades later, the Suzhou Municipal Organization Department

overruled his nomination for a leading position at a research institute. 36 Yet Yang was

certainly not the worst affected. Although the major official process of dealing with the

Cultural Revolution ended in the late 1980s, his experience shows that political suppression

of designated perpetrators lasted beyond this period. The possibility of new injustices in

addressing the violent past further complicates current debates in post-Mao China about

individual accountability and punishment for their actions during the Cultural Revolution.

Accountability and the Issue of Legitimacy

Immediately after arresting the Gang of Four, the central leadership under Hua Guofeng

formulated preliminary policies on how to deal with different groups that had been heavily

involved in the Cultural Revolution. The later addressing of Cultural Revolutionary violence

mainly followed policies outlined at this time. The first challenge that the post-Mao leadership

faced was how to deal with military and civilian cadres. As mentioned above, military and

civilian forces, rather than student and worker rebels, were the dominant forces in local

governance during the Cultural Revolution. Jiangsu was put under military control as early as

35 Ding Qun, “Yuanyu biandi de Jiangsu sheng qingcha wu yao liu yundong” 冤狱遍地的江苏省清查”五·一六“运动 [Injustices All over in Jiangsu Province during the Campaign to Ferret out May 16 Counterrevolutionaries], Wenshi jinghua, no. 1 (2009): 30. 36 Yang Jun, Interview (Suzhou, November 2, 2016).

Introduction

10

March 1967. Officers of the Nanjing Military Region took over Jiangsu and occupied leading

positions until 1971 when the military experienced a setback in local governance because of

the Lin Biao Incident. Moreover, despite a number of Jiangsu civilian leaders being persecuted

in the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, many of them regained power very quickly. Peng

Chong (彭冲), former Secretary of the Nanjing Municipal Party Committee, was persecuted

following the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, but he regained power in 1968 and

assumed the position of Deputy Director of the Jiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee.

Xu Jiatun (许家屯), a standing member of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee before the

Cultural Revolution, was ousted in 1967, but restored to power in 1970. Their career paths

suggest they played leading roles in the Cultural Revolution in Jiangsu.

The central leadership immediately summoned local leaders to Beijing and assured them

of their political safety at a series of meetings between October 7 and 14, 1976. Politburo

members in Beijing had at least two meetings with the Jiangsu leaders Peng Chong and Xu

Jiatun and the Commander of the Nanjing Military Region, Ding Sheng (丁盛), on October 7

and 8, in order to placate them and seek their support for the arrest of the Gang of Four. Both

Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying absolved Jiangsu military and civilian leaders from responsibility

and guaranteed their political safety at a meeting on October 8, 1976. Hua Guofeng promised

that neither local cadres nor the masses would be held responsible, even if they had made

mistakes during the Cultural Revolution: “The Gang of Four is simply four of them… We [the

Central Committee] will not strike down a great crowd as they [the Gang of Four] did… For

comrades who committed wrong deeds…the Central Committee will not hold them

responsible.”37 When addressing the issue of Shanghai at the meeting, Ye Jianying declared

that “Comrades in Shanghai who made mistakes, [we] draw a line here. [They] hold no

responsibility for the past.”38 From the very start, officials at the provincial level were thus

explicitly spared from accountability for the Cultural Revolution.

Hua Guofeng also portrayed Jiangsu authorities as victims of the Gang of Four at the

meeting. He first accused the Gang of Four of sabotaging the Jiangsu military:

37 Jiangsu shengwei bangongshi, 71. 38 Jiangsu shengwei bangongshi, 71.

Introduction

11

In order to wreck the Nanjing Military Region, they [the Gang of Four] racked their

brains. How vicious. They spread the word to make the Nanjing Military Region look

terribly bad.39

By portraying the Jiangsu military as a victim, Hua distanced it from the Gang of Four. Hua

continued to absolve Jiangsu civilian leaders:

Since the Central Committee appointed you as provincial Party committee members,

we should trust [you] and be supportive of the work below. We criticize if there are

mistakes. However, they [the Gang of Four] were not like that. Within the Politburo,

they kept saying that Nanjing was not chaotic enough (不够乱), and they needed to

send people [out] to wreak havoc (Figure 1). In fact, they had already sent people

there.40

In this way, Hua transferred the responsibility for the chaos in Nanjing, the provincial capital

of Jiangsu, from the local leadership to Beijing and the Gang of Four. Meanwhile, Hua also

sent another important message to Jiangsu leaders: the Gang of Four had sent collaborators

to Jiangsu. To distance itself from the Gang of Four, the Jiangsu leadership would need to

identify the local collaborators and followers.

Figure 1: "Jiangsu was not chaotic enough" by Ma De This illustration was produced in 1977 to criticize the

alleged Gang of Four, including Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan,

Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan (from left to right).

The image depicts the Gang of Four attempting to stir up

a fire to burn down a doorplate that reads “Jiangsu

Provincial Revolutionary Committee.” In the smoke, it says

“Jiangsu was not chaotic enough.” The comic is compiled

in Zalan “sirenbang” manhuaji 砸烂四人帮漫画集 ,

available in The Maoist Legacy,

https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/3719

39 Jiangsu shengwei bangongshi, “Zhongyang zhengzhiju lingdao tongzhi shi yue ba ri xiawu zhi jiu ri lingchen zai si shengshi san junqu fuze tongzhi huishang de jianghua” 中央政治局领导同志十月八日下午至九日凌晨在四省市、三军区负责同志会上的讲话 [Central Politburo Members’ Speeches at the Meeting with Leaders of Four Provinces and Cities, and Three Military Regions between October 8 and 9], October 8, 1976, 65, E101-121-0339, NMA. 40 Jiangsu shengwei bangongshi, 72.

https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/3719

Introduction

12

Hence, immediately upon their return from Beijing, the Jiangsu leadership under Xu

Jiatun arrested many former rebels and accused them of Gang of Four followers. Xu Jiatun

became the First Secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Committee in February 1977 and was in

charge of casting out Gang of Four followers in Jiangsu until 1983.41 Local leaders, who had

played a leading role during the Cultural Revolution, became the main force behind the

nationwide search and persecution of Gang of Four followers. As a result, the central and

Jiangsu leaders shifted the blame for the consequences of the Cultural Revolution in Jiangsu

to the Gang of Four at the top and to their local followers at the bottom.

Securing local leaders’ support was critical for the central leadership because they faced

real threats and there were serious challenges to the Party’s legitimacy nationwide following

the arrest of the Gang of Four. While previous research and memoirs have mainly portrayed

the downfall of the Gang of Four as a peaceful process, this study shows that the casting out

of the Gang of Four and the search for followers encountered various local resistance. Many

people in Shanghai depicted the arrest of the Gang of Four as “a political coup by rightists”

(右派政变) and “revisionism coming to power” (修正主义上台), both terms that marked

serious accusations against the Hua Guofeng central leadership.42 The unrest in some regions

also severely threatened political and social stability in the area. The most extreme case,

which is little known today, but is nonetheless crucial to understanding the extent of local

unrest following the arrest, was that of Baoding Prefecture in Hebei Province. Here, armed

struggles between two rival factions broke out across the 23 counties of the prefecture,

resulting in the installation of two parallel leadership structures. According to the CCP Central

Committee, the factions robbed military factories, banks and stores, intercepted military

vehicles, and even looted supplies destined for the victims of the 1976 Tangshan earthquake.

The factions were accused of committing various other crimes, including arson, rape, and

41 Xu Jiatun was assigned to Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Branch Limited in March 1983. Because of his dissenting opinions about how the Beijing government dealt with the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, he exiled himself to the United States of America in 1990. 42 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Zhuanfa Shanghai shiwei guanyu jiefa pipan sirenbang qunzhong yundong de qingkuang baogao” 转发上海市委关于揭发批判四人帮群众运动的情况报告 [Transmitting Shanghai Municipal Party Committee’s Report on the Mass Movement of Exposing and Criticizing the Gang of Four], February 22, 1977, 31, E101-121-0351, NMA; Li Haiwen and Wang Shoujia, “Sirenbang” Shanghai yudang fumie ji “四人帮”上海余党覆灭记 [An Account of the Destruction of the “Gang of Four’s” Followers in Shanghai] (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 2015), 70–78.

Introduction

13

murder.43 In the end, the Central Committee directly intervened in Baoding by sending the

army in to put down the armed struggle.44 Similar scenes were reported in Yunnan Province,

where a number of rebels were found to have prepared for armed insurrection after learning

about the arrest.45 The CCP Central Committee also had to directly intervene to put an end to

local resistance in Yunnan.46 This tension in Hebei and Yunnan Provinces, to a lesser or greater

extent, also existed in other provinces. The post-Mao leadership thereby needed to gain local

leaders’ support by ensuring their political safety.

In order to gain local leaders’ support for the ousting of the Gang of Four, the central

leadership adopted the principle of leniency towards them. This principle persisted

throughout the process of dealing with the Cultural Revolution. However, the leniency policy

did not apply to the former rebels who had risen to the rank of cadres during the Cultural

Revolution. They were designated as Gang of Four followers and purged from power. The

post-Mao leadership adopted different standards to deal with former rebels and military and

civilian cadres, which became one of the most controversial topics in the debate regarding

responsibility for the Cultural Revolution. The difference was very clear when it came to

meting out punishment to veteran cadres (老干部) – those who had participated in the

revolutionary course of the CCP pre-1949 and assumed high-ranking posts before and during

the Cultural Revolution. In 1978, Hu Yaobang, Head of the Central Organization Department

43 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu jiejue Baoding diqu wenti de bugao yinfa tongzhi” 关于解决保定地区问题的布告印发通知 [Notification on the Issuance of the Notice to Solve the Problems in Baoding Prefecture], November 17, 1976, 6, E101-121-0339, NMA. 44 In order to solve the issues in Baoding, 20 regiments, as well as the garrison in Baoding, were assembled directly by the CCP Central Committee to dissolve the fortifications occupied by the factions. The military took over weapons and arrested 21 factional leaders. In total, the army captured 11000 guns, 699 cannons, 145,000 bullets, 55,000 grenades, and a bunch of landmines and explosives. See Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu guanche zhongyang bugao de qingkuang baogao de tongzhi” 关于贯彻中央布告的情况报告的通知 [Notification on Transmitting the Report on the Implementation of the Central Notice], December 3, 1976, 55, E101-121-0338, NMA. 45 Yunnan sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Yunnan shengzhi: zhonggong Yunnan shengwei zhi 云南省志: 中共云南省委志 [Chronicle of Yunnan: Volume on the Yunnan Provincial Party Committee], vol. 43 (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 2000), 1127. 46 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu zhuanfa ‘zhonggong Yunnan shengwei guanyu liang ge yue lai gongzuo qingkuang de baogao’ de tongzhi” 关于转发《中共云南省委关于两个月来工作情况的报告》的通知 [Notice on Transmitting ”the Yunnan Provincial Party Committee’s Report on the Work Situation of the Last Two Months“], May 9, 1977, E101-121-0351, NMA; Zhonggong zhongyang, “Pizhuan Yunnan shengwei he Kunming junqu canjia zhongyang jiejue Yunnan wenti huiyi tongzhi xiang zhongyang de baogao” 批转《云南省委和昆明军区参加中央解决云南问题会议同志向中央的报告》 [Transmitting “the Report to the Center by the Yunnan Provincial Party Committee and Leaders of the Kunming Military Region Who Attended the Central Meeting Concerning to Solve the Issues in Yunnan”] (The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, February 4, 1977), https://ccradb.appspot.com/post/850.

Introduction

14

of the CCP, distinguished between policies for dealing with veteran cadres and rebel cadres

who had “committed mistakes,” a broad category that included people involved in various

kinds of Cultural Revolutionary violence.

Even though veteran cadres made serious mistakes, they need to be treated with

leniency… Chen Ada47 (陈阿大) and Weng Senhe48 (翁森鹤) have done no good

deeds, but some veteran cadres are meritorious in history… The mistakes that Geng

Qichang49 (耿其昌) made are as bad as Tang Qishan’s50 (唐岐山), but Geng Qichang

did good deeds in the past, and Tang Qishan did not. Tang should fall into the category

of “contradiction between the enemy and us (敌我矛盾),” while Geng should not. In

terms of punishment, their past has to be taken into consideration. If [veteran cadres]

have not been dealt with according to this principle, their cases must be corrected. In

Tianjin, the mistakes of Xie Xuegong51 (解学恭) are more serious than those of Sun

Jian52 (孙健). But [we] should hand out lighter punishment to Xie and heavier to Sun.

47 Chen Ada was a factory worker in Shanghai before the Cultural Revolution and rose to rebel during the Cultural Revolution. He later became a Standing Member of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee and Deputy Director of the Shanghai Municipal Trade Union. Chen was accused of a key follower of the Gang of Four in Shanghai and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment in 1982. 48 Weng Shenhe was a worker rebel in Hangzhou of Zhejiang Province during the Cultural Revolution and assumed the posts of Standing Member of the Zhejiang Provincial Revolutionary Committee and Deputy Director of the Zhejiang Provincial Trade Union. Wang was labeled as a key follower of the Gang of Four and charged with counterrevolutionary in 1978, resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment. 49 Geng Qichang was Secretary of the Xinxiang Prefecture Party Committee in Henan Province before the Cultural Revolution and later became Secretary of the Henan Revolutionary Committee during the Cultural Revolution. Geng was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in 1979. 50 Tang Qishan was a worker at the Zhengzhou Railway Bureau before the Cultural Revolution. He rose to rebel after the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution and became Secretary of the Zhengzhou Municipal Party Committee and Standing Member of the Henan Provincial Party Committee. Tang was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1979. 51 Xie Xuegong was Member of the Secretariat (书记处书记) of the North China Bureau of the CCP Central Committee before the Cultural Revolution and became First Secretary of the Tianjin Municipal Party Committee and Director of the Tianjin Municipal Revolutionary Committee during the Cultural Revolution. Xie was removed from office in 1978 and Expelled from the Party in 1987. Hu Yaobang insisted on keeping Xie Xuegong’s party membership after Xie was dismissed from his positions within the Party. However, after Hu Yaobang fell from power in 1986, the CCP Central Committee ultimately decided to expel Xie Xuegong from the Party. See Liu Chongwen, “Hu Yaobang he wo tan xiatai qianhou” 胡耀邦和我谈下台前后 [Hu Yaobang Talked to Me about His Stepping Down], Yanhuang chunqiu, no. 03 (2010): 14. 52 Sun Jian was a factory worker in Tianjin before the Cultural Revolution. He became a rebel and was promoted to Vice-Premier of the State Council, First Secretary of the Tianjin Municipal Party Committee, and Deputy Director of the Tianjin Municipal Revolutionary Committee. Sun was dismissed from official posts and demoted to a factory as a worker in 1978.

Introduction

15

The cases of Liu Guangtao53 (刘光涛) and Zhang Hongchi54 (张洪池) should also be

dealt with in the same way. Doing so is not favoring privilege.55

Hu Yaobang differentiated between local veteran cadres and rebel cadres. He thereby made

it clear that veteran cadres should be handled with much leniency in consideration of their

historical merits, instead of merely focusing on the gravity of the crimes committed. On the

contrary, Hu considered that the rebel cadres should be punished more severely.

The principle of leniency also applied to later criminal prosecution. Among the 57 high-

profile officials convicted in court for their crimes during the Cultural Revolution, in a series

of highly publicized trials in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 45 were workers or students

before the start of the Cultural Revolution, rising to power as rebel leaders in the movement;

only 12 had been serving as civilian or military cadres before 1966.56 Thus, former rebel

leaders accounted for the majority of the perpetrators convicted in the courts.

For the above reasons, the blame that fell on the Gang of Four and its alleged followers

continuously encountered challenges, doubts, and even resistance. Many regarded the

assignment of responsibility and punishment as the political revenge of veteran cadres who

had suffered from the Cultural Revolution and they deemed it “victor’s justice.” The rebels

were subjected to punishment, while veteran cadres, who were mostly restored to power

after the Cultural Revolution, carried out the investigations and punishment of the defeated

rebels. The problem with the designation of perpetrators was the context in which the

violence occurred. The Central Committee had formally announced the launch of the Cultural

Revolution, and the vast majority of the population had participated in it. Some instruments

of the CCP rule were, as Xu Lizhi points out, strengthened during the Cultural Revolution.57 In

53 Liu Guangtao was a Major General and Political Commissar of the Army before the Cultural Revolution. Liu assumed the post of First Secretary of the Heilongjiang Provincial Party Committee and Director of the Heilongjiang Revolutionary Committee. Liu retired in 1983. 54 Zhang Hongchi was a worker at the Daqing Oil Field before the Cultural Revolution. He became Secretary of the Heilongjiang Youth League Committee during the Cultural Revolution. Zhang was dismissed from his posts in 1977 and then demoted to the Daqing Oil Field as a worker in 1979. 55 Hu, “Hu Yaobang tongzhi zai ba sheng shi zizhiqu nongcun jiceng ganbu luoshi zhengce gongzuo zuotanhui shang de jianghua,” 275. 56 In addition to provincial gazetteers, the author mainly draws the information upon the volume “The Great Trial in History – Sequel.” The volume compiled dozens of court judgments and indictments of these cases. For more details, see Lishi de shenpan - xuji 历史的审判——续集 [The Great Trial in History - the Sequel] (Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 1986). The entire volume is also available at the online database The Maoist Legacy. 57 Xu, Lizhi, “Beyond ‘Destruction’ and ‘Lawlessness’: The Legal System during the Cultural Revolution,” in Victims, Perpetrators, and the Role of Law in Maoist China, A Case-Study Approach, ed. Leese, Daniel and Engman, Puck (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 25–51.

Introduction

16

this case, attributing widespread violence to a specific group of people, in particular to a group

that was deliberately selected, inevitably became controversial in post-Cultural Revolution

China.

The attribution of accountability was a key ingredient in the process of redressing Cultural

Revolutionary violence and injustices in post-Mao China. Given that there is little research on

the issue of perpetrators of the Cultural Revolution, this study primarily investigates the

process of searching, defining, and punishing perpetrators of the Cultural Revolution. Who

were considered to be perpetrators and why? What was the criterion for allocating

accountability? With regard to the labels of perpetrator, how were the labels applied? How

did such labels evolve? In terms of accountability and punishment for the Cultural Revolution,

what was the relationship between the punishment and the crime committed? What role did

law play in punishment? Finally, how does a designated perpetrator view their role in the

Cultural Revolution today? By taking formally designated perpetrators’ opinions into account,

this study also discusses the consequences of blaming the violent past on a select group for

the politics and society of present-day China. Answering these questions is not only essential

for understanding the legacy of the Cultural Revolution and tracing the historical origins of

contemporary debates; it is also significant for understanding the post-Mao political, social

and cultural transformations that still shape China’s development.

Transitional Justice and Unsettling Accounts

Ending political violence and attempting to right historical wrongs was a lengthy process

known in Party history as “bringing order out of chaos (拨乱反正).” “Bringing order out of

chaos” was a historiographical phrase used to refer to a series of measures that in various

ways dealt with the legacy of the Cultural Revolution.58 The post-Mao leadership justified this

course of action on the grounds that it provided a break with the violent past and a step

58 For details about how the post-Mao CCP dealt with past injustices, see Leese, Daniel, Maos Langer Schatten: Chinas Umgang Mit Der Vergangenheit (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2020), 304–69; Xiao Donglian, Lishi de zhuangui: cong buluan fanzheng dao gaige kaifang (1978-1981) 历史的转轨：从拨乱反正到改革开放（1979-1981） [The Turning Point of History: From Bringing Order out of Chaos to Reform and Opening-up (1978-1981)] (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2008), 83–164; Trevaskes, Sue, “People’s Justice and Injustice: Courts and the Redressing of Cultural Revolution Cases,” China Information, no. 2 (2002): 1–26. For details on the criminal trial of the Gang of Four, see Cook, Alexander C., The Cultural Revolution on Trial: Mao and the Gang of Four (Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016). In terms of historical truth and reconciliation in the post-Mao transition, see Fromm, Martin T., Borderland Memories: Searching for Historical Identity in Post-Mao China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

Introduction

17

towards an orderly and peaceful future. In the words of Deng Xiaoping, “Dealing with lingering

issues is intended to concentrate strength to look forward (处理遗留问题，是为了集中力

量向前看).”59 This statement shows both the limits of the state-sponsored project to address

past injustices, and its perceived urgency. In pursuit of criminal justice, political reform and

economic development, it was imperative to respond to the demand for historical justice by

punishing perpetrators and addressing injustices. At the same time, the post-Mao leadership

strove to avoid reigniting old conflicts.

To explore the mechanisms involved in the post-Mao transition period, I draw upon the

concept of “transitional justice.” Transitional justice is mainly applied to countries or regions

where various types of measures, including criminal punishment and administrative sanctions,

have been employed to redress past violence and injustices.60 The conception of transition is

often defined within a limited period that spans two regimes, usually from authoritarian rule

to democracy.61 Most examined cases of transitional justice relate to countries and regions

that underwent transition to democracy in the late 20th century. For example, many post-

communist countries have undergone political change in which the communist regime has

collapsed or been overthrown and the country has shifted to a democratic leadership style.62

Attention also falls on the transition from apartheid to non-racial democracy in South Africa

in the 1990s and scholars have argued that the case of South Africa has important implications

for debates about transitions to democracy. South Africa’s transition demonstrates that not

only political elite actors, but also popular and social movements, can play a critical role in

the transition to democracy.63

59 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Deng Xiaoping nianpu: 1975-1997 邓小平年谱 1975-1997 [Chronological Biography of Deng Xiaoping: 1975–1997], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 493. 60 Transitional justice mechanisms are the major policy innovation of the late twentieth century to deal with human rights violations and war criminals. See Teitel, Ruti G., Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 61 O’Donnell, Guillermo and Schmitter, Philippe C., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 62 Nalepa, Monika, Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Borneman, John, Settling Accounts: Violence, Justice, and Accountability in Postsocialist Europe (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997). 63 Maharaj, Mac, “The ANC and South Africa’s Negotiated Transition to Democracy and Peace,” Http://Edoc.Vifapol.de/Opus/Volltexte/2011/2549/, Berghof Transitions Series: Resistance (Berlin, 2008); Adler, Glenn and Webster, Eddie, “Challenging Transition Theory: The Labor Movement, Radical Reform, and Transition to Democracy in South Africa,” Politics & Society 23, no. 1 (March 1, 1995): 75–106.

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18

However, this definition limits the discussion and comparative studies on transitional

justice in non-democratic transformation processes. The problematic link between

transitional justice and transition to democracy can also be found in relation to transitional

justice in the former socialist bloc.64 Compared to the former communist countries that

underwent dramatic regime changes when ending political violence,65 China did not undergo

a transition to democracy in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. Given the unclear

relationship between transitional justice and democratization, however, a case can be made

within the same analytical framework for considering the engagement with the past during

the “systematic transformation through reorientation” that China underwent in the years

after Mao’s death. 66 The post-Mao leadership addressed, as the following chapters

demonstrate, the violent past by means of criminal trials and political exclusion of

perpetrators, rehabilitation of previously persecuted people, the establishment of the rule of

law and compensation for confiscated properties, all of which are common measures of

transitional justice. The post-Mao leadership also consulted German and Japanese experts in

post-war economic development for advice on how to recover and develop the economy that

had stagnated because of the Cultural Revolution.67 Both countries had experienced what

today is termed transitional justice processes to deal with their violent pasts after World War

II.68 The CCP engineered political, economic, and social transformations during the period of

transitional justice.

64 Stan, Lavinia and Nedelsky, Nadya, Post-Communist Transitional Justice: Lessons from Twenty-Five Years of Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), XV. 65 For an overview of the diversity and the reasons of regime changes in post-communist countries, see Pop-Eleches, Grigore, “Historical Legacies and Post-Communist Regime Change,” The Journal of Politics 69, no. 4 (November 1, 2007): 908–26. 66 Eser, Albin, Sieber, Ulrich, and Arnold, Jörg, Strafrecht in Reaktion auf Systemunrecht: Vergleichende Einblicke in Transitionsprozesse (Freiburg im Breisgau: Duncker & Humblot, 2012), 120. 67 The General Office of the Central Party Committee distributed documents on this topic for internal reference. For example, Deng Liqun introduced his tour of investigation to Japan in January 1979 at a meeting with cadres of the Academy of Social Science. His report on Japan’s economic development in post-War was distributed to each province for further study. See Zhonggong Zhejiang sheng weiyuanhui, “Guanyu yinfa Riben jingji qingkuang de tongzhi” 关于印发“日本经济情况”的通知 [Notice on Printing and Distributing “Economic Situation in Japan”], March 17, 1979, 1–20, 01-56-10, HMA. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also distributed two articles of German economists about the economic development in post-War West Germany. See Zhonggong Zhejiang sheng weiyuanhui, “Guanyu Xide zhanhou jingji fazhan wenti” 关于西德战后经济发展问题 [Issues of Economic Development in Post-War West Germany], March 5, 1979, 131–38, 01-56-10, HMA. Gu Mu (谷牧) also recalled visits of Japanese experts in his memoir. See Gu, Mu, Gu Mu huiyilu 谷牧回忆录 [Memoirs of Gu Mu] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2009), 332. 68 Scholars often analyze the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials within the theoretical framework of transitional justice and highlight their legacy in formulating and developing the concept of transitional justice. For example, see Futamura, Madoka, War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice: The Tokyo Trial and the Nuremburg Legacy

Introduction

19

In the immediate post-Mao period, the allocation of responsibility for the Cultural

Revolution, or “settling accounts” (算账) in Chinese, comprised retributive justice within the

framework of transitional justice.69 Retributive justice refers to punishment-centered means

of dealing with accountability and collaboration stemming from a violent recent past.

Although scholars often maintain that the politics of historical justice after Mao’s death were

focused on the experience of injustice – for example through state-sponsored “scar literature”

– retributive justice and court involvement went far beyond the famous show trial against the

Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Cliques. The Gang of Four Trial was termed China’s “trial of the century”

(世纪审判).70 Existing literature mostly considers the trial’s role in the development of the

rule of law in post-Mao China. For example, based on the account of Zhang Sizhi (张思之), a

well-known lawyer assigned to the defense at the Gang of Four Trial, Judith Bout revisited the

trials from the perspective of the assigned defense counselors and concluded that the Gang

of Four trials resulted in the normalization of defense in post-Mao China.71 In his book The

Cultural Revolution on Trial: Mao and the Gang of Four, Alexander Cook reexamines the Gang

of Four Trial and reveals the legal, political, and cultural meanings and implications of the

trial.72 In Cook’s opinion, the trial redefined the violence of the Cultural Revolution as a matter

of law, which became an instrument for dealing with the violent past.

This dissertation highlights how the post-Mao authorities devoted considerable effort to

investigating past violence and imposing punishment. In total, over 20,000 people stood trial,

and almost half a million people received administrative sanctions for past violence during

the period of addressing the legacy of the Cultural Revolution. However, there has been little

scholarship to date on the subject.73 The vast majority of the trials were located at provincial,

municipal, and county levels.74 There is little in-depth research into the legal procedures and

(New York: Routledge, 2007). 69 For more detailed definitions of these two concepts, see Daly, Kathleen, “Restorative versus Retributive Justice,” Criminal Justice Matters 60, no. 1 (June 2005): 28–37. 70 Many China observers compare the Bo Xilai (薄熙来) trial in 2013 to the Gang of Four Trial. They argue that there is a historical continuity as to how the CCP seeks to eradicate its political dissent. 71 Bout, Judith, “The Creation of Defence in China: Revisiting the Trial of the Gang of Four,” Books & Ideas, December 17, 2012, https://booksandideas.net/The-Creation-of-Defence-in-China.html. 72 Cook, The Cultural Revolution on Trial. 73 For a short introduction to these trials, see Zhang, Man and Leese, Daniel, “Political Trials and Historical Justice,” The Maoist Legacy, 2018, https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/political-trials-and-historical-justice. 74 For parts of them, see Richter, Thomas, Strafrecht in Reaktion auf Systemunrecht: Vergleichende Einblicke in Transitionsprozesse, ed. Eser, Albin, Sieber, Ulrich, and Arnold, Jörg, vol. 9 (China) (Freiburg im Breisgau: Duncker & Humblot, 2006), 200–230. Based on Richter’s work, researchers of the Maoist Legacy project have compiled

Introduction

20

regional variances of these trials. The large-scale administrative sanctions imposed at the time

are even less known. Many questions remain under-researched about the post-Mao

retributive justice.

There are two main reasons for the paucity of scholarly and public discussion about the

issue of responsibility. Firstly, compared to the large quantity of available sources on post-

Mao reversals, few archival documents were accessible on the processes of defining and

punishing perpetrators in the immediate aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. The heavy

involvement of CCP leaders turned Cultural Revolutionary violence and injustices into the

“skeletons in the closet” and relevant archives were maintained in secrecy. 75 Cook has

illuminated the significant challenges that the lack of available archival sources poses to

historians, especially when dealing with topics as sensitive as the aftermath of the Cultural

Revolution.76 Unavailability of reliable sources becomes a roadblock to historical research on

the issue of responsibility.

Secondly, state censorship on such topics has limited public discussions and scholarly

research. Public discussions about the issue of accountability for the Cultural Revolution, or

the Cultural Revolution in general, are not officially tolerated in China. The designated

perpetrators are still considered to be responsible for Cultural Revolution violence and

injustices in official accounts today. Voices of the designated perpetrators are often

marginalized and silenced in public. The majority of them remain silent. Under such political

circumstances, it is quite challenging for researchers to conduct oral-history interviews with

the designated perpetrators. When some are willing to be interviewed, there are not only

issues regarding historical memories but also the complexity of perpetrator accounts.77 The

problems of conducting oral history interviews will be further discussed in the following

section.

a more comprehensive list of 800 people who stood trial on the charge of committing killings, beatings, and other sorts of violence during the Cultural Revolution. 75 The risk of damaging the ruling party in punishing collaborators of past injustices restrained the new regime from transitional justice measures. For more information see Nalepa, Skeletons in the Closet, 11–16. 76 Cook, The Cultural Revolution on Trial, 8–10. 77 For various types of perpetrator confessions, see Payne, Leigh A., Unsettling Accounts: Neither Truth nor Reconciliation in Confessions of State Violence (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2008). For more details on how a designated perpetrator changed his accounts according to different political contexts after the Cultural Revolution, see Zhang, Man, “From Denial to Apology: Narrative Strategies of a ‘Perpetrator’ after the Cultural Revolution,” in Victims, Perpetrators, and the Role of Law in Maoist China, A Case-Study Approach, ed. Leese, Daniel and Engman, Puck (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2018), 150–73.

Introduction

21

The absence of research on these topics could lead to misunderstandings of the history

of the post-Mao transitional period. For example, in the most recent research, one scholar

suggests that there were no other official measures to deal with the issue of responsibility

aside from trials of some leading cadres.78 Furthermore, the lack of research could lead to

merely blaming the rebels or the officially designated perpetrators for all crimes and violence

committed during the Cultural Revolution. Published descriptions of the Cultural Revolution

are either scholarly narrations of the events, reports of experiences by Red Guards or “victims,”

or memoirs of “black figures” and victimized top leaders, their children, relatives or

acquaintances. This victim-centered focus leads to one-sided storytelling and fails to provide

a full picture of the practice of justice in post-Mao China. This risks simplifying the intricate

issues of responsibility for the Cultural Revolution and leading to disputes in today’s debates.

Therefore, it is imperative to examine how the CCP dealt with the issue of accountability for

the Cultural Revolution for understanding, as the case of Qiu illustrates, why this continues

to unsettle today’s China.

A Local Perspective on the Post-Mao Transition

Working with Archives

This dissertation is primarily based on archival research and oral history interviews. Many

of the archive materials used in this research are drawn from the flood of declassified official

documents 30 years from the date of the information.79 Over the course of several fieldwork

trips between 2015 and 2018 in China, I visited eight archives in Jiangsu and Zhejiang

Provinces, including the Jiangsu Provincial Archive and the municipal archives in Suzhou, Wuxi,

Changzhou, Nantong, Huai’an, Xuzhou, and Hangzhou. Most of these archives restrict access

to documents on the topics of this study. The main sources used in this thesis came from the

Suzhou Municipal Archive (SMA) and the Nantong Municipal Archive (NMA). Neither archive

78 Mok, Francis K. T., Civilian Participants in the Cultural Revolution: Being Vulnerable and Being Responsible (London and New York: Routledge, 2020), 4–6. 79 For an exhaustive description of the situation of doing archival research in China, see Kraus, Charles, “Researching the History of the People’s Republic of China,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper, no. 79 (2016), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/researching-the-history-the-peoples-republic-china.

Introduction

22

offers a copying service, and neither will allow people to take photographs. Archival

documents can only be copied by hand or typed onto a laptop.

Working with digitized archives was another challenge. At the Suzhou and Nantong

archives, the majority of their archival documents have been digitized. On the one hand,

digitization significantly simplified the procedure of accessing documents. I could search by

keyword and access items available in their internal databases that had been carefully

censored during digitization. On the other hand, this placed serious limitations on my access

to archival contents and catalogs. Keywords limit search results because only document titles

are searchable in the archives. This left out documents that contained information I needed

but that was not mentioned in the titles. The second limitation is that digitization

disassembles the original file. Both databases list a single document as one item and do not

provide information on the documents that were originally compiled together in the physical

file. It is thus difficult to find other relevant documents from the same file.

My solution was to search for file identifiers assigned by each archive.80 This approach to

searching was only possible after I understand how the documents were organized in each

archive. Searching by file identifiers allowed me to find documents by Party and government

institution and by year. The archival documents in this dissertation were produced by a wide

array of Party, administrative, and judicial institutions at all levels. They include central

documents that stipulate policies and instructions, work reports and summaries from lower

levels, leaders’ speeches addressing specific issues, and a large number of meeting minutes

generated during the 1970s and 1980s. I also found that documents issued by central and

provincial party committees are often compiled together by year. This knowledge enabled me

to acquire a large number of central and Jiangsu provincial documents issued to the municipal

level and below, which provided valuable insights into how the central, Jiangsu provincial, and

municipal levels interacted with each other. These archival records allow us to develop a

comprehensive picture of the state processes of searching for, defining, and punishing the

Gang of Four and their alleged followers from the central to the county level. They also

provide a window onto internal agendas, motivations, and tensions that informed official

policies and public actions in the process of dealing with the Cultural Revolution. By drawing

80 Each archive compiles documents and assigns identifiers in different ways. To give an example, the Nantong Municipal Archive assigned “D101-111” to documents generated by the Nantong Prefecture Party Committee.

Introduction

23

on these archival documents, this study refines our understanding of critical initiatives and

various facets and phases of the transition period from Maoist campaign-style politics to the

reform era.

It is worth highlighting another group of sources used in this dissertation in detail: legal

documents generated by the Jiangsu courts in the late 1970s. I accessed these documents at

the Nantong Municipal Archive. These court records include information about the

defendants, the coping strategies of prosecutors at court, court judgments, and defendant

appeals. They reveal how local courts reviewed and addressed past injustices and prepared

for the trials of Gang of Four followers. These records also present us with a unique

perspective on the legal process of redressing wrongfully adjudicated cases from the Cultural

Revolution and the legal grounds that local trials of perpetrators were based on. By closely

examining these sources, we can obtain fresh insight into the extent to which the order of law

was restored, as well as regional variances in post-Mao China.

Oral History Interviews

Alongside the archival records, interviews with labeled perpetrators provide different

perspectives on the Cultural Revolution, and their side of the story casts a different light on

past events. In the process of dealing with the Cultural Revolution, designated Cultural

Revolution perpetrators were generally silenced in official narratives. Following the downfall

of the Gang of Four, the Party-state attempted to establish a univocal historical narrative and

understanding of the Cultural Revolution. Sources that describe the designated perpetrators’

first-hand experiences can be found in confession letters (坦白/交代书), statements of

confession (认罪书), self-examinations (自我检查), and self-understandings (自我认识)

within individual case files.81 However, descriptions and discussions of their alleged guilt and

wrongdoing dominate these official accounts. In particular, by putting the Gang of Four and

their alleged followers on public trial and carrying out a reevaluation of the Cultural

Revolution in 1981 – the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the

Founding of the People’s Republic of China (关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议) – the

81 Leese, Daniel, “Case Files as a Source of Alternative Memories from the Maoist Past,” in Popular Memories of the Mao Era: From Critical Debate to Reassessing History, ed. Veg, Sebastian (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2019), 199–219.

Introduction

24

post-Mao CCP central leadership sought to create a dominant narrative that the Gang of Four

and their followers were responsible for the Cultural Revolution.

Therefore, it is necessary to make the voices of outcast perpetrators heard in the

discussion of accountability for the Cultural Revolution. Interviewees who are investigated in

this research include students, workers, and cadres who were all heavily involved in the

Cultural Revolution. During my fieldwork in China, I reached out to 17 Cultural Revolution

participants in cities in Jiangsu. Six of them were workers and students who were imprisoned

during the Cultural Revolution, but their cases were later deemed “unjust cases.”82 In Party

terms, they are victims of the Cultural Revolution. Although they were rehabilitated in the

early 1980s, their past experiences still have a strong impact on their lives. While this study

does not directly consider their narratives, my analysis has benefited considerably from the

interviews with them. The remaining interviewees were all designated perpetrators at the

provincial and municipal levels in Jiangsu.

Although I was introduced to all of them by acquaintances or lifelong friends, four of those

who at first agreed later refused to be interviewed. According to feedback from my contacts,

there were two reasons for their refusals: intervention by their children and fear of political

consequences. In the case of a rebel leader who played a critical role in Suzhou during the

Cultural Revolution, the interviewee confirmed that the former was the reason for ultimately

dropping out. During a brief call I managed to arrange with her, she was still willing to briefly

answer my questions and she mostly expressed her disappointment in politics, stating “It is

meaningless to talk about the past.” 83 However, her daughter quickly interrupted the

conversation and hung up the phone. Other interviewees also stated that their children are

not interested in their past and sometimes they even prevent them from revealing it to others.

Klotzbücher notes that perpetrators of Cultural Revolutionary violence have most difficulty

communicating with their offspring because they are unwilling to question their own agency.

They instead seek audiences outside the family.84 In many cases, their children have difficulty

understanding, let alone communicating, the Mao-era experiences and emotions. Scholars of

82 Two of the interviewees died in the past three years. It becomes increasingly urgent for us to record stories of historical witnesses as they are aging. 83 The call took place in Suzhou on November 22, 2016. 84 In chapter 7, Klotzbücher introduces the intergenerational transmission of memories and emotion related to the Cultural Revolution. For the interaction between perpetrators of violence and their children, see Klotzbücher, Sascha, Lange Schatten der Kulturrevolution: Eine transgenerationale Sicht auf Politik und Emotion in der Volksrepublik China, Psyche und Gesellschaft (Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag, 2019), 376–401.

Introduction

25

Germany have also found that there was an almost total silencing of accounts of the

Holocaust at perpetrators’ homes.85 It seems common for the children of perpetrators to

consign the violent past to oblivion.

I was able to interview seven designated perpetrators. Four were students during the

Cultural Revolution and three were cadres. Most of them became rebel leaders during the

Cultural Revolution but fell into disgrace as followers of the Gang of Four and were later

excluded from their positions. My sample size is relatively small, but lengthy interviews

allowed for a close, qualitative analysis of their individual accounts. The interviews lasted at

least two hours and some lasted as long as six hours; I spoke with some of the interviewees

more than once. I wanted to know what events these so-called perpetrators regarded as

important, so I did not outline any specific questions but instead asked the interviewee at the

beginning of each interview an open-ended question: tell me your story in relation to the

Cultural Revolution. I then asked follow-up questions as we went, rather than using a fixed

set of questions.86 This seemed necessary given the diversity of the individual experiences. As

the conversations progressed, I continued to narrow and personalize the questions.87

Interviews on such a sensitive topic as the Cultural Revolution can be challenging. Even

more so with designated perpetrators. Present circumstances significantly impact how an

interviewee represents his or her past. As Gail Hershatter writes, “Every memory is also a

creation – not necessarily a whole-cloth invention (although there are also those), but a

product of the confluence of past events and present circumstances.” 88 Present political

85 See Bar-On, Dan, “Children of Perpetrators of the Holocaust: Working through One’s Own Moral Self,” Psychiatry 53, no. 3 (August 1990): 229–45. 86 However, to get some necessary information about each interviewee, I asked them a couple of general questions during our interviews, such as their family background, social status, education, the reason for their participation in the Cultural Revolution, their experience after the arrest of the Gang of Four, their opinions about being held responsible for the Cultural Revolution, and influence on their families, etc. The order of asking these questions was somewhat random. For a general description of oral history theory, see Abrams, Lynn, Oral History Theory (London and New York: Routledge, 2010). For a brief overview of oral history in China since 1949, see Thompson, Paul, The Voice of the Past: Oral History, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 100–108. Thompson also provides an exhaustive description of the theory and practice of oral history in the book. 87 To give examples, some interviewees mentioned their activities in local armed struggles. I would ask about their specific roles, connections with other rebels, and the consequences of local armed struggles in detail. If an interviewee mentioned that he/she had been kept in custody during the Cultural Revolution, I would ask more questions about the experience. Some interviewees were sent down to the countryside around 1968 and 1969, so questions about their experiences in rural areas and how local authorities handled them after October 1976 would follow. 88 Gail Hershatter, The Gender of Memory: Rural Women and China’s Collective Past (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2011), 22.

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26

circumstances, their living conditions, and even their children’s attitudes towards their

parents’ past impact the way labeled Cultural Revolution perpetrators narrate their past. Due

to the political sensitivity of the topic, it is also important to consider the environment in

which the interviews were carried out. I mostly carried out one-on-one interviews and they

usually went better if there was no third party present. For example, at the start of the

interview with Lu Shiwei, a former member of the Changzhou Municipal Revolutionary

Committee and later labeled as a key follower of the Gang of Four in Changzhou, my contact,

Li, who had also participated in the Cultural Revolution, was present.89 Although they know

each other well, Lu was reluctant to describe his experiences of the Cultural Revolution

despite Li repeatedly asking him to do so. Instead, Lu spent about half an hour telling us that

he was a loyal Party member by showing us various certificates he had brought to the

interview. However, as soon as Li left, Lu immediately began to narrate his past experiences

and express his opinions on both the Cultural Revolution and the purge of the alleged Gang

of Four followers without my prompting. There are two possible reasons for Lu acting this

way: either to avoid confrontations with my contact who also experienced the Cultural

Revolution in Changzhou or simply a lack of trust and fear of any potential consequences. Lu’s

initial reluctance with Li present illustrates that labeled perpetrators remain cautious of

discussing their past.

These oral accounts provide much little-known, yet vital, information concerning current

debates about responsibility for the Cultural Revolution. They narrate their stories, express

their views on the identity of perpetrator that they were assigned, and outline how this

identity impacts their political and personal life. Their narratives and voices represent

diverging opinions on the role of the Cultural Revolution and the Maoist era within the current

society. Thus, their accounts hold significant value for us in understanding current debates

about the Cultural Revolution.

Local History in the Transition

Mainly based on the above two types of sources, this dissertation adopts a case-study

approach that focuses on Jiangsu Province in order to understand how the CCP dealt with its

89 This was the first time that Lu accepts an interview. My contact Li convinced him. One reason for his agreement to this interview is probably that I conduct my research project abroad. Lu considers there is less political risk for him to tell his story. During the interview, however, I could tell that he was very nervous about the interview.

Introduction

27

violent past from the central to the county level. There are two reasons for this approach.

Firstly, as many case studies on the Cultural Revolution show, local situations varied

significantly during the period.90 The diversity and complexity of local circumstances during

the Cultural Revolution resulted in a variety of phases of dealing with the Cultural Revolution.

Jiangsu was among the earliest to label and punish alleged Cultural Revolution perpetrators.

It is also the region where the concept “unjust, false, and mistaken cases” (冤假错案) was

first formulated; addressing these cases came to be a prominent feature of the transitional

justice mechanisms in China. This case-study approach suggests regional variations to this

transition period and highlights the critical role of local initiatives in dealing with the Cultural

Revolution. A local perspective also allows us a deep understanding of complex situations that

the CCP faced in the wake of the Cultural Revolution.

Secondly, the redressing of past wrongs in Jiangsu accelerated the central policy-making

process. Mid-level bureaucracy, including cadres at the provincial and municipal levels, acts

as an intermediary between central policy-making and grassroots needs.91 Measures adopted

at the provincial and municipal levels in Jiangsu reflect the numerous appeals for

rehabilitation at the lower levels. As a result of ambiguous and belated central policies, and

to serve their own needs, local officials often reinterpreted or refused to implement central

policies during this transition period. This local-focused approach demonstrates how local

cadres responded to public demands to redress past wrongs in the absence of central policies

and how local dynamics interplayed with central policies through the medium of middle-level

cadres. The case of Jiangsu illustrates the pressure on the CCP to deal with its past. The

addressing of the Cultural Revolution was not just a top-down process. Local initiatives in

Jiangsu considerably contributed to this process. Therefore, undertaking a case study of

90 For example, Shanghai was the stronghold during the Cultural Revolution and impacted the development of the movement nationwide. See Perry, Elizabeth and Li, Xun, Proletarian Power: Shanghai in The Cultural Revolution (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997). In Zhejiang, political violence continued throughout the Cultural Revolution, see Forster, Keith, Rebellion and Factionalism in a Chinese Province: Zhejiang, 1966-76 (Armonk, N.Y: Routledge, 1990). In Guangzhou and Guangxi, massacres of “class enemies” took place during 1967 and 1968 that executed tens of thousands of people. See Su, Collective Killings in Rural China during the Cultural Revolution. In Yunnan, the Cultural Revolution impacted on the ethnic minority populations, see Schoenhals, Michael, “Cultural Revolution on the Border: Yunnan’s ‘Political Frontier Defence,’” The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 19 (March 10, 2004): 27–54. 91 For the complex relationship between the central leadership and a range of provincial and local authorities, see Goodman, David S. G., “Centre and Periphery after Twenty Years of Reform: Redefining the Chinese Polity,” in China’s Communist Revolutions: Fifty Years of the People’s Republic of China, ed. Goodman, David S. G. and Draguhn, Werner (London: Routledge, 2002), 250–76.

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28

Jiangsu sheds light on incentives for the development of national processes of coming to

terms with the violent recent past.

With this focus on Jiangsu Province, two cities are given particular attention in the study:

Suzhou (苏州) and Nantong (南通) Prefectures. This is not only because Jiangsu leaders

closely supervised the processes of dealing with the legacies of the Cultural Revolution in

these two regions, but also because the two regions were often selected as opposing models

by Jiangsu leaders. Due to Suzhou rebel leaders’ broad influence in Jiangsu and their close

relationship with their counterparts in Shanghai, Jiangsu leaders paid close attention to the

situation in Suzhou following the downfall of the Gang of Four.92 Experiments in Suzhou were

often considered a model for dealing with the Cultural Revolution at the province level. Thus,

Suzhou is a revealing example of Jiangsu’s processes. The case of Nantong draws our attention

for a different reason. Nantong was regarded as a negative example from the Party

perspective, and its leaders were criticized nationwide for allegedly resisting provincial

leaders’ orders to search for Gang of Four followers.93 Jiangsu leaders had to replace Nantong

leaders to push through the designation of Gang of Four followers in the region. The cases of

Suzhou and Nantong thus together exemplify the complex and sometimes conflicting

processes of allocating blame for the Cultural Revolution.

Local history also provides a new perspective for understanding the post-Mao period.

Existing scholarship generally follows the official periodization defined by the 1981 Resolution

and accepts that the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee in December 1978 was

a crucial transition point away from Mao’s mass politics and its concomitant discourse.94 By

defining the Party history, the post-Mao leadership intended to shape historical trajectories

and create a dominant narrative to separate itself from its predecessors.95 Party narratives

92 For more details on the relationship between Suzhou and Shanghai rebel leaders, see Dong and Walder, “Foreshocks,” 1098–99. 93 Lu Chunkang and Liu Qi, “Zhe zhang ‘baopiao’ kaodezhu ma? Nantong diqu qingcha yundong shuping” 这张"包票"靠得住吗？南通地区清查运动述评 [Does This “Voucher” Reliable? Commentary on the Investigation Campaign in Nantong Prefecture], People’s Daily, March 21, 1978, 1–2. 94 Schoenhals, Michael, “Political Movements, Change and Stability: The Chinese Communist Party in Power,” The China Quarterly 159 (1999): 595–605. 95 The CCP leadership also created the 1949 divide in the year it came to power in order to separate its “New China” from the feudal past and the Guomindang government. Many scholars have examined the fallacy of the perceived “1949 divide.” See Cohen, Paul, “Reflections on a Watershed Date: The 1949 Divide in Chinese History,” in Twentieth-Century China: New Approaches, ed. Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. (London: Routledge, 2003), 27–36; Zhang, Jishun, “Shanghai around 1949: Continuity or Rupture?,” Journal of Modern Chinese History 10, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 100–105.

Introduction

29

also tend to entirely credit Deng Xiaoping with the transitional measures adopted in the post-

Mao period and downplay the role of Hua Guofeng.96 However, by examining the period

between October 1976 and December 1978, this local study of Jiangsu poses the question of

whether the year 1978 was a watershed moment in the history of contemporary China. It

challenges the current historiographical writing regarding the transition from Mao to Deng.

The process of attributing accountability for the Cultural Revolution was a hybrid of

continuity and discontinuity. Political campaign tactics that were mainly inherited from the

Maoist era continued to play an important role in searching for and defining Cultural

Revolution perpetrators. This process began with the campaign of Exposing, Criticizing, and

Investigating the Gang of Four. During this campaign, previously-used campaign language and

techniques played a critical role in mass mobilization to denounce the Gang of Four Clique. At

the same time, the post-Mao regime underwent significant transformations, from a focus on

persecution to rehabilitation, and from Maoist mass politics to an emphasis on law. The

operational practices and effects of political campaigns also changed significantly. Compared

to the large-scale persecutions during the Cultural Revolution, the persecution of the Gang of

Four Clique was less violent and more limited in scale. The central leadership insisted on

“neither treat[ing] cadres and the masses the same as them [the Gang of Four]

nor…extend[ing] the scale of implication. Overthrowing everything never ends well.”97

Structure of the Thesis

This dissertation is divided into five chapters. The chapters’ points of departure range

from a focus on specific individuals, single events, and concrete policies, to the realms of

political and social transformation. The first three chapters analyze different perspectives that

closely relate to the campaign of Exposing, Criticizing, and Investigating the Gang of Four that

96 Only very recently have historians begun to reassess the role of Hua Guofeng in the post-Mao transition and address the longstanding Party narrative that has been accepted by historians. See Teiwes, Frederick C and Sun, Warren, “Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and Reversing the Verdict on the 1976 ‘Tiananmen Incident,’” China Review 19, no. 4 (November 2019): 85–124; Li Haiwen, “Hua Guofeng yu zhongguo gaige kaifang de faren” 华国锋与中国改革开放的发轫 [Hua Guofeng and the Beginning of the Reform and Opening-up in China], Dangshi bolan, no. 8 (2018): 4–12; Han Gang, “Guanyu Hua Guofeng de ruogan shishi” 关于华国锋的若干史实 [Several Historical Facts about Hua Guofeng], Yanhuang chunqiu, no. 2 (2011): 9–18; Han Gang, “Guanyu Hua Guofeng de ruogan shishi (xu)” 关于华国锋的若干史实(续) [Several Historical Facts about Hua Guofeng (Continued)], Yanhuang chunqiu, no. 3 (2011): 9–17. 97 Jiangsu shengwei bangongshi, “Zhongyang zhengzhiju lingdao tongzhi shi yue ba ri xiawu zhi jiu ri lingchen zai si shengshi san junqu fuze tongzhi huishang de jianghua,” 71, 74.

Introduction

30

ran from October 1976 to December 1978. Thematically, Chapter 1 highlights the continuities

in the approach, language, and techniques used when searching for and defining the national

conspiracy – the Gang of Four Clique in Jiangsu. Chapter 2 examines the labeling of singled-

out perpetrators and reveals various resistances to the attribution of accountability for the

violence that occurred during the Cultural Revolution. Chapter 3 presents a discussion of how

the nationwide search for perpetrators evoked a public call to redress past wrongs in Jiangsu

and how the resulting practice drove the CCP regime into a large-scale process of

rehabilitation and correction. During this examined period, resistance, negotiation, and

compromise between the state and labeled perpetrators, the CCP and its cadres, and the

interaction among the CCP Central Committee, local leadership, and the grassroots,

prompted the post-Mao regime to shift its focus from Maoist-style campaign politics to

transitional justice.

Chapter 4 explores Jiangsu follower trials in 1979 and the political exclusion and inclusion

of perpetrators in the 1980s. The chapter illustrates the procedures of putting local followers

on trial in Jiangsu and discusses the relationship between law and politics in these trials. The

central leadership tended to minimize the scale of criminal trials and mainly resorted to Party

disciplines to deal with past violence and emerging political dissent within the Party. However,

central policies of how to deal with designated perpetrators changed continuously in the

1980s. The central authorities ultimately abandoned previous categories that had defined

perpetrators and unmade a large number of perpetrators. Primarily based on oral history

interviews, Chapter 5 identifies and examines four types of accounts of perpetrators: denial

and amnesia; heroism and nostalgia; betrayal; and remorse. From the perspective of

perpetrators, this chapter suggests that the role of individuals is far more complex than the

state-given dichotomy between perpetrator and victim. It highlights the complexity and

diverging narratives about the Cultural Revolution in contemporary China. These divergent

narratives contest the official interpretation of the past and create unsettling accounts of the

Cultural Revolution.

The dissertation concludes with a discussion of accountability for the Cultural Revolution

and the practice of justice in post-Mao China. It offers perspectives to understand the

enduring political disputes that still divide Chinese society. This also leads to the question of

what the legacy of the making and unmaking of the perpetrators of the Cultural Revolution

means to contemporary Chinese politics, law, and society. This final part further discusses

Introduction

31

how the Chinese experience of transitional justice can contribute to transition theory and

how lessons can be drawn from this.

Chapter 1 “A People’s War” against the Gang of Four: Defining

Perpetrators in Jiangsu Province

After arresting the Gang of Four, the central leadership first attempted to keep the news

of the purge from the public, thus creating more time for the Party to control and stabilize

the state. This was similar to the way it had handled the Lin Biao Incident, in which the former

Minister of Defense fled the country and died in Mongolia in 1971.1 Between October 7 and

14, 1976, the central leadership only announced the arrest to high-ranking leaders. Hua

Guofeng and Ye Jianying, along with other Politburo members, secretly held a series of

internal meetings and briefed key provincial and military leaders about the arrest in groups.2

The Jiangsu leaders, Peng Chong and Xu Jiatun, First Secretary and Secretary of the Jiangsu

Provincial Party Committee respectively, were among the first to be informed about the arrest

on October 7, 1976.3 The top-secret meeting minutes recorded by Jiangsu leaders reveal that

Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying emphasized the urgent need to arrest the Gang of Four.4 Hua

and Ye declared that the arrest was to be carried out at the behest of Chairman Mao.

According to them, Mao had coined the term Gang of Four at the Politburo meeting on July

17, 1974 and criticized the Four on various occasions.5 Ye Jianying even burst into tears when

recounting how Chairman Mao had suffered at the hands of the Gang of Four.6

In order to pledge their support to the new leadership, Peng Chong and Xu Jiatun,

alongside other Party and military leaders present at these meetings, immediately turned the

1 MacFarquhar, Roderick and Schoenhals, Michael, Mao’s Last Revolution (Harvard University Press, 2008), 337–38. 2 Teiwes, Frederick C. and Sun, Warren, The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics During the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976: Chinese Politics During the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976 (Routledge, 2014), 583. 3 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Shi yue qi ri xiawu zhongyang zhengzhiju tongzhi jiejian Peng Chong Xu Jiatun tongzhi shi de tanhua jilu” 十月七日下午中央政治局同志接见彭冲、许家屯同志时的谈话记录 [Conversation Records of Central Politburo Members’ Meeting with Peng Chong and Xu Jiatun on the Afternoon of October 7th], October 7, 1976, E101-121-0339, NMA. For more details about the meetings, see He Peng Chong zai yiqi de rizi 和彭冲在一起的日子 [Days Together with Peng Chong] (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1997), 174–76. 4 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Shi yue qi ri xiawu zhongyang zhengzhiju tongzhi jiejian Peng Chong Xu Jiatun tongzhi shi de tanhua jilu,” 15–19. 5 For more details about how the term of Gang of Four came into place, see MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, 397–400. 6 Jiangsu shengwei bangongshi, “Zhongyang zhengzhiju lingdao tongzhi shi yue ba ri xiawu zhi jiu ri lingchen zai si shengshi san junqu fuze tongzhi huishang de jianghua,” 66.

Chapter 1 “A People’s War” against the Gang of Four

33

meetings into criticism sessions against the Gang of Four. They suggested that the Central

Committee investigate the Gang of Four’s “problems of political history” (政治历史问题).

Some accused the Gang of Four of attempting to tamper with Chairman Mao’s orders, while

others reported Jiang Qing’s mistakes in inciting people and undermining the daily work

order.7 These high-ranking Party cadres’ criticisms and accusations aimed at the Gang of Four

were not confined to the meetings, and they soon swept across the country.

The central leadership deployed a mass campaign to denounce and investigate the Gang

of Four, officially termed the Exposing, Criticizing, and Investigating campaign (揭批查运动).

The campaign was designed to reveal the Gang of Four’s crimes to the public. Based on the

discovered crimes, designated members of the Gang of Four Clique were subjected to

criticism nationwide. To do so, the Party-state leadership collected and circulated extensive

criticism materials against the clique and evidence of these crimes nationwide. Searching for

evidence became a means of mass mobilization. Simultaneously, past activities of designated

key followers became the subject of state investigations at all levels, which will be elaborated

in Chapter 2. In short, a mass criticism campaign took place against those allegedly involved

in the Gang of Four conspiracy.

Those designated as followers of the Gang of Four were mostly former rebel leaders and

factional members, particularly in regions where the former four central leaders had close

relationships with local cadres. Jiangsu was one of these areas. On returning from the

meetings, the Jiangsu authorities immediately arrested a group of former rebel leaders and

accused them of being Gang of Four followers in Jiangsu. The Jiangsu leadership subjected

the designated followers to public criticism and revealed their crimes in the campaign to

Expose and Criticize the Gang of Four. By 1978, local authorities had identified over 3,600

people as Gang of Four followers and supporters in Jiangsu, located in more than 90% of the

counties in Jiangsu.8

While the campaign was dedicated to revealing the crimes of the Gang of Four, it created

new narratives about the past and created an example for the public of how the recent past

should be remembered. The central Party leadership distinguished itself from the former

leadership that, it claimed, had been dominated by the Gang of Four since 1973. The Center

7 Jiangsu shengwei bangongshi, 60–65. 8 Jiangsu sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Jiangsu shengzhi: zhonggong zhi, 328.


34

first accused the Gang of Four of having sabotaged the Cultural Revolution, but backed off as

it began to reassess the movement. Soon, it designated the Gang of Four Clique as

perpetrators of the violence and injustices committed during the Cultural Revolution. The

nationwide denunciation created the notion of perpetrators among the public. Meanwhile,

the Party, the state, and the people became their victims. The entire nation was thus placed

in a dichotomy: the Gang of Four Clique (the perpetrators), and their victims. In short, by

criticizing the Gang of Four, the post-Mao leadership redefined the notions of perpetrator

and victim and reimagined the Cultural Revolution.

This chapter explores the key developments in the political campaign to Expose and

Criticize the Gang of Four in Jiangsu. This process started with inventing the Gang of Four

Clique – a group comprising rebel leaders, local military leaders, and cadres. The post-Mao

leadership blamed these individuals for past violence and designated them perpetrators. The

campaign targeted these perpetrators and adopted techniques that were widely used during

the Cultural Revolution, such as drawing up criticism materials and organizing criticism

meetings nationwide. To avoid being criticized as a whole, Party-state authorities carefully

guided popular opinion on the designated perpetrators during the campaign. Finally, the local

campaign also dealt with tensions at the grassroots level, for example, the tension between

victims of violence and their direct victimizers. However, these modest reconciliation efforts

remained weak and ultimately ineffective.

1.1 Locating Gang of Four Followers in Jiangsu

Following the downfall of the Gang of Four, local authorities immediately detained

groups of former rebel leaders in every region and labeled them Gang of Four followers and

supporters. As Xu Jiatun stated in a speech, “After we came back from Beijing, our first task

was to mobilize the masses and carry out the campaign [of Exposing and Criticizing the Gang

of Four].”9 Therefore, what was crucial to the Jiangsu leadership was to single out a group of

alleged Gang of Four followers and subject these people to extensive public denunciation in

the region.

9 Xu, Jiatun, “Xu Jiatun tongzhi zai shengwei changwei tingqu zhuan’an cailiao gongzuo huiyi huibao shi de jianghua” 许家屯同志在省委常委听取专案材料工作会议汇报时的讲话 [Xu Jiatun’s Speech given When Listening to the Report of Standing Members of the Jiangsu Party Committee on the Case Material Work Meeting], May 16, 1978, 97, E101-121-0378, NMA.


35

At the provincial level, the Jiangsu Party Committee designated 11 figures as key Gang of

Four followers in Jiangsu (Table 1).10 These followers were distributed across three political

groups: former rebel leaders, military officials, and cadres who had been included in

revolutionary committees. The distribution originated from the so-called “three-in-one

combinations” (“三结合”), referring to established revolutionary committees that included

the revolutionary masses, the military, and revolutionary cadres during the Cultural

Revolution.11 The local leadership accused the designated followers of associating with the

Gang of Four and engaging in various forms of violence. In this way, the post-Mao leadership

manufactured a systematic and organized Gang of Four Clique nationwide. It is also critical to

point out that the invention of the Gang of Four Clique was more a result of lingering political

conflicts from the Cultural Revolution than a course for seeking justice. Conflicts over power

among various political groups continued to impact who was designated as a follower.

Table 1: Labeled Key Followers in Jiangsu

Status Name Position during the Cultural Revolution Origin

Rebel leaders

Hua Linsen 华林森

Acting Director of the Suzhou Municipal Revolutionary Committee, Deputy Director of the Jiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee, Chairman of the Jiangsu Provincial Trade Union

Suzhou

Zeng Bangyuan 曾邦元

Standing Member of the Jiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee Nanjing

Zou Xueqi 邹学琪

Member of the Suzhou Municipal Revolutionary Committee, Chairman of the Suzhou Municipal Trade Union

Suzhou

Kong Qingrong 孔庆荣

Deputy Director of the Xuzhou Municipal Revolutionary Committee, Chairman of the Xuzhou Municipal Trade Union, Vice Chairman of the Provincial Trade Union

Xuzhou

Gu Binghua 顾炳华

Member of the Xuzhou Municipal Revolutionary Committee Xuzhou

Zou Haigen 邹海根

Deputy Director of the Wuxi Municipal Revolutionary Committee Wuxi

Military

Yang Guangli 杨广立 Secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Committee Nanjing Military Region

Wu Dasheng 吴大胜 Secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Committee Jiangsu Provincial

Military District

Jiang Ke 蒋科 Standing Member of the Jiangsu Provincial Committee

Jiangsu Provincial Military District

10 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, Guanyu jinyibu kaizhan jiepi sirenbang douzheng dahao di san zhanyi di er zhang de tongzhi 关于进一步开展揭批“四人帮”斗争打好第三战役第二仗的通知 [Notification concerning to further carry on the struggle of exposing and criticizing the Gang of Four and win the second fight of the third battle], April 8, 1978, NMA, D101-121-0608, 101. 11 For further reading see Schoenhals, Michael, China’s Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969: Not a Dinner Party (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 59–65.


36

Cadre

Shi Zhaoxiang 施兆祥

Head of the Jiangsu Provincial Organization Department, Secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Communist Youth League

Suzhou

Chen Hefa 陈和发

Head of the Jiangsu Provincial Poor and Lower-middle Peasants Association Jiangsu

Among the 11 followers in Jiangsu, former rebels comprised the largest portion. The rebel

leaders were cast out for three main reasons. The first relates to the conflict between them

and the provincial leaders. As Dong Guoqiang and Andrew Walder have shown, Jiangsu

veteran cadres used local rebels to oppose military officials in around 1974, but later held

them back from power.12 The rebels criticized veteran cadres like Xu Jiatun in early 1976 as a

way to take their revenge.13 By the criticism campaign, the Jiangsu leadership, headed by Xu

Jiatun, would not let any rebels who could threaten its rule go free. Second, the casting out

was based on local factional politics. In Nanjing, Suzhou, and Xuzhou, factional conflicts were

fierce in terms of violence and its consequences during the Cultural Revolution. 14 The

designated rebel leaders mostly originated from these regions. In particular, they still had an

impact on local politics. For example, factional conflicts continued in Suzhou during the

campaign against the Gang of Four.15 After seeing opponent rebel leaders arrested, some

factional members considered this as an opportunity to regain power in Suzhou. However,

the local leadership would not tolerate any faction’s return and regarded the emerging

factional activities as a threat. Ultimately, Xu Jiatun announced that “both factions had

villains,” and they needed to be cast out.16 As a result, these factional members were also

subjected to criticism.17 Finally, some of the followers had indeed, either directly or indirectly,

12 Dong and Walder, “Nanjing’s ‘Second Cultural Revolution.’” 13 Dong and Walder, “Foreshocks.” 14 Dong, Guoqiang and Walder, Andrew G., “Factions in a Bureaucratic Setting: The Origins of Cultural Revolution Conflict in Nanjing,” The China Journal 65 (January 2011): 1–25; Dong and Walder, “Forces of Disorder.” 15 In the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, various factions formed in work units and further developed into two major citywide factions that held opposite political stances, usually termed the “conservative faction” (保守派) and the “rebel faction” (造反派). In most cases, local leaders favored one faction and suppressed the other. The suppressed factional members were usually marginalized from power and they sometimes suffered persecution. 16 Zhonggong Nantong shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu dangqian jiepi sirenbang yundong qingkuang de baogao” 关于当前揭批“四人帮”运动情况的报告 [Report on the Current Situation of the Campaign to Expose and Criticize the Gang of Four], September 15, 1978, 115, E101-111-0356, NMA. 17 They are Xu Dingui, Zhang Yunquan, and Zhou Jixiang. See Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Guanyu jiepi Xu Zhang Zhou dahui hou de qingkuang huibao” 关于揭批许、张、周大会后的情况汇报 [Report on the Situation Following the Meeting of Exposing and Criticizing Xu, Zhang, and Zhou], January 4, 1978, 114–15, A1-16-21, SMA. They were officially arrested on March 13, 1979. See Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “1979 niandu dashiji” 1979年度大事记 [Chronicle of Events in 1979], 1979, 16, A1-1-313, SMA.


37

committed violence during the Cultural Revolution. In official terms, they were labeled as

“beat-smash-loot elements” (打砸抢分子).18 Those who had fallen victim to the violence

called for the perpetrators to be punished after the downfall of the Gang of Four (Chapter 3).

Three military officials were designated as Gang of Four followers. The targeting of

military officials in the criticism campaign mainly resulted from their conflicts with Jiangsu

civilian cadres over power during the Cultural Revolution. In the newly-established structure

of power at the local level around 1968, military officials occupied leading posts at various

levels.19 For example, Deputy Director of the Nanjing Military Region Political Department

Yang Guangli, Political Commissar of the Jiangsu Provincial Military District Wu Dasheng, and

Deputy Command of the Provincial Military District Jiang Ke each became a leader of the

Jiangsu provincial revolutionary and party committee. Civilian cadres thus suffered a serious

setback to their power. However, they were soon able to take the opportunity provided by

the rapidly changing political circumstances and fight back against the military officials. The

military not only retreated from local administration; it was also subjected to nationwide

criticism during the 1974 campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius (批林批孔运动),

designed to weaken the army’s control over local Party-state structures.20 Wu Dasheng and

Jiang Ke were accused of being followers of Lin Biao.21 The defeated military leaders were

unwilling to submit and fought back again during the campaign to Criticize Deng [Xiaoping]

(批邓) in early 1976.22 In light of local cadres’ continuing conflict with military officials, Jiangsu

leaders again targeted military officials during the campaign.

Another two labeled followers, Shi Zhaoxiang and Chen Hefa, had been cadres before the

Cultural Revolution. Shi Zhaoxiang was a graduate of the Suzhou Silk Manufacturing College

and was appointed Deputy Secretary of the Suzhou Municipal Communist Youth League

18 They were targeted in the so-called Double-Strike Campaign (双打运动), referring to strike down active counterrevolutionaries and strike down landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries (现行反革命分子), bad elements who counterattacked in revenge (反攻倒算地富反坏分子), corruptionists and larcenist elements (贪污腐败分子), speculators and profiteers (投机倒把分子), and beat-smash-loot elements (打砸抢分子). See Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu shenzhong chuli wuchan jieji wenhua dageming zhong da za qiang wenti de tongzhi” 关于慎重处理无产阶级文化大革命中打砸抢问题的通知 [Notice on Cautiously Dealing with the Issues of Beating, Smashing, and Looting during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution] (The Maoist Legacy, August 13, 1978), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/76. 19 Dong, Guoqiang and Walder, Andrew G., “From Truce to Dictatorship: Creating a Revolutionary Committee in Jiangsu,” The China Journal 68 (July 2012): 1–31. 20 Dong and Walder, “Nanjing’s ‘Second Cultural Revolution.’” 21 For more information on the Lin Biao Incident, see Jin, The Culture of Power. 22 Dong and Walder, “Foreshocks.”


38

Committee in 1965. He became an important local rebel leader in 1967. Due to the fact that

the faction to which he belonged cooperated closely with the military in Jiangsu, he was later

promoted to Secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Communist Youth League Committee and

Deputy Head of the Provincial Organization Department in the early 1970s. His rebel origin

and his close relationship with Suzhou rebels made him a target following the downfall of the

Gang of Four.23 Chen Hefa was a peasant-activist during the rural collectivization movement

and later joined the Party. Before the Cultural Revolution, he rose to a leading position in

Danyang County (丹阳) in Jiangsu. His passionate participation in the Cultural Revolution won

him Deputy Director of the Jiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee in 1970 and President

of the Jiangsu Provincial Poor and Lower-middle Peasants Association in 1974. However, Chen

suffered political persecution in 1975, when veteran cadres purged new rebel cadres in the

name of criticizing factionalism in Jiangsu.24 In early 1976, to complain about his experiences,

Chen sent a letter to Wang Hongwen and accused provincial leaders like Xu Jiatun.25 This

letter was later used as evidence of his direct relationship with the Gang of Four, illustrating

that he had attacked veteran cadres.

The Jiangsu leadership assigned the 11 key figures to specific political roles in the Gang of

Four Clique. Yang Guangli and Hua Linsen were the Gang of Four’s representatives (代理人)

in Jiangsu. Wu Dasheng, Jiang Ke, and Chen Hefa actively followed (积极追随) the Gang of

Four, while Shi Zhaoxiang and the other rebel leaders were backbones (骨干分子) of the

Clique. These labels were preliminary, but they laid the groundwork for later categorization

(Chapter 2). Thus, the Jiangsu leaders grouped local followers in a hierarchically organized

23 Shi Zhaoxiang, Interview (Suzhou, October 2, 2016); Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Chedi fensui sirenbang zai Jiangsu de zichan jieji bangpai tixi: jiefa pipan Zeng Bangyuan, Shiz Zhaoxiang jiebang lapai ‘san gao yi cuan’ de zuixing” 彻底粉碎四人帮在江苏的资产阶级帮派体系: 揭发批判曾邦元、施兆祥结帮拉派“三搞一篡”的罪行 [Thoroughly Smashing the Bourgeois Factional System of the Gang of Four in Jiangsu: Exposing and Criticizing Zeng Bangyuan and Shi Zhaoxiang for the Crime of “Three Undermines and One Seizure”], September 26, 1977, 32, A1-16-7, SMA. 24 In 1975 the Center came up with the slogan “opposing the bourgeois factionalism” in order to criticize factional activities nationwide. Xuzhou was one of the main regions where the rebels were severely suppressed in Jiangsu. See Zhonggong zhongyang, “Pizhuan zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei guanyu Xuzhou diqu guanche zhixing zhongyang 9 hao wenjian de qingkuang xiang zhongyang guowuyuan de baogao (gaiyao)” 批转中共江苏省委关于徐州地区贯彻执行中央9号文件的情况向中央、国务院的报告 (概要 ) [The Central Committee Comments and Transmits the Jiangsu Party Committee’s Report to the Central Committee and State Council Concerning the Situation of Implementing the Central Document No.9 in Xuzhou Prefecture] (The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, June 2, 1975), https://ccradb.appspot.com/post/803. 25 Wang Chunnan, Interview (Nanjing, November 16, 2016). Chen Hefa requested Wang to deliver his letter to Wang Hongwen as Wang was working in People’s Daily.


39

conspiracy led by the Gang of Four.

The local leadership also designated followers as a local gang of four. The Suzhou

leadership termed the designated followers the Hua Linsen Bourgeois Factional System (华林

森资产阶级帮派体系). The Factional System followed a structure similar to the Gang of Four

(Chart 1). Local denunciation mainly targeted four rebel leaders of the faction and associated

them with the Gang of Four correspondingly. In local denunciation materials, Hua Linsen was

compared to Wang Hongwen.26 They were both worker rebel leaders who rose to power

during the Cultural Revolution. Vice Secretary of the Suzhou Municipal Party Committee and

Deputy Director of the Municipal Revolutionary Committee Wang Yongzhu was the only

female figure in the alleged faction, corresponding to Jiang Qing’s role in the Gang of Four.

Office Secretary of the Suzhou Municipal Party Committee Zhao Baokang was the faction’s

“villainous adviser” (狗头军师) – a title usually given to Zhang Chunqiao. Another member

was entitled a “black ghostwriter” ( 黑笔杆 ), the same way that central denunciation

documents portrayed Yao Wenyuan. The Suzhou leaders invented a local factional system by

corresponding each main figure to the Gang of Four hierarchy. In the same way, such

designation took place across the country. In doing so, the authorities manufactured a

systematic conspiratorial group – the Gang of Four Clique – nationwide, which had been a key

variable in rectification denunciation since 1942.27

26 Zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei cailiaozu, “Hua Linsen de zuizheng cailiao” 华林森的罪证材料 [Incriminating Evidence against Hua Linsen], November 1978, Arch.34, G415., MLC. 27 For example, Dai Qing describes the formation of the Five-Man Anti-Party Wang Shiwei Conspiracy Group as

the Gang ofFour

Hua Linsen

Wang Yongzhu,Zou Xueqi, Zhao

Baokang

Chen Rongxin(shiwei

bangongshi)

Lu Jiechang (Suzhou

zhongxue)

Gu Changsheng (erqing ju)

Chang Zheng, Xuan Guoliang (wuxiandian ju)

fourcommanders in

suburbs

Yang Guangli,Wu Dasheng,

etc.

Chart 1: Hierarchy of Alleged Jiangsu Followers


40

In addition to the above groups, cadres who failed to designate followers risked being

criticized and labeled as followers. In Nantong, after local leaders claimed that there were no

Gang of Four followers in the region in mid-1977, they were soon subjected to criticism.28

The Jiangsu Party Committee criticized the Nantong Prefecture and Municipal Party

Committees for paying little attention to the criticism campaign and being lenient to followers.

In January 1978, the Jiangsu Party Committee sent a work team to guide the criticism

campaign in Nantong. The Jiangsu leaders soon decided to remove Secretary of the Nantong

Prefecture Party Committee Hu Diannan and Secretary of the Nantong Municipal Party

Committee Liu Guang for allegedly hindering the designation of local followers.29 According

to a Nantong work report from September 1978, the newly-replaced Nantong leadership

officially labeled Liu a Gang of Four follower.30 It blamed Liu for the inactivity of the criticism

campaign in Nantong. Although it is unclear why Liu failed to carry out the campaign – perhaps

he agreed with the Gang of Four, or perhaps he just sympathized with the local rebels – his

fall illustrated the risk involved in resisting the designation of local followers. The newly-

assigned leaders immediately singled out a Nantong factional system (南通帮派体系) for

criticism.31 The case of Nantong suggests that cadres faced punishment for resisting the push

to locate Gang of Four followers and that anyone could potentially be identified as a member

of the Gang of Four Clique.

Similar to the Gang of Four Clique, Lin Biao and his alleged allies were singled out again

as an organized clique, although Lin had died in an airplane accident in 1971 and he was then

heavily criticized in 1974.32 On June 2, 1978, Deng Xiaoping first put forward the plan to

“manufactured” and illustrates how the accusations against Wang Shiwei and the rest four were came up with. See Dai, Qing, Wang Shiwei and Wild Lilies: Rectification and Purges in the Chinese Communist Party, 1942-1944, ed. Apter, David and Cheek, Timothy, trans. Liu, Nancy and Sullivan, Lawrence R. (Armonk, N.Y; London: M.E. Sharpe, 1994). 28 Nantong shi geming weiyuanhui, “Guanyu Nantong shi wanren jiepi sirenbang fangeming zhengzhi gangling dahui shang Cai Yun, Xu Wei, Feng Xueyi, Wang Gang si tongzhi de pipan fayangao” 关于南通市万人揭批四人帮反革命政治纲领大会上蔡云、徐蔚、冯学一、王刚四同志的批判发言稿 [Speech Drafts of Cai Yun, Xu Wei, Feng Xueyi, and Wang Gang at the Ten-Thousand People Conference of Exposing and Criticizing the Gang of Four’s Counterrevolutionary Political Program], December 22, 1977, E101-121-0359, NMA. 29 The work team was withdrawn by the end 1978, see Nantong shi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Nantong shi zhi 南通市志 [Chronicle of Nantong], vol. 1 (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 2000), 100. 30 Zhonggong Nantong shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu dangqian jiepi sirenbang yundong qingkuang huibao” 关于当前揭批四人帮运动情况汇报 [Report on the Current Situation of the Campaign to Expose and Criticize the Gang of Four], June 25, 1978, 18, E101-111-0356, NMA. 31 Zhonggong Nantong shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu dangqian jiepi sirenbang yundong qingkuang de baogao.” 32 Jin, The Culture of Power.


41

criticize the Lin Biao Clique alongside the Gang of Four, claiming that they had conspired. The

decision to target the Lin Biao Clique resulted from difficulties in carrying out the criticism

campaign against the Gang of Four at the local level. Initially, the central leadership instructed

local cadres to focus their criticism on the period between 1973, when the Four rose to power

at the CCP’s Tenth National Congress, and 1976, when they were arrested.33 However, local

cadres found it difficult to link the Gang of Four to violence and injustice under military

dictatorship before 1973. They also reported that it was impossible to settle scores with

factional leaders or eliminate factionalism without considering previous crimes.34 Jiang Hua,

President of the Supreme People’s Court, commented that “Criticizing the Gang of Four must

be accompanied by criticizing Lin Biao. Otherwise, it would be difficult to carry out the

criticism campaign further.”35 Therefore, central leaders decided to subject the Lin Biao

Clique to criticism alongside the Gang of Four. These two groups were later officially termed

the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Counterrevolutionary Clique.

Another reason for criticizing the Lin Biao Clique was to shift the blame for past violence

away from the military as a whole. Factional conflict, armed struggles, and various injustices

had occurred when military officials were in charge of local administration.36 For example,

around 90% of “malicious attack” cases (恶毒攻击案件), such as misspelling slogans and

words and complaining about central leaders, took place between 1970 and 1972 in Jiangsu.37

When deploying criticism against the Lin Biao Clique, Suzhou leaders specifically demanded

that military officials who had committed crimes be differentiated from the Lin Biao Clique.38

In late 1978, Hua Guofeng explicitly stated that the military held no responsibility for the

33 Li Haiwen, “Zhonggong shida hou xingcheng de sirenbang yu zhengzhiju duoshu de duili” 中共十大后形成的“四人帮”与政治局多数的对立 [The Antagonism between the Gang of Four and the Majority of the Politburo after the Tenth Congress of the CCP], Dangshi bolan, no. 7 (2017): 36–43. 34 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu jiepi sirenbang lianxi jiepi Lin Biao de qingkuang jianbao” 关于揭批四人帮联系揭批林彪的情况简报 [Briefing on Exposing and Criticizing the Gang of Four along with Lin Biao], October 20, 1978, 77, A1-1-174, SMA. 35 Jiang Hua, “Jiang Hua yuanzhang zai zuotanhui shang de chahua (zhi yi)” 江华院长在座谈会上的插话指示(之一) [President Jiang Hua’s Remarks at the Symposium (Part 1)], September 11, 1978, 143, E237-111-0076, NMA. 36 Walder and Su demonstrate that the majority of killings occurred after the establishment of county revolutionary committees and they seemed to have been the result of organized action by new organs of political and military power. See Walder, Andrew G. and Su, Yang, “The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside: Scope, Timing and Human Impact,” The China Quarterly 173 (2003): 74–99. 37 Zhonggong jiangsu shengwei dangshi gongzuo bangongshi, Bo luan fan zheng Jiangsu juan, 165. 38 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei cailiaozu, “Jia shizhen tongzhi zai shiwei zhuan’an gongzuo huiyi jieshu shi de jianghua” 贾世珍同志在市委专案工作会议结束时的讲话 [Jiang Shizhen’s Speech at the End of the Municipal Case Examination Work Meeting], June 5, 1978, 156, A1-14-87, SMA.


42

violence and injustices that occurred when they took charge of the local administration.39

Thus, blaming the violence and injustices on the Lin Biao Clique shifted public attention away

from the military and its responsibility.

However, criticizing the Lin Biao Clique together with the Gang of Four led to new

problems. Firstly, Jiangsu cadres were concerned that criticizing the Lin Biao Clique would

negate the Cultural Revolution since it was still deemed to be the correct course of action at

the time. For example, in their evaluation of the Cultural Revolution, Suzhou cadres stated,

“Currently, it is not enough to say 30% mistakes and 70% accomplishments (三分错误七分

成绩 ). 40 The accomplishments [of the Cultural Revolution] are fewer and fewer as the

criticism continues.”41 Their doubts about the Cultural Revolution entailed serious political

risk because negating the Cultural Revolution virtually equated to negating Mao Zedong. Local

cadres were keen to avoid this type of risk, and thus they were reluctant to criticize the Lin

Biao Clique.42 Secondly, the criticism against Lin Biao led to the questions of accountability for

past violence and the extension of campaign targets. To avoid public fear and confusion,

central and local leaders both had to repeatedly emphasize that criticizing the Lin Biao Clique

neither “meant settling accounts with rebels nor looking into individual responsibility, and

the criticism must not be entangled with historical accounts” (不要纠缠历史旧账).43 Finally,

local leaders were reluctant to carry out the denunciation, fearing that the rapidly changing

political climate would put them at risk again. A Suzhou cadre complained:

[The circumstances] have changed back and forth several times in the past years. A

lot of things are correct in one second but become wrong in the next second. [We are]

39 Hua Guofeng, “Zai zhongyang gongzuo huiyi shang de di er ci jianghua” 在中央工作会议上的第二次讲话 [The Second Speech at the Central Work Conference], November 25, 1978, 189–90, E101-121-0363, NMA. 40 Before the Center made the Resolution to negate the Cultural Revolution in 1981, “30 percent mistakes and 70 percent accomplishments” (三七开) was usually employed to evaluate the period from 1966 to 1977. Mao Zedong came up this evaluation in 1976. See Jin Chongji and Pang Xianzhi, Mao Zedong zhuan 毛泽东传 [Biography of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2003), 1756. 41 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Dangqian yixie zhuyao sixiang qingkuang ji jidian jianyi” 当前一些主要思想情况及几点建议 [Some Current Main Thoughts and Suggestions], July 25, 1978, 98, A1-16-17, SMA. 42 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu jiepi sirenbang lianxi jiepi Lin Biao de qingkuang jianbao,” 83. 43 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Gongzuo yijian” 工作意见 [Work Suggestions], 1978, 69, A1-16-17, SMA; Qu Yanbin, “Zai shiwei cailiao gongzuo huiyi jieshu shi de jianghua” 在市委材料工作会议结束时的讲话 [Speech at the End of the Material Work Meeting of the Municipal Party Committee], December 1978, 168, A1-14-87, SMA.


43

confused, afraid, and cannot get a thorough understanding and a clear idea… No one

knows what it will be in the future.44

These doubts reflected the difficulties of ending the Cultural Revolution by designating

perpetrators. Nevertheless, the nationwide search comprised the manufacturing of an

organized and systematic conspiracy that was blamed for the violent recent past.

1.2 Collecting as Mobilization: Searching for Evidence of Crimes

On October 20, 1976, the CCP Central Committee set up the Central Wang [Hongwen]-

Zhang [Chunqiao]-Jiang [Qing]-Yao [Wenyuan] Case Examination Group (hereafter CCEG) to

undertake a thorough investigation into the four leaders’ “anti-Party crimes.”45 The CCEG

consisted of Politburo members. The group was affiliated with an office headed by Wang

Dongxing (汪东兴), then the Director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee,

and Li Xin (李鑫), Wang’s direct subordinate. The office also included Yu Sang (于桑) and Yan

Youmin (严佑民), both vice ministers of public security, Deputy Director of the Central Bureau

of Guards Wu Jianhua (武建华), Director of the General Office Secretary Bureau Zhou Qicai

(周启才), and Ren Zichao (任子超) and Wang Zhimin (王志民), who were cadres in the

Ministry of Public Security. Liu Shaoqi began CCEG in 1966, and it was an institutionalized

committee for supervising various major and minor cases.46 With Wang Dongxing generally

in charge, the group started to compile evidence of the Gang of Four’s crimes across the

country.

It had long been the pattern that the CCP would accuse targets first and then search for

evidence of their crimes in order to criminalize them in political struggles. This was pushed to

an extreme during the Cultural Revolution. Vast quantities of alleged evidence were

generated and distributed to criticize the targets of continuous political campaigns; for

example, in the anti-Liu Shaoqi campaign in 1967.47 Similarly, during the campaign to criticize

44 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu dangqian yundong bushu de baogao” 关于当前运动部署的报告 [Report on Current Campaign Deployment], July 24, 1978, 56, A1-1-174, SMA. 45 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu chengli ‘sirenbang’ zhuan’anzu de tongzhi” 关于成立“四人帮”专案组的通知 [Notice on Establishing the Gang of Four Central Case Examination Group], October 20, 1976, E101-121-0338, NMA. 46 Schoenhals, Michael, “The Central Case Examination Group, 1966-79,” The China Quarterly, no. 145 (1996): 88–90. 47 Dittmer, Lowell, Liu Shao-Chi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Mass Criticism (Berkeley:


44

Lin Biao, three collections of evidence against the Lin Biao Anti-Party Clique were organized

and undertaken across the country by the CCEG.48 Criticism materials against the Gang of Four

and local followers were also compiled by following this pattern.

The Center used searching for and collecting evidence against the Gang of Four as a

method of campaign mobilization. In late October 1976, the Central Committee demanded

that local institutions expose the Gang of Four’s crimes and submit evidence to the CCEG.49

The CCEG closely guided the search for evidence of the Gang of Four’s crimes in Jiangsu. In

December 1976, via the Jiangsu Provincial Public Security Bureau, the CCEG furnished various

Jiangsu institutions with key points and clues about the Gang of Four’s crimes and requested

that they search for evidence accordingly.50

In particular, the CCEG requested that the Suzhou Municipal Library look for materials

about Cui Wanqiu, an alleged spy of the Guomindang (GMD). Cui had written articles praising

Jiang Qing and published Zhang Chunqiao’s articles in the 1930s.51 Staff at the library looked

through thousands of periodicals, books, and newspapers to find what was requested of

them.52 Eventually, three articles were found by the library staff and later included in the

central collection to criticize Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao.53 Meanwhile, 28 publications by

Yao Pengzi, Yao Wenyuan’s father, who was arrested and allegedly surrendered to the GMD

government in the 1930s, were found.54 Since Yao Pengzi was labeled as a traitor and spy,55

University of California Press, 1974). 48 For example, Zhonggong zhongyang, “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zuzhi chuanda he taolun ‘fensui Lin Chen fandang jituan fangeming zhengbian de douzheng (cailiao zhi yi)’ de tongzhi ji cailiao” 中共中央关于组织传达和讨论《粉碎林陈反党集团反革命政变的斗争（材料之一）》的通知及材料 [The CCP Central Committee’s Notice on How to Pass on and Discuss the “Struggles to Smash the Counterrevolutionary Coup d’Etat of the Lin and Chen Anti-Party Clique (Part 1)”], The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, December 11, 1971, https://ccradb.appspot.com/post/692. 49 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu chengli ‘sirenbang’ zhuan’anzu de tongzhi.” 50 Zhonggong Suzhou shi tushuguan zhibu, “Guanyu qingcha ‘sirenbang’ lishi zuixing cailiao de baogao” 关于清查“四人帮”历史罪行材料的报告 [Report on Investigating the Historical Crime Materials of the Gang of Four], January 15, 1977, 141–42, C37-2-206, SMA. 51 Mao Dexin, “Cui Wanqiu bushi wenhua tewu” 崔万秋不是文化特务 [Cui Wanqiu Is Not an Intellectual Spy], Yanhuang chunqiu, no. 7 (2011): 45; Zhonggong zhongyang, “Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan fandang jituan zuizheng cailiao zhi er” 王洪文、张春桥、江青、姚文元反党集团罪证(材料之二) [Criminal Evidence against Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan Anti-Party Clique (Part 2)] (The Maoist Legacy, March 6, 1977), 11–16, 53–54, https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/2530. 52 Zhonggong Suzhou shi tushuguan zhibu, “Guanyu qingcha ‘sirenbang’ lishi zuixing cailiao de baogao,” 141. 53 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan fandang jituan zuizheng cailiao zhi er.” 54 Zhonggong Suzhou shi tushuguan zhibu, “Guanyu qingcha ‘sirenbang’ lishi zuixing cailiao de baogao,” 142. 55 During the Cultural Revolution, after the Center issued a document to state that 61 high-ranking cadres had


45

his publications were used to suggest that Yao Wenyuan, as the son of a traitor, was also a

class enemy.56 The library staff submitted 33 reports and reviews on Jiang Qing’s lifestyle and

the films she had starred in during the 1930s. 17 articles, either about or written by Zhang

Chunqiao, were also discovered. The Suzhou library is just one illustrative case of many,

through which local cadres were mobilized in the campaign. Ultimately, second only to

Shanghai, Jiangsu contributed a large part of the materials used to criticize the Gang of Four.57

The process of searching for evidence against the Gang of Four in Jiangsu suggests that a

nationwide search for proof took place to justify the casting out of the Gang of Four.

However, compared to the Suzhou Municipal Library’s results, the Nantong Traffic

Transport Bureau’s search was fruitless. On December 25, 1976, the bureau received

instructions to search for evidence of crimes in publications from before 1949, among people

who had taken part in reactionary organizations and individuals who had been arrested by

the GMD and surrendered in the 1930s.58 In the following two days, the affiliated work units

in the bureau organized 23 mass meetings with 4,056 attendees. The bureau also established

five investigation groups staffed with 23 Party members. In total, the groups investigated 172

people. Nonetheless, one week later, cadres in the bureau reported that they had found

nothing relevant. The bureau did not produce any evidence or suspicious people as the CCEG

requested.

The CCEG selected and compiled the materials sent by local institutions and then

disseminated them nationwide. Among them, the most prominent denunciation materials

were the three collections of evidence of crimes. The CCEG promulgated the first collection

on December 10, 1976. The collection accused the Gang of Four of “conspiring to usurp Party

and state power” (篡党夺权). It also highlighted Mao Zedong’s awareness and criticism of the

Gang of Four since 1974, thereby justifying the casting out as fulfilling the Chairman’s

surrendered and betrayed the Party, usually known as “the case of 61 traitors,” a large group of previous underground party members were labeled as traitors and suffered from persecution. All these cases were only reversed after the Cultural Revolution. 56 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan fandang jituan zuizheng cailiao zhi er.” 57 Yan Youmin, Gong’an zhanxian wu shi nian: yi wei fubuzhang de zishu 公安战线五十年: 一位副部长的自述 [Fifty Years in Public Security System: An Account by a Deputy Minster] (Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 2005), 216. 58 Nantong shi jiaotongju, “Guangyu qingcha sirenbang lishi zuixing cailiao gongzuo de qingkuang huibao” 关于清查四人帮历史罪行材料工作的情况汇报 [Report on the Investigation of the Historical Crime Materials of the Gang of Four], January 3, 1977, 21, E228-121-0037, NMA.


46

behest. 59 In March and September 1977, the CCEG distributed the second and third

collections of evidence of crimes nationwide. The second collection gathered evidence that

allegedly outlined the Gang of Four’s “historical problems” (历史问题), including the bad

family backgrounds of Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen’s

corrupt conduct. All of the four, it is claimed in the material, had collaborated with the GMD.60

The last collection defined the Gang of Four as “ultra-rightist” (“极右”) and denounced their

pursuit of the “revisionist line” (修正主义路线).61 Overall, the CCEG endeavored to present

the evidence in a systematic and objective way. It included a large number of photographs,

and originally-written and transcribed witness statements. However, there were no clear

attempts to distinguish political issues from crimes.62

Based on these three collections, the central leadership carried out the campaign in three

phases. In official narratives, the three phases were termed the “three battles” (三大战役),

drawing a comparison with the three major battles between the CCP and the GMD from 1948

to 1949.63 The rhetoric of “war” was designed to mobilize the public in criticizing the Gang of

Four. The CCEG disseminated the three collections and noted that people across the country

should study them. After receiving the second collection of materials on March 15, 1977, the

Nantong Municipal Party Committee immediately gathered 300 cadres to collectively study

the document. Within two days, the committee had publicized the collection to tens of

thousands of people and called for more study meetings in the region. The local leadership

also trained a group of propagandists and placed them into 20 propaganda teams to preach

about the Gang of Four’s crimes in the region.64 Suzhou cadres employed various tools,

59 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan fandang jituan zuizheng cailiao zhi yi” 王洪文、张春桥、江青、姚文元反党集团罪证(材料之一) [Criminal Evidence against Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan Anti-Party Clique (Part 1)] (The Maoist Legacy, December 10, 1976), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/1869. 60 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan fandang jituan zuizheng cailiao zhi er.” 61 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan fandang jituan zuizheng cailiao zhi san” 王洪文、张春桥、江青、姚文元反党集团罪证(材料之三) [Criminal Evidence against Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan Anti-Party Clique (Part 3)] (The Maoist Legacy, September 23, 1977), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/2109. 62 For a detailed discussion on this issue of the three collections see Leese, Maos Langer Schatten, 215–25. 63 Jin Chongji, “Jiang Jieshi shi zenyang yingdui san da zhanlue juezhan de?” 蒋介石是怎样应对三大战略决战的？ [How Did Jiang Jieshi Respond to Three Battles?], Modern Chinese History Studies, no. 1 (2010): 4–27. 64 Chen Daren, “Guanyu chuanda zhongyang (1977) 10 hao wenjian de dianhua huibao” 关于传达中央 (1977) 10 号文件的电话汇报 [Report through Phone Call on Distributing the Central Document 1977 No.10], March 17, 1977, 52–53, E101-121-0357, NMA.


47

including broadcasts, publications, comics, and literature, to distribute the collections.65 In

December 1977, the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee organized over 11,000 cadres to

spend more than 20 days undertaking an extensive search of the archives, newspapers, and

periodicals from the Republican period to investigate the past of Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing,

and Yao Wenyuan. 66 Local cadres soon turned the criticism into a mass campaign and

encouraged them to denounce the targets based on the central collections.

The central collections of evidence also created a template that the collections of

materials against local followers were modeled on in terms of content and format. Collecting

evidence of crimes became a means of framing local Gang of Four followers. In November

1978, the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee issued several collections of criticism materials

against local followers to encourage public denunciation. 67 The committee circulated

evidence of Hua Linsen’s crimes in the province and asked for public opinions. Presented in a

similar way to the central collections, the criticism materials against Hua Linsen listed six

accusations. Two of the accusations – “provoking armed struggles and fabricating unjust cases,

and attacking veteran cadres” – were intended to suggest that Hua, along with his faction,

had engaged in violence and caused people’s suffering. Another three accusations – seeking

protection from the Gang of Four, usurping the Party power in Suzhou, and undermining the

provincial committee by seizing power – portrayed Hua as an ally of the Gang of Four plotting

to overthrow the local Party authorities. These accusations designated Hua as a Gang of Four

follower and blamed him for the violence during the Cultural Revolution. The last accusation

– destroying evidence against him – served as proof of Hua’s resistance to the accusations.68

If a political target resisted and refused the accusations against them, their punishment would

usually be more severe, or, in official terms, severe punishment for those who refuse to

confess (抗拒从严). Overall, by distributing the evidence against designated followers, the

local party authorities attempted to present the Gang of Four Clique as a systematically and

hierarchically organized group that was responsible for violent actions.

65 Xuzhou shi shizhi bangongshi, ed., Zhongguo gongchandang Xuzhou difangshi (zhengqiu yijiangao) 中国共产党徐州地方史(征求意见稿) [Local History of the Chinese Communist Party in Xuzhou (Draft for Suggestions)], 2008, 212. 66 Jiangsu sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Jiangsu shengzhi: zhonggong zhi, 328. 67 Zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei bangongting, “Xu Jiatun tongzhi zai di shiwei shuji huiyi shang de jianghua” 许家屯同志在地市委书记会议上的讲话 [Xu Jiatun’s Speech at the Meeting with Secretaries of Prefecture and Municipal Party Committees], June 25, 1978, 19, D101-121-608, NMA. 68 Zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei cailiaozu, “Hua Linsen de zuizheng cailiao.”


48

The language used in the mobilization of the campaign to Expose and Criticize the Gang

of Four was not novel; it was recycled from the revolution period. Hua Guofeng referred to

the campaign as “a people’s war” (人民战争) against the Gang of Four.69 Maintaining Hua’s

metaphor, the campaign against the Gang of Four commonly engaged language that had been

used to describe the Civil War in official narratives. The criticism was built on discursive

elements previously used during wartime. Moreover, the accusations against the Gang of

Four had generally been used against veteran cadres during the Cultural Revolution, such as

“capitalist roaders” (走资派), “anti-Party” (反党), “counterrevolutionary revisionists” (反革

命修正主义分子), and “traitors” (叛徒).70 The CCP leadership thereby adopted familiar

language and attempted to immediately arouse popular anger against the Gang of Four.71

Both central and local evidence reflected the rapidly changing political situation. The

notions of perpetrator and victim changed accordingly. In the first central collection issued in

December 1976 against the Gang of Four, the Center still portrayed Deng Xiaoping as the

“black hand” behind allegedly counterrevolutionary activities. However, after the Center

restored him to power in mid-1977,72 criticism materials started to portray Deng as a victim

of the Gang of Four. In Jiangsu’s 1978 materials against Gang of Four followers, all the names

of listed victims were replaced with triangles (△), or only surnames were listed, for example,

replacing Deng Xiaoping with “Deng △ △ .” Especially when referring to the issue of

“criticizing Deng” (批邓), references only appeared as “criticize △” (批△). These criticism

materials thus carefully avoided reminding the public that Deng had once been the target of

criticism during the Cultural Revolution, and instead emphasized his role as a victim.

Central cadres competed to be on the list of Gang of Four victims and deemed this a sign

of rehabilitation. Many cadres complained about not being listed as victims in the indictment

of the Gang of Four in 1980. Before and during the Gang of Four Trial in 1980, Deng Xiaoping

69 Hua Guofeng, “Zai di er ci quanguo nongye xue dazhai huiyi shang de jianghua” 在第二次全国农业学大寨会议上的讲话 [Speech at the Second National Conference of Agriculture Leaning from Dazhai] (The Maoist Legacy, December 25, 1976), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/4738. 70 Song Renqiong, Song Renqiong huiyilu 宋任穷回忆录 [Memoirs of Song Renqiong], vol. 2 (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2007), 67. 71 Schoenhals, Michael, Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1992), 6. 72 In fact, the central leadership under Hua Guofeng was already reducing the level of criticism of Deng from early 1977. For more details, see Han Gang, “Liangge fanshi de yi duan gong’an” “两个凡是”的一段公案 [A Complicated Legal Case of Two Whatevers], Yanhuang chunqiu, no. 02 (2016): 2–3.


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and Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission Peng Zhen both had to

explain that not being listed as victims of the Gang of Four did not mean negating cadres’

victimhood, and being on the list did not suggest complete innocence either. 73 Cadres’

competition for victimhood reflected not only a desire for their past suffering to be justified,

but also an attempt to distance themselves from the Gang of Four. At the very least, being an

official victim could secure their political safety.

The Party leadership made a significant effort to defame the Gang of Four. Serving as

evidence of the Gang of Four Clique’s crimes, all these materials were propagated on a large

scale at various levels. People in every unit had to read and study them. However, local cadres

in some regions were reluctant to criticize the Gang of Four amidst the rapidly changing

political climate. They were afraid of being implicated since they had often implemented the

four former central leaders’ directives in their daily work to a greater or lesser extent. Some

local cadres suggested there was no need to launch the criticism campaign and stated, “The

Gang of Four were in Beijing, and they did not have any influence in my region.”74 Verbal

denunciation and physical displays were widely adopted alongside written evidence of crimes

in order to mobilize the criticism campaign on a broad scale.

1.3 Emotional Mobilization: Public Denunciation of the Gang of Four Clique

For local leaders, after the arrest of the Gang of Four was revealed to the public the

ensuing consequences were challenging.75 Local resistance to the arrest emerged in regions

such as Shanghai, Yunnan, and Hebei. This made the task of explaining and clarifying the

casting out of the four central leaders to the public more complex than expected. 76 In

retrospect, convincing the public of the Gang of Four’s guilt was a prolonged process bound

up with ending the Cultural Revolution.

The above reality made it essential for the CCP to provide the public with a plausible

explanation for the arrests. Public criticism meetings became a prominent stage for arousing

73 Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting, “Guanyu yinfa Peng Zhen tongzhi xiang tebie fating pangting renyuan jianghua yaodian de tongzhi” 关于印发彭真同志向特别法庭旁听人员讲话要点的通知 [Notification on Distributing the Key Points of Peng Zhen’s Speech to the Special Court’s Sitter-Ins] (The Maoist Legacy, November 17, 1980), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/400. 74 Jiang, “Jiang Hua yuanzhang zai zuotanhui shang de chahua (zhi yi),” 140. 75 MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, 448–49. 76 Yuan and Gu, He Peng Chong zai yiqi de rizi, 182–88; Li and Wang, “Sirenbang” Shanghai yudang fumie ji, 70–80.


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public anger against the Gang of Four Clique.77 To mobilize the populace to participate in the

“war” against the Gang of Four Clique, Party and state institutions initiated a public ritual of

denunciation at every level, with hundreds and thousands of attendees. In Jiangsu, as in other

provinces, the Gang of Four and its followers were subjected to public denunciation on

various stages at criticism and self-criticism sessions. For example, within the five months

following the arrest of the Gang of Four, the Suzhou leadership held around 1,000 criticism

meetings at the district level.78

At these public criticism sessions, the CCP encouraged the audience to express their anger

and further mobilized them to criticize the designated perpetrators. Public denunciation was

meant to develop a sense of shame and guilt in designated perpetrators. John Braithwaite

argues that Chinese culture frequently uses shaming and guilt induction as a means of

informal and formal social control. 79 Shame and guilt were two emotions that the CCP

intended to incite among the perpetrators to establish control. This shaming stage not only

disseminated the notions of victim and perpetrator, but also displayed the political and social

transformation, in which the new Party leadership was portrayed as the savior.

Elisabeth Perry terms this process “emotion work” and notes that the CCP devoted

significant attention to the emotional dimension of mass mobilization throughout Mao’s

rule.80 This attention was a key ingredient in the CCP’s revolutionary course. Organizational

methods in the CCP’s “emotion work,” Perry suggests, included speaking-bitterness (诉苦)

rituals, political rhetoric that mobilized and directed public emotions during the land reform

campaigns,81 criticism meetings, and small group meetings. These methods continued to

77 Criticism and self-criticism had a long tradition and was one of the most common practice within the CCP regime, for more information on the origins of this practice and how it played a role in the CCP’s rule, see Teiwes, Frederick C., Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950-1965 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Yang, Kuisong, “How a ‘Bad Element’ Was Made: The Discovery, Accusation, and Punishment of Zang Qiren,” in Maoism at the Grassroots: Everyday Life in China’s Era of High Socialism, ed. Brown, Jeremy and Johnson, Matthew D. (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, 2015), 19–50; Dittmer, Liu Shao-Chi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution. 78 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Wu ge yue lai cailiao gongzuo qingkuang he jinhou yijian” 五个月来材料工作情况和今后意见 [Material Work Situation in the Recent Five Months and Future Opinions], March 1977, 1, A1-14-87, SMA. 79 Braithwaite considers that Asian cultures, such as in China and Japan, are influenced by Confucianism and center on family. This type of society tends to use what he terms as “reintegrative shaming” to impose social control. See Braithwaite, John, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 80 Elizabeth J. Perry, “Moving the Masses: Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution,” Mobilization, no. 7(2) (2002): 111–28. 81 The practice of speaking bitterness has been substantially researched by a number of scholars in and outside China. See Sun, Feiyu, Social Suffering and Political Confession: Suku in Modern China (Singapore: World


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exert a powerful influence over people’s attitudes and actions in the post-Mao era. Perry’s

observation is particularly pertinent to the “war” against the Gang of Four Clique. In criticizing

the Gang of Four, the CCP widely adopted criticism meetings with speaking bitterness as a

tool of emotional mobilization. Local cadres organized people who were considered to have

suffered during the Cultural Revolution to narrate their suffering in public to incite the

audience’s anger against the Gang of Four Clique.82 These stages were designed to develop a

sense of guilt in the accused and promise the populace significant political change.

However, as the following sections demonstrate, these criticism sessions were also

different from those in previous political campaigns. First, the public denunciation was much

more controlled and focused on overcoming divisions rather than fomenting them. The aim

of the public denunciation was limited, confined to naming the Gang of Four’s crimes and

distancing the Party from them. Second, the followers on display faced less political pressure

at these sessions than during the Cultural Revolution. The targets rarely experienced physical

violence at the criticism meetings. There was a noticeable change in the political atmosphere.

Furthermore, these criticism sessions were often noisy, poorly organized, and disordered.

There were many public complaints in the internal reports on these meetings and this

emotion work was not always effective. Finally, public denunciation created undesired effects:

public demands for the truth about the past and punishment for the uncovered violence.

1.3.1 The Organization of Criticism Meetings

The process of criticism meetings against the Gang of Four Clique shared similarities with

those of previous ones during the Cultural Revolution.83 A criticism meeting mostly opened

with a revolutionary song, such as The East is Red. After the song, all the targets were brought

forward and displayed on the stage. The meeting’s main body then comprised selected

victims making denouncing speeches to accuse the targets of causing their suffering. After

Scientific, 2013); Li Fangchun, “Ku, geming jiaohua yu sixiang quanli: beifang tugai shiqi de ‘fanxin’ shijian” 苦、革命教化与思想权力——北方土改期间的“翻心”实践 [Bitterness, Revolutionary Transformation, and Ideological Power: The “Fanxin” Practice during the Land Reform of the North], Kaifang Shidai 10 (2010): 5–35; Li Lifeng, “Tugai zhong de suku: yi zhong minzhong dongyuan jishu de weiguan fenxi” [Speaking Bitterness during the Land Reform: Microanalysis of a Mass Mobilization Technique], Journal of Nanjing University 5 (2007): 97–109. 82 Perry, “Moving the Masses”; Liu, Yu, “Maoist Discourse and the Mobilization of Emotions in Revolutionary China,” Modern China 36, no. 3 (2010): 329–62. 83 For more details about criticism meetings during the Cultural Revolution, see Ji, Fengyuan, Linguistic Engineering: Language and Politics in Mao’s China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004).


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this, the accused would be taken off the stage and removed from the meeting. 84 This

procedure was already relatively familiar to both cadres and the masses.

The criticism meetings denounced the Gang of Four Clique and propagated central

policies at the same time. For example, among 15 slogans used at a Suzhou criticism meeting,

only five of them, such as “Down with the Gang of Four,” were designed to criticize the Four.

The rest mainly conveyed various central policies and decisions, including upholding the

leadership of Hua Guofeng, the restoration of Deng Xiaoping, who had been persecuted

during the Cultural Revolution, and the convening of the Third Plenum of the Tenth Central

Committee of the CCP.85 On the one hand, listing the recent political events was designed to

propagate central policies and seek public support. This was an essential way for the new

central leadership to maintain its legitimacy and face the tensions following the arrest of the

Gang of Four. On the other hand, the new central leadership attempted to break with the

recent past and promise a new future.

To guide the emotions of the masses, Jiangsu established a large number of criticism

teams and sent them out to deploy criticism in the region. These provincial criticism teams

strictly organized and controlled criticism meetings at local levels. Martin Whyte argues that

“small groups” played an important role in political communication between higher

authorities and individuals down to the lowest level, ensuring a hierarchical control.86 At the

provincial level, for example, the Trade Union, the Poor and Lower-middle Peasants

Association, the Women’s Federation, and the Communist Youth League, all mass

organizations under the government’s supervision, combined to set up a criticism team to

denounce designated followers in their organizations. The criticism team not only organized

criticism meetings at the provincial level, but also sent out small squads at the local level to

guide the criticism throughout the province. For example, these small squads convened 142

criticism meetings against Hua Linsen at various levels across Jiangsu within four months of

1978.87 Moreover, the squads spread to the municipal and county levels and ensured that the

84 Sheng jie pi sirenbang xunhui pipan xiao fendui, “Huiyi chengxu anpai” 会议程序安排 [Meeting Schedule], n.d., 54–55, A1-16-22, SMA; Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “jiepi Liu Boying dahui qingkuang huibao” 揭批刘伯英大会情况汇报 [Report on the Meeting of Exposing and Criticizing Liu Boying], May 27, 1978, 75, A1-16-21, SMA. 85 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Dahui kouhao” 大会口号 [Meeting Slogans], n.d., 56, A1-16-22, SMA. 86 Whyte, Martin King, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 12–13. 87 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Guanyu liangnian lai da pipan gongzuo de zongjie” 关于两年来的批


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local criticism meetings maintained their focus on the process. They thereby supervised and

standardized local criticism meetings. For example, the leaders of the Jiangsu Provincial

Committee Criticism Team instructed the Suzhou Municipal Criticism Team to modify the

opening and ending paragraphs of its denouncing scripts to provide a standard script for local

criticism meetings. 88 The provincial teams formalized and closely controlled distribution at

the lower-level criticism meetings. Local cadres were expected to carry out public

denunciation within the stipulated framework and language.

Criticism teams were also set up at the municipal level and below. The local authorities

systematically carried out control over public denunciation from the provincial to the county

level. By November 1976, Nantong had set up 927 criticism teams affiliated with 7,429 people

at various levels. These teams organized 4,300 criticism meetings, at which 33,109 people

gave speeches to denounce the Gang of Four. In total, 832,780 people attended these

criticism meetings. 89 The Suzhou Municipal Criticism Team also sent criticism squads to

penetrate each bureau and work unit and mobilize people’s participation in criticism.

Between July and October 1977, Suzhou squads held 49 criticism meetings and a total of

94,500 people attended. 90 The large number of criticism teams not only guided public

denunciation at the lower levels but, more importantly, confined it to the designated targets,

thus avoiding public criticism against the Party as a whole.

1.3.2 Roles and Performativity

Mobilizing the emotions of the masses was critical to fulfilling a criticism meeting’s

function: arousing people’s anger against the Gang of Four Clique. Yu Liu categorizes this

mobilizing of emotions in the Maoist era into three main themes: victimization, redemption,

判工作的总结 [Summary of Criticism Work over the Past Two Years], February 15, 1979, 3, A1-16-21, SMA. 88 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Guanyu xiao fendui lai Suzhou shi xunhui pipan wenti huibao” 关于小分队来苏州市巡回批判问题汇报 [Report on Issues of Criticism Tour of the Squad Coming to Suzhou], October 25, 1977, 40–41, A1-16-17, SMA. 89 Nantong shi geweihui banshizu, “Guanyu qing shiwei geji, ju, zhishu danwei quntuan zuzhi huibao ban xuexiban, jianli da pipanzu, pipan dahui cishu, renshu de tongzhi” 关于请市委各级局、直属单位、群团组织汇报办学习班，建立大批判组、批判大会次数、人数的通知 [Notice on Requesting Bureaus and Directly Affiliated Units of the Municipal Party Committee at All Levels, and Mass Organizations to Report the Number of Study Classes, Criticism Groups, Criticism Meetings, and People], November 24, 1976, 180, E101-121-0342, NMA. 90 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Jie pi Hua Linsen fandang bangpai tixi xunhui pipan gongzuo huibao” 揭批华林森反党帮派体系巡回批判工作汇报 [Work Report on the Tour of Exposing and Criticizing the Hua Linsen Anti-Party Factional System], November 7, 1977, 64, A1-16-21, SMA.


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and emancipation.91 To do so, a criticism meeting was usually equipped with carefully picked

propagandists, including so-called fighters (战斗员 ), slogan-shouters (口号员 ), hosts of

bitterness (苦主), and insiders (知情人). A fighter mainly functioned to guide the criticism on

the stage. He or she led and carried out the criticism. A slogan-shouter could sense the

opportune moments at a criticism meeting and lead the audience to shout out slogans to stir

up the audience further. Hosts of bitterness, considered the main protagonists in speaking of

their bitterness, portrayed themselves as victims of the Gang of Four Clique and criticized

them for having caused their suffering. Finally, an insider, someone who had also been labeled

a follower, confessed and revealed his or her allies’ crimes. The organizers carefully selected

all these players from Party and state bodies and trained them before the criticism meeting.92

Their task was to portray the Gang of Four Clique as wrongdoers and arouse public indignation,

thereby gaining popular support for the casting out of the designated perpetrators.

A fighter usually possessed several qualities: a sonorous voice, clear expression, literacy,

and, most importantly, political reliability. Fighters repeatedly rehearsed and read

denouncing scripts before they found an effective and authentic way to mobilize public

emotions.93 They had to carefully select the right words and phrases and express them with

precise emotions to produce an effective criticism meeting. A 1977 report by the Suzhou

Municipal Criticism Team describes how fighters prepared to read criticism scripts as follows:

They repeatedly familiarized themselves with the scripts. They helped each other

correct pronunciation word for word and ponder sentence by sentence how to

display emotions. [They] poured out their bitter hatred against the Gang of Four and

Hua Linsen Clique in every single word and phrase.94

In another case, the audience commended the fighters’ performances at 34 criticism

meetings that the Suzhou Party Committee’s criticism squads had held.

91 Liu, “Maoist Discourse and the Mobilization of Emotions.” 92 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Guanyu xiao fendui lai Suzhou shi xunhui pipan wenti huibao,” 40. 93 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Jie pi Hua Linsen fandang bangpai tixi xunhui pipan gongzuo huibao,” 71. 94 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Sheng xunhui jiepi sirenbang zuixing dahui qingkuang fanying” 省巡回揭批四人帮罪行大会情况反映 [Report on the Provincial Tour Meetings of Exposing and Criticizing the Gang of Four’s Crimes], August 17, 1977, 28, A1-16-21, SMA.


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Fighters at the meetings pronounced clearly and spoke with deep emotions. [Their

speeches] were appealing. Everyone could hear clearly and understand them.

Meetings like these were effective.95

Fighters employed their public speaking skills to make the audience believe in the Gang of

Four Clique’s guilt and arouse public anger. Their theatrical performances thereby mobilized

public emotions.

Among all the roles, criticism meeting organizers considered insiders crucial in persuading

the audience and putting pressure on the targets at a criticism meeting. An insider engaged

in self-criticism and appeared as a witness to testify against other targets. Models were

cultivated and established at each level. For example, the Suzhou Industry and Transportation

Section alone selected 140 model insiders and victims for criticism meetings.96 Organizers of

criticism meetings believed that insiders’ accounts were more convincing to the audience:

“Their exposure and criticism are their personal experiences and [they are] concrete, incisive,

and convincing.”97 According to a Nantong report, people who were regarded as having

engaged in wrongdoing began to “feel restless and report problems that very night or

immediately confessed their crimes” following an insider’s exposure and criticism. 98 By

confessing in public, insiders were supposed to develop a sense of guilt in those who had

committed crimes and to exert pressure on those who resisted pleading guilty.

However, an insider’s testimony and criticism sometimes served his or her interest. At a

criticism meeting against the Suzhou rebel leader Wang Yongzhu, three targets who had been

labeled as Wang’s supporters were instructed to testify against Wang. However, they

considered the criticism meeting an opportunity to atone for their mistakes and crimes. They

blamed all past wrongs on Wang Yongzhu and sought exemption from punishment.99 The

accused targets attempted to shift blame to their superior to avoid punishment, a common

95 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Jie pi Hua Linsen fandang bangpai tixi xunhui pipan gongzuo huibao,” 69–70. 96 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu jin liang ge yue yundong qingkuang de baogao” 关于近两个月运动情况的报告 [Report on the Campaign over the Last Two Months], December 6, 1977, 57, A1-1-161, SMA. 97 Zhonggong Nantong shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu dangqian jiepi sirenbang yundong qingkuang de baogao,” 20. 98 Zhonggong Nantong shi weiyuanhui, 20. 99 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Guanyu zuzhibu, xuanchuanbu, bangongshi zhaokai de jiefa pipan Wang Yongzhu tuixing fangeming zhengzhi gangling” 关于组织部、宣传部、办公室召开的揭发批判汪永珠推行反革命政治纲领大会的反映 [Reflection on the Organization Department, the Propaganda Department, and the Party Committee Office’s Meeting of Exposing and Criticizing Wang Yongzhu for Carrying out Counterrevolutionary Political Program], May 2, 1978, 143, A1-16-21, SMA.


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technique used by identified perpetrators in their narratives of responsibility.100

To a large degree, the effectiveness of a criticism meeting lay with these actors’

performances. With the fighter’s passionate invocation, the victim’s bitterness, and the

insider’s revelations at the criticism meeting, the local authorities expected to arouse the

sympathy of the general populace and mobilize them to engage in the “war” against the Gang

of Four. However, it is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of a criticism meeting at mobilizing

public emotions as official work reports outline the audience’s reactions in a standardized

way, such as in the report below that Suzhou sent to the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee

in 1977.

Insiders’ exposure in anger revealed the Hua Linsen faction’s conspiracies; with tears

of blood, victims’ accusations uncovered the ferocious features of Hua Linsen’s

faction. Tears dropped with the voice on the stage, and [the audience] cried offstage.

Intensive class hatred and angry condemnation bound people onstage and offstage,

inside and outside the meeting in a united combat group.101

Nonetheless, some criticism meetings with inauthentic and artificial performances failed to

move the audience. In Suzhou, the audience complained in May 1978 about a criticism

meeting: “Although fighters can speak good Mandarin, [their performances] were affected

and pretend.” 102 Similarly, when criticizing Hua Linsen, one of the fighters’ ambiguous

pronunciation and dry reading made it difficult to follow, and the audience became bored.103

In many cases, criticism meetings turned out to be noisy and disorderly.

In addition to denouncing the Gang of Four Clique, the display of victimhood was another

theme of the performativity of criticism meetings. “Hosts of bitterness,” usually referring to

those who had fallen victim to the Cultural Revolution, were organized to narrate their

sufferings at the hands of the Gang of Four and Hua Linsen. The selected protagonists usually

borrowed the language used in the campaign for speaking bitterness to describe their

encounters and claim their victimhood. For example, Zhang Zhaozhong, whose father had

100 Zhang, “From Denial to Apology”; Williams, Timothy, “Agency, Responsibility, and Culpability: The Complexity of Roles and Self-Representations of Perpetrators,” Journal of Perpetrator Research 2 (2018): 39–64; Payne, Unsettling Accounts. 101 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu jin liang ge yue yundong qingkuang de baogao,” 57. 102 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “jiepi Liu Boying dahui qingkuang huibao,” 148. 103 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Jie pi Hua Linsen fandang bangpai tixi xunhui pipan gongzuo huibao,” 70.


57

been persecuted to death 104 due to a fabricated counterrevolutionary case during the

Cultural Revolution, narrated his family’s past as such:

Under the evil rule of the reactionary GMD, in the endless darkness of old China, my

family, the same as thousands of people, suffered deeply from oppression and

exploitation of the “three mountains” (三座大山 ) 105 … Chairman Mao and the

Chinese Communist Party emancipated us from misery… However, the extremely evil

Gang of Four deprived us of all happiness… Wise Chairman Hua, at Chairman Mao’s

will, crushed the Gang of Four once and for all and rescued the revolution, the Party,

and my whole family. My family is emancipated for the second time.106

Noticeably, in this case, as I argued previously, a continuous pattern of language is used.

When Zhang compared the Gang of Four to the GMD and blamed them for the sufferings of

his family, the language he used was strikingly similar to the language employed in previous

speaking bitterness campaigns, with words such as “repression,” “exploitation,” “suffering,”

and “emancipation.” It was also not novel to divide the society into oppressors, the Gang of

Four Clique in this case, and the oppressed. As exploitation and repression had been the

central component of the victimization discourse in modern China, mobilizing oppressed

people to personalize their victimhood and provoke anger had been the CCP’s long-standing

strategy.107 In the political context, where a large portion of the population was victimized in

one way or another during the Cultural Revolution, the discourse of victimhood could be

powerful as it addressed real grievances. Hua Guofeng was also portrayed as a savior of the

revolution, the Party, and oppressed individuals, invoking a new and better future under

Hua’s leadership.

1.3.3 Small Group Meetings

After several criticism meetings, criticism teams usually convened small group meetings

104 At that time, the investigation group claimed that the surgery doctor committed suicide, while the son of the victim believed that his father was persecuted to death by the investigation group under the instruction of Hua Linsen and his allies. 105 It refers to feudalism, imperialism, and capitalism in the state discourse. 106 Zhang Zhaozhong, “Hua Linsen bangpai ba wojia di er ci tuijin kuhai” 华林森帮派把我家第二次推进苦海 [The Hua Linsen Faction Made My Family Suffer for the Second Time], Criticism materials, no. 13 (November 1, 1977): 9–11. 107 Liu, “Maoist Discourse and the Mobilization of Emotions,” 336–37.


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to gather feedback and reflect on the effectiveness of recent criticism meetings. The teams

then drafted situation reports or reflections (情况汇报/反映) and reported to the higher

authorities.108 This process became one of the functions of the small group ritual, and Whyte

argues that it produced mutual communication within the system.109 Cadres, workers, and

peasants were supposed to express their feelings, attitudes, doubts, and even discontent in

the course of group discussions, through which criticism teams expected to discover what

was working and what was not. The teams would then improve their methods based on this

feedback to produce better popular responses in future. Thus, these reports provided an

insight into the audience’s responses to criticism meetings.

Small group meetings offered people the opportunity to express their opinions about a

criticism meeting, and they were an extension of public denouncing stages. The majority of

participants recycled the language used at criticism meetings and condemned the accused.

They tended to show that they were convinced of the guilt of the Gang of Four. At one of

these small group meetings, participants from the Suzhou Youth League Municipal

Committee and the Silk Engineering College noted how criticism meetings against Shi

Zhaoxiang changed their perspectives and revealed Shi’s “true face.”

We previously had the impression that he was an honest man. Now [criticism

meetings] have revealed his reactionary face. [We] see clearly that he is not an old

rebel but a new-born counterrevolutionary and [he has] committed many evil deeds

under the signboard of the rebel faction; [he is] hypocritical and two-faced rather

than honest; [he is] not only politically reactionary but also a careerist and conspirator;

[he is] also a black backbone (黑骨干) of the Gang of Four and the root cause of the

long-term chaos in Jiangsu.110

Others believed that Shi had committed unforgivable crimes and suggested he should receive

108 A situation report usually comprised of three parts: description of criticism meetings; public responses to them; and existing problems. Public responses took up the main part of a situation report and detailed attendees’ evaluation on criticism meetings. See Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Guanyu ben zu de gongzuo zongjie he qingkuang huibao” 关于本组的工作总结和情况汇报 [Work Summary and Report on the Group’s Work], August 1977–February 1978, 16–21, A1-16-21, SMA. 109 Whyte, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China, 12–13. 110 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Guanyu jiepi Zeng Bangyuan, Shi Zhaoxiang xiao fendui lai Suzhou shi jiepi qingkuang huibao” 关于揭批曾邦元、施兆祥小分队来苏州市揭批情况汇报 [Report on the Situation of Exposing and Criticizing Zeng Bangyuan and Shi Zhaoxiang by the Squad Coming to Suzhou], November 7, 1977, 132, A1-16-21, SMA.


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harsh punishment.111 These small group participants thus echoed the message they had

heard at the criticism meetings and expressed support, whether or not this was sincere.

Criticism meetings also pressured some participants to confess their crimes and admit

their guilt at the meetings. After reflecting upon the criticism meeting held on November 10,

1977 with 10,000 attendees, a worker with the surname Fei confessed as follows:

I was previously indifferent to criticizing Hua Linsen due to the influence of

factionalism… I believed that I was right and should be credited [for participating in

the Cultural Revolution]. Armed struggles were only minor matters, and the [rival]

factional members who were killed deserved it. However, after listening to the

denunciation, I feel deeply that I was duped. I should not be credited and am, in fact,

guilty. I am responsible for the incident in which the First Company of the Worker

Picket (工人纠察队) under my leadership killed Wang Zhiping of Suzhou Third Dyeing

and Weaving Factory.112

Fei claimed that the criticism meeting changed his attitude, and he even pleaded guilty to

causing the death of a worker. In the course of confessing their guilt, self-abnegation

prevailed, and repetition of this led people to doubt themselves.113 Fei thus revealed his

crimes and admitted his guilt.

However, small group participants’ disagreement with the criticism meetings revealed

the ineffective side of public denunciation. Common complaints about criticism meetings

included poor organization, speakers either having strong accents or being inaudible, poor

attendance, and disorder. They also pointed out errors in denunciation materials, such as

inappropriate labeling of the accused. In one case, the participants criticized the misuse of

the official formulation at a criticism meeting, accusing a target of being “ultra-rightist” (极

右) when his issue had been identified as a “contradiction among the people.”114 A person

defined as “ultra-rightist” would be labeled as an “enemy.” In another case, they criticized

the direct recycling of the same denouncing materials and formulations used by the accused

during the Cultural Revolution. “The masses do not know what is true and what is false now.

111 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, 132. 112 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Qingkuang huibao” 情况汇报 [Situation Report], November 15, 1977, 93–94, A1-16-21, SMA. 113 Liu, “Maoist Discourse and the Mobilization of Emotions,” 345–46. 114 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “jiepi Liu Boying dahui qingkuang huibao,” 150.


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All the denouncing materials at this meeting had already been repeatedly used in the past…

It is not good to hold more [criticism] meetings like this one.”115 They also complained that

some of the accused did not take criticism meetings seriously, chatting and laughing with

other people before and after the meeting.116 Indeed, some of the accused simply considered

criticism meetings as a performance, commenting, “I have acted in four plays and still have

nine to go. Could we just do them all together at once!”117 When asked to reflect upon it,

some of the accused simply replied that they had not thought about the criticism meeting at

all.118

These denouncing sessions also widely resulted in public demands for the truth about the

past, rehabilitation, and punishing of perpetrators. In almost every situation report, people

made specific requests for further revelations about past injustices, particularly cases that

had implicated many people. At a 1977 small group meeting, participants demanded that the

Suzhou Municipal Party Committee thoroughly investigate a group case that had victimized

hundreds of people in Suzhou and reveal the whole truth.119 At the same meeting, they also

requested an investigation into another killing to find the perpetrator. At another meeting in

January 1978, the participants requested that victims and their family members be

rehabilitated and compensated for their loss. In addition to requests for the truth and

compensation, participants made strong demands for perpetrators to be punished. Workers

at the Changfeng Machinery Factory expressed their discontent with the handling of an

identified follower at the factory.120 Instead of sending him to a so-called study class – a

lighter form of persecution that involved the target making a confession and engaging in self-

criticism – workers felt that he should have been arrested and placed in a less comfortable

setting.121 Others demanded that the Suzhou Municipal Party Committee arrest those who

115 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Guanyu jiepi Xu Zhang Zhou dahui hou de qingkuang huibao,” 121. 116 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Guanyu kaizhan xunhui pipan de qingkuang huibao” 关于开展巡回批判的情况汇报 [Report on Undertaking Criticism Tours], September 19, 1977, A1-16-21, SMA. 117 Suzhou shi geming weiyuanhui gongjiao bangongshi, “Zoudu shencha de duixiang dangqian sixiang fanying yu dongtai qingkuang” 走读审查的对象当前思想反映与动态情况 [Current Thoughts and Trends of Investigated Targets], October 8, 1977, 91, A6-3-115, SMA. 118 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “jie laodi pipan bangpai tixi dahui de qingkuang huibao” 揭老底批判帮派体系大会的情况汇报 [Report on the Meeting of Exposing inside Stories and Criticizing Factional System], July 1977, 79–80, A1-16-21, SMA. 119 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Qingkuang huibao,” 96. 120 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, 97. 121 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Guanyu jiepi Xu Zhang Zhou dahui hou de qingkuang huibao,” 122; Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei da pipanzu, “Guanyu kaizhan xunhui pipan de qingkuang huibao,” 45.


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had fabricated cases and deal with them according to the law. Therefore, public denunciation

against the Gang of Four allowed people to claim victimhood and set the tone among the

public to address past injustices and bring justice to victims and perpetrators. This mood

eventually led to, as later developments suggest, increasingly extensive nationwide

rehabilitation (Chapter 3).

Generally speaking, the primary purpose of a criticism meeting was not punishment but

to create a political discourse that ascribed the label of perpetrator and justified the purge of

designated perpetrators. Moreover, criticism meetings in the post-Mao era were not

physically violent, unlike those during the Cultural Revolution.122 Nonetheless, in July 1979,

the Military Court announced that criticizing and struggling tours (巡回批斗) were wrong

practices, and they should be abolished without exception.123 The campaign to Expose and

Criticize the Gang of Four officially ended in late 1978; criticism meetings faded out by

degrees.124

1.4 Self-criticisms or “Clarification Meetings”? Local Attempts at Reconciling

Victims and Perpetrators

Large-scale criticism meetings reminded the public of past violence and injustices. They

also provided ordinary people with a channel for expressing their discontent and grievances.

Although the central leadership attempted to blame all past wrongdoing on the Gang of Four

Clique, conflicts and resentment resulting from the Cultural Revolution continued to emerge

in people’s everyday lives. The nationwide search and invention of perpetrators neither

satisfied the grieving public nor reduced tension within the society. Public demands for the

truth about the violence increased following the large-scale public denunciation.

Indeed, the Cultural Revolution had left a large and increasingly vocal group of victims. In

122 According to the archival materials in Suzhou and Nantong, and the interviews with the accused, the criticism meetings rarely involved physical abuse. During a criticism meeting, the accused could sit on chairs and be free to go to the toilet. 123 Zong zhengzhibu, “Pizhuan quanjun junshi fayuan yuanzhang huiyi jiyao (jielu)” 批转全军军事法院院长会议纪要（节录） [Commenting on and Transmitting the Conference Summary of Presidents of Military Courts (Excerpt)], in Zhengzhi gongzuo shouce (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zong zhengzhibu bangongting, 1980), 417. 124 However, the techniques of public humiliation were reemployed during the Strike-Hard Campaign in 1983-1986. On the Strike-Hard campaigns, see Trevaskes, Susan, Policing Serious Crimes in China: From ‘Strike Hard’ to ‘Kill Fewer’ (New York: Routledge, 2010); Tanner, Harold M., Strike Hard! Anti-Crime Campaign and Chinese Criminal Justice, 1979-1985 (New York: Cornell University East Asia Program, 1999).


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Jiangsu alone, millions of victims and their family members had suffered persecution.125 As

more and more people received political rehabilitation and restoration of their former posts,

many found themselves sharing workplaces or living space with their aggressors. To avoid

confusion, I refer to these perpetrators as “aggressors” or “direct perpetrators” here. The

effectiveness of political mobilization did not necessarily guarantee changes in individual

attitudes.126 Resentment and hostility remained between victims and their aggressors. Both

cadres and the general public expressed more hostility towards direct perpetrators of harm

against them than towards the Gang of Four, and they requested that these perpetrators be

punished harshly.127

In this case, how to get victims and perpetrators to coexist peacefully became an issue

because they often lived or worked in the same community or work unit. To resolve this, local

cadres made attempts to reconcile victims and their aggressors at the grassroots levels. These

local attempts suggest that ending the Cultural Revolution involved both the nationwide

designation of perpetrators and further attempts to reveal the truth of the recent past and

reconcile the divided society. Despite the lack of a formalized institution, this local practice

closely resembles a truth and reconciliation commission, which many countries and regions

have implemented during a political transition period.128 A truth commission is usually an

official body designed to provide a space for victims to voice their experiences of injustice and

for perpetrators to seek amnesty, thus bringing about reconciliation within the society.129

During the campaign against the Gang of Four, local cadres used this practice to reveal the

“truth” of the Cultural Revolution. Their attempts reflected a brief moment of bridging the

divided society in the wake of the movement.

To settle conflicts and end the hostilities caused by the Cultural Revolution, the central

leadership launched the so-called mass self-education (群众性自我教育) campaign, officially

termed the Three Speak-outs (三大讲). This referred to vocalizing bitter hatred toward the

125 Hui Yuyu, “Zai Jiangsu sheng di shi san ci renmin sifa huiyi jieshu shi de jianghua” 在江苏省第十三次人民司法会议结束时的讲话 [Speech at the End of the 13th Jiangsu Provincial People’s Judicial Conference], September 17, 1978, 164, E237-121-0076, NMA. 126 Whyte, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China, 233. 127 For more details about cadres’ demand for harsh punishment, see Wang, Cong Tong huai zhou dao shen Jiang Qing, 65-66,160-169. 128 On the prevalence of truth commissions, see Hayner, Priscilla B., Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2010). 129 Hayner, Priscilla B., “Fifteen Truth Commissions -1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study,” Human Rights Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1994): 597–655.


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Gang of Four, experiences of fighting the Gang of Four, and people’s understanding of fighting

the Gang of Four. The Three Speak-outs originated in Daqing, a place that is well-known as a

model for the industry.130 On February 10, 1977, People’s Daily published an article on its

front page praising Daqing’s Three Speak-outs.131 On March 19, 1977, the Central Work

Conference introduced this nationwide.132 The Three Speak-outs soon became a component

of “learning from Daqing” at the National Conference of Learning from Daqing in Industry on

May 4, 1977.133 Central leaders soon established the Daqing experience of the Three Speak-

outs as a nationwide model.134

The Three Speak-outs usually took place within a closed community like a factory or a

state institution. Higher authorities often dispatched work teams to supervise the practice.

Despite the definitions of the Three Speak-outs being vague, they dealt with such issues as

injustices, violence, and factionalism resulting from the Cultural Revolution. The speak-outs

involved victims, aggressors, and hostile factional members. Although the Three Speak-outs

took place under the umbrella of criticizing the Gang of Four, they were not simply a copy,

but instead involved seeking truth and reconciliation at the local level.

The first speak-out was designed to express public hatred for the Gang of Four. While this

part was heavily engaged with criticism of the Gang of Four Clique, individuals who had

suffered from various forms of violence had the opportunity to come forward and present

their grievances in public. In this, they received official acknowledgment of their victimhood

from local authorities. At a work report dated December 6, 1977, the Suzhou Party Committee

bluntly revealed that “some victims’ families were broken up and suffered deaths. It was so

horrible that one could hardly bear to look.”135 Acknowledging victims’ suffering could, as

studies in other regions have suggested, promote reconciliation. 136 The revelation of

130 For more details on the model of Daqing, see Wei, Lim Tai, Oil in China: From Self-Reliance to Internationalization (Singapore: World Scientific, 2009). 131 “Daqing kaizhan san da jiang, shenru jiepi sirenbang” 大庆开展三大讲，深入揭批四人帮 [Daqing Carrying out Three Speak-Outs and Thoroughly Exposing and Criticizing the Gang of Four], People’s Daily, February 10, 1977, 1. 132 Zhonggong Nantong shi weiyuanhui banshizu, “Guanyu zenyang kaizhan san da jiang de taolun qingkuang” 关于怎样开展“三大讲”的讨论情况 [Discussion on How to Carry out Three Speak-Outs], May 1977, 134–38, E101-121-0358, NMA. 133 Zhonggong Nantong shi weiyuanhui banshizu, 133. 134 Yu Qiuli and Kang Shien were also the main promoters of making Daqing a model in the industry throughout the country. 135 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu jin liang ge yue yundong qingkuang de baogao,” 50. 136 Gibson, James L., “Does Truth Lead to Reconciliation? Testing the Causal Assumptions of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Process,” American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 2 (2004): 201–17.


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individual suffering also developed the notion of perpetrators among the public. To promote

reconciliation, local authorities mobilized and pressurized aggressors to admit their guilt in

public.

The second speak-out was dedicated to aggressors engaging in self-criticism and

confessing their mistakes and crimes. This group of aggressors mostly comprised cadres and

former factional members. In official terms, they were categorized as “having said or done

something wrong (说错话、做错事),” the mildest category of perpetrators at the time

(Chapter 2). By January 1978, the local authorities in Suzhou had placed 535 people into this

category.137 They usually received no substantial punishment, but they had to clarify their

mistakes and engage in self-criticism at so-called clarification meetings (讲清楚会). Their

clarification was aimed not only at seeking the forgiveness of victims, but also regaining Party

trust. By explaining themselves in public, Suzhou leaders emphasized, cadres in this category

could regain Party trust. “As far as [they] clarify themselves, [we] shall not hold onto [their

mistakes] … Neither shall [we] discriminate against them. We should trust them politically

and in work.”138 Aggressors could walk away unpunished if their confessions were considered

sufficient.

At clarification meetings, aggressors were expected to show a willingness to admit their

mistakes and transform themselves to receive public forgiveness. They first needed to engage

in self-criticism, a long-standing method for dealing with outcast cadres in Party history, in

which they presented themselves as transformed.139 For example, a leader with the surname

Wang at the Suzhou Machinery Factory (苏州机械厂) stated in his self-criticism that:

In the fight to expose and criticize the Gang of Four, [I] drew a clear line with the Gang

of Four and the Hua Linsen group and washed off the impurity deep in my heart and

soul. [I] will strive to reform my worldview and live up to the reputation of a Party

member.140

137 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui cailiaozu, “Yi nian lai qingcha gongzuo qingkuang he jinhou yijian (taolun gao)” 一年来清查工作情况和今后意见（讨论稿） [The Investigation Work Situation over the Past Year and Future Opinions (Draft for Discussion)], March 1, 1978, 103, A1-14-87, SMA. 138 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui cailiaozu, “Guanyu qingcha gongzuo de qingkuang he jinhou yijian” 关于清查工作的情况和今后意见 [The Investigation Work Situation and Future Opinions], December 23, 1977, 55, A1-14-87, SMA. 139 For more information on self-criticism, see Teiwes, Frederick C., Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950-65 (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1979). 140 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu Suzhou linye jixie chang kaizhan ‘san da jiang’ de qingkuang


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The Jiangsu leadership established the factory as a model of the Three Speak-outs in the

province. Due to the consequences of disobedience, outcast cadres tended to express their

regret, whether sincerely or not, and ask for forgiveness. According to local work reports,

these cadres received public forgiveness. 141 However, it is worth noting that their self-

criticism mostly focused on their work ethic. This is because the central leadership stipulated

that cadres held no responsibility for mistakes at work.142

Cadres also tended to attribute their mistakes to the influence of the Gang of Four Clique

as a defense. They defended their actions during the Cultural Revolution, suggesting that they

were, as many perpetrators do in similar societies, a means of self-protection in a given set of

circumstances not of their choosing. For example, a leader at the Suzhou Machinery Factory

emphasized that he had no choice but to follow Hua Linsen to avoid persecution during the

Cultural Revolution.143 In another case, a deputy Party secretary at the Suzhou Changfeng

Factory (苏州长风厂 ) argued that he had suffered from Hua Linsen’s persecution and

considered it unfair that he had to engage in self-criticism as well.144 They thus clarified their

wrongdoing by blaming the Gang of Four Clique. If successful, they would be entitled to an

exemption because the central leaders had announced that people held no responsibility for

their own wrongdoing if it resulted from the Gang of Four’s influence.145

In the final speak-out, local cadres initiated a process to reconcile the involved parties. In

Party terms, this process was called “demolish[ing] walls” (拆墙), “fill[ing] gullies” (填沟)

between people, and “dispel[ling] knots in one’s heart” (解疙瘩), meaning bridging divides,

repairing rifts, and removing misunderstandings within the society. All these expressions have

jianbao” 关于苏州林业机械厂开展三大讲的情况简报 [Briefing on the Situation of the Suzhou Forestry Machinery Factory Carrying out Three Speak-Outs], May 28, 1977, 101, A1-1-161, SMA. 141 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu guanche shiwei buwei ban ju fuzeren huiyi jingshen de qingkuang huibao” 关于贯彻市委部委办局负责人会议精神的情况汇报 [Report on the Implementation of the Meeting Spirit of Leaders of the Municipal Party Committee, Department Committees, Offices, and Bureaus], November 1978, 3, E237-121-0053, NMA. 142 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Pizhuan di ba ci quanguo renmin sifa gongzuo huiyi jiyao de tongzhi” 批转第八次全国人民司法工作会议纪要的通知 [Comments on and Transmits the Meeting Summary of the Eighth National People’s Judicial Work Conference] (The Maoist Legacy, June 12, 1978), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/4401. 143 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu Suzhou linye jixie chang kaizhan ‘san da jiang’ de qingkuang jianbao,” 101. 144 Zhonggong Nantong shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu dangqian jiepi sirenbang yundong qingkuang de baogao,” 31. 145 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan fandang jituan shijian de tongzhi” 关于王洪文、张春桥、江青、姚文元反党集团事件的通知 [Notice on the Incident of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan Anti-Party Clique] (The Maoist Legacy, October 18, 1976), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/1997.


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connotations of reconciliation. As the Suzhou Municipal Party Committee asserted, “Many

cadres actively demolish walls, fill gullies, and dispel knots with those who were persecuted

during the Cultural Revolution.” The committee further claimed that victims did not blame

these cadres for their suffering.146 For example, Cadre Wu tortured a female worker at a

Suzhou factory and forced her to confess to a non-existent plan – an attempt to blow up the

factory – in the early stage of the Cultural Revolution. During this speak-out, Wu admitted his

mistakes. According to the factory report, the female worker agreed to settle her conflict and

promote unity. 147 These accounts suggest that the local authorities attempted to make

coexistence, if not full reconciliation within the society, possible, especially between victims

and their aggressors.

Equally important, this reconciliatory practice was devoted to resolving factional conflicts

that had divided society since the Cultural Revolution. Local cadres made efforts to repair the

rift between local factions and expected them to tolerate different political views. According

to a 1977 Suzhou Party Committee report, members of two rival factions criticized

factionalism and restored their friendship by allying themselves with each other against the

Gang of Four Clique.148 At the Suzhou Sewing Machine Factory, personal hostility resulting

from factional conflicts reportedly ceased because of the speak-out. A factional member, Dai,

had beaten up an opponent with the surname Wang, and Wang consequently lost a tooth.

Wang had held a grudge against Dai since then. He refused to replace the tooth and kept it as

evidence. According to the factory’s work report, after Dai spoke out and apologized to him,

Wang attributed responsibility to the Gang of Four Clique and forgave Dai.149 According to the

same report, 47 sets of opposing factional members similarly reconciled with each other at

the Suzhou Glass Factory alone. Although we cannot tell if they genuinely made peace, this

reconciliatory process made it possible to eliminate factionalism, enabling hostile factional

members to coexist at the grassroots level.

Overall, the Three Speak-outs all engaged with the revelation of past violence and

injustice. It is essential to establish past truths for political and social reconciliation in post-

146 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu jin liang ge yue yundong qingkuang de baogao,” 52. 147 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu jiepi sirenbang lianxi jiepi Lin Biao de qingkuang jianbao.” 148 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu Suzhou linye jixie chang kaizhan ‘san da jiang’ de qingkuang jianbao,” 102. 149 Suzhou shi geming weiyuanhui di yi qinggongye ju, “Guanyu qingcha gongzuo yanshou qingkuang de baogao” 关于清查工作验收情况的报告 [Report on the Acceptance Check of the Investigation Work], April 28, 1978, 21, A6-3-117, SMA.


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conflict societies.150 This practice was also a feature of the Three Speak-outs. According to a

1977 report, workers at the Suzhou Changfeng Factory, where the rebel leader Hua Linsen

was originally based, first reported 270 crimes by Hua and his faction, and later 557 more.

The factory further claimed that these charges essentially took shape after a few rounds of

discussion and investigation.151 The Suzhou Party Committee stated that:

Much of the confused right and wrong has been reset. Many bad guys and

wrongdoings harbored by the Hua Linsen faction have been exposed. The [Suzhou]

Industry and Transportation Sector alone has provided over 900 clues to cases of

killing, arson, and beating, smashing, and looting.152

Therefore, it seems that the local authorities and ordinary people took the opportunity to

establish their “truths” and collective memory about past violence. Individuals had an

opportunity to present their grievance in public. Local authorities also pressurized aggressors,

especially cadres, to apologize to their victims. Regardless of whether they were authentic or

not, public apology made social reconciliation possible.

However, reconciliation was difficult when it came to cases involving such violence as

killings and persecution that resulted in death (迫害致死). In many cases in Jiangsu, family

members of those killed simply did not accept the need to reconcile, and they usually

demanded that perpetrators be punished. This difficulty was considerable in extreme cases

such as Guangxi Province, where mass killings took place on a much larger scale than in other

regions. The Cultural Revolution caused the deaths of tens of thousands of people in

Guangxi.153 The local leadership took much longer and made more significant efforts to

address the public grievances resulting from these killings.154 Similarly, in countries such as

Rwanda, where mass killings affected the vast majority of the population, people strongly

resisted reconciliation; it took a long time and significant efforts to initiate the reconciliatory

150 Gibson, “Does Truth Lead to Reconciliation?” 151 Zhonggong Nantong shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu dangqian jiepi sirenbang yundong qingkuang de baogao,” 32. 152 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu jin liang ge yue yundong qingkuang de baogao,” 51. 153 Su, Collective Killings in Rural China during the Cultural Revolution. 154 Local authorities in Guangxi only started the overall process of dealing with the Cultural Revolution in 1983. Continued political and factional conflicts were too strong to pursue the cause of reconciliation at that time. See Yan Lebin, “wo canyu Guangxi wenge yiliu wenti” 我参与广西文革遗留问题 [I Participated in Dealing with Lingering Issues of the Cultural Revolution in Guangxi], Yanhuang chunqiu, no. 11 (2012). The research of my colleague, Song Guoqing in the Institute of Sinology at the University of Freiburg, focuses explicitlyon the issue of dealing with killings in Guangxi. His dissertation is titled “Healing the Wounds?” Redressing State Crimes in Guangxi after the Cultural Revolution.


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process.155

There were also other difficulties in the process of reconciliation. Aggressors were not

always willing to admit their guilt. In Suzhou, a cadre’s colleagues condemned him and

considered him a traitor because he admitted to his mistakes and engaged in public self-

criticism. They refused to accept any blame.156 Another cadre cared too little to write the

script of self-criticism himself and simply asked someone else to write it for him.157 In other

cases, cadres complained about being demoted after engaging in the Three Speak-outs.158

Some local institutions also did not carry out the Three Speak-outs.159 Instead, Nantong

cadres, for example, considered this an opportunity to distance themselves from the Gang of

Four Clique to avoid being implicated. When Nantong leaders mapped out the plan for the

Three Speak-outs, they requested that it concentrate on “distinguishing right from wrong and

drawing a clear distinction between ‘us’ and the Gang of Four Clique.” 160 Cadres at the

Nantong Intermediate People’s Court emphasized that they had followed a correct political

line since 1974 and highlighted their resistance to the Gang of Four’s “counterrevolutionary

line.”161 By doing so, they defended and distanced themselves from the Gang of Four Clique.

They could thus maintain intact reputations during the criticism campaign against the Gang

of Four.

All these passive responses to the Three Speak-outs suggest the difficulties entailed in

this reconciliatory process, or, more broadly, in dealing with the Cultural Revolution. The

Three Speak-outs practices came to an end in early 1978 when the central leadership

155 Thomson, Susan, Whispering Truth to Power: Everyday Resistance to Reconciliation in Postgenocide Rwanda, 1 edition (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2013). 156 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu Suzhou linye jixie chang kaizhan ‘san da jiang’ de qingkuang jianbao,” 102–3. 157 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei bangongshi, “shishi qiushi gaohao zhuanan cailiao gongzuo” 实事求是搞好专案材料工作 [Practically and Realistically Carrying out Case Material Work], October 27, 1978, 80–81, A1-14-88, SMA. 158 Suzhou Linjichang, “guanche gongye ‘san shi tiao’ qingkuang huibao” 贯彻工业《三十条》情况汇报 [Report on Carrying out “the Thirty Articles” of Industry], n.d., 68, A6-1-36, SMA. 159 Zhonggong Nantong shi fayuan dangzu, “Guanyu zongjie 11 ci luxian douzheng jingyan jiaoxun de qingkuang baogao” 关于总结11次路线斗争经验教训的情况报告 [Report on Summarizing Experiences and Lessons of the Eleventh Line Struggle], January 5, 1978, E237-111-0073, NMA. 160 Zhonggong Nantong shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu quanshi kaizhan san da jiang luxian duibi de qingkuang jianbao” 关于全市开展“三大讲“路线斗争的情况简报 [Situation Briefing on Carrying out the Line Struggle of Three Speak-Outs Citywide], April 25, 1977, 130, E101-121-0358, NMA. 161 Zhonggong Nantong shi fayuan dangzu, “Guanyu zongjie 11 ci luxian douzheng jingyan jiaoxun de qingkuang baogao”; Zhonggong Nantong shi fayuan dangzu, “Guanyu zongjie 11 ci luxian douzheng jingyan jiaoxun de xiaojie” 关于总结11次路线斗争经验教训的小结 [Brief Summary of Experiences and Lessons in the Eleventh Line Struggle], January 5, 1978, 11–26, E237-111-0073, NMA.


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specifically demanded that the people “not linger on historical accounts,” and instructed

victims to forget the past and look forward (向前看) to the future.162 The central demand led

to the fading away of local reconciliation measures and made it difficult to increase efforts at

reconciliation on a large scale. After Deng Xiaoping shifted the focus to economic

development, social reconciliation ceased to take center stage. Some scholarship has argued

that a truth and reconciliation commission has to capture widespread attention among the

people in a country for it to be influential.163 On the one hand, local reconciliation measures

could only reduce tensions between perpetrators and victims, and between members of rival

factions, to a limited extent, such as within a work unit. The central policies in dealing with

the Cultural Revolution, on the other hand, rarely addressed the issue of reconciliation, and

thus could not create a reconciliatory atmosphere nationwide. The reconciliatory process

within Chinese society ended too soon to provide an effective mechanism for bringing about

reconciliation in the post-Cultural Revolution period.

Conclusion

By searching for Gang of Four followers and criticizing them in public, the CCP leadership

invented the Gang of Four Clique as an organized and hierarchical conspiracy. It then

attributed the violence of the recent past to this group. Those who were allocated to this

group assumed the identity of perpetrator. At the same time, the notion of victimization

became familiar to the public through public denunciation. Local authorities organized those

who had suffered during the Cultural Revolution to denounce the Gang of Four Clique and

assigned them the identity of victim. In fear of being implicated along with the casting out of

the Gang of Four, cadres also competed for victimhood. With no intention of punishing the

majority, the Party authorities constructed two political identities: perpetrators – the Gang of

Four Clique – and victims – the Party, the state, and its people. The Gang of Four were

compared to feudalism and the GMD, and it was said that the entire country had suffered at

their hands. The memory of victimhood from recent history played an important role in

162 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu pizhuan ‘di shi qi ci quanguo gong’an huiyi jiyao’ de tongzhi” 关于批转第十七次全国公安会议纪要的通知 [Notice on Transmitting the Minutes of the 17th National Public Security Conference], January 15, 1978, 16, E101-121-0360, NMA. 163 Gibson, James L., “The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation: Lessons from South Africa,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 3 (2006): 409–32.


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reconstructing victim and perpetrator identities. This was used as an instrument to legitimize

the CCP’s rule following the destructive Cultural Revolution.164 The Hua Guofeng leadership

maintained and regained control by reconstructing the perpetrator-victim discourse following

the political shake-up that cast out the four former central leaders. This CCP practice of using

the power of discourse can be traced back to the Yan’an period.165

The invention of the conspiracy and the reconstruction of political identities were

premised on the CCP’s emotion work. Recently reinstated veterans cast out the Gang of Four

and its followers by recycling the very political campaign techniques and rituals used to attack

them during the Cultural Revolution. Public denunciation and speaking bitterness were

designed to incite popular anger against the Gang of Four and mobilize people to the

campaign. These theatrical performances also conveyed how to frame the newly outcast

group using official language, and further formed the notion of perpetrator among the public.

However, local cadres encountered various difficulties in creating and labeling the Gang

of Four Clique as perpetrators. Moreover, neither the reconstruction of political identities nor

the nationwide denunciation solved the tension within the society. The coexistence of victims

and their aggressors became a significant issue that local cadres had to address. Although the

campaign-style truth-telling and confession appeared to ease the tension at the local level, it

could not provide a long-standing and effective means of societal reconciliation. At the same

time, the Party-state maintained close control over what could be expressed and how. The

ineffectiveness of political campaigns underlies the fact that various political groups resisted

blame. The campaign to Expose and Criticize the Gang of Four officially came to an end in

December 1978 at the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee. However, the

handling of designated perpetrators continued and turned out to be a protracted and

controversial process.

The campaign sought to expose the Gang of Four’s crimes and put society on a new path.

Ironically, the campaign primarily did so using the same tools, techniques, and even language

that the Cultural Revolution leadership had relied upon. Familiar political campaign

164 The narrative of victimhood and the historical memory of so-called “national humiliation” (国耻) has been a long-last theme in official discourse. For a comprehensive study on how the legitimacy-challenged CCP used historical memory to maintain its rule following the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, see Wang, Zheng, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 165 Apter, David Ernest and Saich, Tony, Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994), 263–93.


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techniques employed in the Party history, including compiling criticism materials, public

denunciation, and criticism and self-criticism, therefore played an important role in

developing the idea of the Gang of Four Clique. The procedure and techniques employed to

denounce the Gang of Four and its alleged followers thereby maintained historical continuity.

However, the process of responsibility attribution also involved a sophisticated investigation

into and labeling followers of the Gang of Four. The investigation and categorization

determined the status of the followers in the Gang of Four Clique and what punishment they

would receive.

Chapter 2 Categorizing Perpetrators, Resistance, and Challenges to

Party Legitimacy

During the process of smashing the bourgeois factional system, we have encountered all

kinds of obstacles and resistance. The struggles between investigation and anti-investigation

ran from the very beginning to the end [of the Investigation Campaign]. We must never let

down our guard.

– Suzhou Municipal Party Committee, March 1978

Now there are all kinds of arguments, but it is completely wrong and impossible to

fundamentally negate the campaign of Exposing, Criticizing, and Investigating.

– Xu Jiatun, Secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee, March 1980

Some people said that it was illegal that we employed isolation (隔离) and study classes

for our investigation, that it was the same as what Lin Biao and the Gang of Four had done.

– Zhou Zhihua, Vice Secretary of the Suzhou Municipal Party Committee, May 1980

On November 18, 1976, Wang Dongxing, director of the General Office of the CCP Central

Committee, suggested that there were “three types of people” who had been influenced by

the Gang of Four.1 The first type included people who had been “deeply poisoned [by the

Gang] and had committed crimes that evoked the people’s bitter anger.” Before this type

could be transformed, Wang emphasized, it was necessary to send them to study classes (学

习班), ad hoc groups in which the targets would be investigated and forced to engage in self-

examination. The second type comprised those who had been “deceived by the Gang,” but

had also engaged in factional activities for the purpose of pursuing private interests. Wang

called upon the public to expose and criticize this type’s mistakes to ensure that they would

henceforth follow the Center’s orders. Finally, he described people who had been “slightly

influenced [by the Gang], had committed some mistakes but were willing to correct them,

and upheld the CCP Center under the leadership of Hua Guofeng.” These people could

continue to work while they received “help” from the Party. This “help” included, among

1 Wang Dongxing, “Zai quanguo xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua” 在全国宣传工作会议上的讲话 [Speech at the National Propaganda Work Conference] (The Maoist Legacy, November 18, 1976), https://ccradb.appspot.com/post/3238.

Chapter 2 Categorizing Perpetrators

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other measures, criticism, ideological education, and labor under the supervision of the

masses. Whether or not the implicated people were willing to accept help and transform

themselves decided how they would be handled. The respective measures that Wang

outlined suggested that the designated followers would be subjected to punishment if they

achieved no attitudinal and behavioral compliance. Wang also provided preliminary

categories for Gang of Four followers.

Wang suggested two steps for dealing with the Gang of Four followers: (1) employing

coercive methods to investigate the followers; and (2) categorizing them according to the

investigation results. To do so, the CCP central leadership launched the campaign to

Investigate People and Things Linked to the Gang of Four (清查与四人帮有关联的人和事,

hereafter, Investigation Campaign) alongside the campaign to Expose and Criticize the Gang

of Four.2 During the Investigation Campaign, the Party and state apparatuses investigated,

defined, and categorized Gang of Four followers and accordingly decided whether or not to

impose punishment later. The central leadership not only devoted the investigation to

categorizing designated perpetrators, but also to addressing genuine social grievances

resulting from the Cultural Revolution. By investigating the past violence, the CCP stigmatized,

regulated, and punished the outcasts and thus further established social control when ending

the Cultural Revolution.3 In doing so, the CCP intended to redefine and rewrite wrongdoing

from the Cultural Revolution and thus establish control over what and how the public

remembered the past.

However, during the Investigation Campaign, Gang of Four followers displayed a strong

tendency to resist the investigation and blame for past wrongs. Scholarship observes that

even the weakest can put up resistance to state policies.4 In Maoist China, despite being

politically marginalized, the designated Gang of Four followers mounted resistance and

2 Together with the campaign to Expose and Criticize the Gang of Four, they were officially named the Exposing, Criticizing, and Investigating campaign (揭批查运动). 3 Dudai, Ron, “Transitional Justice as Social Control: Political Transitions, Human Rights Norms and the Reclassification of the Past,” The British Journal of Sociology 69, no. 3 (2018): 691–711; Cohen, Stanley, “State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability, and the Policing of the Past,” Law & Social Inquiry 20, no. 1 (1995): 7–50; Innes, Martin and Clarke, Alan, “Policing the Past: Cold Case Studies, Forensic Evidence and Retroactive Social Control,” The British Journal of Sociology 60, no. 3 (August 24, 2009): 543–63. 4 James Scott laid out and analyzed peasants’ everyday resistance, among which can be found sarcasm, gossip, theft, and sabotage, see Scott, James C., Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1985).


74

invoked state policies to their advantage in the face of state power.5 In an attempt to deter

potential resistance and demonstrate its authority, Shanghai sentenced 24 so-called

“counterrevolutionaries” and criminals to death by execution with immediate effect in

January 1977. Beijing and Tianjin adopted a similar approach. The local authorities imposed

this extreme measure to “guarantee the smooth development of the campaign to Criticize,

Expose, and Investigate the Gang of Four.”6 However, local followers’ resistance was open

and direct, and it grew when it came to investigation, a step that could lead to actual punitive

sanctions. At this stage, a majority of the investigated followers resisted official charges or

thought transformation (思想转化). Thought transformation was meant to pressure the

targets to confess through education, persuasion, criticism and struggle (批斗). Even when

followers accepted and confessed to their crimes, they strove to place themselves in

categories that would be allotted milder or no punishment.

Meanwhile, inconsistencies and ambiguities between central and provincial policies

opened up local variations and constant negotiation in terms of categorizing Gang of Four

followers. In the absence of standardized central-level policies on dealing with the Gang of

Four followers, Jiangsu took a leading step in categorizing the investigated targets and

suggesting punishment accordingly. However, the Central Committee’s criteria, circulated six

months later, turned out to be much more tolerant than that of Jiangsu. The inconsistency of

policies between the Center and Jiangsu not only created an opportunity for followers to

negotiate their categories, but also led them to challenge the legitimacy of the Investigation

Campaign and further threaten the Jiangsu leadership’s authority. Jiangsu and central policies

were again inconsistent in dealing with the violence that had occurred during the Cultural

Revolution. The Jiangsu leadership engaged in continuous negotiation and compromises with

every level, both horizontally and vertically, which came to be an essential feature of the CCP

5 Wemheuer, Felix, Famine Politics in Maoist China and the Soviet Union (Yale University Press, 2014); Smith, Aminda M., Thought Reform and China’s Dangerous Classes: Reeducation, Resistance, and the People (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013); Gao Wangling, Renmin gongshe shiqi Zhongguo nongmin fanxingwei diaocha 人民公社时期中国农民"反行为"调查 [Investigation of Counter-Actions of Chinese Peasants in the Era of the People’s Communes] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2006); O’Brien, Kevin J. and Li, Lianjiang, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Friedman, Edward, Pickowicz, Paul G., and Selden, Mark, Revolution, Resistance, and Reform in Village China (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2005). 6 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Zhuanfa Shanghai shiwei guanyu jiefa pipan sirenbang qunzhong yundong de qingkuang baogao,” 33.


75

political system in the post-Mao period.7 The changing circumstances led Jiangsu leaders to

be much more cautious about punishing perpetrators.

Not only did the targets’ resistance and the changing central policies pose challenges to

the Investigation Campaign, but local cadres also challenged the campaign-style approach to

investigating Gang of Four followers.8 The challenge was particularly strong after the Center

shifted its focus to the establishment of a law-based rule. Although recent scholarship notes

that the Cultural Revolution was not entirely “lawless,” 9 judicial personnel and legal

institutions suffered severe damage. The CCP leaders realized that they were not immune

from persecution in a volatile political situation and thus they were eager for written laws to

be observed.10 Following the downfall of the Gang of Four, Hua Guofeng requested that the

socialist legality (加强社会主义法制 ) be strengthened as early as mid-1977.11 Socialist

legality was originally known as the model for legislative and judicial institution-building in

the Soviet Union. 12 The Jiangsu court immediately implemented and demanded law

propagation and education in December 1977.13 Hua further stated that “It is essential to

strengthen the socialist legality if we are to bring about great order.”14 Building up the legal

7 Lieberthal, Kenneth G. and Lampton, David M., eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (California: University of California Press, 2018), 9–10. 8 For a brief overview of local cadres’ responses to the Investigation Campaign, see Zhao Yanlai, “‘jie pi cha’ yundong yanjiu” “揭批查”运动研究 [Research on the Exposing, Criticizing, and Investigating Campaign] (Master Thesis, Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, 2009), 51–63. 9 Xu, “Beyond ‘Destruction’ and ‘Lawlessness’: The Legal System during the Cultural Revolution,” 25–51. 10 Leung, Frankie Fook-Lun, “Some Observations on Socialist Legality of the People’s Republic of China,” California Western International Law Journal 17, no. 1 (1987): 104. 11 Hua Guofeng, “Shi yi da shang de zhengzhi baogao” 十一大上的政治报告 [Political Report at the Eleventh National Congress of the CCP] (The Maoist Legacy, August 12, 1977), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/4746. 12 Smith, Gordon B., “Development of ‘Socialist Legality’ in the Soviet Union,” in Perspectives on Soviet Law for the 1980s, ed. Simons, William B. and Feldbrugge, F. J. M. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 77–97. The CCP took a similar step to build up its legal system with the help of soviet experts after it took over power in 1949. See Leese, Daniel and Engman, Puck, “Politics and Law in the Early People’s Republic of China,” in Victims, Perpetrators, and the Role of Law in Maoist China, A Case-Study Approach (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 4; Baum, Richard, “Modernization and Legal Reform in Post-Mao China: The Rebirth of Socialist Legality,” Studies in Comparative Communism 19, no. 2 (June 1, 1986): 69–103. For the influence of Soviet experts on the development of China see Sheng Zhihua, Sulian zhuanjia zai Zhongguo (1948-1960) 苏联专家在中国 (1948-1960) [Soviet Experts in China: 1948-1960] (Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2003). 13 Jiangsu sheng gaoji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu dangqian gongzuo de jidian yijian: Lin Xizhao tongzhi zai di shi zhongji fayuan yuanzhang zuotanhui shang de jianghua” 关于当前工作的几点意见——林希昭同志在地、市中级法院院长座谈会上的讲话 [Several Opinions on Current Work - Lin Xizhao’s Speech at the Symposium of Presidents of Prefecture and Municipal Intermediate People’s Courts], December 17, 1977, 105–6, E237-111-0076, NMA. 14 Hua Guofeng, “Tuanjie qilai, wei jianshe shehui zhuyi de xiandaihua qiangguo er fendou - 1978 nian er yue 26 ri zai di wu jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di yi ci huiyi shang de zhengfu gongzuo baogao” 团结起来，为建设社会主义的现代化强国而奋斗——一九七八年二月二十六日在第五届全国人民代表大会第一次会议上


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system and an orderly political environment became the focus of the central political

agenda.15

This new scheme – imposing law-based rule – suggested that local investigators had to

handle Gang of Four followers according to the law.16 Inevitably, this provided a way for the

accused, and in some cases even cadres, to question the legitimacy of the Investigation

Campaign. They questioned whether investigating Gang of Four followers through political

campaigns and identifying perpetrators through internal party investigations, for example,

was legal. 17 Even cadres at lower levels challenged high-level authorities on the

implementation of the Investigation Campaign. Jiangsu leaders had to repeatedly justify the

labeling of perpetrators and convince the public that they had not wronged campaign targets.

Drawing upon a broad range of first-hand materials acquired from the archives in Jiangsu,

this chapter reveals different moments of resistance when categorizing Gang of Four

followers; it highlights the challenges and threats to the legitimacy of the local Party

leadership posed by inconsistent policies and the investigation procedure itself. Via the

documentation of the Investigation Campaign, the CCP leadership intended to redefine and

rewrite wrongdoing from the Cultural Revolution and thus establish control over what and

how the public remembered.

2.1 “Locked Horns” (顶牛): Study Classes and Resistance of the Investigated

Jiangsu put Wang Dongxing’s suggestions into action, but this process turned out to be

highly complex. For example, by June 1977, Suzhou had sorted out 153 people at the

municipal and district levels as “people who had been involved in the Gang of Four’s

conspiratorial activities” and it had taken measures to keep them under control (see Chart

2).18 The chart below illustrates how these 153 people were dealt with after being designated

的政府工作报告 [Uniting and Striving to Build up a Socialist Modern and Powerful Country - Political Report at the First Meeting of the Fifth National People’s Congress on February 26, 1978], People’s Daily, March 7, 1978. 15 Hsia, Tao-tai, “Legal Developments in the PRC since the Purge of the Gang of Four,” Review of Socialist Law 5, no. 2 (1979): 109–30. 16 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu pizhuan ‘di shi qi ci quanguo gong’an huiyi jiyao’ de tongzhi,” 14; Zhonggong zhongyang, “Pizhuan di ba ci quanguo renmin sifa gongzuo huiyi jiyao de tongzhi.” 17 For the relationship between party internal investigation and the legal system in the CCP regime, see Sapio, Flora, Sovereign Power and the Law in China: Zones of Exception in the Criminal Justice System (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010). 18 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei cailiaozu, “Guanyu qian jieduan cailiao gongzuo qingkuang he jinhou yijian (huibao tigang)” 关于前阶段材料工作情况和今后意见（汇报提纲） [Material Work Situation in the Previous Stage


77

Gang of Four followers. The chart shows that 17 targets were either arrested and dealt with

according to the law (逮捕法办), taken into custody and investigated (拘留审查), dismissed

from their positions and investigated (离职审查), or isolated and investigated (隔离审查).

The Suzhou Municipal Case Examination Group ( 苏州市专案组 ) carried out the

investigation. 19 Ten targets also had to “clarify” themselves, meaning engaging in self-

criticism and resolving their issues in public (see Chapter 1). The majority of the Suzhou

targets were subjected to two main approaches, including help and supervision (帮促, or 帮

助督促) and study classes (学习班). Help and supervision took place in a variety of ways,

including public denunciation, thought education (思想教育), and one-to-one supervision.

People targeted in this group usually received minor or no punishment. While in study classes,

participants were subjected to criticism, interrogation, and “education” by means of

persuasion and political study. Targets in study classes had to repeatedly write self-examining

essays (自我检查), confessing their links to the Gang of Four and their crimes and “exposing”

others.20 Given that study classes generated written documents and recorded interrogation,

the following section will focus on study class investigations, revealing how identified Gang of

Four followers resisted and highlighting reasons for their doing so.

Chart 2: Measures Towards 153 Targets in Suzhou

and Future Opinions (Report Outline)], June 25, 1977, 21–22, SMA. 19 A case examination group was an ad hoc investigation body initially set up during the Cultural Revolution and adapted to examine the Gang of Four and its followers after 1976. For more details, see Schoenhals, “The Central Case Examination Group, 1966-79.” 20 For more details on study classes, see Zhang, “From Denial to Apology,” 155–57.

58

68

105 5 4 3

学习班帮促讲清楚逮捕法办拘留审查离职审查隔离审查0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

person


78

There was no explicit standard applied to those who were to be forcibly enrolled and

investigated in study classes.21 Study class targets varied and changed over time depending

on their attitude and performance, as well as the severity of their mistakes or crimes. These

targets had to engage in self-examination and confess to whatever they were accused of. In

accordance with investigators’ evaluations, study class targets were either put into a

“boarding school” (住读) or “day school” (走读), terms that were used to differentiate the

two types of classes at that time.22 “Boarding” meant isolating the target from others and

investigating him or her in study classes day and night. Only when investigators believed that

their targets had engaged in comprehensive self-examination and achieved satisfactory

confessions, which were thought to reflect transformation, could the targets be transferred

to the lighter punishment of “day school.” This meant that the target only had to participate

in study classes when summoned. When investigators approved the target’s attitude towards

their mistakes, even if they had not completed the investigation, they would release the

target from study classes. However, the targets still had to participate in labor under

surveillance while waiting for the results of the investigation.23

Aside from investigating the targets’ activities related to the Gang of Four and Jiangsu

factions, study classes were also meant to transform their thoughts. Investigators regularly

had conversations with their targets to “help” them not only confess their problems and

crimes, but also expose others’ “conspiratorial activities.” This involved public denunciation,

persuasion, ideological education, and so on. Meanwhile, the target had to repeatedly engage

in self-examination. By doing so, the investigation team attempted to achieve compliance and

behavioral transformation.

The targets had to show a good attitude towards investigation and transformation in

order to improve their political situation. Investigators evaluated each target’s attitude and

performance in study classes and put forward suggestions for further actions. For example,

the Suzhou Industry and Transportation Office gathered information on study class targets on

21 For more information on arbitrary detentions in China, see Sapio, Sovereign Power and the Law in China. 22 Suzhou shi geming weiyuanhui gongjiao bangongshi, “Juban xuexiban duixiang jianyao qingkuang” 举办学习班对象简要情况 [Brief Information about Study Class Targets], February 2, 1977, A6-3-115, SMA. 23 While undertaking manual work, targets must obey five rules: actively participate in labor; accept the mass’s supervision and criticism as well as sincerely reform thoughts; it was forbidden to link up (chuanlian), to interrupt the campaign, and to spread rumors; loyally and honestly accept investigation and wait for further handling; and regularly report on thoughts to organization departments. See Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui cailiaozu, “Guanyu qingcha gongzuo de qingkuang he jinhou yijian.”


79

February 2 and 10, 1977, respectively describing 21 and 20 targets’ reactions to the

investigation, their attitude towards self-examination, and general performance in study

classes.24 Both inquiries claimed that more than half of the people investigated displayed

undesirable attitudes and conduct in study classes. Based on these evaluations, the

investigators suggested that these targets should remain in “boarding school”; in other words,

they should remain under full control. 25 In another case, when instructed to report his

improvement after studying central documents, a target with the surname Wang, a former

cadre of the Suzhou Labor Union, refused to do so and stated that his ideological

understanding had reached its limit, and so it could not be expanded any further.26 Wang was

later sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. In contrast, a target with the surname Jiang,

showing his inclination to transform, expressed his willingness to confess and asked for a

chance to expose the mistakes of others. As a reward, Jiang was allowed to go home and

spend the Spring Festival with his family. He was also downgraded to “day school” on the

condition that he undertake in-depth self-examination.27 By investigating their past, the Party

authorities thus imposed close control over the outcast Gang of Four followers.

In some cases, the control over individuals worked: investigated targets understood how

they could maneuver the system in order to escape. As the target Jiang stated when reflecting

on his behavior in study classes:

I realized that I should at first reform through labor, reform my worldview… In terms

of confessing and exposing issues, the attitude must be good. This is the only way

out.28

Jiang knew that he had to yield to and perform in the way that his investigators demanded.

To do so, he wrote four essays describing the past and wrongdoings of other people, ranging

from the municipal level to the grassroots.29 Jiang thereby rewrote the past according to the

24 Suzhou shi geming weiyuanhui gongjiao bangongshi, “Juban xuexiban duixiang jianyao qingkuang,” 77–86. 25 Suzhou shi geming weiyuanhui gongjiao bangongshi, “Juban xuexiban duixiang jianyao qingkuang.” 26 Suzhou shi geming weiyuanhui gongjiao bangongshi, “Shencha duixiang dangqian sixiang fanying he dongtai qingkuang—11 da wenjian xuexi yihou” 审查对象当前思想反映和动态情况-十一大文件学习以后 [Current Thoughts and Trends of Investigated Targets - after Studying the Eleventh National Congress Documents], September 13, 1977, 105, A6-3-115, SMA. 27 Suzhou shi geming weiyuanhui gongjiao bangongshi, “Juban xuexiban duixiang jianyao qingkuang,” 79. 28 Suzhou shi geming weiyuanhui gongjiao bangongshi, “Zoudu shencha de duixiang dangqian sixiang fanying yu dongtai qingkuang,” 88. 29 Suzhou shi geming weiyuanhui gongjiao bangongshi, 88.


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new political circumstances in order to improve his situation.

However, the targets did not always comply and transform as the investigators desired,

even after they had received lenient treatment. For example, after being downgraded to “day

school,” a target with the surname Yan in the Suzhou First Light Industry Bureau was reported

to have cursed at his superior Zhang, the bureau’s head, for not taking responsibility and

blaming everything on him. Yan also complained that the bureau’s organization department

had unfairly laid all the blame on him.30 He rejected the accusations and complained about

his unfair treatment. Yan’s previous acquiescence or performance had not resulted in a

transformation.

Some targets heavily challenged the investigation in spite of knowledge that obedience

would improve their situation. Study class targets often “locked horns” with their

investigators, which included refuting accusations, refusing to obey, and resisting

transformation. According to the Suzhou Industry and Transportation Office’s report of

October 8, 1977, a well “transformed” target fulfilled the criteria of confessing his or her

crimes and performing well in labor work. However, of 47 study class targets participating in

“day school,” 19, or roughly 40%, claimed that they were innocent and denied all accusations;

another two targets refused to confess and maintained a hostile attitude to the investigation.

Whilst 40% verbally acknowledged their mistakes or pleaded guilty, they were, according to

the report, reluctant to confess or retract their original statements.31 Therefore, the report

concluded that around 85% held unsatisfactory attitudes and refused to obey the

investigators. For example, a former leader at the Suzhou Metallurgical Factory, having been

subjected to public denunciation four times, stated, “I have acted (表演) in four plays and still

have nine to go. Could we just do them all together at once!”32 The investigation was seen as

a performance rather than a real transformation.

In another case, the investigated, Teng, was kept full time in study classes, but he

managed to convince his guards to deliver messages and materials to the outside world for

him. His guard even acted as lookout for Teng, so he could sneak into the investigators’ office

and access various investigation files.33 By September 1977, there were still 14 targets in the

30 Suzhou shi geming weiyuanhui gongjiao bangongshi, “Juban xuexiban duixiang jianyao qingkuang.” 31 Suzhou shi geming weiyuanhui gongjiao bangongshi, “Zoudu shencha de duixiang dangqian sixiang fanying yu dongtai qingkuang.” 32 Suzhou shi geming weiyuanhui gongjiao bangongshi, 91. 33 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei cailiaozu, “Guanyu qian jieduan cailiao gongzuo qingkuang he jinhou yijian (huibao


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“boarding school,” meaning that the local authorities deemed that they had either refused

the charges against them or resisted transforming their attitude. Scholars have demonstrated

that resistance was common in reeducation centers in the Maoist era.34 However, this state

control over outcast followers and the intention to blame them for past violence encountered

strong and open resistance among the investigated targets.

Furthermore, the resistance was clearly not transitory; it continued to the end of the

Investigation Campaign. As the Jiangsu Party Committee announced, by early 1978 the

campaign was coming to an end at the provincial level. However, resistance was still ongoing.

To resist investigation, suicides and escapes from study classes were common during the

Investigation Campaign in Suzhou.35 The Suzhou Municipal Party Committee’s work summary

in March 1978 stated that:

During the process of smashing the bourgeois factional system (资产阶级帮派体系),

we have encountered all kinds of obstacles and resistance. The struggles between

investigation and anti-investigation ran from the very beginning to the end [of the

Investigation Campaign]. We must never let down our guard.36

This comment indicates that some targets still strongly resisted the investigation even after

they underwent large-scale public humiliation, self-examination, or manual labor. Their

resistance continued to the end of the Investigation Campaign.

Local leaders were also cautious about this campaign-style method of investigation.

Investigation via study classes was broadly employed during the Cultural Revolution and

usually led to physical abuse and torture.37 Many local cadres had probably been victims of

study classes during the Cultural Revolution. They therefore tended to sideline this method

when investigating designated perpetrators. For example, in June 1977, Suzhou Party leaders

tigang),” 29. 34 Smith, Thought Reform and China’s Dangerous Classes, 181–99. 35 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui cailiaozu, “Yi nian lai qingcha gongzuo qingkuang he jinhou yijian (taolun gao),” 112. 36 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui cailiaozu, 108. 37 During the Cultural Revolution, massive study classes were held in order to carry out political campaigns, especially the One Strike, Three Antis (一打三反), the campaign to Cleanse Class Ranks (清理阶级队伍), as well as the campaign to Investigate May 16 Counterrevolutionaries. Study classes caused injustices on a large scale. For example, Jiangsu had sorted out over 130,000 May 16 Counterrevolutionaries, but all were treated as unjust cases after the Cultural Revolution. See Zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei zuzhibu, ed., Zhongguo gongchandang Jiangsu sheng zuzhishi ziliao 中国共产党江苏省组织史资料 [Chinese Communist Party Jiangsu Province Organization History Materials] (Nanjing: Nanjing chubanshe, 1993), 757. The investigation in study classes usually accompanied with violence, see Zhang, “From Denial to Apology,” 155–56.


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complained that no targets had been explicitly “liberated,” meaning freed from study class

investigation and subjected to labor work. In order to decrease the number of study classes,

Suzhou leaders called upon investigators to end study classes if the targets clarified their

problems or if they showed a willingness to confess. They suggested enforcing other methods

of investigation, such as reform through labor instead of study classes. 38 These actions

demonstrate that Suzhou leaders attempted to avoid investigation through study classes.

This intention, however, was not realized because of the targets’ resistance. After six

months, by December 1977, of the 65 targets in study classes in Suzhou, only 27 had been

released and were participating in labor work.39 Of the rest, according to the investigators’

evaluations, 26 targets were supposed to be freed from study classes by early 1978. 40

However, by March 1978, there were still 26 targets in study classes.41 They had allegedly

committed various crimes, such as killings, or denied the accusations against them. As one of

them argued, “I did not usurp the Party’s leadership, it was the higher authorities that

assigned me to [the leading position].” 42 In sum, using campaign-style techniques of

investigation encountered strong resistance among the identified perpetrators. The local

authorities struggled to keep them under control.

2.2 “Our Political Stance was Correct”: Resistance of Cadres

Not every region in Jiangsu implemented the investigation following the instructions of

the Jiangsu Party leadership. The Investigation Campaign also encountered resistance among

local cadres in some regions. Where upper-level orders and criticism did not function because

of uncooperative local cadres, the high-level authorities would eventually replace local cadres

or transfer them to lesser positions. The following section demonstrates cadres’ resistance in

Nantong. The Jiangsu Party leadership adopted coercive measures towards its cadres in order

to smooth the process of the investigation. These measures also responded to pressure from

victims to redress injustice and punish perpetrators.

38 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei cailiaozu, “Guanyu qian jieduan cailiao gongzuo qingkuang he jinhou yijian (huibao tigang),” 31. 39 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui cailiaozu, “Guanyu qingcha gongzuo de qingkuang he jinhou yijian.” 40 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui cailiaozu. 41 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui cailiaozu, “Yi nian lai qingcha gongzuo qingkuang he jinhou yijian (taolun gao).” 42 Suzhou shi geming weiyuanhui gongjiao bangongshi, “Shencha duixiang dangqian sixiang fanying he dongtai qingkuang—11 da wenjian xuexi yihou,” 105.


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Local cadres’ resistance was neither violent nor offensive. Instead, they passively carried

out or delayed the investigation. For example, the Nantong Municipal People’s Court started

the Investigation Campaign in May 1977. One month later, the court reported that it had not

found any targets that had direct or indirect links to the Gang of Four and its provincial

followers, either by direct contact or letters. The court announced that the Investigation

Campaign had come to an end.43 In another report, the Court Party Leading Group defended

themselves by stressing the correctness of their political stance during the Cultural Revolution:

“At that time our stance was clear. We insisted we had carried out a correct line and [our]

stances and opinions were right.”44 In other words, they did not need to investigate their past.

Reflecting upon this response in late 1977, the court stated:

We were unclear whether Nantong had people or things connected [to the Gang of

Four] after all. [We] thus, in fact, did not carry out denunciation and exposure (检举

揭发)… As for [criticizing] capitalist factionalism, especially that the two factions were

both wrong, we have not yet expected or prepared ourselves. Thus, the campaign

was only on the surface even though we have carried it out.45

The Nantong Municipal People’s Court attributed its lukewarm response to the campaign

to the Nantong Municipal Party Committee’s negative attitude towards the Investigation

Campaign. By September 1977 Nantong had not identified a single person with supposed links

to the Gang of Four, even after the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee repeatedly pointed

out this issue to the Nantong leaders. Instead, the Nantong leaders guaranteed that Nantong

had always been stable and resisted the Gang of Four during the Cultural Revolution, thus

nothing and no-one could be connected to the Gang; it argued that the bourgeois factions did

not exist in Nantong.46 This statement obviously did not satisfy the provincial requirements

of the Investigation Campaign. One reason for the Nantong leaders resisting the campaign is

that they were reported to support the military leader Wu Dasheng, Secretary of the Jiangsu

Party Committee, who had been singled out as a member of the Lin Biao Clique in Jiangsu.

They also opposed the provincial leaders Peng Chong and Xu Jiatun in the late stage of the

43 Zhonggong Nantong shi fayuan dangzu, “Baogao” 报告 [Report], June 17, 1977, 1, E228-121-0052, NMA. 44 Zhonggong Nantong shi fayuan dangzu, “Guanyu zongjie 11 ci luxian douzheng jingyan jiaoxun de xiaojie,” 19. 45 Zhonggong Nantong shi fayuan dangzu, 26. 46 Lu and Liu, “Zhe zhang ‘baopiao’ kaodezhu ma? Nantong diqu qingcha yundong shuping,” 1.


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Cultural Revolution.47 The conflict between the Nantong leaders and Xu Jiatun, who became

First Secretary of the Jiangsu Party Committee in February 1977, contributed to the resistance

that they were later criticized for.

The provincial leadership criticized the Nantong Prefecture and municipal leaders for not

actively carrying out the campaign. It sent out a provincial work team to directly command

and intervene in the campaign in Nantong in September 1977.48 Under provincial pressure,

the Nantong leadership deployed the Investigation Campaign again from October. However,

according to a People’s Daily report in March 1978, Nantong leaders only investigated five

followers from among non-local cadres.49 The report accused the Nantong leadership of being

perfunctory. The criticism in People’s Daily drew the Jiangsu leadership’s attention, and it

then instructed local cadres to report on similar cases in their regions.50 The Jiangsu Provincial

Party Committee ultimately replaced both secretaries of the Nantong Prefecture and

Municipal Party Committees in April 1978 and subjected them to public criticism in the region.

By early 1979, Nantong had investigated 120 followers.51

As a well-developed technique for dealing with upper-level criticism, cadres subsequently

undertook self-criticism in Nantong.52 In a 1978 work summary, the Nantong People’s Court

admitted that they had not genuinely carried out the campaign at the start because they had

been uncertain whether Nantong had people or things connected to the Gang of Four. To

show their determination to carry out the campaign, at the end of the summary, the Court’s

Party Leading Group encouraged personnel to expose the group’s problems and declared that

they would definitely not attack or retaliate.53 The self-criticism suggested that local cadres

did not attempt to openly oppose orders, although they were reluctant to execute them.

At the county level of Nantong, resistance was reportedly even fiercer. Hai’an, a county

47 During the Campaign to Criticize Lin and Confucius (批林批孔), Jiangsu veteran cadres confronted military officials and attempted to regain power, see Dong and Walder, “Nanjing’s ‘Second Cultural Revolution.’” 48 Zhonggong Nantong diqu weiyuanhui, “Ji Yuan tongzhi zai diwei zhaokai de qingcha ding’an chuli gongzuo zuotanhui shang de jianghua,” 107. In the local published history, it stated that the provincial leadership sent out a work team in January 1978. See Nantong shi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, ed., Nantong shi zhi 南通市志 [Annals of Nantong], vol. 3 (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 2000), 1613. 49 Lu and Liu, “Zhe zhang ‘baopiao’ kaodezhu ma? Nantong diqu qingcha yundong shuping,” 1. 50 Zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei cailiaozu, “Tongzhi (changtu dianhua jilu)” 通知(长途电话记录) [Notice (Record of a Long-Distance Call)], March 30, 1978, 87, E101-121-0378, NMA. 51 Zhonggong Nantong diqu weiyuanhui, “Ji Yuan tongzhi zai diwei zhaokai de qingcha ding’an chuli gongzuo zuotanhui shang de jianghua,” 107. 52 Martin Whyte has explored that criticism and self-criticism in small groups were the most common tactic whenever divergent thoughts or actions took place. See Whyte, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China. 53 Zhonggong Nantong shi fayuan dangzu, “Guanyu zongjie 11 ci luxian douzheng jingyan jiaoxun de xiaojie,” 25.


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attached to Nantong, only carried out the Investigation Campaign in October 1977 after

provincial intervention. According to the January 1979 work report by the Hai’an County Party

Committee, several county leaders allegedly protected former rebels and resisted the

Investigation Campaign. They had also complained about the unfair treatment of the Gang of

Four. Their political fates were closely connected to those of local followers. By investigating

local followers, county leaders would inevitably implicate themselves. As the report clearly

pointed out, “some leaders attempt to cover up so as to protect factions and themselves;

some had said or done something wrong, they thus did not dare to lead the campaign.”54 The

Jiangsu provincial leadership clearly specified that the main issue of Hai’an was the

factionalism in the county leadership. In light of their deep involvement in the Cultural

Revolution and in order to maintain their positions, many local cadres were unwilling to

investigate their past. Local cadres’ resistance to the investigation was not a result of

sympathy with the Gang or its followers, but because they had been deeply involved in the

injustices that occurred during the Cultural Revolution.

Therefore, in order to carry out the Investigation Campaign, the provincial leadership first

deprived these disobedient leaders of power. The provincial leadership sent out a work team

to guide the campaign in Hai’an and replaced local leaders. Prior to the Investigation

Campaign, in Hai’an, among 48 work units of county administrative organs, the leaders of 21

work units were replaced. At the office and bureau level, 12 leaders had reportedly

committed mistakes and crimes, indicating that they would also be removed from leading

positions.55 Ultimately, five of eleven county leaders were replaced and investigated during

the campaign due to their close connections with local rebels.56 The large-scale replacement

was intended to guarantee that local leadership would follow and efficiently execute the

orders and policies issued by the provincial authorities in the future. In the end, the new

county leadership designated and investigated 19 followers and 6 perpetrators of violence,

54 Zhonggong Hai’an xian weiyuanhui, “Guanyu xianji jiguan jie pi cha yundong qingkuang zongjie baogao” 关于县级机关揭批查运动情况总结报告 [Summary Report on the Situation of the Exposing, Criticizing, and Investigating Campaign at County-Level Organs], January 5, 1979, 6, D101-121-0645, NMA. 55 Zhonggong Hai’an xian weiyuanhui, 5. 56 Zhonggong Hai’an xian weiyuanhui, 5. According to the report, these five leaders made self-examination in public. They were assigned to factories or rural areas to conduct some investigation and labor work after the in early 1979. No substantial sanctions were reportedly imposed on them, suggesting the likelihood that they could be reinstated as a cadre in future.


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and it “helped and educated” 21 people.57

Where resistant leaders persisted, however, the campaign was not carried out despite

provincial intervention. In Haimen, another county attached to Nantong, the investigation

proceeded rather slowly despite a provincial and prefecture work team being sent out to

direct the campaign. As a Haimen County Party Committee work report claimed, “at the

apparatuses of the County Party Committee, the struggle between investigation and anti-

investigation was strong and resistance was stiff.”58 Based on the same report, the majority

of cadres in Haimen were reluctant to implement the campaign because they believed neither

that the Gang of Four had directly intervened in Haimen during the Cultural Revolution nor

that Haimen had anything to do with the provincial followers. The investigation was to no

avail. Alongside this, some cadres were simply afraid of being implicated.59

It took the provincial work team several steps to break down the resistance in Haimen

and carry out the Investigation Campaign. Firstly, the work team ordered the county

committee to organize four large-scale cadre study sessions in which they would study central

policies and leaders’ speeches, which was one of the designated political rituals for dealing

with deviations or correcting problems.60 Secondly, the regrouped county leadership outlined

atrocities that had occurred during the Cultural Revolution in detail so as to convince local

cadres that violence had taken place in Haimen and that it was necessary to redress them.

The county reported that the Cultural Revolution had caused 364 deaths and 15,000 people

had been persecuted, and it engaged in 1,528 unjust cases, where people were wronged or

unfairly punished.61 Thirdly, in addition to replacing disobedient leaders in some departments,

the county leadership reinstated the cadres and the masses who had been persecuted during

the Cultural Revolution and relied on them to carry out the investigation. It trained a group

of 1,525 so-called “activists” to guarantee the implementation of the campaign.62 Lastly, the

county leadership directed all attention to one or two targets who had strongly resisted. For

example, the county organized eight investigation groups to collect evidence against Deputy

57 Zhonggong Hai’an xian weiyuanhui, 4–1. 58 Zhonggong Haimen xian weiyuanhui, “Guanyu jie pi cha yundong de qingkuang baogao” 关于揭批查运动的情况报告 [Report on the Exposing, Criticizing, and Investigating Campaign], January 4, 1979, 55–56, D101-121-0645, NMA. 59 Zhonggong Haimen xian weiyuanhui, 55. 60 Whyte, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China, 59. 61 Zhonggong Haimen xian weiyuanhui, “Guanyu jie pi cha yundong de qingkuang baogao,” 56–57. 62 Zhonggong Haimen xian weiyuanhui, 56–57.


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Director of the County Committee Zhang Jishan. The investigation groups concluded that

Zhang had committed serious crimes, and thus isolated him for investigation (隔离审查).63

Meanwhile, the county committee asserted that the vast majority were good people who had

made mistakes (犯错误的好人), and even though they had been followers of Lin Biao and

the Gang of Four, they were also their victims. With all these measures, resistance to the

investigation was supposed to crumble and the unity among local cadres was to be

maintained. However, according to a later work report, Nantong still did not ultimately

categorize any targets as “backbones” (骨干分子), a category that would result in severe

punishment.64

Resistance not only mounted in Nantong, but also took place in Suzhou, where the

provincial and municipal Party committees had made significant efforts to investigate

followers. In Changshu County, a complaint letter allegedly written by the masses in around

June 1978 was sent to Xu Jiatun, Secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee, to decry

the inadequacy of the Investigation Campaign. The letter referred to several major killings

that took place during the Cultural Revolution and criticized the county leadership for not

carrying out the Investigation Campaign. The petitioners requested that those who had

committed atrocities during the Cultural Revolution be punished.65 On July 22, Xu Jiatun sent

an investigation team composed of provincial and prefecture cadres to Changshu. On

September 2, 1978, the provincial committee transmitted the investigation team’s report in

the province and suggested taking action if a similar situation existed in the region.

The investigation report confirmed the masses’ complaints and concluded that there

were three issues in Changshu. First, the county leadership had not yet taken any action to

address the wrongdoing of some standing members of the county committee during the

Cultural Revolution. Second, violent actions, as well as other kinds of actions that violated

Party discipline during the Cultural Revolution, had been severe in the county. As the report

described, the Cultural Revolution caused 4,906 wrongfully adjudicated cases and 713 deaths

63 Zhonggong Haimen xian weiyuanhui, 58. 64 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu qingcha anjian shenli gongzuo qingkuang baogao” 关于清查案件审理工作情况报告 [Report on the Work of Hearing Investigated Cases], January 24, 1980, 31, E237-121-0075, NMA. 65 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Guanyu pizhuan Changshu xian yi feng renmin laixin de diaocha baogao” 关于批转常熟县一封人民来信的调查报告 [Commenting and Transmitting the Investigation Report on a Letter from the People in Changshu County], September 2, 1978.


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as a result of torture and persecution in Changshu.66 However, the county leaders had ignored

these problems during the Investigation Campaign. The final issue was that a large number of

former rebels were allegedly in power at the county and lower levels. The report stated that

41 leaders from the county-level organs had originated from workers or grassroots cadres

and it accused some of having caused deaths during the Cultural Revolution; for example,

Secretary of the County Bleaching and Dyeing Factory Feng commanded an armed struggle

on October 15, 1967, resulting in 18 deaths.67 The investigation report suggested that two

years after the arrest of the Gang of Four, leaders in Changshu had not yet fulfilled the task

of identifying the Gang’s followers and carrying out the investigation because the majority of

them were also supposed targets of the campaign. Facing the upcoming sanctions that the

Investigation Campaign might bring about, leaders at lower levels instead took the risk of

resisting the investigation.

2.3 Inconsistent Standards: Categorizing Perpetrators in Jiangsu and at the

Party Center

As the campaign to Investigate People Linked to the Gang of Four in Jiangsu wore on, the

issue of how to categorize Gang of Four followers came to the fore. At the national level,

Jiangsu took the lead in labeling followers in the absence of central standards. It came up with

its own categories six months earlier than the Central Committee. However, Jiangsu’s

categories did not conform to the later-issued central categories, leading campaign targets to

raise doubts about Jiangsu’s previous categorization. The inconsistency left local cadres with

a dilemma, where they, on the one hand, had to justify earlier “incorrect” labeling, and, on

the other hand, they had to reclassify the investigated targets based on central standards.

2.3.1 The Jiangsu Standard for Categorization

On October 8, 1977, the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee issued the document

“Suggestions Regarding the Issues of Dealing with People Linked to the Gang of Four’s

Conspiratorial Activities of Usurping Party and State Power,” which provided more specific

classifications and punishments.68 The document opened with guidelines on grouping those

66 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, 91. 67 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, 93. 68 [Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui], “Guanyu dui tong ‘sirenbang’ cuandang duoquan yinmou huodong


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who had taken part in the Gang’s conspiratorial activities, outlining their

counterrevolutionary nature and explaining the “contradiction between the enemy and us,”

an essential term employed by the CCP to distinguish non-people from people in the Maoist

period. Once a person was grouped as a “class enemy,” they no longer belonged to the people

and could therefore be deprived of their rights as a citizen and even dehumanized. Michael

Schoenhals has elaborated these terms as “political dysphemism” and their definitions were

being constantly reinvented and developed following a series of political campaigns under

Mao.69 The document continued by categorizing Gang of Four followers into four types: 1)

backbone elements (骨干分子), who had participated in the Gang’s conspiratorial activities

of usurping the Party and state power; 2) people who had made serious political mistakes (犯

严重政治错误), including those who had participated in conspiratorial activities; 3) people

who had made political mistakes (犯政治错误), referring to those who had been manipulated

to participate in the conspiratorial activities of usurping the Party and state power; and 4)

those who had said or done something wrong (说错话，做错事) because of the Gang’s

influence.

The document further distinguished and classified these four types based on the nature

of the follower’s issues, in particular, whether they belonged to contradictions among the

people or contradictions between the enemy and us; the severity of the follower’s mistakes

or crimes; and his or her attitude, meaning whether the follower had expressed a willingness

to comply. Based on the evaluation using these three aspects, Jiangsu further placed

designated followers into 15 sub-categories and suggested five types of sanctions (Table 2).70

Sanctions 1 (S.1) to 5 (S.5) became gradually lighter. For example, backbones who had

continued resisting after the arrest of the Gang were considered “die-hard elements” (死硬

分子) needing to be subjected to the severest punishment. Meanwhile, those who had

you qianlian renyuan chuli wenti de yijian” 关于对同“四人帮”篡党夺权阴谋活动有牵连人员处理问题的意见 [Opinions on Handling People Who Were Involved in the Gang of Four’s Conspiratorial Activities of Usurping Party and State Power], October 8, 1977, 45–50, D101-121-0590, NMA. 69 The original terms included two kinds of contradictions, i.e., contradictions among the people and contradictions between the enemy and us. For more information see Schoenhals, Michael, “Demonising Discourse in Mao Zedong’s China: People vs Non-People,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 8, no. 3–4 (September 2007): 465–82. 70 It is not easy to shorten these categories. Therefore, the five types of sanctions are coded as S.1 to S.5 in sequence. Same is applied to 15 sub-categories (C.1…C.6). In the following section, for example, S.1-C.2 refers to the second sub-category of the first type of sanction.


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acknowledged their mistakes and clarified them in public held no responsibility and were

exempted from punishment.

Table 2: Jiangsu’s Suggestions for Categorizing Gang of Four Followers

Sanction 1 (S.1)

Contradiction between the enemy and us; arrested and handled according to the law, or labeled as counterrevolutionaries or bad elements. 作敌我矛盾性质处理，逮捕法办或者戴上反坏分子帽子

Category 1 (C.1)

Backbone elements who participated in the Gang’s conspiratorial activities of usurping Party and state power; committed serious crimes, and evoked the people’s bitter anger. 参与“四人帮”篡党夺权阴谋活动，罪行严重，民愤很大的骨干分子.

C.2 Die-hard elements who participated in the Gang’s conspiratorial activities of usurping the Party and state power and committed serious crimes. 参与“四人帮”篡党夺权阴谋活动，罪行严重，继续顽抗的死硬分子.

C.3 Counterrevolutionaries who participated in the Gang’s conspiratorial activities of usurping the Party and state power, maliciously attacking Chairman Mao, Premier Zhou, Chairman Hua, and the CCP Center under the leadership of Chairman Hua, as well as attempting to strike down a batch of Party, state, and military leaders at the central and local levels. 参与“四人帮”篡党夺权阴谋活动，并恶毒攻击毛主席、周总理、华主席和以华主席为首的党中央，妄图打倒一大批中央和地方党政军负责同志的反革命分子.

C.4 Ringleaders of troublemakers and principal beat-smash-loot elements who committed all kinds of evil in the Gang’s conspiratorial activities of usurping the Party and state power. 在“四人帮”篡党夺权阴谋活动中，作恶多端，罪行严重的闹事头子，打砸抢为首分子.

C.5 Those who participated in the Gang’s conspiratorial activities of usurping the Party and state power and had serious historical issues, such as elements who were released upon the completion of a sentence, rightists or escaped rightists, those who consistently had reactive thoughts, and other bad elements. 参与“四人帮”篡党夺权阴谋活动，历史上又有严重问题的（如系刑满释放分子，右派或漏网右派分子，思想一贯反动的分子，以及其他坏分子）.

C.6 Those who participated in the Gang’s conspiratorial activities of usurping Party and state power, who should be prosecuted for criminal liabilities because of having committed other crimes, such as corruption and theft, profiting and speculating, sabotaging Up to Mountains and Down to the Countryside, raping women, killings, and so forth. 参与“四人帮”篡党夺权阴谋活动，又有其他罪犯行为（如贪污盗窃、投机倒把、破坏上山下乡、奸污妇女、致死人命等），应予追究刑事责任的人.

S.2 Classified as contradictions between the enemy and us but handled according to contradictions among the people; limited sanctions imposed. 定敌我矛盾性质，作人民内部矛盾处理，给予一定的处分

C.1 Backbones who participated in the Gang’s conspiratorial activities of usurping Party and state power and committed serious crimes, but actively exposed [others] and whose attitudes towards confession were deemed satisfactory. 参与“四人帮”篡党夺权阴谋活动的骨干分子，虽然罪行严重，但尚能积极揭发，认罪态度较好，有悔改表现的.

C.2 Those who participated in the Gang’s conspiratorial activities of usurping the Party and state power; although they were not backbones, they had committed other crimes and were contradictions between the enemy and us. 参与“四人帮”篡党夺权阴谋活动，虽不属骨干分子，但有其他罪行，属于敌我矛盾性质，而认罪态度、悔改表现好的.


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S.3 Political mistakes or serious political mistakes; given disciplinary sanctions. 属于政治错误或严重政治错误，给予纪律处分

C.1 Participated in part of the Gang’s conspiratorial activities of usurping the Party and state power and the situation was serious, but they were used and manipulated and bitterly repented. 参与某些篡党夺权阴谋活动，情节比较严重，但尚属受人利用，悔改又较好的

C.2 Participated in part of the Gang’s conspiratorial activities of usurping the Party and state power and showed a bad attitude to confession, despite the situation not being serious. 参与某些篡党夺权阴谋活动，虽然情节不严重，但交代态度不好的

C.3 Cadres who ganged up to pursue selfish interests; the situation was serious and their attitudes were bad. 有些干部，通帮靠派，结帮营私，情节严重，态度不好的

C.4 Those who made offensive statements about Chairman Mao, Premier Zhou, Chairman Hua and the Central Party Committee, as well as central and local leaders of the Party, the military and the government. 对毛主席、周总理、华主席和党中央、对中央和地方党政军负责同志，有攻击性言论，检讨认错好的

S. 4 No sanctions, but must be transferred away from current leading positions and crucial departments. 不给处分，但要调离现有领导岗位或要害部门

C.1 Someone who rapidly rose to leading positions and participated in the Gang’s conspiratorial activities of usurping the Party and state power. If the situation was general and their attitude to self-criticism was good, could be exempted from sanctions, but must be transferred away from current leading positions and returned to their original work unit or undertake labor work at the grassroots level.属于“突击提干”提到领导岗位上来的，参与“四人帮”篡党夺权阴谋活动，情节一般，检讨态度较好，可以不予处分，但要调离现有领导岗位，回到原单位或到基层参加劳动

C.2 Leaders who were influenced by the Gang of Four and made mistakes; if they undertook self-criticism, they were exempted from sanctions. If it was not appropriate for them to continue to assume a leading position in the region or the work unit, they should be transferred away and reassigned. 有些领导干部，受“四人帮”影响，犯了错误，检讨较好，可以不予处分，但不宜再在本地、本单位担任领导工作的，应予调离，另行分配工作

C.3 Involved in the Gang’s conspiratorial activities of usurping the Party and state power and worked in a crucial department; must be transferred even if their issue was general. 与“四人帮”篡党夺权阴谋活动有牵连而在要害部门工作的，即使问题一般，也必须调离

S. 5 Despite being involved in the Gang’s conspiratorial activities of usurping the Party and state power and making mistakes due to low-level consciousness of class struggle and line struggle, these problems could be clarified through the Three Speak-outs, education and lessons from the past. They held no responsibility as far as they acknowledged their problems and corrected them. 同“四人帮”篡党夺权阴谋活动虽有牵连，犯了错误，属于阶级斗争和路线斗争觉悟不高，可通过“三大讲”和路线对比教育等方式，讲清问题，总结经验教训，认识了，改了就好，不予追究

The sanctions for these categories reveal several key characteristics. Firstly, whether they

were deemed to be participating in the Gang’s “conspiratorial activities” or not was a criterion

for excluding or including followers as a part of the people. Secondly, the follower’s attitude

played a critical role in punishment. The different results between sub-categories S.1-C.2 and


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S.2-C.1 clearly illustrated this point. Targets in both categories were considered to have

participated in the Gang’s activities and committed serious crimes. However, if they resisted

– rendering them so-called “die-hard” elements (S.1-C.2) – then they would be arrested or

labeled as a counterrevolutionary or bad element; if they actively exposed others’ crimes and

showed attitudinal compliance (S.2-C.1), they received limited sanctions. In another case, the

sub-categories of followers who had committed severe mistakes but showed a “good”

attitude (S.3-C.1) and followers with mild issues but a “bad” attitude (S.3-C.2) would receive

the same punishment (S.3). Thus, individual “attitude” played a decisive role. Thirdly, the

infamous “malicious attack” (恶毒攻击), an act treated as counterrevolutionary throughout

the Cultural Revolution, was still considered a serious crime. This was not a particular case in

Jiangsu, but instead a nationwide political hunt for anyone who had expressed discontent

with the central leaders. 71 Finally, cadres were handled leniently. Among the 15 sub-

categories, only two explicitly address the issues of cadres and both sub-categories are in the

milder classifications of S.3 and S.4.

Based on provincial suggestions, the Suzhou Municipal Party Committee continuously

urged investigators to categorize cases and reach verdicts on those investigated. In December

1977, Suzhou suggested that most work units would complete the materials required for

classification before February 1978.72 By January 1978, Suzhou reported that 219 people had

been identified to have links to the Gang of Four’s conspiratorial activities. Among them, the

local authorities had completed the investigation of 192 targets, accounting for 87.67%.73 The

Suzhou leadership expected to complete the majority of investigations by the end of April

1978. However, the Center’s newly-issued standard for categorization immediately disrupted

Suzhou’s plan. By March 1978, Jiangsu had investigated 3,621 people with alleged links to the

Gang of Four’s conspiracy.74

2.3.2 The Central Standard for Categorization

On March 30, 1978, Xu Jiatun relayed an urgent instruction by phone, in particular

71 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu jianjue daji zhengzhi yaoyan de tongzhi” 关于坚决打击政治谣言的通知 [Notice on Firmly Scotching Political Rumors], February 8, 1977, 18, E101-121-0351, NMA. 72 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui cailiaozu, “Guanyu qingcha gongzuo de qingkuang he jinhou yijian.” 73 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui cailiaozu, “Yi nian lai qingcha gongzuo qingkuang he jinhou yijian (taolun gao).” 74 Jiangsu sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Jiangsu shengzhi: zhonggong zhi, 328.


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commanding municipal leaders to postpone the labeling of investigated targets.75 Xu gave

this order because he was aware that the Central Committee was about to issue a document

that spelled out the standards for settling verdicts on the investigated targets across the

country. This is based on the date when the document was drafted. On March 11, the

Shanghai Municipal Party Committee submitted the document, “Situation Report Concerning

the Investigation Work in Shanghai,” to the Center.76 As Xu Jiatun later revealed, the Center

specifically assigned the drafting of this document to the Shanghai Party Committee.

Politburo members closely monitored the drafting, repeatedly discussed Shanghai’s drafts,

and finally approved the circulation of the document nationwide in early April.77 As the First

Secretary of Jiangsu, it is hard to imagine that Xu Jiatun had not yet been informed about this

document by March 30. Xu’s order to pause categorization suggests that he had become

aware of the potential incompatibility.

On April 5, the Center transmitted document Zhongfa 1978 No. 12 to the provincial

level.78 In addition to a description of Shanghai’s results and accomplishments during the

Investigation Campaign, the document introduced three categories for categorization and

respective sanctions for the investigated targets, illustrating them with representative figures

in Shanghai (Table 3). The first category was backbones, those who had actively participated

in the Gang of Four’s conspiratorial activities of usurping the Party and state power and who

had thus committed serious crimes. The principle for handling the backbones in this category

was that they were defined as “contradictions between the enemy and us.” Local authorities

should expel this category of people from the Party and dismiss them from all positions inside

or outside the Party. Nonetheless, the final verdicts on backbones were also based on the

gravity of their crimes, individual attitude, and public anger, and were further differentiated

in specific ways. (1) Culprits (首恶分子) who had committed extremely severe crimes and

evoked the people’s bitter anger: a) if they did not repent and their attitude towards

75 Zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei cailiaozu, “Tongzhi (changtu dianhua jilu),” 85. 76 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu tongyi he zhuanfa Shanghai shiwei guanyu Shanghai shi qingcha gongzuo de qingkuang baogao” 中共中央关于同意和转发上海市委关于上海市清查工作的情况报告 [The Central Committee Agrees with and Transmits Shanghai Municipal Committee’s Report on the Investigation Work in Shanghai], April 5, 1978, E101-121-0360, NMA. 77 Xu, “Xu Jiatun tongzhi zai shengwei changwei tingqu zhuan’an cailiao gongzuo huiyi huibao shi de jianghua,” 97. At the time, the Politburo members included Hua Guofeng, Ye Jiangying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, and Wang Dongxing. 78 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu tongyi he zhuanfa Shanghai shiwei guanyu Shanghai shi qingcha gongzuo de qingkuang baogao.”


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confession of their crimes was bad, such as Ma Tianshui and Wang Xiuzhen, Secretaries of the

Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, and Chen Ada, Standing Member of the Shanghai

Municipal Party Committee, they were to be arrested and handled according to the law; and

b) if they confessed to a satisfying degree and made corrections, such as Xu Jingxian, Secretary

of the Shanghai Party Committee, they could be exempted from criminal penalties. (2)

Backbones who had committed lighter crimes: a) if their attitude towards confession of their

crime was bad, such as Xue Ganqing, Vice Secretary of the Party Committee of the Shanghai

Municipal Public Security Bureau, and Su Guizhen, Vice Secretary and Standing Member of

the Xuhui District Party Committee, they should participate in manual work under the

supervision of the masses; and b) if their attitude was good and they showed repentance, for

example, Chen Peizhen, the Deputy Director of the Shanghai Women’s Federation, they could

return to production posts or assume lesser positions at the grassroots level.

The second category comprised people who had made serious political mistakes,

including those who had participated in Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian, and Wang Xiuzhen’s

conspiratorial activities of usurping the Party and state power. In comparison to the sanctions

on backbones, targets in this category received much milder punishments. The document

prescribed that limited disciplinary or administrative actions could be taken towards those

whose attitude was bad or who the masses were discontented with. If their attitude was good

and they were making corrections, they could be rendered immune from penalties, but they

were not to assume leading positions or work in crucial departments. They could either return

to production posts or be assigned suitable positions.

The last category related to those who had limited involvement in Ma Tianshui, Xu

Jingxian, and Wang Xiuzhen’s conspiratorial activities of usurping the Party and state power

and who had made political mistakes after being manipulated by others. They had to clarify

their issues, accept criticism, and learn their lesson. After gaining the forgiveness of the

masses, they were to be free, but transferred from leading positions or crucial departments

to production posts, or assigned to minor positions. Job reassignment was one of the milder

sanctions by which to remove troublesome or disruptive cadres while avoiding formal

disciplinary procedures.79 Targets classified into this category would receive neither penal

punishment nor disciplinary sanctions. The document specifically listed all the names of

79 Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China, 29.


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Shanghai followers in an attempt to provide references and comparisons when categorizing

followers in other regions. However, the strong local points of reference made application

difficult in other regions.

Table 3: The Central Standard for Categorization

Category 1: The backbone who actively involved in the Gang of Four’s conspiracy to usurp the Party and state power. They stole part of the power and committed a large number of crimes that are not tolerated by the party and the state. 第一类，积极参与“四人帮”篡党夺权阴谋活动的骨干分子。他们窃取了一部分权力，干了大量为党纪国法所不容的坏事，犯下了严重的罪行。

These backbones, belonging to the contradiction between the enemy and us, should be expelled from the Party and removed from all positions inside and outside the Party. 这些骨干分子，属于敌我矛盾性质，都应开除党籍，撤销党内外一切职务。

(1) Culprits who had committed extremely severe crimes and evoked the people’s bitter anger 对其中罪行极其严重、民愤极大的首恶分子

a) if they did not repent and their attitude towards confession of their crimes was bad, such as Ma Tianshui, Wang Xiuzhen, Chen Ada and others, they were to be arrested and handled according to the law. 交代态度不好、不肯悔改的，如马天水、王秀珍、陈阿大等人，应逮捕法办。 b) if they confessed to a satisfying degree and made corrections, such as Xu Jingxian and others, they could be exempted from criminal penalties. 交代态度较好、有悔改表现的，如徐景贤等人，可免于刑事处分。

(2) Backbones who had committed lighter crimes 对其中罪行较轻的骨干分子

a) if their attitude towards confession of their crime was bad, such as Xue Ganqing, Su Guizhen and others, they should participate in manual work under the supervision of the masses. 交代态度不好的，如薛干青、苏桂珍等人，应放到群众中监督劳动。 b) if their attitude was good and they showed repentance, such as Chen Peizhen and others, they could return to production posts or assume lesser positions at the grassroots level. 交代态度较好、有悔改表现的，如陈佩珍等人，可回到生产劳动岗位，或放到基层做一般工作。

Category 2: Those who participated in certain conspiracies of the Gang of Four and Ma, Xu and Wang to usurp the Party and state power, actively joined the bourgeois factional system, rampantly implemented the counterrevolutionary political program and revisionist line of the Gang of Four, and committed serious political mistakes. 第二类，参与“四人帮”及马、徐、王一伙某些篡党夺权的阴谋活动，积极投靠资产阶级帮派体系，猖狂推行“四人帮”的反革命政治纲领和反革命修正主义路线，犯有严重政治错误。

a) For those who had bad attitudes and received strong criticism from the masses, such as Zhang Jingbiao and Pang Fuli, they were given certain Party disciplinary or administrative sanctions. 对其中态度不好，群众很有意见的，如张敬标、庞夫力等人，给予一定的党纪或行政处分。

b) For the ones who showed a good attitude and repentance, such as Lü Meiying and others, they can be exempted from disciplinary sanctions. But [they] can no longer hold leading positions or work in the confidential and essential departments. They can return to the original production and labor positions, or otherwise be assigned to suitable jobs. 对其中交代态度较好、有悔改表现的，如吕美英等人，可以不予处分。但都不能在担任领导职务，不能在机密要害部门工作，可回到原生产劳动岗位，或另行分配适当工作。

Category 3: Those who were partly involved in the Gang of Four and Ma, Xu, Wang’s conspiratorial activities of usurping the Party and state power, but were used by others, and committed political mistakes. 第三类，与“四人帮”及马、徐、王一伙篡党夺权阴谋活动有些牵连，但尚属受人利用，犯有政治错误。


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a) For this category of people, the focus should be on ideological criticism, urging them to clarify their problems, raise awareness, and learn a lesson. After gaining the understanding of the masses, [they can] be freed. 对这类人，着重进行思想批判，促使他们把问题说清楚，提高觉悟，接受教训，在取得群众谅解后，予以解脱。

b) Those who hold leading positions or work in confidential and essential departments should be removed from the leading positions and the departments. [They] can return to the original production and labor positions, or otherwise be assigned to suitable jobs. 其中担任领导职务或在机密要害部门工作的，应调离领导岗位和机密要害部门，可回到原生产劳动岗位，或另行分配适当工作。

2.3.3 Inconsistent Standards between Jiangsu and the Center

In order to study Document No. 12 and discuss the issues of categorization in Jiangsu, the

Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee convened the Case Investigation Materials Work

Conference (专案材料工作会议) between May 7 and 19, 1978. Local leaders who were

responsible for the Investigation Campaign attended the conference. They mainly discussed

the issues resulting from the different standards between Jiangsu and the Center. On May 9,

the conference bulletin, a top-secret document, specifically listed 24 main questions that

attendees brought up and argued about after studying the central document. These questions

focused on the three categories prescribed in the central document.80 Local leaders asked for

definitions of categories. For example, regarding the category of backbones, it was noted,

could there be an explicit definition of backbones? What was the specific standard for

backbones in Jiangsu? Were they to allocate these backbones political labels or not? If so,

what kind of political label should it be? The attendees also questioned how to handle

followers that would have been more severely dealt with according to Jiangsu’s previous

categorization. They asked: How should they deal with those who had previously been

announced as backbones at public criticism meetings, but were now not backbones according

to the central standards?

Local cadres also brought up issues based on applying the central standard. They argued

that Shanghai’s experience outlined in Document No. 12 did not conform to the reality in

Jiangsu, and Jiangsu should have its own standard. Some local cadres considered that

followers in their regions did not meet the central standard.81 They also raised questions

about practical implementation. For example, with regard to people who had made serious

80 Zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei cailiaozu, “Guanyu zhuan’an cailiao gongzuo huiyi jianbao (3)” 关于专案材料工作会议简报 3 [Briefing on the Work Meeting of Case Materials], May 9, 1978, E101-121-0378, NMA. 81 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei cailiaozu, “Jia shizhen tongzhi zai shiwei zhuan’an gongzuo huiyi jieshu shi de jianghua.”


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political mistakes or political mistakes, how were these two categories to be differentiated?

Did the sanction of “no longer assuming a leading position” mean currently or permanently?

After being “transferred” from a leading position, could cadres still assume leading positions

at other work units? After a demotion, should these cadres’ salaries be reduced? As for Party

disciplinary sanctions, did “imposing certain Party disciplinary or administrative sanctions”

include “expulsion from the Party” (开除党籍)? For those who had joined the Party because

of factionalism, should they be permanently removed from the Party (清除出党)? All these

questions illustrated the difficulties local cadres encountered in practice as a result of the

ambiguousness of the central policies and the inconsistencies between Jiangsu and the

Center’s standards.

Bemused by the central and Jiangsu standards, local cadres also expressed doubts about

Jiangsu’s earlier implementation of criticism and investigation. As a result, Xu Jiatun had to

address the issues of standard changes and defended earlier approaches at the conference.

He stated on May 16:

Prior to the document Zhongfa No. 12, we had already created four categories. They

were preliminary. Regarding categorization and punishment, it is natural that Jiangsu

did not have consistent opinions at the beginning. [This is] because the Center did not

unify regulations, and it was not yet at the stage of punishing.82

In Xu’s opinion, it was not wrong for Jiangsu cadres to take a leading role in categorizing

followers, and the inconsistency resulted from the absence of central regulations, rather than

being Jiangsu’s fault. In particular, Xu defended the reclassification of backbones.

It was correct to call them backbones during the Criticism Campaign. Now…not to

classify them as backbones…does not mean [they] were wronged earlier. If your area

does not have any backbones, could [we] say that criticizing the capitalist factional

system in your area is wrong? It is not wrong. The bourgeois factional system existed

in your area… Even if [they] were not categorized as backbones, they still have

factionalism. No backbones do not signify no factions.83

Xu intended to explain that local cadres had correctly carried out the criticism and

82 Xu, “Xu Jiatun tongzhi zai shengwei changwei tingqu zhuan’an cailiao gongzuo huiyi huibao shi de jianghua,” 96. 83 Xu, 99–100.


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investigation even though they needed to reclassify some followers into more lenient

categories. Nonetheless, when addressing the question of which standard local categorization

should apply, Xu emphasized that:

There is only one standard, i.e., the Center’s Document No. 12. It is the basis. Our

material group (材料组) originally put forward four categories. [It does] not work,

[we] still have to put [followers] into the three categories according to Document No.

12.84

Both negating the campaign undertaken in Jiangsu and resisting the central standard would

put the Jiangsu leadership’s authority at risk.

However, these questions and doubts did not cease after the provincial conference, but

instead extended to lower levels and grew stronger. Following the provincial conference,

Suzhou immediately held a municipal meeting to disseminate and study Document No. 12 in

late May 1978. At the meeting, cadres complained that it negated their past work if they could

no longer regard investigated followers as backbones after having announced them as such

at various criticism meetings for over a year.85 Some cadres were afraid of being accused of

“rightist tendencies” (右倾) if they implemented Document No. 12, suggesting they were

being too lenient on the targets. Others were reluctant to further investigate targets because

they preferred not to make future relations with the targets difficult for no reason.86 The

investigators would not take all these risks just to implement the new standards. The policy

changes therefore resulted in a passive reaction to the Investigation Campaign.

Meanwhile, local cadres were also concerned that the public would be discontented with

the recategorization. As increasing numbers of survivors demanded the punishment of those

who caused their suffering and their family members’ deaths during the Cultural Revolution

(Chapter 3), local cadres faced considerable pressure. They clearly stated their concerns about

public discontent at the provincial and the Suzhou conferences when instructed to reclassify

all cases. They were aware that if they reclassified targets in accordance with the central

standard, the public would be resentful of the majority of campaign targets receiving no

84 Xu, 97. 85 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei cailiaozu, “Jia shizhen tongzhi zai shiwei zhuan’an gongzuo huiyi jieshu shi de jianghua,” 152. 86 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei cailiaozu, 150, 157.


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substantial sanctions and that “the masses’ enthusiasm would be damaged.”87 Therefore, on

the one hand, Suzhou leaders demanded that Document No. 12 only be circulated among the

investigators and that discussion on reclassification was kept confidential for the time being,

and, on the other hand, they requested that local cadres “educate” the masses, meaning

convincing them to comply.88

2.3.4 Recategorizing Local Followers

Following the changed policies, local cadres had to verify their previous investigations and

recategorize local followers. For example, in the case of Chang Zheng (常政), a leader of the

Suzhou Wireless Bureau, his categories were modified several times. Chang was reported to

have suggested that the detention of the Gang of Four was due to capitalists’ counterattacks

and the Soviet Union revisionists’ coming to power. Both accusations were conceived as

“malicious attack” and classified as “contradictions between the enemy and us” at the start

of the campaign.89 Based on this decision, Chang would belong to the category of backbone.

However, his investigators revised the verdict of “malicious attack” to “reactionary remarks”

and “contradictions among the people” after the Center emphasized the lenient handling of

targets at the Fifth National People’s Congress. Following Document No. 12, the investigators

later deemed this verdict still too severe and changed it to “aggressive speeches.” Ultimately,

Chang was categorized as having made political mistakes, a much milder category than a

backbone. This meant that he could stay in the Party and assume a lesser position instead of

receiving the most severe Party sanction: being permanently removed from the Party and

dismissed from all positions within and outside the Party. Following the latter punishment, it

was only in exceptional cases that a person could ever rejoin the Party or assume any leading

position.90

In other cases, local cadres simply rewrote investigation reports to apply the central

standard without recategorization. For example, the investigators at the Office of the Suzhou

87 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Guanyu pizhuan Changshu xian yi feng renmin laixin de diaocha baogao.” 88 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei cailiaozu, “Jia shizhen tongzhi zai shiwei zhuan’an gongzuo huiyi jieshu shi de jianghua,” 154, 160. 89 Xu Gaocheng, “Zuohao shencha duixiang cailiao jianmian gongzuo de yixie tihui” 做好审查对象材料见面工作的一些体会 [Some Experiences of Entitling Investigated Targets to Read Their Materials], October 27, 1978, 129, A1-14-88, SMA. 90 Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China, 31.


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Municipal Party Committee originally put Chen Rongxin (陈荣馨), a former secretary of the

office, into the category of making serious political mistakes. After five drafts, in the final

investigation report on Chen, the investigators changed “participation” (参与) to “active

participation” (积极参与) when describing Chen’s factional activity.91 In this case, Chen would

still belong to the category of making serious political mistakes according to the central

standard. In this case, they did not recategorize, but instead used rhetoric to enforce the

central standard.

As these categories determined their political fates and led to the risk of criminal

punishment, designated followers also seized this opportunity to fight for lighter categories.

Jiangsu had stipulated that all investigation reports must be available to the investigated and

only when the investigated signed and agreed with them could the investigation be

completed.92 With access to their investigation reports, followers tended to argue their way

out of severe categories. The implicit criteria for categorization, such as “active participation,”

“participation,” and “involvement,” also left substantial room for them to do so. When

reading their investigation reports, followers paid significant attention to details. By arguing

about these details, they could sometimes alter their final verdict and exempt themselves

from punishment. In the case of Lu Jiechang (陆介昌), a worker in a Suzhou school-run factory

who was promoted to cadre in the Suzhou Municipal Militia Headquarters in 1974, he put

forward 11 quite deliberate suggestions with regard to “the facts of his mistakes” after

reading his investigation report several times. 93 For example, in terms of the original

description that “Lu had drafted a slanderous letter under the instructions of Hua Linsen and

Wang Yongzhu to attack one of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee’s meetings,” Lu

suggested that he drafted the letter only “under Wang Yongzhu’s instruction.”94 This change

was important because Hua Linsen belonged to the category of backbones. Distancing himself

91 Shen Zhihao and Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei bangongshi, “women shi zenyang qicao he xiugai shencha baogao de” 我们是怎样起草和修改审查报告的 [How We Drafted and Revised Investigation Reports], October 27, 1978, 137, A1-14-88, SMA. 92 On September 7, 1978, the People’s Daily reported Shanghai’s experience of making investigation reports accessible to the investigated. Since then, Jiangsu had popularized this method and targets could read and comment on the report regarding their mistakes. 93 Xu Xinyuan, “women shi zenyang ba shencha baogao yu shencha duixiang Lu Jiechang jianmian de” 我们是怎样把审查报告与审查对象陆介昌见面的 [How Did We Inform Lu Jiechang about His Investigation Report?], October 27, 1978, 134, A1-14-88, SMA. 94 Xu, 134.


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from Hua Linsen’s activities would reduce the possibility of being put into a severe category.

The other suggestions he made were very similar, such as modifying the “plot to draft a

telegram” to “was instructed to draft,” resulting in a shift in the main responsibility. All these

changes in the narrative illustrate how the investigated targets made every effort to mediate

punishment. In fact, altering accounts of the past was a common strategy among identified

perpetrators.95

The above illustrates that the investigated followers made every effort to reverse their

case verdicts, or pingfan (平反), meaning to reverse an unjust case verdict. However, the local

authorities sometimes treated followers’ attempts as an act of “reversing verdicts” (翻案

fan’an). The term fan’an was used to criticize people, usually those ousted as political targets,

who demanded the reversal of “correct” verdicts. Designated followers’ attempts to move

into a more lenient category were potentially risky. Xu Jiatun specifically outlined how to deal

with fan’an at a meeting with local leaders:

Some people [have] attempted to reverse their verdicts. What are you afraid of? If

someone tries to reverse his verdict, [we] will first educate him. If it does not work,

[we] will mobilize the masses to struggle against him and severely punish him.96

Thus, instead of being put into a lenient category, local followers could risk heavier

punishment if they deemed their case verdicts unjust and attempted to reverse them.

Nonetheless, facing the changing policies, Jiangsu leaders started to be very cautious

about the measures they took towards local followers. In November 1978, Xu Jiatun

suggested coldly handling (冷处理) followers in the categories that would require criminal

and disciplinary sanctions. He further instructed that they should not rush to punish, but

instead “wait for central concrete regulations, then study and implement them.” 97

Categorizing and punishing the designated followers continued into the 1980s in Jiangsu. This

process turned out to be a lengthy negotiation (Chapter 4).

95 Payne, Unsettling Accounts; Zhang, “From Denial to Apology,” 150–73. 96 Xu, “Xu Jiatun tongzhi zai shengwei changwei tingqu zhuan’an cailiao gongzuo huiyi huibao shi de jianghua,” 100. 97 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Xu Jiatun tongzhi zai di shiwei shuji pengtou huiyi jieshu shi de jianghua” 许家屯同志在地市委书记碰头会议结束时的讲话 [Xu Jiatun’s Speech at the End of the Brief Meeting with Secretaries of Prefecture and Municipal Party Committees], November 7, 1978, 97–1, D101-121-0608, NMA.


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2.4 Dealing with Violent Perpetrators

In the document Zhongfa 1978 No. 12, the Central Committee also requested the

investigating of five types of “criminals whom the Gang of Four and its followers had

supported, indulged, and protected.”98 The five types of criminals touched upon various

issues, including economic misconduct, corruption, larceny, political slander, and violence

committed during the Cultural Revolution.99 In official terms, the violence included “beating,

smashing, and looting” (打砸抢), and the people involved were “beat-smash-loot elements”

(打砸抢分子). The perpetrators of violence targeted mostly former factional members who

had engaged in armed struggles, killings, torture, and beatings. As the Center criticized Lin

Biao alongside the Gang of Four in early 1978, this broke the limitation of focusing on the

period after the CCP Tenth National Congress in 1973 and brought up atrocities committed

earlier during the Cultural Revolution. The Central Committee instructed that principal violent

perpetrators should be arrested and handled according to the law.100 Local cadres thus made

a significant effort to investigate violent perpetrators. However, given that the central

leadership still considered the Cultural Revolution correct, the Jiangsu leadership faced

serious challenges in dealing with the violence committed during the movement.

The central leadership launched the so-called Double-Strike Campaign (双打运动) to deal

with violent perpetrators. 101 Unlike the previously orchestrated political campaigns, the

Center did not have explicit guidelines for local implementation of this campaign. Jiangsu first

carried out the campaign by conducting an experiment in Huangqiao Town in Yangzhou in the

autumn of 1977. In February 1978, the Jiangsu Party Committee transmitted Huangqiao’s

98 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu tongyi he zhuanfa Shanghai shiwei guanyu Shanghai shi qingcha gongzuo de qingkuang baogao,” 90. 99 The five types of criminals included active counterrevolutionaries (现行反革命分子); landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements who counterattacked in revenge (反攻倒算地富反坏分子); principal culprits of beating, smashing, and looting (打砸抢首恶分子); speculators, profiteers, corrupt and larcenist elements (投机倒把、贪污盗窃分子); and criminals who severely undermined public security and committed other criminal activities ( 严重破坏社会治安和进行其他刑事犯罪活动的犯罪分子 ). Active counterrevolutionaries, for example, mainly referred to those who had engaged in “malicious attack (恶毒攻击),” as Suzhou identified over 60 people who had made offensive statements about former and present central leaders in relation to the detention of the Gang of Four. See Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui cailiaozu, “Yi nian lai qingcha gongzuo qingkuang he jinhou yijian (taolun gao),” 111. 100 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu tongyi he zhuanfa Shanghai shiwei guanyu Shanghai shi qingcha gongzuo de qingkuang baogao.” 101 In line with the campaign to Criticize the Gang of Four, it was also called “One Criticize and Double-Strike” Campaign (“一批双打” 运动).


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pilot report as a reference for campaign implementation in the province. 102 The report

suggested that the investigated targets in Huangqiao had mostly engaged in economic crimes,

such as corruption. Regarding how to handle these targets, the Huangqiao experience

emphasized the need to “educate” them so that they could achieve thought transformation.

The Jiangsu Party Committee praised the Huangqiao experience, stating that it made the

Double-Strike “a revolutionary mass movement that re-educated and transformed men.”103

The committee further offered cadres and the masses who had made mistakes or had

financial issues the opportunity to clarify themselves in public (Chapter 1).104

However, Jiangsu never implemented the Huangqiao experience on a larger scale. The

Jiangsu leaders were still vague in terms of how to carry out the Double-Strike Campaign. As

the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee suggested in April 1978, each locality could consider

its own circumstances to decide when and in which work units to carry out the campaign.105

More importantly, the Huangqiao experience failed to address the issue of Cultural

Revolutionary violence and its victims – mainly cadres and the general public.

Jiangsu cadres brought up their concerns about dealing with violent perpetrators when

studying Document No. 12. They put forward several questions about the questions of

accountability for past violence and killings:

1) Among those who had links [to the Gang of Four], when and with whom should

new accounts (新账) and old accounts (旧账) be settled? When and with whom

should the historical accounts not to be entangled?

2) Should some people’s accounts from the campaign to Criticize Lin and Confucius,

including creating disturbances at [government] organs and surrounding leaders to

request fixing of policy (落实政策) by mustering a group of people, be settled?

3) Some people committed extremely serious crimes during the Cultural Revolution,

such as beating, smashing and looting, and causing deaths, etc. However, when the

102 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Pizhuan Taixing xian Huangqiao zhen hen zhua zhongdian shencha duixiang zhuanhua gongzuo de qingkuang huibao” 批转泰兴县黄桥镇狠抓重点审查对象转化工作的情况汇报 [Commenting on and Transmitting the Huangqiao Town of Taixing County’s Report on Transforming Key Investigated Targets], February 5, 1978, E101-121-0365, NMA. 103 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, 49. 104 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Guanyu kaizhan jiepi ‘sirenbang’ douzheng de tongzhi” 关于开展揭批四人帮斗争的通知 [Notice on Carrying on the Struggle of Exposing and Criticizing the Gang of Four], April 8, 1978, 124, E101-121-0365, NMA. 105 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, 124.


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Gang of Four ran rampant, they only made general mistakes in terms of usurping the

Party and state power, or they did not participate in these activities at all. Should their

past accounts be settled?106

Jiangsu cadres considered the violence and killings that occurred in the early stage of the

Cultural Revolution to be “historical issues” or “old accounts” (旧账), while they deemed

following the Gang “new accounts” (新账), referring to the period between when the Gang

of Four and other radical forces entered the Central Committee in 1973 and when the Gang

were arrested in 1976. This differentiation reveals the question of whether to deal with

Cultural Revolutionary violence overall or only with crimes committed in the late stage. These

questions directly pointed to the issue of how to evaluate the Cultural Revolution, which was

still deemed correct at the time. Local cadres were confused over who should be held

responsible for Cultural Revolutionary violence.

Jiangsu leaders such as Xu Jiatun obviously had preferred targets to settle accounts with.

On June 25, 1978, Xu Jiatun gave an instruction to the prefecture and municipal Party

secretaries as follows:

Incited by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, some people assaulted and smashed the

Party Committee ( 冲击党委 ) and overthrew everything during the Cultural

Revolution. They are reactionary. This account should not be settled with the masses

but with Lin Biao and the Gang of Four. With landlords, rightists,

counterrevolutionaries, bad elements and active counterrevolutionaries, new-born

capitalist activists, as well as factional backbones, this account must also be settled.107

In terms of historiography, it is striking that Xu asserted that the action of “assaulting and

smashing the Party Committee” per se was reactionary in 1978. This refers to power seizures

by rebels, or the so-called January Revolution, in the early stage of the Cultural Revolution.108

The Central Committee only officially negated the January Revolution in January 1979.109 This

indicates that, as a direct victim of power seizure, Xu took the opportunity provided by dealing

106 Zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei cailiaozu, “Guanyu zhuan’an cailiao gongzuo huiyi jianbao (3),” 83. 107 Zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei bangongting, “Xu Jiatun tongzhi zai di shiwei shuji huiyi shang de jianghua,” 26. 108 For more information on power seizure, see MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, 155–69. 109 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Zhuanfa Shanghai shiwei “guanyu jiejue suowei yi yue geming wenti de qingshi baogao de tongzhi” 转发上海市委关于解决所谓“一月革命”问题的请示报告的通知 [Notice on Transmitting Shanghai Municipal Party Committee’s Request for Instructions on How to Resolve the Issue of so-Called “January Revolution”] (The Maoist Legacy, January 4, 1979), https://maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/852.


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with the violence to pronounce the rebels’ power seizure illegal.110 Xu added two labels that

directly referred to former rebels, “newly born capitalists” ( 新生资产阶级分子 ) and

“factional backbones.” 111 Xu called former factional members to account, indicating the

reinstated cadres’ desire to cast out them.

Xu was not the only one driven to investigate violent perpetrators on a large scale. The

central leadership did not seem to have expected this development when requesting local

cadres investigate the violence in April 1978. Thus, on August 13, 1978, the CCP Center issued

a specific notification requiring local leaders to deal carefully with Cultural Revolutionary

violence.112 In this central notice, it criticized the extensiveness (扩大化) and inappropriate

measures that local cadres had taken to address past violence:

The Central Committee recently found out that a number of regions and work units

have some inappropriate formulations (提法) and methods in terms of dealing with

the issues of beating, smashing, and looting during the Cultural Revolution. For

example, some investigated the issues of beating, smashing, and looting in the same

way that they carried out the Three Antis and Five Antis campaigns; some proposed

comprehensively investigating all kinds of beating, smashing, and looting during the

Cultural Revolution, even going so far as to investigate [cases] in which a person had

only a hair on his head touched; some demanded that everyone had to confess

whether he or she had participated in beating, smashing, and looting during the

Cultural Revolution; some regions established dedicated offices for investigating

beating, smashing, and looting and paraded those who had taken part in these

activities through the streets. The Center has deemed that Party committees of all

levels have to pay attention to all these issues.113

The Central Committee preferred not to redress Cultural Revolutionary violence on a large

110 For the power seizure in Nanjing, see Dong and Walder, “Nanjing’s Failed ‘January Revolution’ of 1967.” 111 For example, the Center often labeled Wang Hongwen a “newly born capitalists.” 112 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu shenzhong chuli wuchan jieji wenhua dageming zhong da za qiang wenti de tongzhi” 关于慎重处理无产阶级文化大革命中打砸抢问题的通知 [Notice on Cautiously Dealing with the Issues of Beating, Smashing, and Looting during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution], August 13, 1978, E101-121-0362, NMA. When this document was recompiled in Party internal publications, the part of criticizing local misconduct when dealing with the violence was left out. An excerpt of this document see Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu shenzhong chuli wuchan jieji wenhua dageming zhong da za qiang wenti de tongzhi,” August 13, 1978. 113 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu shenzhong chuli wuchan jieji wenhua dageming zhong da za qiang wenti de tongzhi,” August 13, 1978, 130.


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scale. It explicitly emphasized that they were “not to entangle with old accounts” (不要纠缠

历史旧账 ), meaning they should not investigate the violence and killings that occurred

between 1966 and 1973, so as to “defend the great achievements of the Cultural Revolution”

( 保卫无产阶级文化大革命伟大成果 ). 114 Instead, the central leadership limited the

investigation to the five types of criminals. The Central Committee also prohibited violent

actions toward the targets. When dealing with them, local cadres were to adhere to the

principle of “learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save

the patient” (惩前毖后治病救人); individuals were not to be held accountable.115 By doing

so, the Central Committee intended to “unite all that can be united,” and “strive to realize

the Four Modernizations of socialism.”

While responding to the changing central policies, Jiangsu also faced public pressure to

punish perpetrators. The local leadership had to provide victims with a plausible explanation

for narrowing the scope of the investigation. Xu Jiatun explicitly addressed how victims should

act towards their suffering:

It is understandable that people who were beaten are disgruntled and full of

grievances. But [we] have to work on them and make them treat [the beating]

correctly. [Those] who suffered and were beaten by someone should see it from a

positive angle… We ourselves have also made mistakes… Chairman Mao required us

to temper ourselves in violent storms and waves, [so] drinking one or two sips of

water amounted to nothing.116

Xu claimed that victims had also made mistakes, meaning that to a certain extent they had

engaged in wrongdoing as well. He thus expected them to forget their grievances, forgive

their perpetrators, and move on.

In terms of how to handle violent perpetrators, Xu further stated that:

Some people consider handling anyone who participated in a beating without

exception. The scale is too large. At that time, it was mainly the Red Guards, but there

114 Zhonggong zhongyang, 131. 115 Zhonggong zhongyang, 131. 116 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Xu Jiatun tongzhi zai di shiwei he sheng ge buwei ban fuzeren huiyi de jianghua” 许家屯同志在地市委和省各部委办负责人会议的讲话 [Xu Jiatun’s Speech at the Meeting with Leaders of Prefecture and Municipal Party Committees, Provincial Department Committees and Offices], August 15, 1978, 38, D101-121-0608, NMA.


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were also veterans who took part in the beating. Now to deal with everyone,

including the old and the young, the scale of attacks is too large. [We] should only

deal with the principal culprits… Although some people beat others up, they are also

victims… These accounts must be blamed on Lin Biao, the Gang of Four and their

agents (代理人) and followers, but not on a particular individual.117

Xu thus portrayed perpetrators as victims too. He proposed blaming the past violence on Lin

Biao, the Gang of Four, and major followers in Jiangsu, instead of individuals. In doing so, the

local leaders responded to central criticism by attempting to avoid a large-scale investigation

into the past violence and perpetrators.

Facing the complex issues of violence and the changing central policies, the Jiangsu

leadership struggled to find a balance between central orders and local pressure. In order to

ease the tension, the Jiangsu leadership focused its efforts on reconciling victims and

perpetrators in the region. Xu Jiatun suggested engaging the methods utilized during the

Three Speak-outs. “If the conflicts were bitter in a work unit, [we] could solve them by

‘demolishing walls (拆墙), filling up trenches (填沟), and untying knots (解疙瘩)’ as well as

[using] role models (典型 ).” 118 The purpose of reconciliation, as stated in many Party

documents, was “not to hurt comrades’ feelings, [but] to turn negative factors into positive

ones, and mobilize all positive factors to contribute to the Four Modernizations.”119

While the Jiangsu leaders announced the deployment of the Double-Strike Campaign at

a provincial meeting in November 1978, Hua Guofeng instructed that the campaign should no

longer be carried out as a mass campaign at the Central Work Conference on November 10,

1978.120 Consequently, Jiangsu only redressed the issues of Cultural Revolutionary violence

on a small scale. For example, by December 1978, Suzhou had only convened two criticism

meetings to denounce six targets labeled as beat-smash-loot elements and corrupt and

larcenist elements. 121 In the case of the Nantong Prefecture, it had investigated 64

117 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, 38–39, 41. 118 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, 38. 119 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu shenzhong chuli wuchan jieji wenhua dageming zhong da za qiang wenti de tongzhi,” August 13, 1978. 120 Hua Guofeng, “Zai zhongyang gongzuo huiyi kaimu hui shang de jianghua” 在中央工作会议开幕会上的讲话 [Speech at the Opening Meeting of the Central Work Conference], November 10, 1978, 183, E101-121-0363, NMA. 121 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “‘Yi pi shuang da’ bushu de baogao” “一批双打”部署的报告 [Report on the Deployment of the One Criticism and Double-Strike Campaign], December 6, 1978, 108–9, A1-1-174, SMA.


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perpetrators of violence by early 1979. 18 of them were arrested and awaiting further

handling, while another 46 people were not subjected to punishment (不作处分) after

investigation and criticism.122 According to the same report, however, the Cultural Revolution

caused the deaths of 2,238 people and 1,578 people were injured, some sustaining long-term

disabilities, 100,000 households were raided, and 150,000 people in Nantong were impacted.

In some Nantong work units, the Double-Strike Campaign only lasted one month, launching

in mid-December 1978 and completed by January 1979. 123 The handling of violent

perpetrators thus came to a premature end in Jiangsu. The quickly changing central policies

demonstrate the limitations of the state-sponsored project of coming to terms with the

country’s recent violent past.

After the 1978 Third Plenum, as the Center shifted its work focus to economic

development, it became problematic for local cadres to balance heavy daily work and the task

of implementing the Double-Strike Campaign. Although the local leadership emphasized the

importance of continuing the campaign and demanded that manpower given to this not be

reduced,124 Jiangsu generally ended the campaign in early 1979. However, coping with the

issues of violence and violent perpetrators continued into the 1980s in Jiangsu (Chapter 4).

2.5 “The Campaign was Wrong”: Challenges to Legitimacy

Local cadres faced considerable challenges in dealing with the designated perpetrators.

These challenges included changing and ambiguous central policies, resistance from various

levels, and public demands for punishment. The changing political circumstances in 1978 also

posed a significant challenge to Jiangsu’s investigation campaign. The new agenda –

reinforcing the socialist legality – resulted in the questioning of previous investigation

methods. In November 1978, the Jiangsu leaders had already pointed out the problem of

continuing the use of detention and study classes for investigation. For example, Secretary of

the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee Hui Yuyu (惠浴宇), who was in charge of Jiangsu

122 Zhonggong Nantong diqu weiyuanhui, “Ji Yuan tongzhi zai diwei zhaokai de qingcha ding’an chuli gongzuo zuotanhui shang de jianghua,” 108. 123 Zhonggong Nantong jiguan dangwei, “Jiguan shuang da yundong xiaojie” 机关双打运动小结 [Brief Summary of the Double-Strike Campaign at Organs], January 1979, 1, E101-121-0081, NMA. 124 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu shan shi shan zhong gao hao ‘shuang da’ douzheng de tongzhi” 关于善始善终搞好“双打”斗争的通知 [Notice on Well Carrying out the Double-Strike Struggle from Beginning to End], December 28, 1978, A1-1-174, SMA.


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political and legal departments (政法部门), stated at a meeting with local political and legal

cadres that:

I heard recently that some places applied outmoded methods again and detained

many people. Each locality must pay attention and must not simplify [methods]. The

old methods must not be implemented anymore, and the lessons are profound. [We]

must be vigilant, especially comrades in political and legal departments, who must

pay more attention to avoid the situation where rehabilitation of these people is

demanded in the future.125

Secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee and the Nanjing Municipal Party

Committee Chu Jiang (储江) also criticized the investigation methods:

It is forbidden to informally hold study classes. If people do that, it will become

isolation for investigation again. Now since [we are] strengthening the socialist

legality, we should act according to the Constitution and laws.126

Both Hui Yuyu and Chu Jiang criticized violent actions towards the investigated. They also

questioned the use of “isolation for investigation” and “study classes.” Chu Jiang pointed out

that holding study classes did not conform to the law and emphasized the role of the law. This

demonstrates that local cadres, especially legal personnel, were expected to change their

methods when investigating perpetrators.

In late 1978, the Center decided not to launch any more political campaigns.127 The CCP

seemed to commit to ending campaign-style mobilization and governance so that they could

terminate the use of the unconventional politics employed during the Cultural Revolution.128

125 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Hui Yuyu tongzhi zai di shiwei fenguan zhengfa gongzuo fuze tongzhi huiyi jieshu shi de jianghua yaodian” 惠浴宇同志在地市委分管政法工作负责同志会议结束时的讲话要点 [Key Points of Hui Yuyu’s Speech at the End of the Meeting with Leaders in Charge of Political and Legal Work], November 29, 1978, 182, E237-111-0076, NMA. 126 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Chu Jiang tongzhi zai di shiwei fenguan zhengfa gongzuo fuze tongzhi huiyi jieshu shi de jianghua yaodian” 储江同志在地市委分管政法工作负责同志会议结束时的讲话要点 [Key Points of Chu Jiang’s Speech at the End of the Meeting with Leaders in Charge of Political and Legal Work], November 29, 1978, 181, E237-121-0076, NMA. 127 Hu Yaobang, “Zai Zhongyang Dangxiao chuanda zhongyang gongzuo huizi sanzhong quanhui jingshen” 在中央党校传达中央工作会议三中全会精神 [Conveying the Spirt of the Central Work Conference and the Third Plenum at the Central Party School] (The Maoist Legacy, December 28, 1978), https://maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/3199. 128 For mass campaigns and their influence in rural areas of China, see Li, Lifeng, “Mass Movements and Rural Governance in Communist China: 1945–1976,” Journal of Modern Chinese History 7, no. 2 (December 2013): 156–80.


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The changing political narratives provided the investigated with an opportunity to challenge

the legitimacy of the Investigation Campaign. They used this new central narrative to improve

their political situation and their attempts to reverse their verdicts continued after the

Investigation Campaign ended. At a forum on investigation and categorization in 1979, a

leader in Nantong Prefecture described the resistance put up by formerly investigated targets

and their attempts to reverse verdicts:

Some people denied their accountability (赖账) in public and did not acknowledge

their mistakes; some wrote appeals and anonymous letters and sent them

everywhere; some sent their relatives to complain to leaders or acquaintances; some

continued factional activities during the investigation; some connected secretly and

planned to complain and reverse cases; some even threatened to drag leaders and

cadres to Beijing to complain; some people took a long period of sick leave and stayed

at home after they had been told to conduct labor work. They refused to take the

jobs assigned to them; some evaded major charges and shifted [responsibility] to

their superiors or subordinates. They claimed that their previous confession was

against their will and they begrudged the criticism; they spread that the

implementation of the [Investigation] Campaign was overly leftist, wrong, and

excessive; they presented themselves as victims and insisted they were always

correct; they requested the policy be fixed for them… Their common goal was to

reverse their cases…and to reverse cases of the Investigation Campaign. 129

The above speech was intended to criticize the phenomena that had emerged among the

previously investigated targets. However, it also illustrates that targets appealed and

complained to whomever could make their situation better, and they demanded

rehabilitation. The investigated refused the official verdicts and negated the Investigation

Campaign.

Some of the investigated targets went further, counterattacking the official narrative that

had previously denounced Nantong leaders for hindering the investigation. Some followers in

Nantong suggested that the article published in the People’s Daily on March 21, 1978 was

wrong. The article had criticized the Nantong leaders’ passive response to the Investigation

129 Zhonggong Nantong diqu weiyuanhui, “Ji Yuan tongzhi zai diwei zhaokai de qingcha ding’an chuli gongzuo zuotanhui shang de jianghua,” 109.


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Campaign. The investigated targets, including the criticized Nantong leaders, demanded that

the People’s Daily clarify nationwide that Nantong had not made mistakes during the

Investigation Campaign.130 Some cadres also expressed the opinion that all previous charges

against the campaign targets should be dropped. They further suggested apologizing to those

who had been arrested and clearing their names.131 Resistance did not decrease after the

Investigation Campaign was over. Instead, it intensified and overloaded local cadres. As one

local leader complained, in order to convince them of the legitimacy of the Investigation

Campaign, “now we have to do the ideological work not only of the investigated targets but

also of the majority of cadres and masses.”132

As well as striving to reverse their cases, the investigated targets’ challenges to the official

narrative also resulted from the principle of “coldly handling” the targets. This principle meant

that local cadres must wait and not mete out substantial sanctions to the targets despite the

fact that they had been carrying out the investigations for around three years. The

categorization and conclusion of these cases lasted until the 1980s, or even to the present, as

the trial of Qiu demonstrates. The protracted process left not only the investigated targets

wondering why local leaders hesitated to punish them, but also left investigators struggling

to justify the campaign. In addition, as the reversal of unjust cases came to the fore in 1979,

some argued that they should also be rehabilitated since the political labels, such as landlords,

rich peasants, and rightists, were being removed.133 Therefore, the request for rehabilitation

was reflective of the political circumstances at the time.

In early 1979, the central leadership announced that restricting personal freedoms by

placing people in study classes violated the law. If the violation constituted a crime, the

lawbreaker had to assume criminal responsibility.134 The central shift of emphasis to law

130 Zhonggong Nantong diqu weiyuanhui, 110. 131 Zhonggong Nantong diqu weiyuanhui, 111. 132 Zhonggong Nantong diqu weiyuanhui, 113. 133 Zhonggong Nantong diqu weiyuanhui, 111. In September 1978, the Center decided to remove the labels of rightist. See Zhonggong zhongyang, “Pizhuan guanche zhongyang guanyu quanbu zhaidiao youpai fenzi maozi jueding de shishi fang’an de tongzhi” 批转贯彻中央关于全部摘掉右派分子帽子决定的实施方案的通知 [Commenting on and Transmitting the Notice on Carrying out the Embodiment of the Central Decision on Removing All Rightist Labels] (The Maoist Legacy, September 17, 1978), https://maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/15. Labels of landlords and rich peasants were removed in January 1979, See Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu dizhu funong fenzi zhaimao wenti he di fu zinü chengfen wenti de jueding” 关于地主、富农分子摘帽问题和地富子女成分问题的决定 [Decision on the Issues of Removing the Labels of Landlord and Rich Peasant and Class Background of Landlords and Rich Peasants’ Children] (The Maoist Legacy, January 11, 1979), https://maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/16. 134 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu zhuanfa di qi ci quanguo jiancha gongzuo huiyi jiyao de tongzhi” 关于转发


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further questioned and challenged the legitimacy of the Investigation Campaign and its

implementation at the local levels. According to Vice Secretary of the Suzhou Municipal Party

Committee Zhou Zhihua, “Some people said that it was illegal that we employed isolation and

study classes for our investigation, that it was the same as what Lin Biao and the Gang of Four

had done.”135 The same doubts arose at the provincial level and thus Jiangsu provincial

leaders, such as Xu Jiatun and Chu Jiang, strove to justify the use of study classes, repeatedly

emphasizing the differences between themselves and Lin Biao and the Gang of Four at a

provincial conference in March 1980. Xu Jiatun highlighted that:

Now there are all kinds of arguments, but it is completely wrong and impossible to

fundamentally negate the campaign to Expose, Criticize, and Investigate… We,

carrying out the investigation, were fighting Lin Biao and the Gang of Four

counterrevolutionary clique and its factional system. This is completely and

essentially different from what Lin Biao and the Gang of Four did to persecute cadres

and the masses and cause unjust, false and mistaken cases. [We] must not mix them

up.136

Chu Jiang also emphasized that they needed to carry out the Investigation Campaign using

various methods:

It is critical to investigate these people. It is not true that the campaign was excessive

and overdone… Under the circumstances of smashing the Gang of Four and its

factional system, it was absolutely necessary to adopt certain organizational

measures [including study classes] towards those involved in the Gang of Four’s

conspiratorial activities. Moreover, these organizational measures were strictly

controlled and approved by the [Jiangsu] Party Committee. Without these

organizational measures, it is hard to imagine that things would be sorted out and

the [factional] system could be destroyed in such a short time.137

《第七次全国检察工作会议纪要》的通知 [Notice on Transmitting “the Summary of the Seventh National Procuratorate Work Conference”], February 17, 1979, 117, E101-121-0381, NMA. 135 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Zhou Zhihua tongzhi zai shiwei jilü jiancha, qingcha dingxing chuli gongzuo huiyi kaishi shi de jianghua” 周治华同志在市委纪律检查清查定性处理工作会议开始时的讲话 [Zhou Zhihua’s Speech at the Opening of the Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection’s Meeting on Investigation, Categorization, and Punishment], May 5, 1980, 2, A1-1-196, SMA. 136 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, 2–3. 137 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, 2–3.


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By the same token, Party leaders in Suzhou also emphasized the Investigation Campaign’s

“essential differences from Lin Biao and the Gang of Four’s fascist investigation. The

[Investigation] Campaign should not be deemed wrong just because of some shortcomings

and mistakes in our work.” However, after the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law

were approved in June 1979, they pointed out that investigation methods such as study

classes should not be employed any longer.138 This suggests that the local leaders agreed that

investigation through study classes was problematic. They nonetheless upheld the struggle to

justify the campaign’s correctness so as to avoid damage to the leadership’s legitimacy. The

Party leadership ultimately compromised and acknowledged the problems with the

Investigation Campaign in the following years (Chapter 4).

Conclusion

The Investigation Campaign intended to redress the issues of factionalism and violence

that occurred during the Cultural Revolution. The launch of the campaign partly indicated that

the Party leadership felt obliged to investigate the past violence and hold identified

perpetrators responsible. More than just a process of labeling and excluding political rivals

after several central leaders were cast out, the campaign to Investigate People and Things

Linked to the Gang of Four addressed substantial violence and held violent perpetrators to

account. By investigating individuals’ actions, the CCP defined and differentiated outcast

perpetrators. By promising leniency, the Party authorities intended to control the way in

which the outcasts remembered the past and thus redefine and rewrite the past violence.

However, Jiangsu’s case demonstrates that the designated followers strongly resisted the

investigation and often negotiated their categories. Local cadres in some regions also resisted

labeling Gang of Four followers and challenged the state process of blaming them for past

violence. They tended to exempt themselves from accountability instead of following higher

orders. Their resistance mostly resulted in them being labeled supporters of the Gang of Four

and removed from power.

Meanwhile, the Jiangsu leadership also faced the challenge of balancing between the

138 These two laws were approved at the Second Conference of the Fifth National People’s Congress in June 1979 and put into effect in January 1980. Both laws were first formally adopted in the history of PRC. For more information regarding criminal justice in China see Mühlhahn, Klaus, Criminal Justice in China: A History (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press, 2009).


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changing central policies and local public demands. They had to repeatedly adjust and

sometimes reverse their approach to dealing with the designated perpetrators. In the face of

the changing political narratives, the challenge was considerable. The new central scheme –

reestablishing the socialist legality and building up a law-based rule – brought the legality of

the Investigation Campaign into question. Both those being investigated and local cadres

challenged the legitimacy of the local leadership’s authority. The Jiangsu leadership had to

repeatedly explain that the Investigation Campaign had been necessary and correct in order

to maintain its prestige and authority among the public. The local leaders were caught in a

dilemma whereby they had utilized the campaign-style methods to investigate the Gang of

Four Clique and then were challenged by the changed central narrative of law.139 They thus

attempted to abandon political campaigns and resorted to legal measures. The change in the

investigation methods multiplied the challenges faced by local authorities. Local cadres had

to rework the evidence of crimes, investigation reports, and witness testimonies that they

had collected and written up. The process of dealing with the designated perpetrators

continued into the 1980s (Chapter 4). Ending the political violence therefore involved a long

negotiated and compromised process among various levels of the Party-state.

139 Leese and Engman, “Victims, Perpetrators, and the Role of Law in Maoist China,” 2–3.

Chapter 3 Reversing the Positions of Perpetrator and Victim:

Correcting Injustices and Making Perpetrators Accountable

If policies cannot be fixed (政策不落实), the masses will be discontent and [the leadership]

will lose the public sympathy and isolate itself from the people.

– A Suzhou leader at the Conference on Fixing Policies in September 1977

We would continue violating citizens’ rights if we did not reverse unjust cases and revise

wrongful cases, which is something that cannot be tolerated by Party discipline and state laws.

– Jiang Hua at the Eighth National People’s Judicial Work Conference in April–May 1978

The campaign to Expose, Criticize, and Investigate the Gang of Four not only developed

the notions of perpetrator and victim among the public, but also brought Cultural

Revolutionary injustices to light. The CCP leadership inevitably had to redress injustices and

deal with their perpetrators. Redressing past injustices became a necessary component of the

campaign against the Gang of Four. The CCP leadership used the addressing of injustices not

only as a way of revealing the Gang of Four’s crimes, but also as a way to distinguish the Party

from the Gang of Four. The leadership thus devoted significant efforts to correcting Cultural

Revolutionary injustices, whether legal or moral, in order to create a break with its violent

recent past. The redressing of past injustices constitutes a primary sign of discontinuity with

the past and develops the potential for political transition.1

In official documents, injustices were usually framed as “unjust, false, and mistaken cases”

(冤假错案), a significant term that shaped the post-Mao transition.2 The judiciary had used

the concepts of “unjust cases” (冤案) and “mistaken cases” (错案) since the 1950s to describe

those who had received severe punishment, been wrongly charged for committing crimes, or

judged and sentenced following the wrong legal procedure during various political campaigns.

In early 1978, the judiciary added the term “false cases” (假案), referring to cases that had

been fabricated and where neither the crimes nor the criminals existed. Soon these three

concepts – unjust cases, false cases, and mistaken cases – were merged into the expression

1 Teitel, Ruti G., Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 124–29. 2 Leese, Daniel, “The Politics of Historical Justice after the Cultural Revolution,” Database, The Maoist Legacy, n.d., https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/politics-of-historical-justice-after-the-cultural-revolution.

Chapter 3 Reversing the Positions of Perpetrator and Victim

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“unjust, false, and mistaken cases.”

This chapter draws upon archival materials concerning rehabilitation and case reversals

to explore the ways in which the Jiangsu Party and legal institutions undertook redressing

past wrongs and dealing with the issue of accountability immediately following the downfall

of the Gang of Four. The chapter mainly focuses on the period between October 1976, with

the arresting of the Gang of Four, and December 1978, when the campaign to Expose, Criticize

and Investigate the Gang of Four came to an end. The redressing of injustices in this period is

important because it provides us with an insight into how case verdict reversals changed the

definition of perpetrator after the Cultural Revolution, how this change brought about large-

scale case reviews and reversals, and how to attribute responsibility that came with the

redressing of injustices. Most of the scholarship acknowledges the significance of the year

1978, which set the course for the restoration of all aspects of society.3 However, the period

between 1976 and 1978 is often underestimated in both Party accounts and scholarship. This

chapter offers a fresh perspective on the process of redressing wrongfully adjudicated cases

during this period, especially in the judicial sector. Investigating individual and municipal cases

in Jiangsu further reveals regional dynamics in redressing past injustices in the wake of the

Maoist period.

In default of specific central policies, Jiangsu was among the first regions to review and

reverse unjust, false, and mistaken cases. There are three reasons why Jiangsu courts started

to correct past wrongs and rehabilitate victims in a rather early stage. First, the criticism

campaign against the Gang of Four revealed past injustices to the public. There was a public

outcry as people demanded that past injustices be redressed. This chapter suggests that a

constant stream of petitions and appeals from ordinary people pressured local cadres in

Jiangsu to respond as quickly as possible and failure to respond to these demands would

further damage the Party’s reputation, a reputation that was already shaken by the

destructive consequences of the Cultural Revolution. The Jiangsu leadership thus began to

3 The current literature on rehabilitation abounds with examples of Party high-ranking cadres and macro level of state policies, such as Dai Huang, Hu Yaobang yu pingfan yuan jia cuo an 胡耀邦与平反冤假错案 [Hu Yaobang and Rehabilitating Unjust, False, and Wrongful Cases] (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1998); Xiao, Lishi de zhuangui: cong buluan fanzheng dao gaige kaifang (1978-1981). There exist few exceptions. For example, both Daniel Leese and Susan Trevaskes focused on the detailed intricacies of redressing cases and rehabilitating victims by a local court in Beijing and Inner Mongolia in post-1978, see Leese, Daniel, “Revising Political Verdicts in Post-Mao China: The Case of Beijing’s Fengtai District,” in Maoism at the Grassroots: Everyday Life in China’s Era of High Socialism, ed. Brown, Jeremy and Johnson, Matthew D. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 102–28; Trevaskes, “People’s Justice and Injustice.”


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take action by addressing the increasing public cry for justice.

Second, reviewing and revising unjust cases was not a novel approach for judical cadres.4

The process of righting wrongs in order to ease the tensions caused by coercive measures in

a series of political movements is a pattern that can be traced back to 1935, when redressing

issues in the wake of the elimination of counterrevolutionaries (肃清反革命) took place at

the northwest base area in Northern Shaanxi.5 Correction and reversals also took place in

1943 after the Rescue Movement (抢救运动) in Yan’an.6 This pattern of “political campaign-

rehabilitation” was explicated and developed at the time as such:

During investigation campaigns, there must be actions that are excessively leftist;

there must be mistaken confessions through torture (torture by individuals and the

masses); there must be turning facts upside down and severe punishment. Leaders

must pay close attention and correct them at the right moment. It is not good to

correct the excessively leftist tendency too early or too late; correcting too early

would be aimless and fruitless and hinder the development of campaigns; correcting

too late would cause mistakes and sap the [Party’s] vitality (损伤元气). Thus the

principal is to pay close attention and correct at the right moment.7

This “strategy” – generate wrongful cases during political campaigns and then revise

previous verdicts afterwards – was a feature of Party politics and judicial work in the Maoist

period.8 For example, the Second National Judicial Conference held in 1953 called upon local

courts to review and correct cases implicating people who had been mistakenly arrested (错

4 Leese and Engman, “Victims, Perpetrators, and the Role of Law in Maoist China.” 5 During the elimination of counterrevolutionaries, base area leader Liu Zhidan was arrested and accused of being a counterrevolutionary. See Wei Deping, “Shanxi sufan de lailong-qumai” “陕北肃反”的来龙去脉 [Causes and Effects of Eliminating Counterrevolutionaries in North Shaanxi], dangshi yanjiu yu jiaoxue, no. 5 (2010): 39–51. This incident was not solved until 1985, when the Central Consultative Committee reviewed this case and reached a final verdict. See Wang Xiaozhong, “Zhongguwei zhuchi jiejue xibei wenti” 中顾委主持解决“西北问题” [The Central Consultative Committee Upholding to Address the Northwestern Issues], Yanhuang chunqiu, no. 8 (2011). 6 Seybolt, Peter J., “Terror and Conformity: Counterespionage Campaigns, Rectification, and Mass Movements, 1942-1943,” Modern China 12, no. 1 (January 1, 1986): 39–73; Song Jinshou, “Yan’an ‘qiangjiu yundong’ zhong de Kang Sheng, Mao Zedong yu Zhou Enlai” 延安"抢救运动"中的康生、毛泽东与周恩来 [Kang Sheng, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in the Yan’an Rescue Campaign], Dangshi bolan, no. 07 (2018): 34–41. 7 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu shencha ganbu de jueding” 关于审查干部的决定 [Decision on Examining Cadres], in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji 1942-1944 (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1986), 332. 8 For re-examination of Party personnel following rectification movements, see Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China.


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捕), detained (错押), or sentenced (错判) during the 1951 Suppress Counterrevolutionaries

Campaign (镇压反革命).9 Following the Elimination of Counterrevolution (肃清反革命), the

Center stressed the need to examine previous unjust and wrongful cases at the Third National

Judicial Conference in 1956.10 Again, between 1958 and 1962, the people’s courts carried out

another round of reviews and corrections.11 During the Cultural Revolution, two major rounds

of “liberation,” mainly to restore cadres to Party and administrative positions, took place in

1971 after the Lin Biao Incident and in 1974 following the investigation of the so-called May

16 Counterrevolutionary elements, a campaign that targeted 10 million people nationwide;

Jiangsu was one of the most severely affected regions.12 It thus seemed natural that, after the

Cultural Revolution, Jiangsu courts would follow the same pattern.

Finally, Jiangsu judicial cadres were obviously familiar with the pattern of reviewing and

correcting wrongfully adjudicated cases following political campaigns. Many judicial leaders

had worked in the judicial system since the early 1950s, including Jiangsu High People’s

Court’s President Lin Xizhao (林希昭) and Advisor Lin Haoran (林浩然), and Vice President of

the Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court Jia Huiqing (贾惠卿). All three had been in leading

positions in the judicial sector since it was established. For example, Lin Haoran assumed the

post of President of the Nanjing Municipal Intermediate People’s Court and the Jiangsu High

People’s Court between 1952 and 1963. He became an advisory leader of the Jiangsu High

People’s Court in September 1978.13 In the case of Lin Xizhao, he was assigned to the position

9 By July 1954, courts in Jiangsu had ferret out 1 150 wrongful cases in total. See Jiangsu sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Jiangsu shengzhi shenpanzhi 江苏省志·审判志 [Chronicle of Jiangsu Volume on Adjudication] (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1997), 285. 10 Zhonggong zhongyang, “关于切实做好镇反检查工作的通知 Guanyu qieshi zuohao zhenfan jiancha gongzuo de tongzhi”, in Shanghai shi gaoji renmin fayuan and Shanghai shi sifaju, eds., Sifa zhengce xuanbian 司法政策选编 [Selected Works of Judicial Policies] (Shanghai, 1982), 201–4. 11 Jiangsu sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Jiangsu shengzhi shenpanzhi, 288–89. 12 For the nationwide description of the so-called May 16 Counterrevolutionaries see MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, 221–38. For the recollection on the Jiangsu investigation into the May 16 Elements, see Pan Zhuping, “Jiangsu qingcha 516 yuanan” 江苏清查"5·16"冤案 [The May 16 Unjust Case in Jiangsu], Yanhuang chunqiu, no. 11 (2007): 63–66; Ding, “Yuanyu biandi de Jiangsu sheng qingcha wu yao liu yundong.” 13 Veteran cadres were later organized in consultative committees at the central and provincial levels starting from 1982 as a result of the abolition of lifelong tenure in leading posts in the CCP regime. Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun were directors of the Central Consultative Committee between 1982 and 1992. It became the actual power holder of the regime in the 1980s of China. See Li Hong, “Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun yu Zhongyang guwen weiyuanhui” 邓小平、陈云与中央顾问委员会 [Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun and the Central Consultative Committee], zhonggong dangshi yanjiu, no. 03 (2017): 60–71; Shen Bingqing, “Gaige kaifang de zhongyao tupokou: lun Zhongyang guwen weiyuanhui de lishi diwei he yiyi” 改革开放的重要突破口: 论中央顾问委员会的历史地位和意义 [Breakthrough of Reform and Opening-up: Discussion on the Historical Role and Significance


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of Vice President of Jiangsu High People’s Court in 1973 when the courts were restored after

being abolished in 1968 nationwide. Although most of these judicial cadres had faced

persecution at some point, they regained power during and after the Cultural Revolution.

Equipped with years of direct experience in handling such redresses,14 the Jiangsu authorities

acted on their own initiative to respond to a public call to redress past injustices. The Jiangsu

judiciaries’ review and correcting of past injustices thus echoed their previous views and

careers.15

During the early posg-Mao period, local input and experimentation in the policymaking

process increased China’s capacity for managing crises and successful transition. 16 The

policies of reviewing and reversing unjust cases that developed in Jiangsu turned out to be

successful at addressing the Cultural Revolution and mobilizing people to move forward. The

central leadership chose to promote Jiangsu’s initiatives because they presented its political

agenda – economic development. Jiangsu’s policies influenced and were integrated into

central policies on addressing Cultural Revolutionary injustices. In this way, redressing past

wrongs was not only a way to deal with the past, but also considered a state process of

mobilizing the populace to take part in the new course of economic development, or the so-

called Four Modernizations that included military, economy, education, and agriculture.

3.1 From Counterrevolutionary to Hero: “Solely Opposing the Gang of Four”

Following the arrest of the Gang of Four, in addition to conducting nationwide criticism

and searching for followers, the central leadership also sought to rehabilitate those who had

been punished for criticizing the four former leaders during the Cultural Revolution. Both

central and local cadres brought up the issue of cases directly connected to the Gang of Four,

particularly the 1976 Tiananmen Incident cases.17 On December 5, 1976, the CCP Central

Committee under Hua Guofeng issued the central document Zhongfa 1976 No. 23, stipulating

of the Central Consultative Committee], Lilun yun gaige, no. 01 (2017): 94–98. 14 Hui Yuyu (惠浴宇), Head of Leading Group of Jiangsu Political-Legal Sector (政法口), also described how he gathered a group of experienced judicial officials to review appellant cases in his biography. See Hui Yuyu, Pengyou ren 朋友人 [Friends], ed. Yu Heizi (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1996). 15 Potter also made a similar argument when examining Peng Zhen’s role in law building in the post-Mao period, see Potter, Pitman B., From Leninist Discipline to Socialist Legalism: Peng Zhen on Law and Political Authority in the PRC (Stanford University Press, 2003), 107–9. 16 Heilmann and Perry, 8. 17 Han Gang, “‘Liangge fanshi’ de youlai ji qi zhongjie” “两个凡是”的由来及其终结 [The Origins and Final Stage of the “Two Whatevers”], zhonggong dangshi yanjiu, no. 11 (2009): 55–57.


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that the cases of people who had “solely opposed the Gang of Four” (纯属反对“四人帮”)

should be reopened (重新处理).18 The document stipulated that the detained must be

released, charges dropped, the investigation must cease, and related disciplinary and criminal

sanctions that had been imposed must be revoked. This decision demonstrates that, even

though the CCP Central Committee did not reverse the verdict on the Tiananmen Incident

until early 1979, it began to rehabilitate implicated victims in late 1976, two years earlier than

the motion to reverse case verdicts at the Third Plenum.19

The cases of “solely opposing the Gang of Four” in Jiangsu refer to those resulting from

the Nanjing Incident in March-April 1976, a massive demonstration to memorialize the

recently deceased Premier Zhou Enlai and express opposition to the resurgence of factional

activities in Jiangsu, which is generally perceived as a prelude to the Tiananmen Incident.20

The close relationship between the Nanjing Incident and the Tiananmen Incident is a major

reason why the Jiangsu leadership began to address this issue earlier than other regions. The

CCP Central Committee announced that the incident at Tiananmen Square was

counterrevolutionary on April 4, 1976, and they arrested a large group of alleged

counterrevolutionaries.21 Soon after, Jiangsu arrested 40 participants and detained another

117 people; many others were investigated in their work units.22 The Jiangsu Provincial Public

Security Bureau detained and arrested 11 students and workers who had been involved in

activities of writing posters, shouting slogans, or giving speeches in the streets in Nanjing.23

18 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu chongxin chuli chuanshu fandui sirenbang anjian de tongzhi” 关于重新处理纯属反对“四人帮”案件的通知 [Notice on Re-Opening the Cases of Solely Opposing the Gang of Four] (The Maoist Legacy, December 5, 1976), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/1998. 19 This conclusion shows the opposite of the 1981 Resolution on Hua Guofeng’s mistake of delaying and obstructing the restoration of veteran cadres and the rehabilitation of historical wrongs, including the Tiananmen Incident. For the overall examination of the reversal of the Tiananmen Incident at the central level, see Teiwes and Sun, “Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and Reversing the Verdict on the 1976 ‘Tiananmen Incident.’” 20 For more information on the Nanjing Incident, see Heilmann, Sebastian, Nanking 1976: spontane Massenbewegungen im Gefolge der Kulturrevolution: Eine Regionalstudie (Brockmeyer, 1990); Dong and Walder, “Foreshocks.” 21 Yan and Gao, Turbulent Decade, 495. 22 Li Xining described the course of the incident in his interview with Dong Guoqiang in 2007, see Dong Guoqiang, ed., “Li Xining jiaoshou fangtan” 李西宁教授访谈 [Interview with Prof. Li Xining], in 亲历“文革”：１４位南京大学师生口述历史 (New York: Cozy Graphics Corp., 2009). 23 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Pizhuan sheng gong’anju dangzu guanyu dui chunshu fandui sirenbang de ren zuohao pingfan chuli gongzuo de baogao” 批转省公安局党组关于对纯属反对“四人帮”的人做好平反处理工作的报告 [Commenting on and Transmitting the Party Group of the Provincial Public Security Bureau’s Report on Rehabilitating and Handling People Who Solely Opposed the Gang of Four], May 30, 1978, 167, E101-121-0365, NMA.


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Among them, Li Xining (李西宁),24 Secretary of the Mathematics Institute General Branch of

the Youth League at Nanjing University in 1975-1976, was considered to be one of the leaders

in the Nanjing Incident and he was arrested on the charge of being a counterrevolutionary.

Jiangsu considered Li’s case as an example of the “solely opposing the Gang of Four” cases.

Drawing upon Jiangsu archival records and Li Xining’s diary,25 this section shows how the

official definition of perpetrator changed in 1976-1978, and how the change turned a former

“counterrevolutionary” into a hero. Li Xining took the opportunity provided by the campaign

against the Gang of Four to improve his political situation. His constant appeals and petitions

eventually managed to get him rehabilitated. The reversal of “solely opposing the Gang of

Four” case decisions was groundbreaking and eventually made a tectonic shift from political

campaigns to a restorative solution to past injustices possible.

Following the issuance of the central document Zhongfa 1976 No. 23, detainees related

to the Tiananmen Incident were portrayed as the Gang of Four’s opponents and victims. On

December 8, 1976, three days after the central order, the Jiangsu Provincial Public Security

Bureau referred to Li Xining and another nine detainees as having “solely opposed the Gang

of Four” and released them immediately.26 However, the case verdicts were not entirely

reversed; the decision to release issued by the Jiangsu Public Security Bureau still declared

the Nanjing Incident counterrevolutionary. Li and the other detainees were only released

because their actions were in opposition to Jiang Qing and her allies. Accordingly, their

verdicts were changed to “release after education” (教育释放) or “innocent and released”

(无罪释放), but they failed to explicitly clarify that they had been wrongly detained or

arrested. All files created during the detention and investigation were also preserved.27 This

was because the Central Committee and the Jiangsu Party Committee did not reverse the

verdicts on the Tiananmen Incident and the Nanjing Incident respectively at the time. Thus,

under the guidelines of the central document, Li and others implicated in the Nanjing Incident

24 Li Xining is current a professor at the University of Guelph in Canada. 25 The author has acquired Li Xining’s permission for using his diary. Note that the diary was abridged by the editor. It was also published in Li Xining, “Wangshi zhuiyi: si wu yundong qianhou” 往事追忆：四五运动前后 [Recollection of the Past: The Ins and Outs of the Tiananmen Incident], in 四五运动：中国二十世纪的转折点——三十年后的回忆与思考, by Chen Ziming et al. (Hong Kong: Bo zhi chubanshe, 2006). The diary is available on Li’s personal website http://www.cis.uoguelph.ca/~xli/interests.html, accessed August 17, 2018. 26 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Pizhuan sheng gong’anju dangzu guanyu dui chunshu fandui sirenbang de ren zuohao pingfan chuli gongzuo de baogao,” 167. 27 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, 167..

http://www.cis.uoguelph.ca/~xli/interests.html


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were unable to clear their names.

Although the above decision only served as a gesture implying the Gang’s crimes, it freed

a number of wrongly detained victims and enabled more people to appeal their cases. Victims

of the Nanjing Incident made further efforts to reverse their cases. According to Li Xining’s

diary, he began to appeal to various Party organizations at all levels and demand full

rehabilitation after being released in December 1976. 28 The Nanjing University Party

Committee promised to remove the previous verdict from his personnel file and rehabilitate

him to a limited degree. However, neither rehabilitation nor destruction of the investigation

materials in his personnel file took place and Li was only assigned to a position in the

university in late April 1977.29 Li made dozens of appeals, including letters to Xu Jiatun,

Secretary of Jiangsu Party Committee. The pressure for rehabilitation came from the whole

province. In the second half of 1977, the Jiangsu Provincial Public Security Bureau had already

requested Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee’s suggestions on rehabilitating victims of the

Nanjing Incident.30 On September 9, 1977, the Changzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau

announced the reversal of judgments for 20 people who had been wrongfully arrested and

detained during the Nanjing Incident.31 Local leadership faced pressure for the rehabilitation

of those implicated in the Nanjing Incident.

Under increasing pressure, the Jiangsu High People’s Court extended the scale of case

reversals. On December 17, 1977, the president of Jiangsu High People’s Court, Lin Xizhao (林

希昭), pointed out that “generally opposing the Gang of Four cases” (基本上属反对四人帮

案件) should also be reopened according to the 1976 Document No. 23. By making a slight

modification, Lin Xizhao in fact extended the range of case reversals from “solely” (纯属) to

“generally opposing the Gang of Four cases.” This modification would include more cases in

the category. As a result, thousands of cases had to be reexamined and revised.

This modification was soon adopted by central-level policies. In January 1978, the CCP

Central Committee disseminated the summary of the 17th National Public Security Conference

and responded to the need to expand on cases “solely opposing the Gang of Four.” The

28 Li, “Wangshi zhuiyi: si wu yundong qianhou.” 29 Li. 30 Li. 31 Changzhou shi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, ed., Changzhou shi zhi 常州市志 [The Chronicle of Changzhou], vol. 3 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1995), 1122.


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summary stipulated that those who had been punished for opposing the Gang of Four and

their followers must be rehabilitated without exception.32 The statement specifically used the

word “rehabilitation” (平反) instead of the more ambiguous “reopening.” Moreover, the

summary demanded the reversal of decisions on cases of opposing not only the Gang of Four,

but also their followers. This central policy extended the reversed cases to a large scale,

including all those implicated by local factional struggles.

Following the provincial and central instructions, the Jiangsu Provincial Public Security

Bureau again revised the case verdicts for Li Xining and the other nine people, issuing the

release decision (释放决定书) in April 1978 (Figure 2). The Bureau reviewed these cases and

concluded in its report to the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee that these case verdicts

were not appropriate and five steps should be taken to reverse these case decisions, including:

1) revise the December 1976 release decision; 2) announce rehabilitation within a limited

scale and restore their reputations; 3) destroy all materials that were created during

detention and investigation; 4) return all detainees’ photos and fingerprints taken during

detention to their work units and destroy them in their presence; and 5) compensate them

for all unpaid salaries.33 This meant that the case verdicts were completely reversed and

everything collected was now recognized as wrong evidence. The destruction of the wrong

evidence erased traces of any wrong that people had experienced during the Cultural

Revolution. However, the decision did not connect Li to the Nanjing Incident or the

Tiananmen Incident so as to avoid redressing the verdicts related to these events. The Nanjing

Incident was still deemed counterrevolutionary.

It is also worth noting that neither the earlier revised verdict nor this reversal decision for

Li Xining, or the majority of its kind, mentioned who was accountable for the unjust cases.

Therefore, the Party-state officially acknowledged and addressed past wrongs, but failed to

attribute accountability. The approach to past wrongs separated the issue of accountability

for violation of individual rights from the case for rehabilitation.34

32 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu pizhuan ‘di shi qi ci quanguo gong’an huiyi jiyao’ de tongzhi,” 17. 33 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Pizhuan sheng gong’anju dangzu guanyu dui chunshu fandui sirenbang de ren zuohao pingfan chuli gongzuo de baogao,” 168. 34 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 2000, 146.


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Figure 2: Jiangsu Provincial Public Security’s Release Decision

(sample, for reference) Xxxx University (or work unit) xxx department (title) xx comrade put up posters (or delivered speeches, shouted slogans) against the Gang of Four out of their love for Premier Zhou when the Gang of Four were on the rampage. Xxx was detained (or arrested) on April 21, 1976. According to the Central Committee [1976] No. 23 Document, these posters (or slogans, speeches) were solely to oppose the Gang of Four after reinvestigation. Thus, [we] decide to release, rehabilitate, and clear their name. All materials generated during investigation should be destroyed and their garnished wages during detention should be paid retroactively. year month day

The Nanjing University Organization Department immediately forwarded this new policy

to Li Xining. Although Li expressed discontent, he wrote in his diary that “in any case there is

finally a verdict; no matter if it is conflicting or not, [the] verdict at least suggests that the

Nanjing Incident was in essence ‘solely opposing the Gang of Four.’”35 What Li meant by

“conflicting” here was that the participants in the Nanjing Incident were rehabilitated, but the

event itself was still deemed counterrevolutionary. Li’s reaction reveals that he was not

satisfied with the verdict. Li eventually received the release decision on September 12, 1978,

nearly two years after his release.

Nonetheless, Li Xining’s case, among others, was only completely redressed when the

verdict on the Nanjing Incident was reversed. On November 15, 1978, the same day that the

Beijing Municipal Party Committee reversed the judgment on the Tiananmen Incident, the

Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee declared the Nanjing Incident revolutionary instead of

counterrevolutionary, as previously stated, and in the following week it rehabilitated 157

people who had been implicated in this incident.36 Li Xining also received a formal reversal

decision (平反决定书) on November 17, 1978 (Figure 3).37 He has treasured this document

ever since and showed it to the author. Unlike the previous two release decisions in December

35 Li, “Wangshi zhuiyi: si wu yundong qianhou.” 36 Jiangsu sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Jiangsu shengzhi: zhonggong zhi, 604. 37 Mr. Li sent me this document when I contacted him through email and asked him whether I could interview him. Although it has been over 40 years since he was rehabilitated, Mr. Li still carefully, probably lifelong, preserves this document. It is a certification to prove his political innocence. On the other hand, without availability to official records, or simply most of the relevant records were destroyed by the state, this document secures his political life.


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1976 and April 1978, the narrative in this reversal decision completely changed. Firstly, the

nature of the Nanjing Incident was reversed, from counterrevolutionary to revolutionary.

Secondly, words such as “bravely stepping forward” (挺身而出) and “revolutionary action”

(革命行动) praised Li’s actions, such as putting up slogans and posters during the Nanjing

Incident. Thirdly, for the first time, it acknowledged that Li had been falsely detained, while

previous release decisions only referred to “arrest” or “detention.” The reversal decision also

suggested a complete rehabilitation (彻底平反) and destruction of all materials related to Li’s

case. Finally, this document declared that the Nanjing Incident was revolutionary. All these

variations in the final reversal decision demonstrate entirely different verdicts on both

historical events and individual lives. Case reversals reversed the definition of perpetrator.

Figure 3: Jiangsu Provincial Public Security Bureau's Reversal Decision

Jiangsu Provincial Public Security Bureau Reversal Decision

Comrade Li Xining, Deputy Secretary of the Nanjing University Youth League Committee (former Secretary of the Mathematics Department General Youth League Branch), bravely stepped forward in the Nanjing revolutionary incident of defending Premier Zhou and opposing the Gang of Four that erupted on March 29, 1976, and put up posters against the Gang of Four. He was wrongfully detained between April 21 and December 7, 1976. The actions of comrade Li Xining were solely motivated by his indefinite love, indefinite yearning, and deep grief for Premier Zhou and solely motivated by hatred for the Gang of Four’s monstrous crimes that wrecked the country and brought ruin to the people. His actions were nothing other than revolutionary. According to Chairman Mao’s policy that mistakes must be corrected whenever discovered, [we] hereby completely rehabilitate him, restore his reputation, and destroy all relevant materials. November 17, 1978 (Stamp: Jiangsu Provincial Public Security Bureau)

Li Xining not only cleared his name, but also improved his political status. Li was regarded

as a model of fighting against the Gang of Four and he benefited from his experience in the

Nanjing Incident. Along with invitations to talk about his experiences of fighting against the

Gang of Four at various central meetings, Li Xining was selected as a member of the Central

Committee of the Communist Youth League of China in October 1978. He was invited to give

numerous interviews, and his story was reported in several newspapers and even retold in

various types of literature. Nanjing University turned Li Xining into a hero for fighting the Gang


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of Four by endowing him with the honorary title “Heroic Warrior” (英勇战士) in November

1978. The changed official definition of perpetrator turned a former “counterrevolutionary”

accused of attacking central leaders into a hero fighting against the Gang of Four.

However, the reversal decision still did not address the issue of accountability. Instead,

the local authorities avoided assigning accountability for past injustices to individuals, not

even to the Gang of Four and its followers who had been blamed overall for Cultural

Revolutionary injustices. In November 1978, Hua Guofeng officially disclaimed the

accountability of Party committees and any individuals who had executed central orders to

prevent mourning activities for Zhou Enlai.38 Thus, neither the Party-state nor individuals

were accountable for wrongful arrests and imprisonment during the Tiananmen Incident.

Li’s struggle for “justice” mirrors the experience of a large number of people in the post-

Cultural Revolution society where a rapid political transition was taking place. A person once

labeled as a perpetrator could become a hero, and vice versa.39 An individual’s life was

constantly being rewritten as political climates changed. Furthermore, passionate individual

petitions and appeals in various regions pressured local authorities to address past injustices

on a large scale. Reversing Li’s case decision, alongside thousands of others, opened the gates

to redressing many more Cultural Revolution cases.

3.2 Jiangsu’s Early Reviews of Cases in 1977

Jiangsu reviewed and redressed many other cases beyond the scope of “solely opposing

the Gang of Four” in 1977. Jiangsu led reviews and reversals of unjust cases nationwide. As

early as July 1977, the Jiangsu Provincial High People’s Court and the Public Security Bureau

jointly requested the review of cases adjudicated during the Cultural Revolution. 40 They

demanded that the review focus on cases from three political campaigns between 1968 and

1972, including Cleansing the Class Ranks (清理阶级队伍), One Strike, Three Antis (一打三

38 Hua, “Zai zhongyang gongzuo huiyi shang de di er ci jianghua,” 190. 39 Yang, “How a ‘Bad Element’ Was Made: The Discovery, Accusation, and Punishment of Zang Qiren.” 40 Nantong shi gong’anju and Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu yuan cuo an dianxing diaocha qingkuang baogao” 关于冤错案典型调查情况报告 [Report on Investigating Typical Unjust and Wrongful Cases], October 5, 1977, 11, E237-121-0056, NMA; Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Shiwei fuze tongzhi zai luoshi zhengce huiyi shang de jianghua” 市委负责同志在落实政策会议上的讲话 [Speech of Municipal Leaders in Charge at the Meeting of Fixing Policies], September 1, 1977, 111, C3-2-175, SMA.


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反), and the campaign to Ferret out May 16 Counterrevolutionaries (清查五一六) in Jiangsu.41

This was the period when the military took over local administration, and public security,

procuratorate, and courts were jointly managed by the military control committee. Walder’s

research shows that the majority of injuries and deaths took place during this period.42

As argued above, case reversal and rehabilitation was not novel to Jiangsu cadres. For

example, Jiangsu had started to reverse verdicts of May 16 cases between 1974 and 1975 in

order to address the severe consequences of the campaign to Ferret out May 16

Counterrevolutionaries.43 This followed the pattern of “political campaign-rehabilitation.”

However, the criticism of Deng Xiaoping in early 1976 interrupted the rehabilitation. The

Jiangsu leadership considered this a crime of the Gang of Four. In 1977, Jiangsu cadres

explained why they should correct past wrongs by quoting Mao Zedong’s speech from January

31, 1962 at the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference addressing the disasters resulting from

the Great Leap Forward:

In all stages of human history, there have always been facts that people were

wrongfully dealt… It is inevitable, whether under leaderships with the correct line or

with the wrong line. There is a difference, however, that under leadership with the

correct line, as soon as it discovers that people have been dealt with wrongly, it

identifies them, vindicates them, apologizes to them, makes them feel better and

raise their heads again. However, under leadership with the wrong line, it is

impossible to do so. Only when people representing the right line rise up can they

41 The Cleansing the Class Ranks campaign lasted between 1968 and 1970 in Jiangsu. On November 13, 1970, the Jiangsu Revolutionary Committee reported 83,190 counterrevolutionaries to the Ministry of Public Security. The One Strike, Three Antis campaign started in 1970 and lasted until 1972. On May 17, 1972, the Jiangsu Revolutionary Committee recorded that 408,132 cases were filed ( 立案 ) and there were 77,655 counterrevolutionaries and criminals identified. The campaign to ferret out May 16 Counterrevolutionaries lasted between 1970 and 1974, during which 260,000 people were subjected to various forms of violence and over 130,000 of them were investigated as May 16 elements. The consequences in Jiangsu were so severe that the Center intervened and requested to rehabilitate implicated people. For more information on these campaigns, see Jiangsu sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Jiangsu shengzhi: zhonggong zhi, 316–20; Ding, “Yuanyu biandi de Jiangsu sheng qingcha wu yao liu yundong.” 42 Walder, “Rebellion and Repression in China, 1966–1971,” 2014. 43 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Guanyu qingcha ‘wu yao liu’ gongzuo zhong yixie wenti de chuli yijian” 关于清查“五一六”工作中一些问题的处理意见 [Suggestions on Dealing with Some Issues in the Work of Ferreting out May 16], August 31, 1974, D101-121-0480, NMA.


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correct the wrongs at the right moment through the method of democratic

centralism.44

Jiangsu cadres differentiated themselves from the Gang of Four by stating that they

represented the correct line, and they considered the criticism of the Gang of Four the right

moment to redress past injustices.

However, in the absence of central-level policies, why did local cadres risk reviewing and

reversing cases at this point in time? To take Suzhou as an example, the local leadership

immediately followed the provincial order and began the practice of reviewing cases in

August 1977. In addition to those noted above, there were other reasons for Suzhou cadres

starting early. First, the new leadership in Suzhou had been less involved in local affairs during

the Cultural Revolution. The Jiangsu Party Committee shuffled the Suzhou leadership in April

1977, replacing Secretary of the Suzhou Party Committee Liu Boying (刘伯英) with Jia Shizhen

(贾世珍), who had not been directly involved in the Cultural Revolution in Suzhou. Liu was

subjected to public criticism for having collaborated with Suzhou factional leaders. Without

the risk of being implicated by investigations into past injustices, Jia Shizhen was inclined to

reverse previous verdicts. Pan Linru (潘林儒), Secretary of the Suzhou Party Committee prior

to the Cultural Revolution, was himself a victim of the Cultural Revolution. He took charge of

the work to review and rehabilitate in 1977 in Suzhou.

Second, Suzhou was institutionally prepared. At the Suzhou municipal level, the Party

Committee reactivated its Policy Investigation Group (政策调查组) attached to the Leading

Group of Fixing Policy (落实政策领导小组), an institution set up in 1975 for the overall

reviewing of cases when Deng Xiaoping took over, and it tried to repair the damage caused

by the Cultural Revolution.45 The group came to a standstill following Deng Xiaoping’s second

downfall in early 1976. The term “fixing policy” was used to delineate the rehabilitation of

people and reversal of cases. Under the direction of the restored Leading Group of Fixing

Policy, the priority was to handle appellate cases of cadres, and then political cases that

implicated ordinary people, such as counterrevolutionary cases.46 Various institutions carried

44 Mao Zedong, “Zai kuoda de zhongyang gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua” 在扩大的中央工作会议上的讲话 [Speech at the Enlarged Central Work Conference], in Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, vol. 10 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996), 19. 45 MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, 379–87. 46 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Shiwei fuze tongzhi zai luoshi zhengce huiyi shang de jianghua,” 116.


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out reviews of unjust cases. Party bodies, judicial organs, and work units that were

responsible for past injustices were essentially obligated to review and correct wrongs. Cadre

cases, including issues of Party membership, rightists, traitors, spies, and so forth, were

reviewed by the Organization Department that had been restored in April 1977.47 With regard

to political cases, the courts mainly reviewed adjudicated cases, while public security

apparatuses focused on cases related to labeling (戴帽). After a case review was completed,

the Leading Group of Fixing Policy would discuss it and reach a final verdict.

Another important reason for local leaders redressing unjust cases left by the Cultural

Revolution was to respond to the difficult situation on the ground: the general public was

constantly lodging appeals and petitions for justice. In August 1977, the Suzhou Municipal

Party Committee demanded that each district and bureau assign at least one cadre to cope

with complaint letters and visits from people.48 On September 1, 1977, the Leading Group of

Implementation Policy of the Suzhou Municipal Committee convened a conference on fixing

policies, primarily to mobilize and encourage the rehabilitation of unjust and wrongful cases

in Suzhou.49 At the conference, Suzhou cadres reported that there were a host of disparate

and personal reasons for people making such appeals and petitions. A political mark on a

person’s personnel file could interfere with marriage prospects. A cadre with the surname Ma

in the Suzhou Cultural Bureau wanted a political verdict so he could get married. Similarly,

students at the Suzhou Silk Engineering College wrote to the municipal committee to

complain that, even if they engaged in good conduct at work after being assigned jobs, they

still could not find marriage partners because their personnel files suggested they were

accused of being May 16 Counterrevolutionaries. Two workers in the public health sector

regularly made public appeals for city-wide rehabilitation after being unjustly implicated by

the infamous counterrevolutionary case of the “Drawing Blood Clique” (抽血集团) that

victimized hundreds of people in Suzhou. Others were plagued with financial problems, such

as intellectuals who asked for the return of their confiscated houses and property and others

47 Chen Hui and Suzhou shi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, eds., Suzhou shi zhi 苏州市志 [The Chronicle of Suzhou], vol. 1 (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1995), 28. 48 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu jiaqiang qu ju xinfang gongzuo de yijian (zhengqiu yijiangao)” 关于加强区局信访工作的意见(征求意见稿) [Opinions on Reinforcing the Work of Petitioning in Districts and Bureaus (Draft for Comment)], August 25, 1977, 119, C3-2-176, SMA. 49 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu shiwei zhaokai luoshi zhengce huiyi de qingkuang jianbao” 关于市委召开落实政策会议的情况简报 [Briefing on the Situation of the Municipal Committee Convening the Meeting of Fixing Policies], September 5, 1977, C1-32-11, SMA.


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who simply demanded salary compensation.50 These complaints illustrate that victims not

only sought justice by bringing up their grievances, but they also confronted the local

leadership by requesting that it redress injustices. It became the CCP’s responsibility to set

right wrongs that would otherwise threaten the stability of the Party’s rule.51 As the plethora

of local archival reports on this topic demonstrate, local party leadership paid attention to

and responded to requests as part of an effort to maintain control over what was becoming

a pressing situation.

Suzhou leaders recognized the danger of inefficiently responding to popular dissent. At a

conference on September 3, Pan Linru stated that:

Currently, petitions and appeals of previously punished people are rapidly increasing,

urgently demanding we fix the policies (落实政策). Hence, the policy fixing cannot be

delayed anymore. If the policies cannot be fixed, the masses will be discontented and

[the leadership] will lose the sympathy of the society and be isolated from the people.

It will go against stability and unity, harm the great order under heaven (天下大治),

as well as not being conductive to mobilizing the masses’ initiative.52

Pan directly stated that reviewing cases was a necessary response to the increasing appeals

and petitions of the persecuted in order to maintain power. The public outcry for the

addressing of injustice compelled local government and Party leaders to deal with past

wrongs as soon as possible. Failing to do so might cause new chaos or even lead to the loss of

the local leadership’s legitimacy. Hua Guofeng put forward “great order under heaven” as a

primary goal that he pursued in 1977, calling for an end to the disorder caused by the Cultural

Revolution and restoration of social order.53 Local cadres regarded this as a call to respond to

local demands, i.e., redress past injustices.

Given that no explicit central policies on reversing case verdicts were available, local

leaders had maneuvering space in interpreting ambiguous instructions laid out by central

leaders. Pan Rulin interpreted one of Hua Guofeng’s speeches on “comprehensively, correctly

50 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, 2–3. 51 Pils, Eva, “Taking Yuan Seriously: Why the Chinese State Should Stop Suppressing Citizen Protests against Injustice,” Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 25 (2011): 292–94. 52 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Shiwei fuze tongzhi zai luoshi zhengce huiyi shang de jianghua,” 109. 53Teiwes and Sun argued that Hua Guofeng was a key supporter of economic development in 1977-78. See Teiwes, Frederick C. and Sun, Warren, “China’s New Economic Policy Under Hua Guofeng: Party Consensus and Party Myths,” The China Journal 66 (July 2011): 1–23.


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carrying out Chairman Mao’s various proletarian polices” (全面正确地贯彻落实毛主席各项

无产阶级政策) from the 11th National Congress as rather specific policies:

We believe “comprehensively” referred to various aspects that included the issues of

cadres, sent-down youth, occupied houses, property and cultural relic confiscation,

and intellectuals, among others. By “correctly” we consider what it means to adhere

to the policy of “counterrevolutionaries must be suppressed wherever found,

mistakes must be corrected whenever discovered (有反必肃，有错必纠)”; [cases]

that needed to be classified and handled must be seriously dealt with; as for [cases]

that were wrong, if they were completely wrong, they must be resolutely

differentiated and reversed (全错的坚决甄别平反); if they were partly wrong, they

must be partly corrected (部分错的，纠正错误部分). All slander and libel must be

repudiated; those who were persecuted to death must be rehabilitated along with

the restoration of [their] reputation in public.54

The policies adopted at this Suzhou conference are rather striking. Although Hua Guofeng

brought up the issues of cadres and sent-down youth, among others, he was by no means

explicitly suggesting the need to reverse all unjust cases.55 By interpreting Hua’s speech in a

specific way, local Party leaders appropriated it for local interests. The principle that the

“completely wrong must be resolutely reversed, while partly wrong must be partly corrected”

(全错全平，部分错部分平 ) is equally significant, suggesting the way Suzhou leaders

proposed dealing with mistaken cases. Mao Zedong originally put forward this principle in

1962 when criticizing the extension of reversing case verdicts following the Great Leap

Forward Campaign.56 This principle later became a main central guideline for case reversals

in the post-Mao period.

After the conference, most Suzhou work units had reactivated or established the groups

leading the fixing policy by October. However, the majority of these groups had not reviewed

any cases. For example, of 31 work units, only eight had reviewed cases. Another 15 work

units had delivered the message, but they had not carried out reviews. The other eight had

54 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Shiwei fuze tongzhi zai luoshi zhengce huiyi shang de jianghua,” 112. 55 Hua, “Shi yi da shang de zhengzhi baogao.” 56 Mao Zedong, “Zai ba jie shi zhong quanhui de jianghua” 在八届十中全会上的讲话 [Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Congress of the CCP], in Mao Zedong sixiang wansui, 1968th ed., 1962.


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only established an institution to carry out the review work.57 In other cases, members of the

reactivated leading groups were unwilling to overturn their previous verdicts and assume

accountability, which often slowed down local case reviews and reversals. For example, the

Suzhou leaders’ decisions to reverse a number of cases were postponed and not implemented

at lower levels. Local leaders ultimately had to investigate and find out why their decisions

were not being implemented.58 This resistance from below slowed the process down, even if

a decision to reverse a case verdict was made.

Cadres at lower levels were reluctant to review unjust cases for several reasons.59 First, a

large number of judicial cadres had taken part in case investigations during the Cultural

Revolution. They refused to reverse the verdicts they had reached because in doing so they

risked being blamed for unjust cases. Instead, they obstructed case reviews and reversals.

Suzhou cadres reported that this was a major problem with carrying out case reviews. Second,

in the absence of explicit policies, cadres who reviewed and reversed previous cases might be

accused of “reversing verdicts for bad people” (为坏人翻案) by those who opposed reviewing

cases; this meant the possibility of becoming a target themselves should political

circumstances change. More importantly, given the lack of specific policies at that time, it was

difficult for local personnel to draw a line between cases generated in the various periods

with regard to reviews and reversal. A host of questions were put forward by cadres, such as:

Should cases adjudicated before the Cultural Revolution and those related to political labels

be accepted and reviewed as well? Should cases previously reviewed but not thoroughly

reversed be reexamined? In particular, when it came to suicides due to political pressure,

mostly defined as a result of the deceased’s “ignorance of polices” (不明政策) at the time,

family members or relatives requested official recognition that the deceased was “persecuted

to death” (迫害致死), demanding rehabilitation and memorial services.60 Finally, there were

questions on how to manage financial issues and follow-up work ( 善后工作 ) after

rehabilitation, which included household, residence, salary, and job arrangement. It was

57 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei zhengce diaochazu, “Guanyu dangqian luoshi zhengce gongzuo de qingkuang jianbao (di yi qi)” 关于当前落实政策工作的情况简报（第一期） [Briefing on the Current Work of Fixing Policies (1)], October 5, 1977, 12, C1-32-11, SMA. 58 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Shiwei fuze tongzhi zai luoshi zhengce huiyi shang de jianghua,” 117. 59 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu shiwei zhaokai luoshi zhengce huiyi de qingkuang jianbao,” 3. 60 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei zhengce diaochazu, “Guanyu dangqian luoshi zhengce gongzuo de qingkuang jianbao (di yi qi),” 13–14.


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unclear which institutions handled what. For example, it was not regulated whether the issue

of rightists should be dealt with by the United Front work departments or organization

departments. Apparatuses at the lower levels requested that the Suzhou Municipal Party

Committee clarify the division of labor and issue policies.61 Without explicit policies and

considering political uncertainty, local cadres were reluctant to carry out reviews.

In addition to review cases, local cadres also investigated reasons for the injustices.

Despite the central leadership placing blame for all past atrocities on the Gang of Four and

the Lin Biao Clique, local authorities came up with other reasons for unjust verdicts. For

example, a top-secret work report of the Nantong Municipal Public Security Bureau and the

Nantong Intermediate People’s Court sent to the Jiangsu Provincial Public Security Bureau

and High People’s Court in September 1977 listed four major reasons.62 Firstly, the report

stated that the boundaries between crimes and non-crimes had been blurred, such as the

accusation of “malicious attack” applied to the statement that “Chairman Mao has a big

mouth and Lin Biao has a hawk nose like a foreigner.” Secondly, some defendants had been

heavily punished due to factional stances, such as a worker who, in 1968, was charged with

smuggling, indecent assault, and for being anti-military, but whose verdict was mainly based

on his participation in local factional struggles. A third reason given was the use of forceful

confession. The example given in the report is of a worker named Zhou implicated in the so-

called “May 16 Counterrevolutionary Clique” who suffered psychiatric problems as a result of

torture. During the investigation, Zhou was reported to have “attacked the socialist system

and the proletariat dictatorship” and he was thus sentenced to five years’ imprisonment as

an active counterrevolutionary. The last reason given was irresponsibility and recklessness on

the part of investigators, such as in reported cases where a person was convicted of writing

“counterrevolutionary slogans” without the handwriting being authenticated or any further

investigation conducted. This internal work report suggests that local personnel considered

more reasons for past injustices than simply placing the blame on the Gang and Lin Biao. In

1977 they already had a relatively clear picture of the primary reasons for so many injustices.

61 Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei zhengce diaochazu, 15. 62 Nantong shi gong’anju and Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu yuan cuo an dianxing diaocha qingkuang baogao,” 11–13.


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3.3 Responding to Central Policies on Case Reversals in 1978

The process of addressing past injustices was accelerated and the scope of case reviews

widened following the CCP Center’s gradual movement into dealing with past injustices.

Starting from late 1977, various conferences were convened at the central level addressing

the issue of injustices. Following each central conference, Jiangsu not only organized

corresponding conferences to convey recently-introduced central policies to local cadres, but

also developed them into detailed policies on redressing unjust cases. The interaction

between the Center and Jiangsu illustrates the transition of the central agenda from criticizing

the Gang of Four to unjust case reversals.

The 17th National Public Security Conference held from December 1977 to January 1978

first provided guidelines on how to deal with case verdicts. The conference summary

distributed by the CCP Center on January 15, 1978 called for those who should not have been

arrested and detained to be released without exception; people who had been punished for

“solely opposing the Gang of Four and its followers” were to be rehabilitated without

exception; every mistaken case and false case was to be revised (纠正); unjust case decisions

were to be reversed (昭雪); and all slander and libel was to be repudiated and overthrown.63

This was the first time that the terms “false case” and “unjust, false, and mistaken cases”

appeared in the official narrative. Jiangsu was among the first provinces to adopt this term on

June 15, 1978, when the Political-legal Leading Group of the Jiangsu Provincial Party

Committee reported the situation of reviews and correction of cases to the Party

Committee.64 This term was later promulgated as a formulation by the CCP Center and it is

still commonly used in judicial language.

In the immediate wake of the national public security conference, Jiangsu convened the

17th Provincial Public Security Conference from February 17 to March 19, 1978. In light of

instructions from the national public security conference, the Provincial Public Security

Conference made the redressing of unjust and wrongful cases a priority and further specified

63 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu pizhuan ‘di shi qi ci quanguo gong’an huiyi jiyao’ de tongzhi,” 17. 64 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Pizhuan shengwei zhengfakou lingdao xiaozu guanyu fucha jiucuo luoshi zhengce de qingkuang he yijian de huibao” 批转省委政法口领导小组关于复查纠错、落实政策的情况和意见的汇报 [Commenting on and Transmitting the Leading Group of the Provincial Political and Legal Sector’s Report and Opinions on the Situation of Reviewing and Correcting Wrongs and Fixing Policies], July 17, 1978, 30, E101-121-0366, NMA.


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in the conference report, circulated in Jiangsu on April 4, the kinds of cases that needed to be

reviewed and reversed.

All mistaken cases regarding designation (定性), labeling (戴帽), detention, arrest,

and imprisonment since the Cultural Revolution and approved by revolutionary

committees, public security bureaus, as well as judicial apparatus at the county level

and above must be reversed (平反) without exception. Unjust cases must be reversed.

All slander and false charges must be overthrown; all made-up evidence and

fabricated materials should be destroyed; those who were detained or arrested [due

to these unjust cases] must be immediately released; depending on the

circumstances, economic losses in connection with [these cases] should be

appropriately handled. [Those] who were labeled as landlord, rich peasant,

counterrevolutionary, bad element, traitor, or spy without the permission of

revolutionary committees, public security bureaus, or judicial apparatuses should be

examined and differentiated… [And] wrongly classified or labeled people should be

rehabilitated.65

This was the first time that the Jiangsu leadership officially proposed the reversal of verdicts

and policy demanded differentiation (甄别) of political labels. They used this differentiation

instead of reversal because the Land Reform and Anti-rightist campaigns that generated most

of these labels were considered to have been correct. The CCP Center formally addressed the

issue of labeling in a document issued half a month after the Jiangsu Provincial Public Security

Conference; the central document officially called for the removal of all rightist labels.66 The

Jiangsu conference interpreted the instructions at the National Public Security Bureau – to

correct all wrongful cases – into relatively specific policies on practical issues. This was also

the first mention of financial compensation, even though at this point what that meant

remained vague.

The 17th Jiangsu Provincial Public Security Conference instructed lower-level officials to

65 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Pizhuan sheng gong’anju dangzu guanyu quansheng di shi qi ci gong’an huiyi de baogao” 批转省公安局党组关于全省第十七次公安会议的报告 [Commenting on and Transmitting the Party Group of the Provincial Public Security Bureau’s Report on the 17th Provincial Public Security Conference], April 4, 1978, 106–7, E101-121-0365, NMA. 66 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu quanbu zhaidiao youpai fenzi maozi de tongzhi” 关于全部摘掉右派分子帽子的通知 [Notice on Completely Removing the Labels of Rightists] (The Maoist Legacy, April 5, 1978), https://maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/2545.


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establish fixing policy offices with personnel from public security bureaus and people’s courts

at the county level and above so as to carry out case reviews and reversals. As a result of this

conference, the Nantong Municipal Party Committee, which the Jiangsu leadership had

shuffled in early 1978, immediately established the Fixing Policy Office in April. Along with the

Nantong Intermediate People’s Court and the Nantong Municipal Public Security Bureau, the

office began to accept appellant cases. The office and the court primarily reviewed and dealt

with counterrevolutionary cases that had been adjudicated by the Nantong Municipal Military

Control Commission and the Nantong Intermediate People’s Court during the Cultural

Revolution, especially active counterrevolutionary cases and criminal cases. The public

security bureau primarily took charge of the reviews and correction of labeling, wrongly

designated class background, detentions, and arrests.67 By the end of May, the Office had

accepted 65 cases appealed by defendants or their family members, including ten cases that

had occurred before the Cultural Revolution and 55 cases during the Cultural Revolution.68

Among these, counterrevolutionary cases comprised 55%, while criminal cases accounted for

34% and the remaining 11% were filed by family members of deceased defendants with a

view to determining the cause of death.69 After a preliminary review, the Office affirmed that

44 of 65 case verdicts had been reached on the basis of materials acquired through brutal

torture.70

Other regions in Jiangsu had either established new institutions or strengthened existing

ones to review and redress cases. A large number of cases had been handled by July. For

example, Changzhou reviewed and dealt with 174 cases, among which 75 were reversed and

corrected, accounting for 43.1%, while in Suzhou, 78 of 126 appellant cases that had been

reviewed (62%) were deemed unjust and wrongful. 71 Most of the cases redressed were

counterrevolutionary cases, and most of these were cases implicating multiple, or hundreds

67 Nantong shi geweihui luoshi zhengce bangongshi, “Nantong shi luoshi zhengce gongzuo qingkuang de huibao” 南通市落实政策工作情况的汇报 [Report on the Situation of Fixing Policies in Nantong], September 20, 1978, 111, E237-121-0055, NMA. 68 Nantong shi geweihui luoshi zhengce bangongshi, “Gongzuo jianbao (di er qi)” 工作简报（第二期） [Work Briefing (2)], June 7, 1978, 100, E237-121-0053, NMA. 69 Nantong shi geweihui luoshi zhengce bangongshi, 100. At least one case concerning the defendants’ death was a teacher committed suicide after being abused and tortured at the May 16 study classes (516 学习班). Two cases’ victims were said to be landlords. 70 Nantong shi geweihui luoshi zhengce bangongshi, 100. 71 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Pizhuan shengwei zhengfakou lingdao xiaozu guanyu fucha jiucuo luoshi zhengce de qingkuang he yijian de huibao,” 30.


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of victims who had been grouped as “counterrevolutionary cliques” (反革命集团). According

to a report by the Leading Group of Jiangsu Provincial Political and Legal Sector (江苏省政法

口领导小组) – an institution instructed to fix policies and reverse cases in the wake of the

Cultural Revolution – a case of so-called “bandits and spies” (匪特) in Taixing County in

Yangzhou involved thousands of people, of whom over 300 were held in study classes or

detained and 16 were persecuted to death during the Cultural Revolution. In Nanjing, among

201 “counterrevolutionary clique” cases filed and investigated in 1970, victimizing over 4,600

people, 192 cases were confirmed as false cases and the remaining nine cases were in the

process of being reviewed. In the case of Suzhou Prefecture, 106 cases of “bandits and spies”

were filed during the Cleansing Class Ranks Campaign, each case involving anywhere between

dozens and several hundred people.72 Compared to the total 116,500 cases that were dealt

with by political-legal departments from 1966 to 1976 in Jiangsu, according to Jiangsu’s

preliminary statistics, these numbers account for only a small fraction. However, they suggest

that Jiangsu was making progress in reviewing and reversing unjust and wrongful cases in

most regions.

The above details illustrate that the instructions of the 17th National Public Security

Conference facilitated reviews and reversals of cases in Jiangsu. The review and rehabilitation

were not limited to high-ranking cadres, but also covered ordinary people. Moreover, at the

time, in addition to being perceived as a pillar of the campaign to Expose and Criticize the

Gang of Four’s crimes, reviewing and redressing cases was also gradually guided by the lines

of the socialist legality laid out by Hua Guofeng at the Fifth National People’s Congress

(Chapter 2). Instead of the Third Plenum, which most official accounts and scholars have

emphasized as a turning point, the outline of how to cope with past injustices was thus clearly

mapped out under Hua Guofeng.

The Eighth National People’s Judicial Work Conference, held from April 24 to May 22,

1978, was a watershed moment in commencing the revision of unjust verdicts and

standardizing policies of case reviews on a national scale.73 Both in Jiang Hua’s speech and in

the summary of the Eighth National Judicial Work Conference circulated by the CCP Center as

Zhongfa 1978 No. 32 on June 12 to guide judicial work nationwide, correcting and redressing

72 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, 30. 73 Leese, “The Politics of Historical Justice after the Cultural Revolution.”


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unjust and wrongful cases was given prominence as the people’s courts’ future work.

Unjust cases need to be thoroughly reversed. Wrongfully decided cases should be

corrected. Completely wrong [verdicts] should be completely reversed, partly wrong

[verdicts] should be partly reversed, correct verdicts should be upheld. [The judiciary]

should cooperate with the relevant departments to render the reversal of unjust and

wrongfully decided cases a success. Not reversing unjust cases and not correcting

wrongfully decided cases equals continuing the illegal practice of infringing on

citizens’ rights (侵犯公民权利的违法行为). This is something that our Party statutes

and state laws cannot tolerate.74

Reversing the unjust case decisions that had been made during the Cultural Revolution was a

necessary step for the judiciary to reinstate its authority among the public. Due to their

destruction during the Cultural Revolution, laws and judicial organs had been disregarded, not

only by the general public, but also by Party cadres. Jiangsu High People’s Court’s president

Lin Xizhao criticized some county leaders for holding courts in contempt, stating “what do your

courts do!? You just sit around and gain fruits without doing any work.”75 In another case,

local cadres simply refused local courts’ case investigations.76 Under these circumstances,

addressing the Cultural Revolutionary injustices helped judiciaries gain judicial prestige among

the public and further restore the socialist legality.

Local officials generally treated the Eighth National People’s Judicial Work Conference

and its summary as a landmark in addressing unjust and wrongful cases that brought the issue

national attention. In order to convey and carry out the policies laid out at the conference,

Jiangsu convened the 13th People’s Judicial Conference from September 6-17, 1978. Alongside

criticizing the Gang of Four and its followers for destroying the socialist legal system, the 13th

Jiangsu Provincial People’s Judicial Conference primarily focused on the issue of how to

implement instructions from the national judicial conference to review and reverse cases.

The conference summary disseminated by the Jiangsu Party Committee on October 20, 1978

74 The translation is directly adopted from Daniel Leese’s work, see Leese. The original document see Zhonggong zhongyang, “Pizhuan di ba ci quanguo renmin sifa gongzuo huiyi jiyao de tongzhi.” 75 Jiang Hua, “Jiang Hua yuanzhang 1978 nian 9 yue 12 ri zai zuotanhui shang de chahua zhishi (zhi er)” 江华院长1978年9月12日在座谈会上的插话指示（之二） [President Jiang Hua’s Remarks at the Symposium on September 12, 1978 (Part 2)], September 12, 1978, 148–1, E237-111-0076, NMA. 76 Hui, “Zai Jiangsu sheng di shi san ci renmin sifa huiyi jieshu shi de jianghua,” 165–1.


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explicitly listed restoring the socialist legality and reviewing and reversing unjust, false, and

mistaken cases as two major tasks for local cadres.77 Ten days later, a Changzhou factory

convened a rehabilitation meeting and reversed 671 people’s case verdicts.78

Instead of simply criticizing the Gang of Four and easing public pressure, the significance

of redressing the past injustices was frankly expressed. At the 13th Jiangsu Provincial People’s

Judicial Conference, Hui Yuyu, a standing member of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee

who was in charge of political and judicial work in Jiangsu, outlined the main purpose of

addressing past injustices:

We now reviewed and corrected [wrongfully decided cases], carried out

rehabilitation, and fixed Party policies so as to redeem the Party’s reputation and win

the broad masses’ support… If one of five family members suffers from injustice, he

would implicate the whole family. This will incur their resentment towards the Party.

In addition, [his unjust case] will also involve his uncles, aunts, landlords, neighbors,

acquaintances, among others, and cause their discontent. In total, the number of

involved people is enormous. Then unjust cases are problems of hundreds of

thousands or even millions of people in the whole [of Jiangsu] province. If we do not

thoroughly reverse case verdicts and do not allow people to vent their widespread

anger, how can we request that they work energetically to realize the Four

Modernizations?! Therefore, this matter [of reversals] must be accomplished fast and

well.79

Hui’s speech illustrates that unjust, false, and mistaken cases not only affected millions of

people’s lives, but also concerned the Party’s reputation and prestige among the public. A

widespread public outcry was of major concern to provincial leaders. Failing to reverse

previous case verdicts that affected millions of people would destroy the Party’s prestige and

further threaten its legitimacy.

Jiang Hua, President of the Supreme People’s Court, and Xu Jiatun, Secretary of Jiangsu

Provincial Party Committee, also both noted the importance of this revision of unjust cases

77 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Pizhuan Jiangsu sheng di shi san ci renmin sifa gongzuo huiyi jiyao de tongzhi” 批转江苏省第十三次人民司法工作会议纪要的通知 [Commenting on and Transmitting the Meeting Summary of the 13th Jiangsu Provincial People’s Judicial Work Conference], October 20, 1978, E237-121-0076, NMA. 78 Changzhou shi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Changzhou shi zhi, 3:1122. 79 Hui, “Zai Jiangsu sheng di shi san ci renmin sifa huiyi jieshu shi de jianghua,” 164.


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for modernization:

The matter of reviews, reversals, as well as fixing Party policies, is not only important

to directly rehabilitate unjustly treated and victimized comrades and to restore [their]

reputation, but more importantly to be able to mobilize initiative in every aspect. It

is critical to realizing the Four Modernizations.80

Instead of being regarded as a part of criticizing the Gang of Four, Jiang Hua now portrayed

redressing past injustices as a precondition for mobilizing the populace to participate in the

Party’s new agenda – achieving the Four Modernizations. Within one year, local leadership’s

impetus to repair the harm caused by the Cultural Revolution was not only intended to

redress people’s grievances, but, more importantly, to gain public support and thus prepare

them for rebuilding an economy that had been seriously damaged during the Cultural

Revolution. This change resulted from the central leadership’s focus shifting to the economy

in 1977-1978.81 Economic transformation has been seen as a major feature of this transitional

period in China and its realization was based on the premise of the need to redress past

injustices. This intention was more explicitly expressed when addressing the issues of so-

called capitalists and compensating people for their confiscated property.82

The emphasis on the role of rehabilitation in Jiangsu soon found an echo at the central

level. The central leadership further confirmed the significance of redressing injustices at the

1978 Central Work Conference in November. By November 1978, Jiangsu ranked third in

progress dealing with unjust cases.83 Of over 84,000 cadres investigated during the Cultural

Revolution, Jiangsu had reviewed over 63,800 cadres’ case verdicts. Among more than 30,000

cases that the Jiangsu political and legal departments filed during the Cultural Revolution, the

80 Hui, 164–1. 81 Teiwes and Sun, “China’s New Economic Policy Under Hua Guofeng.” 82 For more information on the handling of a labeled capitalist, see Engman, Puck, “Vetting the People’s Servant: On the Principles of Revolutionary Integrity,” in Victims, Perpetrators, and the Role of Law in Maoist China: A Case-Study Approach, ed. Leese, Daniel and Engman, Puck (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2018). 83 Heilongjiang and Liaoning Provinces ranked first and second places. Heilongjiang only started to review cases in late 1977 after the Central Committee replaced its leaders. Comparatively speaking, Heilongjiang had totally 81,155 unjust, false, and mistaken cases from the Cultural Revolution, which was fewer than Jiangsu, where there were 95,154 cadre cases alone. Liaoning started the process of case reviews in mid-1977. Between 1977 and 1978, Liaoning mostly dealt with cadre cases and group cases. For more information, see Heilonhjiang sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, ed., Heilongjian shengzhi: gongchandang zhi 黑龙江省志共产党志 [Chronicle of Heilongjiang: Volume on the Chinese Communist Party] (Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1996), 271–73; Liaoning sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui bangongshi, ed., Liaoning sheng zhi: difang zuzhizhi 辽宁省志地方组织志 [Chronicle of Liaoning: Volume on the Local Organization] (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2005), 835–37.


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departments had reviewed over 8,000 cases and found over 3,000 unjust, false, and mistaken

cases. All the people implicated by these cases received rehabilitation.84

3.4 A Model of Reversing Counterrevolutionary Cases

The central authorities promoted the Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court as a national

model of handing appellant cases filed by ordinary people, or the so-called masses. Between

1977 and 1978, most places gave priority to reviews of cadre cases. For example, Jiangsu

reviewed 32% of more than 85,000 cadre cases by July 1978. Some cities had reviewed over

70% of cadre cases. However, the addressing of wrongfully adjudicated cases involving

ordinary people was given less attention and encountered more difficulties, in particular with

counterrevolutionary cases and cases that involved “malicious[ly] attacking” (恶毒攻击)

Party leaders. As the Nanjing court mainly dealt with appeals against these case verdicts, the

Supreme People’s Court promoted Nanjing’s experience and requested that local courts

address unjust, false, and mistaken cases.

The Nanjing court had been reviewing appellate cases of the masses since 1973, when

the court was restored, and it continued following the arrest of the Gang of Four. These

appellate cases mostly originated from the period between 1967 and 1973 that was under

military control. From this period, the Nanjing People’s Court adjudicated over 5,000 criminal

cases and over 1,300 counterrevolutionary cases. By August 1978, the Nanjing People’s

Courts had reviewed around 1,000 appellant cases and reversed and corrected 290 case

verdicts.85 The court later concluded that 85.25% of the counterrevolutionary cases were

unjust, false, and mistaken cases.86

On July 13, 1978, the People’s Daily propagated the experience of the Nanjing

Intermediate People’s Court and called upon local courts to learn from it.87 President of the

84 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Xu Jiatun tongzhi zai di shiwei shuji pengtou huiyi jieshu shi de jianghua,” 88. 85 Chen Lecun and Nanjing shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Zhuajin shensu fucha gongzuo renzhen luoshi dang de zhengce” 抓紧申诉复查工作认真落实党的政策 [Paying Close Attention to the Review of Appeals and Conscientiously Fixing Party Policies] (The Maoist Legacy, October 1978), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/4405. 86 Nanjing shi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui and Nanjing shenpan zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, eds., Nanjing shenpan zhi 南京审判志 [Chronicle of Adjudication in Nanjing] (Beijing: Fangzhi chubanshe, 1997), 156. 87 “Nanjing shi zhongji renmin fayuan jiaqiang lingdao caiqu cuoshi - zhuajin fucha qunzhong shensu anjian” 南京市中级人民法院加强领导采取措施——抓紧复查群众申诉案件 [The Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court Reinforced Leadership and Took Actions - Paying Close Attention to the Review of Cases That the Masses


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Supreme People’s Court Jiang Hua played an important role in promoting the Nanjing court’s

experience. On a nationwide tour examining the implementation of the policies framed at the

Eighth National People’s Judicial Work Conference in each locality, he praised and introduced

the Nanjing experience to other provinces.88 For example, at the meetings with judicial cadres

in Heilongjiang, Liaoning, and Anhui Provinces in July and August 1978, Jiang Hua specifically

asked them to take the Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court as an example of addressing

unjust cases.89 At meetings with Jiangsu judicial cadres in September, Jiang again asserted

that:

You [the Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court] have done a great job regarding the

review of appellant cases. People’s Daily and Xinhua News Agency have reported it. I

agree with your opinions [on reviewing cases] and the ten questions you brought up

need to be classified (归类).90

These ten questions referred to the criteria for types of counterrevolutionary cases that had

mostly implicated ordinary people and should be revised or reversed, including (hereafter the

ten types of cases will be mentioned by code (a-j); for the original Chinese text, see appendix

1):91

a. Cases regarding allegedly counterrevolutionary acts of mentally ill people or

people who suffered from psychiatric disorders due to torture should be revised;

b. All people sentenced to imprisonment as a counterrevolutionary due to lapsus

linguae, clerical error, misspoken slogans and so forth, should be acquitted and

rehabilitated without exception;

Appealed], People’s Daily, July 13, 1978, 1. 88 Jiang, “Jiang Hua yuanzhang zai zuotanhui shang de chahua (zhi yi),” 245. 89 Jiang Hua, “Jiang Hua yuanzhang zai Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Anhui san sheng renmin sifa gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua zhaiyao (zonghe)” 江华院长在黑龙江、辽宁、安徽三省人民司法工作会议上的讲话摘要（综合） [Excerpts from President Jiang Hua’s Speech at the People’s Judicial Work Conference in Heilongjiang, Liaoning and Anhui Provinces (Combined)], People’s Daily, October 21, 1978. 90 Jiang, “Jiang Hua yuanzhang zai zuotanhui shang de chahua (zhi yi),” 141. 91 Zhonggong Nantong shi weiyuanhui, “Shiwei changwei, shi geweihui fuzhuren Yang Jianlu tongzhi zai shi zhengfa ganbu huiyi shang de jianghua” 市委常委、市革委会副主任杨建鲁同志在市政法干部会议上的讲话 [Standing Member of the Municipal Committee and Deputy Director of the Municipal Revolutionary Committee Yang Jianlu’s Speech at the Meeting with Municipal Political and Legal Cadres], October 15, 1978, 89–90, E237-121-0055, NMA.


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c. People accused of insulting leaders’ portraits and sentenced as a

counterrevolutionary due to unintentionally damaging leaders’ portraits should

be exonerated and released;

d. People given sentences for counterrevolutionary sabotage due to accidents in

production or scientific research must be rehabilitated without exception;

e. People who already had verdicts and were punished before for historical issues

and were re-dealt with as counterrevolutionaries without committing new crimes

should be rehabilitated without exception;

f. People forced to shout out or write reactionary slogans because of torture and

deemed counterrevolutionary should be rehabilitated or [cases] revised;

g. People opposing Lin Biao and the Gang of Four and sentenced as

counterrevolutionaries must be acquitted and released without exception;

h. Other criminal cases adjudicated as counterrevolutionary cases should be revised

and penalties should be reduced;

i. People who occasionally spread reactionary slogans should be rehabilitated or re-

sentenced as long as they did not deliberately diffuse and attack;

j. Due to unfamiliarity with line struggles and confounding the lines, people who

not only said something to oppose Lin Biao and the Gang of Four but also said

something wrong or complained during the Cultural Revolution should not be

dealt with as “malicious attacks.” Their original sentences should be changed or

reversed.

Nanjing’s ten principles for reversing counterrevolutionary cases were implemented

through references in other regions of Jiangsu, and they became part of national policies. In

October and November 1978, the Supreme People’s Court tasked the National Criminal

Adjudication Work Conference in Shanghai with addressing the issues of reviewing unjust,

false, and mistaken cases in the legal sphere.92 While most presidents who spoke at the

conference were from high people’s courts, President of the Nanjing Intermediate People’s

Court Jiangsu Chen Lecun (陈乐村 ) presented a report on the experience of reviewing

92 Zeng Hanzhou, “Zai quanguo xingshi shenpan gongzuo huiyi shang de baogao” 在全国刑事审判工作会议上的报告 [Report at the National Criminal Adjudication Work Conference] (The Maoist Legacy, October 21, 1978), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/2576.


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appellant cases.93 Jiang Hua later read Chen Lecun’s report and promoted the rehabilitation

experience of the Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court. The Supreme People’s Court adopted

these Nanjing criteria and reclassified them into five types in its report to the CCP Center in

November 1978. The Center later distributed this report nationwide on December 29, 1978

(Zhongfa [1978] No. 78), taking these categories as criteria for identifying unjust, false, and

mistaken cases from allegedly counterrevolutionary cases. 94 The five categories of cases

included cases of solely opposing the Gang of Four and Lin Biao, and those implicated for

having complained about the treatment of Deng Xiaoping; malicious attacks; unintentionally

misspelling or misspeaking slogans; class vengeance; and “political madness” (Appendix 2).95

Comparing the Nanjing categories with the central ones, they shared various similarities

and areas in which they overlapped. First, categories g and j could both be classified as cases

of opposing the Gang of Four and Lin Biao, thereby included in three types of cases. Second,

categories b, c, and i all referred to misspoken or misspelled slogans, while categories d and

e could both be covered by “class vengeance.” “Political madness” cases were also directly

relevant to category a, and category f mostly involved “malicious attack” cases. Overall, the

Supreme People’s Court adopted the Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court’s ten categories

and the CCP Central Committee further distributed them.

Local experiments in reviewing and redressing the Cultural Revolutionary injustices

therefore clearly had a significant influence on central-level policymaking. In contrast to

acknowledging the Third Plenum as a landmark in the progress of addressing the violent past,

the case of Nanjing suggests that local policy experimentation in fact provided central leaders

with an alternative solution to cope with Cultural Revolutionary injustices and this was quickly

turned into nationwide action in the winter of 1978-1979.96 Official narratives and scholars

have overemphasized the significance of the Third Plenum as a watershed moment and

93 Chen and Nanjing shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Zhuajin shensu fucha gongzuo renzhen luoshi dang de zhengce.” 94 For a translation of the entire document, see Zhonggong zhongyang, “Pizhuan zhonggong zuigao renmin fayuan dangzu guanyu zhuajin fucha jiuzheng yuan jia cuo an renzhen luoshi fang de zhengce de tongzhi” 批转中共最高人民法院党组《关于抓紧复查纠正冤假错案、认真落实党的政策的请示报告》 [Comments on and Transmits the CCP Supreme People’s Court Party Group’s “Request for Instructions on Paying Close Attention to the Review and Correction of Unjust, False, and Mistaken Cases and Conscientiously Implementing Party Policy”] (The Maoist Legacy, December 29, 1978), https://maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/73. 95 Leese, “Revising Political Verdicts in Post-Mao China,” 113–26. 96 Heilmann, Sebastian, “Policy-Making through Experimentation: The Formation of a Distinctive Policy Process,” in Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China (Cambridge (Massachusetts); London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011).


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understated the transitional period under Hua Guofeng as an important precondition for

addressing past injustices.

3.5 Dealing with Perpetrators of Cultural Revolutionary Injustices

As Jiangsu’s efforts to redress Cultural Revolutionary injustices increased, the issue arose

of who was accountable for the injustices. Dealing with past injustices requires not only the

repairing of wrongs, but also the identification of perpetrators. Despite the Party leadership

portraying the Gang of Four Clique as accountable overall for past wrongs, the local

authorities faced the question of how to deal with those who had directly perpetrated

injustices. Victims of unjust, false, and mistaken cases demanded punishment for their past

suffering. The attribution of accountability was an ingredient in the correction of past wrongs.

Group cases (集团案件) were a type of unjust, false, and mistaken case that often

implicated dozens or even thousands of people and caused severe consequences. A group

case was often accompanied by forced confessions, mostly involving torture. When

addressing group cases, local cadres inevitably faced the issue of how to deal with the

violence and the actual perpetrators. In order to provide a reference for redressing group

cases in the province, on June 24, 1978, the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee distributed

the Wuxi Municipal Party Committee’s case review report on the so-called “Underground

Black Headquarters of the GMD” ( 国民党地下黑司令部 , hereafter “Underground

Headquarters”) at Wuxi’s First People’s Hospital.97 The provincial leadership also selected this

case as a model of coping with false cases in the province.98 The so-called Underground

Headquarters at Wuxi’s First People’s Hospital was a “counterrevolutionary clique” case, in

which doctors at the hospital had been accused of being GMD underground spies. In June

1968, the Nanjing Medical College Revolutionary Committee sent a letter to the hospital and

accused two doctors of being spies. The committee requested that the hospital arrest them

immediately. The investigation at the hospital was begun in September 1968 by the Cleansing

the Class Ranks by the Workers’ Propaganda Team (工人宣传队), a group consisting mostly

97 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Pizhuan zhonggong Wuxi shi di yi renmin yiyuan suowei ‘Guomindang dixia hei silingbu’ anjian fucha de qingkuang baogao” 批转中共无锡市第一人民医院所谓“国民党地下黑司令部”案件复查的情况报告 [Commenting on and Transmitting Wuxi Municipal First People’s Hospital’s Report on Reviewing the so-Called “Guomindang Underground Black Headquarters”], June 24, 1978, 11, E101-121-0366, NMA. 98 Hui, Pengyou ren, 258.


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of workers from Jiangning Machinery Factory (江宁机械厂) dispatched to the hospital to

seize power.99 Through torture and forceful confessions, the case implicated 120 people in

total and caused 20 deaths.100 In November 1971, the Nanjing Medical College dismissed its

original accusations. However, the case of the hospital remained in Wuxi.

To redress the case, the Wuxi Municipal Party Committee selected and sent a review

team affiliated with 16 cadres to the hospital. On May 10, 1978, the Wuxi Municipal Public

Health Bureau convened a rehabilitation meeting and cleared the names of the implicated

victims. It formally declared this a false case that had been entirely grounded on false

evidence resulting from forceful confessions gained using torture.101 Victims also received

confiscated properties and compensation for their losses. However, the responsibility for this

false case was another important dimension of the case reversal. Victims and their family

members demanded the “catching [of the] killers” ( 抓凶手 ). Despite the Wuxi Party

Committee requesting that investigators guide victims and their family members’ hatred

against Lin Biao and the Gang of Four and that they not focus on personal loss, the victims

and family members did not comply with this request. Some family members of the deceased

were discontented with the final verdict regarding the cause of death. Surviving victims and

their family members pushed for punishment of those who had caused their suffering,

especially those involved in beatings during the case investigation.102

According to the Wuxi Party Committee report, the review team took various measures

to deal with people responsible for this false case and its severe consequences. The false case

was blamed on two main figures. The report claimed that a doctor with the surname Gao, a

member of the Wuxi Municipal Party Committee, was mainly accountable (重要责任) for the

99 Workers’ Propaganda Team was an abbreviation for the “Workers’ Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team” (工人毛泽东思想宣传队), mostly consisting of workers selected from various factories. On 25 August, Mao Zedong demanded that “Workers and PLA soldiers should be dispatched to educational or research institutions where there is a concentration of intellectuals.” On the same day, a central document was issued announcing the decision to dispatch workers’ propaganda teams to all schools in urban areas. See Zhonggong zhongyang et al., “Guanyu pai gongren xuanchuandui jin xuexiao de tongzhi” 关于派工人宣传队进学校的通知 [Notice on Sending Workers’ Propaganda Teams to Schools] (The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, August 25, 1968), https://ccradb.appspot.com/post/538. 100 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Pizhuan zhonggong Wuxi shi di yi renmin yiyuan suowei ‘Guomindang dixia hei silingbu’ anjian fucha de qingkuang baogao,” 11. The death number in this report was 12, but another official document suggested this case had caused 20 deaths. See Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Pizhuan shengwei zhengfakou lingdao xiaozu guanyu fucha jiucuo luoshi zhengce de qingkuang he yijian de huibao,” 30. 101 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Pizhuan zhonggong Wuxi shi di yi renmin yiyuan suowei ‘Guomindang dixia hei silingbu’ anjian fucha de qingkuang baogao,” 13. 102 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, 14.


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case. It further accused Gao of hiding his “rich peasant” family background, a typical

accusation against those targeted in the Maoist period. He was said to have infiltrated the

Workers’ Propaganda Team and violated Party policies, including being the first to undertake

beatings, taking the lead in confiscating houses, and attempting to provide fake medical

records in order to cover up the real reason that Bao, a victim in the case, was beaten to death.

According to the report, medical personnel in the hospital had complained bitterly about Gao.

Based on these records, Gao was depicted as a Gang of Four follower and identified as a

perpetrator in this case. As a result, Gao was placed into study classes and further investigated

and it was noted that he would be dealt with seriously.103

Another unnamed person who was alleged to hold leadership responsibility (领导责任)

had been a leader of the Workers’ Propaganda Team, usually led by revolutionary committee

members or military officers, and they had taken charge of the case investigation. The

investigation led to six deaths due to torture and forced confessions.104 However, compared

to the description of Gao’s role in the investigation, the Wuxi Municipal Party Committee’s

report only vaguely addressed this leader – the person in charge (个别负责人) – and no name

was ever given. Either the Wuxi report did not include this person’s name, or the Jiangsu Party

Committee deleted the name when disseminating the report to various provincial levels;

clearly, although for unclear reasons, this particular Party leader was protected. Furthermore,

according to the Wuxi Party Committee’s report, this leader’s punishment was to clarify his

issues and undertake self-examination, a rather lenient sanction among the punishments

meted out to perpetrators (Chapter 2). This Workers’ Propaganda Team leader’s role in

causing the false case was thus defined as “shortcomings and mistakes in work.” By

undertaking self-criticism in public, he was expected to change his attitude and behavior, and

thus prevent similar “mistakes” in future.

Those who had participated in investigating this case were classified as “people who had

said or done something wrong,” the most lenient category for perpetrators; they were

103 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, 13. According to an online source, Gao committed suicide in the study class. The investigation was interrupted. However, due to repeated appeals, three other members of the Workers Propaganda Team were arrested and sentenced to penalties ranging from seven to ten years’ imprisonment for having beaten one victim to death. See http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/articlelist_1269717202_0_1.html, accessed on October 10, 2018. 104 It is not clear whether they committed suicides or were tortured to death. According to the source in footnote 77, one person was at least beaten to death during the investigation.

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/articlelist_1269717202_0_1.html


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instructed to take part in criticizing the Gang of Four and told to undertake self-examination,

if necessary, in order to seek public forgiveness. The punishment for the leader who was

deemed responsible for six deaths was therefore almost the same as that for those who “have

said or done something wrong.” The discrepancy in how the cadres found accountable for

injustices were dealt with is striking. This case demonstrates that accountability was

distributed more among the lower-ranking cadres than the leader.

The case of Wuxi reveals how the local authorities attributed responsibility for a false

case. First, in addition to blaming past injustices on the Gang of Four Clique, the local

authorities also allocated individual responsibility. Second, the local Party leadership often

defended or protected other Party leaders so as to avoid linking itself to Cultural

Revolutionary injustices. Third, political labels were still adopted and played a role in

accusations: Gao’s family background – rich peasant – was emphasized and perceived as the

ideological roots for his actions during the Cultural Revolution. Political labels, including

landlords, rich peasant, counterrevolutionaries, and bad elements, were only removed in

early 1979 and finally abandoned in 1983.105

The handling of the Wuxi case followed the central guidelines. While addressing the issue

of injustices, the central leadership also drew up guidelines for dealing with the perpetrators

involved. The 17th Jiangsu Provincial Public Security Work Conference pointed out that

individuals should generally not be held accountable for unjust case verdicts. However, it also

stressed that “counterrevolutionaries and bad elements” who had caused unjust, false, and

mistaken cases to be brought out of class revenge, and those who had caused injustices and

severe consequences out of personal enmity, must be seriously dealt with and by no means

remain unpunished.106 The central leadership further specified the question of who was

accountable for the unjust, false, and mistaken cases at the Eighth National People’s Judicial

Work Conference:

105 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu dizhu funong fenzi zhaimao wenti he di fu zinü chengfen wenti de jueding”; Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting, “Zhuanfa gong’anbu dangzu guanyu gei xianyou silei fenzi zhaidiao maozi de qingshi baogao” 转发公安部党组关于给现有四类分子摘掉帽子的请示报告 [Transmitting the Report with Request for Instructions by the Party Group of the Ministry of Public Security Concerning to Remove the Labels of Existing Four Types Elements] (The Maoist Legacy, July 9, 1983), https://maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/54. 106 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Pizhuan sheng gong’anju dangzu guanyu quansheng di shi qi ci gong’an huiyi de baogao,” 108.


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Revising unjust and wrongful cases must take different situations into consideration.

If backbones of the Gang of Four Clique or wrongdoers deliberately framed unjust

and wrongful cases, [we] should not only actively reverse [verdicts] but also hold

them responsible; if unjust and wrongful cases were caused by work defects and

mistakes of judicial personnel, [we] should actively reverse [verdicts] and sum up

experiences and lessons, rather than focusing on individual responsibility.107

These guidelines were rather vague. However, the central leadership did not blame past

injustices entirely on the Gang of Four Clique. It also allowed responsibility to be placed on

those who had framed other people. At the same time, the central leadership removed the

risk of judicial personnel assuming accountability for unjust verdicts.

In the Wuxi case, the management of perpetrators at the time followed the principle that

investigators, namely the Workers’ Propaganda Team, were not punished. Only those who

were directly involved in violence and who allegedly had bad family backgrounds were

blamed. In July, the Jiangsu leadership further emphasized the need to cautiously deal with

the issue of accountability for past injustices. It suggested blaming the deaths caused by

torture and persecution on Lin Biao and the Gang of Four and their local followers, while

cadres should assume no responsibility for unjust cases caused by their mistakes and

shortcomings at work.108 This policy is different from those of the early 1950s regarding

judicial personnel’s accountability for wrongful arrests and sentences. The policy in the 1950s

regulated that, in order to restore the Party and the government’s political influence, cadres

in charge and law enforcement organs that had caused wrongful cases due to dereliction of

duties, violation of laws, or false accusations (诬告), must assume accountability and be

punished.109 The regulation of the early 1950s punished individual cadres who were deemed

to have engaged in misconduct.

By the end of 1978, the issue of allocating accountability for injustices was again taking

107 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Pizhuan di ba ci quanguo renmin sifa gongzuo huiyi jiyao de tongzhi,” 155. 108 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Pizhuan shengwei zhengfakou lingdao xiaozu guanyu fucha jiucuo luoshi zhengce de qingkuang he yijian de huibao,” 32. 109 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu chuli geji renmin fayuan zai guoqu shiqi suo fasheng de cuobu, cuoya, cuopan, cuosha wenti de zhishi (jielu)” 中共中央关于处理各级人民法院在过去时期所发生的错捕、错押、错判、错杀问题的指示（节录） [CCP Center Directive on How to Handle the Issue of Wrongful Arrests, Wrongful Imprisonments, Wrongful Sentencings, and Wrongful Executions That Have Occurred in the Past in People’s Courts on Various Levels (Excerpt)] (The Maoist Legacy, April 7, 1953), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/5474.


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center-stage. In response to local cadres’ complaints, Hua Guofeng repeatedly urged leaders,

as a collective, to shoulder responsibility for past injustices. On November 25, 1978, when

addressing a number of major cases like the Tiananmen Incident at the Central Work

Conference, Hua Guofeng emphasized that the Central Committee held overall responsibility

for the military’s involvement in factional struggles that had caused a large number of deaths

and injuries in the so-called Three Supports and Two Militaries (三支两军) during the Cultural

Revolution.110 He absolved the military and individuals of accountability. One month later, at

both the Central Work Conference and the Third Plenum, Hua further requested that Party

leaders take responsibility for past injustices. “Leaders must engage in self-criticism more

often and voluntarily assume responsibility for subordinates.”111 When addressing the issue

of reversing unjust cases, Hua called upon leaders to bear responsibility and examine their

mistakes so as to unite the cadres and the populace and look forward (向前看 ).112 By

acknowledging the Party leadership’s responsibility for past injustices and avoiding placing

blame on individuals, the leadership under Hua Guofeng attempted to promote reconciliation

and look forward to the future.

Conclusion

As the place where the Nanjing Incident occurred, Jiangsu started this process of dealing

with past injustices earlier than other regions. The case reversals redefined the term

perpetrator in the official narratives. In April 1976, an individual was accused of being a

counterrevolutionary for attacking Jiang Qing and other central leaders, later known as the

Gang of Four. Several months later, the same person was now a victim of the Gang of Four,

and even a hero. The reversal of case verdicts also reversed the definitions of perpetrator and

victim. The reversal of cases of “solely opposing the Gang of Four” was also a starting point

for reviewing past cases after the Cultural Revolution. This provided a moment when the

110 Hua, “Zai zhongyang gongzuo huiyi shang de di er ci jianghua,” 189–90. Andrew Walder and Su Yang suggest that the vast majority of casualties during the Cultural Revolution occurred from 1968 to 1971 when the establishment of provisional organs of political and military power. See Walder, Andrew G., “Rebellion and Repression in China, 1966–1971,” Social Science History 38, no. 3–4 (January 2014): 513–39. 111 Hua Guofeng, “Zai zhongyang gongzuo huiyi bimuhui shang de jianghua” 在中央工作会议闭幕会上的讲话 [Speech at the Closing Meeting of the Central Work Conference], December 13, 1978, 194, E101-121-0363, NMA. 112 Hua Guofeng, “Zai shi yi jie san zhong quanhui bimuhui shang de jianghua” 在十一届三中全会闭幕会上的讲话 [Speech at the Closing Meeting of the Central Work Conference], December 22, 1978, 202, E101-121-0363, NMA.


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survivors of the Cultural Revolution were conditioned to redress their cases. The appeals to

reconsider cases went beyond the limits of “solely opposing the Gang of Four” cases. In order

to get unjust verdicts reversed, people at the grassroots level appealed to and pressed local

authorities to correct the injustices they had suffered. Local authorities were also willing to

address past injustices in order to rebuild their prestige and authority, which had been

severely damaged during the Cultural Revolution. Petitioners and local cadres applied the

notions of perpetrator and victim developed during the campaign against the Gang of Four to

address the injustices caused by the Cultural Revolution and to settle accounts with the

perpetrators.

Jiangsu’s positive practice of case reviews and reversals was praised at the central level

and further influenced the redressing of past wrongs nationwide. To avoid losing overall

control, along with some central leaders’ promotion of reparation, the Central Committee

started responding to victims and their family members’ grievances. Local experimentation

and initiatives advanced the central process of addressing large-scale injustices. Addressing

previous injustices not only provided a solution and a way for the Party to give the victims

justice, but also served the function of mobilizing the majority of the population to move

forward and focus on rebuilding the economy. To push this argument to its limits, reparatory

measures were later mainly intended to advance economic transformation.113 In this sense,

case reviews and reversals during the period of 1976 to 1978 challenged the watershed

significance of the 1978 Third Plenum. The transition from the Maoist era to Deng Xiaoping’s

reform period did not occur abruptly, but was a result of interplay among the Party-state

apparatus at the central, provincial, and lower levels immediately following the downfall of

the Gang of Four. Both addressing past injustices and dealing with perpetrators continued

under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, who assumed the majority of power after the 1978

Third Plenum.

Redressing past injustices raised issues in relation to perpetrators. Local cadres not only

needed to deal with the perpetrators designated during the campaign to Expose, Criticize,

and Investigate the Gang of Four, but also those who were responsible for injustices during

the Cultural Revolution. The local authorities devoted efforts to identifying individual

perpetrators instead of entirely blaming past wrongs on the Gang of Four Clique. At the same

113 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 2000, 129–31.


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time, in order to distance itself from Cultural Revolutionary injustices, the Party leadership

absolved Party and judicial cadres from responsibility for past wrongs. This controversial

attribution of accountability led to further debates among those who were identified as

perpetrators and necessitated a protracted and difficult process of punishment for past

violent actions.

Chapter 4 Exclusion and Inclusion: Punishing, Purging and Redressing

Perpetrators (1979-1987)

The campaign to Expose, Criticize, and Investigate the Gang of Four between 1976 and

1978 led to questions of who should be held accountable for the violent recent past and what

punishment they should receive. Simultaneously, the reversals of unjust, false, and mistaken

cases restored cadres and Party and state institutions. In particular, the rehabilitation of legal

professionals and the reestablishment of commissions for discipline inspection in 1978

provided the institutional and personnel prerequisites for proceeding with addressing the

matter of perpetrators. After 1978, the CCP no longer dealt with the designated perpetrators

through political campaigns, but instead through conventional Party and state institutions.

On November 25, 1978, Hua Guofeng announced the abolishment of case examination

groups ( 专案组 ), ad hoc entities for investigating political and criminal crimes. 1 Hua

demanded that the examination groups hand over all ongoing cases to two sectors for further

management.2 Cases regarding inner-Party issues should go to the commissions for discipline

inspection ( 纪律检查委员会 ), and political and criminal cases, such as

counterrevolutionaries, should be transferred to political-legal institutions (政法机关). This

decision terminated provisional institutions for case investigation and suggested two main

paths for dealing with perpetrators: the legal system and Party discipline. Between the late

1970s and the 1980s, over 20,000 people stood trial, and half a million people were subjected

to disciplinary and administrative sanctions nationwide for their acts during the Cultural

Revolution.3

This chapter discusses the legal trials and disciplinary measures taken towards the

designated perpetrators in Jiangsu between 1979 and 1987. It examines the interaction of

law and politics in dealing with the violent past and further discusses how this affected the

distribution of political power in post-Mao China. After 1978, debates on the character of the

post-Mao regime centered on the relationship between politics and law. For example, in

1 For more information on case examination groups, see Schoenhals, “The Central Case Examination Group, 1966-79.” 2 Hua, “Zai zhongyang gongzuo huiyi shang de di er ci jianghua,” 189. 3 Gao, “Qingli ‘sanzhongren’ de qianqian houhou.”

Chapter 4 Exclusion and Inclusion

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December 1978, Deng Xiaoping outlined the deficiencies of the law: “[We] tended to regard

the words of our leaders as ‘law,’ and if there were disagreements with the leaders’ words, it

would be considered ‘illegal.’ If leaders’ words changed, the ‘law’ would also change.”4 To

avoid this, Deng suggested enacting laws that included the Criminal Law, the Civil Code, the

Criminal Procedure Law, and so forth.5 Ye Jianying continued to expound on the significance

of the socialist legality: “We need to speed up the pace of socialist construction and achieve

the Four Modernizations. This is our goal. To achieve it, we must promote democracy and

strengthen the socialist legality.”6 The CCP leadership thereby shifted its attention to the role

of law with the intention of creating a law-based rule. The trials of Jiangsu followers were

embedded in this historical context.7

Jiangsu judicial officials emphasized the significance of public trials as a response to the

call for the rule of law. At a provincial conference in February 1979, Jiangsu High People’s

Court president Lin Xizhao described the Maoist era as a period in which the Party-state

favored political campaigns over the law. 8 For example, during the Cultural Revolution,

judicial institutions did not openly hear criminal cases. To address this situation, Lin Xizhao

outlined that public trials were key to law enforcement and explained that:

4 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Sanzhong quanhui yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian 三中全会以来重要文献汇编 [Collection of Important Documents Issued after the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCP Congress], vol. 1 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1982), 19. 5 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, 1:19. 6 Ye Jianying, “Zai zhongyang gongzuo huiyi bimuhui shang de jianghua” 在中央工作会议闭幕会上的讲话 [Speech at the Closing Meeting of the Central Work Conference], December 13, 1978, 211, E101-121-0363, NMA. 7 There is a precedent for countries using the law to cope with their violent past. For example, both the GMD government and the CCP had put so-called collaborators (汉奸) on trial following the Anti-Japanese War. Between November 1945 and October 1947, the GMD government put 14,918 collaborators on trial and handed out sentences ranging from the death penalty to fixed-term imprisonment. See Meng Guoxiang and Cheng Tangfa, “Chengzhi hanjian gongzuo gaishu” 惩治汉奸工作概述 [Overview of the Work of Punishing Collaborators], Minguo dang’an, no. 2 (1994): 105–19. For the handling of collaborators in the base areas (根据地) of the CCP, see Weng Youwei, “Kangri genjudi minzhu zhengquan chengzhi hanjian de lifa he zhengce yanjiu” 抗日根据地民主政权惩治汉奸的立法和政策研究 [Research on the Democratic Regime’s Legislation and Policies on Punishing Collaborators at Anti-Japanese Base Areas], Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu, no. 2 (2006): 56–65. 8 Lin Xizhao, “Lin Xizhao tongzhi zai quansheng xingshi shenpan gongzuo huiyi jieshu shi de jianghua” 林希昭同志在全省刑事审判工作会议结束时的讲话 [Lin Xizhao’s Speech at the End of the Provincial Criminal Adjudication Work Conference], February 11, 1979, 60, E237-111-0081, NMA. However, recent scholarship argues that existing research has overemphasized the destructive impact on legal system and in fact parts of its functions were even strengthened during the Cultural Revolution, for more details, see Xu, “Beyond ‘Destruction’ and ‘Lawlessness’: The Legal System during the Cultural Revolution.”


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Public trials create an atmosphere where officials, the public, and everyone else act

according to the law… Public trials demonstrate the independence of the court’s

adjudication, the seriousness and the great authority of the law… Public trials also

ascertain the truth, ensure the quality of cases, punish crimes, protect people, and

are faithful to the truth.9

Lin’s account illustrates the political and didactic purpose of putting the designated

perpetrators on public trial. First, the public trial of perpetrators served as a didactic venue to

audiences in and outside the courtroom. According to Lawrence Douglas, perpetrator trials

have all explicitly embraced a didactic purpose and this purpose lies at the very heart of the

proceeding.10 Public trials, sometimes attended by thousands of people, also carry educative

messages – acting in accordance with the law – for participants, spectators, and even

audiences outside the courtroom. 11 For example, over 60,000 spectators nationwide

attended the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Clique Trial, and hundreds of millions of people watched

it televised. Many more accessed the trial through newspapers and broadcasts. 12

Immediately after the trial, the central leadership suggested that it achieved the desired goal

and described it as “a vivid legal education.”13 In this sense, the trials of the designated

perpetrators carried a strong didactic function.

The Party-state also used the trials of designated perpetrators to demonstrate political

power and state authority. The post-Mao leadership was comfortable using legal procedure

as an instrument of state power.14 Courts that staged trials functioned as agents of state

control. By putting the Gang of Four and its followers on trial, the Party-state sought to

legitimate its authority and undermine that of the accused. As the central authorities claimed,

9 Lin, “Lin Xizhao tongzhi zai quansheng xingshi shenpan gongzuo huiyi jieshu shi de jianghua,” 60–61. 10 Douglas, Lawrence, “The Didactic Trial: Filtering History and Memory into the Courtroom,” European Review 14, no. 4 (2006): 513–14. 11 Trevaskes, Susan, “Propaganda Work in Chinese Courts: Public Trials and Sentencing Rallies as Sites of Expressive Punishment and Public Education in the People’s Republic of China,” Punishment & Society 6, no. 1 (January 2004): 5–21. 12 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu panjue Lin Biao, Jiang Qing fangeming jituan’an shi ming zhufan hou xuanchuan gongzuo zhong jige wenti de tongzhi” 关于判决林彪、江青反革命集团案十名主犯后宣传工作中几个问题的通知 [Notification on Several Issues in Propaganda Work after the Trial of the Ten Principal Criminals of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Counterrevolutionary Group Case], January 23, 1981, 55, E101-121-0435, NMA. 13 Zhonggong zhongyang, 55. 14 For further discussion on how the Gang of Four Trial demonstrated state power, see Cook, Alexander C., “China’s Gang of Four Trial: The Law v. The Laws of History,” in Political Trials in Theory and History, ed. Meierhenrich, Jens and Pendas, Devin O. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 275–78.


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the Gang of Four Trial demonstrated the dignity of the law and the power of the Party-state.

It also served to dismantle the remaining forces of the group, urging them to confess their

guilt, plead guilty, and reform their behavior.15 Simultaneously, the central authorities strictly

controlled the public discussion of the trial and asserted that it was not good to dwell on it

for long.16 The legitimate authorities further exerted state control.

Finally, the trials were also an instrument that the state used to create an authoritative

legal “truth” about the violent past. Participants in trials – judges, defendants, and lawyers –

told competing and often contradictory stories of the past in the courts. As Meierenrich and

Pendas have argued, many conflicts in trials are over the appropriate interpretive schema to

be applied to an agreed-upon set of “facts” and often the conflicting schemata is

simultaneously legal and political in nature.17 The trials of local followers were designed to

formulate a legal “truth” about the Gang of Four Clique’s crimes and justify casting them out

as perpetrators. In doing so, the local authorities sought to construct an authoritative

interpretation of the violent recent past within a legal framework and further demonstrate a

break with the past.

However, although the central leadership emphasized the significance of the law, politics

still played an essential role in punishing the designated perpetrators. The CCP leadership

tended to minimize the scale of criminal prosecutions and mainly dealt with the designated

perpetrators through administrative and disciplinary measures. As a response to past

violence, these measures are quite similar to the policy of lustration. The policy of lustration

describes the removal of members and those who collaborated with former suppressive

regimes from power, and it is usually only applied to post-Communist countries, such as the

Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.18 The exclusion of former officials is considered a

standard response to past violence and a “transitional justice” procedure.19 The theoretical

goal of lustration has generally been state security and the exclusion of potential political

15 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu panjue Lin Biao, Jiang Qing fangeming jituan’an shi ming zhufan hou xuanchuan gongzuo zhong jige wenti de tongzhi,” 56. 16 Zhonggong zhongyang, 56. 17 Meierhenrich, Jens and Pendas, Devin O., eds., Political Trials in Theory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 37–38. 18 David, Roman, Lustration and Transitional Justice: Personnel Systems in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Nalepa, Monika, Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 19 Cohen, Stanley, “State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability, and the Policing of the Past,” Law & Social Inquiry 20, no. 1 (1995): 7–50.


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threats. Despite the generally lenient approach to the designated perpetrators in the 1980s,

the upper echelons of the CCP considered the exclusion of potential threats from the Party

indispensable to securing its rule. The policy of lustration also became an instrument for

tightening the Party’s control over dissenting voices within the Party. The exclusion of former

rebel leaders and dissenting voices made it difficult for them to return to power. These

measures had a significant impact on the distribution of political power. The CCP

concentrated power on itself and guaranteed that no political forces could distribute its

power in future.

4.1 Trial Preparation in Jiangsu

Putting Gang of Four followers on trial at the local level began with the campaign to

Expose, Criticize, and Investigate the Gang of Four. As early as December 1976, a former rebel

leader was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for illegal detention (非法拘禁他人) in

Suzhou.20 In June 1977, Gu Binghua (顾炳华), a rebel leader in Xuzhou during the Cultural

Revolution, was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Xuzhou Intermediate People’s Court

on charges including commanding armed struggles, being heavily involved in beating,

smashing, and looting, inciting workers to stop production and sabotaging railway

transportation. 21 On March 3, 1975, Deng Xiaoping personally instructed the Xuzhou

leadership to punish Gu Binghua because the local factional activities had hindered the

railway operations in Xuzhou. With the Jiangsu leadership’s support, the Xuzhou Municipal

Public Security Bureau arrested Gu and two other factional leaders on March 10, 1975. On

the same day, the Jiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee accused these factional leaders

of having incited factionalism, engaged in smashing, beating and looting, disrupted social

order, and sabotaged production and transportation.22

20 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Guanyu qingcha duixiang he bufen yuan zaofanpai toutou xianshi biaoxian de diaocha baogao” 关于清查对象和部分原造反派头头现实表现的调查报告 [Investigation Report on the Actual Performance of Investigated Targets and Former Rebel Leaders], September 14, 1981, 18, E101-121-0442, NMA. 21 Jiangsu sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Jiangsu shengzhi shenpanzhi, 332. 22 For more detailed information on the rectification of the railway in Xuzhou, see Zhang Hua, “Deng Xiaoping yu yi jiu qi wu nian tielu zhengdun” 邓小平与一九七五年铁路整顿 [Deng Xiaoping and the Rectification in Railway], Bainianchao, no. 08 (2014): 33–40; Wu Xueqing, “Deng Xiaoping yu 1975 nian Xuzhou tielu zhengdun” 邓小平与1975年徐州铁路整顿 [Deng Xiaoping and the Xuzhou Railway Rectification in 1975], Bai nian chao [Hundred Year Tide], no. 6 (2002): 11–16.


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Such early trials were not exclusive to Jiangsu Province. Between July 26 and August 13,

1978, the Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court in Zhejiang Province put Weng Senhe (翁森

鹤), a former rebel leader identified as a core member of the Gang of Four Clique, on trial and

handed down a life sentence.23 Like Gu Binghua, Weng Senhe had also been detained for

investigation on July 9, 1975 because the Center intended to solve the issue of factionalism

in Zhejiang. The Zhejiang authorities officially arrested Weng on December 23, 1976.24 Local

authorities had excluded these rebel leaders from power and kept them in custody during the

Cultural Revolution due to their factional activities. After the downfall of the Gang of Four,

local courts tried them as a part of the clique. Factionalism and political factors played a

decisive role in these early trials.

In early 1979, the Jiangsu High People’s Court identified politics and factionalism as the

two main factors that interfered with the independence of adjudication in Jiangsu. First, the

court highlighted Party leaders’ interference in legal practices. It described that:

Some leaders ‘instructed’ the court to sentence and kill the accused before they were

arrested; some cadres did not implement the decisions of the provincial court, but

acted on the erroneous opinion of an individual leader. Some did not allow the court

to examine the files but asked the court to issue a verdict. Some forcibly instructed

the court to handle matters that should not be dealt with by the court.25

The court thus suggested that local legal cadres should resist the will of superiors (长官意志)

who abused their power and did not act according to the law. Second, the court noted the

influence of factionalism in legal practices :

Factionalism has interfered with our independent adjudication. People who should

have been sentenced according to the law said that they were wrongly convicted,

23 Zhejiang sheng Hangzhou shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Xingshi panjueshu (Weng Senhe)” 刑事判决书（翁森鹤） [Written Judgment (Weng Senhe)] (The Maoist Legacy, August 13, 1978), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/2317. 24 On July 12, 1975, the Center approved the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee’s decision to detain Weng Senhe. The committee announced the decision on the same day and demanded to terminate any factional activities. For the fulltext of the provincial document, see Zhang Letian, Xi Fuqun, and Yan Yunxiang, eds., Work Journals of Zhou Shengkang, 1961-1982, vol. 2 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2018), 944–45. 25 Jiangsu sheng gaoji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu jiaqiang xingshi shenpan gongzuo de jidian yijian” 关于加强刑事审判工作的几点意见 [Some Suggestions for Strengthening Criminal Trials], February 16, 1979, 83, E237-111-0081, NMA.


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while we rehabilitated good people who had been wrongly convicted, and they stated

that the bad people were let free.26

Jiangsu’s procedure for handling perpetrator cases also illustrates the role of political

leaders. At the provincial level, Hong Peilin (洪霈霖), Head of the Jiangsu Provincial Public

Security Department, Zheng Shilu (郑士鲁), Deputy Chief Procurator of the Jiangsu Provincial

People’s Procuratorate, and Jiang Weibang (江维邦), Deputy Chief Judge of the Jiangsu

Higher People’s Court, jointly took charge of case examination and proposed a procedure for

putting these cases on trial. When handling a criminal case, Hong, Zheng, and Jiang were the

first to propose criminal penalties. Then they reported the case in the form of indictments (起

诉书), along with incriminating evidence, to the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee to seek

further approval. Once approved, the case would normally go to public trial.27 In this sense,

legal verdicts only came into effect with the consent of the provincial Party committee. Party

leaders still played a critical role in legal practices. Furthermore, case verdicts had been

reached before the court hearings. The trials of local followers thus became a stage to exhibit

law enforcement to the public.

The above issues drew more attention during the promulgation of the Criminal Law (刑

法) and the Criminal Procedure Law (刑事诉讼法). In June 1979, the first Criminal Law and

the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC came into place.28 Legal reform was a vital component

of the restoration of socialist legality in post-Mao China.29 The new laws provided a legal basis

for public trials. Nationwide learning and propagation of the law therefore took place.30

Immediately, the Jiangsu Party Committee requested that legal cadres familiarize themselves

with the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law so that they could act according to the

26 Jiangsu sheng gaoji renmin fayuan, 84. 27 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Zhuanfa guanyu dui yijing daibu de sirenbang bangpai gugan fenzi he da za qiang shoue fenzi shenpan chuli he shenpi gongzuo yijian de tongzhi” 转发关于对已经逮捕的“四人帮”帮派骨干分子和打砸抢首恶分子审判处理和审批工作意见的通知 [Notice on Transmitting Opinions on the Trial and Approval of the Arrested Factional Backbones of the Gang of Four and Beat-Smash-Loot Principal Culprits], June 30, 1979, 93, D101-121-0685, NMA. 28 Peng Zhen, “Guanyu qi ge falü caoan de shuoming” 关于七个法律草案的说明 [Introduction to the Seven Legislative Bills], in <刑法><刑事诉讼法>等法律汇编, 1979, 206. 29 Baum, “Modernization and Legal Reform in Post-Mao China.” 30 For an investigation on the popularization of laws in the PRC, see Altehenger, Jennifer E., Legal Lessons: Popularizing Laws in the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1989 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, Asia Center, 2018).


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law.31 Soon the scale of law propagation and learning extended to every work unit and

brigade in the province. The goal was that “everyone knows the laws, [and] abide[s] by

them.”32 Law learning and propaganda served to cultivate legal knowledge among cadres and

the populace and thus overcome law enforcement obstacles. The emphasis on the rule of law

laid the legal groundwork for bringing the designated perpetrators to trial in Jiangsu.

However, local legal officials questioned the efficacy of the new laws. For example, after

studying the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law, Nantong judicial officials

expressed concern about the effectiveness of the enforcement of new laws. Some cadres

doubted whether the promise that everyone was equal before the law (法律面前人人平等)

could be fulfilled in reality. Some worried that abuse of privilege would interfere with the

implementation. Others stressed the difficulty of practicing according to the new laws due to

the lack of judicial professionals. 33 Local cadres mainly expressed concerns about the

relationship between politics and law under the CCP leadership, under which law had

generally been subordinated to politics and was lacking independence.

The local judicial authorities also faced significant challenges to the enforcement of the

law. In a report to the Jiangsu High People’s Court, judicial officials of the Nantong People’s

Court complained: “Some Party bodies at grassroots levels do not carry out court judgments;

involved parties in court tore up legal documents and interrupted the courtroom; some

individuals even hurled invectives and resorted to violence.” 34 On the one hand, these

concerns indicate that the post-Mao leaders faced difficulty controlling the bureaucracy

required to institutionalize a legal-based rule.35 On the other hand, as the Party enjoyed the

monopoly on state power, this also extended to the judicial system. Many legal cadres had

fallen victim to the Cultural Revolution and thus feared the risks of practicing law in a changing

31 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Guanyu jiaqiang fazhi xuexi de tongzhi” 关于加强法制学习的通知 [Notice on Strengthening Legal Learning], August 1, 1979, 65–66, E101-121-386, NMA. 32 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Guanyu kaizhan shehui zhuyi minzhu he fazhi xuanchuan jiaoyu de tongzhi” 关于开展社会主义民主和法制宣传教育的通知 [Notice on Carrying out the Propagation and Education of Socialist Democracy and the Legal System], November 6, 1979, 127–28, E101-121-0386, NMA. 33 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu xuexi Dangzhongyang 64 hao wenjian de qingkuang huibao” 关于学习党中央64号文件的情况汇报 [Situation Report on Studying the Central Committee’s No. 64 Document], October 13, 1979, 64–65, E237-121-0063, NMA. 34 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, 66. 35 Morgan, Maria Chan, “Controlling the Bureaucracy in Post-Mao China,” Asian Survey 21, no. 12 (December 1, 1981): 1223–36.


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political climate. In addition, local courts were short of judicial professionals, and many poorly

trained judicial officials were incapable of fulfilling the requirements for legal practices.

Under these circumstances, the CCP Central Committee further emphasized the role of

law and promised the independence of court adjudication to dispel fears and concerns among

cadres and encourage them to enforce the law. On September 9, 1979, the Central Committee

issued Document No. 64, highlighting that disrespect for law and the authority of the judicial

organs was an act damaging the Party’s leadership and prestige. While studying this

document, local judicial officials mainly focused on three issues.

First, the notion that everyone was equal before the law. The document defined this as

such:

Regardless of the differences in the socio-political status, social background and

political history of the accused, and regardless of whether the accused has committed

a crime or belongs to the contradiction between the enemy and us, there must be

equality in the application of the law, which means that all persons are equal before

the law.36

This notion impacted the trials of local followers in Jiangsu. On the one hand, it entitled the

defendants to certain rights in court, for example, the right to defense and appeal, which had

been impossible during the Cultural Revolution. On the other hand, as the following section

shows, the defendants often used this notion to challenge the court on the fairness of their

trials. Drawing upon this, Jiangsu judicial cadres also criticized leaders’ privileges: “In the past,

some people exercised privileges and interfered with our law enforcement, and we could do

nothing about it. Now they must restrain themselves or else they will be sanctioned by Party

discipline and state law.”37

The second issue outlined in Document No. 64 related to abolishing the practice of Party

committees reviewing and approving case verdicts (党委审批案件制度) that had come into

effect in March 1967. The Party’s power over legal affairs was at the center of local debates

36 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu jianjue baozheng Xingfa, Xingshi susongfa qieshi shishi de zhishi” 关于坚决保证刑法、刑事诉讼法切实实施的指示 [Instructions on Firmly Guaranteeing the Implementation of the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law] (The Maoist Legacy, September 9, 1979), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/1047. 37 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu xuexi Dangzhongyang 64 hao wenjian de qingkuang huibao.”


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about adjudication independence. A Nantong cadre criticized the practice when studying the

document:

The approval of cases by Party committees has become a mere formality. Some

leaders neither read case files nor investigated the cases and only listened to reports

to hand down sentences. They were not good at listening to investigators’ opinions

and simply drew verdicts… Wrongs often occurred.38

Local judicial cadres considered abolishing this practice in a step towards the independence

of courts to adjudicate cases.39 Meanwhile, local cadres requested further information about

when to abolish the Party committee approval system and what provisions and measures

would be in place to deal with this reform.40 It was unclear how to implement the abolishment

and what it meant for their legal practices. This uncertainty came to play a role in local

follower trials, where the Party leadership exerted strong power over legal practices.

The last issue was the lack of judicial professionals. To enact the new laws, Jiangsu

decided in September 1979 to add 4,227 new staff members comprising political-legal cadres

(政法干部) – 1,858 in local courts, 1,600 in procuratorates, and 769 in the public security

apparatus.41 These cadres had to meet certain requirements: to include young and middle-

aged cadres who were politically potent, to possess a high policy level, to have received

education above middle school level, and to be in good health. The requirements were

minimum and emphasized political merits more than professional skills. Jiangsu also deployed

180 lawyers who were either graduates of a law school who had also worked in the legal field

for at least one year, or held a position as a judge or prosecutor in a court or procuratorate.42

These measures prepared local courts for the trials of followers in late 1979. However, the

above debates about the relationship between politics and law continued.

38 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, 65. 39 For the development of judicial independence in the PRC, see Tian Fu, “Zhongguo duli xingshi shenpanquan zhidu de lishi kaocha” 中国独立行使审判权制度的历史考察 [Investigation on the Institution of Independent Exercise of Judicial Power in China], Huanqiu falu pinglun, no. 2 (2016): 36–47. 40 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu xuexi Dangzhongyang 64 hao wenjian de qingkuang huibao,” 66. 41 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Pizhuan shengwei zuzhibu zhengfakou lingdao xiaozu guanyu chongshi jiaqiang quansheng zhengfa ganbu duiwu de qingshi baogao” 批转省委组织部、政法口领导小组关于充实加强全省政法干部队伍的请示报告 [Commenting on and Transmitting the Provincial Organization Department and the Leading Group of the Political and Legal Sector’s Request for Instructions on Strengthening the Ranks of Political and Legal Cadres in the Province], September 4, 1979, 92, E101-121-0386, NMA. 42 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, 92.


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4.2 Jiangsu’s Gang of Four Followers on Trial

Punitive action against designated perpetrators became the first test of the efficiency of

the law. Despite the CCP’s intention to control how people interpreted and used legal

knowledge,43 people used it to contend with state authority.44 As detailed below, in the dock

the accused employed recently-learned legal knowledge to defend themselves. They also

used the concept of “equality before the law” to challenge the official discourse blaming them

for past injustices. In this sense, the state achieved its goal of developing a “legal

consciousness” among the people and transforming its reign and society through law.45

However, local courts avoided enforcing the newly-enacted laws at the Gang of Four follower

trials. As such, Jiangsu trials were based on different legal grounds from those of the Gang of

Four.

The majority of Jiangsu trials of Gang of Four followers took place in late December 1979,

only a few days before the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law came into effect. On

June 20, 1979, Xu Jiatun, First Secretary of the Jiangsu Party Committee, urged political-legal

cadres first to put local “backbones” and perpetrators of violence on trial as soon as

possible.46 The offenders in the dock in Jiangsu primarily included two groups of people who

had been singled out during the campaign to Expose, Criticize, and Investigate: backbones of

the Gang of Four Clique (帮派骨干分子) and principal culprits of beating, smashing, and

looting (打砸抢首恶分子). According to the central policy on categorizing Gang of Four

followers, “backbones” referred to those who had committed severe crimes but refused to

repent and had a bad attitude to confessing their crimes. They were to be punished according

to the law.47 The definition of beating, smashing, and looting was rather broad, including

those who had engaged in violence, such as armed struggles, confiscating state property, and

physical abuse, usually termed “beat-smash-loot elements” in the Party language.48

43 Altehenger, Legal Lessons, 3–5. 44 Alford, William P., “Double-Edged Swords Cut Both Ways: Law and Legitimacy in the People’s Republic of China,” Daedalus 122, no. 22 (1993): 45–69. 45 Altehenger, Legal Lessons, 171. 46 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Zhuanfa guanyu dui yijing daibu de sirenbang bangpai gugan fenzi he da za qiang shoue fenzi shenpan chuli he shenpi gongzuo yijian de tongzhi,” 93. 47 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu tongyi he zhuanfa Shanghai shiwei guanyu Shanghai shi qingcha gongzuo de qingkuang baogao.” 48 Originally, landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, and bad elements were also listed and about to be punished along with beat-smash-loot elements. However, as political labels such as landlord, rich peasant had been removed since early 1979, they were not targeted in trials later on. See Zhonggong zhongyang,


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The case of Hua Linsen was the first under discussion in Jiangsu. The Jiangsu authorities

used Hua’s case to showcase the penalties meted out to perpetrators in the province. Hua

was regarded as a Gang of Four backbone and a principal participant in violence in Jiangsu. In

early 1979, with the Central Committee’s approval, the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee

deprived Hua of all posts within and outside the Party, expelling him from the Party, and

removing him from public office (开除公职). The leadership then transferred Hua Linsen to

the Suzhou Intermediate People’s Court for further handling.49 The Suzhou court did not

openly try Hua Linsen, but it announced the final sentence in public. On December 28, 1979,

the Suzhou Intermediate People’s Court put Hua Linsen on a public sentencing rally and

sentenced him to 18 years’ imprisonment. 50 Over 4,000 people attended the public

sentencing.51 The purpose of announcing the sentence in public was to perform its didactic

function to the public. As the Jiangsu court demanded, public sentencing was necessary for

educational significance.

4.2.1 Follower Trials in Nantong

The Nantong trials serve as an illustration of the process of sentencing designated

perpetrators and the various challenges to the attribution of legal accountability for past

violence. Due to the fact that the local authorities considered no followers to qualify as

backbones of the Gang of Four in Nantong, Nantong trials mainly dealt with violent actions

that had occurred during the Cultural Revolution. Nantong investigated 56 people for violence

during the Cultural Revolution. Of them, 15 people stood trial.52 Between December 17 and

28, 1979, the Nantong Intermediate People’s Court openly put 13 defendants on trial (Table

“Guanyu dizhu funong fenzi zhaimao wenti he di fu zinü chengfen wenti de jueding.” 49 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Guanyu yinfa Yang Guangli, Hua Linsen he Wu Dasheng, Jiang Ke, Chen Hefa zuizheng cailiao de tongzhi” 关于印发杨广立、华林森和吴大胜、蒋科、陈和发罪证材料的通知 [Notice on the Issuance of the Incriminating Evidence of Yang Guangli, Hua Linsen, Wu Dasheng, Jiang Ke, and Chen Hefa], February 26, 1979, 69, E101-121-0385, NMA. 50 Jiangsu sheng Suzhou shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Hua Linsen fangeming an xingshi panjueshu” 华林森反革命案刑事判决书 [Written Judgment on Hua Linsen Counterrevolutionary Case] (The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, December 28, 1979), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/2332. 51 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “1979 niandu dashiji” 1979年度大事记 [Chronicle of Events in 1979], 1979, 118, A1-1-313, SMA. 52 Huang Shuxiong, “Zai diqu qingcha ding’an gongzuo huiyi shang de fayan: shanshi shanzhong gaohao qingcha jielun chuli gongzuo” 在地区清查定案工作会议上的发言：善始善终搞好清查结论处理工作 [Speaking at the Prefecture Investigation and Case Settlement Work Meeting: Well Reaching Investigation Verdicts and Inflicting Punishment from Beginning to End], February 23, 1982, 8, D134-111-0010, NMA..


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4).53 The 13 defendants belonged to ten cases. Four defendants were charged with beating,

smashing, and looting, mainly referring to former rebel leaders who had organized and

directed armed struggles that caused deaths in the early stage of the Cultural Revolution.54

The remaining were charged in connection with killings or deaths.

Table 4: Information on Gang of Four Follower Trials in Nantong

Name Gender Cause of Action First Instance Judgment Response

Wang Jinfu male Beat people to death 打人致死 Seven years’ imprisonment Appeal

Zhang Renjie male Shot someone 枪杀人命 Eight years’ imprisonment Appeal

Zhang Song male Persecuted people to death 残害他人致死 Five years’ imprisonment Appeal

Wu Qiangzhou male

Caused another’s death 致死人命 Seven years’ imprisonment Appeal

Tao Zhiyi male Injured another, resulting in their death 伤害致死人命 Seven years’ imprisonment Appeal

Yu Wangsheng male

Injured another, resulting in their death 伤害致死人命 Seven years’ imprisonment Appeal

Liu Hanlin male Injured another, resulting in their death 伤害致死人命 Exempt from criminal punishment No

appeal

Zhang Songtao male

Injured another, resulting in their death 伤害致死人命 Exempt from criminal punishment Appeal

Wu Zhengguo male

Shot someone 枪杀人命 Ten years’ imprisonment Appeal

Wang Maolin male

Beating, smashing, looting 打砸抢

Two years’ imprisonment and deprivation of political rights for two years

No appeal

Shi Shunlin male Beating, smashing, looting 打砸抢

Three years’ imprisonment and deprivation of political rights for one year

Appeal

Shen Bin male Beating, smashing, looting 打砸抢

Seven years’ imprisonment and deprivation of political rights for two years

Appeal

53 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu qingcha anjian shenli gongzuo qingkuang baogao,” 32. 54 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu yundong anjian shenli qingkuang de baogao” 关于运动案件审理情况的报告 [Report on the Situation of Hearing Campaign Cases], December 1979, 95, E237-121-0075, NMA.


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Yang Biao male Beating, smashing, looting 打砸抢

Three years’ imprisonment and deprivation of political rights for two years

Appeal

To cope with the challenges of dealing with the defendants in court, the Nantong

Intermediate People’s Court also carefully prepared before the trials. The Nantong court

deployed six judges and eight clerks and hired 19 people’s assessors to establish a special

team with seven cadres from the procuratorate in 1979. The court then established ten trial

teams, each with one judge, two people’s assessors, one clerk, and one public prosecutor.55

The trial teams collectively read the case files, investigated and verified the evidence,

discussed the charges, and put forward the sentence. The trials were then openly held. In

total, over 2,000 people attended the trials.

The Nantong court also devoted significant efforts to designing the courtroom. The

courtroom became a space for demonstrating the power of the state. The court described the

impressive effect of the room in its report:

On entering the gate, two armed bailiffs were present at the main entrance to inspect

the tickets, and two more bailiffs were present at the courtroom door to collect the

tickets. The national emblem was displayed above the front of the courtroom. There

were armed bailiffs on duty in the corridors on both sides of the courtroom. The

entire courtroom was solemn and dignified, giving people a feeling of authority.56

The court considered this demonstration of authority to exert great power over the

defendants: “the criminals, who had been very arrogant in the detention center, had to follow

the instructions to answer questions and confess crimes as soon as they entered the

courtroom.”57 A prosecutor stated that “we have never had such a solemn courtroom in

Nantong.”

To cope with the various situations that might arise during the trials, the court drafted

questions and answers to provide judges and prosecutors with guidelines. The questions and

answers were based on interrogations with the defendants before the trials. It listed seven

main questions that the defendants were likely to pose in court and prepared standard

55 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu qingcha anjian shenli gongzuo qingkuang baogao,” 30. 56 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu yundong anjian shenli qingkuang de baogao,” 99. 57 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, 99.


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answers (Appendix 3). 58 In general, it demonstrates that two main issues were being

considered at the trial: whether the defendants were guilty and who should be held criminally

accountable for the violence during the Cultural Revolution. For example, one defendant

explained his participation in the Cultural Revolution by stating that he had been following

Mao Zedong’s orders. This claim was a common defense strategy assumed by the defendants

who had participated in the Cultural Revolution and committed violence in the context of this

state-sponsored movement. In response, the judges and prosecutors were supposed to refute

the defendant’s question and explain that they were not on trial for having taken part in the

Cultural Revolution but for the serious crimes they had committed during the Cultural

Revolution. This raises the common question of whether a defendant who has followed the

orders of a superior should be punished or not, one of the most challenging problems faced

when trying criminals in post-conflict societies.59 In another case, a defendant justified armed

struggles on the grounds that his faction had been trying to curtail violence and protect state

property (by taking part in armed struggles). The court judges emphasized that both factions

were wrong to engage in armed struggles and violence during the Cultural Revolution. Local

judicial cadres tended to show that these trials merely engaged with criminal actions and did

not result from any political factors.

In other cases, the defendants questioned the fairness of the trial by using the newly-

propagated legal knowledge at the time – everyone is equal before the law – arguing that

many military officers and cadres who had also played a critical role in the violence were

exempted from punishment. They denounced the trial as factional revenge. The court

responded that military courts would handle military officers who had committed crimes.

Those who stood trial were either key followers or principal culprits of violence. The court

further explained that some major participants in armed struggles would not be prosecuted

if they confessed and showed remorse. This suggested that the defendants were being put

on trial not only because they had engaged in violence, but also because they did not show

desired attitude. The court further explained that the majority of the masses had been

58 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Dabianci cankao ziliao (taolungao)” 答辩词参考资料（讨论稿） [References for the Defense (Draft for Discussion)], [December 1979?], 72, E237-121-0063, NMA. 59 For more information on the development of the defense of obedience to superior orders, see Takemura, Hitomi, ed., “Defence of Superior Orders: Duties of Individuals to Disobey Manifestly Illegal Orders under International Law,” in International Human Right to Conscientious Objection to Military Service and Individual Duties to Disobey Manifestly Illegal Orders (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2009), 137–81; Dinstein, Yoram, The Defence of “Obedience to Superior Orders” in International Law (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1965).


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deceived into taking part in armed struggles and thus they bore no responsibility. This

decision was in accord with the central policy outlined in early 1979 concerning the so-called

January Revolution (一月革命): the state suggested that mass organizations and the populace

had been deceived and they therefore bore no responsibility.60

The Nantong court’s responses indicate that local judicial officials attempted to maintain

the legality of these trials by avoiding sweeping judgments of the Cultural Revolution. They

struggled to separate individual illegal acts from the historical context of political campaigns

and denied these trials’ political nature. Instead, local trials highlighted the legal convention:

there were punishable crimes, and the offenders should be subject to the law. At least on the

surface, the drive to put these perpetrators on trial was neither factional nor political.

However, the effort made by local courts to restrict these cases to legal issues and disclaim

the play of political forces at the trials was not always successful. In the courtroom, the judges

encountered various responses from the defendants. A court report provides some insights

into defendants’ performances in the courtroom: “Some defendants were physically ill and,

upon their request, were allowed to sit down and answer questions; some wanted tea and

were allowed to have it… Some did not speak and refused to answer any questions.”61 Having

a cup of tea while on trial presents a very different image from a courtroom characterized by

solemnity and authority. In particular, faced with silence, as Robert Ferguson has argued,

“judges are left with naked power in the place of consensual, validating process.”62 Zhang

Chunqiao took this strategy of silence to the extreme during the Gang of Four Trial. Zhang’s

silence throughout the trial was unnerving in the Chinese context, as Cook has noted, and it

“rejected the trial narrative whole cloth.”63

Some defendants, however, engaged an active defense in court. They challenged the

legal charges and defended themselves by raising various questions in court, including: “What

crimes did I commit in responding to Chairman Mao’s call to participate in the Cultural

Revolution!” “Armed struggles were supported and directed by the [Nanjing] Military Region

(军区) and the People’s Armed Department (人民武装部).” “What crime did I commit when

60 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Zhuanfa Shanghai shiwei “guanyu jiejue suowei yi yue geming wenti de qingshi baogao de tongzhi.” 61 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu yundong anjian shenli qingkuang de baogao,” 100. 62 Ferguson, Robert A., “Untold Stories in the Law,” in Law’s Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, ed. Brooks, Peter and Gewirtz, Paul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 95. 63 Cook, The Cultural Revolution on Trial, 121–24.


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carrying out orders!” “Why do you punish me and not others? Everyone is equal before the

law.”64 These questions illustrate that the defendants questioned the fairness of the trials and

challenged their legitimacy. The defendants insisted that they did not commit any crimes in

taking part in a state-sponsored political movement, and they thus should not assume any

legal responsibility. They adopted the legal narrative – everyone is equal before the law – to

defend themselves and raise doubts about selective punishment: the majority of military

officials did not stand trial despite their heavy involvement in the violence.

All these questions opened a debate about justice and accountability for the violent past.

This debate often occurs across different post-war and post-conflict settings. One of the most

discussed points is whether soldiers are responsible for crimes committed when following

orders. In post-unification Germany, the German government tried dozens of former East

German soldiers for shooting and killing East German citizens who attempted to cross the

Berlin Wall. Although accused border guards claimed that they were only following orders,

they were held responsible for the shootings.65 The International Criminal Law and many

domestic laws generally suggest that obedience to a superior authority is not a defense. A

subordinate should bear responsibility for his or her acts.66

The defendants further explicitly voiced their discontent about the trial in court. As the

Nantong Intermediate People’s Court outlined in its later report:

Some defendants behaved with unbearable insolence, refused to plead guilty, and

made excuses [for themselves] … Some of them even threatened [the court] by

stating that “as long as I am not sentenced to death, after being released from prison,

I will crawl to Beijing to lodge a complaint (告状) [about this case] if necessary.67

The defendants’ responses were not simply their defense in court, but, more importantly, a

strategy to destabilize the legal truth and narrative that the court intended to establish

64 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu yundong anjian shenli qingkuang de baogao.” 65 Goodman, Micah, “After the Wall: The Legal Ramifications of the East German Border Guard Trials in Unified Germany,” Cornell International Law Journal 29 (1996): 727–66. 66 Gaeta, Paola, “The Defence of Superior Orders: The Statute of International Criminal Court versus Customary International Law,” European Journal of International Law 10, no. 1 (January 1, 1999): 172–91; Dinstein, The Defence of “Obedience to Superior Orders” in International Law. Scholars also argue that even children, who are usually portrayed as powerless, can find a way to resist in the strictest of environments. For a detailed investigation of child soldiers from Africa, Asia, Europe, and South America, see Wessells, Michael, Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009). 67 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu qingcha anjian shenli gongzuo qingkuang baogao,” 31.


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through the trials. The defendants attempted to tell a different story of the past and

introduced an alternative conception of justice. For these defendants, as Meierhenrich and

Pendas note in their study of political trials, their fate was likely secondary to the “success”

of delivering an ideological message.68 The most famous example in this context is Jiang Qing’s

performance at the Gang of Four Trial. She frequently interrupted the proceedings and

questioned the trial’s legitimacy with disruptive comments and incisive sarcasm. 69 Jiang

Qing’s performance even won her the respect of defenders like Zhang Sizhi and many in the

public audience.

The results of the Nantong trials were highly anticipated and the Nantong Intermediate

People’s Court convicted all defendants. It sentenced 11 defendants to imprisonment ranging

from two to ten years and exempted the other two from criminal punishment. However, the

defendants did not end their challenge to the authority of the court here. Although it was

unlikely that they would change their verdicts, 11 defendants appealed after receiving their

judgments, including one who was remitted. Their appeals manifested their refusal of the

legal judgment of their past.

Some judicial officials and defenders also initiated disputes over the trials. According to

a Nantong court report, some judicial officials deemed the defendants innocent and proposed

that they be acquitted or not prosecuted. Some case investigators negated the guilt of the

defendants from the start of dealing with these cases. They asserted that if they had to bear

responsibility, then the military and everyone else should also stand trial. It seemed to local

judicial cadres that there was collective responsibility for the Cultural Revolution. According

to the same report, prosecutors and judges did not feel sufficiently justified in refuting the

defendants and lawyers’ statements in the courtroom. In contrast, the defenders and

defendants were “impassioned and eloquent.”70 According to the Nantong court, this was

partly because some judicial officials were new and inexperienced with legal practices. They

could not make appropriate responses and remained silent in these unprecedented situations

that arose in court. The requirements for recruiting judicial officials in Jiangsu also contributed

to their incompetence, while the lawyers had received a professional legal education.

68 Meierhenrich and Pendas, Political Trials in Theory and History, 40. 69 For a detailed examination of Jiang Qing’s performance at court, see Cook, 124-129. 70 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu yundong anjian shenli qingkuang de baogao,” 100–101.


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Meanwhile, unlike in the Gang of Four Trial, debates between defense counsels and

prosecutors were reported to rage in court (争得不可开交).71 The audience’s reaction also

reflected the intense debates in the courtroom. After attending the trials, some audience

members stated, “The court was so democratic, as long as you were reasonable, you could

argue to the best of your ability.”72 The reason provided by the court was that judicial officials

still favored factionalism, and there were even instances of cadres leaking confidential

information to the defendants they supported. There was not only disagreement with the

pursuit of individual accountability, but also incompatibility between the legal narratives. The

court’s authority and the legitimacy of the trials faced challenges from the defendants and

state officials.

Compared to the Gang of Four Trial, these local trials have several distinctive features.

First, no special court was established to pursue the conviction of the followers. Most trials

took place in courts that had been restored in 1973. While the Special Court of the Supreme

People’s Court carried out the Gang of Four Trial, follower trials took place in regular courts.

Second, despite their political nature, Nantong trials mainly dealt with violent actions rather

than political accusations emphasized during the Criticism Campaign. In doing so, local courts

intended to differentiate legal prosecutions from politics. Lastly, the Jiangsu follower trials

were based on the existing laws when the crimes were committed, 73 for example, the

Regulations on Punishing Counterrevolutionaries in the People’s Republic of China (中华人民

共和国惩治反革命条例) that had come into force in 1951.74 Thus, Jiangsu trials employed

neither special courts nor new laws, which differed from the widely discussed Gang of Four

Trial in the winter of 1980-1981. The legal basis for the Gang of Four Trial was the Criminal

71 In the case of the Gang of Four trials, lawyers were reluctant to represent the Gang of Four and defended for them. See Zhang Sizhi and Yang Xiaoguang, “Shenpan sirenbang, wo wei yiduan bianhu” 审判“四人帮”，我为异端辩护 [Trying the Gang of Four: I Defended for Dissidents], Wenshi cankao, no. 12 (2011): 105. 72 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu yundong anjian shenli qingkuang de baogao,” 100. 73 The case of Jiangsu was not unique. Local courts in other provinces and cities, including Zhejiang, Henan, Shanghai, Anhui and Yunnan, also based Gang of Four follower trials on the Regulations on Punishing Counterrevolutionaries and the Constitution. See Richter, Thomas, Strafrecht in Reaktion auf Systemunrecht: vergleichende Einblicke in Transitionsprozesse, ed. Eser, Albin, Sieber, Ulrich, and Arnold, Jörg, vol. 9 (Freiburg im Breisgau; Berlin: Ed. Iuscrim, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht; Duncker & Humblot, 2006), 200–206. 74 Zhongyang renmin zhengfu weiyuanhui, “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo chengzhi fangeming tiaoli” 中华人民共和国惩治反革命条例 [The PRC’s Regulations for the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries] (The Maoist Legacy, February 20, 1951), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/661. The Regulations was repealed in January 1, 1980 because it conflicted with the Criminal Law.


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Law and the Criminal Procedure Law. The same was true of local trials that followed. Thus,

trials of the perpetrators were on the basis of two different sets of laws.

4.2.2 The Limits of Criminal Trials

It is likely that the Jiangsu courts intentionally avoided applying the new laws to the local

trials. This conclusion is drawn from the reasons outlined below. First, the courts in Nanjing,

Suzhou, and Nantong rushed to try followers of the Gang of Four just a few days before the

Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law came into force. For example, both the Nantong

and Suzhou Municipal Intermediate Courts announced their final judgments on December 28,

1979, only three days before the two new laws came into effect. Second, local judicial officials

were fully aware of the new laws and the upcoming Gang of Four Trial. They studied and

acquainted themselves with the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law during the

nationwide propagation of legal knowledge at the time. Jiangsu judicial officials also studied

the procedure for the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Cliques in 1979 before local trials took place.75

In particular, Liu Shunyuan (刘顺元), Former Vice Secretary of the Jiangsu Party Committee,

became Vice Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in 1978 and took

charge of the investigation of the Lin Biao Clique.76 Jiangsu’s former leader, Peng Chong (彭

冲), was a Politburo member and later in charge of the Gang of Four Trial. These connections

would provide Jiangsu cadres with full knowledge of the new laws and the central trials.

However, the Jiangsu legal cadres chose to try Gang of Four followers at the end of December

1979 instead of waiting until after the Gang of Four trials as most leaders in other provinces

did.77 The Jiangsu judicial cadres did so to avoid applying the newly-introduced laws.78

75 The first national meeting concerning the judicial work of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Clique was convened between August and September 1979. See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Deng Xiaoping nianpu: 1975-1997, 1:551–52. On September 3, 1979, Hu Yaobang reported the trial work to Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng, see Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng, “Deng Xiaoping, Hua Guofeng zai Hu Yaobang huibao liang’an shenli gongzuo shi de jianghua” 邓小平华国锋在胡耀邦汇报两案审理工作时的讲话 [Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng’s Speeches When Listening to Hu Yaobang’s Report on Hearing the Two Cases] (The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, September 3, 1979), https://ccradb.appspot.com/post/3279. 76 Wang, Cong Tong huai zhou dao shen Jiang Qing, 54. 77 Followers in the majority of provinces and cities were put on trial between 1982 and 1983 following the Gang of Four trials, including Beijing, Shanghai, Yunnan, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Hunan, and so forth. See Tung, Fei Hsiao, A Great Trial in Chinese History: The Trial of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Counter-Revolutionary Cliques, Nov. 1980-Jan. 1981 (University Press of the Pacific, 2003). 78 Jiangsu was not the only place to rush trials before 1980. According to the published history of Henan Province, in late December 1979, the Henan leadership urgently assigned local legal institutions to try those imprisoned during the Exposing, Criticizing, and Investigating campaign in order to avoid the constraints of the Criminal Law


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There were legal and practical reasons for the Jiangsu judicial cadres rushing to close Gang

of Four follower cases. First, the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law would raise

doubts about the legitimacy of previous case investigations that were mostly carried out in

the form of case examination groups and study classes ( 学习班 ). Both were ad hoc

institutions set up during political campaigns and without any legal grounding,79 meaning that

the legitimacy of the investigations could be questioned. As the President of the Supreme

People’s Court, Jiang Hua had warned judicial officials about the challenges of enacting new

laws in 1979, “People will come to us, watch over us as we put laws into practice, and bring

up all sorts of issues and opinions. We have to prepare to be bombarded.”80 Second, changing

the legal framework would also create more work for local investigators and judicial officials

as they had to rewrite legal documents accordingly.

Finally, employing new laws to judge past crimes related to the rule of the retroactive

application of law, an issue with the Nuremberg trials that has been criticized by many legal

professionals. 81 The defendants, and even the general public, would inevitably use the

retroaction to question the trials’ legality.82 Jiangsu judicial officials chose to try perpetrators

on the legal grounds of existing laws and thereby avoided the retroactivity of law. Later, at a

provincial meeting in March 1980, Jiangsu leaders explicitly explained why they did not apply

the new laws to local trials by drawing upon Huang Kecheng’s speech at the Third Central

Forum of Handling “Two Cases”:

On the one hand, from the legal point of view, Huang [Kecheng] said: law is not

retroactive to history. The law only takes effect from the day it is promulgated.

and Criminal Procedure Law, which came into effect on January 1st, 1980. More than 2,400 people were sentenced in this month in the province. 79 For more information on case examination groups, see Schoenhals, “The Central Case Examination Group, 1966-79.” As for an illustration of study class, please see Zhang, Man, “From Denial to Apology: Narrative Strategies of a ‘Perpetrator’ after the Cultural Revolution,” in Victims, Perpetrators, and the Role of Law in Maoist China, A Case-Study Approach, ed. Leese, Daniel and Engman, Puck (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2018), 150–73. 80 Jiang Hua, “Zai bufen gao zhongji renmin fayuan he junshi fayuan fuze tongzhi zuotanhui jieshu shi de jianghua” 在部分高、中级人民法院和军事法院负责同志座谈会结束时的讲话 [Speech at the End of the Symposium with Leaders of Some High and Intermediate People’s Courts and Military Courts], April 10, 1979, 186, E237-111-0081, NMA. 81 Wyzanski, Charles E, “Nuremberg: A Fair Trial? Dangerous Precedent,” The Atlantic Monthly 177, no. 4 (1946): 66–70. 82 For example, the Gang of Four Trials received doubts and questions in terms of its legality. Judicial leaders had to justify the Trials by stressing the principle of “handling matters according to law”, see Zhang and Leese, “Political Trials and Historical Justice.”


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Almost nine years have passed since the Lin Biao case, and more than three years

have passed since the Gang of Four case. They are both historical matters. That is to

say, things that happened after the Criminal Law came into effect must be handled in

strict accordance with the law; things that happened in the past, historical matters,

may not necessarily be pursued by the present law. On the other hand, Huang said,

the Central Committee has instructed dealing with the historical issue of the two

cases according to policy (按政策办). This should be conducted according to the

Party’s policy by referring to the law. It should be considered based on the Party and

the state’s current interests and what is good for the people and stability and unity.

Acting by the Central Committee’s policy is not in conflict with the law, nor is it

disrespectful to the law.83

Thus, Jiangsu leaders considered that the trial of local followers dealt with historical matters

and should be handled by applying the existing law instead of the new laws. Jiangsu cadres

were concerned about the issue of retroactivity. The quote from Huang Kecheng also

illuminates the relationship between the law and Party policies in dealing with the designated

perpetrators. The Jiangsu authorities were inclined to support Party policies rather than the

law.

The Nantong trials also followed this policy. The Nantong Party leadership exerted

significant power over local legal practices. Although the court asserted that it had

“conducted the entire courtroom activities in accordance with the Procedural Law and

adequately protected the rights of the defendants,” the Nantong Municipal Party Committee

still played a decisive role in the court’s legal practices. As a Nantong court report stated,

“from detention, arrest, trial, and sentencing to the finalization of the various court

documents, [we] conducted all of them under the direct supervision of the Nantong Municipal

Party Committee.”84 In this sense, the Nantong Party Committee decided whether these local

followers would be criminally punished. The public trials thus served as a didactic show

presented to the public. At the time, some judicial officials questioned this practice, saying it

was illegal, and questioning why the indictment, prosecution, trial outline, and verdict were

all sent to the Party committee for revision and approval. The Nantong court responded that

83 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Zhou Zhihua tongzhi zai shiwei jilü jiancha, qingcha dingxing chuli gongzuo huiyi kaishi shi de jianghua,” 3–4. 84 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Guanyu yundong anjian shenli qingkuang de baogao,” 100–101.


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the cases resulting from the Investigation Campaign had certain peculiarities and complexities

and it would evoke factionalism if they were not handled well. They noted that the Party

committee “help us resolve the problems and share our responsibilities.” 85 This was a

lingering issue that resulted from long-term intervention of politics in legal practices. The

court could fall victim to its own verdicts on cases if the political climate changed.

There was a reason for the local courts’ uncertainty. The questions of how many followers

should face trial remained unanswered at the central level. The central leadership could not

agree on the scale of prosecution required against followers. In March 1980, Wang Heshou

(王鹤寿), Second Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, commented

on the disagreement and restraint shown by central leaders meting out criminal punishment.

At the very beginning, the Central Committee already considered that the Lin Biao

and Jiang Qing Counterrevolutionary Cliques came into being in a particular historical

context and that the number of people on trial must be limited. Initially, a maximum

of 1,000 people was to be criminally punished nationwide. Later the number was

reduced to between 300 and 500 people. Huang [Kecheng] (黄克诚) suggested it

should be only around 200 to 400 people. [We] reported to comrade Chen Yun (陈

云), and he said that it should be only about 100 to 300 people. Some comrades said

that central policies are changing. In fact, central policies are not changing. Instead, a

large number of comrades have gone to extremes. We convened four national

conferences to count [the number of punishable followers]. The numbers in each

province are gradually decreasing… It is not acceptable to pass sentences and exclude

members from the Party on a large scale.86

The changing numbers suggested that central leaders disagreed on how many followers

should be put on trial and showed the central leadership’s inclination to limit the scope of

criminal punishment to a minimum. Wang Heshou instead criticized local cadres for meting

out heavy punishment. Other sources also suggested that some central cadres were inclined

to prosecute identified followers on a large scale. 87 Therefore, not only did the central

85 Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, 101. 86 Wang Heshou, “Zai zhongyang jiwei sanci quanhui jieshu shi de jianghua” 在中央纪委三次全会结束时的讲话 [Speech at the End of the Third Plenary Session of the Central Discipline Inspection Committee], March 4, 1981, 140, A4-2-171, SMA. 87 Wang, Cong Tong huai zhou dao shen Jiang Qing, 166–69.


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leadership disagree on the number of local followers to be punished, but there was also

disagreement between the local and central authorities on this issue.

The Central Committee further stated its intention to minimize the prosecution of high-

ranking cadres. The number of prosecuted cadres was reduced several times, from an original

108 cadres, then to 68, later to 34 cadres, and finally to 32 cadres. Then, even though the

Central Commission for Discipline Inspection further shortened the list to 27 cadres, the CCP

Central Committee still did not approve it.88 Later developments suggest that only 10 of them

ultimately stood trial: the ten culprits of the so-called Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Cliques. The

Central Committee also requested that central and lower levels put off bringing implicated

cadres to criminal trial. The central restraint was evident in light of concerns about the risk of

instability and resistance to the Party’s rule that large-scale trials and punishment might

create.

In late 1981, the central leadership explicitly requested that provinces minimize the

number of people sentenced after the Gang of Four Trial.89 In 1982, the central leaders also

acknowledged the controversy of the Investigation Campaign and began to address the issues

that had resulted from it. The leadership thus suggested reviewing the adjudicated cases of

local followers. It requested that they “correct those that had been truly wronged, mitigate

the punishment of those that had been excessively severe, and re-sentence those with

abnormally heavy penalties or release the implicated persons earlier from prison at the

appropriate time.”90 For example, Nantong leaders requested that local courts re-examine

cases of those sentenced to imprisonment earlier and those who had been exempted from

prosecution to decide whether they had been too severely punished. If so, their sentences

and verdicts were to be amended as well.91 The Nantong authorities reviewed and corrected

cases of previously punished perpetrators. These measures suggest that the local Party

leadership adopted the central policy of leniency and minimized the punishment of local

followers. In some cases, already convicted followers could get their verdicts reviewed and

revised and return to power.

88 Wang, “Zai zhongyang jiwei sanci quanhui jieshu shi de jianghua,” 140. 89 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu pizhuan ‘di wu ci quanguo “liang’an” shenli gongzuo zuotanhui jiyao’ de tongzhi” 中共中央关于批转《第五次全国“两案”审理工作座谈会纪要》的通知 [The Central Committee’s Notification on Commenting and Transmitting the Summary of the Fifth National Symposium on Handling “Two Cases”], January 31, 1981, https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/402. 90 Zhonggong zhongyang. 91 Huang, “Zai diqu qingcha dingan gongzuo huiyi shang de fayan,” 15.


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Bout argues that the Gang of Four Trial was not merely a political show, but it was also

designed to reinforce the impression, both inside and outside the country, that the Party was

committed to law.92 When looking at the local Gang of Four follower trials, the situation

becomes more complex, however. Local trials mainly dealt with Cultural Revolutionary

violence. They functioned to punish past crimes and allowed more space for disagreement

and conflict in court. Criminal trials here served as a sign of a break with the past and

commitment to the law in the post-Mao period.

However, the use of law to respond to the violence faced challenges from various political

forces. Within the CCP leadership itself, leaders could not agree on the numbers and

punishment of perpetrators. The central leadership limited criminal justice in dealing with the

violent past in post-Cultural Revolution China.93 It is difficult to find the extent to which those

who had stood trial managed to reduce their penalties. However, as the following section

shows, the lenient policy had a pronounced impact on imposing disciplinary sanctions.

4.3 Exclusion and Inclusion of Perpetrators (1980-1982)

The categorization of designated perpetrators went through constant changes in the

1980s. In 1980, the central criterion for categorizing perpetrators changed from the one

issued in 1978. Jiangsu had to recategorize local targets according to the new policy. However,

in 1981, frustrated with disputes over how to handle the designated perpetrators, central

leaders refused to provide an explicit standard for categorization nationwide, and they placed

the responsibility for handling perpetrators on local cadres. In 1982, after the Gang of Four

Trial, the central leadership decided to abandon all previous categories and suggested

correcting cases of designated perpetrators if they had been wronged.

The policy of lustration played an essential role in dealing with the perpetrators. Among

the followers who received punishment, the majority were subjected to disciplinary and

administrative sanctions. The CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and its

subordinate counterparts took charge of the lustration. The commissions were reestablished

92 Bout, Judith, “The Creation of Defence in China: Revisiting the Trial of the Gang of Four,” Books & Ideas, December 17, 2012, https://booksandideas.net/The-Creation-of-Defence-in-China.html. 93 Scholars and practitioners challenged the assumption underlying the criminal justice system that punishing the aggressors is sufficient, or even necessary, to restore justice. See Braithwaite, John, “Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts,” Crime and Justice 25 (January 1, 1999): 1–127.


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at the Third Plenum with Chen Yun as the first secretary, Deng Yingchao (邓颖超) as the

second secretary, and Hu Yaobang as the third secretary. 94 According to an incomplete

statistic, the Jiangsu Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection placed 2,972 people who

were considered to have been involved with the Gang of Four Clique on file for investigation

(立案审查) between 1978 and 1982. The commission only transferred 26 people’s cases to

the judicial institutions for further handling according to the law, while imposing Party and

administrative sanctions on 174 people.95 Thus, six times more people received disciplinary

sanctions than criminal ones. The CCP mainly dealt with the designated perpetrators through

lustration.

However, the above statistic reveals another more important phenomenon: most local

followers were granted amnesty and remained in the regime. The Jiangsu authorities deemed

that only around 7% of the previously investigated followers should be punished by excluding

them from power. They exempted the rest from punishment, and thus they remained in

power. The latter group could be instructed to clarify their deeds in public or engage in self-

criticism, although some simply went free without substantial punishment. The restraint of

lustration reflected some central leaders’ attitude toward lustration. They showed a strong

tendency toward lenient policies and strove to limit the exclusion of followers to a rather

small scale.

From the start, central leaders showed a tendency to restrain the exclusion of cadres. For

example, in October 1978, Hu Yaobang emphasized that cadres who had made mistakes and

serious mistakes should be dealt with leniently so long as they sincerely engaged in self-

criticism and corrected their mistakes.96 In late 1978, Hua Guofeng repeatedly highlighted the

need to unite these two categories of cadres.97 He proposed forgiving this group of cadres and

94 The predecessor of the Central Discipline Inspection Committee was the CCP Central Supervision Commission (中共中央监察委员会). The commission and its local organizations were disbanded at the Ninth National Congress of the CCP in 1969. For more information, see Wei Mingduo, ed., Zhongguo gongchandang jilü jiancha shi 中国共产党纪律检查史 [The History of the CCP Discipline Inspection] (Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 1993), 179–81. 95 Jiangsu shengzhi jijian jiancha zhi (zhengqiu yijian gao) 1978-2008 江苏省志·纪检监察志（征求意见稿）1978-2008 [Chronicle of Jiangsu: Volume on Discipline and Supervision (Draft for Suggestions) 1978-2008] (Nanjing, 2014), 145. 96 Hu Yaobang, “Hu Yaobang zai quanguo xinfang gongzuo huiyishang de jianghua” 胡耀邦在全国信访工作会议上的讲话 [Hu Yaobang’s Speech at the National Petition Work Conference], October 5, 1978, 366, HB979-10-333-13, HPA. 97 Hua Guofeng, “Zai zhongyang gongzuo huiyi bimuhui shang de jianghua” 在中央工作会议闭幕会上的讲话 [Speech at the Closing Meeting of the Central Work Conference], December 13, 1978, 104, E101-121-363, NMA.


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protecting them from exclusion.98 The central leaders attempted to minimize the number of

outcast cadres and sought unity within the Party. Nonetheless, as is shown below, it proved

challenging for the post-Mao leadership to handle the designated perpetrators.

Therefore, in 1980, the Deng Xiaoping leadership began to concentrate the exclusion on

the Party leadership, and this lasted until the late 1980s. The new round of exclusion partly

resulted from the escalating political and social conflicts in the post-Mao period. As reversals

of past wrongs were in full swing nationwide in the early 1980s,99 the issue of accountability

for injustices arose. Petitions and appeals related to grievances were reported to be turning

violent, such as attacking government offices and reception staff. 100 Meanwhile, the

increasing demand for democracy by various political groups between 1978 and 1979, usually

known as the Democracy Wall Movement (民主墙运动), became very concerning for central

leaders such as Deng Xiaoping.101 They worried that such public appeals would develop into a

nationwide movement like the Tiananmen Incident of early 1976 when millions of people

took to the streets to express their discontent with politics.102

4.3.1 Recategorization in 1980-1981

In July 1979, the Central Committee established the Central Leading Group for Handling

the “Two Cases” (中央“两案”审理领导小组) and associated it with the Central Commission

for Discipline Inspection to deal with the two cases of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Cliques.

After several months of discussion and three symposiums, the leading group developed the

categorization and punishment of local followers in February 1980. 103 The leading group

proposed three categories for designated perpetrators: those who had committed crimes and

98 Hua, “Zai shi yi jie san zhong quanhui bimuhui shang de jianghua,” 202–3. 99 Xiao, Lishi de zhuangui: cong buluan fanzheng dao gaige kaifang (1978-1981), 83–107. 100 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Deng Xiaoping nianpu: 1975-1997, 1:569; Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Chen Yun nianpu 陈云年谱 [Chronological Biography of Chen Yun], vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2015), 269. 101 Xiao, Lishi de zhuangui: cong buluan fanzheng dao gaige kaifang (1978-1981), 234–40; Brodsgaard, Kjeld Erik, “The Democracy Movement in China, 1978-1979: Opposition Movements, Wall Poster Campaigns, and Underground Journals,” Asian Survey 21, no. 7 (1981): 747–74. 102 Xiao, Lishi de zhuangui: cong buluan fanzheng dao gaige kaifang (1978-1981), 169–71. For more information about the 1976 Tiananmen Incident, see Dong and Walder, “Foreshocks.” 103 Zhongyang liang’an shenli lingdao xiaozu, “Zhongyang liang’an shenli lingdao xiaozu dui jiepi sirenbang douzheng zhong shou shencha renyuan dingxing chuli de yijian” 中央“两案”审理领导小组对揭批“四人帮”斗争中受审查人员定性处理的意见 [Opinions of the Central Leading Group of “Two Cases” on Categorizing and Punishing Investigated People during the Struggle of Exposing and Criticizing Gang of Four] (The Maoist Legacy, February 13, 1980), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/398.


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belonged to the “contradiction between the enemy and us” group, those who had made

serious political mistakes, and those who had made political mistakes. In contrast to the 1978

policy, the new categorization abandoned the category of “backbones” and replaced it with

the broader category of “contradiction between the enemy and us.” This category covered

eight types of violent activities. It is also worth noting that organizing factions and power

seizures were on the list as punishable crimes.104 The central leadership originally disclaimed

responsibility for mass organizations in the January Power Seizure in January 1979. 105

However, perpetrators now included those who had led and planned violent activities in the

early stage of the Cultural Revolution. This category of people was subjected to either criminal

punishment or severe disciplinary sanctions based on the gravity of their crimes and conduct

(表现). The last two categories remained the same. They were defined as a “contradiction

among the people,” meaning the person would not face criminal charges and they were

handled via the Party and administrative discipline process. For example, people who had

made serious political mistakes faced various disciplinary sanctions, while those who had

made mistakes would not be subjected to disciplinary sanctions.

Responding to the changed central policy, the Jiangsu Leading Group of Investigation,

Categorization, and Punishment, established by the Jiangsu Commission for Discipline

Inspection in 1979,106 convened a meeting on categorization and punishment between March

26 and April 5, 1980. At the meeting, local cadres discussed two main issues: how to

recategorize the investigated targets according to the new central policy and how to evaluate

the Investigation Campaign. The evaluation resulted from increasing appeals and petitions

from those subjected to investigation and disciplinary sanctions during the campaign.

According to the petition office of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, appeals

regarding cases related to the Investigation Campaign increased significantly in 1980,

accounting for more than 20% of a total of 263,000 complaints.107 The Jiangsu Provincial

Commission for Discipline Inspection reported a similar phenomenon. 108 The Jiangsu

104 Zhongyang liang’an shenli lingdao xiaozu. 105 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Zhuanfa Shanghai shiwei “guanyu jiejue suowei yi yue geming wenti de qingshi baogao de tongzhi.” 106 Jiangsu shengzhi jijian jiancha zhi (zhengqiu yijian gao) 1978-2008, 144. 107 Zhonggong zhongyang jiwei xinfangshi, “Zhongyang jiwei xinfangshi 1980 nian gongzuo zongjie” 中央纪委信访室1980年工作总结 [Work Summary of the Petition Office of the Central Discipline Inspection Committee in 1980], March 1981, 172–73, A4-2-171, SMA. 108 Zhonggong jiangsu sheng jilü jiancha weiyuanhui, “1980 nian gongzuo qingkuang he 1981 nian gongzuo yijian”


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leadership stressed that the Investigation Campaign had been generally correct. However, Xu

Jiatun acknowledged that the campaign to Expose, Criticize, and Investigate was extensive in

Jiangsu, and some people were wrongfully punished during this campaign. In particular, Xu

pointed out that cadres at the lower levels should not be held responsible for these wrongful

cases because they had only followed provincial orders. The Jiangsu Provincial Party

Committee had to assume responsibility.109

This was the second time that Jiangsu had reclassified the categories of local followers.

The first was in 1978 when Jiangsu had to recategorize followers and reorganize investigation

materials due to inconsistencies between the earlier categories proposed by Jiangsu Province

and the later central regulations (Chapter 2). This time, Jiangsu again had to recategorize local

followers in accordance with the new central policy. The general guidelines for categorization

and punishment focused on leniency, or, in the official language, they should, “enlarge the

scale of education, and narrow the scope of attack” (扩大教育面，缩小打击面). For those

who fell into the first category, the Jiangsu leadership further asserted, the guideline was

“killing none and capturing only a few” (一个不杀，大部不抓). The scope of sentencing and

expulsion from the Party should be “narrower [rather] than broader, and the number should

be smaller [rather] than larger, thus adopting a more lenient policy.” For those who made

mistakes, including serious political mistakes, Jiangsu leaders requested that they apply the

policy of “learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the

patient” (惩前毖后治病救人).

In compliance with the above central policy, Jiangsu cadres re-examined cases and

verified materials resulting from the Investigation Campaign. By May 1981, Jiangsu had

reportedly examined nearly 70% of cases of 764 investigated people that still awaited a

verdict, and some particularly efficient localities and units had gone through all of them.110

Local cadres had not concluded these cases at the time because they mostly required Party

disciplinary or criminal sanctions. The local authorities had generally concluded cases that did

1980年工作情况和1981年工作意见 [Work Situation of 1980 and Work Suggestions for the Year of 1981], May 8, 1981, 62, A4-2-171, SMA. 109 Xu Jiatun, “Zai quansheng dang de jilv jiancha gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua” 在全省党的纪律检查工作会议上的讲话 [Speech at the Provincial Party Discipline Inspection Work Conference], April 23, 1981, 37, A4-2-171, SMA. 110 Zhonggong jiangsu sheng jilü jiancha weiyuanhui, “1980 nian gongzuo qingkuang he 1981 nian gongzuo yijian,” 61.


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not require sanctions. However, the central policy resulted in many of the pending cases

receiving milder penalties. For example, among 26 cadres administrated by the prefecture,

the Nantong leadership initially decided that 11 should be expelled from the Party and

dismissed from all posts, 12 should be subjected to disciplinary sanctions, and three were

exempted from punishment. 111 Following the central policy, the Nantong leadership

recategorized nearly 50% into milder categories and punishment in late 1980 (Table 5). In

January 1981, the Nantong Prefecture Commission for Discipline Inspection revised verdicts

and mitigated the punishment of 13 former leaders. Initially, eight leaders were categorized

into “having committed serious political mistakes” and five into “having committed political

mistakes.” Nine of the 13 leaders were to receive disciplinary sanctions, ranging from being

expelled from the Party (开除党籍) to being given a serious warning (严重警告). However,

on January 21, 1981, the commission decided that eight of these leaders were to be neither

put into categories (不定性) nor punished, meaning that over 61% were recategorized. It also

reduced the punishment of another leader from removing from office to serious warning. The

commission only maintained four leaders in their original category of “having committed

serious mistakes.”112

Table 5: Revision of Categories and Punishment in Nantong in 1980

Date Number

Originally 26 cadres

Categorization 8 committing serious political mistakes; 9 committing political mistakes; 1 beat-smash-loot element; 4 people committing serious mistakes of beating, smashing, and looting; 4 violating Party discipline.

Punishment 11 cadres to be expelled from the Party and dismissed from all posts; 12 cadres to be subjected to disciplinary sanctions; 3 cadres be exempted from punishment.

Late 1980

26 cadres

Recategorization 5 committing serious political mistakes; 6 committing political mistakes; 3 cadres having said or done something wrong; 1 beat-smash-loot element; 2 committing serious mistakes of beating, smashing, and looting; 2 committing general mistakes of beating, smashing, and looting;

111 Zhonggong Nantong diqu jilü jiancha weiyuanhui, “Guanyu guanche sheng qingcha ding’an chuli zuotan huiyi qingkuang de huibao” 关于贯彻省清查定案处理座谈会议情况的汇报 [Report on the Implementation of the Provincial Symposium on Investigation, Verdict, and Punishment], October 1980, 80, D134-111-0010, NMA. 112 Zhonggong Nantong diqu jilü jiancha weiyuanhui, “Nantong diqu qingcha ding’an gongzuo dasuan” 南通地区清查定案工作打算 [Work Plan of Investigation and Verdicts in Nantong Prefecture], January 21, 1981, 117–18, D134-111-0011, NMA.


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6 violating Party discipline; 1 no category (不定性).

Punishment No one was expelled from the Party; 6 cadres were removed from all posts; 8 cadres were subjected to disciplinary sanctions; 7 cadres received no punishment; 5 cadres needed further investigation.

Designated perpetrators in Nantong maximized the opportunities to negotiate their

verdicts and punishment by fully exploiting the policy of leniency. They questioned and

challenged verdicts reached during the Investigation Campaign. The central policies outlined

that previously investigated followers were entitled to know their verdicts and voice different

opinions. Ji Yong (季永), a former deputy director of the Nantong Municipal Revolutionary

Committee, wrote a 97-page supplementary piece on his investigation report and verdict

after being informed of it by Nantong leaders in October 1980.113 In 1978, the local authorities

categorized Ji as a Gang of Four follower due to his resistance to the campaign to Expose,

Criticize, and Investigate. After receiving Ji’s opinions, the Nantong Municipal Commission for

Discipline Inspection immediately reviewed and reinvestigated Ji’s “factual mistakes” in the

previous verdict. Ultimately, the commission reported that “a large number of Ji’s problems

should be situated in a particular historical background (有当时的特定历史背景); some of

them resulted from superiors’ mobilization or assignment; while some related to military

leaders.” For these reasons, the commission concluded that the initially-proposed sanction –

two-year probation within the Party (留党察看两年) – was too severe and they suggested

that the Nantong Municipal Party Committee give Ji a “warning” (警告) or a “serious warning”

(严重警告) sanction instead.114

Ji was not the only one who managed to change their verdict and receive a lighter

sanction. The Nantong commission withdrew another two followers’ original verdicts of

“having committed political mistakes” and changed them to “no categorization and

punishment” (不定性、不处分). In other cases, even though those investigated agreed with

their final verdicts, Nantong leaders instructed that the imposition of sanctions should be

113 Zhonggong Nantong shi jilü jiancha weiyuanhui, “Guanyu guanche shengwei jiwei qingcha dingxing chuli gongzuo zuotanhui qingkuang de huibao” 关于贯彻省委纪委清查定性处理工作座谈会情况的汇报 [Report on the Implementation of the Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection’s Symposium on Investigation, Categorization, and Punishment], February 14, 1981, 142, E107-121-0062, NMA. 114 Zhonggong Nantong shi jilü jiancha weiyuanhui, 141–43.


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postponed.115 In January 1981, the Jiangsu leadership was still instructing local cadres to wait

before imposing specific punishments. 116 These reviews and revisions indicate that the

punishment of the designated perpetrators was accompanied by negotiation and

compromise between the authorities and those cast out.

Hu Yaobang explained the reason for not imposing sanctions on a large-scale. While the

Gang of Four Trial was ongoing, Hu stressed the significance of avoiding detailed investigation

into past events and pardoning cadres who had committed violence during the Cultural

Revolution in late 1980.

For historical issues, except for very few major cases, i.e., die-hard followers of Lin

Biao and the Gang of Four and criminals who incited public anger, the rest should not

be investigated anymore. Because if we did so, it would inevitably cause a chain

reaction. On the one hand, it would leave cadres who have shortcomings or mistakes

in fear and panic, and there are a large number of cadres like this. On the other hand,

it would lead extreme cadres to badger [us] with old accounts and even lead cadres

who wanted to vent personal spite to violate Party principles. If so, this would be

harmful to stability and unity.117

By “cadres who had shortcomings or mistakes,” Hu referred to those who engaged in violence

to various degrees; Hu thus suggested dropping the investigation into such cadres’ past

mistakes and constraining their exclusion in order to avoid creating further conflict. He was

also concerned that digging into the past would not only cause fear and uncertainty among

cadres, but also provide cadres with an opportunity to exploit the lustration to purge their

opponents. Either situation would deepen the divide within the Party. Hu Yaobang considered

state stability more important than the lustration when the CCP dealt with its violent recent

past. Hu further stressed the need to “unite and forgive cadres who have made mistakes and

115 Zhonggong Nantong shi jilü jiancha weiyuanhui, 143. 116 Zhonggong jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Guanyu qingcha dingxing chuli gongzuo de tongzhi” 关于清查定性处理工作的通知 [Notice on the Work of Investigation, Classification, and Punishment], January 5, 1981, 1, E101-123-0786, NMA. 117 Zhongyang jilü jiancha weiyuanhui, “Zhongyang jiwei di san ci quanweihui canyue wenjian zhi er: Hu Yaobang tongzhi de yi feng xin” 中央纪委第三次全委会参阅文件之二：胡耀邦同志的一封信 [Second Document for Reference at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection: A Letter from Hu Yaobang], February 1981, 179, A4-2-171, SMA.


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serious mistakes” in January 1981. Otherwise, he argued, it would be impossible to make

peace.118

Leaders of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection further emphasized the

policy of amnesty in 1981. In February, the central commission shared Hu Yaobang’s opinion

at its plenary meeting. Leaders of the commission, Wang Heshou and Huang Kecheng, both

requested that they be lenient on cadres who had made mistakes during the Cultural

Revolution.

It is impossible to thoroughly and clearly address problems that occurred during the

Cultural Revolution. I have stated several times in the past that it was inevitable for a

large number of cadres to make mistakes under the complex historical circumstances

of the Cultural Revolution... [We] should offer them chances to correct [their]

mistakes and not entirely strike them down. The scale of punishment must not be

extensive. We suffered from [this] in the past. Extensive punishment would bring up

numerous old problems time after time without end. It would drag our energy into

countless old accounts (陈年旧账). As a result, no problems would be solved, and

much more important work would be delayed in the end.119

What Huang Kecheng stresses here is the need to move beyond settling accounts with

wrongdoers from the Cultural Revolution. In terms of accountability, Huang attributed cadres’

wrongdoing to the political environment of the movement and sought to restrain the

lustration. He instead encouraged cadres to turn their attention from punishment to

economic development.

In local reports, Jiangsu local cadres expressed discontent with the changing policies. The

practical reason for this was that local officials had to reorganize the investigation materials

in accordance with the new central policies. As a Suzhou leader requested at a meeting in

May 1980:

118 Kang Di, “Guanyu zhongyang jiwei san ci quanhui jingshen de chuanda tigang” 关于中央纪委三次全会精神的传达提纲 [The Outline of Transmitting the Spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the Central Discipline Inspection Committee], April 11, 1981, 85, A4-2-171, SMA. 119 Huang Kecheng, “Zai zhongyang jiwei changweihui shang de fayan” 在中央纪委常委会上的发言 [Speech at the Meeting with Standing Members of the Central Discipline Inspection Committee], February 23, 1981, 147, A4-2-171, SMA.


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In the previous stage, each unit has done a lot of work, repeatedly verifying the

materials, making them available to the investigated, and studied categorization and

punishment of those cases that needed a verdict… But with the current requirements,

they are quite inadequate. Our existing materials were mostly created before the

Third Plenum. [We] must now conduct a comprehensive analysis and study and make

the necessary revisions. In addition to circumstantial evidence, the investigation

reports must be reorganized too.120

To conduct this work, the Suzhou leadership requested bringing back the team that had

engaged in the material work during the Investigation Campaign, which had since been

dismissed. Nantong cadres’ complaints were straightforward. In its report to the Provincial

Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Nantong Commission for Discipline Inspection

complained:

From now on, [we] hope that the provincial leading group could distribute us more

examples of handling and reaching verdicts against the investigated targets for future

reference… [We] expected the Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection to put

forward explicit and consistent suggestions. Previously, [the commission] sometimes

agreed with our handling, but then it demanded that we stop, which made it very

difficult for us to understand [the policies]. Complaints frequently arose from below,

including from the investigated.121

The Nantong cadres’ complaint suggests that the changing policies at the central and

provincial levels caused confusion and even hindered the process of dealing with perpetrators

at the lower levels. A Nantong leader also emphasized that it was challenging to gain victims’

understanding of the lenient policy toward violent perpetrators.122 Local authorities not only

faced challenges from the designated perpetrators and lower-level cadres, but also pressure

from victims. The CCP faced significant challenges in dealing with past violence.

120 Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui, “Zhou Zhihua tongzhi zai shiwei jilü jiancha, qingcha dingxing chuli gongzuo huiyi kaishi shi de jianghua,” 8. 121 Zhonggong Nantong shi jilü jiancha weiyuanhui, “Guanyu guanche shengwei jiwei qingcha dingxing chuli gongzuo zuotanhui qingkuang de huibao,” 145. 122 Huang, “Zai diqu qingcha ding’an gongzuo huiyi shang de fayan: shanshi shanzhong gaohao qingcha jielun chuli gongzuo,” 13.


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The central leadership also highlighted the complex reality and challenges. Responding

to reported difficulties in categorizing and punishing perpetrators by many regions, Huang

Kecheng outlined the situation on February 23, 1981 at a central meeting:

I feel that it is difficult to come up with an appropriate unified standard, and even if

a standard is established, it may not solve the problem. The Central Commission for

Discipline Inspection had begun to work on a unified policy standard to handle the

two cases at the very beginning. It produced one, but it was inappropriate. After two

years, we realized that a wide range of people made mistakes of one kind or another

during the Cultural Revolution. The circumstances in which they had made their

mistakes varied enormously and were so complicated that it was difficult to

summarize and distinguish such complex issues with a few criteria.123

One year after the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection issued the policy on

categorization and punishment in early 1980, the central leadership already regarded them

as inapplicable. Frustrated with the handling of designated perpetrators, central leaders now

considered it impossible to come up with national criteria for categorization and punishment.

It believed that a unified standard could not address the problems of perpetrators. Instead,

the central leaders claimed that it was the duty of local cadres to resolve the issue of

perpetrators and it encouraged them to assume greater responsibility. As a result, in April

1981, Xu Jiatun demanded that “in terms of historical issues, mainly those from the Cultural

Revolution, in general, do not investigate or settle accounts with them.” 124 Dealing with

perpetrators seemed to have reached a deadlock.

4.3.2 De-categorizing Perpetrators and Redressing their Cases in 1982

On June 27, 1981, the Central Committee issued the Resolution on Some Questions

Concerning the History of the Party since the Founding of the PRC and attempted to establish

a definitive account of the violent past. 125 The resolution officially negated the Cultural

Revolution and addressed the issue of responsibility. It stated that Mao Zedong should be

123 Huang, “Zai zhongyang jiwei changweihui shang de fayan,” 149. 124 Xu, 38, 40. 125 Deng Xiaoping, “Dui qicao ‘guanyu jianguo yilai dang de ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi’ de yijian” 对起草《关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议》的意见 [Deng Xiaoping’s Opinions on How to Draft the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China] (The Maoist Legacy, March 1980–June 1981), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/1451.


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mainly held responsible for launching the movement and the central leadership was also

accountable for allowing it.126 Nonetheless, the Party leadership distinguished Mao Zedong

from the case of the Gang of Four, asserting that Mao had made errors instead of committing

crimes. Weigelin-Schwiedrzik argues that the resolution claimed collective complicity and

thus collective responsibility, which left the perpetrators, such as Red Guards, unpunished.127

This research finds that it was not collective complicity that defined the response, but instead

blaming the violent past on a select group. As the following section shows, the designated

perpetrators refused to take the blame. The authorities had to remove previously assigned

labels to the perpetrators and redress their cases in 1982.

The resolution settled neither accounts of the past nor disputes over responsibility for

the Cultural Revolution. Jiangsu reported serious doubts at the time about the designation of

accountability, in particular about the Investigation Campaign that carried out the

designation. In Huaiyin 128 , some people compared the Investigation Campaign with the

campaign to Ferret out May 16 Counterrevolutionaries and denied the necessity and

correctness of the campaign. The latter had caused severe consequences during the Cultural

Revolution in Jiangsu and it was officially announced to be completely wrong. Investigated

targets also threatened the local authorities to force their rehabilitation and they openly

criticized Party policies.129 In Nantong, some Party members and cadres became skeptical

about the Investigation Campaign. The investigated targets refused responsibility or to accept

their guilt, while some completely negated the campaign and demanded public rehabilitation

(公开平反) and policy fixing (落实政策).130 They employed the ongoing redressing of wrongs

of the earlier periods to address their own needs. The outcast perpetrators argued that the

CCP had wronged them by blaming them for Cultural Revolutionary wrongs and violence.

126 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu jianguo yilai ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi” 关于建国以来若干历史问题的决议 [Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China] (The Maoist Legacy, June 27, 1981), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/356. 127 Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne, “Coping with the Cultural Revolution: Contesting Interpretations,” Jindaishi Yanjiusuo Jikan 61 (2008): 97–154. 128 The prefecture is now known as Huai’an, a region in northern Jiangsu province. 129 Lu Che, “Lu Che tongzhi zai qingcha dingxing gongzuo he guanche zhongyang ‘jinji tongzhi’ huiyi jieshu shi de jianghua” 路澈同志在清查定性工作和贯彻中央《紧急通知》会议结束时的讲话 [Lu Che’s Speech at the End of the Meeting on Investigation and Categorization and the Implementation of the Central Committee’s Emergency Notification], February 21, 1982, 61, 63, D002-1982-001-118-1982, HMA. 130 Huang, “Zai diqu qingcha ding’an gongzuo huiyi shang de fayan: shanshi shanzhong gaohao qingcha jielun chuli gongzuo,” 10.


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To address the issue of perpetrators, the Central Leading Group for handing the “two

cases” convened a symposium between November 6 and 22, 1981. At the symposium, Chen

Yun outlined the central general guidelines, and Hu Yaobang explained them in detail. Chen

Yun emphasized that leniency was the only correct approach for those involved in the Lin Biao

and Jiang Qing Cliques. He further stated that:

The Cultural Revolution was, after all, a political struggle in the grand scheme of

things. Therefore, apart from several conspiratorial and ambitious individuals who

must be dealt with in a different manner, others who were involved must be dealt

with by means of a political struggle (以政治斗争的办法处理).131

As to what it meant by “the means of political struggle,” Hu Yaobang illustrated this as follows:

Some comrades have thought too narrowly about this approach, assuming that it is

merely a matter of dealing with [people] according to Party discipline and state law,

which simplifies the problem... There are many ways. For example, for people who

made mistakes, considering their historical performance was not so bad, as long as

they confess, engage in self-examination, and the problems are clear, then [we] let it

go. Another example, some non-Party personages misbehaved and had many issues

during the Cultural Revolution or in 1976. According to the general standard, they

could be more or less designated as Gang of Four backbone members. But they are

non-Party personages after all… It is enough for them to engage in self-criticism.

Some veteran cadres… were very confused, very bad, and very dishonorable on

certain issues… For this kind of people, we can put a record…in their personnel files…

Besides, Chairman Mao kept some people in power during the Cultural Revolution...

and they did many bad things… [We can] remove them from all positions and criticize

them by name. Is there any danger in handling them this way? I think the threat is

mostly eliminated, to say the least… And then again, [we could] remove people from

all posts, but keep paying them a monthly living wage.132

131 Chen Yun’s instructions were directly quoted in Hu Yaobang’s speech, see Hu Yaobang and Zhonggong zhongyang jilü jiancha weizuanhui, “Hu Yaobang tongzhi zai quanguo di wu ci ‘liang’an’ shenli gongzuo zuotanhui shang de jianghua” 胡耀邦同志在全国第五次“两案”审理工作座谈会上的讲话 [Hu Yaobang’s Speech at the Fifth National Symposium on Handling “Two Cases”], Dangfeng yu dangji 55, no. 1 (January 1, 1982): 4–5. 132 Hu and Zhonggong zhongyang jilü jiancha weizuanhui, 5–6.


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None of the measures outlined by Hu Yaobang involved Party discipline or legal penalties. The

central leadership was no longer inclined to use Party discipline and the law to deal with the

perpetrators at this stage. Instead, Hu Yaobang proposed measures that the Party had

traditionally been comfortable with since the 1940s, such as criticism and self-criticism, self-

examination, a record in their personnel files, or removal from office. 133 These methods

demonstrate the leniency policy toward cadres and non-Party personages, etc. In contrast,

however, Hu Yaobang suggested that those who rebelled, joined the Party during the Cultural

Revolution and engaged in wrongdoing must be dismissed from their posts and expelled from

the Party. The central leniency policy did not apply to former rebel leaders, which

foreshadowed the national cleansing of late 1982.

On January 31, 1982, the Central Committee transmitted the policy resulting from the

symposium in the form of a summary. 134 The central policy on how to deal with the

perpetrators changed again this time. For example, the document specified how to record

the verdicts of the investigated as follows:

If they committed a crime, write down the crime as such; do not use the label

“element” except for those who were put on trial; if they made a mistake, write down

the mistake as such and generally do not use the terms “political mistake” or “serious

political mistake.” For those who have said or done something wrong, as long as they

clarified their problems and learned their lesson, there is no need for a verdict.135

This time, the central leadership did not require the use of categories with “elements” (分子),

such as backbone elements (骨干分子) and beat-smash-loot elements (打砸抢分子). It also

dropped the previous categories of “political mistake” and “serious political mistake” in case

verdicts. Thus, the Center abandoned all the categories it had previously proposed. “Having

said or done something wrong” was the only category that remained. For them, “no verdict”

meant terminating the investigated cases, and the persons implicated received no

133 For detailed discussion about criticism and self-criticism, see Dittmer, Lowell, “The Structural Evolution of ‘Criticism and Self-Criticism,’” The China Quarterly, no. 56 (1973): 708–29. 134 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu pizhuan ‘di wu ci quanguo “liang’an” shenli gongzuo zuotanhui jiyao’ de tongzhi.” 135 Zhonggong zhongyang, Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu pizhuan ‘di wu ci quanguo “liang’an” shenli gongzuo zuotanhui jiyao’ de tongzhi.


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punishment. Later, the central leadership also requested that local cadres return or destroy

any self-examination materials generated during the Investigation Campaign.136

On December 10, 1981, prior to the official issuance of the central policy outlined at the

national symposium, the Jiangsu leadership sent an expedited telegram to all regions,

informing them of the convening of a provincial meeting between December 16 and 23,

1981.137 The main purpose of the meeting was to distribute the policy outlined at the national

symposium and to deploy the related work in Jiangsu based on Chen Yun and Hu Yaobang’s

instructions. At the meeting, Jiangsu’s leaders highlighted that the wrongdoing and crimes of

those involved with the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary groups had all occurred

under the specific historical circumstances of the Cultural Revolution. The situation of those

who made mistakes or committed crimes varied. Thus, this particular historical background

and complicated situation must be taken into account in dealing with the issue. This included

the nature of the investigated individual’s problem, and the specific circumstances of the

mistake or crime committed, the severity of the situation, the consequences and public anger,

the individual’s attitude toward the mistake or crime, as well as toward the Party policies

since the Third Plenary Session, and the individual’s historical merits and performance. Thus,

there was no longer categorization of designated perpetrators.

On February 9, 1982, the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee distributed a summary

alongside Hu Yaobang and Chen Yun’s instructions in the province.138 Following the new

central policy, local cadres reviewed cases and revised their verdicts. 139 They dropped

136 Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting and Guowuyuan bangongting, “Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting, Guowuyuan bangongting zhuanda guojia dang’anju deng danwei lianhe diaochazu ‘guanyu “wenhua dageming” he “liang’an” shenli zhong xingcheng de dang’an cailiao chuli wenti de baogao’” 中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅转发国家档案局等单位联合调查组《关于“文化大革命”和“两案”审理中形成的档案材料处理问题的报告》 [The General Office of the Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council Transmitted the Report of the Joint Investigation Group of the National Archives Administration and Other Units on the Handling of Archival Materials Generated during the Cultural Revolution and during the Handling of the Two Cases.] (The Maoist Legacy, June 4, 1983), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/606. 137 Zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei qingcha lingdao xiaozu, “Zhaokai quansheng qingcha dingxing chuli gongzuo zuotanhui (dianbao)” 召开全省清查定性处理工作座谈会 (电报 ) [Convening a Provincial Symposium on Investigation, Categorization, and Punishment (Telegram)], December 10, 1981, 49, D101-121-0800, NMA. 138 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Guanyu Zhongyang 9 hao wenjian chuanda fanwei de tongzhi” 关于中央 9 号文件传达范围的通知 [Notification on the Scale of Distributing the Central Document No.10], February 9, 1982, E101-121-0468, NMA. 139 In Zhejiang Province, Jiangsu’s neighbor, the review and revision took place on a large scale in 1982. By 1980, the Zhejiang province investigated 41,668 people and decided to categorize and punish 15,991 of them. After the revision in 1982, the local authorities reduced the number of punishable people to 8,899, exempting over 55% from categorization and punishment. Nevertheless, Zhejiang ultimately put 1,424 people on trial and subjected 5,634 people to disciplinary sanctions for crimes and issues committed during the Cultural Revolution.


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previous categories of local followers and instead addressed them as investigated targets (清

查对象). Given that the label “element” was to no longer be applied, the category “beat-

smash-loot element” now became “mistakes of beating, smashing, and looting” (打砸抢错

误). By early 1982, the Nantong authorities had retained only 13 people as investigated

targets, and none of them faced trial. 56 people fell into the category of violent perpetrators,

15 of them standing trial.140 In 1980, the number of local followers and violent perpetrators

was 87 and 92 respectively.141 Thus, in 1982, Nantong authorities revised over 85% and 39%

of the investigated cases and exempted implicated people from punishment. Nantong

categorized 235 cadres as having said or done something wrong in 1982, meaning they would

not receive punishment.

The Party leadership also acknowledged that the Investigation Campaign had not been

entirely correct:142 “At the beginning of the campaign, there were instances of over-criticism

of the investigated targets or organizational measures that should not have been taken to

investigate but were.” 143 The Jiangsu leadership suggested that the leaders should take

responsibility for the wrongs that occurred during the Investigation Campaign.144

The policies on how to cope with the perpetrators suggest a period of constant flux with

regard to ending and addressing political violence in the post-Mao period. The changing

policies at the central level illustrate the uncertainties of the political environment and the

challenges that the Party-state faced in dealing with the violent past. Some scholarship argues

that post-communist parties in East Europe demonstrated an adaptive ability and strategic

forethought in the process of lustration when facing challenging circumstances. 145 The

difficult challenges and complex reality facing the post-Mao leadership drove it to

For more details see Zhejiang sheng Zhongguo gongchandang bianzuan weiyuanhui, ed., Zhejiang sheng Zhongguo gongchandang zhi 浙江省中国共产党志 [Chronicle of Zhejiang: Volume on the Chinese Communist Party] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 2007), 217. 140 Huang, “Zai diqu qingcha ding’an gongzuo huiyi shang de fayan: shanshi shanzhong gaohao qingcha jielun chuli gongzuo,” 8. 141 Zhonggong Nantong diqu jilü jiancha weiyuanhui, “Guanyu shan shi shan zhong gaohao qingcha dingxing chuli gongzuo de jidian yijian,” 109. 142 Hu and Zhonggong zhongyang jilü jiancha weizuanhui, “Hu Yaobang tongzhi zai quanguo di wu ci ‘liang’an’ shenli gongzuo zuotanhui shang de jianghua,” 15–16. 143 Lu, “Lu Che tongzhi zai qingcha dingxing gongzuo he guanche zhongyang ‘jinji tongzhi’ huiyi jieshu shi de jianghua,” 61. 144 Zhonggong Nantong diqu jilü jiancha weiyuanhui, “Guanyu shan shi shan zhong gaohao qingcha dingxing chuli gongzuo de jidian yijian,” 14. 145 Nalepa, Skeletons in the Closet, 227–28.


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strategically use lustration in dealing with Cultural Revolutionary violence and its

perpetrators. After constantly changing policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s, central and

local leaderships ultimately reached an agreement to mitigate punishment of the designated

perpetrators. The CCP leadership followed an overall guideline of caution and leniency to

overcome resistance and stabilize society. Thus, the post-Mao leadership considered

reintegration and restorative justice not only a more effective means of social control of the

perpetrator, but also critical to surmounting the obstacles left by the past and moving the

entire nation forward.

In late 1982, the Jiangsu leadership announced that it had completed dealing with the

investigated perpetrators.146 However, the handling of perpetrators continued until the late

1980s at the national level. It was only in 1988 that the Central Committee decided to disband

the Central Leading Group for handling the “two cases.” Furthermore, as the following section

shows, a new exclusion of potential threats to the Party’s rule had begun in 1980 in Jiangsu

and later nationwide in the name of eliminating the Gang of Four’s influence. The exclusion

was a variation of lustration and stemmed from the need to weaken the existing and emerging

opposition and dissidents within the Party itself.

4.4 Clearing out the “Three Types of People” (1980-1987)

While the CCP leadership faced challenges in handling the issues of perpetrators in

general, it shifted the focus to former rebels in power. For the CCP leadership, the purge of

rebels who remained in power removed potential threats and safeguarded the Party’s

perpetual rule. Deng Xiaoping, who gradually took over power from Hua Guofeng after the

Third Plenum, was the prime motivator of the purge. Immediately after the Investigation

Campaign officially ended in late 1978, Deng Xiaoping began to emphasize the need to

exclude those who had gained power during the Cultural Revolution and were still in power.

He targeted three categories of people, later known as the “Three Types of People” (“三种

人”).147 They included people who had followed the Gang of Four and rose to power through

146 Jiangsu shengzhi jijian jiancha zhi (zhengqiu yijian gao) 1978-2008, 144. 147 In November 1976, at the beginning of the Investigation Campaign, Wang Dongxing had introduced three types of people among Gang of Four followers and proposed corresponding measures to deal with them. For more details, see Chapter 2. For an investigation of the cleansing of Three Types of People nationwide between 1982 and 1987, see Daniel Leese, Maos Langer Schatten: Chinas Umgang mit Der Vergangenheit (Munich: C.H.Beck, 2020), 458–70; Gao, “Qingli ‘sanzhongren’ de qianqian houhou.”


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rebellion; people who had serious factional thinking; and people who had been involved in

beating, smashing, and looting. Deng saw them as a potential threat to the Party’s future rule,

stating that “even a small number of them could create disastrous consequences.”148 The

exclusion particularly targeted cadres within the Party leadership at all levels. Thus, the CCP

leadership adopted a forward-looking approach to cast out any potential threats to its rule.

Cleansing the Three Types of People (清理“ 三种人”) was also an alternative solution to the

inefficiency of the Investigation Campaign. As noted above, the investigations and

categorizations could not cope with the complex reality. Therefore, Cleansing the Three Types

of People was the most convenient way for the CCP to serve its political agenda, aiming to

solve the questions of accountability and inner-Party disputes.

In March 1979, Deng warned his fellow cadres at the Party Theoretical Work Conference:

Some Party cadres have been deeply poisoned by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four. A

minority of them spread rumors and attacked the Third Plenum policies violating

Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thoughts. Some Party cadres even support

opposition to the Four Fundamental Principles.149

This was when Deng Xiaoping laid out the Four Cardinal Principles that include upholding the

socialist path, upholding the people’s democratic dictatorship, upholding the leadership of

the Chinese Communist Party, and upholding Mao Zedong’s Thought and Marxism-Leninism.

Deng’s principles responded to the rise of political dissidents within the Party who, in the

Party language, did not “maintain consistency with the Center in politics” (政治上与中央保

持一致) and resisted central guidelines and policies.150 The central leadership emphasized

monolithic Party leadership.151

148 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu yinfa Deng Xiaoping tongzhi zai zhongyang zhengzhiju kuoda huiyi shang de jianghua de tongzhi” 关于印发邓小平同志在中央政治局扩大会议上的讲话的通知 [Notice on the Issuance of Deng Xiaoping’s Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo], September 11, 1980, 84, E101-121-0407, NMA. 149 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu pizhuan Deng Xiaoping zai dang de lilun gongzuo wuxuhui shang de jianghua de tongzhi” 关于批转邓小平在党的理论工作务虚会上的讲话的通知 [Notice on Transmitting Deng Xiaoping’s Speech at the Party Theoretical Work Conference], May 11, 1979, E101-121-0381, NMA. 150 Zhongyang jilü jiancha weiyuanhui, “Zhongyang jilü jiancha weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi de jueyi” 中央纪律检查委员会第三次全体会议的决议 [Resolution of the Thrid Plenary Session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection], March 4, 1981, 158, A4-2-171, SMA. 151 Hu Jiwei, Cong Hua Guofeng xiatai dao Hu Yaobang xiatai 从华国锋下台到胡耀邦下台 [Between Hua Guofeng and Hu Yaobang’s Fall out of Power] (Hong Kong: Mingjing chubanshe, 1997), 88, 126.


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On the one hand, Deng Xiaoping attributed problems to the Gang of Four’s lingering

“pernicious influence” and called for measures to eliminate it. On the other hand, he

considered this to be partly resulting from the Democracy Wall Movement of 1978 and 1979

that led to public discussion about democracy.152 In January 1980, Deng Xiaoping included

dissenting voices within the Party who publicly opposed socialism and criticized Party

leadership in targets for exclusion. He termed them “democrats” (民主派) and regarded them

as a main destabilizing factor.153 Thus, Cleansing the Three Types of People not only dealt with

lingering problems from the past, but also new emerging issues within the Party.

Deng Xiaoping officially developed the three categories into a fixed term at the Enlarged

Conference of the Politburo on August 18, 1980. When addressing the issues of promoting

middle-aged and young cadres within the Party, Deng articulated that the Three Types of

People could by no means be promoted to leading posts. If they were in a leading position,

they must be dismissed.154 Deng’s speech was transmitted down to every level within and out

of the Party and studied nationwide.155 The term “Three Types of People” became widely

known. However, on a national scale, the cleansing only began in late 1982.

Jiangsu was again the leading province in Cleansing the Three Types of People. It began

to identify the Three Types of People in 1980. In September 1980, the Nantong Municipal

Party Committee had established the Leading Group for Clearing out the Three Types of

People within Leadership (南通市委清理领导班子中“ 三种人”领导小组). The Nantong

Prefecture Organization Department organized nearly 100 cadres to implement the exclusion.

The cadres investigated the performance of leaders at the level of commune deputy directors

and above during the Cultural Revolution and since the Third Plenum. On November 22, 1980,

the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee put forward suggestions for excluding the Three Types

of People.156 It requested that local leaders establish leading groups to identify the Three

152 Xiao, Lishi de zhuangui: cong buluan fanzheng dao gaige kaifang (1978-1981), 234–40; Brodsgaard, “The Democracy Movement in China, 1978-1979: Opposition Movements, Wall Poster Campaigns, and Underground Journals.” 153 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Sanzhong quanhui yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, 1:407–8. 154 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu yinfa Deng Xiaoping tongzhi zai zhongyang zhengzhiju kuoda huiyi shang de jianghua de tongzhi,” 84. 155 Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting, “Guanyu kuoda chuanda Deng Xiaoping tongzhi ‘zai zhongyang zhengzhiju kuoda huiyi shang de jianghua’ de tongzhi” 关于扩大传达邓小平同志《在中央政治局扩大会议上的讲话》的通知 [Notice on Increasing the Circulation of Deng Xiaoping’s “Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo”], October 11, 1980, 15, E101-121-0411, NMA. 156 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Guanyu renzhen gaohao qingli lingdao banzi zhong ‘sanzhongren’ gongzuo de yijian” 关于认真搞好清理领导班子中“三种人”工作的意见 [Opinions on Earnestly and Well


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Types of People across the provincial and county levels. As Deng Xiaoping had laid out, the

Jiangsu Party Committee also demanded the removal of any Three Types of People from

leading positions, and it prevented them from promotion in the future. In early 1981, the

Jiangsu Commission for Discipline Inspection further outlined that those who were hostile to

and opposed the Four Cardinal Principles, Party line, and policies should be severely punished.

People who refused to change could risk being permanently expelled from the Party (清除出

党).157 The Jiangsu authorities considered that Cleansing the Three Types of People was a

strategic organizational measure to ensure “the Party’s purity and the state’s stability.”

However, Jiangsu cadres cautiously carried out the exclusion at this early stage. With

regard to excluding the labeled people from leading positions and imposing disciplinary

sanctions, Jiangsu leaders noted that targets’ performance and attitude should be taken into

consideration.158 Jiangsu leaders also emphasized the need to neither carry out the cleansing

as a campaign nor to come up with new slogans.159 These rules were later confirmed by the

central leaders. In March 1981, Wang Heshou emphasized that the Three Types of People

should not “be excluded in batches nor like a swarm of bees (一窝蜂地). Otherwise, it goes

against stability and unity.”160 This stemmed from the fact that central leaders had set aside

political campaigns since late 1978.161 Wang further stressed the need to “leave them a way

out” (给出路), meaning assigning them jobs and reintegrating them into society. The Jiangsu

authorities therefore mostly removed the identified Three Types of People from leading

positions and did not impose disciplinary or legal sanctions in this phase.

By 1982, the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee had removed 719 cadres who had made

serious mistakes from the county leaderships and above. Among them, 28 cadres below the

Carrying out the Work of Cleansing the “Three Types of People” in the Leadership], November 22, 1980, 138–40, E101-121-0434, NMA. 157 Kang, “Guanyu zhongyang jiwei san ci quanhui jingshen de chuanda tigang,” 82–83; Zhonggong jiangsu sheng jilü jiancha weiyuanhui, “1980 nian gongzuo qingkuang he 1981 nian gongzuo yijian,” 65. 158 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, “Guanyu renzhen gaohao qingli lingdao banzi zhong ‘sanzhongren’ gongzuo de yijian,” 140. 159 Zhonggong Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui, 140. 160 Wang Heshou, “Zai zhongyang jiwei sanci quanhui jieshu shi de jianghua” 在中央纪委三次全会结束时的讲话 [Speech at the End of the Third Plenary Session of the Central Discipline Inspection Committee], March 4, 1981, 138, A4-2-171, SMA. 161 No matter in economy, politics, or redressing past wrongs, Deng Xiaoping repeatedly emphasized to abandon the approach of campaigns. He considered the abolition of political campaigns as part of party modernization. See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Deng Xiaoping nianpu: 1975-1997, 1:436, 553, 563.


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county level were categorized as Three Types of People.162 In Nantong, by March 1982, of

2,775 leaders at the level of deputy directors of communes and above in six counties, the

Nantong Prefecture Organization Department reported that 183 leaders had made mistakes

during the Cultural Revolution, including 83 leaders who made serious mistakes and 100 who

made general mistakes. Among them, 84 were rebel leaders who had gained power in the

leadership, 70 were leaders, but not of the rebellion, and the remaining 29 leaders belonged

to the People’s Armed Forces Department (人民武装部 ).163 It is worth noting that the

categories, “committing serious mistakes” and “committing mistakes” that were designated

to group perpetrators, were now picked up here. This suggests that Cleansing the Three Types

of People was a variation on the previous exclusion, but it focused on the Party leadership.

The Nantong authorities had removed 98 leaders from power by October 1982. 164

However, the leadership at the county level sometimes did not follow the decision to

reshuffle the local leadership. In Nantong, local authorities valued work abilities and

downplayed cadres’ mistakes during the Cultural Revolution. Some leaders were concerned

about work needs and reluctant to remove identified people from office. For example, the

Rudong county leadership maintained eight cadres who should have been dismissed. The

Qidong County Party Committee did not implement the decision to exclude two committee

members more than three months after the Nantong Prefecture Committee issued it. Instead,

the county leadership repeatedly requested that the prefecture committee reconsider its

decision.165 This was the case in Jiangsu, but also in many parts of the country where the

exclusion had not yet begun. As Hu Yaobang assessed in July 1982, Cleansing the Three Types

of People was more empty talk than practical implementation in many regions.166

162 Zhonggong jiangsu shengwei dangshi gongzuo bangongshi, Bo luan fan zheng Jiangsu juan, 57. 163 Zhonggong Nantong diqu weiyuanhui zuzhibu, “Guanyu qingli gongzuo qingkuang he yijian de huibao” 关于清理工作情况和意见的汇报 [Report on the Situation and Opinions on Cleansing], March 15, 1982, 81, D101-121-0874, NMA. 164 Zhonggong Nantong diqu weiyuanhui zuzhibu, “Guanyu qingli ‘sanzhongren’ qingkuang he jinhou gongzuo dasuan de jianbao” 关于清理“三种人”情况和今后工作打算的简报 [Briefing on the Cleansing of the “Three Types of People” and Plans for Future Work], October 19, 1982, 87, D101-121-0874, NMA. 165 Zhonggong Nantong diqu weiyuanhui zuzhibu, “Guanyu qingli gongzuo qingkuang he yijian de huibao,” 85. 166 Li Li’an, “Guanyu jiaota-shidi di chedi qingli geji lingdao banzi zhong ‘sanzhongren’ de yijian” 关于脚踏实地地彻底清理各级领导班子中“三种人”的意见 [Opinions on Thoroughly Clearing out the Three Types of People within Leadership at All Levels] (The Maoist Legacy, December 19, 1982).


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Therefore, the Central Committee issued a document calling for a nationwide cleansing

of the Three Types of People on December 30, 1982.167 This 1982 document further defined

the Three Types of People. The first type of people, those who had risen to power through

rebellion during the Cultural Revolution, referred to those who had followed the Lin Biao and

Jiang Qing Clique, participated in rebellion and power seizures and were promoted during the

Cultural Revolution. The second type of people, who had serious factional thinking, included

those who had advocated the thoughts of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Clique during the

Cultural Revolution and continued factional activities after 1976. Beat-smash-loot elements

comprised two groups: people who had persecuted cadres and the masses, engaged in

physical abuse, and caused serious harm, and people who had plotted and directed

confiscation and armed struggles. Based on the definitions, the Three Types of People mainly

consisted of people held responsible for Cultural Revolutionary violence and factional

activities. In this sense, the cleansing was the continuation of the previous campaign to

address the violent past. Meanwhile, the Central Committee demanded that those who were

opposed to the Party line after the Third Plenum should be punished as a way of coping with

the Three Types of People. 168 The national exclusion also dealt with emerging political

dissidents within the Party.

The central leadership carefully avoided associating the exclusion measures with the

political persecution of the Cultural Revolution. It suggested not carrying out the exclusion as

a campaign, but instead incorporating it into regular cadre examinations that had been

constantly carried out since the early 1940s.169 The launching of the Rectification Movement

in October 1983 further revealed this intention.170 Rectification movements often targeted

cadres who were considered to be lacking in integrity, a process that has a long tradition in

the Party history.171 A main objective of the 1983 Rectification Movement was to exclude

167 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu qingli lingdao banzi zhong ‘sanzhongren’ wenti de tongzhi” 关于清理领导班子中“三种人”问题的通知 [Notice on the Issue of Clearing out the Three Types of People within Leadership] (The Maoist Legacy, December 30, 1982), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/79. 168 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu qingli lingdao banzi zhong ‘sanzhongren’ wenti de tongzhi.” 169 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu shencha ganbu de jueding.” For more detailed discussion on the cadre examination in the 1940s, see Gao Hua, “1940 nian Yan’an shengan” 1940年延安审干 [The 1940 Cadre Examination in Yan’an], Yanhuang chunqiu, no. 3 (2012): 21–27. 170 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu zhengdang de jueding” 关于整党的决定 [Decision on Rectifying the Party] (The Maoist Legacy, October 11, 1983), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/70. 171 For a detailed discussion about the rectifications in the 1950s and 1960s, see Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950-65.


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cadres and Party members who were perceived to create dissent in the Party.172 The Central

Committee categorized the dissidents into two groups: those with “incorrect tendencies”

within the Party – people who resisted the Party line and policies after the Third Plenum; and

those who questioned or undermined the Four Cardinal Principles. The central leadership

attributed the former group’s acts to the influences of the Gang of Four, and the latter’s

demands for democracy to “bourgeois liberalization” ( 资产阶级自由化 ). This task

demonstrates that the 1983 Rectification Movement also targeted newly emerging issues

within the Party.

Affiliated with the Rectification Movement, the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee

instructed its subordinate institutions to establish small groups to examine the Three Types

of People. By 1984, Jiangsu had recruited 20,000 cadres to carry out the task. Through

interviewing victims and witnesses and interrogating suspected targets, the Jiangsu

examination groups for Cleansing the Three Types of People investigated historical events

and relevant figures in order to identify the tainted cadres. The examination groups screened

over 360,000 cadres.173 They reported that the examinations sorted out factional networks

and major rebel leaders in Jiangsu, verified people who mainly held accountability for past

injustices and violence, and found those who had brutally tortured people and caused severe

physical injuries. By June 1987, Jiangsu had investigated 3,409 cadres during the Cleansing

Three Types of People. Among them, local authorities categorized 171 people as Three Types

of People, which meant that they were inevitably expelled from the Party. 1,277 people were

perceived to have made serious mistakes and 1,485 people to have made general mistakes.

In total, the local authorities expelled 318 Party members and meted out other Party

disciplinary sanctions to 1,243 members in Jiangsu.174

172 According to the published provincial party history, local authorities expelled at least 317,926 party members from the Party between 1979 and 1987. The numbers were mainly withdrawn from provincial materials of party organization history (组织史资料) and provincial chronicles of the Communist Party (中共志). For a more detailed description, see Leese, Maos Langer Schatten, 468. 173 Jiangsu sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, ed., Jiangsu shengzhi: zhonggong zhi 江苏省志中共志 [Chronicle of Jiangsu: Volume on the Chinese Communist Party] (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2003), 198. 174 Jiangsu sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, 198–99.


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Conclusion

Following the arrest of the Gang of Four, the CCP leadership constructed a narrative of

the “lawlessness” of the past rule and emphasized the restoration of the socialist legality. The

use of the legal system became a major approach during the period of “bringing order out of

chaos.” In the framework of a law-based regime, a criminal trial is usually deemed an effective

response to past injustices by a state in transition.175 The people’s courts put the identified

perpetrators on trial at the central and local levels. Jiangsu trials mainly dealt with violent

perpetrators who had caused deaths and physical injuries. However, as the legality of trials

against perpetrators in post-conflict societies remains controversial,176 the trials in Jiangsu

also faced challenges and resistance within the Party and the society. In response, judicial

leaders in Jiangsu chose to avoid the newly-introduced laws and to try perpetrators using the

existing laws. They thereby circumvented the problem of retroactivity in trying past crimes.

Furthermore, despite local judiciaries striving to draw a clear line between law and politics in

terms of legal charges, both defendants and judicial officials questioned the attribution of

individual accountability for crimes committed during a state-sponsored political movement.

Ultimately, the preference for peace over punishment and justice resulted in limited criminal

sanctions.177

The early 1980s were a period of political flux. During this period, the post-Mao

leadership strategically accommodated lustration procedures to punish or pardon the

designated perpetrators. The leadership first relied primarily on Party discipline and

institutions to deal with the perpetrators. Faced with serious local challenges and doubts, the

CCP began to resort to one of its oldest traditions – political struggle – in order to mitigate

the controversy and resistance to the designation of responsibility. The central policies were

also changing, with a clear tendency towards leniency. Local authorities not only

175 Teitel, Ruti G., Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 28–33. 176 In the case of the Nuremberg trials, some scholars deemed that the trials were fair and legal. See Tusa, Ann and Tusa, John, The Nuremberg Trial (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1984). Some scholars emphasized that the trials produced positive changes in law and society, see Ehrenfreund, Norbert, The Nuremberg Legacy: How the Nazi War Crimes Trials Changed the Course of History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Critics also erupted among scholars, see Washington, Ellis, The Nuremberg Trials: Last Tragedy of the Holocaust (Lanham: University Press of America, 2008); Wyzanski, “Nuremberg: A Fair Trial? Dangerous Precedent”; Wechsler, Herbert, “The Issues of the Nuremberg Trial,” Political Science Quarterly 62, no. 1 (1947): 11–26. 177 Teitel argues that the “limited criminal” sanction is what distinguishes criminal justice in transition. See Teitel, Transitional Justice, 46–49.


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recategorized the majority of previously-investigated perpetrators, but also redressed parts

of their cases that were deemed wrongfully handled. This leniency partly resulted from the

complex reality of Cultural Revolutionary violence and local challenges to the designation of

accountability. As a result, the majority of the designated perpetrators received mild or no

sanctions.

The ineffectiveness of the previous measures and the growing number of dissenting

voices within the Party drove the Deng Xiaoping leadership to launch a new purge. However,

unlike the previous ones, this exclusion targeted the leadership at all levels to secure the

Party’s rule in the future. It expelled a large group of Party members. Dissident voices within

the Party were so strong that the Deng Xiaoping leadership even deployed a national

rectification movement to purge them from the Party. Nonetheless, the new purges by no

means marked an end to dealing with past violence. Disputes over the handling of

perpetrators and the attribution of responsibility continue to the present day and continue

to impact Chinese politics and society.

Chapter 5 Narratives and Voices of Cultural Revolution

“Perpetrators”1

I did not usurp the Party’s leadership; it was [my] superior who assigned me to this [leading]

position.2

– Zhou Jianguan, September 13, 1977

We received education and cultivation from the Party for such a long time; [we] listened

to the Party and studied and worked hard; [we] pursued our vocations as an instrument of the

Party. We rushed forward when the Party demanded this of us; [we] were forced to participate

in the movement [of the Cultural Revolution].3

– Lu Shiwei, November 23, 2016

On May 8, 2009, Jiang Tengjiao, the last surviving member of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing

Clique, died. Jiang Tengjiao was the Nanjing Military Area Command Political Commissar

between 1967 and 1971 and became one of the ten main perpetrators of the Cultural

Revolution put on trial as part of the Clique in the winter of 1980-81.4 He was selected for

trial in June 1980 after the previous defendant Wang Fei, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force,

was diagnosed with schizophrenia and deemed unfit for court.5 In January 1981, Jiang was

sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment. With his death, all the ten official members of the Lin

Biao and Jiang Qing Cliques were gone. However, public debates about them have never

ceased and will likely continue so long as a large number of those designated perpetrators

are still alive. Some remain under close state surveillance even though the Cultural Revolution

ended more than four decades ago. Their voices have not disappeared with the end of the


1 This chapter is in memory of Mr. Fang Zifeng who passed away in November 2017. Mr. Fang was accused of being an “active counterrevolutionary” and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment during the Cultural Revolution. He provided generous help for my fieldwork. 2 Suzhou shi geming weiyuanhui gongjiao bangongshi, “Zoudu shencha de duixiang dangqian sixiang fanying yu dongtai qingkuang,” 105. 3 Lu Shiwei, Interview (Changzhou, November 23, 2016). 4 For more details about the trial, see Cook, The Cultural Revolution on Trial. 5 Tu Men and Xiao Sike, Tebie shenpan: Lin Biao Jiang Qing fangeming jituan shoushen shilu 特别审判: 林彪江青反革命集团受审实录 [Special Trial: Record of the Trial of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Counterrevolutionary Clique] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2003), 67–68.

Chapter 5 Narratives and Voices

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Disputes over the allocation of responsibility and culpability for the Cultural Revolution

continue to this day. In the above two quotes, Zhou Jianguan, Director of the Suzhou Casting

and Machinery Factory Revolutionary Committee, and Lu Shiwei, former Standing Member of

the Changzhou Municipal Party Committee, explain their actions during the Cultural

Revolution in 1977 and 2016 respectively. Zhou and Lu were both designated as Cultural

Revolution perpetrators and subjected to punishment during the Investigation Campaign.

Despite the interval of fifty years between the two accounts, they both defend themselves in

similar ways, emphasizing that they were following superiors’ orders. They suggest that they

had no, or at least not the main, responsibility for what occurred in the region during the

Cultural Revolution. Officially designated perpetrators rarely and only indirectly portray

themselves as such; and more often they consider themselves victims, and sometimes even

heroes. Based primarily on oral interviews, this chapter traces the complexity and multiplicity

of the narratives of those labeled as Cultural Revolution perpetrators.

The CCP rulers have never been able to silence dissenting voices on the Cultural

Revolution within Chinese society. 6 Even within the framework of a well-established

authoritative narrative of the pre-1949 revolution, divergent voices have found their way into

Party history via autobiographical writing.7 In the face of historiographical condemnation,

designated perpetrators adopted diverse methods to save their own life writing. 8 Their

accounts provide a very different narrative of the recent Chinese past from the official

accounts. In her work on perpetrators’ accounts, Leigh Payne examines how perpetrators

reinvent their past through narratives that fit particular political moments or personal needs.

She categorizes perpetrators’ accounts of the past into remorse, heroism, denial, sadism,

silence, fiction and lies, amnesia, and betrayal. 9 These various types of narratives

6 For detailed opinions about the Cultural Revolution of younger generations, see Feng Jicai, “Fei ‘Wenge’ jinglizhe de ‘Wenge’ gainian” 非“文革”经历者的“文革”概念 [The Notions of the Cultural Revolution from People Who Do Not Experience the Cultural Revolution], in Yi bai ge ren de shi nian (Beijing: Wenhua yishu chubanshe, 2014), 308–13. Weigelin-Schwiedrzik argues that the CCP has never been able to define a master narrative for post-1949 Chinese history. See Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne, “In Search of a Master Narrative for 20th-Century Chinese History,” The China Quarterly 188 (December 2006): 1070–91. 7 Spakowski, Nicola, “Destabilising the Truths of Revolution: Strategies of Subversion in the Autobiographical Writing of Political Women in China,” in Writing Lives in China, 1600–2010: Histories of the Elusive Self, ed. Dryburgh, Marjorie and Dauncey, Sarah (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 133–58. 8 Life writing is inclusive, and it can encompass diaries, letters, autobiography, obituaries, internet blogs, and also oral history. For an introduction to life writing, see Jolly, Margaretta, ed., Encyclopedia of Life Writing: Autobiographical and Biographical Forms (London and Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2013). 9 Payne, Unsettling Accounts, 19–22.


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demonstrate the complexity of perpetrator narratives and reveal the question of whether

individuals are accountable for state violence.

Individual experiences during the Cultural Revolution obviously differed, and the reality

is far more complex than the state-given dichotomy between perpetrators and victims

(Chapter 1).10 In many cases, alleged perpetrators can also claim to have been victimized, and

so-called victims can likewise be considered to have victimized others. 11 The Cultural

Revolution involved a large segment of the country’s population, who could be victims,

perpetrators, or both, and were interchangeable at various times. Furthermore, the Cultural

Revolution took place with the broad support of the CCP. The military and Party apparatuses

sponsored the most brutal violence that caused the majority of deaths during the Cultural

Revolution.12 In this particular context, blaming state violence on a select group of individuals

has inevitably resulted in discontent. The designated Cultural Revolution perpetrators that I

interviewed outlined diverse narratives, but all of them rejected the identity of perpetrator.13

Based on Payne’s categorization and my interviews, I distinguish four types of narratives

constructed by labeled Cultural Revolution perpetrators: denial and amnesia; heroism and

nostalgia; betrayal; and remorse. These categories are not absolute and often overlap.

Individual narratives may also change over time. Nonetheless, these divergent narratives

contest the official interpretation of the past.

In general, the voices of labeled Cultural Revolution perpetrators are absent from

contemporary discussions, at least in public.14 In a few cases, Cultural Revolution participants

have come forward to reveal past wrongdoings and express remorse in public.15 The majority

10 For an alternative to suffering and persecution that dominates official and individual accounts of the Maoist era, see Zhong, Xueping, Wang, Zheng, and Di, Bai, eds., Some of Us: Chinese Women Growing Up in the Mao Era (New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London: Rutgers University Press, 2001). 11 Erin K. Baines, “Complex Political Perpetrators: Reflections on Dominic Ongwen,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 47, no. 2 (June 2009): 163–91; Erica Bouris, Complex Political Victims (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2007). 12 Walder and Su, “The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside.” 13 I use the term “perpetrator” here because the CCP still officially held them responsible for Cultural Revolutionary violence. 14 Different or oppositional versions of the past are often coercively forgotten in public memory, see Schwarcz, Vera, “Strangers No More: Personal Memory in the Interstices of Political Commemoration,” in Memory, History, and Opposition under State Socialism, ed. Watson, Rubie S. (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 1994), 45–64. 15 For example, several red guards, including Chen Xiaolu, Song Binbin, publicly apologized to their victims and displayed remorse for their past wrongdoings. Also see Wang Keming and Song Xiaoming, eds., Women chanhui 我们忏悔 [We Repent] (Beijing: China CITIC Press, 2014).


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of available accounts of the Cultural Revolution, however, focus on the victims. A large

number of high-ranking Party cadres and intellectuals have narrated their sufferings and

experiences of victimization in memoirs.16 As a response to the crisis of socialist legitimacy

that the post-Mao CCP leadership faced, Party-affiliated institutions collected the memories

of individuals and compiled them into so-called wenshi ziliao (文史资料).17 Existing scholarly

discussions on the Cultural Revolution and the purge of the Gang of Four engage little with

individual experiences at the grassroots level, however.18 Particularly little attention has been

paid to how those officially labeled as perpetrators situate their roles when considering the

issue of accountability. In order to address the complexity of and controversy over

responsibility for the Cultural Revolution within current society, it is therefore essential to

make the voices of the perpetrators heard. One way to begin to address this issue is through

a deep analysis of the narrative scripts provided by labeled perpetrators of the Cultural

Revolution in Jiangsu.

This chapter mainly relies on two types of sources: oral history interviews and published

materials issued as public apologies and expressions of remorse. As I have introduced the

interviews in the introduction, I will briefly describe the latter. Recent scholarship has drawn

on a large body of published autobiographical and oral history collections to examine the

memory of perpetrators and the issue of responsibility.19 Therefore, I will only use published

16 To name a few of publications concerning cadre and intellectuals’ victimized experiences during the Cultural Revolution, see Feng Jicai, Yi bai ge ren de shi nian 一百个人的十年 [Ten Years of a Hundred People] (Beijing: Wenhua yishu chubanshe, 2014); Ji Xianlin, Niupeng zayi 牛棚杂忆 [Memories of the Cowshed] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1998); Yang Jiang, Ganxiao liuji 干校六记 [Six Records of a Cadre School] (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Company, 1981). 17 Martin Fromm closely examines the processes, politics, and debates behind the mobilization, production, circulation, and publication of wenshi ziliao and argues that wenshi ziliao created a memory space to integrate and reconcile different ideologies, historical perspectives, and social interests in post-Mao China. See Fromm, Borderland Memories. 18 Recently scholars started to focus on grassroots history and everyday life from the perspective of relatively unknown historical actors, see Leese, Daniel and Engman, Puck, eds., Victims, Perpetrators, and the Role of Law in Maoist China, A Case-Study Approach (Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, 2018); Yang Kuisong, “Bianyuanren” jishi: jige “wenti” xiaorenwu de beiju gushi “边缘人”纪事：几个“问题”小人物的悲剧故事 [Chronicles of the Marginal: The Tragedies of Several “Problematic” Obscure People] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2016); Brown, Jeremy and Johnson, Matthew D., eds., Maoism at the Grassroots: Everyday Life in China’s Era of High Socialism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015). 19 For example, Mok discusses the moral responsibility of those who participated in the Cultural Revolution. See Mok, Civilian Participants in the Cultural Revolution. In her study of memories of the Cultural Revolution, Lingchei Letty Chen explores the publishing historical memories of perpetrators, especially in chapter 2, see Chen, Lingchei Letty, The Great Leap Backward: Forgetting and Representing the Mao Years (New York: Cambria Press, 2020).


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articles on apologies and repentance in this chapter. They consist mainly of public apologies

published in newspapers and journals since 2000 and the public discussion surrounding these

apologies. For example, the public apology by Song Binbin, the daughter of General Song

Renqiong (宋任穷), attracted widespread attention and sparked heated public debate. Since

2008, the periodical Yanhuang Chunqiu and the newspaper Southern Weekend have

published a series of apologetic articles. Also worth mentioning is the volume We Repent (我

们忏悔) that was published in 2014. About 40 people from different backgrounds recounted

their actions, sometimes crimes, during the Cultural Revolution and expressed their

repentance for them. Although these public repentances and apologies are still scarce and

the vast majority of people have remained silent, we can begin by analyzing these apologies

to comprehend the disputes remaining from the Cultural Revolution and answer the question

of how Chinese society can move closer to reconciliation with its violent past.

5.1 Denial and Amnesia

Despite being labeled as perpetrators, my interviewees seldom accepted this label in

their narratives. They denied their participation in the Cultural Revolution, the occurrence of

some historical events, and refused to take individual responsibility for state violence. Their

denials are interrelated with amnesia: choosing to tell their sides of the story and “forget”

other parts. This is partly because the CCP has been, as Vera Schwarcz argues, determined to

enforce forgetfulness in public memory. 20 Those experiencing trauma and atrocities

collectively sometimes choose to forget uncomfortable knowledge and turn it into an “open

secret” that is known by all, knowingly not known.21 This is particularly true within Chinese

society, in which discussions about the Cultural Revolution have never ceased but are

nonetheless difficult to hear in public due to political constraints. The labeled Cultural

Revolution perpetrators interview often employed narratives of denial and amnesia.

Lu Shiwei often narrated his past through denial and amnesia during our interview. Lu

Shiwei was a cadre at the Changzhou Municipal Organization Department when the Cultural

Revolution began in May 1966. Lu participated in the faction within the Organization

20 Schwarcz, “Strangers No More.” 21 Cohen, Stanley, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 138.


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Department and became a rebel leader.22 In September 1967, he represented his faction and

took part in negotiations with its rival in Beijing when the CCP Center called upon local factions

to cease armed struggles and form an alliance.23 Lu stood as the Standing Member of the

Changzhou Municipal Revolutionary Committee in 1971. In 1975, he delivered a speech at the

First National Conference of “Learning from Dazhai in Agriculture” (农业学大寨) because

Changzhou had been established as a model for developing the local economy.24 With this,

Lu’s career reached its peak. He was cast out as a Gang of Four follower by the Changzhou

Party leadership during the Exposing, Criticizing, and Investigating campaign. Lu was then

demoted to a factory as an ordinary worker and he received a verdict in 1982, stating that he

“had made erroneous remarks during the campaign to Counterattack the Rightist-deviation

Wind to Reverse Verdicts (反击右倾翻案风).” He was given a serious warning (严重警告)

within the Party and reassigned to a Changzhou middle school as Deputy Director of Teaching

and Discipline (教导主任).

The above information provides us with an overview of the turning points in Lu’s political

life during and after the Cultural Revolution. The fact that he was selected to represent his

faction in the negotiations with their opponent suggests that Lu became a rebel leader. He

was soon promoted to a leading position in the Changzhou Revolutionary and Party

Committees and later played an important role in local administration and economic

development in the mid-1970s. Finally, he was labeled as a Gang of Four follower in

Changzhou and demoted from his leading position in the Changzhou Party Committee

following the downfall of the Gang of Four.

22 The faction was usually called “United Command Corps” (联指兵团) and later renamed the “Revolutionary Link-up of Workers, Peasants, and Students” (工农学革命串联会, abbr. “工农学”). For more information regarding factions in Changzhou, see Changzhou shi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Changzhou shi zhi, 3:1103–5. 23 On October 17, 1967, the CCP Central Committee issued a document to call for factions to form a great alliance. See Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guowuyuan Zhongyang junwei zhongyang wenge xiaozu “Guanyu anzhao xitong shixing dalianhe de tongzhi” 国务院、中央军委、中央文革小组《关于按照系统实行大联合的通知 [State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group’s Notice on Realizing the Great Alliance According to Systems] (The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, October 17, 1967), https://ccradb.appspot.com/post/361. 24 Xinhua News Agency, “‘Nongzi dangtou gun xueqiu’ - Changzhou gongye da gazhan diaocha zhi yi” “农字当头滚雪球”——常州工业大发展调查之一 [Investigation on the Great Industry Development in Changzhou (Part 1)], People’s Daily, May 10, 1975; Xinhua News Agency, “‘Zhuozi’ shang changqi le daxi - Changzhou gongye da fazhan zhi er” “ 桌子 ” 上唱起了大戏 —— 常州工业大发展之二 [Investigation on the Great Industry Development in Changzhou (Part 2)], People’s Daily, May 11, 1975.


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During the interview, however, Lu equivocated on the reason why he was promoted to a

leading position during the Cultural Revolution and later singled out as a follower of the Gang

of Four. When describing his actions in the early period of the Cultural Revolution, Lu

emphasized that his faction made efforts to preserve archives and state property when the

opponent faction attacked the archival system and searched for “black materials” in

personnel files. From Lu’s perspective, his faction was protecting state property and fighting

against violence. Although he agreed that violence had nonetheless occurred, he denied any

participationand only referred to armed struggles in one sentence: “The Cultural Revolution

came and armed struggles took place.” When directly asked about his involvement in violence,

he responded, “I am not aware of armed struggles [having taken place] in Changzhou.”25

His other accounts, however, contradicted this claim. He recalled in detail that the Beijing

negotiation between factions had been a result of serious harm caused by armed struggles.

According to official statistics, a factional fight in Changzhou in 1967 resulted in 78 deaths,

115 injuries, and a direct economic loss above 24 million yuan.26 Lu recounted that he had

reported each week to Zhou Enlai on the progress of negotiations between the two factions.

Therefore, he must have been familiar with the content of negotiations, i.e., the factional

struggles in Changzhou. When asked where factional members had acquired heavy weapons

such as canons and why armed struggles in Changzhou had caused such serious consequences,

Lu responded as follows:

I do not know about this. When I was coerced into the negotiation during the great

alliances, the armed struggles had nearly ended. I was not one of the rebel leaders,

neither a leader of the Worker, Peasant, and Student Faction, nor a leader of the

faction in Party and government organs. I was only a member of the Organization

Department rebel faction… I was coerced into [the Cultural Revolution]. (这个我就

不清楚了。我是在大联合谈判时被裹胁进去的，武斗已经基本结束了。我不在

群众组织头头里头，不是工农学的头, 我连机关里都不是头。我是组织部的造

反派的成员……所以我是被裹胁进去的。) 27

Denial and amnesia are merged in Lu’s recounting of history. He claimed to be nothing more

25 Lu, Interview. 26 Changzhou shi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Changzhou shi zhi, 3:1106. 27 Lu, Interview.


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than an ordinary factional member. Although Lu did not deny the occurrence of violence, he

denied any involvement or responsibility. More importantly, Lu repeatedly stressed that he

had no choice but to take part in the movement. Reference to the coercive context within

which they were acting is a common strategy by which perpetrators challenge the label of

perpetrator and justify their actions. 28 Lu situated his past acts in a particular political

situation and denied any personal motivations for being part of the movement. Lu further

suggested that he was singled out as a perpetrator for political reasons and he considers

himself a victim of the political movement: “After all, [the state] needed some representatives

be made into scapegoats.”29

Lu’s emphasis on coercive political circumstances and scapegoating for the violent past

was also common with others I interviewed. Shi Zhaoxiang, a rebel leader in Suzhou who was

promoted to municipal and provincial leading positions during the Cultural Revolution,

emphasized that he did not choose the path, and the political environment had thrust it upon

him.30 A former rebel leader with the surname Qu, based in Nanjing, denied being part of any

violence and presented himself as a victim of the campaign against the Gang of Four. Qu

stated that cases targeting former young rebels who had participated in the Cultural

Revolution were “unjust, false, and mistaken” – a term employed in the late 1970s and early

1980s to describe all wrongly adjudicated cases before and during the Cultural Revolution –

and further suggested that the CCP redress their verdicts.31 The majority of my interviewees

denied having been followers or supporters of the Gang of Four. Instead, they asserted that

they had disagreed with the Gang during the Cultural Revolution.

Lu Shiwei outlined his main viewpoints on the Cultural Revolution and his past

experiences in a two-page script that he wrote prior to the interview. He made six points: 1)

The central leaders, who initiated the Cultural Revolution, rather than ordinary participants,

were mainly responsible for its consequences. 2) Mao’s initial intentions for the Cultural

Revolution were to eliminate corruption within the Party and prevent revisionism in China. 3)

Central leaders’ loss of control over the movement led to serious consequences. 4) The post-

28 In another political context, former Khmer Rouge cadres distanced themselves from their own agency and portrayed themselves as more passive subjects of the situation in order to resist the label of perpetrator. See Williams, “Agency, Responsibility, and Culpability,” 52. 29 Lu, Interview. 30 Shi, Interview, October 2, 2016. 31 Qu Xueshi, Interview (Nanjing, August 16, 2017).


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Mao Party leadership extended the purge and applied double standards to cadres and young

people (rebels) when attributing responsibility for the Cultural Revolution. 5) Changzhou was

established as a nationwide model for economic growth in 1975 under his charge. 6) He was

forced to take part in the Cultural Revolution and despite being unjustly labeled as a Cultural

Revolution perpetrator he has never complained and has always worked hard for the Party’s

good.32

Lu carefully constructed the script and ponder over the accounts he would give in the

interview. He was not the only case like this. Another alleged follower with the surname Wang,

who was based in Nanjing, wrote a four-page script describing in detail his experiences during

the campaign to Expose, Criticize, and Investigate the Gang of Four. Wang listed five previous

accusations against him and refuted them one by one, stating “these accusations were

unfounded (不成立的).”33 Through the script, Wang Chunnan refuted and denied the official

charges. These well-prepared scripts show that they not only took the interview seriously, but

were also very careful about how they tell their past. They even appeared to see the interview

as an opportunity to express the injustices of being labeled as a perpetrator, or at least to

prove their innocence to the interviewer and their potential listeners.

Denial and amnesia played out in the narrative of Liang Yulou, another former Nanjing

rebel leader. When the Cultural Revolution began, Liang was a student at the Institute of

Meteorology at Nanjing University and he soon became the second-in-command for one

Nanjing’s main factions.34 Like Lu Shiwei, Liang was selected for the delegation team sent to

Beijing to participate in the negotiation between Nanjing factions in 1968. In 1969, many rebel

leaders were suppressed and sent to the countryside for re-education (再教育), and Liang

ended up on a rural farm for a year and a half. Afterward, he assumed a post at the Rudong

County Meteorology Bureau. According to Liang, the bureau began an investigation into his

role in the Cultural Revolution in November 1978. The investigation lasted for one year but

did not reach a verdict. He managed to restore his position at the Rudong County

Meteorology Bureau in 1979. It seems that Liang, despite having engaged heavily in rebellion

32 Lu Shiwei, “Ji ge guandian” 几个观点 [Some Opinions], November 23, 2016. 33 Wang Chunnan, “1976 nian 10 yue yihou de qingcha yundong he ‘bo luan fan zheng’ (tanhua tigang)” 1976年10月以后的清查运动和“拨乱反正”(谈话提纲) [The Investigation Campaign and “Bringing Order out of Chaos” after October 1976], November 16, 2016, 3–4. 34 For more information on the formation of factions in Nanjing, see Dong and Walder, “Factions in a Bureaucratic Setting.”


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in the early stage of the Cultural Revolution and later being labeled a Gang of Four follower

in the late 1970s, received no significant punishment. When narrating his Cultural Revolution

experiences, Liang stated: “As a rebel leader at the Institute of Meteorology, I actually knew

nothing [about the movement].”35 He also denied that any violence had occurred in Nanjing,

insisting that “It is nonsense to say there were armed struggles. Armed struggles never

occurred at Nanjing University. It was difficult to put up an armed struggle in Nanjing. Even

though I once prepared for fighting, it did not take place.”36 He instead used the euphemism

“physical friction” (肢体摩擦) to describe a large-scale and serious factional fight that took

place on January 3, 1967 in Nanjing, which according to official statistics resulted in the injury

of more than a thousand people.37 This first large-scale armed struggle in Jiangsu is officially

known as the January 3 Incident (一三事件).38 Liang referred to it as “friction” so as to

downplay and mitigate the violence.

While denying the occurrence of violence, Liang nonetheless described many details

about his leading role in organizing factional members to defend or retreat. For example, he

recalled in detail leading his faction in a retreat after they had been defeated and revealed

that they had loaded trucks with spears so they could fight at any moment. He also mentioned

that two members of his faction had been killed while attempting to make grenades that then

exploded.39 Liang’s detailed description and use of words such as “retreat,” “defeat,” “fight,”

“spear,” and “grenade” indicate that armed struggles did indeed occur in Nanjing and that he

is well aware of them. Liang thereby presented conflicting accounts of the past. He further

claimed that he respected professors, and had never beat or punished any, but rather

protected them from being attacked.40 What Liang described seems closely informed by Jiang

Qing’s notorious 1967 slogan to “attack with words, defend with arms (文攻武卫),” which

35 Liang Yulou, Interview (Rudong, August 24, 2017). 36 Liang. However, scholarly and official publications note that intensive and prolonged armed struggles took place in Nanjing during the Cultural Revolution. See Dong and Walder, “Factions in a Bureaucratic Setting”; Zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei dangshi gongzuo bangongshi, Zhonggong Jiangsu difang shi 1949-1978 中共江苏地方史 (1949-1978) [The Local History of Jiangsu], vol. 2 (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2011), 363–68. 37 Zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei dangshi gongzuo bangongshi, Zhonggong Jiangsu difang shi 1949-1978, 2:353–56. 38 For more information on the Incident see Dong Guoqiang, “1967 nian Nanjing ‘yi·san shijian’ qianxi” 1967年南京"一·三事件"浅析 [Analysis on the Nanjing January 3rd Incident in 1967], Remembrance, no. 2 (2011): 1–18. 39 Liang, Interview. 40 Liang.


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intensified ongoing armed conflicts in various regions. He portrayed the armed struggles as

defensive and thus did not perceive them as violent.

Lu Shiwei and Liang Yulou both reflect a tendency to distance themselves from past

violence. They generally recollected details in which they appeared in a positive light,

including heroic acts of protecting state property, being a loyal follower and supporter of

central policies, and contributing to local economic development. For example, Lu entirely

attributed his promotion to a leading position to the military representatives’ admiration for

his excellent writing skills when reporting on the progress of negotiation to central leaders.

He asserted that this decision did not benefit from his rebel status. He disclaimed factional

struggles, but clearly remembered in detail the negotiation between local factions.

The above-noted instances of denial are representative of the responses of many

officially labeled perpetrators regarding the Cultural Revolution and the following purges.

First, they refuse to take responsibility for what occurred during the Cultural Revolution and

often deny any violence or wrongdoing. Liang denied violence, wrongdoing, and responsibility.

In other cases, singled-out perpetrators admit to violence but not to wrongdoing, while others

admit to wrongdoing but deny any personal responsibility and place the blame on the CCP

leadership. Second, they suggest that the Party-state cast out young participants in the

Cultural Revolution and used them as scapegoats. The majority who received punishment

afterwards were rebels, while cadres and the so-called “Old Red Guard” (老红卫兵) – mostly

children of high-ranking cadres and the first group of students responding to Mao’s call to

rebel in the early Cultural Revolution – were generally exempted from punishment.41 As

Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik has pointed out, the CCP’s 1981 resolution failed to develop a

clear judgment regarding the active participation of the “Old Red Guards” in violent armed

struggles during the Cultural Revolution.42 Finally, many of the labeled perpetrators claimed

to be victims of the Cultural Revolution. They asserted that they were forced to take part due

to circumstances and political pressure. Some complained that the Party-state used them and

then cast them out. The narrative of denial and amnesia helps us understand that generally

attributing responsibility for the Cultural Revolution to former rebel leaders remains

controversial. Many labeled perpetrators continue to refuse the label of perpetrator assigned

41 Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne, “Coping with the Cultural Revolution: Contesting Interpretations,” Jindaishi Yanjiusuo Jikan, no. 61 (June 2009): 97–154. 42 Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, “Coping with the Cultural Revolution.”


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to them by the Party-state.

5.2 Heroism and Nostalgia

The theme of heroism appears with high frequency in Cultural Revolution participants’

narratives of the past. This portrayal of a heroic past often reflects a sense of nostalgia among

Cultural Revolution participants. 43 Labeled perpetrators also often retell their past and

portray it in a heroic way. This theme is probably related to the Chinese traditional moral

value of "sacrificing one’s interests for the sake of others (舍己为人).”44 The interviewees

generally depicted their acts, including house raid, archive seizure, and armed struggles, as

protection, rescuing, and contribution, or, more generally, a revolution. Diverging from the

official history, their heroic version of the past serves to disclaim the label of perpetrator and

reconstruct their historical identity.

One main accusation of the Party-state against Gang of Four followers was that the

followers had attempted to usurp the Party and state power (篡党夺权), mainly referring to

the power seizures that began in January 1967. Most of my interviewees mentioned this

accusation and defended themselves. Some claimed that their participation had simply been

driven by their faith in Mao Zedong. For example, when asked about his motives for taking

part in the Cultural Revolution, the former rebel leader Liang Yulou claimed that he was simply:

“Following Chairman Mao’s call.” 45 Similarly, Wang Yongzhu,46 Deputy Director and Vice

Secretary of the Suzhou Revolutionary and Party Committees, attributed her participation in

the movement to the circumstances of the time and her loyalty to Mao Zedong: “I listened to

Chairman Mao and followed his path.” 47 Wang further described her actions during the

Cultural Revolution as such: “I was completely selfless and honestly served the people. My

family did not benefit from [my position] at all.” Wang thus presented herself as dedicated in

43 Yang, Guobin, “China’s Zhiqing Generation: Nostalgia, Identity, and Cultural Resistance in the 1990s,” Modern China 29, no. 3 (July 2003): 284. 44 Lu, Xiuyuan, “A Step Toward Understanding Popular Violence in China’s Cultural Revolution,” Pacific Affairs 67, no. 4 (1994): 533–63. 45 Liang, Interview. 46 Wang Yongzhu was a factory worker and became a main female rebel leader in Suzhou during the Cultural Revolution. She was isolated and investigated following the detention of the Gang of Four. Wang was expelled from the Party and dismissed from all posts both inside and outside the Party, but exempted from criminal punishment (免予刑事处罚). 47 Wang Yongzhu, Interview (Suzhou, November 22, 2016).


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this leading position to the extent of having sacrificed everything else – including her family –

for the sake of the people.

Others indicated that they had simply followed superiors’ orders. Lu Shiwei explained his

engagement by claiming that his superiors had encouraged him to fight for the cause:

Seizing power came to the fore after 1967. [People] in each region could not but rebel

even if [they] did not want to. You had to rebel if you wanted a revolution.

Additionally, the municipal committee empowered [us]: [If] they rebelled, you should

also rebel. (67 年以后就夺权了，各地不造反也得造反。你要革命就要造反。再

加上市委授权：既然他们[造反派]会造反，你们也好造反的。) 48

Lu emphasized that the Changzhou Municipal Party Committee had authorized and even

encouraged his actions. He further justified his rebellion as an indispensable step for a noble

cause – revolution. Most interviewees stressed that their participation was simply a response

to the call for “revolution.” From their perspective, these actions were not only legitimate but

even honorable.

Lu also glorified his past actions and portrayed them as necessary for protection. He

frequently used the word “we” and distinguished “we” from “they” to denote those who had

engaged in violence:

They snatched archives, and we absolutely condemned their acts. We first moved all

the archives to a cellar, but someone knew about it. We then placed them at a military

airport. Our purpose was simply to protect state archives. (他们抢档案，我们当然

看不惯，一开始放到地下室，有人知道了，又后来放到[军队]飞机场，就是保

护我们国家的档案。) 49

Lu situated “us,” or himself, in opposition with those who had engaged in destruction, and he

presented himself as a protector of state property. Further, he distinguished his faction from

others and claimed to have acted bravely against the violence of other faction.

Other interviewees emphasized efforts to protect people at various points during the

Cultural Revolution and later Investigation Campaign. Wang Chunnan, a former journalist at

Xinhua Daily, the Party newspaper of the Jiangsu Provincial Committee, and People’s Daily,

48 Lu, Interview. 49 Lu.


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stated that: “I protected others when investigators came and asked me for more

information… I sometimes shouldered responsibility in order to absolve others from it.”50 In

the same vein, Qu Xueshi, a rebel leader at Nanjing University, also highlighted that he

protected others: “I only confessed what I had done and did not implicate anyone else during

the investigation.”51 This narrative of protection is common among my interviewees.

The act of contribution is another theme in Lu’s narrative. During the interview, he placed

particular emphasis on his contribution to and accomplishments in economic development

during the Cultural Revolution. He presented two articles he had written during the interview,

recalling the historical moment when Changzhou was propagated nationwide as a model of

“Learning from Dazhai in Agriculture.” 52 Lu, as the leader in charge of agriculture in

Changzhou, was invited to various central conferences to outline the Changzhou experience,

and he considered this his moment of glory. He also brought certificates for various honors

to our meeting, such as one for Outstanding Member of the Communist Party (优秀共产党

员), clearly in order to support his unswerving loyalty to the Party. From Lu’s perspective, his

past is a glorious one.

Lu was not the only one who spoke of the past with a sense of nostalgia. Many Cultural

Revolution participants remember the Maoist era in this way.53 Liang Yulou asserted that he

has never regretted (无悔) taking part in the Cultural Revolution.54 Shi Zhaoxiang, a rebel

leader in Suzhou and Head of the Jiangsu Provincial Organization Department Jiangsu during

the Cultural Revolution, stated that a large number of previous rebels with whom he has

contact share a similar view. As he explained, “many consider their participation in this war

(i.e., the Cultural Revolution) as a source of lifelong pride (骄傲). They think that present and

future generations will never experience years of passion as they did, not anymore!” (有的人

觉得自己能够参加这场战争是一生的骄傲。他们认为，现在的人包括将来的，再也接

50 Wang, Interview, November 16, 2016. 51 Qu, Interview. 52 “Learning from Dazhai in agriculture” was a state program to promote agriculture development during the Maoist period and the reform era. For more details, see Xiao Donglian, “yi ge shidai de zhongjie: dui nongye xue Dazhai yundong de zongjie” 一个时代的终结: 对农业学大寨运动的总结 [The Ending of an Era: Summary of the Movement of Learning from Dazhai in Agriculture], Dangshi bolan, no. 11 (2014): 11–14. 53 Xin Qun, Wuhui nianhua: baiming zhiqing hua dangnian 无悔年华: 百名知青话当年 [Years without Regret: One Hundred Educated Youth Talk about Their Past] (Shenyang: Shenyang chubanshe, 1998). 54 Liang, Interview.


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受不到像他们一样激情燃烧的岁月了，没有了。)55 Wang Chunnan regarded his role in

the Cultural Revolution in the same way: “I never regretted participating in the Cultural

Revolution. My choice was rational and sincere, and also in fitting with the trend of the

time.”56 They portrayed their past as the “good old days” and seemed to celebrate and be

proud of it.

Giving such particular significance to their motivations and heroic actions reflects a

common personal goal among my interviewees: clearing their names by countering present

official accounts with previous ones.57 In the 1981 Resolution on Certain Questions in the

History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, the CCP Central

Committee outlined that the vast majority of Cultural Revolution participants acted out of

faith in Mao Zedong and the Party and they disapproved of launching struggles against leading

cadres.58 This statement intended to show that the vast majority were against violence and

their participation in the Cultural Revolution was simply a result of following Mao’s orders. In

this sense, the majority of participants were not held responsible for the Cultural Revolution.

By claiming to follow Mao’s orders and to be acting in the interests of a “revolution,” those

labeled as perpetrators include themselves amongst this vast majority who were not held

accountable for the Cultural Revolution. They thereby use the Party narrative to tell their

stories of the past and confront the official history, i.e., that they were perpetrators of the


This heroic narrative reflects a sense of nostalgia for the Maoist era. Hannah Arendt notes

that a follower of totalitarianism is not “likely to waver even if he becomes a victim of

persecution himself, if he is framed and condemned, if he is purged from the party and sent

to a forced-labor or a concentration camp.” 59 Despite being blamed for the Cultural

Revolution and removal from power, the designated perpetrators’ cult of Mao Zedong

remained unwavering and their nostalgia for the Mao era remained strong.60 Nostalgia has

been even stronger among the sent-down youth. Since the 1990s, a wave of nostalgia has

55 Shi, Interview, October 2, 2016. 56 Wang, Interview, November 16, 2016. 57 Payne, Unsettling Accounts, 104. 58 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu jianguo yilai ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi.” 59 Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1962), 307. 60 Klotzbücher also notes the sense of nostalgia among former Red Guards, see Klotzbücher, Lange Schatten der Kulturrevolution: Eine transgenerationale Sicht auf Politik und Emotion in der Volksrepublik China, 325–36.


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emerged among those sent down to the countryside between the 1960s and 1970s. As Yang

Guobin has argued, this nostalgia emerged as a resistance to the present situation in the post-

Mao period.61 This observation is particularly true of those labeled as perpetrators, including

those I interviewed. Many of them obtained power and participated in political life during the

Cultural Revolution. Since being cast out of the regime, the majority of them have been

politically and socially marginalized. For them, nostalgia is not simply a yearning for yesterday,

but also a political expression of their present. They expressed discontent with their current

status and mostly criticize the demoralized society where materialism outweighs social values.

In this sense, their description of a heroic past becomes an alternative way for them to

participate in political discussion.

5.3 Betrayal

The CCP holds the Gang of Four and so-called followers accountable for violence and

injustices that took place during the Cultural Revolution. This blame was supposed to resolve

popular grievances that the Cultural Revolution had caused. However, the majority of labeled

perpetrators do not accept this blame. Some regard the blaming as a betrayal of their loyalty.

Perpetrators who feel betrayed by the regime, their superiors, or their colleagues are more

likely to speak out and reveal past violence.62 They generally implicate others and examine

the reasons for past violence when retelling the past. This narrative of betrayal is underpinned

by one of the issues most discussed in relation to post-conflict societies: individual

responsibility while following orders.

When recounting the past violence, my interviewees frequently explained this as

obedience to superiors’ orders or they noted that they had the support of authorities. They

emphasized their close connections with high-ranking cadres and implied that they had strong

support for their actions from Party and military leaders. Zeng Bangyuan, first commander of

one of the Nanjing factions at Nanjing University, revealed that Zhou Enlai called and

encouraged him to seize power from the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee.63 Similarly, Jiang

Kaiming, a rebel leader from Suzhou’s Number Seven Middle School during the Cultural

61 Yang, “China’s Zhiqing Generation.” 62 Payne, Unsettling Accounts, 2008, 277. 63 Wu Qingsheng, Interview (Nanjing, November 18, 2016). Also see Dong and Walder, “Nanjing’s Failed ‘January Revolution’ of 1967,” 681.


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Revolution, repeatedly emphasized his close relationship with military leaders and asserted

that the leaders permitted and even encouraged his factional activities.64 Their claims are

consistent with what Dong Guoqiang and Andrew Walder have argued: that power seizure

could only have succeeded under the condition of Beijing’s clear backing and military

support.65 Regardless of their motivations in recounting this during interviews, this narrative

of betrayal provides us with another perspective on debates about the attribution of

responsibility for the Cultural Revolution.

My interviewees also focused their accounts on the wrongdoings of those who they said

betrayed them. In 1968, Wang Chunnan was a journalist at Xinhua Daily, the Party newspaper

of the Jiangsu Provincial Committee. He started working at People’s Daily in 1975. Following

the downfall of the Gang of Four, he was subjected to investigation and dismissed from his

position.66 In 1974, Wang, together with two colleagues, wrote a series of big character

posters denouncing military officers for brutal persecution during the campaign to Ferret out

May 16 Counterrevolutionaries.67 The posters drew significant attention and were distributed

throughout the province. At the time, veteran cadres in Jiangsu, such as Peng Chong and Xu

Jiatun, drew on popular grievances and rebel forces to ensure their victory against the military

officers who had dominated civilian government since the initial stage of the Cultural

Revolution.68 Wang stated that Peng and Xu considered his big character posters to be

supportive and they expressed their appreciation. However, Wang believed that Xu Jiatun and

other leaders had later used one of the big character posters to accuse him after the Cultural

Revolution. For Wang, therefore, his superiors had betrayed him.

Wang Chunnan ascribed this accusation to his superiors taking personal revenge. One of

64 Jiang Kaiming, Interview (Suzhou, September 10, 2017). 65 Dong and Walder, “Nanjing’s Failed ‘January Revolution’ of 1967,” 678. 66 Wang, Interview, November 16, 2016. Three accusations against Wang were listed: First, he was an “escaped rightist” (漏网右派) in light of a note he wrote in 1956; Second, he had helped a Jiangsu rebel leader deliver two letters to Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, meaning that he linked Jiangsu rebels with the Gang of Four; Lastly, Wang had written a series of big character posters to denounce Wu Dasheng and the campaign to Ferret out May 16 Counterrevolutionaries (清查五一六) under his leadership in Jiangsu in 1974. One poster was taken as proof that Wang had opposed provincial leaders Xu Jiatun and Peng Chong after the Cultural Revolution. He was categorized into the group of people who “committed general political mistakes” (犯有一般政治错误) and dismissed from his position in October 1978. 67 Wang Chunnan provided more details in a published article. See Wang Chunnan, “Wenge zhong pipan qingcha wu yao liu yundong” “文革”中批判清查“五·一六”运动 [The Campaign of Criticizing and Investigating May 16 Counterrevolutionaries during the Cultural Revolution], Shiji, no. 01 (2015): 23–27. 68 Dong and Walder, “Nanjing’s ‘Second Cultural Revolution.’”


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Wang’s superiors, with the surname Fan, led the campaign to Ferret out May 16

Counterrevolutionaries at Nanjing University. Fan’s implementation of the campaign

generated thousands of cases that were later determined to be unjust.69 In his 1974 posters,

Wang criticized provincial leaders and his superiors for the serious consequences caused by

the campaign. As a result of this criticism, according to Wang, Fan then directed criticism at

him and distorted his previous words, accusing him of using the posters to attack the

provincial leaders Peng Chong and Xu Jiatun. In Wang’s opinion, Fan did so in order to cover

up his own mistakes and distance himself from past violence. Wang further noted that he had

helped a Nanjing factional leader submit a complaint letter to the Center against Xu Jiatun in

early 1976; he believed this also contributed to the accusations against him. “[The complaint

letter] was in fact a petition letter. I wanted to petition. [However] the petition letter was

taken as a crime for investigation!”70 As a result, Wang stated, Xu personally called for an

investigation into him in 1977. Wang’s detailed description of his superiors’ past actions

attributed accusations made against him to personal conflicts. He claims innocence and

clearly feels betrayed by his superiors.

Wang also suggested that the allocation of accountability for the Cultural Revolution

adopted “double standards” for different groups of people. He deemed it unfair that Fan did

not receive any punishment for his past wrongdoing afterwards, stating: “Fan caused a large

number of unjust cases at Nanjing University, he was accountable. However, he was not only

not investigated but also led the investigation at Xinhua Daily [after the Cultural Revolution].

He investigated me.” In this sense, Wang suggested that the Investigation Campaign not only

failed to address the issue of responsibility but also caused further disputes among Cultural

Revolution participants.

Wang provided such detailed descriptions of the past in the interview that it seemed he

was trying to both clear his name and restore the dignity that his accusers had taken from

him. Wang wrote, “I was dragged on stage, shamed in public (台前示众), and forced to ‘bend

my head and admit my guilt’ (低头认罪).”71 In his autobiography, Wang further outlines this

loss of dignity: “The CCP’s political campaigns always grind people down. They can never ever

69 Ding, “Yuanyu biandi de Jiangsu sheng qingcha wu yao liu yundong,” 318–20. 70 Wang, Interview, November 16, 2016. 71 Wang, “1976 nian 10 yue yihou de qingcha yundong he ‘bo luan fan zheng’ (tanhua tigang),” 2.


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stand up again… In this country, ordinary people are trampled underfoot like grass.”72 This

criticism and his later encounters destroyed Wang’s sense of dignity. As Spakowski notes,

even Party supporters sometimes give particular significance to detailed descriptions in which

they subtly engage with and destabilize the established truths of the Party history without

rejecting them outright in their autobiographical writing. 73 This technique is particularly

obvious in the autobiographical writing of the outcast. Wang recounted his past in his

autobiography to subvert the “truth” established in the official narrative. In particular, Wang’s

doubting of Fan’s integrity was an attempt to restore his own, which he felt had been taken

away when he was officially labeled as a perpetrator.

Most of my interviewees attributed their accusations to the former Jiangsu leader Xu

Jiatun, who they had attacked during the Cultural Revolution. They accused Xu of persecuting

them for the sake of personal revenge and they frequently portrayed him as a “double-dealer”

(两面派). Xu was First Secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee between 1977 and

1983. In 1990, Xu Jiatun fled the country and self-exiled to America over his disagreement

with the Center’s suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. 74 My interviewees all

mentioned Xu’s exile. They obviously considered criticizing Xu to be politically safe because

he had been expelled from the Party and became a fugitive. One interviewee took this a step

further, citing Xu’s exile as a reason to rehabilitate his past victims. He stated: “Xu Jiatun

escaped to America, and the [central] verdict [on his exile] was ‘betraying the Party and the

country (叛党叛国).’ However, people who Xu persecuted have still not been rehabilitated

(许家屯走了，去了美国，当时的结论是叛党叛国，但也没有平反受他迫害的人).”75 My

interviewees thereby seem to use Xu’s “betrayal” to imply that the Party should recognize he

had persecuted them and, as such, their verdicts should be reversed.

My interviewees sometimes employed the stories of others to express their sense of

betrayal. Qu Xueshi, a student rebel leader at Nanjing University, exemplified his perspective

with a story of Zeng Banyuan, his ally at the university and a main rebel leader in Jiangsu. Qu

72 Wang Chunnan, “buzai shensu” 不再申诉 [No More Petitions], in Memoirs of Wang Chunnan, Unpublished, n.d. The part of Wang’s memoir is provided to the author by Wang Chunnan himself. 73 Spakowski, “Destabilising the Truths of Revolution.” 74 Xu Jiatun, Xu Jiatun Xianggang huiyilu 許家屯香港回憶錄 [Xu Jiatun’s Memoirs] (Hong Kong: Xianggang lianhe bao youxian gongsi, 1993). 75 Qu, Interview.


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noted that Zeng had loyally supported provincial leaders during the Cultural Revolution.

Following the downfall of the Gang of Four, Zeng Bangyuan was labeled a key follower of the

Gang of Four in Jiangsu and on December 29, 1979 and sentenced to 16 years’

imprisonment.76 From Qu’s perspective, the previous provincial leaders should not have

allowed Zeng to receive such a heavy. “Zeng Bangyuan was a sacrificial victim of politics. I feel

sad looking back on the past (曾邦元是个政治牺牲品，回忆起来很令人心酸 ).”77 In

expressing his sympathy for Zeng, Qu demonstrates a strong sense of betrayal by superiors.

In a few cases, former superiors actually protected those labeled as perpetrators. During

the campaign of Exposing, Criticizing, and Investigating the Gang of Four, five rebel leaders

were singled out as main followers of the Gang in Suzhou, including Shi Zhaoxiang, Hua Linsen,

and Wang Yongzhu, etc. (Chapter 1). Comparatively speaking, Shi, Hua, and Wang held higher

ranks and played more of a leading role than the other two. However, although Shi Zhaoxiang

and Wang Yongzhu were expelled from the Party, they were exempted from criminal

sanctions, while the remaining three were expelled and in 1979 sentenced to 18, 15 and seven

years in prison.78 According to one interviewee, Shi and Wang were exempted because they

received protection from their former superior, Xiang Xiaoshu, Commander of the 79 Division

in the Suzhou garrison and Director of the Suzhou Municipal Revolutionary Committee

between 1968 and 1969.79 Xiang was unhappy with the investigation into rebel leaders and

defended Shi and Wang in front of local leaders, stating that the military representatives in

Suzhou, rather than rebel leaders, were responsible for what had occurred during the Cultural

Revolution. Under Xiang’s protection, Shi and Wang avoided legal responsibility and received

lighter sanctions than the other labeled perpetrators in the region.

A large number of those labeled as perpetrators were left deeply disappointed and

pessimistic about politics. They felt that they had been used and then scapegoated. According

to my interviewees, these labeled perpetrators tend to maintain silence or to be less willing

to retell their past. For example, Yang Jun, a student who became a rebel leader in Suzhou,

76 Nanjing shi Gulou qu renmin fayuan, “Zeng Banyuan fangeming an Nanjing shi Gulou qu renmin fayuan xingshi panjueshu” 曾邦元反革命案南京市鼓楼区人民法院刑事判决书 [Nanjing City Gulou District People’s Court’s Written Judgment on Zeng Bangyuan Counterrevolutionary Case] (The Maoist Legacy, December 29, 1979), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/2333. 77 Qu, Interview. 78Chen and Suzhou shi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Suzhou shi zhi, 1:59. 79 Lu, Interview.


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was accused of being responsible for a death during the Cultural Revolution and was

imprisoned in 1968. He stated that, “The majority of us do not talk about [the Cultural

Revolution] anymore. It is pointless. It is difficult to say who was right and who was wrong (多

数都不谈了，没意思了。谁对谁错，很难说呀！ ).”80 Another former rebel likewise

simply refused to recollect the past in public: “[I] know now what politics are. It is pointless

to talk about the past. (知道政治是怎么回事了,谈过去没什么用).”81 She considered that

she had paid for criticizing and struggling against old cadres by being expelled from the Party

and excluded from power. She called it “getting even” (扯平了).

These narratives ultimately highlight the issue of individual responsibility for following

orders during the Cultural Revolution. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, those designated as

Cultural Revolution perpetrators, alongside other political groups, heatedly debated this topic

when they were being subjected to criminal punishment (Chapter 4). At present, many of

those labeled as perpetrators still consider it unfair that the authorities blamed them for so

many past wrongdoings and they feel betrayed by their superiors and, more generally, the

Party-state. This is one reason why disagreement emerges whenever the legacy of the

Cultural Revolution resurfaces with in society, such as through public apologies. As I discuss

below, public opinions remain rather divergent.

5.4 Remorse

In the wake of the Cultural Revolution, local authorities organized apologies to victims

and reconciliation between rival factional members at local levels in Jiangsu (Chapter 1).

Apology and repentance have been an ongoing topic of public discussion since the official end

of the Cultural Revolution. Particularly in recent years, a few former Cultural Revolution

participants have voluntarily apologized in public to those who suffered as a result of their

past actions. From the perspective of these participants, public remorse and apologies are a

way of coming to terms with what they did, reflecting on the Cultural Revolution, and

ultimately promoting reconciliation within Chinese society. However, the complexity of

Cultural Revolution violence has led to mixed public reactions over public displays of remorse.

Public apologies and expressions of remorse have evoked heated discussion in which the

80 Yang, Interview. 81 Wang, Interview, November 22, 2016.


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issues of truth (真相), reflection (反思), and reconciliation (和解) are at the center. The issue

of remorse becomes even more complex when it comes to those officially labeled as

perpetrators.

Intellectuals were among the first to begin public discussions. 82 For example,

immediately after the Cultural Revolution, Ba Jin (巴金) frankly admitted to his part in the

Cultural Revolution, urging the entire nation to repent (全民共忏悔).83 Feng Jicai (冯骥才), a

pioneer in Scar Literature, advertised for contributions in a newspaper in 1986 and received

over four thousand letters, a strong demonstration that ordinary people wished for their

experience be publicly recognized. However, Feng wrote, “Repentance was something I had

been looking forward to during my oral history interviews, because for a long time I had

encountered all the victims and none of the penitents, and this made me worried.”84 At the

time, in contrast to the storytelling of sufferings, confessions of Cultural Revolution violence

were largely absent.

In the 1990s, intellectual debates about whether individuals should repent of their

actions during the Cultural Revolution also attracted much public attention. Starting in the

late 1990s, the cultural critics Yu Jie (余杰) and Yu Qiuyu (余秋雨) began a long-running

dispute about remorse for Yu Qiuyu’s acts during the Cultural Revolution. Yu Qiuyu was a

member of a writing group that produced criticism articles against campaign targets during

the Cultural Revolution. 85 The debate between them continued for years. 86 Many more

intellectuals joined in and debated about whether Yu Qiuyu should apologize for his actions.

82 Li Li gave an overview of the existing accounts about the Cultural Revolution in her book, see Li Li, Memory, Fluid Identity, and the Politics of Remembering: The Representations of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in English-Speaking Countries (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 7–20. 83 Ba Jin, Suixiang lu 随想录 [A Collection of Random Thoughts] (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1980). 84 Feng, Yi bai ge ren de shi nian, 4. 85 For more information on writing groups during the Cultural Revolution, see Ding Dong, “Wenge xiezuozu xingshuai lu” 文革写作组兴衰录 [The Rise and Fall of Cultural Revolution Writing Teams], Dangshi bolan, no. 19 (2005): 4–11; Yin Jiamin, “Wenhua da geming zhong de Liang Xiao, Luo Siding xiezuozu” “文化大革命”中的梁效、罗思鼎写作组 [The Liang Xiao and Luo Siding Writing Teams during the Cultural Revolution], Dangshi bolan, no. 10 (2004): 30–37. For decoding the pseudonyms and the system of writing groups, see Tsai, Wen-Hsuan and Kao, Peng-Hsiang, “Secret Codes of Political Propaganda: The Unknown System of Writing Teams,” The China Quarterly 214 (2013): 394–410. 86 Yu Jie, “Yu Qiuyu, ni weihe bu chanhui?” 余秋雨，你为何不忏悔？ [Yu Qiuyu, Why Don’t You Repent?], Dawutai, no. 1 (2000): 54–63; Yu Qiuyu, “Da Yu Jie xiansheng” 答余杰先生 [Reply to Yu Jie], Zhongguo xinwen zhoukan, no. 3 (2000); Yu Jie, “women you zui, women chanhui - jian da Yu Qiuyu xiansheng ‘da Yu Jie xiansheng’” 我们有罪，我们忏悔——兼答余秋雨先生《答余杰先生》 [We Are Guilty, We Repent: Reply to Yu Qiuyu’s “Reply to Yu Jie”], Shehui kexue luntan, no. 4 (2000): 21–30.


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This polemic attracted much public attention to the issue of reflection and remorse.87

The most recent trend of public apology began around 2008 when a sent-down youth

named Wang Keming (王克明) issued a public apology in the journal Yanhuang Chunqiu for

his beating of a peasant named Gu Zhiyou (古志有).88 The journal began a section called

“Confession” and this set off a chain of public confessions and apologies in the following years.

In total, between 2008 and 2014 17 Cultural Revolution participants published articles in

Yanhuang Chunqiu apologizing and repenting for past wrongdoing.89 One of the most well-

known cases was Zhang Hongbing’s (张红兵) apology for reporting his mother and causing

her death during the Cultural Revolution. Zhang’s mother was accused of “malicious attacking”

(恶毒攻击) and executed in April 1970. Zhang expressed remorse in his articles: “I repent and

apologize to you [his mother]: it was me who sold you out and cut your head off with a

guillotine… If I could trade your valuable life with mine, I would die immediately.”90 As well as

admitting to his culpability, Zhang asserted that the Party-state should be held responsible

for his mother’s death.

Cultural Revolution participants also repented and apologized for past actions on other

platforms. A number of people published apologies for hurting others in the newspaper

Southern Weekly (南方周末). In 2010 a group of former students of the Beijing Foreign

Language School apologized to their teacher Cheng Bi (程璧) for attacking her during the

Cultural Revolution.91 Subsequently, a number of former Red Guards published apologies. On

87 For a number of public discussions, see Zhu Yong, “Yu Qiuyu, ni yongbuzhao chanhui le - gonghe Yu Jie yu Yu Qiuyu hejie” 余秋雨，你用不着忏悔了——恭贺余杰与余秋雨和解 [Yu Qiuyu, You Do Not Need to Repent: Congratulations to the Reconciliation between Yu Jie and Yu Qiuyu], Dawutai, no. 3 (2000): 14–16; Jiang Ni, “Ye tan chanhui - cong Yu Qiuyu de ‘bu chanhui’ shuo kai qu” 也谈忏悔——从余秋雨的“不忏悔”说开去 [Also Talking about Repentance: Starting from Yu Qiuyu’s “Non-Repenting”], no. 4 (2000): 31–34; Tao Dongfeng, “Yu Qiuyu de bu chanhui yu 80 hou de budong ‘Wenge’” 余秋雨的不忏悔与80后的不懂“文革” [Yu Qiuyu’s Non-Repenting and the After-80s Generation’s Ignorance of the Cultural Revolution], Dangdai wentan, no. 4 (2010): 4–6. 88 Wang Keming, “Wo da Gu Zhiyou” 我打古志有 [I Beat Gu Zhiyou], Yanhuang chunqiu, no. 05 (2008), http://www.yhcqw.com/69/2599.html. 89 All articles see “Chanhui lu,” Yanhuang Chunqiu, n.d., http://www.yhcqw.com/69/69_1.html; Liu Boqin, “Zhengzhong daoqian” 郑重道歉 [Sincerely Apologize], Yanhuang chunqiu, no. 6 (2013): 83. 90 Zhang Hongbin, “Meiyou dizhi de xin: gei wo de mama Fang Zhongmou” 没有地址的信——给我的妈妈方忠谋 [A Letter without Address: To My Mom Fang Zhongmou], Yanhuang chunqiu, no. 3 (2014), http://www.yhcqw.com/69/69_1.html. 91 Wang Youqin, “‘Dai le ge haotou’: hongweibin daoqian” “带了个好头”: 红卫兵道歉 [“Taking a Good Lead”: Red Guards Apologize], Southern Weekly, October 22, 2010, http://www.infzm.com/content/51494; Zhao Getu and Yang Jibin, “Lishi shenchu de laixin, si shi si nian hou zhongyu you hongweibin gongkai daoqian le” 历史深


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June 21, 2013, Song Jichao (宋继超) apologized to his middle school teacher for making false

accusations against him.92 Wang Gengxing (王庚星) issued an apology to a stranger he had

hurt during the Cultural Revolution.93 In 2014, dozens of Cultural Revolution participants

expressed remorse for having committed various wrongs in a book titled We Repent (我们忏

悔).94 The authors outline the consequences of the absence of remorse: “There are no crimes

in the public memory; only ‘Wang [Hongwen], Zhang [Chunqiao], Jiang [Qing], and Yao

[Wenyuan]’ are historically condemned.”95 The authors wanted to confess past truths and

seek forgiveness, however.

Among all the public repentance, Chen Xiaolu (陈小鲁) and Song Binbin’s (宋彬彬)

apologies for their wrongdoings attracted the most attention due to their status as children

of veterans Song Renqiong and Chen Yi, two of the eight founding generals of the PRC.96 In

January 2014, Song Binbin publicly apologized for the death of Bian Zhongyun (卞仲耘), Party

General Branch Secretary of the Beijing Normal Girls’ High School: “I am responsible for the

unfortunate death of Principal Bian... I tried to prevent the beating… I could not and it was

impossible to forcibly prevent the violence against Principal Bian and other school leaders.”97

Song acknowledged her responsibility and apologized for Bian’s death. Nonetheless, she also

emphasized the coercive political circumstances in which the violence took place. Song

claimed, “I never organized or participated in any types of violent activities at the early stage

of the Cultural Revolution, neither house raid, beating, nor intentionally hurting teachers and

处的来信四十四年后，终于有红卫兵公开道歉了 [A Letter from the Past: Some Red Guards Finally Apologize after 44 Years], Southern Weekly, November 10, 2010, http://www.infzm.com/content/52172. 92 Song Jichao, “wo ye lai dao ge qian” 我也来道个歉 [I Also Apologize], Southern Weekly, June 21, 2013, http://www.infzm.com/content/91592. 93 Wang Gengxing, “Shenmai zai xinli de daoqian” 深埋在心里的道歉 [The Apology Deep in My Heart], Southern Weekly, November 2, 2013, http://www.infzm.com/content/95650. 94 Wang and Song, Women chanhui. 95 Wang and Song, 4. 96 Shi Wei, “Duihua Chen Xiaolu: Wenge bu keneng zaixian” 对话陈小鲁: “文革”不可能再现 [Dialogue with Chen Xiaolu: The Cultural Revolution Will Never Come Back], Southern Weekly, October 31, 2013, http://www.infzm.com/content/95566; Perlez, Jane, “Decades After the Cultural Revolution, a Rare Letter of Remorse,” The New York Times, December 6, 2013, https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/06/decades-after-the-cultural-revolution-a-rare-letter-of-remorse/; Buckley, Chris, “Bowed and Remorseful, Former Red Guard Recalls Teacher’s Death,” The New York Times, January 13, 2014, https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/13/bowed-and-remorseful-former-red-guard-recalls-teachers-death/. 97 Song Binbin, “Wo de fansi” 我的反思 [My Reflections], Remembrance 106, no. 1 (January 15, 2014): 31–37.


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classmates.”98 Song neither considered herself a perpetrator nor disclosed who had killed

Bian.

Her apology sparked public debates.99 Some consider public apologies important for

opening up a public discussion about the Cultural Revolution and prompting the Party to

reflect on accountability. They regard public remorse as a critical step towards social

reconciliation. However, in this case, some people also criticized Song’s apology, suggesting

it was insincere and defensive.100 Bian’s husband, for example, rejected the apology and

called Song “hypocritical.”101 Meanwhile, erstwhile rebels took the opportunity to criticize

high-ranking cadres’ offspring.102 If a public apology is deemed insufficient, it is unlikely to

bring about reconciliation between different parties, and can sometimes widened the divide

in society.

All of the above-mentioned Cultural Revolution participants who offered public apologies

or expressed remorse for past wrongdoing were never officially identified as perpetrators.

The fact that they were exempted from accountability was one of the reasons for the

divergent public reactions to their apologies. The majority did not receive any significant

punishment in the years following the Cultural Revolution. In particular, the children of high-

ranking cadres not only evaded any responsibility for past actions, they also still enjoy a

privileged social and political status in the post-Mao period. As Wang Keming, one of the

editors of We Repent, stated:

Following the Gang of Four trials, the initiators of the Cultural Revolution did not take

responsibility and we, who had been infinitely loyal to the initiators during the

98 Song. 99 Wu Di categorized responses to Song Binbin’s apology into five groups: approval, rejection, criticism, insufficiency, and elaboration. For more information, see Wu Di (Qizhi), “Song Binbin daoqian zhihou” 宋彬彬道歉之后 [After Song Binbin’s Apology], New York Times (Chinese), July 17, 2014, https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20140717/cc17sbb/. For an in-depth analysis on public reactions, see Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne and Cui, Jinke, “Whodunnit? Memory and Politics before the 50th Anniversary of the Cultural Revolution,” The China Quarterly 227 (September 2016): 734–51. 100 Wu, “Song Binbin daoqian zhihou.” 101 “Wenge shouhai xiaozhang zhangfu jueshou daoqian, chize Song Binbin xuwei” 文革受害校长丈夫拒受道歉，斥责宋彬彬虚伪 [The Husband of the Victimized Principal during the Cultural Revolution Refused Song Binbin’s Apology and Denounced Her Being Hypercritical], sina.com, February 1, 2014, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/p/2014-02-01/142129388421.shtml. 102 Weigelin-Schwiedrzik and Cui, “Whodunnit?”


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Cultural Revolution, were also not held responsible. All [accountabilities] were wiped

away and everyone moved on with light hearts.”103

Without any taint on their political profiles, alongside their protected political identity, this

group of Cultural Revolution participants can initiate public apologies and call for collective

remembering.

The issue of public remorse is much more complex for those assigned the label of

perpetrator. Most of my interviewees focused on their “suffering” following the downfall of

the Gang of Four and deemed it unjust that they were removed from power. No one I spoke

to accepted the identity of “perpetrator.” Instead, they tended to consider themselves as

victims. The controversy over their roles in the Cultural Revolution made my interviewees’

attitudes towards public apology ambiguous. Despite, or perhaps because of having been

labeled as perpetrators, they did not express any remorse during the interviews.

Instead, the labeled perpetrators constantly suggested that their verdicts should be

reversed and they deemed them unjust and demanded an improvement in their living

conditions. For example, after dismissed from his position, Wang Chunnan repeatedly wrote

to provincial and central leaders to voice his grievances, but to no effect. He refused to work

in a factory and instead took paid leave. In 1983, Wang obtained a job at a publishing house

as an editor. Other interviewees also noted that many labeled perpetrators continue to

petition the government and demand better treatment. By emphasizing their suffering,

labeled perpetrators remain unlikely to express remorse in public, regardless of any past

wrongdoing.

In fact, even when in cases where one of my interviewees took a limited degree of

responsibility for past wrongdoings, this was done without remorse. For example, Shi

Zhaoxiang admitted his own culpability in the wrongdoings committed by his subordinates

because he had been their leader. He stated that, “If the Center regarded seizing power (夺

权) as ‘usurping Party and state power,’ yes, I did that (power seizure) during the Cultural

Revolution. I do not want to argue that.”104 Jiang Kaiming also asserted that as a rebel leader

he was partly responsible, but not for everything: “[My participation] is not deniable and

103 Wang, “Wo da Gu Zhiyou.” 104 Shi Zhaoxiang, Interview (Suzhou, September 10, 2017).


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occurred in reality, but it is forgivable.”105 Both of these former leaders insisted that the Party-

state should be the actor held accountable for the Cultural Revolution; neither regretted

having participated in the events that transpired.106 Although they were once Party cadres,

they tend to view themselves as outcasts today and therefore not a part of the Party-state

apparatus. Similar to Zhang Hongbin’s claim that the authorities were primarily responsible

for his mother’s execution, Shi and Jiang developed a sense of personal guilt, but even more

so, they believed that the CCP as a collective, and especially the leadership, should bear the

main burden of responsibility.

Conclusion

This chapter highlights the complex and divergent narratives provided by those officially

labeled as perpetrators in relation to their participation in the Cultural Revolution and the

issue of individual accountability for state violence. Some of those labeled as perpetrators

deny their past actions; some heroically portray their past; others express a sense of betrayal

by their superiors and are enthusiastic about telling their side of the story. They carefully

recount their pasts through diverging narratives of denial, amnesia, heroism, and betrayal,

and they often portray themselves as victims of politics. They refuse to accept the blame for

the Cultural Revolution or the label of perpetrator, and they disclaim personal responsibility

for the violence that occurred in the state-sponsored political movement. When narrating

their pasts, they tend to remove this political label and attempt to end the historical

condemnation they receive in official accounts so as to restore their own dignity. From their

perspective, they were simply following state orders and therefore should not be held

responsible, or at least not entirely responsible, for the violence that occurred. They hold the

CCP and their superiors responsible. They condemn those who remained in power despite

having committed serious crimes during the Cultural Revolution. For them, injustice and

partiality were features of the process of transitional justice within the Chinese context.

A few Cultural Revolution participants who have never been officially labeled as

perpetrators have reflected upon their wrongdoing during the Cultural Revolution and

expressed remorse, issuing public apologies. Proponents consider this type of public remorse

105 Jiang, Interview. 106 Shi, Interview, September 10, 2017. Jiang and Shi are now friends and maintain close contact.


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and apology as “soul-searching” within Chinese society.107 They have highlighted that their

guilty conscience drives them to apologize. Remorse offers them the possibility of closure.

Some authors have called for a collective reflection upon the Cultural Revolution so that a

similar situation never occurs again. The appeal for public apologies shows that there is a

demand for social reconciliation that transcends the fate of individuals. However, public

apologies also raise questions. Victims who receive apologies may regard them insincere,

manipulative, and defensive. Moreover, the number of people who have repented falls

extremely short of the number of recognized victims. The majority of those involved in

Cultural Revolution violence – including some of my interviewees – remain silent or reject the

need to apologize. Finally, the Party-state continuously and strictly controls public discussion

of the Cultural Revolution. In these circumstances, public remorse is far from able to settle

accounts with the past.

107 For example, on the cover of a book titled We Repent, it writes, “Remorse is to save my soul and forgiveness is to save his humanity.” For more details, see Wang and Song, Women chanhui.

Conclusion: Making and Unmaking Perpetrators

The post-Mao leadership dealt with a major problem in the aftermath of the Cultural

Revolution: determining who had committed crimes and who it was politically justifiable to

place outside of power. Which group, or individual, could be held accountable for the

wrongdoing without dividing the Party as a political community? The CCP’s responses to these

questions decided which offenses were punishable and therefore worthy of prosecution.

They also determined who the CCP could blame and punish for Cultural Revolutionary

violence. In this context, the authorities designated the Gang of Four Clique as the

perpetrators, while the Party, the state, and the people became their victims. However, the

study of Jiangsu shows that the local authorities often disagreed with central policies on the

questions of who should be punished for the Cultural Revolution and how. The designated

perpetrators in Jiangsu also strongly resisted blame. Therefore, blame being placed on the

Gang of Four Clique entailed a lengthy process of negotiation and compromise among Party

and state authorities at every level, between superiors and subordinates, and between the

authorities and individuals. In the early 1980s, responding to the changing central policies,

the Jiangsu authorities redressed a large number of decisions on previously designated

perpetrators. The post-Mao leadership ultimately confined punishment to a small number of

the Gang of Four Clique and exempted the rest. This strategy, or the doctrine of superior

responsibility in legal terms, enabled the CCP to absolve the majority from responsibility and

advance the transition to order and peace in the short term.

Alongside the question of who was held accountable for the Cultural Revolution, it is

necessary to consider who was not. Although selective punishment is a common feature of

transitional justice in post-conflict societies, the scale of punishment in Jiangsu was relatively

minor compared to the crimes committed during the Cultural Revolution. The local

authorities were dealing with large-scale violence and atrocities committed in the recent past.

Political status also sometimes determined individual responsibility, instead of the gravity of

crimes. In particular, veteran cadres and their offspring absolved themselves from

responsibility and reasserted their privileges. In court, Jiang Qing questioned the prosecutors’

part in the Cultural Revolution and accused the leaders persecuting her of also committing


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crimes.1 Her words rang closer to the truth that might have been uncomfortable for many:

the Cultural Revolutionary violence was not perpetrated by a few select ringleaders; it was

instead a result of state violence. However, the post-Mao leadership waived the responsibility

of the majority of those who were heavily involved in the violence. Many serious crimes

remain unpunished. The selective attribution of accountability caused serious difficulties in

addressing the recent violent past and sometimes backfired. The Jiangsu authorities had to

repeatedly recategorize and redefine previously designated perpetrators in the 1980s.

The post-Mao leadership’s addressing of the perpetrators converged with the transition

from Maoist campaign-style politics to a law-based rule. The CCP first employed political

campaigns to criticize the Gang of Four and form the notions of perpetrator and victim among

the public. Ousting the Gang of Four was not simply a result of the extension of Cultural

Revolution-style political struggle and purges. The scale of purges was limited and less violent.

The post-Mao leadership also officially abolished political campaign techniques and shifted

its political focus away from continuous class struggle to modernization and economic growth.

However, the campaign approach led to the legitimacy of this blaming being questioned.

Jiangsu cadres even compared the investigation of the Gang of Four Clique to the political

persecutions during the Cultural Revolution. The CCP leadership thus turned to law and Party

discipline to address Cultural Revolutionary violence.

The transition bore the imprint of the 1950s, but also transcended this. The legal reform

in the 1950s provided a useful repository of past experiences for the post-Mao leaders.

Jiangsu cadres intuitively called on their previous experiences of redressing violence and

injustices deriving from political campaigns in the early Maoist era. However, such large-scale

punishment and rehabilitation was unprecedented in Party history. For example, the CCP not

only redressed past wrongs originating from the Cultural Revolution, but also from periods

prior to this. By 1980, the CCP had rehabilitated 30 million people who fell into the categories

of unjust, false, and mistaken cases. Including their family members, the redressing of unjust,

false, and mistaken cases involved over a billion people, one ninth of the population in China

at the time.2 As a response to the past wrongs and violence, the authorities put over 20,000

1 Cook, The Cultural Revolution on Trial, 124–29. Jiang Qing made this statement at court on December 24 1980. The original script is only partly available online. 2 Liao Gailong, “Lishi de jiaoxun he muqian de renwu” 历史的教训和目前的任务 [Historical Lessons and Current Tasks], Zhonggong Shanxi shengwei dangxiao xuebao, no. 05 (1980): 36. In December 1978, Ye Jianying stated


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people on trial and subjected half a million to disciplinary sanctions.3

How successful was the post-Mao CCP in addressing the violent past in the process of

transition? If we compare this with former communist party states in the socialist bloc, the

CCP successfully maintained its power and underwent the transition from Maoist mass

campaign politics to Deng’s reform period. However, if we individually consider the goals of

transitional justice, answers to this question become highly complicated. Here, I will examine

the impact of post-Mao transitional justice from four angles: the claim to legitimacy; the

redefinition of justice; the rule of law; and social reconciliation. These approaches are not

necessarily exhaustive, but they aim to explain the Cultural Revolution’s continuing influence

on contemporary China.

The CCP’s claim to be the legitimate authority in post-Mao China was its most important

goal in the post-Mao transition.4 The consequences of the Cultural Revolution degraded the

CCP’s authority and legitimacy considerably. The CCP’s immediate legitimacy in the transition

rested largely on its responses to past violence and injustices. What kinds of injustice to

recognize and where to locate criminality and accountability for the Cultural Revolution was

a crucial issue for the CCP’s claim to legitimacy.5 By shifting the blame onto a select group of

perpetrators and restoring the legal system, the post-Mao leaders differentiated themselves

from the Gang of Four, and the CCP succeeded in maintaining power. However, the very

principles the CCP used to derive legitimacy challenged its authority. As a result of employing

the same investigation methods that had marked the Cultural Revolution, Jiangsu cadres and

designated perpetrators characterized the ousting of the Gang of Four Clique as a continued

at the Central Work Meeting that there were around 100 million people implicated (受牵连) during the Cultural Revolution. See Ye, “Zai zhongyang gongzuo huiyi bimuhui shang de jianghua,” 206. Another central leader, Feng Wenbin, asserted that 40 to 50 million people fell victim to the Cultural Revolution in December 1979. See Feng, “Feng Wenbin tongzhi zai quanguo jingwei gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua,” 20. 3 Gao, “Qingli ‘sanzhongren’ de qianqian houhou.” 4 Holbig and Gilley identify several sources of CCP’s legitimacy in the post-revolutionary regime, including economic performance, nationalism, ideology, culture, governance, and democracy. They argue there is a clear shift from an economic-nationalistic approach to a more ideological-institutional approach in recent years. See Holbig, Heike and Gilley, Bruce, “Reclaiming Legitimacy in China,” Politics & Policy 38, no. 3 (2010): 395–422; Holbig, Heike, “Ideology after the End of Ideology. China and the Quest for Autocratic Legitimation,” Democratization 20, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 61–81. 5 A large amount of scholarship argues that performance, particularly economic performance, constitutes the primary base of the Party-state legitimacy. See Yang, Hongxing and Zhao, Dingxin, “Performance Legitimacy, State Autonomy and China’s Economic Miracle,” Journal of Contemporary China 24, no. 91 (January 2, 2015): 64–82. Other scholars also argue that the post-Mao CCP maintains its legitimacy through economic performance, nationalism, ideology, culture, governance. See Holbig and Gilley, “Reclaiming Legitimacy in China.”


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power struggle. The campaign-style approach undermined the legitimacy of blaming. The

Jiangsu authorities, as well as the central leadership, were thus caught in a paradox of

struggling to claim their legitimacy by blaming the past on select perpetrators, whilst facing

the challenge of justifying this blame.

The CCP maintained its rule by addressing past wrongs and punishing the perpetrators.

Following the official acknowledgment of their suffering, surviving victims overwhelmingly

demanded the punishment of those who had harmed them. With waves of appeals and

petitions, it seemed that the approach of blaming the violent past on a select group was

unable to sufficiently address public grievances. Party and government authorities identified

violent perpetrators and subjected them to criminal, administrative, and disciplinary

sanctions. In this respect, the post-Mao redressing of accountability was more than

scapegoating. As Judith Shklar has argued, a legal system’s legitimacy does not rest simply on

its neutrality and objectivity, but on the appropriateness of the response to perceived

injustice.6 Therefore, in spite of its partiality and selectivity, the CCP’s political and legal

response to the violent past contributed to legitimating its rule in post-Mao China.

The post-Mao CCP also rested its legitimacy on a search for socialist legality, and

redefining justice and injustice was fundamental to this process. On the one hand, the post-

Mao leaders provided specific definitions of injustice and reversed identified wrongs. The

post-Mao authorities cleared the names of people who had suffered injustices, thereby

reversing millions of case verdicts. Immediately after the downfall of the Gang of Four, Jiangsu

judicial cadres resumed their efforts to investigate past wrongs. As the case of Li Xining

demonstrated, a previously defined perpetrator now became a hero. Local cadres based the

reversals on meticulous verification of evidence whilst dealing with waves of appeals and

reinvestigation.7 By investigating and correcting injustices, the post-Mao leadership tended

to establish procedures that were perceived as more just than those that came before. On

the other hand, the Party-state outlawed what had been a justified and established principle

of accountability for crimes. From the late stage of the Cultural Revolution, the CCP leadership

began to acknowledge wrongs caused by various political struggles during the movement, for

example, the redressing of May 16 Counterrevolutionary cases in Jiangsu in 1974-1975. The

6 Shklar, Judith N., The Faces of Injustice (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). 7 Review and rehabilitation also took place in other regions, see Leese, “Revising Political Verdicts in Post-Mao China”; Trevaskes, “People’s Justice and Injustice.”


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CCP ultimately illegitimated the Cultural Revolution in 1981. 8 What Mao Zedong had

announced – “to rebel is justified (造反有理),” a phrase that the Red Guards often used to

legitimize their activities during the Cultural Revolution – was now ruled to be illegal and

punishable. 9 Many former rebels now became perpetrators. The post-Mao leaders

reconstructed the definitions of justice and accountability. One stated intention of this was

to prevent future similar actions that could threaten the rule of the CCP. As Hua Guofeng put

it in 1979, the reconstruction of socialist legality aimed to “ensure that the political system no

longer has serious loopholes that conspirators such as Lin Biao and the Gang of Four can

exploit to carry out counterrevolutionary restoration.”10

The post-Mao leadership obviously meant to ensure that something like the Cultural

Revolution never occurred again, at least at the time. The Party-state thus put in place an

unprecedented amount of legislation, more than in any other period since 1949, and

launched practices of law dissemination nationwide.11 Responding to the call to address

Cultural Revolutionary crimes according to the law, Jiangsu courts put some designated

perpetrators on trial. Criminal trials were an important ingredient of post-Mao transitional

justice. The Party-state widely broadcasted the trials of the Gang of Four and their local

followers, with a view to rebuilding people’s perceptions of justice and creating a model for

legal practice in the post-Mao period. However, these trials were not just show trials; instead,

they served a didactic purpose and performed a strong authoritative function.12 The Jiangsu

authorities displayed representative defendants in court, sometimes in public sentencing

8 Zhonggong zhongyang, “Guanyu jianguo yilai ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi” 关于建国以来若干历史问题的决议 [Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China] (The Maoist Legacy, June 27, 1981), https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/356. 9 For example, the power seizures of rebels are portrayed as attack or destruction in local official history. In Shaanxi Party history, seizing power during the Cultural Revolution is directly declared illegal (非法). See Zhonggong Shaanxi shengwei zuzhibu, ed., Zhongguo gongchandang Shaanxi sheng zuzhishi ziliao 中国共产党陕西省组织史资料 [Chinese Communist Party Shaanxi Province Organization History Materials] (Xi’an: Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 1994), 525–39. 10 Hua, “1979 nian Guowuyuan zhengfu gongzuo baogao-1979 nian 6 yue 18 ri zai di wu jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di er ci huiyi shang.” 11 Altehenger, Legal Lessons. 12 When discussing the role of criminal trials in dealing with past atrocities, legal scholars and historians attributed great transformative potentials to such trials. Douglas even argues that legal responses to extraordinary crimes like the Holocaust must take the form of show trials that serve both the interest of justice as conventionally conceived and the broader didactic purpose of serving history and memory. See Douglas, Lawrence, The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust (Yale University Press, 2001). For the didactic function of the Gang of Four Trial, see Cook, “China’s Gang of Four Trial.”


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rallies attended by thousands of people, to deter and control local opponents and their

sympathizers. The law was thus instrumental in addressing the violent past and exhibiting

state power. The CCP intended to replace the political violence of the Cultural Revolution with

socialist law and order.

However, the role of criminal trials was limited in addressing past violence. The central

leadership imposed political constraints on the prosecution of those involved in the Cultural

Revolution and criminal prosecution was limited among veteran cadres. As in many post-

conflict societies, the law could not make sense of the mass violence with enough clarity and

precision in the processes of transitional justice.13 This issue is mainly related to the process

of using new laws to try past crimes. Local reactions to the application of newly-enacted laws

to past crimes varied; Jiangsu cadres chose not to enact the new laws when trying past crimes

in order to avoid the issue of retroactivity. The complex issue of retroactive law was an

obstacle to applying the law in prosecuting Cultural Revolutionary crimes. The CCP was also

incapable of controlling public uses and interpretations of law within its carefully outlined

framework, posing significant challenges to deriving political legitimacy from legal reform.14

The limitations of law are noticeable in dealing with a violent past.

Seeking political legitimacy from legal reform is challenging. The proclamation of socialist

legality has not led to a transition to a rule-of-law society. Instead, this campaign-style law

implementation has constantly recurred since the early 1980s in China. Between 1983 and

1986, only four years after the central leadership officially abolished the use of campaigns,

judicial sectors again employed a campaign-style approach, the so-called Strike Hard

campaign (“严打”), to control the surging crime rate. 15 This anti-crime approach is still

present in today’s public security and crime control in China.16 The lack of rule of law and the

13 Osiel, Making Sense of Mass Atrocity. 14 Altehenger, Legal Lessons; Potter, Pitman B., “Riding the Tiger: Legitimacy and Legal Culture in Post-Mao China,” The China Quarterly, no. 138 (1994): 325–58. 15 On the topic of Yanda, see Tanner, Strike Hard! Anti-Crime Campaign and Chinese Criminal Justice, 1979-1985; Trevaskes, Policing Serious Crimes in China: From ‘Strike Hard’ to ‘Kill Fewer.’ 16 The Ministry of Public Security of China still considerably conducts the practice of Yanda nowadays. For example, the ministry called upon to severely crack down gambling nationwide. A national Yanda campaign also took place in 2010, targeting gun crimes, prostitution, gambling, and drugs. For more details, see The Ministry of Public Security, “Gong’anbu bushu quanguo zhi’an xitong shenru kaizhan yanda zhengzhi huodong” 公安部部署全国治安系统深入开展严打整治活动 [The Ministry of Public Security Deploys the National Security System to Carry out In-Depth Strike-Hard and Crackdown Actions], June 2010, https://www.mps.gov.cn/n2255053/n5147059/c5164102/content.html.


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Party-state’s supremacy over law remain the biggest challenges to the CCP’s legitimacy.17

Another common goal of transitional justice mechanisms is to reconcile a society that has

been divided by various conflicts. In response to the society being divided by factional

struggles during the Cultural Revolution,18 the Jiangsu authorities made concerted efforts to

let “bygones be bygones” and move forward into the future. However, the divide remains.

Some issues are still unresolved and controversial regarding the Cultural Revolution. Various

groups compete to narrate their own past, often posing counternarratives to the official

narrative outlined in the 1981 Resolution. 19 These groups manipulate historical

reconstructions to advance their various political agendas.

Firstly, the designated perpetrators, including my interviewees, contest and challenge

the state’s historical account and question the legitimacy of the blame cast on them. Although

the blame cast on the Gang of Four Clique seems to stand in official history, neither the

selected perpetrators nor the victims consider this blame fair. The designated perpetrators

believe that they have been scapegoated for state crimes and they too are victims of the

Cultural Revolution. They nonetheless experience life-long political stigma. Thus, the

deliberate selectivity of the blame has been unable to settle accounts with the violent past,

instead further provoking disputes among the blamed group. In fact, public debates over the

level of responsibility the Gang of Four should assume rarely take center stage. Instead, some

people portray Jiang Qing as a martyr and the Gang of Four as heroes.20

Secondly, opinions vary as to individual roles – victim or perpetrator – in the Cultural

Revolution. Jiangsu’s case shows that whether individuals are officially recognized victims,

selected perpetrators, or rebel participants in the Cultural Revolution, they all tend to portray

themselves as victims of the Cultural Revolution and strive for power in the discourse about

the past. Memories of the Cultural Revolution have thus become a “battleground” for various

17 Gore, Lance L. P., “The Communist Party-Dominated Governance Model of China: Legitimacy, Accountability, and Meritocracy,” Polity 51, no. 1 (January 1, 2019): 161–94; Potter, Pitman B., “The Chinese Legal System: Continuing Commitment to the Primacy of State Power,” The China Quarterly, no. 159 (1999): 673–83. 18 Wu, Yiching, The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2014); Walder, Andrew G., Fractured Rebellion: The Beijing Red Guard Movement (Cambridge (MA) and London: Harvard University Press, 2009). 19 Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, “Coping with the Cultural Revolution”; Yang, Guobin, “‘A Portrait of Martyr Jiang Qing’: The Chinese Cultural Revolution on the Internet,” in Re-Envisioning the Chinese Revolution: The Politics and Poetics of Collective Memories in Reform China, ed. Lee, Ching Kwan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 287–316. 20 Yang, “‘A Portrait of Martyr Jiang Qing’: The Chinese Cultural Revolution on the Internet.”


237

groups.21 In contrast, individuals are rarely willing to assume the label of perpetrator. Today,

some designated perpetrators continue to demand case reversals and better political and

financial treatment.22 The accounts of my interviewees further suggest that even if a Cultural

Revolution participant admits wrongdoing, he or she insists that they acted on state orders

and refuses to regard themself as a perpetrator.23 The fact that the responsibility of veteran

cadres and the military has never been addressed arouses further controversy. 24 The

widespread participation in the Cultural Revolution suggests a harsh reality, as Friedman

states: “It is closer to the truth to remember that all were perpetrators than to remember all

as victims.”25

Thirdly, there are disputes between victims and their victimizers. The question of where

to locate accountability also concerns those who suffered during the Cultural Revolution. The

study of Jiangsu demonstrates that most individual victims were inclined to blame those who

directly inflicted suffering on them, rather than placing responsibility on the Gang of Four

Clique. In Qiu’s case, introduced at the start of the dissertation, surviving victims demanded

a death penalty.26 They also expressed their discontent with Qiu’s unapologetic attitude,

condemning him for showing no remorse and feigning ignorance in court. “Even if he could

just say ‘[I] hurt your family terribly,’ we would feel better.” 27 A post-conflict society

potentially risks cycles of counterviolence if punishment of crimes is largely absent. The

21 Weigelin-Schwiedrzik and Cui, “Whodunnit?” 22 For example, in Henan and Yunnan provinces, designated perpetrators repeatedly file petitions to the central government and utter their discontent with being punished for the Cultural Revolution. See Zhang Guolao et al., “Henan shu qian gongchandangyuan de yuan’an weihe bu runxu shensu” 河南数千共产党员的冤案为何不允许申诉 [Why Thousands of Party Members in Henan Are Not Allowed to Appeal for Their Unjust Cases?], April 10, 2018, http://www.hongqi.tv/xywch/2018-04-15/12845.html; “Henan wenge ‘liang’an’ qingcha renyuan zhi quanguo renda zhengxie de gongkaixin” 河南文革“两案”清查人员致全国人大政协的公开信 [An Open Letter to the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference from the Investigated in the “Two Cases” Resulting from the Cultural Revolution in Henan], February 19, 2011, http://www.difangwenge.org/read.php?tid=6052&displayMode=1; Yun Renxiang, “Yunnan wenge laoren shangfang jishi” 云南文革老人上访纪实 [The Petition of the Elderly from the Cultural Revolution in Yunnan], July 26, 2013, http://difangwenge.org/simple/?t8840.html; “Yunnan jie pi cha tekun ruoshi qunti shi san nian weiquan qingkuang zongjie” 云南揭批查特困弱势群体十三年维权情况总结 [Summary of the 13-Year Defending the Rights of the Destitute and Vulnerable from the Campaign of Exposing, Criticizing, and Investigating in Yunnan], June 22, 2011, http://difangwenge.org/simple/?t6820.html. 23 Song, “Wo de fansi.” 24 Much research has shown the major role of the military in local conflicts, see Dong and Walder, “Forces of Disorder”; Xu Youyu, “Neizhan he shangshan xiaxiang” 内战和上山下乡 [Civil War and Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside], 2014, http://www.aisixiang.com/data/73230-3.html. 25 Friedman, “Modernity’s Bourgeoisie,” 93. 26 Liu, “Shenpan Wenge yi’an.” 27 Liu.


238

tension between victims and their victimizers, who often share the same workplace or

neighborhood, is still a potential danger that creates divides. The historical accounting against

the Gang of Four does not seem to ease this tension.

The post-Mao CCP leaders could not construct an authoritative narrative of the past.28

The official evaluation of the Cultural Revolution outlined in the 1981 Resolution has been

continuously contested. Some scholarship debates the nature of the Cultural Revolution and

distinguishes between “two Cultural Revolutions” – a top-down power struggle at the elite

level and a bottom-up social movement at the grassroots level.29 Some scholars defend the

Cultural Revolution by highlighting its positive effects in rural areas.30 The Maoist faction (毛

派), a rising force that promotes Maoist ideals of the Cultural Revolution in contemporary

China, seeks every opportunity to overturn the 1981 evaluation. 31 These diverse

interpretations of the Cultural Revolution reflect an unsettling past. The fact that the

government imposes strict limitations on public discussion of the Cultural Revolution further

creates new bias and affects public perceptions of the period. The Cultural Revolution has

thus become an open secret within Chinese society.32

From a local perspective and through a case study of Jiangsu Province, this study

examines the historical questions of who were designated perpetrators of the Cultural

Revolution and how. It describes the process of making and unmaking perpetrators in dealing

with the violent past and reveals continuous changing definitions of perpetrator. Changing

28 Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, “In Search of a Master Narrative for 20th-Century Chinese History.” 29 For more details and debates about the development of “two Cultural Revolution” theory, see Jin Chunming, “‘Liangge Wenge shuo’ yu ‘wenhua dageming’ de dingxing yanjiu” “两个文革说”与“文化大革命”的定性研究 [Qualitative Analysis on “the Two Cultural Revolutions Theory” and “the Cultural Revolution”], zhonggong dangshi yanjiu, no. 02 (1998): 61–67; Xu Youyu, “‘Liangge Wenge’ shuo: quanli douzheng haishi shehui chongtu?” “两个文革”说: 权力斗争还是社会冲突? [The “Two Cultural Revolutions” Theory: Power Struggle or Social Conflict?], 2011, http://www.aisixiang.com/data/45366.html. On the contrary, official scholars insist that there was only one Cultural Revolution. 30 Gao, Mobo, The Battle for China’s Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution (London; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2008); Han, Dongping, The Unknown Cultural Revolution: Life and Change in a Chinese Village (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 2000). 31 Weigelin-Schwiedrzik and Cui, “Whodunnit?” 32 I cite here my personal experience with absurdity concerning the topic of the Cultural Revolution as an example. In 2018, when I was traveling from Hong Kong to Shanghai, at the Shanghai border security, one officer in charge took away several books that I had bought in Hong Kong on the topic of the Cultural Revolution. While the superior was examining the books in their “small dark” room, I waited outside and chatted with other officers who were about in their thirties. I asked them why they examined these books, they somehow felt sorry for me and said: “Superiors (领导) still consider the Cultural Revolution sensitive, but who does not know about it! Everyone knows.”


239

central policies confronted local authorities with a long, iterative, and contentious process of

dealing with perpetrators. The study also addresses the political, social, and institutional

background to how the CCP dealt with Cultural Revolutionary violence, highlighting the

multiplicity of the perpetrator identity, the complex issue of responsibility for the Cultural

Revolution, and the historical origins of the issue of responsibility remaining highly

controversial today.

The significance of this study also lies in its relevance to the present. The diverging

opinions about responsibility for the Cultural Revolution remind us of an unsettling violent

past. The designated perpetrators have expressed discontent. The legacy of Cultural

Revolutionary violence is still present in society. The reform and opening up has brought

about a widening gap between rich and poor, and significant social inequalities. These factors

all contribute to growing disagreement about the role of the Cultural Revolution. Some views

are alarming. Many people present the Cultural Revolution in a favorable light and they have

developed a sense of nostalgia for the Maoist era.33 The official attitude to the Cultural

Revolution has also become ambiguous in recent years. In 2018, there were attempts to

change the evaluation of the Cultural Revolution – completely wrong – outlined in the 1981

Resolution.34 If we consider the reasons for the Cultural Revolution explained by the post-

Mao leadership in the 1981 Resolution, the current political conditions seem precarious. As

the personality cult of Xi Jinping continues to be built, the danger becomes more real. Yet

developing insight into the danger of the Cultural Revolution requires more public discussion

than the CCP leadership seems to tolerate. The question of responsibility for the Cultural

Revolution remains controversial, leaving the making and unmaking of the perpetrators an

unfinished and daunting task.

33 Weigelin-Schwiedrzik and Cui, “Whodunnit?” 34 For example, the history textbook changed the original version of “Mao Zedong wrongly believed that revisionism had emerged in the Party Central Committee and that the Party and the country faced the danger of capitalist restoration” in the Resolution to “Mao Zedong believed that the Party and the country faced the danger of capitalist restoration.” For a brief description of the controversy that followed the revision, see Zou, Mandy, “Controversy over Changes in Textbook’s Cultural Revolution Chapter,” South China Morning Post, January 11, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2127817/controversy-over-chinese-textbooks-cultural-revolution-chapter. The content about the Cultural Revolution in the history textbooks was changed twice more in 2019 and 2020, ultimately restoring the original assessment of the Cultural Revolution in the 1981 Resolution. See Lew, Linda, “New Chinese Textbook That Says Cultural Revolution Brought ‘Disaster’ on Country Stirs Debate about Historical Memory | South China Morning Post,” September 6, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3100389/new-chinese-textbook-says-cultural-revolution-brought-disaster.

Appendixes

Appendix 1

南京市中级人民法院，在复查纠错工作中，对反革命案件，主要是掌握以下政策界限，我们可以参照执

行。

1. 凡是精神病患者发病期间，或者在逼供信的法西斯审查方式的摧残下，精神失常者的言行，被

冤为反革命的一律改判，不按反革命论处，不追究刑事责任。

2. 凡是口误、笔误、说错话、喊错口号被当作反革命判刑的，一律宣告无罪，予以平反。

3. 犯无意损害领袖领袖像或处理不当被以侮辱领袖像按反革命定罪判刑的一律改判无罪释放。

4. 凡生产和科研过程中的难免失职或责任事故被以反革命破坏定性处刑的一律平反，即是因失职

而造成严重后果的也只能当成责任事故而不能视为反革命破坏。

5. 历史上问题已作过结论和处理的，又无新的罪行而被当作反革命重新处理的一律平反，有的因

说了错话，翻历史上老帐，定性处理不当的，也予以平反纠正。

6. 对确实在逼供信下被迫喊反动口号或写反动标语，被定为反革命的，要实事求是地予以平反或

改判，有些人表现一直很好，并无反革命的思想基础，但由于受不了逼供信的折磨，有的为了

创造条件进监狱，有的被毒刑拷打对党的政策产生怀疑和不满。如市建设局秘书张继深被法西

斯刑罚折磨得神志恍惚，求生不得，求死不成，为了创造条件进看守所，就喊反动口号，结果

被以“攻击无产阶级司令部”的反革命罪判刑，分析其作案动机，是为了逃避酷刑，而不是出

于反革命目的，故不以反革命论处，予以释放。

7. 凡是反对林彪、“四人帮”而被以反革命处刑的，一律宣告无罪释放。不少青年，文化大革命

中看不惯，有说他“阴险”，有说“鹰钩鼻子，秤砣心”等，如南京水泥制品厂技术员童庆仪

说：“林彪年轻时好【】，家里还有织布机。”被当作“攻击无产阶级司令部”的现行反革命

判刑，凡这类案件，一经发现，坚决平反。

8. 对其他刑事罪被当作反革命宣判的一律改变性质，减轻刑罚。南京铁路分局司炉胡得甫，怀疑

妻子作风有问题，将其殴打成伤，因女的是下放人员，就以破坏上山下乡的现行反革命罪判刑

7 年，经复查后，改为行凶打人，给予改判减刑。

9. 凡是偶尔传播反革命标语等，只要不是蓄意扩散，借以攻击，而被作为反革命处理的，应予以

改判或平反。栖霞区一青工对另一工人说，有个反革命用四句正面口号组成一句反动标语，说

着就用粉笔写在工作台上，结果被指控为书写反标判刑。经查确属好奇传谈，故宣判无罪。

10. 在文化大革命中，由于不了解路线斗争的情况，分不清路线记错了帐，既说了一些反对林彪、

“四人帮”的话，也说了一些不满的话，错误的话，怀疑的话，被定为反革命判刑的，不能当

做恶毒攻击处理，实事求是地给予改判、平反。

Source: [Nantong] shiwei changwei, shi geweihui fuzhuren Yang Jianlu tongzhi zai shi zhengfa ganbu huiyi shang

de jianghua (jilugao), October 15,1978, NMA, E237-121-55, 89-90.

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241

Appendix 2

从各级人民法院目前复查的情况看，这些冤、假、错案有以下几种类型：

一、因反对林彪、“四人帮”和为邓副主席遭诬陷迫害鸣不平而被判刑，以及因不了解党内斗争情况，

在议论林彪、“四人帮”时，发过某种怨言，说过某些错话而被定为恶毒攻击判刑的案件。……

二、把人民群众对某些干部不满、对党的某项政策不理解或由于个人利益未得到满足，在向上级写信，

或在自己书写的日记、文章、诗词中，写了一些对党、领袖和社会主义制度不满甚至谩骂言词的，当做

反革命“恶攻”而判刑的案件。

三、把人民群众由于疏忽大意写错字句、喊错口号或乱写乱划中形成反动字句，以及少年儿童由于年幼

无知而乱写、乱画有损于党和社会主义制度的反动字句而当做现行反革命予以判刑的案件。

四、对历史上的问题，过去已经交代，并已作过处理结论，且结论基本正确，“文化大革命”中未发现

新问题，又以老账新算而判了刑的案件。因出身不好，“文化大革命”中说过错话，做了错事或与干部、

群众打架斗殴被当做“阶级报复”而判刑的案件。

五、把一些精神病患者的胡言乱语定为反革命犯罪判刑的案件。……

Source: Zhonggong zhongyang, “批转中共最高人民法院党组关于抓紧复查纠正冤假错案、认真落实党的政

策的请示报告,” Database, The Maoist Legacy, December 29, 1978, https://maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/73.

https://maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/73

Appendixes

242

Appendix 3

答辩词参考资料（讨论稿）

References for the Defense (Draft for Discussion)

一、文化大革命是毛主席亲自教导和发动的，我们是响应毛主席的号召参加文化大革命的，现在为什么

要追究我们的责任？

答：关于文化大革命的问题，叶剑英同志在庆祝中华人民共和国成立三十周年大会上的讲话中已经做了

初步总结。今天不是追究参加文化大革命有什么责任的问题，而是你在文化大革命中搞打砸抢造成严重

后果，构成犯罪，是依法追究你的刑事责任问题。

1. The Cultural Revolution was taught and initiated by Chairman Mao himself. We answered Chairman Mao’s

call to participate in the Cultural Revolution, so why are we being held accountable now?

Answer: On the question of the Cultural Revolution, Comrade Ye Jianying already made a preliminary summary

in his speech at the conference celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of

China. Today it is not a question of pursuing any responsibility for taking part in the Cultural Revolution, but

rather a question of holding you criminally responsible in accordance with the law for the serious consequences

that you had caused by engaging in beating, smashing, and looting during the Cultural Revolution. This

constituted a crime.

二、当时我参加武斗是保卫三红，是革命的行动，不是反对革命，没有想到有罪。

答:你所说的保卫“三红”的理由是根本不能成立的。所谓保卫“三红”是林彪、“四人帮”及其帮派体系为了

篡党夺权制造的一种舆论，也是煽动“全面内战”的一种借口；粉碎“四人帮”以后，对这个问题的是非早

已清清楚楚，你今天仍以所谓保卫“三红”来为自己的罪行辩护，只能说明你还是站在林彪、“四人帮”的

反动立场上。

2. At that time, I took part in the armed struggle to defend the Three Reds. This was a revolutionary action, not

an opposition to the revolution. I do not think I am guilty.

Answer: The reason you give for defending the “Three Reds” is simply untenable. The so-called defense of the

“Three Reds” was a public opinion created by Lin Biao, the “Gang of Four” and their gang system to usurp the

Party and seize power, as well as a pretext to incite “all-out civil war”. After smashing the “Gang of Four,” the

rights and wrongs of this issue have been clear for a long time. Today, the fact that you are still using the so-

called defense of the “Three Reds” to justify your crimes only shows that you are still standing on the reactionary

stance of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four.

三、南通市武斗是解放军支持和指挥的，我是执行的，解放军的 xx人倒无罪，却把罪过算在我的身上。

答：搞武斗都是错误的，都是违背中央“九五命令”和毛主席的指示的。毛主席指示，要文斗不要武斗。

南通市的武斗情况我们是清楚的，在揭批查运动中和你交代中涉及到支左解放军某些人的问题，根据中

Appendixes

243

央有关指示精神，已由有关部门转到部队去处理了，解放军中如有人犯了罪，那要由部队军事法庭处理，

你应该老老实实认罪服罪。

3. The armed struggle in Nantong was supported and commanded by the PLA, and I was the one who carried it

out. But XX in the PLA is innocent of any wrongdoing, yet the blame is placed on me.

Answer: It was wrong to engage in armed struggle, for it violated the “September 5th Order” of the Central

Committee and Chairman Mao’s instructions. Chairman Mao called for a struggle with words, not with violence.

We are aware of the situation of armed struggles in Nantong, and the problems involving certain members of

the PLA in the campaign to Expose, Criticize, and Investigate and in your confession have been transferred to

the army by the relevant departments to be dealt with in accordance with the spirit of the relevant central

instructions. If anyone in the PLA has committed a crime, it will be dealt with by a military court. You should

honestly and sincerely admit your guilt and plead guilty.

四、我当时参加武斗，是因为另一派挑动武斗，搞打砸抢，我们是为了制止武斗，制止打砸抢，保护国

家财产的。

答：这是一种“武斗有理”、“武斗有功”的反动谬论。关于南通市三次武斗的真相，这次揭批查运动中都

已查清楚了。不管哪一派，搞武斗、搞打砸抢都是错误的。南通市武斗，不存在哪一派为制止武斗而搞

武斗，相反这是为了挑起武斗找借口。南通市三次武斗，特别是第三次武斗是沈斌等人有预谋有计划地

策划、组织的一次大规模的武斗，而且在武斗以后又进行了大规模的打砸抢抄抓，使国家和人民的生命

财产遭受了严重损失，造成严重后果，这是尽人皆知的。难道用制止武斗，制止打砸抢的托词就能开脱

罪责吗？你至今还死抱住这种荒谬的“武斗有理”“武斗有功”论不放，对你认识自己的罪行痛改前非是没

有什么好处的，你应该改变这种立场。

4. I took part in the armed struggle at that time because the other faction was instigating the armed struggle

and engaging in beating, smashing, and looting, and we were there to stop the armed struggle, stop the beating,

smashing, and looting, and protect state property.

Answer: This is a kind of reactionary fallacy of “armed struggle is justified” and “armed struggle is meritorious.”

The truth about the three armed fights in Nantong has been clearly established in this campaign to expose,

criticize, and investigate. Regardless of which faction is involved, it is wrong to engage in armed struggle, and in

beating, smashing, and looting. In Nantong armed struggles, there is no one faction engaging in armed struggle

in order to stop the armed struggle; on the contrary, this is an excuse for provoking armed struggle. It is well

known that the three armed struggles in Nantong have caused serious losses of life and property to the country

and the people, resulting in serious consequences. Especially, the third armed struggle was a large-scale armed

struggle planned and organized by Shen Bin and others in advance, and followed by large-scale beating,

smashing, and looting, raiding, and arrests. Is it possible to use the pretext of stopping armed struggles and

stopping smashing and looting to exonerate the guilty? You still cling to this absurd theory of “justification for

armed struggle” and “merit in armed struggle,” and it will do you no good to learn about your own crimes and

Appendixes

244

change your position.

五、我承认参加武斗，造成严重后果，我要负应负的责任，但是有些人当时也很积极，为什么只处理我，

不处理他们，应该法律面前人人平等。

答：在林彪、“四人帮”煽动派性，制造分裂，掀起“全面内战”的恶浪中，南通市确实有不少人参加了武

斗，但是绝大多数人是受蒙蔽的，他们是没有责任的。对于为首策划、组织武斗和直接致伤人命的人，

其性质就不同了。所以，这次追究刑事责任的，是少数打砸抢为首分子和直接打死人的犯罪分子，凡是

这两种人，不管是什么人都要办罪的。法律面前是人人平等的，不这样就不能伸张正义，严明法纪。

5. I acknowledge that I am responsible for the serious consequences of my participation in the armed struggle.

However, some people were very active at the time. Why only punish me and not them? Everyone is equal

before the law.

Answer: In the midst of Lin Biao and the “Gang of Four” fomenting factionalism, creating divisions and setting

off an “all-round civil war,” many people in Nantong indeed participated in the armed struggle, but the vast

majority of people were deceived. Therefore, they are not responsible. The nature is different in the cases of

those who led the planning and organization of armed struggles and directly injured and killed people. Therefore,

this time, criminal responsibility will be pursued against a small number of beat-smash-loot culprits and criminals

who directly killed people. All these two types of people, no matter who they are, will be criminally prosecuted.

All are equal before the law, and justice and discipline cannot be served without this.

六、魏志辉也是参与策划和指挥武斗的，为什么不办他的罪？

答：据我了解在这次揭批查运动中群众是揭发了魏志辉在武斗中的问题，经过调查，他尚未构成犯罪，

所以不追究刑事责任，至于他的错误，他已作了检查交代。党和政府对犯了错误，包括犯了严重错误

的同志，一贯政策是惩前毖后，治病救人，有错误，检讨，认识了就好。

6. Wei Zhihui was also involved in planning and directing the armed struggle, so why not prosecute him?

Answer: As far as I know in the campaign to Expose, Criticize, and Investigate, the masses exposed Wei Zhihui’s

problems in the armed struggle, and after investigation, he has not yet constituted a crime, so he will not be

held criminally responsible, and as for his mistakes, he has confessed and made a self-examination. The Party

and the government’s policy to comrades who have made mistakes, including serious mistakes, has always been

learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient. If one commits a

mistake, it is fine as long as he examines and recognize it.

七、那么，梁友山也是为首策划指挥武斗的，他这一派也打死了人的，为什么不办梁友山的罪？

答：关于梁友山，他在南通市第三次武斗结束后就被关押，审讯批斗六七年之久，他承认了自己的罪行；

这次揭批查运动中，他能主动检查交代自己的问题，认识态度较好，他的检讨已在全市许多场合讲过。

根据党的政策，不再追究刑事责任。

7. Then, Liang Youshan was also the leader that planned and directed the armed struggle, and his faction also

Appendixes

245

killed people, so why not prosecute Liang Youshan for his crimes?

Answer: As for Liang Youshan, he had been imprisoned after the third armed struggle in Nantong, and he was

interrogated and criticized for six or seven years. He has confessed to his crimes. In the campaign to Expose,

Criticize, and Investigate, he initiated to examine and confess his issues with a good cognitive attitude, and he

had undertaken self-examination on many occasions in the city. According to the Party’s policy, he will no longer

be held criminally responsible.

Source: Nantong shi zhongji renmin fayuan, “Dabianci cankao ziliao (taolungao)” 答辩词参考资料（讨论稿）

[References for the Defense (Draft for Discussion)], [December 1979?], 72, E237-121-0063, NMA.

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———. “Guanyu qingcha ‘wu yao liu’ gongzuo zhong yixie wenti de chuli yijian” 关于清查“五一六”工作中一些问题的处理意见 [Suggestions on Dealing with Some Issues in the Work of Ferreting out May 16], August 31, 1974. D101-121-0480. NMA.

———. “Guanyu renzhen gaohao qingli lingdao banzi zhong ‘sanzhongren’ gongzuo de yijian” 关于认真搞好清理领导班子中“三种人”工作的意见 [Opinions on Earnestly and Well Carrying out the Work of Cleansing the “Three Types of People” in the Leadership], November 22, 1980. E101-121-0434. NMA.

———. “Guanyu yinfa Yang Guangli, Hua Linsen he Wu Dasheng, Jiang Ke, Chen Hefa zuizheng cailiao de tongzhi” 关于印发杨广立、华林森和吴大胜、蒋科、陈和发罪证材料的通知 [Notice on the Issuance of the Incriminating Evidence of Yang Guangli, Hua Linsen, Wu Dasheng, Jiang Ke, and Chen Hefa], February 26, 1979. E101-121-0385. NMA.

———. “Guanyu Zhongyang 9 hao wenjian chuanda fanwei de tongzhi” 关于中央 9 号文件传达范围的通知 [Notification on the Scale of Distributing the Central Document No.10], February 9, 1982. E101-121-0468. NMA.

———. “Hui Yuyu tongzhi zai di shiwei fenguan zhengfa gongzuo fuze tongzhi huiyi jieshu shi de jianghua yaodian” 惠浴宇同志在地市委分管政法工作负责同志会议结束时的讲话要点 [Key Points of Hui Yuyu’s Speech at the End of the Meeting with Leaders in Charge of Political and Legal Work], November 29, 1978. E237-111-0076. NMA.

———. “Pizhuan Jiangsu sheng di shi san ci renmin sifa gongzuo huiyi jiyao de tongzhi” 批转江苏省第十三次人民司法工作会议纪要的通知 [Commenting on and Transmitting the Meeting Summary of the 13th Jiangsu Provincial People’s Judicial Work Conference], October 20, 1978. E237-121-0076. NMA.

———. “Pizhuan sheng gong’anju dangzu guanyu dui chunshu fandui sirenbang de ren zuohao pingfan chuli gongzuo de baogao” 批转省公安局党组关于对纯属反对“四人

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———. “Pizhuan sheng gong’anju dangzu guanyu quansheng di shi qi ci gong’an huiyi de baogao” 批转省公安局党组关于全省第十七次公安会议的报告 [Commenting on and Transmitting the Party Group of the Provincial Public Security Bureau’s Report on the 17th Provincial Public Security Conference], April 4, 1978. E101-121-0365. NMA.

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———. “Pizhuan shengwei zuzhibu zhengfakou lingdao xiaozu guanyu chongshi jiaqiang quansheng zhengfa ganbu duiwu de qingshi baogao” 批转省委组织部、政法口领导小组关于充实加强全省政法干部队伍的请示报告 [Commenting on and Transmitting the Provincial Organization Department and the Leading Group of the Political and Legal Sector’s Request for Instructions on Strengthening the Ranks of Political and Legal Cadres in the Province], September 4, 1979. E101-121-0386. NMA.

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———. “Pizhuan zhonggong Wuxi shi di yi renmin yiyuan suowei ‘Guomindang dixia hei silingbu’ anjian fucha de qingkuang baogao” 批转中共无锡市第一人民医院所谓“国民党地下黑司令部”案件复查的情况报告 [Commenting on and Transmitting Wuxi Municipal First People’s Hospital’s Report on Reviewing the so-Called “Guomindang Underground Black Headquarters”], June 24, 1978. E101-121-0366. NMA.

———. “Shi yue qi ri xiawu zhongyang zhengzhiju tongzhi jiejian Peng Chong Xu Jiatun tongzhi shi de tanhua jilu” 十月七日下午中央政治局同志接见彭冲、许家屯同志时的谈话记录 [Conversation Records of Central Politburo Members’ Meeting with Peng Chong and Xu Jiatun on the Afternoon of October 7th], October 7, 1976. E101-121-0339. NMA.

———. “Xu Jiatun tongzhi zai di shiwei he sheng ge buwei ban fuzeren huiyi de jianghua” 许家屯同志在地市委和省各部委办负责人会议的讲话 [Xu Jiatun’s Speech at the Meeting with Leaders of Prefecture and Municipal Party Committees, Provincial Department Committees and Offices], August 15, 1978. D101-121-0608. NMA.

———. “Xu Jiatun tongzhi zai di shiwei shuji pengtou huiyi jieshu shi de jianghua” 许家屯同志在地市委书记碰头会议结束时的讲话 [Xu Jiatun’s Speech at the End of the Brief Meeting with Secretaries of Prefecture and Municipal Party Committees], November 7, 1978. D101-121-0608. NMA.

———. “Zhuanfa guanyu dui yijing daibu de sirenbang bangpai gugan fenzi he da za qiang shoue fenzi shenpan chuli he shenpi gongzuo yijian de tongzhi” 转发关于对已经逮捕的“四人帮”帮派骨干分子和打砸抢首恶分子审判处理和审批工作意见的通知

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Zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei qingcha lingdao xiaozu. “Zhaokai quansheng qingcha dingxing chuli gongzuo zuotanhui (dianbao)” 召开全省清查定性处理工作座谈会 (电报) [Convening a Provincial Symposium on Investigation, Categorization, and Punishment (Telegram)], December 10, 1981. D101-121-0800. NMA.

Zhonggong Nantong diqu jilü jiancha weiyuanhui. “Guanyu guanche sheng qingcha ding’an chuli zuotan huiyi qingkuang de huibao” 关于贯彻省清查定案处理座谈会议情况的汇报 [Report on the Implementation of the Provincial Symposium on Investigation, Verdict, and Punishment], October 1980. D134-111-0010. NMA.

———. “Guanyu shan shi shan zhong gaohao qingcha dingxing chuli gongzuo de jidian yijian” 关于善始善终搞好清查定性处理工作的几点意见 [Several Suggestions on How to Well Conduct Investigation, Categorization, and Punishment from the Beginning to the End], July 18, 1980. D134-111-0011. NMA.

———. “Nantong diqu qingcha ding’an gongzuo dasuan” 南通地区清查定案工作打算 [Work Plan of Investigation and Verdicts in Nantong Prefecture], January 21, 1981. D134-111-0011. NMA.

Zhonggong Nantong diqu weiyuanhui. “Ji Yuan tongzhi zai diwei zhaokai de qingcha ding’an chuli gongzuo zuotanhui shang de jianghua” 季元同志在地委召开的清查定案处理工作座谈会上的讲话 [Ji Yuan’s Speech at the Prefecture Committee’s Symposium on Investigation, Verdicts, and Punishment], 1979. D101-121-0139. NMA.

Zhonggong Nantong diqu weiyuanhui zuzhibu. “Guanyu qingli gongzuo qingkuang he yijian de huibao” 关于清理工作情况和意见的汇报 [Report on the Situation and Opinions on Cleansing], March 15, 1982. D101-121-0874. NMA.

———. “Guanyu qingli ‘sanzhongren’ qingkuang he jinhou gongzuo dasuan de jianbao” 关于清理“三种人”情况和今后工作打算的简报 [Briefing on the Cleansing of the “Three Types of People” and Plans for Future Work], October 19, 1982. D101-121-0874. NMA.

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———. “Guanyu dangqian jiepi sirenbang yundong qingkuang huibao” 关于当前揭批四人帮运动情况汇报 [Report on the Current Situation of the Campaign to Expose and Criticize the Gang of Four], June 25, 1978. E101-111-0356. NMA.

———. “Guanyu quanshi kaizhan san da jiang luxian duibi de qingkuang jianbao” 关于全市开展“三大讲“路线斗争的情况简报 [Situation Briefing on Carrying out the Line Struggle of Three Speak-Outs Citywide], April 25, 1977. E101-121-0358. NMA.

———. “Shiwei changwei, shi geweihui fuzhuren Yang Jianlu tongzhi zai shi zhengfa ganbu huiyi shang de jianghua” 市委常委、市革委会副主任杨建鲁同志在市政法干部会议上的讲话 [Standing Member of the Municipal Committee and Deputy Director of the Municipal Revolutionary Committee Yang Jianlu’s Speech at the Meeting with Municipal Political and Legal Cadres], October 15, 1978. E237-121-0055. NMA.

Zhonggong Nantong shi weiyuanhui banshizu. “Guanyu zenyang kaizhan san da jiang de taolun qingkuang” 关于怎样开展“三大讲”的讨论情况 [Discussion on How to Carry out Three Speak-Outs], May 1977. E101-121-0358. NMA.

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Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui. “1979 niandu dashiji” 1979 年度大事记 [Chronicle of Events in 1979], 1979. A1-1-313. SMA.

———. “Chedi fensui sirenbang zai Jiangsu de zichan jieji bangpai tixi: jiefa pipan Zeng Bangyuan, Shiz Zhaoxiang jiebang lapai ‘san gao yi cuan’ de zuixing” 彻底粉碎四人帮在江苏的资产阶级帮派体系: 揭发批判曾邦元、施兆祥结帮拉派“三搞一篡”的罪行 [Thoroughly Smashing the Bourgeois Factional System of the Gang of Four in Jiangsu: Exposing and Criticizing Zeng Bangyuan and Shi Zhaoxiang for the Crime of “Three Undermines and One Seizure”], September 26, 1977. A1-16-7. SMA.

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———. “Guanyu jin liang ge yue yundong qingkuang de baogao” 关于近两个月运动情况的报告 [Report on the Campaign over the Last Two Months], December 6, 1977. A1-1-161. SMA.

———. “Guanyu qingcha duixiang he bufen yuan zaofanpai toutou xianshi biaoxian de diaocha baogao” 关于清查对象和部分原造反派头头现实表现的调查报告 [Investigation Report on the Actual Performance of Investigated Targets and Former Rebel Leaders], September 14, 1981. E101-121-0442. NMA.

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———. “Guanyu shiwei zhaokai luoshi zhengce huiyi de qingkuang jianbao” 关于市委召开落实政策会议的情况简报 [Briefing on the Situation of the Municipal Committee Convening the Meeting of Fixing Policies], September 5, 1977. C1-32-11. SMA.

———. “Guanyu Suzhou linye jixie chang kaizhan ‘san da jiang’ de qingkuang jianbao” 关于苏州林业机械厂开展三大讲的情况简报 [Briefing on the Situation of the Suzhou Forestry Machinery Factory Carrying out Three Speak-Outs], May 28, 1977. A1-1-161. SMA.

———. “Shiwei fuze tongzhi zai luoshi zhengce huiyi shang de jianghua” 市委负责同志在落实政策会议上的讲话 [Speech of Municipal Leaders in Charge at the Meeting of Fixing Policies], September 1, 1977. C3-2-175. SMA.

———. “Wu ge yue lai cailiao gongzuo qingkuang he jinhou yijian” 五个月来材料工作情况和今后意见 [Material Work Situation in the Recent Five Months and Future Opinions], March 1977. A1-14-87. SMA.

———. “‘Yi pi shuang da’ bushu de baogao” “一批双打”部署的报告 [Report on the Deployment of the One Criticism and Double-Strike Campaign], December 6, 1978. A1-1-174. SMA.

———. “Zhou Zhihua tongzhi zai shiwei jilü jiancha, qingcha dingxing chuli gongzuo huiyi kaishi shi de jianghua” 周治华同志在市委纪律检查清查定性处理工作会议开始时的讲话 [Zhou Zhihua’s Speech at the Opening of the Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection’s Meeting on Investigation, Categorization, and Punishment], May 5, 1980. A1-1-196. SMA.

Zhonggong Suzhou shi weiyuanhui cailiaozu. “Guanyu qingcha gongzuo de qingkuang he jinhou yijian” 关于清查工作的情况和今后意见 [The Investigation Work Situation and Future Opinions], December 23, 1977. A1-14-87. SMA.

———. “Yi nian lai qingcha gongzuo qingkuang he jinhou yijian (taolun gao)” 一年来清查工作情况和今后意见（讨论稿） [The Investigation Work Situation over the Past Year and Future Opinions (Draft for Discussion)], March 1, 1978. A1-14-87. SMA.

Zhonggong Suzhou shiwei bangongshi. “shishi qiushi gaohao zhuanan cailiao gongzuo” 实事求是搞好专案材料工作 [Practically and Realistically Carrying out Case Material Work], October 27, 1978. A1-14-88. SMA.

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———. “Guanyu jiepi Zeng Bangyuan, Shi Zhaoxiang xiao fendui lai Suzhou shi jiepi qingkuang huibao” 关于揭批曾邦元、施兆祥小分队来苏州市揭批情况汇报 [Report on the Situation of Exposing and Criticizing Zeng Bangyuan and Shi Zhaoxiang by the Squad Coming to Suzhou], November 7, 1977. A1-16-21. SMA.

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———. “Guanyu dizhu funong fenzi zhaimao wenti he di fu zinü chengfen wenti de jueding” 关于地主、富农分子摘帽问题和地富子女成分问题的决定 [Decision on the Issues of Removing the Labels of Landlord and Rich Peasant and Class Background of Landlords and Rich Peasants’ Children]. The Maoist Legacy, January 11, 1979. https://maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/16.

———. “Guanyu guanche zhongyang bugao de qingkuang baogao de tongzhi” 关于贯彻中央布告的情况报告的通知 [Notification on Transmitting the Report on the Implementation of the Central Notice], December 3, 1976. E101-121-0338. NMA.

———. “Guanyu jianguo yilai ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi” 关于建国以来若干历史问题的决议 [Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China]. The Maoist Legacy, June 27, 1981. https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/356.

———. “Guanyu jianjue baozheng Xingfa, Xingshi susongfa qieshi shishi de zhishi” 关于坚决保证刑法、刑事诉讼法切实实施的指示 [Instructions on Firmly Guaranteeing the Implementation of the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law]. The Maoist Legacy, September 9, 1979. https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/1047.

———. “Guanyu jianjue daji zhengzhi yaoyan de tongzhi” 关于坚决打击政治谣言的通知 [Notice on Firmly Scotching Political Rumors], February 8, 1977. E101-121-0351. NMA.

———. “Guanyu jiejue Baoding diqu wenti de bugao yinfa tongzhi” 关于解决保定地区问题的布告印发通知 [Notification on the Issuance of the Notice to Solve the Problems in Baoding Prefecture], November 17, 1976. E101-121-0339. NMA.

———. “Guanyu panjue Lin Biao, Jiang Qing fangeming jituan’an shi ming zhufan hou xuanchuan gongzuo zhong jige wenti de tongzhi” 关于判决林彪、江青反革命集团案十名主犯后宣传工作中几个问题的通知 [Notification on Several Issues in Propaganda Work after the Trial of the Ten Principal Criminals of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Counterrevolutionary Group Case], January 23, 1981. E101-121-0435. NMA.

———. “Guanyu pizhuan Deng Xiaoping zai dang de lilun gongzuo wuxuhui shang de jianghua de tongzhi” 关于批转邓小平在党的理论工作务虚会上的讲话的通知 [Notice on Transmitting Deng Xiaoping’s Speech at the Party Theoretical Work Conference], May 11, 1979. E101-121-0381. NMA.

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———. “Guanyu Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan fandang jituan shijian de tongzhi” 关于王洪文、张春桥、江青、姚文元反党集团事件的通知 [Notice on the Incident of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan Anti-Party Clique]. The Maoist Legacy, October 18, 1976. https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/1997.

———. “Guanyu yinfa Deng Xiaoping tongzhi zai zhongyang zhengzhiju kuoda huiyi shang de jianghua de tongzhi” 关于印发邓小平同志在中央政治局扩大会议上的讲话的通知 [Notice on the Issuance of Deng Xiaoping’s Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo], September 11, 1980. E101-121-0407. NMA.

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———. “Guanyu zhuanfa di qi ci quanguo jiancha gongzuo huiyi jiyao de tongzhi” 关于转发《第七次全国检察工作会议纪要》的通知 [Notice on Transmitting “the Summary of the Seventh National Procuratorate Work Conference”], February 17, 1979. E101-121-0381. NMA.

———. “Guanyu zhuanfa ‘Zhonggong Yunnan Shengwei guanyu liang ge yue lai gongzuo qingkuang de baogao’ de tongzhi” 关于转发《中共云南省委关于两个月来工作情况的报告》的通知 [Notice on Transmitting “the Yunnan Provincial Party Committee’s Report on the Work Situation of the Last Two Months”], May 9, 1977. E101-121-0351. NMA.

———. “Guowuyuan Zhongyang junwei zhongyang wenge xiaozu “Guanyu anzhao xitong shixing dalianhe de tongzhi” 国务院、中央军委、中央文革小组《关于按照系统实行大联合的通知 [State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group’s Notice on Realizing the Great Alliance According to Systems]. The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, October 17, 1967. https://ccradb.appspot.com/post/361.

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———. “Pizhuan Yunnan Shengwei he Kunming junqu canjia zhongyang jiejue Yunnan wenti huiyi tongzhi xiang zhongyang de baogao” 批转《云南省委和昆明军区参加中央解决云南问题会议同志向中央的报告》 [Transmitting “the Report to the Center by the Yunnan Provincial Party Committee and Leaders of the Kunming Military Region Who Attended the Central Meeting Concerning to Solve the Issues in Yunnan”]. The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, February 4, 1977. https://ccradb.appspot.com/post/850.

———. “Pizhuan zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei guanyu Xuzhou diqu guanche zhixing zhongyang 9 hao wenjian de qingkuang xiang zhongyang guowuyuan de baogao (gaiyao)” 批转中共江苏省委关于徐州地区贯彻执行中央9号文件的情况向中央、国务院的报告(概要) [The Central Committee Comments and Transmits the Jiangsu Party Committee’s Report to the Central Committee and State Council Concerning the Situation of Implementing the Central Document No.9 in Xuzhou Prefecture]. The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, June 2, 1975. https://ccradb.appspot.com/post/803.

———. “Pizhuan zhonggong zuigao renmin fayuan dangzu guanyu zhuajin fucha jiuzheng yuan jia cuo an renzhen luoshi fang de zhengce de tongzhi” 批转中共最高人民法院党组《关于抓紧复查纠正冤假错案、认真落实党的政策的请示报告》 [Comments on and Transmits the CCP Supreme People’s Court Party Group’s “Request for Instructions on Paying Close Attention to the Review and Correction of Unjust, False, and Mistaken Cases and Conscientiously Implementing Party Policy”]. The Maoist Legacy, December 29, 1978. https://maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/73.

———. “Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan fandang jituan zuizheng cailiao zhi er” 王洪文、张春桥、江青、姚文元反党集团罪证(材料之二) [Criminal Evidence against Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan Anti-Party Clique (Part 2)]. The Maoist Legacy, March 6, 1977. https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/2530.

———. “Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan fandang jituan zuizheng cailiao zhi san” 王洪文、张春桥、江青、姚文元反党集团罪证(材料之三) [Criminal Evidence against Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan Anti-Party Clique (Part 3)]. The Maoist Legacy, September 23, 1977. https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/2109.

———. “Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan fandang jituan zuizheng cailiao zhi yi” 王洪文、张春桥、江青、姚文元反党集团罪证(材料之一) [Criminal Evidence against Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan Anti-Party Clique (Part 1)]. The Maoist Legacy, December 10, 1976. https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/1869.

———. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu chuli geji renmin fayuan zai guoqu shiqi suo fasheng de cuobu, cuoya, cuopan, cuosha wenti de zhishi (jielu)” 中共中央关于处理各级人

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———. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu pizhuan ‘di wu ci quanguo “liang’an” shenli gongzuo zuotanhui jiyao’ de tongzhi” 中共中央关于批转《第五次全国“两案”审理工作座谈会纪要》的通知 [The Central Committee’s Notification on Commenting and Transmitting the Summary of the Fifth National Symposium on Handling “Two Cases”], January 31, 1981. https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/402.

———. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu tongyi he zhuanfa Shanghai shiwei guanyu Shanghai shi qingcha gongzuo de qingkuang baogao” 中共中央关于同意和转发上海市委关于上海市清查工作的情况报告 [The Central Committee Agrees with and Transmits Shanghai Municipal Committee’s Report on the Investigation Work in Shanghai], April 5, 1978. E101-121-0360. NMA.

———. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zuzhi chuanda he taolun ‘fensui Lin Chen fandang jituan fangeming zhengbian de douzheng (cailiao zhi yi)’ de tongzhi ji cailiao” 中共中央关于组织传达和讨论《粉碎林陈反党集团反革命政变的斗争（材料之一）》的通知及材料 [The CCP Central Committee’s Notice on How to Pass on and Discuss the “Struggles to Smash the Counterrevolutionary Coup d’Etat of the Lin and Chen Anti-Party Clique (Part 1)”]. The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, December 11, 1971. https://ccradb.appspot.com/post/692.

———. “Zhuanfa Shanghai shiwei guanyu jiefa pipan sirenbang qunzhong yundong de qingkuang baogao” 转发上海市委关于揭发批判四人帮群众运动的情况报告 [Transmitting Shanghai Municipal Party Committee’s Report on the Mass Movement of Exposing and Criticizing the Gang of Four], February 22, 1977. E101-121-0351. NMA.

———. “Zhuanfa Shanghai shiwei “guanyu jiejue suowei yi yue geming wenti de qingshi baogao de tongzhi” 转发上海市委关于解决所谓“一月革命”问题的请示报告的通知 [Notice on Transmitting Shanghai Municipal Party Committee’s Request for Instructions on How to Resolve the Issue of so-Called “January Revolution”]. The Maoist Legacy, January 4, 1979. https://maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/852.

Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting. “Guanyu kuoda chuanda Deng Xiaoping tongzhi ‘zai zhongyang zhengzhiju kuoda huiyi shang de jianghua’ de tongzhi” 关于扩大传达邓小平同志《在中央政治局扩大会议上的讲话》的通知 [Notice on Increasing the Circulation of Deng Xiaoping’s “Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo”], October 11, 1980. E101-121-0411. NMA.

———. “Guanyu yinfa Peng Zhen tongzhi xiang tebie fating pangting renyuan jianghua yaodian de tongzhi” 关于印发彭真同志向特别法庭旁听人员讲话要点的通知 [Notification on Distributing the Key Points of Peng Zhen’s Speech to the Special Court’s Sitter-Ins]. The Maoist Legacy, November 17, 1980. https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/400.

———. “Zhuanfa gong’anbu dangzu guanyu gei xianyou silei fenzi zhaidiao maozi de qingshi baogao” 转发公安部党组关于给现有四类分子摘掉帽子的请示报告 [Transmitting the Report with Request for Instructions by the Party Group of the Ministry of Public

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Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting and Guowuyuan bangongting. “Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting, Guowuyuan bangongting zhuanda guojia dang’anju deng danwei lianhe diaochazu ‘guanyu “wenhua dageming” he “liang’an” shenli zhong xingcheng de dang’an cailiao chuli wenti de baogao’” 中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅转发国家档案局等单位联合调查组《关于“文化大革命”和“两案”审理中形成的档案材料处理问题的报告》 [The General Office of the Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council Transmitted the Report of the Joint Investigation Group of the National Archives Administration and Other Units on the Handling of Archival Materials Generated during the Cultural Revolution and during the Handling of the Two Cases.]. The Maoist Legacy, June 4, 1983. https://www.maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/606.

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Zhonggong zhongyang jiwei xinfangshi. “Zhongyang jiwei xinfangshi 1980 nian gongzuo zongjie” 中央纪委信访室 1980 年工作总结 [Work Summary of the Petition Office of the Central Discipline Inspection Committee in 1980], March 1981. A4-2-171. SMA.

Zhongyang jilü jiancha weiyuanhui. “Zhongyang jilü jiancha weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi de jueyi” 中央纪律检查委员会第三次全体会议的决议 [Resolution of the Thrid Plenary Session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection], March 4, 1981. A4-2-171. SMA.

———. “Zhongyang jiwei di san ci quanweihui canyue wenjian zhi er: Hu Yaobang tongzhi de yi feng xin” 中央纪委第三次全委会参阅文件之二：胡耀邦同志的一封信 [Second Document for Reference at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection: A Letter from Hu Yaobang], February 1981. A4-2-171. SMA.

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Interviews

Dai Deren. Interview. Nanjing, August 22, 2017. Fang Zifeng. Interview, Nanjing, February 20, 2016. ———. Interview. Nanjing, August 15, 2017. Jiang Kaiming. Interview. Suzhou, September 10, 2017.

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Liang Yulou. Interview. Rudong, August 24, 2017. Lu Shiwei. Interview. Changzhou, November 23, 2016. Qu Xueshi. Interview. Nanjing, August 16, 2017. Ren Yi. Interview, Nanjing, November 15, 2016. Shi Zhaoxiang. Interview. Suzhou, October 2, 2016. ———. Interview. Suzhou, September 10, 2017. Song Baochen. Interview. Nanjing, November 19, 2016. Wang Chunnan. Interview. Nanjing, November 16, 2016. Wang Yongzhu. Interview. Suzhou, November 22, 2016. Wu Qingsheng. Interview. Nanjing, November 18, 2016. Yang Jun. Interview. Suzhou, November 2, 2016. Zhu Jiatai. Interview. Nanjing, November 20, 2016.

Newspaper and Website Articles

Buckley, Chris. “Bowed and Remorseful, Former Red Guard Recalls Teacher’s Death.” The New York Times, January 13, 2014. https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/13/bowed-and-remorseful-former-red-guard-recalls-teachers-death/.

“Daqing kaizhan san da jiang, shenru jiepi sirenbang” 大庆开展三大讲，深入揭批四人帮 [Daqing Carrying out Three Speak-Outs and Thoroughly Exposing and Criticizing the Gang of Four]. People’s Daily, February 10, 1977.

“Henan wenge ‘liang’an’ qingcha renyuan zhi quanguo renda zhengxie de gongkaixin” 河南文革“两案”清查人员致全国人大政协的公开信 [An Open Letter to the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference from the Investigated in the “Two Cases” Resulting from the Cultural Revolution in Henan], February 19, 2011. http://www.difangwenge.org/read.php?tid=6052&displayMode=1.

Hua Guofeng. “1979 nian Guowuyuan zhengfu gongzuo baogao-1979 nian 6 yue 18 ri zai di wu jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di er ci huiyi shang” 1979年国务院政府工作报告——1979年6月18日在第五届全国人民代表大会第二次会议上 [1979 State Council Government Work Report - June 18, 1979, at the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress], June 18, 1979. http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_200759.htm.

———. “Tuanjie qilai, wei jianshe shehui zhuyi de xiandaihua qiangguo er fendou - 1978 nian er yue 26 ri zai di wu jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di yi ci huiyi shang de zhengfu gongzuo baogao” 团结起来，为建设社会主义的现代化强国而奋斗——一九七八年二月二十六日在第五届全国人民代表大会第一次会议上的政府工作报告 [Uniting and Striving to Build up a Socialist Modern and Powerful Country - Political Report at the First Meeting of the Fifth National People’s Congress on February 26, 1978]. People’s Daily, March 7, 1978.

Jiang Hua. “Jiang Hua yuanzhang zai Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Anhui san sheng renmin sifa gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua zhaiyao (zonghe)” 江华院长在黑龙江、辽宁、安徽三省人民司法工作会议上的讲话摘要（综合） [Excerpts from President Jiang Hua’s Speech at the People’s Judicial Work Conference in Heilongjiang, Liaoning and

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Lew, Linda. “New Chinese Textbook That Says Cultural Revolution Brought ‘Disaster’ on Country Stirs Debate about Historical Memory | South China Morning Post,” September 6, 2020. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3100389/new-chinese-textbook-says-cultural-revolution-brought-disaster.

Liu Chang. “Shenpan Wenge yi’an” 审判文革遗案 [Hearing a Lingering Case of the Cultural Revolution]. Southern Weekly, February 28, 2013. http://www.infzm.com/content/88391.

Lu Chunkang, and Liu Qi. “Zhe zhang ‘baopiao’ kaodezhu ma? Nantong diqu qingcha yundong shuping” 这张"包票"靠得住吗？南通地区清查运动述评 [Does This “Voucher” Reliable? Commentary on the Investigation Campaign in Nantong Prefecture]. People’s Daily, March 21, 1978.

“Nanjing shi zhongji renmin fayuan jiaqiang lingdao caiqu cuoshi - zhuajin fucha qunzhong shensu anjian” 南京市中级人民法院加强领导采取措施——抓紧复查群众申诉案件 [The Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court Reinforced Leadership and Took Actions - Paying Close Attention to the Review of Cases That the Masses Appealed]. People’s Daily, July 13, 1978.

Perlez, Jane. “Decades After the Cultural Revolution, a Rare Letter of Remorse.” The New York Times, December 6, 2013. https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/06/decades-after-the-cultural-revolution-a-rare-letter-of-remorse/.

Shi Wei. “Duihua Chen Xiaolu: Wenge bu keneng zaixian” 对话陈小鲁: “文革”不可能再现 [Dialogue with Chen Xiaolu: The Cultural Revolution Will Never Come Back]. Southern Weekly, October 31, 2013. http://www.infzm.com/content/95566.

sina.com. “Wenge shouhai xiaozhang zhangfu jueshou daoqian, chize Song Binbin xuwei” 文革受害校长丈夫拒受道歉，斥责宋彬彬虚伪 [The Husband of the Victimized Principal during the Cultural Revolution Refused Song Binbin’s Apology and Denounced Her Being Hypercritical], February 1, 2014. http://news.sina.com.cn/c/p/2014-02-01/142129388421.shtml.

sohu.com. “Dui Wenge zhong zuoezhe jinyou liangzhi de shenpan shi bu gou de” 对文革中作恶者仅有良知的审判是不够的 [It Is Insufficient to Only Put the Conscience of Perpetrators of the Cultural Revolution on Trial], August 29, 2013. http://cul.sohu.com/20130829/n385348972.shtml.

Song Jichao. “wo ye lai dao ge qian” 我也来道个歉 [I Also Apologize]. Southern Weekly, June 21, 2013. http://www.infzm.com/content/91592.

The Ministry of Public Security. “Gong’anbu bushu quanguo zhi’an xitong shenru kaizhan yanda zhengzhi huodong” 公安部部署全国治安系统深入开展严打整治活动 [The Ministry of Public Security Deploys the National Security System to Carry out In-Depth Strike-Hard and Crackdown Actions], June 2010. https://www.mps.gov.cn/n2255053/n5147059/c5164102/content.html.

Wang Gengxing. “Shenmai zai xinli de daoqian” 深埋在心里的道歉 [The Apology Deep in My Heart]. Southern Weekly, November 2, 2013. http://www.infzm.com/content/95650.

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Zusammenfassung

Nach der Verhaftung der Viererbande am 6. Oktober 1976 verhafteten lokale Behörden im

ganzen Land sofort eine große Zahl ehemaliger Rebellen, beschuldigten sie, Anhänger der

Viererbande zu sein, und bezeichneten sie als Täter der Kulturrevolution. Auf der Grundlage einer

eingehenden Analyse der Provinz Jiangsu, dem Ort früher Maßnahmen zur Aufarbeitung

kulturrevolutionärer Gewalt und Ungerechtigkeit, und hauptsächlich auf der Grundlage von Archiven

und mündlichen Interviews aus erster Hand, untersucht diese Dissertation die Verfahren zur

Benennung, Definition und Bestrafung von Tätern der Kulturrevolution. Die Untersuchung von

Jiangsu zeigt, dass die designierten Mitläufer und lokalen Kader die zentrale Politik zur Bestimmung

von Tätern kontinuierlich herausforderten, in Zweifel zogen und Widerstand leisteten. Der

kampagnenartige Ansatz untergrub die Legitimität der Ausweisung weiter. In den frühen 1980er

Jahren, angesichts der lokalen Herausforderungen und der komplexen Frage der Verantwortung,

korrigierte die zentrale Führung eine große Anzahl ihrer früheren Benennungen von Tätern und

konzentrierte sich darauf, das Erbe der Kulturrevolution innerhalb der Parteiführung zu beseitigen

und damit ihre zukünftige Herrschaft zu sichern.

Die Studie untersucht weiter, wie die Kommunistische Partei Chinas ihren Machtanspruch

legitimierte, wie es ihr gelang, den politischen und sozialen Wandel im China nach Mao einzuleiten,

und wie sich die Schuldzuweisung auf die aktuellen Debatten innerhalb der chinesischen Gesellschaft

auswirkt. Trotz der konzertierten Bemühungen der Kommunistische Partei Chinas, das Thema

Kulturrevolution abzuschließen, lebt sie heute weiter, sowohl als Symbol für historisches Unrecht als

auch, vielleicht unerwartet, als Objekt der Nostalgie. Die Kulturrevolution hallt bis in die Gegenwart

nach. Die Frage, wer für die Kulturrevolution verantwortlich war und ob die benannten Täter bestraft

werden sollten, bleibt ein kontroverses Thema in der heutigen chinesischen Gesellschaft.

Verschiedene Gruppen wetteifern darum, ihre eigene Vergangenheit zu erzählen, wobei sie oft

Gegenargumente zu der offiziellen, in der Resolution von 1981 dargelegten Erzählung vorbringen.

Diese unterschiedlichen Interpretationen der Kulturrevolution reflektieren eine beunruhigende

Vergangenheit.

Chapter 1 “A People's War” against the Gang of Four

Documents

Transcript of Chapter 1 “A People's War” against the Gang of Four