Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis: standing shoulder to shoulder

with the US?

I would like to start my presentation with a quote by John F.

Kennedy, who summed up the nature of the Canada-US relationship

thus: “Geography has made us neighbours. History has made us

friends. Economics has made us partners. And necessity has made us

allies. Those whom nature hath so joined together, let no man put

asunder.”1 I am going to examine this quote in the light of the

Cuban Missile Crisis.

Over half a century has passed since the Cuban Missile Crisis, and

those thirteen fraught days in October, 1962 when the world stood

on the brink of nuclear war. Since then, whilst the crisis has

been intensely studied by scholars seeking to interpret the

actions of Kennedy, Castro, and Khrushchev, the same cannot be

said for Canada. By comparison, the role of America’s closest

neighbour in the crisis is often ignored or downplayed.

For example, the online interactive Cuban Missile Crisis exhibit

of the JFK library doesn’t mention Canada’s participation once,

despite having a transcript of JFK’s phone call to British PM

Harold McMillan…2But Canada’s role was important – as Professor

Peter McKenna notes, few are aware for example, of the important

role played by the Canadian Navy during the crisis. Because of the

expertise of the Canadian navy in anti-submarine warfare, they

were tasked with assisting the US navy in the Northwest Atlantic

to defend against Soviet submarines, and if necessary, engage

them.3 The Canadian navy also allowed the US to deploy its ships

1

further south, enabling it to participate in the naval quarantine

of Cuba.4

A revealing insight into the US’ view of Canada during the crisis

was later found in the papers of John F. Kennedy. As Jocelyn

Maynard Ghent notes, “A summary of the foreign press response to

the blockade, found in President Kennedy’s office files, makes it

clear that a differing perception was not expected from the

Canadians. The nine page resume covers the press reaction of

Europe, America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East but does not

mention a single Canadian newspaper.”5

During the crisis, with the Kennedy Administration frantically

seeking a way to resolve the emergency, what the United States was

not counting on was anything less than full support from their

next door neighbour. Or at least, anything they perceived as less

than full support.

There was a six day interval between the time the President

learned of the missile bases in Cuba, and his announcement to the

American people, and indeed, the world. Although Kennedy had

informed British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of the situation

three days before the other allies6 and personally phoned him after

his television address, Canada was effectively ignored.7 Whilst JFK

kept in constant communication with Macmillan throughout the

crisis8, no such phone calls or explanations were made to John

Diefenbaker, even though in Macmillan’s words the missiles were, “a

pistol pointed at America and Canada.”” 9 Indeed, Diefenbaker was only

notified of the emergency via a delivered message, an hour and half2

before Kennedy’s public broadcast.10 Diefenbaker later claimed in

his memoirs that when he called Kennedy to ask “When were we

consulted?” Kennedy replied “You weren’t.” 11

Eschewing the need for a more direct approach to his Canadian

cousins, Kennedy instead sent an envoy, but, as Jocelyn Maynard

Ghent reports, “To Prime Minister DeGaulle, Kennedy sent Dean Acheson,”12

(former Secretary of State under Eisenhower). Whereas, “To Prime

Minister Diefenbaker, Kennedy sent former U.S. ambassador to Canada, Livingston

Merchant.” 13 Although Kennedy stated in the note delivered to

Diefenbaker that “….we should all keep in close touch……I will do all I can to keep

you informed,” 14 this appears at odds with what actually happened. At

no time during the crisis in fact, did President Kennedy get in

touch with Diefenbaker, “……or Rusk with Green, or even McNamara with

Harkness.” 15 There was a complete lack of communication at the

political level between the Kennedy Administration and the

Canadian government.16

Later the same evening, Diefenbaker addressed the Canadian people

in a statement to the House of Commons.17 His speech reiterated

much of what Kennedy had said about the missile sites in Cuba,

with construction of some being at an advanced stage. The Canadian

Prime Minister added that as well as posing danger to the United

States, these missiles constituted a threat to “…….most of the cities of

North America, including our major cities in Canada.” 18 He also urged for a

sense of calmness to prevail, and asked the Canadian people, “……not

to panic at this time.” 19

3

However, the main thrust of Diefenbaker’s speech was to urge the

importance of seeking a resolution to the crisis via the UN.

Demonstrating his eagerness for a multilateral solution, he stated

that “The determination of Canadians will be that the United Nations should be charged

at the earliest possible moment with this serious problem.”20 The Prime Minister

argued that the only way to know for sure whether the missiles in

Cuba were offensive, or, as the Soviets claimed, merely defensive,

was to send independent inspectors to the island.21

The Prime Minister closed his speech by emphasising Canada’s

traditional stance of taking a “……..strong stand throughout the years on

behalf of peace.” 22 In this way, he seemed to be subtly distancing

himself from whatever plans the United States might have in store

by stating that “Canada knows the meaning of war. Canadians want peace, so do

all free men in all parts of the world.” 23

Much of the Canadian distrust of American intentions during the

Cuban Missile Crisis can be traced back to the failed invasion at

the Bay of Pigs, some 18 months earlier. As Jocelyn Gent notes,

“Canadians…..regarded American involvement in the Bay of Pigs fiasco as deplorable and

condemned a presumed American right of forceful intervention as a means of blocking a

‘communist penetration’ of the hemisphere.” 24

After the failed invasion, Diefenbaker had personally attempted to

“………offset public and parliamentary criticism of American participation in the Bay of Pigs

invasion.” 25 As part of this strategy, he had sought assurances from

the United States that he would be informed of any future plans

for drastic action with respect to Cuba.26 The fact that he was

4

ignored when the missile crisis occurred the following year, only

confirmed his distrust of Kennedy.

The Bay of Pigs disaster added to the animosity between

Diefenbaker and JFK, which was further cemented by a disastrous

visit by the President to Ottawa in May, 1961. Diefenbaker felt

humiliated by JFK’s wisecracking digs at his expense, mis-

pronouncement of his name and general perceived disrespect.27 JFK

was furious over the Rostow Memo affair, calling Diefenbaker a

“thief and a liar”28 when he hung on to a US memo that had been

mistakenly left at a meeting instead of returning it immediately.29

A further ‘flashpoint’ occurred in May, 1962, just before the

Canadian elections, when JFK invited Liberal leader Lester Pearson

to the White House. Diefenbaker was convinced this was part of a

conspiracy to unseat him, and according to aides, went into a

tirade that was disturbingly hysterical for a world leader.30 By

the time the Cuban Missile Crisis occurred 5 months later, the

fuse had not only been lit in the Diefenbaker-JFK relationship,

but was fast reaching the point of explosion….

Additionally Cuba was a source of irritation between Washington

and Ottawa due to their vastly different opinions about how

Castro’s communist regime should be treated.31 From Canada’s point

of view, Cuba was “….remote and of negligible economic importance.” 32

Furthermore, Canada relied heavily on foreign trade, and did not

see how maintaining normal relations with the island, signified a

tacit approval of Castro’s regime.33 The United States on the other

hand was greatly annoyed by Canada’s refusal to see the threat

Cuba posed to the entire hemisphere.34 President Kennedy was5

particularly concerned over remarks made by Howard Green, the

Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, who stated that

the U.S. should allow the Cuban people to choose their own

government.35 Washington believed that this view demonstrated

Canada’s “‘distressing’ inattention to the facts,” and thought that the

Canadians needed to be made aware of “what is really going on in Cuba.”36

Added to this, Washington was also bitter over Canada’s continued

trade with the island.37

There appears to be a disparity in accounts of the crisis over the

question of Canada’s military alert. Diefenbaker claimed in his

memoirs that he was requested by Kennedy’s ambassador Livingston

Merchant, to immediately place Canadian forces on alert, but this

was denied by both Merchant and Diefenbaker’s own Defense

Minister, Douglas Harkness.38 Diefenbaker claimed that Kennedy had

demanded the Canadian government give “…..‘carte blanche’ in support of

unilateral action by the United States.” 39 However, Harkness (who was also

present at the briefing), claims that Merchant never carried any

such demands with him and when questioned about the alert stages

the Americans would be put on, Merchant and his aides were ‘hazy’

about the details.40 It is hard to know whose account was correct,

but knowing Diefenbaker’s tendency to ‘rush to judgement’ as far

as the U.S. was concerned, perhaps Diefenbaker was mistaken in his

recall of events. What is apparent is that whilst Diefenbaker was

publicly trying to pursue a UN resolution at this stage, the

Canadian military and NORAD appeared to have other ideas.

After the United States had raised their alert Level to DEF CON 2,

permission was similarly sought from Defence Minister Harkness, by6

the Canadian military, to raise the Canadian alert level.41 From

the military’s point of view, this proposed course of action was a

logical step, considering Canada’s participation in the joint

defence arrangement that was NORAD.42

When Harkness relayed the request to Diefenbaker however, the

Prime Minister refused to authorise any elevation in the threat

level or to put Canada’s forces on standby. Harkness, confident

that Diefenbaker would agree to the request, informally told the

military chiefs to go and ‘get ready,’ but Diefenbaker, refused to

authorise an alert until he could discuss it with the cabinet the

following morning.43 When the cabinet met to discuss the issue on

October 23rd, many members were angered by the U.S. failure to

consult them, and some were “……..outraged at the American assumption that

Canada would offer immediate and unqualified support no matter what the situation.” 44

Others were less angry but felt that they would have been “……

satisfied with at least the courtesy of token consultation.” 45

Meanwhile, on October 23rd, the Organisation of American States had

approved the U.S. quarantine with only 3 abstentions, and the

quarantine had gone into force early on the morning of October

24th.46 After nearly two days of deliberation however, there was

still no agreement to raise Canada’s alert.47 Then, on the evening

of the 24th October, Harkness managed to convince Diefenbaker to

authorise the alert, on the basis of new intelligence he had

received regarding the Russians preparations. 48 What Diefenbaker

did not realise is that Harkness had already gone ahead and given

permission for the alert to be raised, even though he had no

7

authority to do so.49 In fact, neither Diefenbaker nor the

Cabinet, or anyone else outside the military, was aware of this. 50

Diefenbaker and some of his cabinet colleagues were clearly angry

at being ignored because Not only was Canada America’s partner in

NATO, but in NORAD as well, and therefore this should have given

them a ‘double claim’ to consultation.51 But whilst there was no

direct consultation between the United States and Canada on a

political level, the military relationship via NORAD continued as

before. Militarily at least the two countries shared a similar

view over the nature of the Soviet threat and the missile base

construction in Cuba, so unlike Diefenbaker and JFK, that working

relationship functioned smoothly.52 Indeed, the only direct

communication between the two countries was via the military,53 and

the only American official to speak to his Canadian counterpart

during the crisis was General Maxwell Taylor, the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff.54

Diefenbaker gave a second speech to Parliament on October 25th,

after authorising the alert. Stating that the situation was a

serious one, although he declared his intention to “...support the United

States and our other allies in this situation,” 55 he still stressed his hope for

finding a solution via the UN.56

While the Canadian government was later criticised for their

delaying tactics in waiting two days to raise their alert level,

it was argued during the cabinet discussions, that “…the Americans had

taken ten days to arrive at their decision, so a twenty-four hour delay in Canadian action

would not be unreasonable.”57 Nevertheless, this was not how the Canadian8

response was perceived by Washington. To the United States, the

two day delay signified disbelief in their evidence.58

In the aftermath of the crisis, President Kennedy’s handling of

the situation was hailed as a great success both at home and

abroad, and the outcome was called a “great achievement for the West,” by

General Norstad of NATO.59 Kennedy was also praised for his strong

leadership. The crisis did not do anything to improve

Diefenbaker’s opinion of Kennedy or U.S.-Canadian relations, and

Canadians “wondered what happened to their special relationship.”60 Diefenbaker

referred to the President as a man who was “….capable of taking the world

to the brink of thermonuclear destruction to prove himself the man for our times, a

courageous champion of Western democracy.”61

The crisis also caused some friction between Canada and the United

States, as the U.S. were irritated by Canada’s ‘dithering,’ not

only over the missiles in Cuba, but the larger question of nuclear

weapons. Of course, Canada was not the only ally during the

crisis, to have reservations about United States policy;62 the

difference is that it was the lone ally to “delay instant cooperation with

American defense requests.” 63

The problem for Diefenbaker was that he did not count on his

actions during the crisis to be unpopular at home. In the

aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, a Gallup poll showed that

80% of the Canadian public disapproved of Diefenbaker’s delay in

standing ‘shoulder to shoulder with the United States.64

Furthermore, Kennedy was extremely popular in Canada,65 and

9

Diefenbaker’s hesitation did not go down well with the Canadian

public, who expected him to act as a loyal ally to the US as

Canada had done in the World Wars.66

Critics of Diefenbaker saw his two day delay as a serious error in

judgement that his minority government could not afford. The June

1962 election had left Diefenbaker, as Robert Bothwell succinctly

puts it, “….a minority Prime Minister with a majority temperament.”67

Diefenbaker’s wishy-washy indecision on nuclear weapons and the

split on the issue in his own cabinet proved impossible to

resolve. In the ensuing chaos and amidst much infighting, Defense

Minister Douglas Harkness resigned and the government swiftly

collapsed when it lost a motion of confidence in the House of

Commons. 68 An election was called, and on the 8th of August 1963,

Diefenbaker’s Conservatives were defeated by the Liberal

government of Lester B. Pearson.69

In conclusion, what does the Cuban missile crisis tell us about

the nature of the US-Canadian ‘special relationship’? Well,

firstly it is obviously important not to define a long-standing

relationship of any kind in terms of one event, no matter how

important. The Cuban missile crisis was, thankfully, an

exceptional event, and t occurred at a time when the personal and

political relationship between JFK and Diefenbaker was

particularly bad. Even so, Diefenbaker eventually, if rather

grudgingly, acknowledged the logic of the situation and agreed to

the alert.

10

Secondly, while the US-Canadian political relationship was under

severe pressure during the crisis, the military relationship via

NORAD continued largely unaffected – partly due to the actions of

the defence minister Douglas Harkness, and partly because the

system of military co-operation embedded in NORAD, which dated

back to World War 2, proved robust enough to cope with what turned

out to be only a temporary difficulty.

Thirdly, Diefenbaker’s election defeat suggests that while

Canadian resentment about real or imagined slights on the part of

the United States government might have been expected to be an

electoral asset, on this occasion a majority of the Canadian

electorate appears to have taken the view that security, and above

all the defence relationship with the United States was too

important an issue with which to play party politics.

Fourthly, the Cuban missile crisis confirmed a basic premise of

the US-Canadian special relationship – i.e. that it remained a

rather one-sided. As Joseph Jockel notes: “Canada was not so

special that it would be consulted by Washington under any

circumstances, including the extraordinary ones that has just

occurred but was still special enough to count on being consulted

in the event of the kind of Cold War crisis that was more probable

and so might still occur.”70

Fifthly, and finally, the US and Canada had been uneasy neighbours

for much of their history and more than one Conservative PM had

won an election against the Liberals by playing the anti-American

card. But in 1963 JFK was sufficiently popular and the stakes were11

sufficiently high that it was Diefenbaker who was defeated at the

polls and the US-Canadian alliance, regardless of its faults, that

was vindicated.

Endnotes

12

1 Mitch Potter, JFK and why Camelot was a living nightmare for Canada (Toronto: The

Toronto Star, 2013), Ebook, location number: 106.2 “The World on the Brink: John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis:

Day 7: October 22,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum,

accessed April 3, 2015,

http://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct22/.3 Peter McKenna, “Canada’s navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” The Chronicle

Herald, October 28, 2012, accessed April 3, 2015,

http://thechronicleherald.ca/thenovascotian/156014-canada%E2%80%99s-navy-

and-the-cuban-missile-crisis.4 Ibid.5 Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, “Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile

Crisis.” Pacific Historical Review, 48:2 (May, 1979): 182.6 Ibid, 163.7 Reg Whitaker, and Steve Hewitt, Canada and the Cold War (Toronto: James

Lorimer & Company Ltd., 2003), 147.8 Ibid, 147.9 Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, “Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile

Crisis.” Pacific Historical Review, 48:2 (May, 1979): 163.10 Ibid, 163.11 Dennis Molinaro, ““Annihilation Without Representation:” Canada, NATO and

the role of Public Intelligence during the Cuban Missile Crisis” (paper

presented at LASA 2010 – ‘Crisis, Response, and Recovery,’ the 29th

International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Toronto,

Canada, October 6-9, 2010):11, accessed December 20th, 2011,

http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/congress-papers/lasa2010/files/

1375.pdf.12 Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, “Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile

Crisis.” Pacific Historical Review, 48:2 (May, 1979): 163.13 Ibid, 163.

14 Ibid, 173.15 Ibid, 173.16 Ibid, 173.17 “Cuba – Statement of Prime Minister Following Television Broadcast by

President of the United States,” extract from Hansard (Debates of the House

of Commons of Canada), October 22nd, 1962, available from the Diefenbaker

Canada Centre, accessed November 1st, 2010,

http://www.usask.ca/diefenbaker/galleries/virtual_exhibit/cuban_missile_cri

sis/pm_statement_following_president.php.18 Ibid.19 Ibid.20 Ibid.21 Ibid.22 Ibid.23 Ibid.24 Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, “Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile

Crisis.” Pacific Historical Review, 48:2 (May, 1979): 160.25 Ibid, 160.26 Ibid, 160.27 Mitch Potter, JFK and why Camelot was a living nightmare for Canada (Toronto: The

Toronto Star, 2013), Ebook, location number: 66-102.28 Mitch Potter, “JFK calls Diefenbaker "thief and liar" in rare White House

tape,” The Star Blogs, November 21, 2013, accessed April 7, 2015,

http://thestar.blogs.com/worlddaily/2013/11/listen-jfk-calls-diefenbaker-

thief-and-liar-in-rare-white-house-tape.html.29 Mitch Potter, JFK and why Camelot was a living nightmare for Canada (Toronto: The

Toronto Star, 2013), Ebook, location number: 108.30 Ibid, location number: 132-140.31 Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, “Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile

Crisis.” Pacific Historical Review, 48:2 (May, 1979): 160.

32 Ibid, 160.33 Ibid, 160.34 Ibid, 161.35 Ibid, 161.36 Ibid, 161.37 Ibid, 161.38 Ibid, 165.39 Ibid, 165.40 Ibid, 165.41 Reg Whitaker, and Steve Hewitt, Canada and the Cold War (Toronto: James

Lorimer & Company Ltd., 2003), 151.42 Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, “Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile

Crisis.” Pacific Historical Review, 48:2 (May, 1979): 169.43 Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, “Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile

Crisis.” Pacific Historical Review, 48:2 (May, 1979): 169.44 Ibid, 176.45 Ibid, 176.46 Ibid, 176.47 Ibid, 176.48 Ibid, 177.49 Robert Douglas Allin, “Implementing NORAD, 1956-1962: The Bureaucratic

Tug of War for Access and Influence” (M.A. thesis. Carleton University,

Ottawa, 1998), 89.50 Ibid, 89.51 John Herd Thompson, and Stephen J. Randall. Canada and the United States:

Ambivalent Allies, third edition (Georgia: University of Georgia Press: 2002),

225.52 Dr Brad W. Gladman, and Dr Peter M. Archambault, “Confronting the

‘Essence of Decision’: Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Defence

Research and Development Canada (DRDC) – Centre for Operational Research

and Analysis (CORA): NORAD Operational Research and Analysis Team, and

Strategic Analysis Section: Technical Memorandum: No. 2010-250, November,

2010, 31.53 Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, “Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile

Crisis.” Pacific Historical Review, 48:2 (May, 1979): 173.54 Ibid, 173.55 Ibid, 1.56 Ibid, 2.57 Robert Douglas Allin, “Implementing NORAD, 1956-1962: The Bureaucratic

Tug of War for Access and Influence” (M.A. thesis. Carleton University,

Ottawa, 1998), 89.58 John Herd Thompson, and Stephen J. Randall. Canada and the United States:

Ambivalent Allies, third edition (Georgia: University of Georgia Press: 2002),

225.59 Ibid, 180.60 Ibid, 183.61 Ibid, 225.62 John Herd Thompson, and Stephen J. Randall. Canada and the United States:

Ambivalent Allies, third edition (Georgia: University of Georgia Press: 2002),

224.63 Ibid, 224.64 Ibid, 225.65 Dennis Molinaro, ““Annihilation Without Representation:” Canada, NATO and

the role of Public Intelligence during the Cuban Missile Crisis” (paper

presented at LASA 2010 – ‘Crisis, Response, and Recovery,’ the 29th

International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Toronto,

Canada, October 6-9, 2010), 9, 17, accessed December 20th, 2011,

http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/congress-papers/lasa2010/files/

1375.pdf.

66 Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984 (Toronto:

UBC Press, 2007), 169.67 Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984 (Toronto:

UBC Press, 2007), 169.68 Robert Bothwell, The Penguin History of Canada (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2007),

399.69 Ibid, 399.70 Joseph T. Jockel, Canada in NORAD, 1957-2007: A History (Kingston, Ontario:

Queen's Policy Studies, 2007), 56.

Bibliography

Primary Sources:

Documents

“Cuba – Statement of Prime Minister Following Television Broadcast by

President of the United States.” Extract from Hansard (Debates of the

House of Commons of Canada), October 22nd, 1962. Available from the

Diefenbaker Canada Centre. Accessed November 1st, 2010.

http://www.usask.ca/diefenbaker/galleries/virtual_exhibit/cuban_missi

le_crisis/pm_statement_following_president.php.

“Cuba – Statement by Prime Minister.” Extract from Hansard (Debates

of the House of Commons of Canada), October 25th, 1962, 1-3.

Available from the Diefenbaker Canada Centre. Accessed November 1st,

2010.

http://www.usask.ca/diefenbaker/galleries/virtual_exhibit/cuban_missi

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“Text of Khrushchev Message to Kennedy.” Moscow Domestic Service In

Russian, 1400, 27 Oct 62. Available from the Diefenbaker Canada

Centre. Accessed May 1st, 2011.

http://www.usask.ca/diefenbaker/galleries/virtual_exhibit/cuban_missi

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Books

Bothwell, Robert. Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984. Toronto:

UBC Press, 2007.

Bothwell, Robert. The Penguin History of Canada. Toronto: Penguin Canada,

2007.

Nathan, James A. Anatomy of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Connecticut: Greenwood

Press, 2001.

Jockel, Joseph T. Canada in NORAD, 1957-2007: A History. Kingston, Ontario:

Queen's Policy Studies, 2007.

Stern, Sheldon M. Averting the Final Failure: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban

Missile Crisis Meetings. California: Stanford University Press, 2003.

Thompson, John Herd, and Stephen J. Randall. Canada and the United States:

Ambivalent Allies. Third Edition. Georgia: University of Georgia Press:

2002.

Whitaker, Reg, and Steve Hewitt. Canada and the Cold War. Toronto: James

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Journal Articles & Conference Papers

Ghent, Jocelyn Maynard. “Canada, the United States, and the Cuban

Missile Crisis.” Pacific Historical Review, 48:2 (May, 1979): 159-184.

Gladman, Brad W. and Peter M. Archambault. “Confronting the ‘Essence

of Decision’: Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Defence Research

and Development Canada (DRDC) – Centre for Operational Research and

Analysis (CORA): NORAD Operational Research and Analysis Team, and

Strategic Analysis Section: Technical Memorandum: No. 2010-250,

November, 2010.

Molinaro, Dennis. ““Annihilation Without Representation:” Canada,

NATO and the role of Public Intelligence during the Cuban Missile

Crisis.” Paper presented at LASA 2010 – ‘Crisis, Response, and

Recovery,’ the 29th International Congress of the Latin American

Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, October 6-9, 2010: 1- 22.

Accessed December 20th, 2011.

Http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/congress-papers/lasa2010/

files/1375.pdf.

Zorbas, Jason. (Department of Political Studies, University of

Saskatchewan) “A Red Tory in Foreign Affairs: Analyzing John G.

Diefenbaker’s Foreign Policies from an Ideological Perspective.”

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http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2010/Zorbas.pdf.

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Allin, Robert Douglas. “Implementing NORAD, 1956-1962: The

Bureaucratic Tug of War for Access and Influence.” 1-103. M.A.

thesis. Carleton University, Ottawa, 1998.

Newspaper Articles

Peter McKenna, “Canada’s navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” The

Chronicle Herald, October 28, 2012, accessed April 3, 2015,

http://thechronicleherald.ca/thenovascotian/156014-canada%E2%80%99s-

navy-and-the-cuban-missile-crisis

Mitch Potter, “JFK calls Diefenbaker "thief and liar" in rare White

House tape,” The Star Blogs, November 21, 2013, accessed April 7,

2015, http://thestar.blogs.com/worlddaily/2013/11/listen-jfk-calls-

diefenbaker-thief-and-liar-in-rare-white-house-tape.html.

Websites

John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. “The World on the

Brink: John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Day 7: October

22.” Accessed April 3, 2015.

http://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct22/.