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Bachelor of Arts in Comparative Literature

King's College London

Moments of Vision: a study of time in Camus's La Mort Heureuse

and Buzzati's Il Deserto dei Tartari

Supervisor: Alicia Kent

01/05/2013

Word Count: 8226

13 Canterbury Place, London

SE173AD

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‘Does the past exist? No. Does the future exist? No. Then only the present exists. Yes.

But within the present there is no lapse of time? Quite so. Then time does not exist? Oh, I

wish you wouldn’t be so tiresome.’1

Time is the most defining mode of our experience2, and it has been the subject of

centuries of philosophical speculations. The philosopher Martin Heidegger, in the

introduction to his masterwork Being and Time, states that 'time must be brought to light - and

genuinely conceived - as the horizon for all understandings of being'3, suggesting that our

concept of time is essential to understand our existence.

In the novels here considered, La Mort Heureuse by Albert Camus and Il Deserto dei

Tartari by Dino Buzzati, time is a key theme, to the point that the protagonists' concepts and

reaction to time determines their lives and meaning. The influence of Heidegger's philosophy

of time pervades both novels; and thus despite being radically different in terms of plot, it is

possible to observe a similar philosophical framework, and linked them in particular to and

existentialist standpoint. The present investigation will consider how the authors appropriate

and dramatize elements of early existentialist philosophy into the novels, focusing in

particular on the subject of time; for this reason, Heidegger’s Being and Time will be used

extensively for their interpretation.

Both novels were written during the first half of the twentieth century, which according

to a standard periodisation corresponds to the first phase of existentialism, and after the

publication of Heidegger's Being and Time in 1927.4 La Mort Heureuse is the first novel by

Albert Camus: Camus writes it between 1936 and 1938, but leaves it incomplete: the final

draft will be published only after his death, in 1971.5 The novel narrates the story of Patrice

Mersault, an office clerk who after committing a murder abandons his alienating job and

seeks happiness in an alternative way of living (see appendix for detailed plot). The plot

presents numerous affinities with L'Etranger; it also anticipates several philosophical notions

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that the author will explicate in Le Mythe de Sisyphe, which for this reason has been

extensively used in this analysis. However, La Mort Heureuse is possibly considered Camus’s

least accomplished work.6 It is nonetheless the most suitable for this investigation, as it

extensively deals with time, and in particular presents a connection between this subject and

the concepts Camus later developed, such as the Absurd. Il Deserto dei Tartari is published in

1940 and is Buzzati's most praised work. It narrates the story of young official Drogo, who

moves into a Fortress as part of a division to defend the border from the Tartars, and ends up

waiting his entire life for an attack that never takes place (see appendix). While Camus is

obviously an exponent of existentialist thought, Buzzati is not equally so. The novel is very

unique and adopts elements from various literary currents, Surrealist techniques especially.

Nonetheless, several common points can be traced between existentialist thought and the

philosophical framework of the novel; and is thus of great interest as an Italian appropriation

of existentialist ideas.

The analysis will be divided in two parts, following the structures of the novels: the first

part will consider the dimension of time linked to the protagonists’ work routines, and the

second will relate the shift to an alternative kind of temporality that will be defined as

kairological time. On the whole, it will be possible to show how these conceptions of time

reveal the existentialist framework of the novels, and are in particular connected to what will

be later developed into the conception of the Absurd.

First of all, the relation between time and narrative has been the subject of extensive

studies, and must be held as a premise to this investigation. Genette observes that in any lexis

(verbal representation of events, according to Plato’s definition) there is a temporal diegetic

component, and that readers always approach a story as a sequence of events;7 and similarly,

Ricoeur emphasises that narrative has always, although not exclusively, a chronological

episodic dimension8. In other words, any novel must present an underlying structure of events

as ordered by chronological directional flow. That does not necessarily mean that events are

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presented in chronological order. The two novels here considered, for example, present

numerous flashbacks and flash-forwards: the entire first part of La Mort Heureuse is a

flashback to the year that precedes the episode narrated in the first chapter; in Il Deserto dei

Tartari, the narrator conveys flash-forward like reflections that foreshadow the subsequent

events. Chronological sequences can nonetheless be retraced by the reader, and thus

chronological temporality remains intrinsic to the narratives. That being said, both Camus and

Buzzati attempt at a representation of different ways of perceiving and representing time,

circumventing in a way the chronological requirements of narrative.

The novels are initially concerned with the representation of what Meyerhoff defines as

public time. Meyerhoff distinguishes public time from le temps humain, or the consciousness

of time: le temps humain is the subjective experience of time, while public time is objectively

measured and intersubjectively valid9. Public time is also characterised by circularity. It is

structured in relation to sidereal rhythms, which are cyclical; and it is marked by the clock,

which graphically renders the repetition of the very same twelve hours over and over. All

societal structures operate in the dimension of public time. 10 To function in society,

individuals have to adjust their lives to its fixed rhythm; but also to a circular routine where

every day is structured in the same way and repeated. This is the dimension of time that the

protagonists initially respond to. Both Mersault and Drogo dedicate their lives to their work,

one at the office and the other at the Fortress, and thus must abide by a precise work schedule:

this schedule is structured as a strict and repetitive routine. Camus extensively describes

Mersault’s routine in chapter two, from the moment he arrives at his office to the evening of

the next day. All time markers are obsessively specified in the narration: Mersault gets to the

office at five past two, deals with clients from three to four, leaves at six. The rhythm is so

precisely determined that it appears mechanical. Certainly it does not reflect a human pace of

living: it is an external imposition on human life and a mechanisation of time. Camus also

emphasises that in Mersault's routine hardly anything changes with time. The year following

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the events in the second and third chapter is in fact omitted from the narration, letting the

reader assume that nothing else has happened throughout this time. Every day is the same,

repeated according to a circular, non-progressive pattern. Work routine is based on endless

circularity, and thus regulates Mersault’s life as such. Buzzati does not provide a full

description of Drogo’s routine, but uses a specific episode as an example of it. Drogo’s life is

regulated by the military protocol, which determines every aspect of the soldiers’ life and

subjects it to a precise time schedule. In chapter five, Buzzati meticulously describe a portion

of this schedule, and adjust the narration so to mimic the protocol: each of the soldiers’ action

is reported, every requirement specified, time is measured obsessively. Also, timings are

discussed in detail, and Tronk, one of the officials, knows the different phases of the soldiers’

movements with a fifteen-minute accuracy. Again, as Mersault, Drogo is subjected to a

mechanical structuring of time. Buzzati uses the same expedient as in La Mort Heureuse to

deny linear progression: significant periods of time are omitted from the narration, to the

extent of a gap of no less than fifteen years between chapter twenty-four and twenty-five. The

Fortress protocol does not allow any change, is based on the repetition of the same schedule

and imposes a circular pattern on the soldiers’ life.

Thus work imposes on the protagonists’ lives a rhythm that is mechanical and endlessly

repeated, and that gives them a circular structure. So, Mersault and Drogo’s routines lack any

type of linear progression and thus do not lead towards any identifiable objective: circular

repetition simply prevents the development towards something. As a result, the protagonists’

lives seem to have no purpose. Mersault's job seems to have no objective: the nature of his

position is not even specified, and thus the reader can only perceive Mersault’s routine as a

sequence of actions with no specific purpose. Buzzati instead proves to the reader that there is

no reason that justifies the soldiers' routine, and is thus pointless. Soldiers claim that the

military protocol is enforced to protect the Fortress in case of an attack by the Tartars’ army.

The Tartars, however, have not been spotted in centuries and it is even suggested that they are

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just an ancient legend. In light of this information, the strict respect of the protocol appears as

an irrational obsession; the routine that the soldiers abide by is a mere repetition with no

actual goal.

If it is true that work routines structure the protagonists’ lives as stagnant repetitions, it

is not the authors' intention to convey a mere social critique of work patterns. Neither of the

authors in fact suggests that other aspects of life can provide an alternative to this stagnation.

On the opposite, all aspects of life seem to fall into the same lack of purpose, and ultimately

do not allow to the protagonists to break away from the circular rhythm. Mersault’s day off

from work is spent in complete inertia, looking down from his balcony and interrupting only

to smoke or to eat. As soon as time is detached from the mechanical rhythm of the workdays,

it becomes completely empty: perhaps not circular, but even more stagnating. Accordingly,

Mersault perceives it as slow and interminable. The narration reflects this perception: the text

breaks into short paratactic sentences that describe every single action performed by Mersault

or by the passers-by, becoming deliberately boring. The reader is prompted to emphatise with

Mersault’s mood, and both are finally relieved when the day comes to an end. Moreover,

Mersault’s relationship with his lover Marthe could provide a way-out from his work, but

instead she is nothing more than an 'image' to him. The gratification provided by Marthe is

only temporary, and in fact it soon fades away: as Mersault explains, he soon loses interest in

her. Certainly she does not provide Mersault’s life with the purpose that he does not find in

his job. Similarly, Drogo could find an alternative to the Fortress routine by returning to the

city. When in chapters eight and nine he goes back on a license, however, he is not able to

appreciate the city way of living. The parties and female company that he indulges in

resemble Mersault’s 'image': they provide nothing more than a momentary pleasure, and

finally have no more purpose than the military routine, which at least, to Drogo’s mind, is

characterised by a certain honorable integrity.

Overall, neither Mersault nor Drogo have a meaningful alternative to the mechanical

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and circular routines, in which they find themselves trapped. At this point, however, there is a

fundamental distinction to be made between the characters, and that is in regard to the way

they react to these routines. Mersault is frustrated by his routine, and is not deceived into

thinking that it has a meaning: all he does is just wait for time to pass and simply wants to

'dormir jusqu'à ce que tout soit consommé'.11 Drogo’s attitude resembles that of Mersault only

at the beginning of the novel. When he first arrives at the Fortress, he is told that the Tartars

do not pose a real threat and thus realises that the military routine is pointless. Disappointed,

he soon asks for a transfer: at this point, similarly to Mersault, all he does is just wait for time

to pass. However, this initial attitude soon changes: while the transfer is repeatedly delayed,

he develops a certain fascination with the Fortress. The mechanisms of the Fortress seem to

exude a magical charm on the soldiers, who for no apparent reason decide to remain on the

outpost and submit to its absurd protocol. The officials that have fallen to it often end up

spending their entire life at the Fortress. The charm can be defined as the ‘disease of the

Fortress’12 and can be interpreted as a fictional representation of the power of habits.13 The

repetitive routine, in fact, is not only pointless and frustrating, as in Mersault’s case, but can

also provide a certain comfort and feeling of security and familiarity. Drogo, in fact, grows

attached to the Fortress and his initial disillusionment disappears. It is finally easier for him to

accept the routine of the Fortress than to leave.

The reason why the two protagonists react in such opposite ways to similar

circumstances is to be found in their perception of time. In order to explain and contextualise

this distinction within existentialist thought, it is necessary here to outline a brief overview of

Heidegger and Camus's ideas. In Being and Time, Heidegger observes that death is the sole

inescapable truth of human life.14 Any other principle or structures of meaning that is

presented as transcendentally truthful is only a construction of society. The only way man can

live truthfully, in what he defines as authentic existence, is through the acknowledgement and

confrontation of death.15 Consciousness of death, however, generates Angst: not only because

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it forces man to accept his own mortality, but also because it reveals all other principles to be

artificial and ultimately illusory. Man thus naturally attempts to escape Angst and, rather than

confronting death, chooses to rely on the illusory principles of society. He conducts an

inauthentic existence, and the meaning that he has constructed for his life according to these

principles is equally illusory and untruthful.16 The concept of Angst shares many similarities

with Camus’s notion of the Absurd, which he theorises in Le Mythe de Sisyphe. Camus first

defines the Absurd as a feeling rather than a philosophical concept: a sense of 'divorce entre

l'homme et sa vie'.17 Man, who naturally seeks to understand the world, comes to the

realisation that the world is inexplicable to him. As does Heidegger, Camus recognises that

death is the greatest source of the Absurd. Principles and structures of meaning that elude

death are only 'illusions et (de) lumières'18 that man superimposes on reality and that are

ultimately false.

Circularity can be identified as one of the illusory principles that both Heidegger and

Camus deal with. It superimposes a structure onto the otherwise chaotic world: work routines,

in fact, organise the protagonists’ interactions with their surrounding and reduce the world to

a manageable schedule. They are mechanical, not natural, and that suggests that they do not

reflect the true nature of reality. As Camus’s 'illusions et lumières', they turn reality into

something orderly and understandable. Besides, they create a meaning that is equally false

and artificial. Although work conventionally tends towards an objective, in the novels this

objective is either omitted or presented as absurd. The authors suggest, in the end, that any

meaning attached to the circular routine is unreachable and illusory. Most importantly, the

circular pattern does not correspond to the nature of human life. Circular time is characterised

by endless repetition; all things cyclical have neither beginning nor end, and are therefore

connected to the eternal. Human life is limited and contingent, and thus cannot be integrated

within circularity. It is a progression from birth to death and belongs to the dimension of

linear time. Work, and the structure of public time in general, by causing men to fall into the

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illusion of circularity, negate the linearity and contingency of human existence. In short,

circular time can be defined as an inauthentic structure. Since the protagonists submit their

lives to this illusory principle, they can be said to be conducting inauthentic existences.

What distinguishes Mersault and Drogo is their level of awareness that their lives are

inauthentic; their different reactions depend on whether or not they recognise circularity as an

illusion. Mersault does not fall into the illusion of circularity. He is aware that the circular

work routine has no purpose and that it is an artificial structure that is imposed on his life, and

thus finds it unbearable. If he abides by it and lives his life inauthentically, it is only because

he sees no better alternative. In light of Camus’s thought, Mersault can be identified as an

early representation of the man who has perceived the Absurd: who, in other words, has

exposed the 'illusions et lumières', has ultimately become aware of the meaninglessness of all

things and feels estranged from the world. Drogo, on the opposite, does not recognise that

circularity is an illusion. Caught in the ‘disease of the Fortress’, he never ponders that the

circular Fortress routine has no purpose and he simply accepts circularity as a proper way to

structure his life. In other words, Drogo has no perception of the meaninglessness and of the

Absurd.

The illusion of circularity distorts the protagonists’ perception of time. As mentioned

earlier, circularity always repeats itself and never progresses, and therefore it is connected to a

dimension of time that is cyclical and eternal. The man who lives according to a circular

pattern falls into the illusion of living in an eternal dimension of time; or, in other words, he

sees his life always repeating itself and fails to perceive the linear passage of time. Man can

locate himself within linear time only when circularity is revealed as an illusion, and when he

comes to the acknowledgement of his own death. The consciousness of death destroys man’s

illusion of eternity. It causes him to understand that his life proceeds linearly and that his time

is limited, and it makes him conscious of the inevitable passage of time. Again, the

protagonists do not present the same level of awareness in relation to death and to the passage

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of time. Mersault is aware that circularity is an illusion and is conscious of his own mortality.

There is a specific episode in the narration that describes the moment when Mersault comes to

acknowledge mortality, and that is the moment of his mother’s death, narrated in a flashback

to many years before. Before the mother’s death, he conducted a happy life and was not

frustrated by the routine. At the funeral, he begins to show disillusionment towards life; it is

stated that not on his mother but 'sur lui, au vrai, que sa pité se retournait',19 and the reader can

assume that this pity derives from the acknowledgement of his own mortality. Consciousness

of death seems to function here as the catalyst to the perception of the Absurd, as in

Heidegger’s notion of Angst: from the moment of the mother’s death, Mersault becomes

frustrated with circularity and perceives its meaninglessness. Since aware of mortality,

Mersault is able to locate himself within linear time and is aware of its passage.20 He actually

looks forward to the end of time, to death, as the moment that will end his anguish. Drogo, on

the opposite, does not question the illusion of circularity and is not conscious of his own

mortality. This does not mean that Drogo imagines himself as immortal: he knows that he is

destined to die, but cannot fully contemplate the concept: when he imagines the war with the

Tartars, for example, he picture himself surviving the fight. As both Heidegger and Camus

point out, man is not capable of imagining his own death.21 As a result, Drogo fails to locate

himself within linear time. His routine relates to a circular dimension of time and he blindly

subjects himself to it. He does not perceive that his life proceeds linearly, nor that his time is

inevitably passing by.22 Buzzati emphasises Drogo’s unawareness of time in a number of

ways. First, Drogo acts as if his time were inexhaustible. He accepts, in fact, to spend long

periods of time just waiting, and all his life is finally characterised by one waiting after the

other: he has waited to graduate from the military Academy, he waits to be transferred away

from the Fortress, he then begins to expect the Tartars and finally, in old age, he even waits

for the recovery. These waits start when he is young, and he uses his youth to reassure himself

that he still has a long time in front of him and that he can afford wasting some of it just

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waiting. However, this attitude does not change as he ages: old and sick, Drogo is still

convinced that he will have time for what he wants to achieve. To put it simply, he thinks and

acts in the dimension of eternal time.23 Second, Drogo simply does not notice that time goes

by. Life at the Fortress is an endless repetition of the same routine, with little development. In

regard to the few things that actually change, Drogo simply overlooks them: he does not

realise, for example, that some of his habits are actually changing due to the fact that he is

aging. Through most of the narration, as years pass by, he is said to feel always in the same

way, and does not realise that he is growing old. Basically, as all days are the same and Drogo

hardly distinguishes between them, he simply has a sense that time is fixed.24 This perception

is reflected in the narration. As mentioned, vast periods of time are completely omitted, and

there are gaps of up to fifteen years between chapters: because of this expedient, the reader

not only assumes that everything has remained the same, but does not even realise that time is

passing until the narrator states that it has done so. It is the narrator that, while Drogo remains

unaware, reminds the reader of the passage of time. This voice, introduced alongside the

report of Drogo’s thoughts, emphasises the distinction between Drogo’s perception of things

and the reality, and finally prevents the reader from fully identifying with the former. The

narrator, in fact, locates Drogo within a linear dimension of time. While Drogo perceives time

as circular and fixed, the narrator contradicts him and states repeatedly that time is running

by. In particular, it points out to the reader all the indicators of the passage of time that Drogo

fails to notice: his age and the number of years that have passed, first of all, but also the many

transformations that have occurred in the city while life at the Fortress has remained more or

less the same. The reader is reminded of the passage of time also through the motif of water.

Time is often compared to a river that drags human beings along with its flow; and it clearly

recalls Heraclitus’s concept of Panta Rhei, thus emphasising that time passes relentlessly and

things never remain fixed.25 The motif of water, in particular, appears in the form of a drop

that falls at regular intervals in the Fortress cistern, mimicking the ticking of a clock as well as

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the motion inside an hourglass. The sound can be heard from Drogo’s room and acts as a

constant reminder of the passage of time. Drogo’s reaction to the noise reflects his perception

of time: when he has just arrived at the Fortress he is bothered by it, but as he falls into the

‘disease of the Fortress’ he gets used to it to the point that he does not hear it any longer. He

does not perceive the drop fall as he does not perceive time.

To sum up, it has thus far been observed that both protagonists regulate their lives

according to patterns that function within a circular dimension of time; and that Mersault

remains nonetheless aware of the linear temporality of human life, while Drogo falls into the

illusions of circularity and of eternal time. As a result, Mersault is aware of the passage of

time, while Drogo is not. Intuitively, one would imagine that Mersault expects change as

brought by the linear progression of things and thus thinks of his future; and that Drogo, on

the other hand, accepts the cyclical repetition and does not conceive a future. However, the

novels show quite the opposite. Mersault has no expectation whatsoever for his future and,

feeling trapped in circularity, doubts that things are ever going to change. He hypothesises

about alternative ways of living but never locates them in his future. Drogo, on the opposite,

is constantly projecting things in the future. Not only is he projecting: he faithfully trusts that

certain things are going to happen, and for this reason spends his life waiting for them. In

particular, the great future event around which the whole narration is constructed is the arrival

of the Tartar army. Drogo frequently fantasises about the eventual war, and imagines that in

that occasion he will perform the heroic act that will give meaning to his entire existence.26

This distinction, although counter-intuitive, reflects the different concepts of time as

developed by Heidegger. As earlier mentioned, Heidegger states that death is the only truth of

life and therefore that life is lived authentically only in acknowledgement of death. The

authentic being is, as he phrases it, a being-towards-death:27 there is no other truth or meaning

to be sought. Accordingly, he distinguishes two types of temporality: the inauthentic

temporality of man who seeks meaning and the authentic temporality of man who has

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accepted death. Inauthentic temporality is identified with the common conception of time as

chronological, that is to say, the succession of past, present and future. Chronological time is

in fact an abstraction derived from the need to construct meaning. Man uses the past to find

causes and the future to expect consequences, in the belief that he can eventually progress

towards the achievement of his purposes. In other words, he conceives time in a way that can

fit with certain structures of meaning. Needless to say, chronological time is as illusory and

inauthentic as these structures of meaning. As meaning is only an illusion, the expected future

when it will be finally achieved does never come into effect.28 Authentic temporality is

instead derived from the acknowledgement of death and is based on the unity of past, present

and future. The only truthful future is that of death; and by acknowledging death, the

authentic being is constantly projecting himself onto the future. He also accepts his past in its

entirety: while the inauthentic being discriminates the past to determine meaning, the

authentic being acknowledges that his past determines his present in a way that is inexplicable

to him. He simply submits to this determination, or fate, and by doing so acts his past out in

his present. Thus the authentic being always exists in the present intersection of past and

future; only in this way can the present become authentic and truthful.29 Heidegger defines

this intersection as an ecstatic moment of vision, or a kairological dimension of time.

Basically, kairological time is the opposite of chronological time. While chronological time

has a quantitative and measurable value, kairological time has a qualitative one: the

significance of a moment within kairological time exceeds its chronological limitations.30 It is

important to clarify that chronological time is not a better alternative than circular time, and

neither the chronological and circular dimensions of time are mutually exclusive. They are, in

fact, both conceptions of time that respond to the desire to obliterate death. The only authentic

dimension of time that acknowledges human contingency is that of kairological time.

Turning back to the novels, it has been observed that Mersault is conscious of death,

whereas Drogo is not: as a result, Mersault is able to reject inauthentic temporality, while

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Drogo can only conceive time as chronological. Mersault knows that all attempts to construct

meaning are destined to fail, and that the only certain future is that of death. Therefore he

renounces to future expectations and to the chronological construction of time altogether, and

simply accepts to live meaninglessly until death. However, neither does he seem to reach a

kairological dimension of time, at least not in the first part of the novel. His life is all but

structured as a qualitatively significant moment. Mersault is aware of the illusion of

chronological time as he is aware of the illusion of circular time, yet he finds himself trapped

in a certain way of living and feels that forces him to abide by both. He states in fact several

times that his work robs him of time and keeps him from living an authentic life; or as he

phrases it, from ‘earning’ his life.31 Finally, he can only imagine how his life would be if he

could structure his time in a different way, but is initially not able to act on it. Drogo, on the

opposite, has not accepted death or the absurdity of life, and still seeks to construct a meaning

for his existence. He projects the achievement of this meaning onto the future and, although

he continues to live according to a circular pattern, he transforms his life into a constant

expectation. The expectation will never be fulfilled: mirroring Heidegger’s notion that future

meaning is illusory, the occasion that Drogo waits for and that will give a sense to his

existence never becomes reality. Drogo, in fact, will never be able to confront the Tartars in

war. Throughout the narration, Buzzati presents to the reader two different perspectives on

Drogo’s expectation. On the one hand, he voices Drogo’s thoughts: the reader, if he identifies

with the protagonist, falls into the same illusion that the attack will actually take place. On the

other hand, Buzzati also provides the reader with a number of clues that suggest that the army

is only a legend, and thus that the expectation is illusory. First, as mentioned, the Tartars have

not attacked in centuries, to the point that it is suggested that they are only a legend spread

and passed on by the soldiers. At the military headquarters, the Fortress is not considered an

important outpost: as the general met by Drogo states, there is no threat coming from that

border. This becomes more and more evident through the narration, as the Fortress

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complement is periodically reduced. Second, at a certain point an army is actually spotted in

the desert, but the soldiers’ immediate excitement then disappears: the army does not pose

any threat and only intends to demarcate the border. At the end, however, the question of the

existence of the Tartars remains open to the reader. A second army is spotted in the desert,

and it appears that this time the Tartars have finally arrived; but Drogo, by now old and sick,

is sent away from the Fortress before he gets the chance to confront the army. What is

important to the plot and to this investigation is not whether the Tartars really exist, but that

they do not provide the occasion that will give meaning to Drogo’s life. In relation to Drogo

only, the expectation of the Tartars and of the heroic act proves to have been an illusion, and

the future that he much waited for never becomes reality. Actually, as Drogo's death and the

arrival of the Tartars occur almost simultaneously, Buzzati seems to suggest that the Tartars

are a symbol of death, and that thus death was the only future that Drogo could expect.

However, failing to realise that, he organises his life according to the same circular and

meaningless patter; unaware that his time is inevitably running by, he ends up waiting for the

Tartars his entire existence.

At this point, the second part of the novels can be taken into consideration; and that

concerns the ways in which the protagonists escape the circularity of their routines, and the

chronological perception of time in Drogo’s case, and reach Heidegger’s moment of vision,

that is, the kairological dimension of time. In La Mort Heureuse, the question of how to gain

time is faced in the dialogue between Mersault and Zagreus in chapter four; and the following

chapters then describe Mersault’s effort towards this goal. Camus, in an earlier version, had

actually chosen for the second part of the novel the title 'Gaining Time', opposed to the title of

the first part, 'Killing Time'.32 In light of the above analysis, it is possible to identify the act of

'killing time' with a circular temporality, and the act of 'gaining time' will the kairological

temporality that Mersault will achieve in the end. So Mersault and Zagreus discuss a series of

principles by which kairological time can be achieved, which Mersault will later put into

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practice; these principles present an evident resemblance with the three consequences of the

Absurd that Camus describes in Le Mythe of Sisyphe, to the extent that, one could argue, they

are possibly an earlier version of them. These consequences are the following: révolte, liberté

and passion.33 Révolte is defined as the constant contemplation of the Absurd34, and

resembles the acknowledgement of death at the basis of kairological time. Man who is in a

state of revolt knows that he is condemned to meaninglessness, yet keeps challenging it and

does not resign to irrationality.35 Mersault openly states that he is 'en état de révolte'36, and for

this reason he cannot be content in his work routine and in circularity. He is frustrated

because he constantly acknowledges its absurdity. Liberté is derived from the realisation that

all structures of meaning are illusory, which is also a premise to kairological time. Man

obtains freedom when he chooses not to abide by these structures, and that includes

circularity.37 Mersault recognises that circular work routine precludes his freedom, and

imagines that he would otherwise be able to structure his time in a different way. The reason

why Mersault continues to work is, quite simply, that he needs money to survive. Hence,

freedom is achieved through the murder of Zagreus, when he takes possession of Zagreus’s

savings. Only then he escapes circularity and can regulate his life within kairological

temporality. Finally, passion is the act of 'vivre le plus', of appreciating the whole experience

of life in spite of its absurdity.38 For this case, the comparison with kairological temporality is

apparent: passion is in fact accomplished only through a specific attitude towards time, and

this attitude pretty much structures it as kairological. Camus introduces passion as based on

'l'indifférence à l'avenir et la passion d'épusier tout ce qui est donné'.39 The 'indifférence à

l'avenir' can be viewed as a consequence of its lack of meaning, so as in kairological

temporality future is annihilated because there is no progression towards a purpose; and

although there is no mention of the past, the 'passion d'épusier tout' mirrors the full acceptance

of things as determined that Heidegger refers to. Passion is the appreciation of the present

regardless of its chronological definition. It leads to a qualitative intensification of the present,

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which can be in a way associated to a kairological dimension of time. In the dialogue with

Zagreus, Mersault proves to be already aware and longing for passion; and he in fact imagines

that, if liberated from his work routine, he would live passionately and enjoy indiscriminately

everything that happens to him. He aspires, in other words, to constant kairological

presentness.

The second part of the novel narrates Mersault’s progression towards the final

achievement of kairological time. He is not able to live passionately immediately after he

liberates himself from work through Zagreus’s murder: instead, he goes through a number of

stages before accomplishing his purpose. These can be identified through the different

locations where he travels. First, he arrives in Prague. For the first time, he is free from work

and able to structure his time as he pleases; yet all he does is just impose another schedule on

his life, which very much resembles his previous routine. Time is still regulated according to

precise markers, as in the dimension of public and circular time, and Mersault’s attitude soon

starts resembling that of the first art of the novel: he follows his schedule mechanically until

he completes it every day, and is then faced with emptiness and can only let time pass waiting

for the next day. His life is still void of passion. Mersault is then reminded of the Absurd by

the sight of a dead man, and this brings him back to his initial intent and convinces him to

move away from Prague.40 The question of time is emphasised once again during his journey

by train, where the speed of the vehicle reminds him of Zagreus’s words: 'il faut du temps

pour vivre'41, he remembers. Time here can be interpreted as to refer to kairological time: it is

not merely free time that he needs, that he already had in Prague, but a different kind of

temporality. He travels through a number of locations in Austria and in Italy, until he decides

to go back to Algeria; there he moves into the so-called Maison devant le Monde. At the

Maison devant le Monde, Mersault and the other residents conduct a life of pure pleasure.

Time seems to be completely annihilated. The narration suddenly adopts the present tense,

there are no time markers whatsoever and it is not clear how much time Mersault spends at

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the Maison overall. He then suddenly chooses to leave. It is not clear what prompts Mersault

to this decision: the only explanation that he gives is that he 'risquerai(t) d'y être aimé'42 by

another resident of the House, Catherine, and 'ça (lui) empecherait d'être heureux'.43 In a

sense, any human relationship creates an illusion of meaning that contradicts the Absurd. One

could argue that the perception of the Absurd is obliterated altogether whilst at the House.

Mersault lives in a kind of happy mindlessness, and that lacks the sense of revolt that is

necessary to confront the Absurd and live authentically.44 At last, he settles down in Le

Chenua village. Here, Mersault appears to have finally reached a state of passion, and that is

reflected in the way he regulates his life and conceives temporality. He starts each day with a

long swim that is said to leave him in a state 'd'abandon et de lassitude heureuse'45, and then

simply enjoys the rest of the day and does not define any specific plan or schedule.

This way of living allows him to reject any chronological definition of time and adjust

to kairological temporality. First, it presupposes that Mersault has no expectations and thus

does not conceive any future; but also it entails the indiscriminate compliance with all things

that happen to him. In particular, the mention of a 'destin sur mesure'46 recalls Heidegger’s

notion of the past determination of the present; and as kairological time calls for an

acceptance of the past in its entirety, Mersault is said to have to subject to this 'destin sur

mesure'. Second, by this way of living Mersault achieves a state of passion and of constant

presentness. Passion is expressed through the enjoyment of sensual pleasure, and in particular

of the physical sensations derived from nature: from the sun, but also and especially from the

water. Water acquires here a different connotation than in Il Deserto dei Tartari. Whereas

Buzzati represents water as a flow, Camus links it to the sea, and presents Meursault’s

morning swim as an emblem of the sensual communion with nature.47 Some critics have

argued that, in this section of the novel, Mersault simply submerges himself into nature and

into physical sensations, and enacts a full renunciation to his consciousness and sense of

self.48 According to this interpretation, he would fail to confront the Absurd. The dimension

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of time represented, rather than kairological, would be simply the cyclical and eternal time of

nature. It is true that all time markers in this section refer to the seasons and to natural

transformations; and that time passes quickly, with a few pages in chapter five covering

several years, and seems to elude Mersault’s consciousness. However, this interpretation is

contradicted by Mersault’s own words: he emphasises the importance of 'une sorte d'énorme

conscience toujours présente"49, which is not suppressed by sensual enjoyment and does not

disappear in a fusion with nature. Mersault remains thus also aware of the Absurd and

achieves authentic passion50. His state of conscious presentness gives to every moment a

qualitative significance. As stated, 'quelque chose d'éternel se figurait pour lui en chaque

seconde51: time has ultimately become kairological.

There is no equivalent progress towards kairological temporality in Il Deserto dei

Tartari. Drogo in fact keeps abiding by his illusions of circular and chronological time until

the last chapter of the novel, when he is forced away from the Fortress. Only at that point, the

protagonist he envisions his own death and perceives the Absurd. Accordingly, also his

conception of time changes only in the last pages of the novel. He is obviously forced out of

the circularity of the Fortress; but also, he exposes the illusion of chronological time. For the

first time, in fact, Drogo renounces to the long sustained expectations of meaning and does

not contemplate any future. The present moment, he realises, is his only occasion to perform

the desired heroic act. This sole moment, therefore, is lived to the fullest, with the same

presentness shown by Mersault; and although there is no intensification of sensual pleasure as

there is for Mersault, the ultimate result is also that of endowing one moment with a

significance that exceeds its chronological limitations. At this point, chronological time does

not matter any longer and it seems that 'la fuga del tempo si fosse fermata'.52 Time acquires a

qualitative value and starts to be conceived as kairological. Contrary to La Mort Heureuse, in

Il Deserto dei Tartari the new dimension of time is not sustained for long, and is linked to

Drogo’s imminent death. There is almost no time frame between the acknowledgement of the

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Absurd and of mortality, and the actual moment of death. One could argue that, while Camus

describes an alternative truthful way of living, Buzzati claims that inauthentic life cannot be

escaped until death.53 In any case, within the dimension of kairological time, duration has no

importance. Duration relates in fact to a quantitative measurement of time that is connected to

chronological temporality, and does not express the qualitative character of kairological

temporality.54 Mersault exists for a few years within the dimension of kairological time, yet he

is constantly present and is not affected by the passage of time, to the point that to him it 'peu

importait qu'il fut deux ou vingt années'.55 In the same way, Drogo focuses only on a present

significant moment that is not chronologically quantifiable, and thus is not concerned by the

length of time he is left to live.

However, when it comes to the actual moment of death, Mersault and Drogo have

radically different attitudes. To Mersault, the moment of death is only 'un accident'.56 He has

accepted the Absurd as well as his own mortality, and throughout his life he has chosen to

remain conscious of both meaninglessness and of the eventuality of death. This has allowed

him to conduct an authentic existence; but also, more precisely, it has led him to happiness.

Camus emphasises that the authentic existence is, in a way, the best life that man can conduct:

one by which man is granted a sort of dignity that derives from the stoic rejection of illusory

structures in favour of the truths of death and of the Absurd, but that also is appreciated

passionately and to the fullest.57 The authentic being, or in Camus’s definition the Absurd

hero, is dignified and happy. Kairological temporality releases this happiness from its

chronological limitations, and endows it with a much greater qualitative value. At the moment

of death, therefore, Mersault must not only confirm his acceptance of mortality, but must be

thoroughly content with his life. Happiness is not annihilated by the imminent death, because

'la bonheur était qu'il fut". 58 Paradoxically, although the consciousness of death has

determined Mersault’s life, the moment of death does not seem to matter. For Drogo, the

moment of death defines the authentic existence. First, as mentioned, he can accept mortality

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and the Absurd, and thus access kairological time, only when this moment is imminent. But

also, he is said to be willing to die: not only does he acknowledge and tolerate mortality, but

also he makes a conscious effort to go towards death, he 'varca con il piede fermo il limite

dell'ombra'.59 He transforms in this way the moment of death into the occasion for the heroic

act that he had long expected: by going towards the certainty of death, Drogo proves the

courage and dignity that makes him worthy as a human being.60 The moment of death is the

kairological moment, qualitatively significant, that at once ends and justifies Drogo’s life.61

Only in this very moment, Drogo achieves the authentic existence and finds happiness;

finally, as the novel concludes, 'benché nessuno lo veda, sorride'.62

Overall, it has been observed that both La Mort Heureuse and Il Deserto dei Tartari

present the contrast between two, if not more, conceptions of time. The protagonists initially

abide by the illusory, circular pattern dictated by public time, and that causes a sense of

estrangement and Absurd to Mersault, while it drives Drogo into the illusions of eternity and

chronological time. Death, whether as the mother’s death for Mersault or the foreshadowing

of his own for Drogo, exposes the illusion of circularity. In a way, the protagonists perceive

the clash between two different temporalities: that of the repetitive circularity, seemingly

endless, and that of the linear progress towards death. This clash can be considered an

example of the Absurd, and to a certain extent one could argue that it is at the origins of

Camus’s definition in Le Mythe de Sisyphe. Circularity is defied only by shifting from circular

to kairological temporality. Although at very different points in the narration, both

protagonists reach kairological temporality, and are able to endow any present moment with

qualitative significance. At the end, Camus and Buzzati both convey what ultimately appears

as a positive humanistic message. They acknowledge the Absurd and the consequent angst

that befalls on men; yet they do not opt for inauthentic and illusory solution, nor they adopt a

nihilistic perspective over life. Instead, the kairological moment becomes the essence of

authentic existence; it constitutes a final act of redemption, which stems from the courageous

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acceptance of things as they are and provides dignity. And ultimately, it is the kairological

moment that defies the nihilism of the Absurd and, providing an answer to the basic

existentialist question of existence, makes human life worth living.

                                                                                                               1  Meyerhoff Time in Literature (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp.6-7 2  Meyerhof, pp.2 3 Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp.39 4 Warnock, Existentialism (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp.2-10. 5 Sarocchi, 'Afterword to La Mort Heureuse', A Happy Death (2002), p.107. 6 Ibid., pp.113-114. 7 Genette, Figures of Literary Discourse (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp.128-136. 8 Ricoeur, "Narrative Time", Critical Inquiry, 7/1 (1980), p.174. 9 Meyerhof, Time in Literature, pp.5-6. 10 Ibid., p.6. 11 Camus, La Mort Heureuse, p.42. 12 Buzzati, p.46. 13 Cavallini, Buzzati: il Limite dell’Ombra (Roma: Studium, 1997, pp.93-94. 14 Heidegger, pp.169-219. 15 Hoffman, 'Death, time, history', The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, pp. 197-199. 16 Heidegger, pp.149-163. 17 Camus, Le Mythe de Sisyphe, p.18. 18 Ibid., p.18. 19 Camus, La Mort Heureuse, p.41. 20 A similar episode in Camus's Cahiers further justifies this claim. It relates the death of a lorry-driver's wife: the lorry-driver’s reacts by‘realize(ing) how old he was’ (Camus, A Happy Death, p.125). 21 Camus, Le Mythe de Sisyphe, p.30. 22 Biaggi, Buzzati: i Luoghi del Mistero (Padova: Messaggero, 2001), pp.85-86. 23 Cavallini, p.63. 24 Ibid., p.61. 25 Ibid., p.29. 26 Caratazzolo La Finestra sul Deserto: a Oriente di Buzzati (Acireale: Bonanno, 2006), pp.53-54. 27 Heidegger, pp.294-295. 28 Ibid., pp.219-224. 29 Ibid., pp.383-421. 30 Murchada, The Time of Revolution (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), pp.18-25. 31 Camus, A Happy Death, p.32. 32 Sarocchi, pp.112-113. 33 Camus, Le Mythe de Sisyphe, p.88. 34 Ibid, pp.77-78.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         35 Ibid., pp.76-77. 36 Camus, La Mort Heureuse, p.74. 37 Camus, Le Mythe de Sisyphe, pp.82-83. 38 Camus, Le Mythe de Sisyphe, p.86. 39 Ibid., p.84. 40 Ellison, Understanding Albert Camus (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), pp.31-32. 41 Camus, La Mort Heureuse, p.115. 42 Ibid., p.155. 43 Ibid., p.155. 44 Hanna, The Thought and Art of Albert Camus (Chicago: H. Reignery, 1958), pp.3-9. 45 Camus, La Mort Heureuse, p.168. 46 Ibid., p.182. 47 Sagi, Albert Camus and the Philosophy of the Absurd (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), p.36. 48 Strauss, 'A Reading of Camus’s La Mort Heureuse', Critical Insights Camus (Pasadena: Salem Press, 2012). 49 Camus, La Mort Heureuse, p.178 50 Ellison, p.35. 51 Camus, La Mort Heureuse, p.169. 52 Buzzati, p.199. 53 Baggi, pp.83-84. 54 Meyerhof, pp.16-17. 55 Camus, La Mort Heureuse, p.53. 56 Ibid., p.180. 57 Hanna, pp.24-25. 58 Camus, La Mort Heureuse, p.202. 59 Buzzati, p.200 60 Caratozzolo, La Finestra sul Deserto: a Oriente di Buzzati (Acireale: Bonanno, 2006), p.40 61 Biondi, Il Tempo e l’Evento (Roma: Bulzoni Editore, 2010), p.107. 62 Buzzati, p.202.

Appendix

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Synopsis of La Mort Heureuse

Mersault lives in the apartment in Algiers left to him by his deceased mother, works as a clerk

and occasionally sees his lover Marthe. He is frustrated by his job and his life in general.

Marthe introduces him to Zagreus, a rich and crippled man. After a long discussion with

Zagreus, Mersault kills him and takes his money. Mersault leaves Algiers and travels through

Prague, Vienna and Genoa. He returns to Algeria where he stays with friends at the House

Above the World, where he conducts a life of pleasures. He then moves out of the House to a

Le Chenua village, where he practises a simple life. At the end of the novel, he falls ill and

dies.

Synopsis of Il Deserto dei Tartari

Drogo has just graduated from the military Academy and is sent to the Fortress, an outpost

bordering the desert. When he realises that there is no chance of a war, he asks to be

transferred but then accepts to wait for four months. After four months, upon getting the

certificate for leaving the Fortress, he decides to stay. Life at the Fortress proceeds orderly

and unchanged except for few major events: the soldiers Lazzari and Angustina die, an army

is spotted by then revealed as not threatening. Drogo returns to the city twice, but in neither

case chooses to remain. Finally, an army is spotted one more time in the desert, but it takes

decades before it gets any closer. At the end of the novel, it is announced that the Tartars have

arrived, but Drogo is sick and moved away before the war. He then dies on his way back to

the city.

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Primary texts

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Buzzati Dino, Il Deserto dei Tartari (Milano: Oscar Mondadori, 1995)

Camus Albert, La Mort Heureuse (Paris: Gallimard, 1971)

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Buzzati Dino, The Tartars’ Desert, trans. by Stuart C. Hood (New York: Farras, Straus &

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Camus Albert, A Happy Death, trans. by Richard Howard (London: Penguin Books, 2002)

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