Building Peace with Conflict Diamonds? Merging Security and Development in Sierra Leone

Building Peace with Conflict Diamonds? MergingSecurity and Development in Sierra Leone

Philippe Le Billon and Estelle Levin

ABSTRACT

This article examines the merging of security and development agendas inprimary commodity sectors, focusing on the case of peace-building reformsin Sierra Leone’s diamond sector. Reformers frequently assume that reform-ing the diamond sector through industrializing alluvial diamond mining willreduce threats to security and development, thereby contributing to peacebuilding. Our findings, however, suggest that the industrialization of allu-vial diamond mining that has taken place in Sierra Leone has not reducedthreats to security and development, as it has entailed human rights abusesand impoverishment of local communities without consolidating state fiscalrevenues and trust in local authorities. This suggests alternative strategies forresource-related peace-building initiatives, which we consider at the end ofthe article: the decriminalization of informal economic activities; the priori-tization of local livelihoods and development needs over central governmentfiscal priorities and foreign direct investment; and better integration betweenlocal economies and industrial resource exploitation.

INTRODUCTION

The merging of security and development concerns has come to dominateaid policy over the past decade. Donors and policy makers, in particu-lar, have frequently assumed that these two agendas are compatible, asexemplified in 2005 by the motto ‘no development without security, nosecurity without development’ (Annan, 2005: 55). Within this agenda, pri-mary commodity sectors figure prominently (Collier et al., 2003). So-called‘conflict commodities’ are perceived as a security threat for both domes-tic and international peace, through increasing the risk of prolonged orrenewed conflicts and sustaining criminal and terrorist networks. Severalstudies have found a positive, if limited, security impact for initiatives cur-tailing access to ‘conflict commodities’ by peace spoilers (Heupel, 2006; LeBillon and Nicholls, 2007). The ‘resource curse’ argument stresses the dele-terious impact of resource wealth and dependence on development, with

The authors wish to acknowledge field assistance from Babar Turay and comments from referees,as well as funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.

Development and Change 40(4): 693–715 (2009). C© Institute of Social Studies 2009. Publishedby Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St.,Malden, MA 02148, USA

694 Philippe Le Billon and Estelle Levin

governance and economic failures constituting a threat to political stabil-ity and the security of populations (Auty, 2001; Le Billon, 2001; Ross,2004).

By merging security and development agendas, reforms in primary com-modity sectors seek to promote conditions for a self-sustaining peace(Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2004). Yet reforms merging security and devel-opment in the resource sectors have been heavily criticized. Some of thesecritiques echo more general concerns about narrow concepts of state-centricsecurity, particularly those allied with neoliberal development prescriptions,that risk reinforcing (neo)colonial relationships, aggravating inequalities,and increasing human rights abuses, in part through overlooking the factthat, in the words of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (2005: 55), ‘bothdevelopment and security also depend on respect for human rights and therule of law [as well as democracy]’ (see Duffield, 2001; Paris, 2004). Othercritiques are specific to commodity issues, such as the concern that reformsmerging security and development serve external interests rather than ad-dressing the causes of conflicts and poverty (Cooper, 2002), and criminalizeartisanal modes of commodity extraction in favour of industrial ventures(Lahiri-Dutt, 2006).

In this article, we engage with this debate through examining the case ofdiamond sector reforms in Sierra Leone. Our main argument is that state-centred notions of security often prevail over broader understandings ofsecurity, including human rights and local livelihoods. In turn, this prioriti-zation of a narrow understanding of security is leading to a broader set ofsecurity problems. Drawing from the experiences of several conflict-affecteddiamond-producing countries and focusing on the case of Sierra Leone, wepresent evidence suggesting that security-driven preference for industrialdiamond mining over artisanal mining can undermine state consolidationand poverty alleviation — the twin tenets of the security and developmentagenda.1 Our analysis of the case of Sierra Leone also acknowledges prob-lems stemming from artisanal mining, allowing us to point to the difficultiesand ambivalent outcomes of initiatives seeking to reform rather than interdictartisanal diamond mining.

Following this introduction, the second section outlines arguments link-ing diamonds, underdevelopment and war, and briefly reviews the maininitiatives seeking to target these linkages. We explain why peace-buildingperspectives merging security and development tend to support industrialover artisanal mining, and we briefly review situations in several conflict-affected diamond-producing countries. In the third section, we examine thecase of Sierra Leone, building on an artisanal mining livelihood survey con-ducted at the height of the ‘post-conflict’ diamond rush in 2004 in the Kono

1. This research draws on field studies conducted in Sierra Leone between 2001 and 2007, aswell as participant observation in several conflict diamond international policy events.

Security and Development in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Sector 695

District, to suggest that misperceptions about artisanal mining encouragedexcessive emphasis on formalization and industrialization of the sector as apeace-building strategy. We also briefly discuss the ambiguities and lim-itations of ‘post-conflict’ diamond sector reforms in Sierra Leone, with afocus on US Government-funded initiatives. We conclude by discussingimplications for resource-related peace-building initiatives, such as the de-criminalization of informal economic activities, the prioritization of lo-cal livelihoods and development needs over central government fiscalpriorities and foreign direct investment, and a search for complemen-tarities and synergies between local economies and industrial resourceexploitation.

MERGING SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE DIAMOND SECTOR

The diamond sector constitutes an interesting case for examining the issuesraised by the merging of security and development, as the concept of ‘conflictdiamonds’ contributed to reframing analyses of contemporary armed con-flicts and peace-building initiatives over the past decade. Diamonds havebeen linked to a wide range of security concerns, from interpersonal vio-lence associated with theft and land conflicts, to regional conflict diffusion,and international terrorism (Le Billon, 2008). Diamonds figure prominentlyamong ‘conflict commodities’ prolonging civil wars (Fearon, 2004), andhave come under more UN Security Council sanctions than any other com-modity, not to mention policy studies and massive media coverage, whilerough diamond trade is subject to the international Kimberley Process Cer-tification Scheme (KPCS) seeking to prevent ‘conflict diamond’ laundering(Smillie, 2005).

Diamonds have also been linked with numerous development concerns,including exploitative labour relations, persistent poverty within miningcommunities, agricultural land and environmental degradation, and poorgovernance characterized by corruption and high levels of income inequal-ity (Goreux, 2001; Hilson, 2002). Yet the developmental potential of di-amonds has also been demonstrated, both at the macroeconomic levelas in the case of Botswana (Acemoglu et al., 2003), and at the microe-conomic level among some local communities in artisanal mining ar-eas (Hilson, 2002; Maconachie and Binns, 2007; Monnier et al., 2001;Pegg, 2006). With a worldwide rough diamond annual production repre-senting about US$ 12 billion with major corporate, public revenue andemployment interests in about thirty countries (KPCS, 2006), diamondsrepresent a development opportunity, in particular for otherwise poor sub-Saharan African countries. Countries are best placed to harness this de-velopment potential and reduce security risks when they benefit from alarge per capita diamond endowment, are not highly dependent on dia-mond revenues, have robust checks and balances over revenue collection


and distribution, and are able to control access to diamonds (Le Billon,2008).2

Empirical studies of diamonds and armed conflicts have stressed that thearticulation of diamond exploitation with armed conflicts varies with typesof diamond deposits and modes of exploitation (Le Billon, 2008; Lujalaet al., 2005; Ross, 2006; Snyder, 2006; Snyder and Bhavanani, 2005). Pri-mary or kimberlite deposits — which generally require large-scale industrialexploitation, are often associated with larger reserve endowments, are rel-atively easy for government to tax, and are less accessible to rebels —have a dampening effect on the incidence of war. In contrast, secondaryor alluvial diamond deposits — which can be mined through artisanal orsmall-scale exploitation, are associated with smaller reserves, are more dif-ficult to tax, and are more accessible to rebels — positively correlate withthe incidence (or relative frequency) of war, especially in poor countries.To caricature the differences, industrial kimberlite exploitation seems tobring peace (and prosperity), while artisanal alluvial exploitation seems tobring war (and misery). As discussed below, donors and governments havethus often privileged industrial mining of alluvial diamond deposits andpromoted exploration to find kimberlitic deposits as a means of attempt-ing to influence the mode of exploitation and thereby reduce the risk ofconflict.

Contrasting Industrial and Artisanal Diamond Mining

How can we assess the respective advantages and drawbacks of industrial andartisanal mining, the two main modes of (alluvial) diamond production, in re-lation to security and development objectives?3 This is an important debate,given that conflicts have affected one in two African diamond-producing

2. Three arguments are conventionally made with respect to the links between resourcesand armed conflicts. The ‘resource curse’ argument suggests that resource abundance anddependence have negative effects on economic and institutional performances. Yet resourceabundance may in fact reduce conflict likelihood, and dependence may itself result fromprevious conflict. The ‘resource conflict’ argument associates resource exploitation withconflicts and violence (e.g. conflicts over property rights of mining plots, violent theft andpolice repression in mining areas). Finally, and most prominently, the ‘conflict resource’argument presents diamonds as opportunities for belligerents to sustain and profit fromhostilities, with such opportunities shaping the motives, structure and behaviour of armedgroups.

3. Artisanal and industrial mining are defined and regulated very differently internationally. InSierra Leone, artisanal mining is defined as ‘operations carried out in the course of miningthat do not involve capital expenditure in excess of US$ 0.5 million or the equivalent, the useof specialized technology for the production of limited amounts of a mineral from depositswith few known ore reserves of a character not amenable to mass mining’ (Government ofSierra Leone, 1994: 2).


countries over the past decade.4 Most of these countries have sought toreassert control over diamond mining and revenue collection through indus-trialization and the formalization or curtailment of artisanal diamond mining,strategies presented as simultaneously re-establishing ‘security’ and promot-ing ‘development’. Varying in their degree of physical brutality and levels ofdispossession of miners and local communities, these processes have oftenreceived the (tacit) support of international mining companies, industry asso-ciations, foreign donors, international agencies and even some anti-conflictdiamond campaigning NGOs (Spiegel, 2008).

On the one hand, the assumption that greater diamond abundance shouldincrease state revenues, thereby improving political stability and economicgrowth (Davis, 1995), has underpinned reforms aimed at increasing produc-tion through foreign direct investment-driven industrialization. The recog-nition that translating resource abundance into fiscal revenues requires anefficient ‘tax handle’ (Oomes and Vocke, 2003; Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005)also suggests that consolidated industrial exploitation, which offers the bestavenue for efficient tax collection (Killick, 1973), should be the preferredstrategy — even if Snyder (2006) suggests that political order can be pre-served in the face of hard to tax (or ‘lootable’) resources through jointpublic–private extraction. Industrialization also minimizes the negative im-pacts of resource growth — such as local currency overvaluation and labourshortages — on other sectors, as it reduces labour diversion into the dia-mond sector (Oomes and Vocke, 2003). Industrial ventures are presentedas modern, efficient and governable, and as agents of development throughcontributions to infrastructure building and staff training. Finally, industri-alization through foreign companies may also strengthen foreign relationswith the home government of these companies. Donor countries tend toallocate more aid to trading partners (Berthelemy and Tichit, 2004), andare more likely to put a premium on domestic political stability. Awardingindustrial mining contracts may thus ‘win friends’ for the host government,a situation prevalent among many major oil producers.

In contrast to industrial mining, artisanal production is frequently pre-sented as technologically backward and inefficient, with only limited poten-tial as a poverty reduction activity, especially in the case of ‘rushes’ typicalof post-conflict situations, given their negative social and environmentalimpacts and their brief time span (Labonne, 2002). Artisanal mining is alsoperceived as ungovernable due to the large number of actors involved andtheir transient character, as well as to a supposed lack of property rightsand social contracts compared to industrial mining (Goreux, 2001). The

4. Taking the form of civil wars, coups d’etat or brutal government repression, these con-flicts have exacerbated security and development concerns over diamond sectors, mostprominently in Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but alsoin Liberia and Ivory Coast, as well as in Guinea, the Central African Republic and mostrecently in Zimbabwe (Le Billon, 2008; PAC, 2008).


artisanal sector is frequently depicted as a generally anarchic, violent andcrime-ridden ‘fertile ground’ for insurrection (Le Billon, 2006). Part of thisviolent character would result from the massive influx of migrant youthsexacerbating grievances and polarization, notably with local communities.The general hypothesis is thus that industrialization will do more for securityand development through state consolidation and poverty alleviation thanartisanal mining.

A more nuanced assessment of the effects of artisanal mining on stateconsolidation and poverty alleviation suggests several counterarguments.First, the positive economic impacts of artisanal mining may be underesti-mated. In fiscal terms, ‘high risk’ contexts tend to reduce taxation rates. Taxholidays and full profit repatriation are frequently offered by ‘post-conflict’governments to attract foreign industrial ventures — not to mention ineptnegotiations or outright corruption. In contrast, there is little need to attractdomestic entrepreneurs and workers eager to rebuild their lives after the war,and imported goods used in the artisanal sector are often channelled throughfully taxed circuits. Also, the value added tax paid by many small-scaleoperators, when it exists, is not reimbursed (Hentschel et al., 2002). Themacroeconomic contribution of artisanal mining can also be underestimateddue to lack of accounting for smuggled production, and use of gross do-mestic product measures rather than net national product (Stewart, 1989).At the microeconomic level, artisanal mining can contribute to poverty al-leviation despite significant occupational and community health costs andenvironmental impacts (Hilson, 2002). Financing of artisanal mining is gen-erally performed by financial intermediaries connecting rural economieswith broader markets (Zack-Williams, 1995). Although often described as‘predatory’ and enticing miners into the consumption of non-productive‘luxury goods’, these ‘supporters’ do provide an important relay and sourceof capital for rural economies and provide relief as patrons when neces-sary. Whereas artisanal mining is negatively presented as impoverishing,it is frequently a poverty-driven activity. People typically turn to it in theface of natural disasters, economic decline or conflict (De Boeck, 1998).Artisanal mining booms have followed rather than preceded economic re-cession, and have contributed to the stabilization of the economy, therebyreversing the resource curse argument while providing a valuable sourceof income for the poorest members of society (Heemskerk, 2001). Arti-sanal mining is also attractive when compared with, or in complement to,subsistence agrarian livelihoods due to its potential to provide cash re-turns, which is proving increasingly important as African economies aremodernized.

Second, artisanal mining generates a high level of employment with apotential for consolidating peace. Such employment can reduce conflicts andcrime, notably by providing an outlet for disenfranchised youth. As arguedby a foreign aid official caricaturing ‘dangerous’ male youths, ‘I prefer tosee these guys knee-deep in the mud digging for diamonds, than roaming


the streets of the capital’.5 Artisanal mining fields have often provided anescape for youths frustrated or excluded by oppressive customary authorities(King, 1979; Peters and Richards, 1998). The desperation of populationsfacing failed and oppressive agrarian or urban institutions and economiesshould thus be acknowledged, notably the domestic and colonial legacies ofservitude and humiliation in agrarian spaces shaping hopes of emancipationin the mining fields (De Boeck, 2001; King, 1979; Richards, 2005).

Third, evidence suggests that natural resource export dependence in-creases the risk of corruption (Leite and Weidmann, 2002). Industrializationconcentrates resource revenues and can thus increase the risk of corruptionat higher levels of government and skew revenue allocation at the expenseof producing areas. Such concentrated high-level corruption can reduce thelegitimacy of the ruling elite and negatively affect the economy, althoughone should stress that it is also more likely to result in monopolistic formsof corruption that may not have as much of a negative impact on politicalstability as competitive forms of corruption potentially associated with arti-sanal mining (Le Billon, 2003; on oil see Fjelde, 2009). Resources amenableto artisanal exploitation, such as alluvial diamonds, are more easily accessi-ble to rebel groups but would also be less likely to motivate insurrection inthe first place than those marginalizing local populations through industrialexploitation, thereby reducing the risk of secessionist conflicts (Buhaug andRød, 2006; Ross, 2004).

Fourth, artisanal mining is generally characterized neither by a lack ofproperty rights, nor by an absence of social contract within the mining com-munity. The problem is not about property rights not being assigned, butabout incompatible property rights between local populations, customaryand ‘modern’ central government authorities, compounded by regulatoryauthorities which often favour larger operators in the allocation (and revi-sion) of property rights. Surveys on the ground often reveal a high degree ofsocial and technical efforts put into defining and asserting property rights.Similarly, there usually exists a social contract (even if exploitative) withinthe artisanal mining group, amongst the diggers or miners themselves, aswell as between the diggers, the supervisors and capital providers or ‘sup-porters’ (Levin, 2005; Monnier et al., 2001). Rather than the absence ofproperty rights, it is the absence of a social contract between the miners andthe state that constitutes a problem. This absence of a social contract oftenresults from the criminalization of miners, the main objective of which isto legitimize the coercion imposed on miners and local communities in theprocess of establishing industrial property rights.

Finally, while an artisanal mining rush can indeed bring about grievancesand polarization between the migrant mining and local population, thereare also many instances of ‘symbiotic’ relationships, notably because themigrant mining population provides a source of income through land access

5. Interview with donor agency official, London, December 2005.


fees and as a market for local food production. In contrast the industrial-ization of a mining sector, especially without care for contribution to localeconomies, can pit local mining communities against the state and the com-panies it is protecting. In terms of polarization, artisanal mining can opposelocal communities to individual migrants or groups. Such conflicts, how-ever, mostly remain at the interpersonal or communal level. In contrast,industrial mining can polarize communities at the national level over issuesof regional dispossession (e.g. secessionist struggles) and unequal access torevenues (e.g. national level distribution of mining revenues). Compared toartisanal mining, industrial mining may thus have a higher risk of violenceescalation. Anecdotally, large-scale violence has resulted from the expul-sion of artisanal miners by army-backed industrial ventures, and from thepolarization of grievances by local communities against (foreign) industrialventures and national elites. This proposition remains untested, however,with arguments on both sides.

To sum up, conventional arguments suggest that diamond mining indus-trialization can achieve security and development objectives, but significantcounter-arguments can be made to support policies favouring artisanal min-ing. Geology can provide little choice, with kimberlitic deposits most oftenrequiring industrial mining. For alluvial deposits the choice, from a devel-opment perspective, often hinges on the desire to increase fiscal revenue(through industrialization) versus providing more direct employment op-portunities (through artisanal mining). Industrial and artisanal mining can‘peacefully’ co-exist, particularly in cases where diamantiferous areas canbe allocated to the most adequate mode of exploitation (CASM, 2008; ILO,1999). Yet governments are often wary of artisanal mining for fear of un-dermining fiscal revenues, deterring foreign direct investment and incitingpopulation movements and diamond smuggling, while companies are eagerto extend project development opportunities and wary of encroachment ontheir existing concessions by artisanal miners.

Accordingly, most conflict-affected diamond producing countries inAfrica have renewed industrialization policies over the past decade. Ex-periences vary across these countries, but some cases (notably Angola andZimbabwe) have been characterized by violent evictions of artisanal min-ers and dispossession of local communities. This violence not only echoedrecent and brutal population displacement by government security forces,but also reflected the acquiescence of international actors seeking to bring‘order’ into diamond mining.

In Angola, the peace that resulted from government military victory overthe rebellion in 2002 largely failed to bring about a ‘fundamental change inthe pattern of exploitation in the diamond fields’, while helping to pave theway for violent ‘clean-up’ operations by government security forces and ‘tolegitimize the status quo [of abuses and corruption] in the eyes of interna-tional observers and participants in the industry’ (Marques and Falcao deCampos, 2005; Pearce, 2004: 54). Angolan government crackdowns — such


as Operation Brilhante (Shining) — facilitated the further industrializationof the diamond sector and brought the ratio of artisanal to industrial produc-tion in value from a quarter to an eighth between 2002 and 2006. Angolaachieved the highest fiscal ratio among conflict-affected countries and one ofthe highest growth rates in tax receipts over the past five years. Yet cronyismis rampant in the mining industry and the KPCS itself is used as an excusefor criminalizing artisanal miners (PAC, 2008). In Zimbabwe, violent re-pression against artisanal miners — Operations Chikorokoza Chapera (NoIllegal Panning) and Hakudzokwi (No Return) — consolidated capture bythe elite through a military takeover and a (largely failed) industrializationscheme by a Zimbabwean parastatal. Controversially, several internationalNGOs as well as the World Diamond Council had initially called for morepolicing during an artisanal diamond mining rush in 2006, while a KPCS re-view team validated the participation of Zimbabwe, demonstrating the limitsand inadequacies of its mandate (Spiegel, 2008). Reports of massive killingsby security forces, forced labour, elite corruption and continued smugglingcaused a leading NGO, Partnership Africa Canada (2009), to call for a UnitedNations Security Council embargo on Zimbabwean diamonds and for theKimberley Process to address gross human rights abuses in the diamondsector. There were also frequent human rights abuses in the DRC, includingby security forces acting against artisanal miners illegally operating withinmining concession perimeters. In contrast to Angola, industrial mining failedto take-off in the DRC, largely due to a combination of corruption, politicalinstability, lack of capital investment, and competition from artisanal min-ing. Artisanal and small-scale mining continued to thrive, despite serioushuman rights abuses and predatory security forces, and official productionfigures declining due to undervaluation (PAC, 2008).

Sierra Leone stands in sharp contrast with the situations in these threecountries and has been depicted internationally as a ‘best case’ scenario, duein part to the timeliness of reforms, the major aid-dependence and opennessof the national government to foreign-driven reforms, and the significant yet‘manageable’ size of the diamond sector. Yet, as discussed below, the SierraLeone example demonstrates the difficulties, limitations and ambivalentoutcomes of reforms attempting to merge security and development goalsthrough the industrialization of the mining sector.

PEACEBUILDING AND DIAMONDS IN SIERRA LEONE

Deprivation and corruption in the diamond sector figure among the citedcauses of Sierra Leone’s civil war, initiated in 1991 by the Revolution-ary United Front (RUF) and Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front ofLiberia (Reno, 1995; Richards, 1996; Smillie et al., 2000; Zack-Williams,1995). Most accounts emphasize the role of diamond mining in prolong-ing a decade-long civil war by providing tens of millions of dollars to


the rebellion and other armed groups (United Nations, 2000). If diamondsrepresent a major contribution to the ‘post-conflict’ economy, with officialdiamond exports accounting for about 12 per cent of a Gross DomesticProduct estimated at US$ 240 per capita in 2007 (IMF, 2009), the sector hasbeen widely portrayed as a liability for security and development. Securityconcerns about diamonds in Sierra Leone have mostly involved the fundingof the RUF, rogue soldiers and paramilitary groups, with the Sierra LeoneanArmed Forces and allegedly peacekeepers also mining diamonds duringthe war (Keen, 2005; Silberfein, 2004). Diamonds were also of concern inpost 9/11 counter-terrrorism, as Al Qaeda operatives were reported to havebought millions of dollars worth of ‘conflict diamonds’ mined by the RUF toevade financial controls (Farah, 2004; Global Witness, 2003). Developmentconcerns include political clientelism, corruption, wasted labour input, mis-erable and dangerous working conditions, massive disparities in revenuesdistribution, as well as negative environmental and health impacts (Davies,2006; Levin and Gberie, 2006; Reno, 1995; Zack-Williams, 1995).

Diamond exploitation dates back to the early 1930s, first through theSierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), a British mining company holdinga countrywide mining and marketing monopoly, and from the mid-1950sonwards through both industrial and artisanal ventures (Hayward, 1972).In 1974, more than a decade after the end of British colonial rule, SierraLeone’s leader, Siaka Stevens consolidated his hold on power by national-izing and clientelizing Sierra Leone’s diamond sector. As demonstrated byReno (1995), diamond mining and revenue allocation were closely inter-twined with corruption and the consolidation of a ‘shadow state’ bringingdiamonds into the private sphere of rulers and cronies, marginalizing formalinstitutions and bureaucracies. Pressed by the International Monetary Fundand motivated by his loss of control over Stevens’ cronies and diamond-funded patronage, Stevens’ successor failed to re-industrialize the sector inthe last years before the war started in 1991. The diamond sector was thenengulfed for a decade in the logics of a regionalized conflict and a civil warpitting the RUF, at times in alliance with a military junta, against the civiliangovernment and self-defence militias (Gberie, 2005; Keen, 2005). From themid-1990s onward, diamonds provided the bulk of RUF finances.

In most ‘conflict diamond’ narratives, political leaders, combatants andminers were often indiscriminately conflated into one single category of‘greedy thugs’. The status of alluvial diamond diggers as victims and legit-imate political agents rightly seeking social change, as well as their socialdiversity, have been documented (Peters and Richards, 1998; Reno, 1995;Richards, 1996; Zack-Williams, 1995). Several studies have examined theviability and complexity of artisanal diamond mining livelihoods in SierraLeone (Binns, 1981; King, 1979; Levin, 2005; Maconachie and Binns, 2007;Zack-Williams, 1995). Yet the policy perspective on diamond miners is pre-dominantly that of young male migrants who rush to the diamond fields tomake a quick buck. Alluvial diamond fields, from this perspective, became


the breeding ground for terror and a threat to political order (Goreux, 2001).By 2002, when hostilities had officially ended, the diamond sector remainedlargely ‘de-industrialized’. An estimated 200,000 people were mining dia-monds artisanally, of which the majority were believed to be former com-batants (Pratt, 2003). In this light, artisanal mining was widely presented asa threat to security and development, with industrial mining presented as thebest solution, as argued by Sierra Leone’s president Tejan Kabbah (cited inPAC, 2005: 1):

A primary focus now . . . is to attract bigger mining companies, which means foreign invest-ment . . . . They are easier to monitor. They keep a paper trail, and they are bringing in a lotof revenue in the form of taxes and employment. The alluvial mines are a problem. Theyalways have been, and will probably continue to be. Until we are able to attract [foreign]companies . . . to invest in the alluvial mines — which are overwhelmingly dominated byartisanal miners — the problem of illicit mining, and therefore smuggling, will remain withus.

Kabbah had awarded a prime diamond mining concession five monthsafter his election in 1996 to Diamond Works/Branch Energy, a Vancouver-based mining company related to a British and South African mercenaryoutfit contracted a year before to oust the RUF (Francis, 1999). Many com-panies followed suit, with one assembling a portfolio of mineral rights cov-ering 57 per cent of the country.6 By 2007, mineral rights held by industrialmining ventures covered close to 94 per cent of the country, including 99per cent of the land mined artisanally, while the number of artisanal mininglicences had declined.7 Artisanal production still represented about 81 percent of official exports by value in 2006, but its share was expected to be indecline while alluvial mining by industrial companies would rise.

Industrialization did face difficulties, however. Following the deaths oftwo protesters at a demonstration against the largest industrial diamond minein the country in 2007, operations were suspended pending the results of acommission of enquiry. The mine was considering laying off 25 per centof its workforce, a move also considered by the second largest company.The electoral victory of the opposition All People’s Congress party in 2007could have marked a turn-around, as new government officials hinted atthe possibility of a contractual review revoking some of the 140 mineralrights licences issued to industrial mining companies under the previousadministration. The new Vice-President had also stressed the employmentimportance of diamond mining, suggesting that ‘by 2010 the sector willemploy 900,000 citizens’ — an unlikely figure as current direct employmentstands at an estimated 150,000, but a more credible one in terms of indirect

6. According to corporate website: http://web.archive.org/web/20070911134308/http://www.african-minerals.com/robots.txt (accessed 11 September 2007).

7. Figures derived from cadastral survey data, provided by UNDP project consultants, De-cember 2006.


jobs and household dependents (cited in Katz and Lieberman, 2008, empha-sis added). This position could have been interpreted as a ‘populist’ agendaseeking to promote artisanal mining (and possibly take advantage of contractrenegotiations), but the new government stressed it remained committed toindustrial diamond mining. By the end of 2008, the global economic crisisand declining diamond prices reduced the perspective of fast growth in theindustrial sector.

Reforming Sierra Leone’s Diamond Sector

Peace building in Sierra Leone has involved diamonds in four major ways.First, reforms within the diamond sector sought to address the diamond-related dimensions of war. Second, because diamonds provided many ofthe narratives about the causes of war, other dimensions were addressedthrough the sector. In this way, the diamond sector became a space forimplementing wider reforms that were seen to be key for addressing thebroader causes of war, such as underdevelopment. Third, broader reformsoutside of the sector were also instrumental in allowing for transformationsin the diamond sector. Finally, diamond exploitation deterred some peace-building and development initiatives. Diamond areas were among the lastones to be relinquished by rebel forces, and were those longest disputedin the conflict. As a result, the presence of peacekeepers and activities ofdevelopment agencies were delayed by about three years compared to otherparts of the country. Furthermore, many NGOs have proven reluctant towork in diamond areas and/or to engage in any diamond-related activities.8

Peace-building initiatives have dominated the ‘conflict diamond’ agendasince the official end of hostilities in 2002. Structural reforms (institutional,legal, regulatory and fiscal), transparency, increased foreign investment, re-duced diamond smuggling, decriminalization of the sector, and poverty andinequality reduction (i.e. grassroots beneficiation) constitute the overarchingprogrammatic objectives of peace-building diamond programmes. Improve-ment of governance involved two main international initiatives, the KPCSand the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative. Up to 2006 the UK’s De-partment for International Development (DfID) also funded a ‘presidentialadviser on diamonds’, and an independent diamond valuator oversaw dia-mond exports. A core mineral policy and eleven relevant pieces of legislationwere drafted, a cadastral system was initiated, and the Gold and DiamondDepartment was relocated from the Ministry of Mineral Resources to theNational Revenue Authority. Donor agencies also provided policy advice

8. (Interviews with former NGO employees, July 2004, and mining company management,2007.) This reluctance to engage in diamond areas is not recent. British commissioners haddifficulties in bringing in the Red Cross and development agencies into the diamond fieldsas early as the 1950s.


and funding for the creation in 2004 of a Precious Minerals Intelligence andInvestigation police unit, which was dismantled after several high level ar-rests by newly trained police officers, suggesting that ‘smugglers’ benefitedfrom political protection.9

One of the major arguments pursued by reformers was that industrializa-tion would increase fiscal revenues. By early 2008, six years after the endof hostilities, very little evidence was available to demonstrate this claim.On the contrary, several key fiscal transparency and accountability projectshad either stalled or remained delayed, while anecdotal evidence suggestedthat fiscal revenues were well below those expected from the level of in-dustrial activity in the country. A Public Information Unit project, designedfor promoting transparency and accountability, had also stalled. Changes inmanagement in the Gold and Diamond Department in 2007 made accessto statistics for that year impossible to come by and, by March 2008, therewas no fiscal information posted on the websites of the Ministry of Min-eral Resources (MMR), National Revenue Agency, or Extractive IndustryTransparency Initiative. Whereas donors actively promoted industrial min-ing through international advertising, tax policies, preferential loans, and thetransfer of competence, progress to ensure that fiscal revenues increased andpromoted the type of ‘good governance’ hoped for by donor agencies wasslow to materialize.

Most notably, a cadastral project aimed at streamlining licensing and tax-ation was also successfully resisted by the MMR, whose officials pointed inturn to a lack of donor support. As noted by a technical expert in the project,‘everyone wanted to join the cadastre but one year later they [MMR officials]realized how much discretionary decisions [would] become constrained’.10

Surface measurement for the payment of mineral rights licences continuedto be done by companies, while high-level bureaucrats continued to makelucrative discretionary decisions over the licensing process. Such discretion,for example, maintained confusion about the activities of industrial miningcompanies, most notably between prospecting, exploration and productionlicences. As a company expatriate candidly argued, ‘with alluvial deposits,mining is prospecting and prospecting is mining’.11 Stones found under ex-ploration licences are legally the property of the Sierra Leonean government.Yet hundreds of tons per day of ‘box sampling’ were processed by industrialcompanies under prospecting or exploration licences, with diamonds foundby companies reportedly treated as if produced under mining licences, lead-ing to the new government banning export of all exploration samples in late2007.12 Anecdotally, fortuitous access to fiscal data allowed consultants toaggregate total MMR fiscal revenues for a three and a half year period. The

9. Corkill (2004); interview with governance reform official, Freetown, 5 December 2006.10. Interview with technical expert, Freetown, December 2006.11. Interview with diamond mining company official, December 2006.12. Interview with diamond mining company official, January 2008.


total of US $5 million contrasted with their estimation of rental fees aloneat US$ 12 million. When voicing their concern, the consultants were toldby a multilateral funding agency to be ‘quieter for their own security’.13

Such findings pushed donors to successfully lobby for moving mineral rev-enue collection and management from the MMR to the National RevenueAuthority.

Overall, the two main donor agencies — the US Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) and DfID — spent approximately US$ 15 millionfor diamond reforms between 1999 and 2007. Whereas DfID covered indus-trialization and macropolicy issues, including through a fiscal transparencyapproach (DfID, 2004), USAID largely focused on formalizing the artisanalsector via the Diamond Policy and Management Project (DIPAM), a USGovernment-funded initiative that originated after the 1999 Lome Agree-ment and which evolved into the Integrated Diamond Management Program(IDMP) that ended in 2007 (Hansen et al., 2002; Tutusaus et al., 2007).Upon the recommendation of an embassy advisor, the US Office of Tran-sition Initiatives contracted a Washington DC-based private developmentconsultancy to implement the provision of the Peace Accord which calledfor the establishment of the Strategic Minerals Committee to be chaired bythe leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh. Overall, the consultancy undertookfive successive projects financed by US$ 6.4 million — roughly equivalentto the Sierra Leone’s government diamond tax revenues for a year (GAO,2006). Although DIPAM and IDMP have been dismissively qualified by aUS official as ‘a string of unsolicited projects by [the consultancy]’,14 theseprogrammes are best understood as a process, whose actors, agendas, ob-jectives and methods evolved between 1999 and 2007 in response to newknowledge, deeper understanding of the problems to be tackled, and thechanging capacities, commitments and priorities of its ‘owners’.

DIPAM and IDMP addressed two main agendas. The first was security,perceived in terms of domestic and regional stability as well as counter-terrorism — with a USAID official affirming raising more funds whenputting on a ‘war on terror hat’.15 The second agenda was development,focused on improving the situation of artisanal miners. This merging of se-curity and development concerns was evident in the founding declarationby the multi-stakeholder organization legitimating DIPAM so that ‘SierraLeoneans produce and market “peace diamonds” and “development dia-monds” to rebuild lives devastated by a decade of diamond-fed civil war’.16

The ‘national’ content of this founding declaration, however, contrasted with

13. Interview with consultants, December 2006.14. Interview with US government official, Freetown, December 2006.15. Interview with US government official, Freetown, December 2006.16. Declaration made at the first annual general meeting of the Peace Diamond Alliance,

December 2002.


narratives of foreign mining companies dispossessing local populations, andforeign consultancy capturing and ‘profiteering’ from the programme.17

DIPAM and IDMP sought to make the diamond sector and mining ar-eas ‘governable’ through three main sets of projects. A first set of projectswas intended to support national-level governance through assistance for theHigh-Level Diamond Steering Committee including Sierra Leonean govern-ment ministers, the US ambassador and UN and donor country representa-tives. Capacity-building support for the Ministry of Mineral Resources, incontrast, was minimal until DfID obtained the government’s acceptance ofan expatriate Director General for the Ministry of Mineral Resources. A sec-ond set of projects sought to improve local governance and empower localcommunities. Initiatives set up to provide alternative modes of governancepromoting poverty alleviation and reducing inequalities in the artisanal di-amond sector largely failed amidst poor leadership, political wrangling andconsultant-driven centralization.18 The final DIPAM/IDMP evaluation re-port noted that the consultancy ‘administered many of its programs under thelabel “PDA” which provided an illusion of an actively functioning indige-nous Peace Diamond Alliance’ (Tutusaus et al., 2007: vi, emphasis added).

The third set of projects aimed at community grassroots empowermentand poverty alleviation, and included community revenue allocation, small-stones classification and valuation, mining co-operatives, environmentalreclamation and community sensitization through zonal meetings (Levinwith Turay, 2008; Tutusaus et al., 2007). Focused on local communitiesin diamond mining areas, the ‘zonal meetings’ provided a local forum toinform and consult local populations about reforms and practices in the dia-mond sector. The zonal meetings were, besides the PDA general assembly,the principal means for dealing with the increasingly contentious issue ofindustrialization. Meetings often focused on other topics such as environ-mental reclamation, although meetings were held between communities andcompanies. The PDA focused in particular on the impact of Sierra Leone’slargest diamond mine, a kimberlite pipe in Koidu. Demonstrations by localpopulations against this mine were ongoing and, as DIPAM/IDMP was duefor closure, clashes with the police led to the deaths of two protesters on13 December 2007 (after which a police station was burned and the mineclosed, as mentioned above).

DIPAM and IDMP provided a valuable effort to legitimize artisanal min-ing and improve its developmental impact. Yet it was driven by a securityperspective that identified the immediate post-conflict diamond rush as athreat in need of intervention. Among the assumptions driving diamondreforms were an overestimation of diamond production (US$ 400 million)

17. Peace Diamond Alliance executive council member, Kono, December 2006. Allegations of‘profiteering’ were sustained by a lack of budgetary breakdown transparency and rumoursof a US$ 350,000 annual package for the expatriate project leader in Koidu.

18. Interview with former PDA spokesperson, Freetown, December 2006.


and level of smuggling (90 per cent), as well as the number and char-acter of artisanal miners (up to 400,000 ‘dangerous’ male youths). Re-forms were also driven by a perception of supporter–miner relationships as‘debt-bondage’, failing to recognize the (admittedly ambivalent) develop-mental potential of patronage relationships (MSI, 2004). The programmealso focused on alternative labour relations (co-operatives) as well as in-creased production and fairer profit sharing to alleviate poverty (MSI, 2003;Tutusaus et al., 2007), rather than alternative livelihoods that constitute theend goal of many artisanal miners (Levin, 2005). Finally, it demonstratedthe difficulties of creating and sustaining an alternative mode of governancebased on participation in the face of the short-term objectives and dirigismeof the consultancy, as well as the individual incentives and expectations ofits constituency.

As the programme was coming to an end, and when prompted about itsrelationship with industrialization, several participants expressed warinessand recognized a failure to engage more systematically with the impact of in-dustrialization on artisanal mining and local livelihoods. As a DIPAM/IDMPsenior consultant acknowledged, ‘The impact [of industrialization] is veryclear. In Sandoh chiefdom 529 square miles of land was given to a company,and we had two riots already. Without any comprehensive plan we are nowin an emergency situation. We will have other conflicts in diamonds areas’.19

There was also a common perception that poverty was worsening in min-ing communities, notably due to the lack of land access for mining andthe associated departure of Lebanese traders and ‘supporters’. The son ofthe second largest diamond exporter wryly noted about industrial venturesthat ‘when you can’t beat them, join them’, suggesting that Lebanese cap-ital might shift from financing multiple artisanal and small-scale venturesto fewer but larger-scale operations.20 Industrialization was also removinglabour input from local communities. As argued by a town chief, whose landhad been allocated to an industrial mining company, ‘the only place to minenow is the courtyard behind the house’.21 Given the lack of income alter-natives, miners were thus not mining ‘at home’ alongside other economicactivities. Rather, some had departed for remote districts where mining landswere still available; leaving other tasks undone or to be performed by thoseleft behind, mostly women, elders and children.

The success of the diamond reform policies initiated in Sierra Leone re-mains open to question. To date, success has been mostly measured throughofficial diamond export figures, which tripled from US$ 41 million in 2002to US$ 142 million in 2007 — with artisanal mining still accounting forabout 80 per cent of production in value in recent years despite a risingindustrial sector. Few other indicators have been used to measure the impact

19. Interview with John Kanu, consultant for DIPAM/IDMP, Freetown, December 2006.20. Interview with diamond exporter, Freetown, December 2006.21. Interview with town chief of Fenima, December 2006.


of diamond reforms. In terms of security, there has been neither a system-atic attempt at assessing the level of (dis)satisfaction with reforms, nor arecording of instances of conflict and violence in diamond mining areas. Interms of development, there has been no systematic assessment of povertyand inequality levels among mining communities, despite a relatively lateattempt at drawing a ‘base-line’ through a livelihood survey among artisanaldiamond miners in 2004.22 Nor has there been a census of artisanal miners,a study of the linkage effects of artisanal mining, or an assessment of the netnational product contribution of artisanal mining as compared to industrialventures.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the decline in artisanal mining opportu-nities has produced a concomitant decline in the local economies generally,and especially in Kono, the traditional heartland of artisanal diamond min-ing. As a result, thousands of people have migrated to Freetown and theother diamond areas, such as Bo and Kenema which, though flourishingin 2007, may suffer economic contraction once the companies exploringtheir artisanal hinterlands start to fence off land and convert it to industrialproduction. While an economic transition reducing the overdependence ondiamond mining would certainly benefit the country, reducing opportunitiesfor artisanal miners may not achieve that goal. Inter-sectoral labour mo-bility requires market opportunities and capitalization. The movement oflabour into other sectors of the Sierra Leonean economy is further frus-trated by low levels of education and a lack of cash in the economy,making entrepreneurialism difficult for many. This tentative assessmentaugurs poorly for the peace-building impact of diamond industrializationreforms, at least in terms of local conflicts and poverty alleviation in miningareas.

CONCLUSION

This article has explored aspects of the debate over the merging of secu-rity and development goals in diamond sector reforms in conflict-affectedcountries, focusing on Sierra Leone. Our primary argument is that the arti-sanal diamond mining sector has been unduly identified as a major sourceof economic and political instability for Sierra Leone, with reforms focus-ing on poverty alleviation and state consolidation being partly misdirectedas a result of this overemphasis. The contradiction between security anddevelopment objectives was manifested in two critical ways: the failure ofstrategies of state consolidation to improve domestic security; and the failure

22. Census data for 2004 indicate that the main diamond district, Kono, has medium levelpoverty but the highest level of inequality (SLIHS, 2004). The next census may allow forsome assessment.


to achieve development objectives of poverty alleviation amongst diamondminers.

First, in terms of state consolidation, eagerness by the international donorcommunity and government to increase foreign investments, improve fiscalreturns and limit government corruption legitimated industrialization. Yetthe limited will or capacity of donors to improve contractual agreementsbetween companies and the government has left the industrial sector prone toexcessive tax incentives, lack of transparency, allegations of corruption, andlocal community level conflicts. Within the diamond sector, the contract forthe largest mineral rights holder was not publicly accessible. Clashes betweenpolice forces and protesters against the country’s largest diamond miningproject resulted in several deaths. Outside of the diamond sector, a rutileproject benefited from massive tax incentives ‘in order to showcase the worldthat Sierra Leone is open for business’.23 Furthermore, donors originallyfinancially sidelined public governance and managerial capacity because ofcorruption concerns, possibly exacerbating the problems of corruption andmismanagement and creating a crisis of capacity in core government arms.24

As argued by a Sierra Leonean independent mining expert, ‘donors canbecome part of the problem. They push for reforms but without providingthe capacity to carry these [out]’.25 Overall there was little evidence ofgreater security resulting from promoting industrialization to achieve stateconsolidation.

Second, in terms of poverty alleviation, attempts at reducing poverty andgrievances among artisanal diamond mining communities were supersededby the fiscal argument of state consolidation through industrialization, whileprogressive initiatives seeking to increase the benefits accruing to artisanalminers had a limited impact. The commercial failure of co-operative schemesundermined the credibility of the idea, and basic diamond valuation coursesdid not alter power relations between diggers, supporters and exporters(Levin with Turay, 2008; Tutusaus et al., 2007).

Reforms also had a limited impact in curtailing abuses of power by custom-ary authorities, even augmenting their authority and maintained the percep-tion of ‘elite’ corruption in the general population — two factors identifiedas central grievances in the emergence of the war in the early 1990s(Fanthorpe, 2006; Jackson, 2007). The corruption and vested interests of lo-cal authorities is a major concern in mining communities. Some chiefs holdshares in industrial projects, with clear conflicts of interest as they side infavour of industrial ventures rather than defending artisanal miners’ access todeposits. The distribution of community development funds was frequently

23. Interviews with donor agency officials, Freetown, December 2006.24. Interviews with local consultancy firm and Ministry of Mineral Resources Official. Free-

town, December 2006. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (accessed1 March 2009) suggested a worsening of corruption between 2003 and 2008.

25. Interview with John Kanu, consultant for DIPAM/IDMP, Freetown, December 2006.


biased by the personal interests of chiefs. Formalization programmes alsodiverted funds away from addressing the wider issues of socioeconomicunderdevelopment, which were a crucial factor — and outcome — in thewar and in promoting artisanal mining as a desirable livelihood for the poor(Levin, 2005).

Overall, the project of democratic governance of a pro-poor artisanal dia-mond mining sector was superseded by one of elite-driven industrializationwith questionable fiscal benefits for the state. Accordingly, our analysissuggests that a developmental approach unencumbered by security priori-ties would have been more sensitive to the needs and potential capacitiesof artisanal miners and their communities. Industrialization does have aplace in the diamond sector of conflict-affected countries, but the devel-opment potential of artisanal mining should continue to be fostered giventhe poverty context in which it is taking place. Local populations and au-thorities, as well as extractive industries, donors and participants to theKimberley Process all have a role to play in this matter. The Kimberley Pro-cess Certification Scheme should recognize and act upon gross human rightsabuses perpetrated against artisanal miners. Kimberley Process participantsshould also help raise the income of artisanal miners through promoting‘fair trade’ standards and certification, and helping to restructure the indus-try to redirect some of the profits made in the downstream part of the valuechain to local communities and authorities (Levin et al., 2008; Vlassen-root and Van Bockstael, 2008). Initiatives should focus on assessing themost suitable mode of exploitation in response to the profile of the diamondreserves, the socio-economic situation of local communities, and broadlyconceived developmental objectives. In this respect, not only should arti-sanal mining be decriminalized, but local livelihoods and development needsshould be prioritized over central government fiscal priorities and foreigndirect investment. Efforts should also be devoted to help artisanal miningcommunities reorient themselves towards other economic sectors througha concerted campaign that provides vocational training and start-up capitaland stimulates local and national economic diversification. Local economiesand industrial resource exploitation should also be better integrated, notablythrough synergies with artisanal mining, creating social bonds rather than an-tagonistic relationships based on spatial exclusion. Without such strategies,it is unlikely that mining will bring about the consolidation of the state andreduction of poverty supposedly motivating the security and developmentagenda.

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Building Peace with Conflict Diamonds? Merging Security and Development in Sierra Leone

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