Boko Haram, Religious Violence and the Crisis of National Identity in Nigeria: Towards a Non-killing...

Copyright © 2013 SAGE Publications www.sagepublications.com (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC)Vol 29(4): 379–403. DOI: 10.1177/0169796X13503198

Boko Haram, Religious Violence, and the Crisis of National Identity in Nigeria

Towards a Non-killing Approach

Daniel Egiegba AgbiboaUniversity of Oxford, UK

Benjamin Maiangwa United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan

ABSTRACT

Since Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999, more than 10,000 people have died in the wake of identity-based violence mostly fought along ethno-religious lines. In 2009, a radical Islamist sect from north-eastern Nigeria, Boko Haram, started a campaign of terror that has so far intensified the apprehensive religious atmosphere in the country. While the Boko Haram crisis cannot be said to be strictly religious, this article will locate the group within the context of the mobilization and politicization of religion in Nigeria, which along with the heavy-handedness of Nigeria’s conflict management processes, informs religious militancy and sectarian violence in the country. We argue that a process of transition from a killing society to a non-killing society is needed to provide an alternative perspective to the existing pedagogy of violence for which northern Nigeria is notorious.

Keywords: religious violence, religious politicization, Boko Haram, and non-killing society.

Introduction

On December 25, 2011, a bomb exploded just outside St. Theresa’s Catholic Church in Madala, a satellite town just about 40 kilometers from the center of the capital Abuja, during a packed Christmas service. The bomb claimed 27 lives and left many critically injured. Hours later, similar blasts were reported at other Christian churches in the ethno-religiously mixed town of Jos, albeit with lesser casualties. Boko Haram, the radical Islamist sect from north-eastern Nigeria, claimed responsibility for the devastating attacks which, we argue, were specifically targeted at

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380 Journal of Developing Societies 29, 4 (2013): 379–403

Nigeria’s religious and ethnic faultlines in an escalating bid to destabilize the nation. The attacks, which show evidence of increasing coordina-tion and sophistication, came days after clashes between security forces and Boko Haram militants killed at least 68 Nigerians (Onuah & Eboh, 2011). There is no gainsaying that the rise of Boko Haram has created and nurtured a climate of intense fear in Nigeria.

Against the foregoing background, this paper will address the follow-ing core questions: What is the fundamental mission of Boko Haram? Why does the group rebel? How can the current impasse be amicably resolved? We situate the emergence of Boko Haram within a context of religious politicization in Nigeria. We argue that a non-violent or non-killing approach is critical to mediating the unrest in northern Nigeria. We also argue that a heavy-handed approach by the Nigerian security forces will only complicate the restive situation in the northern region.

The Politicization of Religion and the Crisis of National Identity in Nigeria

Down through the years, religion has played varying roles in shaping the course of human history. The emperor of the Roman Empire Constantine used religion as a centrifugal force to hold together his ever-growing empire. The role of religion as a unifying force in state affairs continued into Medieval Europe where religion served as a symbol of national identity as citizens were united under a single religion. Religion has also been at the heart of some of the most violent wars in human history. The various killings carried out by the Jihads and the Crusades are salutary reminders of this sombre fact. In contemporary society, much attention continues to be devoted to the role of religion in society. For instance, sociologists seek to understand the impact of religion on the formation of national identity (Blanco-Mancilla, 2002; Cohen, 1989). Quite aside, the role of religion as a tool for nation-building varies across countries, with the more developed countries of the West tuning down this role as epitomized by the conspicuous absence of reference to God in the trea-ties of the European Union (EU) despite having a history anchored in a Judeo-Christian heritage (Zambeta, 2000). The influence of religion in the formation of national identity is critical to the point of blurring the distinction between being an Israeli and being a Jew (Bard, 2010; Cohen, 1989). The role of religion in the formation of national identity also fea-tures prominently in societies as different as Tibet,1 Poland, and Pakistan.

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Journal of Developing Societies 29, 4 (2013): 379–403

Agbiboa and Maiangwa: Towards a Non-killing Approach 381

Given its religious pluralism, Nigeria presents an interesting case for analyzing the impact of religion in the formation of national identity. The diversity of religion and ethnicity coupled with the “complex web of politically salient identities and history of chronic and seemingly intrac-table conflicts and instability” qualifies Nigeria as one of the “most deeply divided states in Africa” (Blanco-Mancilla, 2002). The religious demo- graphy in Nigeria is evenly split between Christians and Muslims with the latter having a slight edge in terms of numbers and political representa-tion. Muslims constitute 50.5 percent of the population while Christians constitute 48.2 percent of the total population. Other animistic religious groups make up the remaining 1.4 percent (Okpanachi, 2009). Religion takes pre-eminence in the daily affairs of Nigerians. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that in February 2004, Nigerians were ranked “the most religious people in the world with 90 percent of the population believing in God, praying regularly and affirming their readiness to die on behalf of their belief”2 (Adoba, 2004). How does this commitment impact on how people see themselves as citizens of Nigeria? Does religion impinge on the emergence of a true national identity in Nigeria?

A number of studies have explored the nexus between religion and identity in Nigeria (see Blanco-Mancilla, 2002; Brown, 2003; Coakley, 2002; Ikelegbe, 2005; Youniss, Mclellan, & Yates, 1999). The term iden-tity has different connotations. Ikelegbe (2005, p. 73) for instance defines identity as a “subsisting sense of belonging and attachment to a group or institution, or such other social, cultural and political entities.” Going by this definition, “identity” acquires meaning when it is used as the only platform for the articulation of common interests or the pursuits of shared beliefs and culture (Ikelegbe, 2005, p. 73). In this sense, ethnicity, religion, culture, etc. are all key components of identity. In his excel-lent study on the impact of religion on identity in northern Nigeria, Blanco-Mancilla (2002, p. 3) defines identity as “an ensemble of ‘subject positions’, e.g. ‘Muslim Hausa’, ‘Christian Female’, ‘northern Nigerian’; each representing the individual’s identification with a particular group, such as ethnicity, religion, gender.” This definition captures the way people view themselves in Nigeria where identity is defined by affilia-tion to religious and ethnic groups rather than the Nigerian state. For example, in Nigeria, it is incorrectly assumed by many that all northerners are Hausas and by virtue of their ethnicity, they are Muslims. Similarly, it is assumed that every Igbo person is a Christian, “a classification which blurs the Hausa-Fulani dichotomy in that region. In the same

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way, most southerners are regarded as Igbos thereby submerging numerous other minority ethnic groups such as the Ibibios, Efiks, Ijaws, and many others” (Ikelegbe, 2005, p. 73). The link between reli-gion and ethnicity holds serious implications for religious converts in Nigeria. For instance, is a Hausa man more of a Muslim than an Idoma man who converts to Islam?

A more comprehensive definition sees identity as “a combination of socio-cultural characteristics which individuals share, or are presumed to share, with others on the basis of which one group may be distin-guished from others” (Alubo, 2009, p. 1). In this sense, identity is not only circumscribed to how I see myself, it is simultaneously a fusion of how I see myself and how I am perceived by others. As the defining feature of people’s perception of the other, identity has deep political undertone. The place of identity in politics is very important since it serves as the “basis for inclusion and exclusion” (Alubo, 2009; Harris & Williams, 2003). This construction of identity has serious implications for the rela-tionship between identity, citizenship and group rights in a country like Nigeria where “citizenship is tied to group rights and thus, inextricably linked with identity” (Alubo, 2009). The consequence of this is that religious affiliation tends to override citizenship and the “state becomes the locus of mobilization” (Ikelegbe, 2005, p. 75).3 As a determinant of group’s rights, identity often delimits who gains access to “opportunities, entitlements, and participation are based on the religion of the seeker” (Abah & Okwori, 2002).

It is against this backdrop that some of the respondents in Blanco-Mancilla’s study in Kaduna State believe that non-Muslims who are better qualified get menial jobs as compared to Muslims. According to the respondents, the discrimination is based on “religion and ethnicity” (Blanco-Mancilla, 2002, p. 4). In the life of its adherents, religion act as many things. It can, for instance, “act both as a strong identity and bond to a social group and as a tool to legitimize power” (Blanco-Mancilla, 2002, p. 4). As a key feature of social interaction, religion can, on the one hand, act as a fillip for social interaction while, on the other hand, it creates exclusive enclaves; a barrier which determines whether you belong to particular social group or not. Religion also acts as the prism through which adherents perceive and interact with the world. By creating its sets of values, meanings, structures, and worldviews, religion significantly define how people perceive themselves and others.

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In a deeply religious country like Nigeria, religion is without any doubt the real stuff of politics and social interaction. The role of religion as a legitimizer of power in particular has important repercussions for a plu-ralistic country like Nigeria. This derives from the views of the dominant religious groups in the country who see God as the source and summit of power. This perception of power leads to the contestation for political leadership along religious lines. This partly explains why elections and political appointments are areas where the interplay between religion and politics are most clearly demonstrated in Nigeria. Adherents of reli-gious groups strongly canvass for one of their kin to be elected to political office. In many instances, “these contestations result in violence. In such conflicts, holders of particular identities as defined by the attackers are singled out for liquidation, forced to relocate and their properties torched. The collective nature of the violence is perhaps serving to strengthen geo-political solidarity” (Alubo, 2009, p. 8).

For instance, the appointment of a Christian as a local council chairman in Jos in September 2001 triggered violence which led to the death of about 160 people. The election of the late Patrick Yakowa as Governor of Kaduna state in 2011, also sparked unrest and protest from some sections of the Muslim population who were embittered that a Christian had become governor in a state that has long been governed by Muslim politicians and generals. Equally, the national election of President Goodluck Jonathan – a southern Christian – in 2011 and the resulting electoral dispute by Muhammadu Buhari – a Muslim northerner – not only reveals the north–south religious divide in Nigeria but also partly explains the callous activities of radical Islamist sects who might have been incited by some embittered northern politicians to challenge the electoral results (Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012). What the foregoing examples demonstrate is that religion per se is not the cause of religious violence in Nigeria; rather for many, religion frequently supplies the fault line along which inter-group competition for power and resources occurs. Indeed, the deepening of poverty, social inequali-ties and political instability in Nigeria, has pushed many individuals into taking solace in religion, which reinforces their potency in society and gives them alternative sites for political expression and struggles that often fuel tension and conflict in the country (Adejumobi, 2005, p. 20).

The divorce of religion from politics may be characteristic of the more developed countries, but religion remains a pervasive force in

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Africa. Specifically, in Nigeria, religion and politics are intricately linked. Indeed, the encroachment of religion into the political realm in Nigeria precludes the emergence of a true national identity and spirit of nation-alism. To complicate matters, the actions of past leaders have often suggested that the country is under a single religion. During his time in office, for example, President Ibrahim Babangida registered Nigeria as a member of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC).4 Anchored on the values and goals of OIC, membership of the organization is under-pinned by a commitment to the advancement of Islam (Kenny, 1996, p. 352). For a sitting president to take such a bold step underscores the importance attached to religion in the Nigerian polity.

According to Abogunrin (1984, p. 118), politics and religion in Nigeria are viewed as “two inseparable institutions in the human social psyche and structure.” Arguing from the Muslim perspective, Abubakre (1984, p. 129) contends that “Islam is a way of life, which dictates the political ideology and practice in any Islamic society.” He equally asserts that “earthly governments are mere agents of God’s theocratic governance of the physical and spiritual world.” The inseparable link between religion and social life creates deep suspicion when it is perceived that one reli-gious group is dominating the political affairs of the country. Members of different religious groups want their religion to dominate the affairs of the country. The struggle for ascendancy and control puts Christianity and Islam at dagger-drawn opposition one that has marked the history of Nigeria since independence. Thus, the history of post-independence Nigeria has been marred by a series of civil unrests, religious conflicts, ethnic crises, and incessant riots. The countless violence that has punctu-ated the history of Nigeria’s return to civil rule implicates the significant role of religion in the politics and identity of Nigerian citizenship (Alubo, 2006; Best, 2008).

During the years of military dictatorship, pressing issues such as human rights abuses, festering injustice, marginalization, exclusion, and the need for the enthronement of democracy acted as a unifying force for the different religious groups. Both Christians and Muslims had a common enemy to fight; they wanted to be liberated from the oppressive clutches of military dictators. However, the chain of military command was able to rein-in the upsurge of religious related violence. Following the sudden death of Nigeria’s last military despot, Sani Abacha, in June 1998, Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military man, won the presidential election thus becoming the democratic ruler of the country. The nascent

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democracy unfortunately had to contend with years of religious tensions which had been suppressed but have accumulated in the collective psyche of many Nigerians.

At the dawn of democracy, the pseudo harmony forged during the protracted reign of military dictators was exposed as different “commu-nities and classes take up arms against each other, with religious groups adopting extreme positions and insisting on a particular religious code as the basis for civil law and judicial matters” (Adejumobi, 2005, p. 36). Within the Muslim community, there was a move for the institutionaliza-tion of the Sharia legal codes in the Muslim dominated states. Proponents of the movement argued that it is their constitutional right to practice their religion within the tenets of the Sharia legal code. The agitation for the implementation of the Sharia code was laced with “human rights language” to justify its implementation through a constitution that protects religious freedom (Ilesanmi, 2001, p. 330).

Through the campaign for Sharia, the battle line was drawn between the majority Muslim community and the minority Christian groups living in the northern states. The tension crystallized on October 27, 1999, when Zamfara became the first state to implement Sharia as the supreme legal code. Between 1999 and 2000, 12 northern states followed Zamfara and even established so-called hizbah groups to enforce the Sharia code. This move was greeted with fear by non-Muslims who viewed it as a prelude to the formation of an Islamic state. In response, some Christian leaders, under the auspices of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), began a sensitization campaign to thwart the implementation of the Sharia legal code in some largely Christian states like Kaduna. In violent confronta-tions repeated sporadically in 2000, religious riots between Christians and Muslims in Kaduna led to hundreds of fatalities and spread ripples to other northern states in Nigeria (Adebajo, 2008, p. 6). Thus, the seeds of the massive ethno-religious violence that broke out from the year 2000 onwards were sown (Ikelegbe, 2005, p. 86).

The net effect of these ethnic conflicts and religious pogroms has been the further segregation and spatial relocation of religious groups in the states of Kaduna and Kano. As observed by Adejumobi (2005, p. 36), “Muslims have now moved to concentrate in one area and Christians in another.” This situation is also acute in Jos, the capital city of the Plateau state. For instance, on September 7, 2001, and again on May 2, 2012, Jos was the site of various violent clashes between Christians and Muslims. The Jos crisis claimed hundreds of lives, first in Yelwa in February with

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the massacre of about a hundred Christians, 67 of them in COCIN Church in Yelwa, and later reprisal killing in Yelwa by Christians who massacred between 650 and 700 Muslims in May 2004. The chorus of disapproval by Muslims against the latter killings led to the declaration of a state of emergency (SOE) on Plateau State by the then President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo. With the massacre and grotesque spectacle of the Boko Haram uprising in recent times, there is a growing fear that Nigeria may fall apart, especially as the rise of Boko Haram in the northern region continues to intensify the deep-seated grievances and animosity between the Christians and Muslims in Nigeria.

The Rise of Boko Haram and the Logic of Violence in Nigeria

Patrick Chabal (2005, p. 1) has argued that “conflict seems to be a hall-mark of African societies.” Indeed, various forms of violent conflict have engulfed Africa, exacting a heavy toll on the continents human and natural resources (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012; Zeleza, 2008, pp. 1–35). Zeleza (2008 p. 3) has identified five types of violent conflict, namely imperialist wars, anti-colonial wars, intra-state wars, inter-state wars and international wars. Of these, intra-state wars have gained increased cur-rency in Africa. But how can we explain the logic of violence in Africa? Fanon (1963, p. 40) revealed how colonial violence influenced the colo-nized to be violent. Firstly, he noted that the colonized people “mani-fest the aggressiveness which has been deposited in their bones against their own people.” Secondly, he showed how the colonized person’s confrontation with the “colonial order of things” placed him/her in “a permanent state of tension” (ibid., p. 41). This pattern is evident in the anti-colonial and anti-Western stance of many radical Islamist groups in northern Nigeria. Thirdly, Fanon demonstrated the colonized native was “an oppressed person whose permanent dream is to become the prosecutor.” In an insightful article on “Coloniality and Violence in Africa,” published in the Journal of Developing Societies, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012, p. 421) similarly locates the logic of violence in Africa in “coloniality” and the reproduction of African subjectivities where race is used not only to denigrate the black population in what Fanon called the nation of the damned (“the wretched of the earth”), but to rob them of their very humanity, so as to justify the use of violence against them.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues that this form of colonial violence and authori-tarianism was reproduced by African nationalism, which bequeathed it

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to postcolonial Africa as a mode of governance (ibid). In the postcolo-nial African context, “the violence [is] justified in the name of national unity, security, and postcolonial development seen as necessary to secure a postcolonial modernity” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012, p. 421). Another shortcoming of the colonial era, which the African leaders willingly reproduced, was the entrenchment of particularistic new forms of identity and consciousness, often structured around religion and ethnicity (Hutchful & Aning, 2004, p. 203). Both the logic of violence and particularistic forms of identity are evident in Nigeria where the state relies heavily on the use of violence to quell internal disputes and where disgruntled politicians and other sinister actors, far from building a coherent nation, adroitly cash in on religious or ethnic identity to incite wars.

Following Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999, 12 northern states introduced the Sharia legal system, setting the stage for the flourishing of pro-Islamic and anti-Western groups in the country, such as the Boko Haram sect. It is widely believed that Boko Haram originated in Borno state in 2002, under the leadership of Sheik Mohammed Yusuf. The sect’s official name is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, meaning “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad.” However, it is by the term Boko Haram—meaning Western education/civilization is sacrilegious—that the sect is popularly known (Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012). The philosophy of Boko Haram is rooted in the practice of orthodox Islam, which loathes Western civilization, including the Nigerian democracy, constitution, and the civil service. Mohammed Yusuf claims that the Nigerian society has deviated from the principles of true Sharia law and adheres to an evil civilization that is perpetuated by forms of Western education (Walker, 2012, p. 6).

With respect to the sect’s emergence in Borno state, The Economist (2012) reported that this should come as no surprise because unlike the other northern Muslim-dominated states, Borno state was once part of the medieval Kanuri Empire of Bornu, and is home to the Kanuri people who prior to the attainment of independence in Nigeria, were known to have led an anti-colonial struggle led by the pan-Kanuri nationalist movement (Tanchum, 2012, p. 76). In present day Nigeria, Borno state is one of the poorest states with high rates of poverty, illit-eracy, child mortality, and unemployment. To alleviate the plight of the people, it is alleged that Mohammed Yusuf built a mosque and set up a disciplined sect to provide free education, food, and the promise of a

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better future for his followers (The Economist, 2012). Mohammed Yusuf was said to have attracted a large following, some of whom have been colluding with other Islamist extremists in countries like Algeria, Niger, Mali, and Chad to plan and strategize attacks against Western countries and interest (The Economist, 2012).

While Boko Haram might have had such humbling beginnings, Tanchum (2012, p. 76), argues that the sect represents convergence of both ethno-nationalist aspirations and religious revivalism. Some accounts link the rise of Boko Haram to the radical Maitatsine sect, whose violent activities enveloped five northern states in the 1980s before it was eventu-ally crushed by the Nigerian military. Like Boko Haram, the Maitatsine (meaning “the one who damns”) movement believed that they were the only true and righteous Muslims and dismissed others as backsliders, and considered non-Muslims as infidels. They were also averse to Western civilization as well as the Nigerian constitution and democratic practices just like Boko Haram (Pham, 2012, p. 2).

Whatever its connections to the Maitatsine uprising, it is still important to understand the gradual evolution of Boko Haram first and foremost as a domestic movement. After it came to the scene as an Islamic sect committed to relieving the hardship of the youths of Borno state, it gradually began to make connections with the Borno state politicians. It is argued in some quarters that the former governor of Borno state, Alhaji Ali Modu Shariff used the support of Boko Haram to secure the governorship seat in 1999, but later abandoned the group without any acknowledgement or reward (Omipidan, 2009, p. 44). The anger and disappointment that Mohammed Yusuf and his group felt following their abandonment by Ali Modu Shariff might have prompted them into declaring Borno state in 2002 as apostate and hopelessly corrupt. It was then that the sect migrated from Maiduguri to a sequestered village called Kanama in Yobe state, where it set up a strict Islamist community governed on the basis of the Sharia law. In Kanama, its members called their new base “Afghanistan” and also named them-selves the “Talibans” (Maiangwa & Uzodike, 2012, p. 2; Tanchum, 2012, p. 77).

In December 2003, while the sect was in Yobe state trying to estab-lish its idyllic Islamic community, it collided with the Yobe State police following a community dispute regarding fishing rights in a local pond. Sect members subdued a detachment of police officers and seized their weapons. This confrontation led to a counter attack by the Nigerian

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military that razed Boko Haram’s Mosque and killed seventy of its members (Walker, 2012 p. 3). The inhumane treatment that the sect received from the Borno and Yobe state governments as well as the Nigerian security forces had led Boko Haram to engage in an increas-ingly violent confrontation with security and state governments in Nigeria (Tanchum, 2012, p. 77). Given the group’s embitterment with the political class and security forces in northern Nigeria, Boko Haram began a campaign of terror in 2009. This campaign reached its peak on July 25, 2009, when the sect waged an all-night attack on the Dutsen-Tanshi police station in Bauchi state. According to Bamidele (2012, p. 35), the Dutsen-Tanshi attack ushered in another phase of ruth- lessness on the part of the security forces in Nigeria. About 800 people including the Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf, were killed in repri-sal attacks. Mohammed Yusuf has been reported to have been executed, presumably, while still in police custody (Maiangwa & Uzodike, 2012, p. 2; Tanchum, 2012, p. 80). The gruesome and extrajudicial killings of Boko Haram members and their leader incapacitated the sect and forced it into hiding. Boko Haram members were reported to have fled to neighboring countries like Niger, Chad and Mali to regroup, recruit and, possibly, obtain more training and even acquire more sophisticated weaponry for future attacks. It is alleged that while in Niger, the sect was given the support of Droukdel, the leader of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), so that they could rebuild their organization and augment their capabili-ties and, in so doing, alter the movement’s operational outlook to be in accordance with Al-Qaeda (Tanchum, 2012, p. 2).

In 2010, Boko Haram made a surprise comeback in “an all-out revenge mission against the Nigerian state” (Oyebode, 2012, p. 5). After embark-ing on a prison break, in which it freed about 100 of its members, Boko Haram continued its attacks on several police stations and government establishments in Borno and Bauchi states, and extended its reign of terror to anyone – particularly Islamic clerics and traditional rulers – perceived to be in league with the secular Nigerian government (Maiangwa, 2012, p. 98). So far, the sect has bombed government estab-lishments, police stations, immigration offices, universities, churches, mosques, media houses, communication centers, and other public places, which they deem incongruent with Islamic practices. One of the highlights of the sect’s campaign of terror was the June 16, 2011 bomb-ing of the police headquarters in Abuja, which was aimed at killing the inspector general of police but instead killed two bystanders and

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destroyed several police vehicles. The attack is considered to be the first suicide attack in Nigeria. It also proved that Boko Haram has now augmented its capabilities and can now utilize Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) to wage its attacks.

The second high profile attack was the attack on the United Nations Headquarters in Abuja, which killed 25 people and injured scores of others on August 23, 2011. The attack signaled a major shift toward the inclusion of international targets, as opposed to the sect’s previous focus on only local targets in Nigeria and also symbolizes a stronger reso-nance with Al-Qaeda’s operation (Cook, 2011, p. 19; Ero, 2011; Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012). In fact, according to Cook (2011, p. 5), the

Boko Haram bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja, is both reminiscent and symptomatic of the type of activities undertaken by other foreign ter-rorist organizations, like the suicide attack in Baghdad against the United Nations in August 2003. Suicide attacks of this nature, in many instances, usually mark the beginning of a new and advanced stage of terrorism that is connected to the Al-Qaeda franchise. (Maiangwa, 2012, p. 100)

There is need for a detailed study of the external dimension to the Boko Haram activities. This has become all the more important because of the alleged link between this sect and recent developments in Mali and the entire Sahel region. Also there is a need to discuss intra-Islamic differences and how these differences have been a factor in Islamic radi-calization. Indeed, the signs that Boko Haram is flirting with other radical sects across West Africa and beyond are compelling. It would seem that Boko Haram is a radical sect with local roots which has exploited the growing internationalization of militancy to get externally wired. Since the violent upsurge of radical Islamic sects in northern Mali, Nigeria along with France have been in the vanguard of quelling what is clearly a contagious crisis which involves a terrorist network that includes Boko Haram, Ansaru and the rebels in Mali (Akande, 2013).

By rescuing Mali from the grasp of Islamist insurgents, some Nigerian politicians are of the view that Boko Haram’s transnational reach will be stemmed as well. Indeed, the events in Mali bear a striking resemblance to what Boko Haram has been doing in Nigeria. These groups are connected and have all boasted of having links to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. In what it called part of its mission to stop the Nigerian Army from joining the Western powers, which want to destroy the Islamic empire in Mali, a group calling itself Ansaru (Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan) –

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which roughly translates to “The group of supporters of Muslims in black Africa,” which is probably a splinter faction of Boko Haram, killed two of Nigeria’s Mali bound troops and injured six others on their way to Kaduna from Kogi state (Murdock, 2013, p. 1). Besides signaling the solidarity between the Nigerian and Malian radical Islamist sects, the attack on the Nigerian military exposes the vulnerability of the security forces in Nigeria and portends danger for the possible rise of transnational terrorism across West Africa. In fact, Ansaru has also claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of seven foreign workers in Nigeria. The hostages, from Italy, Greece, France, Lebanon, and Britain, were captured in a raid on a construction site in Bauchi state. Ansaru reported that it has killed the captives in revenge for what it called European atrocities against its brethren in Mali and Afghanistan (BBC, March 10, 2013). The incident has garnered widespread condemnation from the international arena and has scared many foreigners doing business or visiting Nigeria.

Given the foregoing, it appears that the absolute commitment of Boko Haram and Ansaru, to institute Sharia law in Nigeria and fight against what it called atrocities against Islam by Westerners, must have motivated the groups into taking “major strategic steps such as the establishment of external linkages with ideologically-driven Islamic terrorist groups in Mali, Somalia, and the Islamic Maghreb” (Eyam-ozung, 2012). But whether Boko Haram or Ansaru has indeed embraced the global jihadist strategy and ideological stance, is something that remains to be seen (Forest, 2012, p. 81).

The third high profile attack waged by Boko Haram in Nigeria was the coordinated attacks in Kano on January 20, 2012. It is reported that in the attack alone, more than 200 human casualties were recorded with properties worth millions of dollars destroyed. Since this dastardly event, Boko Haram has attacked Muslim clerics, prominent traditional rulers like the emir of Kano and the Shehu of Borno, and other individuals they think might be colluding with the government to arrest them. More importantly, it is the incessant attacks on Churches in northern Nigeria that has worried many Christians and has led to more deadly reprisals. But as Oyedepo (2012, p. 5) aptly notes, the attacks by Boko Haram on churches are aimed at putting Christians and Muslims at daggers drawn in order to create a façade of a religious war. As a result of the increasing proportion and changing frequency of Boko Haram attacks, the menace remains the most severe internal security threat that Nigeria has contended with since the outbreak of the civil war (1967–1970).

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Boko Haram terrorism has no doubt instilled a climate of fear and sus-picion among the various religious groups in Nigeria and, consequently, the country has become severely fractured. To avoid its passage towards disintegration it will be imperative to adopt a non-violent approach in order to unmask the divisive agents in the society who have employed identity card or base as a rostrum to sow the seeds of political division and social cleavages in the country.

Towards a Non-Killing Approach

In the light of the above, we argue that a non-killing approach is needed that is based on a framework for research and action, in which a concerted effort is made to understand the practices, policies, institutions, cultures, politics, and behaviors that uphold the killing of humans and non-humans in society and to assess what is required to transit from the present killing state in Nigeria to a non-killing one. This kind of approach is needed to guide policy and the cultural, political, and socio-economic behavior of individuals and institutions in the Nigerian society. This approach will help to build a society characterized by the absence not only of killing, but also of political violence, injustice, hunger, poverty, inter alia.

The idea of a non-killing approach was first broached by Professor Glenn D. Paige in his seminal work Nonkilling Global Political Science published in 2002. In this work, Paige (2002, p. 1) defines a non-killing society as

a human community, smallest to largest, local to global, characterized by no killing of humans and no threats to kill; no weapons designed to kill humans and no justifications for using them; and no conditions of society dependent upon threat or use of killing force for maintenance or change.

The crux of Paige’s argument is that the extant structures of society do not require lethality as a conditio sine qua non for change or mainte-nance. This contention is put forward as a challenge and useful option to the time-honored belief that lethality is unavoidable in human relations. Page’s position is that a non-killing global society is indeed possible and he adduces the following grounds for his position:

1. It is widely accepted that humans have potential for killing and non-killing, and despite the ability and opportunity to kill, most

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humans have not killed other humans and are not likely to become killers. Indeed, 99 percent of humans have never killed another person. Why then do we readily accept it as inevitable?

2. Some social institutions have already demonstrated a capacity for making contributions towards realizing a non-killing society that if properly appropriated and supported could contribute even further to such a society emerging.

3. Giving existing knowledge and evidence of the causes of killing and non-killing, as well as factors responsible for the transition from killing to non-killing, the various social, economic, psychologi-cal, and biological explanations for a non-killing society promise “nonkilling transformative intervention”5 (Paige, 2002, p. xii).

To corroborate his argument that lethality can be supplanted, Paige provides empirical evidence of places with characteristics of non-killing approaches. Specifically, he identifies 47 societies around the world with experience in non-killing. And as of 2001, there were 27 countries without standing armies (Paige, 2002, p. 47). The non-killing theory is predicated on a four-part approach to political analysis. This includes: (a) the causes of killing; (b) the causes of non-killing; (c) the causes of transition between killing and non-killing; and (d) the characteristics of completely killing-free societies (Paige, 2002, p. 13). Understanding causation is key to unlocking killing, non-killing, and the transition from killing to non-killing societies. It is in this regard that his non-killing theory provides opportunities for understanding the Boko Haram impasse and exploring the possibility of creating a non-killing society in Nigeria.

Its novelty in academic research aside, Paige has encouraged skepti-cal scholars to pose questions in their research using the hypotheses derived from his theory. A careful perusal of the theoretical literature lends evidence to the fact that there have been tendencies for scholars to conceptualize “nonkilling” in guise of “nonviolence” and the two are sometimes used interchangeably because of the intersection of both con-cepts. The latter is reinforced by some of India’s successful experiences with nonviolent struggle against oppression and all kinds of injustice, led by Mohandas Gandhi and his followers. As Joám Evans Pim (2009, p. 13) notes, “the underlying ideas behind nonkilling are not new.” Similarly, Gregory Bourne (2011, p. 15) argues that

[t]he idea of creating societies where people do not kill other people, and which are free from the fear of being killed is both old and new. It is “old”

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in that anthropologists can cite numerous societies throughout history where intentional killing was absent, or considered as an anomaly. It is “new” because, until more recently, we seem to have lost sight of the pos-sibility that killing-free societies are within our grasp.

Notably, some religions, including Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism are founded on non-killing tenets; their long histories suggest that the idea of nonkilling is long-established. Pim further contends that non-killing and non-violence arose mutually in historical moments as strategies for social change. However, Western scholars prefer non-violence to non-killing, perhaps because “it is better suited to the western intellectual taste to abstract concepts” (Pim, 2009, p. 13). Pim quotes Howard Thurman (1963) as arguing that non-killing and non-violence are two sides of the same coin (Pim, 2009, p. 14). Since Paige’s publication of Nonkilling Global Political Science, some scholars have perceived non-violence as a key ingredient in the non-killing recipe (Natalia & Morales, 2004, p. 79). Others have responded affirmatively to Paige’s questioning of whether a global non-killing society is pos-sible. Notable among these scholars is Leslie Sponsel (2009, pp. 35–73) who writes from an anthropological background, laying out extensive scientific data on existing societies that have lived peacefully, without killing, throughout history. The edited work Towards a Nonkilling Filipino Society is without doubt the first effort by a group of scholars to focus analytic attention on the non-killing concept or theory (Abueva, 2004). This volume is an attempt to justify the idea of non-killing as a possible framework for research, analysis, and action by applying it to a specific society. The relevance of the theory addressed here draws from, and rests profoundly, on the budding scholarship of non-killing political analyses.

Taking a cue from Paige’s non-killing thesis, the Nigerian govern-ment will have to attend to the following issues: promote a culture of religious tolerance; address issues of underdevelopment and extremism in northern Nigeria; and control its porous borders against the influx of small arms and terrorists. Based on Paige’s informative data that found 47 societies around the world capable of demonstrating the capacities for non-violent peacefulness (Paige, 2002, p. 47), the Nigerian govern-ment must, as a matter of extreme urgency, recognize and celebrate the peaceful nature of its diverse religious groups. The story of Christians and Muslims coming together to protect each other during national protests

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or sectarian crises should be encouraged and publicized. The following examples are noteworthy:

In the metropolitan city of Kano, Muslim clerics attended Sunday Church services as a show of faith and tolerance. The leader of the delegation, Bashir Ishaq Bashir, stated that they came to the Church to deliver a message of hope, peace, and solidarity. Once, again, in Minna and in Lagos, Christians joined hands to protect Muslims as they prayed during the nationwide oil subsidy removal strike on January 1, 2012. Christians and Muslims have also been united in protesting against bad governance and corruption . . . In the wake of recent security challenges, Christians have shielded Muslims from any potential attack during the weekly Friday Jumat prayers in major mosques. Similarly, Muslims have provided the same protection for their Christian brethren around major Churches during Sunday services. These hands of fraternity, solidarity and fellowship should be continued and sustained on a regular basis until divisive agents of violence and lawlessness are dealt with (Ensign, 2012).

As these examples illustrate, there are some covenantal goods in both Islam and Christianity that could be the foundation for a non-killing society in which mutually productive alternatives are available for diverse individuals in Nigeria. The recognition and championing of the goods in both Islam and Christianity can motivate people with diverse interests to co-exist in multiple, overlapping jurisdictions of varying geographical scopes and can go a long way in building a non-killing community, where religion can play a role as a force for harmony, truth and equity. Also relevant in this regard is an effort to consolidate the inter-faith comrade-ship in the country by engaging more religious leaders to interact with potential and identified members of radical Islamic sects such as Boko Haram. Indeed, since Boko Haram represents the most recent and audacious manifestation of a longer history of violent religious violence viewed by many as the symptom of religious politicization and extrem-ism in Nigeria, the agency of the Muslim and Christian religious leaders must be involved to dilute the group’s threat (Forest, 2012, p. 97). Since religion is a powerful tool for legitimacy and an important source of identity for many Nigerians, religious actors in the country, especially those in authority positions, must become heralds, advocates, and insti-tution builders in addition to their role of providing spiritual leadership. As the case of Northern Ireland and that of Apartheid South Africa have

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shown (Sandal, 2011, p. 936), faith leaders have a well-established and pervasive influence in their communities, which they must not abuse but must use to bring about constructive changes in their societies based on a respected set of religious values, and reconciling conflicting parties. For this reason, Forest (2012, p. 98) argues that religious leaders, from both sides, can be significantly instrumental through their proclamations and religious edicts. Their regular appearances on television and radios provide them with a powerful platform to counter religious radicalization in their communities. Already, some faith leaders in Nigeria like Cardinal John Onaiyekan, Bishop Mathew Hassan Kukah, Sultan Mohammed Sa’adu Abubakar III, among others, have all shown exemplary leadership in their communities, through their preaching, writings, and participation in national reconciliation processes. Such exemplary leadership from these notable religious leaders should be sustained and emulated.

To bolster the effort of faith leaders in Nigeria, civil society organiza-tions, such as the Interfaith Mediation Centre that operates in Kaduna, can also be established in other volatile cities in the country. Strikingly, the Interfaith Mediation Centre in Kaduna state was founded by James Wuye, a Pentecostal pastor, and Muhammad Ashafa, an Imam both indigenes – who led conflicting community groups, but who have rec-onciled and joined forces to bring about peace in the state. The Center aims to re-establish relationships damaged by violence, minimize the likelihood of the recurrence of religious violence, and organize projects that will involve both Christians and Muslims, such as cultural events and peace workshops (Crisis Group Africa Report, 2010, p. 24). The Center also addresses issues of sectarian violence by preventing the occurrence of violent conflicts and contributing to raising the level of trust and tolerance among Christians and Muslims in Nigeria (Wuye & Ashafa, 2005, p. 228). With trust, tolerance, and the absence of violence, recon-ciliation can begin through the development over time of collaborative relationships and cohesive peace constituencies in both communities (Wuye & Ashafa, 2005, p. 228).

To further the strides made by the Interfaith Centre, non-killing civil societies and spiritual councils should be established at every level of government in Nigeria (Paige, 2002, p. 19). The groups should com- prise lawyers, educated clerics, community and youth leaders, who will represent every faith and ethnic group in their particular region. Their responsibilities will be to affirm and endorse the respect of human rights and dignity of all persons as well as organize peacemaking,

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and post-conflict reconstruction programs. The presence of lawyers in the group will be pivotal in prosecuting those found guilty of abusing the fundamental right to life of all citizens in the jurisdiction and beyond. The clerics and spiritual leaders should be charged with the responsibility of advising the youths and general populace in accor-dance with the doctrines of their religious books. In discharging these duties, special attention is to be accorded to the youth who are in most cases, fiercely passionate about their faith and easily used on that basis by politicians and religious demagogues to fuel instability and perpetrate acts of violence. It seems then, that any program of change or theory of non-killing and conflict transformation without due regards to the role or place of the youths, clerics, community leaders, etc. as agents of change in their societies, is unlikely to yield the desired results (Maiangwa, 2012, p. 123).

Furthermore, to set in place any meaningful development plan in northern Nigeria, the populace must be educated and gainfully employed. The Nigerian government should by all means see the need for a new thinking on resolving conflicts and restoring peace without recourse to their usual military solution. This new thinking on conflict transform-ation should be couched in the non-killing framework and should entail the creation of job opportunities for the teeming number of unemployed youths. When jobs are provided for these restive youths, conditions that predispose them to robbery, armed violence, and suicide bombings will be significantly altered (Maiangwa, 2012, p. 123). If Boko Haram is to be prevented from rising up in anger and killing innocent individuals, then the leaders in the country will have to heed to the crying need of virtu-ally all Nigerians by providing adequate educational and health facilities, decent housing, clean water supply, and steady electricity for the people (Duodu, 2012). After all, there cannot be peace without development. The leaders must also show a strong desire and willingness to be more transparent, efficient, and effective with regard to service delivery, rule of law, accountability, and justice. They must also foster an equitable strategy of resource distribution and improvement in education and economic opportunities among the different regions in the country (Forest, 2012, p. 93). Without the prospect of economic improvement for millions of poor and unemployed youths in northern Nigeria, the security situation will deteriorate further (Maiangwa, 2012, p. 124).

In addition, the proliferation of ammunition and other weapons of mass destruction in Nigeria have contributed to perpetuating a killing

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society in the country. Boko Haram has used Nigeria’s porous borders and the limited capacities of neighboring countries to its advantage. There are allegations that the sect received ammunitions and explosives from Al-Qaeda affiliates in the Sahel region (Forest, 2012). Thus, greater cooperation and intelligence-sharing between states in the region need to be encouraged and facilitated by regional and international agencies (Pham, 2012, p. 7). At the sub-regional level, it is imperative for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to establish its own sub-region-led police force to checkmate the activities of criminals and terrorists across the sub-regional borders. But security itself cannot be sustained or promoted without a corresponding counterbalancing strategy of promoting legitimate politics, peace-building, institutional building, sub-regional courts, and democratization processes as catalysts for sustainable development in the sub-region. If and when all these are done in the right manner, then it is unlikely that Boko Haram in Nigeria and other extremist Islamist groups in Mali will carve out niches for themselves across the sub-region. The Nigerian government must also collaborate with others at the global level to combat regional and global trafficking networks that could be exploited to help finance and sustain terrorist groups in the country (Forest, 2012, p. 88). This will help to weaken the operational capabilities of domestic terrorist groups like Boko Haram. Equally important is for the Nigerian citizenry and politi-cal leaders to show loyalty and commitment towards realizing the much needed national cohesion and stability, which will go a long way to stem the tide of identity-based conflicts and insurgency in the country.

NOTES

1. Religion was a defining feature of national identity in Tibet prior to the Chinese occupation. It continues to play a significant role particularly among the exiled community despite the harsh anti-religious policies of the Chinese government.

2. This is the result of a survey titled “What the World Thinks of God” in 10 countries carried out by the BBC.

3. This idea is well captured by one of the respondents of Blanco-Mancilla (2002) who states that “I consider a Malian or Chadian who speaks Hausa and is a Muslim more a citizen of Sabon-Gari than an Ibo or Yoruba who is not a Muslim.”

4. The registration of Nigeria as a member of OIC created a fission between Muslims and Christians. While Muslims welcomed the move, the Christians

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were vehemently opposed to membership of OIC. Despite the tension, Nigeria is still registered as a member of OIC.

5. A non-killing transformative intervention refers to various efforts at inter-personal, institutional, policy, or governmental levels to transform a killing society or culture into a non-killing one.

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Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa is a DPhil Scholar in the Oxford Department of International Development, University of Oxford. He obtained an MPhil in Development Studies from the University of Cambridge and an MA in International Relations from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. His research interests are in the field of sociology and politics of development, with a special focus on sub-Saharan Africa. [email: [email protected]]

Benjamin Maiangwa is a graduate scholar at the Institute for Sustainability and Peace, United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan. He holds an MA in Conflict Transformation and a BA (Hons) in Political Science from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. His research and writing have focused on Human Rights issues, ethno-religious conflicts, and terrorism in Africa. [email: [email protected]]

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