‘Big Bang’ Planning and Urban Design: Imperatives and Outcomes

in Sydney and Melbourne’s Old Port Areas

Assoc. Professor Glen Searle

University of Queensland,

Brisbane, Qld 4072 Australia.

Email: g.searle@uq.edu.au

Assoc. Professor Robin Goodman

RMIT University,

GPO Box 2476 Melbourne, Vic 3001 Australia.

Email: robin.goodman@rmit.edu.au

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Paper Presented in Track 10 (Urban Cultures, Heritage and Urban Design) atthe

3rd World Planning Schools Congress, Perth (WA), 4-8 July 2011

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‘Big Bang’ Planning and Urban Design: Imperatives and Outcomes

in Sydney and Melbourne’s Old Port Areas

Abstract

This paper uses an exploration of the imperatives that favour contemporary ‘big

bang’ urban planning (characterised by large scale, rapid planning and

development processes) to show how this drives production of precincts that fail to

deliver high quality urban design. The key imperatives focus on the evolution of the

property development industry leading to the development of very large property

development corporations, the hegemony of financial and employment dimensions

in current state city-making, and the related subordination of urban design

considerations. This situation is contrasted with the distilled wisdom of foundational

contributors to planning thought such as Geddes and Jacobs who advocated careful,

slow and iterative planning in order to produce the best urban outcomes. Two case

studies are used to illustrate the paper’s propositions: the near-CBD redevelopments

of the Docklands area of Melbourne and the Barangaroo dockside area in Sydney.

In both cases there has been a state government focus on large scale development

over a relatively short period, where development returns have been intended to pay

for state infrastructure costs, and that have involved state development corporations

and very large property developers to drive development forward. The result in each

case has been the production of precincts with development that has been attacked

as over-scaled by urban design professionals and local council planners, and that

has failed to produce the human scale, pedestrian intimacy and visual variety, inter

alia, that characterise the adjacent Central Business Districts.

Key words:

Urban mega-projects; Melbourne Docklands; Sydney; Barangaroo;

development corporations

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Introduction

Urban mega-projects have become increasingly significant

within overall city development over the last three decades,

as forces of global competition between cities and greater

willingness to mobilise private sector funds for urban

planning ends have intensified. Yet conceptualisation of this

tendency has focused on institutional and governance aspects

and community impact/participation. Analysis of such projects

in terms of critical concerns originally voiced by Jacobs

(1965), notably urban design issues, has been largely absent.

This paper is an initial attempt to address this lack. It

uses two case studies to understand how central

characteristics of major urban projects can lead to deficient

urban design outcomes such as excessive scale and/or lack of

enclosure, lack of connection to the existing urban fabric,

lack of variety, and so forth. We relate the case study

outcomes back to conceptualisations of appropriate urban

design outcomes as enunciated by Jacobs and Geddes in

particular. The case studies are two former docklands areas in

Australian cities: Barangaroo in Sydney, and Docklands in

Melbourne.

‘Big Bang’ projects and planning

The rise of large scale urban development projects has been

associated with intensified globalisation and a turn to a more

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neo-liberal governance across much of the West (Swyngedouw,

Moulaert and Rofriguez, 2002). These developments have been

used to spatially ‘fix’ mobile global capital in inter-city

competition. They have increasingly involved ‘exceptionality

measures’ in planning, and been characterised by less

democratic and more elite-driven priorities (Swyngedouw,

Moulaert and Rofriguez, 2002, p. 195). Thus the usual checks

and balances of standard planning controls and processes have

been reduced.

The most famous critic of large scale urban development

projects is Jane Jacobs, who argued for ultimate maximum

densities of around 200 dwellings per net acre (around 500 per

net hectare), or about eight storeys with a site coverage of

two thirds. More than this brings a considerable danger of

standardised buildings, of ‘rank upon rank of virtually

identical massive elevator apartment houses’, generating large

open areas in Jacobs’ conceptualisation (Jacobs 1965, p228).

Jacobs saw the key problem of major urban redevelopment

schemes as standardisation, which reduces building variety and

thus urban vitality. Standardisation ‘is fatal because great

diversity in age and types of buildings has a direct, explicit

connection with diversity of population, diversity of

enterprises and diversity of scenes’ (Jacobs 1965 p225). A mix

of old and new buildings allows for people of different

incomes to live together, and for businesses to start up with

relatively little capital. Older buildings can enable lower

rents particularly in areas dominated by new expensive

developments, and these allow for new business ventures

5

particularly for the young and innovative (Soderstrom 2008, p.

65).

The rapid timeframe and large scale of the ‘big bang’

project could not be further from the process of planning

advocated by Patrick Geddes (1915), arguably one of the

foundational thinkers of urban planning. Geddes’ approach is

worth revisiting as it resonates surprisingly well with

current sustainability agendas. His recommended process of

conducting a comprehensive survey and analysis before

developing a plan compelled the planner to develop a real

understanding and appreciation for not only the existing urban

form, but all other elements. His premise was that people, the

environment and the local economy all contribute to the

complexity of any place and that these elements influence and

are influenced by each other (Golany 1995, 115). Therefore

each place is different and cookie cutter plans will not work.

Geddes advocated the use of ‘conservative surgery’ – that is

careful and iterative change which conserved and respected

heritage rather than wholesale redevelopment. He believed that

the involvement of the community and the preservation of its

history were key (Sutcliffe 1980, p.205). His emphasis on

process was radical in the early part of the 20th century when

other urban thinkers were concentrating either on civic design

at a local level, or ideal cities on a blank slate. Eleanor

Smith Morris suggests that his influence extended to the

conservation movement of the 1970s and 1990s (Morris 1997,

p.47).

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Arising from such thinking is a recurring criticism of

major stand-alone urban development projects: their lack of

connection and integration with the existing city, and the

resulting fragmentation of the urban fabric and built form.

Dovey has critiqued Melbourne’s Docklands development on this

account (Dovey, 2005), which we take up further below.

The imperative for major developer-driven precinct

construction to produce negative urban design outcomes has

intensified as state planning for metropolitan areas has

increasingly prioritised economic competitiveness, which has

come to define the parameters of other dimensions of urban

policy (Brenner, 2004, p. 254). This has generated customised

state administrative arrangements, such as the development

corporations in the two case study areas here, to accelerate

economic growth within strategic urban zones (Brenner, 2004,

p. 216). These frequently involve the suspension of existing

planning regulations intended to produce good urban design

outcomes, inter alia. Such special authorities are usually

given high development targets to be attained over relatively

limited timeframes. The related contracting of development to

major corporations in just a handful (or less) of major

tranches, to speed up overall development, produces financial

pressure to complete a large amount of construction in as

short a time as possible. This in turn encourages the

development agency to limit planning controls for the sake of

more rapid development. It also encourages developers to

bargain for development scales beyond those allowed under the

simplified planning regimes that attempt to set minimum urban

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amenity outcomes. As Farrelly has observed, the inherent

conflict in such development authorities between their

developer and consent roles makes them prefer economic over

civic values (Farrelly, 2011b). The imperatives of rapid

development mean that incremental, ‘organic’ Jacobs-style

growth, which generates precincts with built environments that

have a rich variety of age, texture, style and affordability,

and resilience in general, cannot be achieved. Proceeding

quickly to predetermined ‘solutions’ forecloses possibilities

for developing alternatives through which adaptability and

transformability can emerge (Hillier, 2011, p. 220).

Barangaroo, Sydney

Like Melbourne’s Docklands, Sydney’s Barangaroo project was

impelled by a need to generate increased economic development,

using value capture of redeveloped state dockside land to pay

for necessary infrastructure. The years following Sydney’s

Olympic Games in 2000 saw the city’s economic development fall

back, with a lack of major new projects to return growth to

1990s levels. Metropolitan population growth was exceeded by

that of Melbourne for the first time in many decades.

The Barangaroo project involves the redevelopment of the

last wharf and associated dockside land in Darling Harbour,

totalling 22 ha, on the western side of Sydney’s CBD. A prime

objective is to ‘secure Sydney’s role as a global financial

services hub in the Asia Pacific region’ (Barangaroo Delivery

Authority, 2010a).

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An international design competition for the site was held

in 2005. A consortium led by local firm Hill Thalis Architects

won the competition. A concept plan based on the winning

design was approved by the state government in early 2007,

using Part 3A powers under the Environmental Planning and

Assessment Act which allows the Minister to approve major

projects instead of the local council. This plan divided the

site into three parts: Headland Park, Barangaroo Central, and

Barangaroo South. The latter precinct was earmarked for major

high rise office development, together with residential,

tourism and retail uses, opening on to a public waterfront

promenade. The maximum approved floor space was 388,000sm. The

multinational corporation Lend Lease was awarded development

rights and a 99 year lease for this precinct, in return for

providing waterfront plaza infrastructure and making payments

to the (subsequent) Delivery Authority that would fund

development of Headland Park, pay the state’s Sydney Ports

authority for the transfer of land, build a pedestrian tunnel

from nearby Wynyard rail station, and relocate the passenger

cruise terminal further west on the harbour, at a total

estimated cost of $521m (Barangaroo Delivery Authority,

2010b). The central precinct was to be a large civic space

with unnamed community uses, plus medium rise civic,

residential and commercial buildings.

In late 2008, the government announced it would establish

a special authority to manage the precinct’s development,

including the provision of infrastructure. It passed the

Barangaroo Delivery Authority Act in early 2009, setting up

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the BDA as a development corporation with a board of public

and private sector members, but concept planning and

development approval powers over the precinct were assumed by

the minister, using Part 3A of the Environmental Planning and

Assessment Act.

In early 2009 the concept plan was modified to increase

the maximum floor space by 120,000sm. Soon after, the design

excellence review panel, led by former Prime Minister Paul

Keating, revised the original concept plan incorporating the

winning design to ‘reinstate’ the Headland Park and Northern

Cove elements of the project into a more ‘natural’ physical

form in which the shoreline and profile would closely resemble

the landscape as it existed in 1836. This reflected Keating’s

long-standing inclination to return Sydney Harbour to a less

urbanised state, as exemplified by his earlier desire to

demolish the century-old Woolloomooloo finger wharf. The

consequence of this decision, however, was that extra

development was required at the southern end to offset the

increased costs of reproducing a more natural foreshore.

In 2010 Lend Lease lodged a concept plan amendment to

increase the floor space by a further 60,000sm (taking total

floor space nearly 50 per cent above the original approval),

and to increase in the height of the towers to a maximum of

209m. Much of the extra floor space would be located in a new

high rise hotel to be built on a new pier. After intense

community opposition, the government approved a modified

version of the application that reduced the commercial towers

from four to three (but kept total floor space at 490,000sm),10

reduced the hotel height to a still significant 170m and

reduced the pier length to 85m. The Delivery Authority

justified this as necessary to preserve Sydney’s financial

services hub status in the south Asia Pacific region and to

provide the floor plates required by global companies

(Barangaroo Delivery Authority, 2010a). The hotel was

justified as ‘cement[ing] Sydney as an international tourism

destination’ (Premier of New South Wales, 2010). These

justifications appear to be a cover for Lend Lease’s ability

to persuade the government to increase its revenue and profits

from the project, however, since hub status and floor plate

considerations existed when the original project brief was

determined. This reflects a long-standing process by which

developers have been able to obtain floor space above that

allowed originally under prevailing plans and controls: ‘By a

process of attrition, community endorsed Development Control

Plans or Master Plans are amended again and again until

developers get the building heights they want’ (Moore 2002).

In the case of Barangaroo, the need for more revenue to pay

for the revised Headland scheme was also significant.

In response, in early 2011 fifty architects and planners

produced an alternative plan for Barangaroo that reinstated

the straight edge of the existing wharf, kept the

international cruise ship terminal in the central precinct,

eliminated the hotel and its pier, aligned roads with the city

grid, and instituted stepped towers (Munro, 2011). In turn,

this plan was criticised by the deputy chairman of the design

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panel as sacrificing proposed parkland, and blocking views to

the harbour (Johnson, 2011).

Barangaroo assessed

A weighting of 35 per cent was given to urban design in

determining the winner of the design competition. Despite

this, the design of the project has been strongly criticised

by professionals, the council, and active community groups

(Friends of Barangaroo; Barangaroo Action Group; Australians

for Sustainable Development). This criticism has intensified

after the significant increase in the scale of proposed

development in the southern precinct, culminating in an 11,000

signature petition to the new state government after the March

2011 election to review the project. Leading architectural

critic Elizabeth Farrelly considers that the government’s

commitment to a given bulk (floor space) has meant that it has

relinquished ‘all real control over design’ (Farrelly, 2011a).

For her, Barangaroo is thereby ‘too boring’ rather than too

big. The planning minister at the time the original concept

plan was approved considered that the constant growth of the

project meant the ‘buildings are bigger than they need to be

and the public domain has been diminished, [and] the public

spaces have been lowered in quality’ (Moore and Robins, 2011).

The most telling critique of the revised plan has come

from Sydney City Council, from which planning control over the

project was taken by the government. The critique centred on

typically problematic outcomes of rapid large scale urban

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development concerning scale and lack of relationship to

existing urban morphology (City of Sydney, 2010a). The two

residential towers were seen as too tall and incompatible with

the adjacent proposed innovation centre. The Council also

considered the heights of the three major commercial towers

should be adjusted to reduce excessive bulk and to provide

height differentiation. Similarly, the building floor plates

were considered too large above lower levels because of their

bulk and negative visual impact. The proposed street widths

were considered to be too narrow and lacking in ‘refinement’,

while streets connecting with the city grid were not properly

aligned with existing streets in the grid. The high rise tower

proposed beyond the existing shore line in Darling Harbour was

considered by the Council as an unacceptable departure from

the approved concept plan, weakening the ‘distinctive western

edge of the compact high-rise city’ (City of Sydney, 2010b).

The Council’s critique also highlighted the lack of

transport capacity to and from the project site. The original

plan was proposed to be served by a station on the proposed

CBD Metro line. However, this proposal was abandoned before

the expanded project size. A proposed pedestrian link to the

existing heavy rail station at Wynyard was considered

uncertain by the Council because of a failure by the

government to unreservedly commit to the $100m cost.

Consequently the Council saw the originally approved concept

plan as generating too much traffic for existing public

transport links to cope with. The proposed increase in the

project scale would further exacerbate this situation. It

13

seems extraordinary that such a major expansion of the CBD

could be proceeding, with approvals already given for early

construction stages, without funding for the necessary

transport infrastructure having been designated. It is not

clear whether future payments by Lend Lease to the state will

be enough to fund any public transport infrastructure beyond

the pedestrian link.. Here, the Barangaroo project has

demonstrated the extent to which the need to hurry such ‘big

bang’ projects can result in studied neglect of basic urban

planning principles.

Docklands, Melbourne

The Docklands area was first identified as an area for

development by the state government in 1987 in planning and

economic strategies and the first strategy for it was produced

in 1989 as the location of the Olympic Village for Melbourne’s

ultimately unsuccessful bid for the 1996 Olympic Games. The

aims for the development articulated in this first document, a

strategic planning framework, were to continue the connection

to Melbourne’s waterfronts (which had begun with the Southbank

development), enable an expansion of the CBD with retail and

entertainment facilities, assist in the policy of urban

consolidation by providing a site for housing and attract

people back to live in central Melbourne (MPE 1989 p. 5). The

scale of development was to be moderate with mixed use

developments of 3 to 4 storeys to avoid overshadowing the

water and keep a human scale. There was to be “a diversity of

14

housing, social mix and tenures which reflect the

characteristics of the existing inner suburbs. In particular,

the provision of public housing, private rental and affordable

owner-occupied housing are important elements” (MPE 1989

p.14). The development was to occur in stages over time and

more detailed plans needed to be produced.

In 1990 the Docklands Task Force, based in the state

government Office of Major Projects, produced an options

paper, a draft strategy and then a final strategy in 1992. A

wide variety of urban planners and other consultants were

involved in one way or another in the development process for

this strategy. It emphasised the need to increase densities to

an average of 67 dwellings per ha but keep most housing to low

rise (one or two storeys) with the occasional tower over 10

storeys (Docklands Task Force 1992 p.33), to increase public

transport use to at least 50% of all trips from the area

(p.46) and keep at least one third of the area as public open

space (p.37). Heritage preservation was also considered

important, and it was noted that this should not lead only to

the preservation of individual buildings isolated from their

context, but should be well integrated to give a sense of

context and identity (Docklands Task Force 1991 p.95). The

urban design principles within the strategy were influenced by

the theories of Jane Jacobs and Kevin Lynch “with a focus on

mixed use, human scale, legibility, permeability and

livability” (Dovey 2005 p.130).

However, this plan was never implemented. A Docklands

Authority was established in July 1991 to take responsibility15

of the future development following a model proposed first by

the boosterist Committee for Melbourne. The new Authority

rejected the Task Force’s Strategy and proceeded with the idea

of developing the area in precincts with far less government

prescription. This was supported by the Kennett Government

elected at the end on 1992 with a neoliberal reform agenda

particularly directed at planning (Buxton and Goodman 2004).

By 1993 the Authority had identified itself as a development

agency rather than a planning authority, adopting a “‘real-

world’ perspective that was cast against the world of public

planning” (Dovey 2005 p. 135). The process determined for the

development of Docklands was to be private sector driven with

little specific requirements placed upon them by government

and no input from the public.

Planning process and the role of large developers

A Docklands Plan was released in 1993 which divided the site

into 6 precincts which were to be development separately by

developers who would also provide the necessary infrastructure

(Docklands Authority 1993). This was further developed in 1995

with a plan for 7 precincts of varying sizes. The idea was

really to give developers a free hand to design their

individual precinct as they wished. A planning scheme

amendment had been passed in 1995 which included details such

as roads, developable lots, heritage and height controls.

However permits could also be given to any proposal that made

a positive contribution to the overall development of

16

Docklands. It was a planning scheme “with which compliance was

voluntary” (Dovey 2005 p.138). One requirement which was

deemed to be essential however was a short time line, with

full development of the site expected in 10 to 12 years.

Initially two preferred bidders were announced for each

of the precincts in 1997, however these were announced, and

then re-announced over the next two years, as the initially

bids were withdrawn or collapsed. Success bids collapsed in

six out of the seven precincts (Millar 2006). The developers

and development proposals for each precinct were finally

determined in the early years of the new decade. The first

development to take place was the football stadium which began

in 1997 and was opened in 2000. The first apartments were

completed in 2001.

The major characteristics of the development process is

that it was piecemeal, in that the planning for each precinct

occurred in isolation, and it was developer-led with little

adherence to an overall plan. The usual manner of development

where the parcelling of land and infrastructure provision is

determined first by the planning authority was reversed. This

occurred due to a “mixture of philosophy and pragmatism”,

according to one critic, which produced “a unique laissez-

faire development process inconceivable prior to the

Regan/Thatcher years” (Styant-Browne 1996 p.87). The transfer

of public land into private hands represented an unprecedented

opportunity for developers with very little requirements

demanded of them in return other than to get on with it.

17

The governance arrangements for Docklands have been

unusually dominated by development priorities. In 1998

municipal powers for the area were transferred from Melbourne

City Council (MCC) to the Docklands Authority. In 2003 the

Docklands Authority was merged with the state government owned

Urban Land Authority to become VicUrban. MCC only regained

control over the area in 2007 finally giving residents some

access to democratic representation.

Docklands assessed

Development at Docklands has progressed rapidly. By 2009

Docklands had 6,000 residents in 3,400 dwellings over four

precinct areas (VicUrban 2009 p 27). Almost all these

dwellings (97%) are apartments and most are in highrise

towers. About 45% of development at Docklands has been for

commercial office space with an estimated 19,000 people

working there and 500,000 m2 of offices completed or under

construction as at 2009 (VicUrban 2009 p 37). Almost all of

the developable land (98%) has been contracted to private

developers and just under half (44%) of the approved

development has been constructed (VicUrban 2009 p 65). All

these figures suggest considerable achievement and if the main

priority was to get development occurring speedily then

Docklands has indeed been successful. The publicly expressed

opinions on Docklands have not however been universally, or

even substantially, favourable. Criticism ranges from the

general - there is a lack of overall design and unifying theme

18

– to the more specific, problems with the overshadowing and

wind tunnel effects of high rise, the lack of heritage

preservation, complete absence of affordable housing etc.

Even before most of the existing development had been

built the lack of unifying design resulting from the swift and

separate development of all precincts was being identified as

potentially problematic. “The permissive Docklands process has

produced a collection of singular and disparate precincts,

each with its own urban pattern, program and typology”

(Styant-Browne 1996 p.90). A number of prominent critics see

faults in the design of both buildings and public spaces as

resulting directly from the process, describing the end result

as lacking in soul or grit, or “bleak at best” (Millar 2006

p.6). The rapid approach to development has meant the loss of

detail, “an absence of ‘stuff happening’ – an absence of that

fine-grain, gritty culture” (Kalms p. 40). Slower more

iterative change would have provided more satisfactory

results. “Unfortunately, the possibility of a gradual

transformation for Docklands was removed long ago, and this

has come at a great cost to the public domain. What was

removed through demolition is virtually impossible to recreate

with new construction”, (Giannini 2003 p. 80).

The financial model of development utilised at Docklands

“driven by high yields expected from towers with expansive

views” have worked against a better urban design outcome

according to Maher (2009 p.9). The market driven approach

meant that height limits originally recommended in the early

strategy for Docklands were abandoned. This has resulted in19

significant overshadowing of public areas and the waterfront,

most noticeably in the New Quay precinct. The tall apartment

towers also create wind tunnels which add to the sometimes

desolate feel of the waterfront promenade. Dovey summed up the

problem as a lack of “vital and integrated urbanity”,

suggesting that Docklands consists instead of a “bunch of

disparate projects in search of an urban district” (Dovey 2009

p. 6).

Part of the apparent bleakness stems from the stark

newness of most of the development with few remnants remaining

of the original uses of the site as a number of critics have

pointed out. “The history of the place largely has been erased

and increasingly there is pressure on the physical fragments

which survive…. The heritage of Docklands which existed in

1991 has now long gone. The city is left with a place which,

like the burgeoning cities of Asia, is unrecognisable from 15

years ago,” (Lovell 2009 p 39). Even some of the remaining

heritage buildings are under threat. The National Trust has

recently highlighted the impending destruction of one of the

few remaining 250-metre long cargo sheds in an article in The

Age, and has called upon the newly elected Baillieu government

to save it, (Dobbin 2010). ''They are developing Docklands as

though it is a greenfield site with nothing there, not as the

earliest and prime heritage place in our city,'' David Moloney

of the National Trust was quoted as saying. ''They've knocked

down some of the most visually interesting buildings in

Melbourne so they could turn it into something that looks like

a Pattersons Lakes business park in the city.”

20

There has been considerable criticism of the exclusive

nature of the residential developments at Docklands. There are

no apartments that could reasonably be considered affordable.

The expensive nature of the apartments at Docklands is seen by

some as a resulting directly from the rushed nature of the

development which meant developers needed fast returns on

major investments (Millar 2006 p.2). There is a widely

expressed view that “a residence and even a meal at Melbourne

Docklands in is really for the rich” (Shaw 2008 p. 193). The

lack of affordable housing in the development “prevents the

social and cultural diversity” existing in other parts of

Melbourne, according to Mary Crooks who was a participant in

the production of the original 1992 Docklands Strategy,

(Millar 2006 p7).

Conclusion

The two case studies indicate that a number of aspects of ‘big

bang’ urban projects can lead to deleterious urban design

outcomes. The imperative for rapid development can lead to

overscaling of development and loss of fine urban grain. The

associated need to deal with as few development corporations

as possible also produces lack of variety. Such urban mega-

projects can also result in lack of connection with the

existing urban fabric and streetscape, as a result of

development control being taken away from local councils as

well as the need for these projects to quickly develop

profitable building space that is not overly constrained by

21

local contextual considerations. It would appear that planners

collectively have forgotten some of the key lessons of the

profession’s foundational thinkers. Large scale rapid

development, wholesale and speedy change which ignores

existing heritage and sense of place, is never going to result

in liveable human scale precincts which will retain their

value well into the future.

22

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