Beyond Reason? The limitations of rationality – a tautological and asocial concept

Patrick Brown

School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research, Giles Lane,

University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NF, UK. p.r.brown@kent.ac.uk

Paper presented at King’s Risk Research Symposium, 5 June 2009,

King’s College London.

Abstract

Notions of rationality are frequently applied by social-scientists as a basis of describing, understanding and evaluating the actions of individuals and organisations in relation to risk-contexts. This paper will critically examine the utility of this contested concept for risk research. The gradual shift away from the invocation of rationality in a dogmatic sense has culminated more recently in approaches which consider multiple rationalities or understand certain action as functioning between the rational and non-rational. From such a starting point this paper goes further to argue that analyses of organisational, and especially individual, decision-making and behaviour are often hindered by considerations of rationality. It is suggested that the usefulness of rationality in describing and explaining action is limited in a number of ways, not least because of the tautological nature of the concept. Moreover a conclusive evaluation as to whether an action is ‘rational’ must be made ex-post the outcome – thus ignoring the multiplicity of contingencies, potential outcomes and limited knowledge apparent at the time of action. At the centre of the paper is the assertion that no action is irrational, and that ascriptions of such a label are merely indications of a limited grasp of the salient social variables. Three specific risk contexts are used by way of illustration.

Introduction: The problem of rationality as dogma

The concept of risk, and the range of policy and academic responses to it, has shifted many analytical lenses away from social structures and towards the individual. Spurred on by the emancipatory possibilities of progress and reflexivity, scientific and indeed many social-scientific approaches to risk have reinvigorating considerations of appropriate or effective human action in the face of future ‘unknowables’ (Keynes 1921). Whether it is in relation to entrepreneurial and investment decisions (ibid), criminal behaviour (Kemshall 2006), or the pension decisions taken by those reaching retirement (Vickerstaff et al 2008), analyses abound as to the nature and process of

correct and less-than-correct – rational and irrational – courses of action. In the midst of an apparent demise of left-right politics (Giddens 1994) and related concerns of rationality at a more meta-system level (eg Habermas 1984), risk has emerged as a dominant political and intellectual ideology (Furedi 2005) which instead focuses attention on the behaviour of specific communities (meso) and moreover individual actors and institutions (micro).

Of course the scrutinising of decision-making and action as rational or otherwise is in many senses timeless. From the concerns of Heraclitus with the lack of reflexivity amongst the ignorant hoi polloi (Sandywell 1996:236), to the new public health of recent NHS policy (Department of Health 2004), societies have been rife with assumptions over the progressive potential for reason to illuminate and rectify the unfounded and/or flawed. The Enlightenment bolstered confidence in the possibilities of reason to progressively elucidate and refine approaches to human problems. Importantly, the vigour by which the Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire, Hume and Montesquieu sought to replace a single-dominant metaphysics (Porter 2001:26) seemingly imbued its successor with a similarly dogmatic presumption about the existence of a single reality - around which one undisputable reason could be honed (Gray 2009).

The hegemonic position of scientific reason makes possible the elevation of generalisable knowledge (Habermas 1981; Adorno and Horkheimer 1973) and a corresponding deprivileging and debasement of subjectivity (O’Neill 1995). Such ontological and epistemological gerrymandering (Woolgar and Pawluch 1983) which this dogmatic rationality facilitates is very much the contextual basis of this article. From here the next section will rehearse positions which note a multiplicity of rationalities at work within social systems and lay society (eg Weber 1968; Habermas, 1987; O’Neill, 1995). Yet the difficulty for any one of these forms to offer a satisfactory account of human action amidst uncertainty has led more recent work (Zinn 2008) to suggest decisions take place across a spectrum spanning the rational (calculative), non-rational (belief, hope), and in between these ideal-types (trust, intuition, emotion). A positive critique of this position will begin by problematising the demarcation between rationality and alternatives. The phenomenology of Schutz (1972) will be used to illustrate that calculative and emotive responses are similarly grounded in prior socialised experiences.

It will be contended that the obscuring of ‘the social’ by the application of rationality hinders understanding – blinding analyses to structural factors. These limitations, alongside the tautological nature of the concept, form the backdrop to the central thesis of this paper: that social scientific accounts of action amidst risk contexts would be more complete by moving beyond notions of rationality. The final three sections will explore and expand on this theorisation through brief, specific, policy-focused case-studies: restorative justice, pension planning and financial markets. These examples underline the

significance of multiple layers of social experience in determining the manner by which knowledge is both accessed and processed. The decisive influence of the social on how knowledge is communicated and received illuminates the structural factors which bear on actors. Conversely notions of rationality would seem to fetishise the utility of refined or generalisable knowledge, at the expense of comprehending the inherent rationality in all agency and the social structures which bear upon this.

From one rationality to many: the multi-dimensionality of human action

The dogma of rationality which Gray (2009) sees as emblematic of the Enlightenment, epitomised for him within the works of Saint-Simon and Compte, has come under considerable and sustained critique. Kant was a contemporary of the Enlightenment who, in his concerted attempt to free humanity from a dogma of metaphysics (Kant 1929: 30), builds on the work of Leibniz and Hume to distinguish between different types of judgement and their relation to human experience. In differentiating between knowledge forms, and moreover reinforcing the limitations of the knowable, Kant lays the groundwork for a contestation of rationality.

In a not dissimilar fashion to Kantian dualisms between the theoretical and the practical, Weber (1968) distinguishes between purposive/instrumental rationality and other formats relating to norms and values, emotions and tradition/habit. Whilst Weber’s use of the term rationality has been criticised as imprecise and fluid (Swidler 1973), his description of human action as motivated by combinations of differing rationalities nevertheless facilitates a more nuanced understanding of behaviour. One that is more open to acknowledging the groundedness of that which would appear untenable from a purely purposive-rational perspective. This perspective is central to Weber’s analyses of religious affiliations, yet his work on bureaucracy also has much light to shed on the nature of 'rational' decision-making.

For Weber, the form of rationality that develops within bureaucracies is very much driven by their social structures - thus reflecting a more general consideration of rationality as a socio-pathological trait1. Yet whilst Weberian accounts of subjective and moral reason tend towards the pessimistic and at times pejorative, two positive critiques of his work (Habermas 1984; Schutz 1972) more readily acknowledge the inherent value and utility of communicative and inter-subjective (as opposed to instrumental-scientific) rationality. Habermas (1987: 204-234) traces a line of thought which illuminates the limitations of Hobbesian (1968) understandings of man as solely driven by purposive-rational tendencies. Building on the empiricism of Locke and Simon and then the extra-contractual emphases of Durkheim and Parsons, a conceptualisation of communicative rationality is developed which

understands the socialised bases of action flowing out of socialised norms and values as much as strategically-reasonable interests (see Brown 2008).

Perhaps more importantly for the concerns of this article, Habermas (1971) draws a clear distinction between different types of knowledge as they relate to human experience - as determined by their respective social contexts. Public experiences are those which can be expressed by generalisable validity-claims - therefore accessible to many, and moreover to institutional bureaucracies. Meanwhile knowledge generated from 'private experiences' is barely utterable, with the accessibility of these therefore restricted to a much smaller number of actors more immediately present. Whilst publicly available knowledge, through its generalisability, is capable of having its rationality validified/contested, private or experiential knowledge is often beyond such acknowledgement. Thus critical theory makes clear two key limitations in contesting the rationality of behaviour: a) human action is oriented around multiple-considerations2 (rationalities) and therefore should not be evaluated on a single, instrumental basis; b) an important part of human experience is beyond generalisability, with this 'invisibility' obstructing empirical examinations concerned with rationality and reason.

Between the rational and the non-rational? Or inherently rational?

Phenomenological insights into human action (Schutz 1972) represent a further challenge to rationality-oriented understandings of human action. The possibility of an actor understanding any notion, or any projected action, is grounded in their direct experiences as it is only via these, the building blocks of cognition, which make possible the inferential constructions required to comprehend the attitudes of others or indeed more abstract notions (ibid). This means of comprehending how actors appropriate knowledge is significant in that direct experiences are typically more concrete for individual actors than more abstract ideas - as the latter require multiple inferential leaps and are accordingly more tentative. So whereas confidence in scientific progress and the Enlightenment of society fetishises the emancipatory possibilities of knowledge and its public communication (as too does Habermas – eg 1984:333) - phenomenology makes evident that human action, and understandings thereof, are decisively rooted in private, socialised, experiential contexts.

O'Neill (1995:179-182), drawing on the work of Schutz (1943), argues against distinctions between what he calls "common-sense" action and a scientific rationality. Given that everyday human behaviour meets the criteria of being 'reasonable' and 'deliberative', and that the ideal-type of rational action is "so idealised that it cannot be found anywhere in the world" (O'Neill 1995: 181; Keynes 1936), it seems that the only aspect which sets lay behaviour apart from its generalisably rational counterpoint is the formers causal complexity. This points towards the tautological nature of the ascriptions of rationality:

How do we know actor a is rational actor? Because s/he follows action x given context D. Why does s/he follow path x? Because s/he is a rational actor3.

A recognition of this system-specific, self-referential and circular conceptualising of rationality in analyses of human decision-making is the first stage in illuminating its problematic nature. If, as implied by O'Neill (1995), lay decisions are set apart by their socially structured complexity - then defining their multi-dimensional manifestations as irrational is merely erecting a schematic obstacle to effective understandings of behaviour; making for a lazy social science. Zinn (2008) posits behaviour as often taking place between the rational and 'non-rational' (via intuition, trust and affect) and in so doing seeks to avoid privileging one over the other. Following Wynne (1996) and Gigerenzer (2007), Zinn acknowledges the mutual effectiveness and necessary complimentarity of the two approaches - even highlighting the superiority of the non-calculative (2008: 444). This recognition of similar utilities and effectual outcomes is doubtless a step forward, yet continued references to two ideal-typical positions within decision-making processes ignore significant commonalities.

All decision-making, whether more calculative, affect-based or 'innate'4, is profoundly shaped by prior socialised experiences (the biographical). Comprehension of more formal or systemised knowledge systems functions through a number of inferential steps rooted in direct experiences of the individual actor (Schutz 1972). Their continued application is based on previous positive feedback from their use and/or socially constructed confidence in their epistemic authority (eg bio-medicine). The very enactment of the science, and moreover its refinement, would be impossible without common-sense judgements (O'Neill 1995: 160). Thus science, as an imperfect analogy useful in interpreting the natural world (Popper 1959; Archer, Bhaskar et al 1998), is simply a more generalisable configuration of the heuristical judgements of/by which it is composed.

Means of making judgements through less generalisable inferences – for example as intuition, trust, and/or affect (Zinn 2008) - are similarly refined strategies learnt through prior socialised experiences (Schutz 1972). The post-London-bombing experiences of John Tulloch5 (2008) illustrate how even the most innate reflexes and reactions are learnt/adopted via prior direct encounters. Once again perceptions of the continued appropriateness of intuition, trust or affect are configured around ongoing feedback in social settings and their constructed validation by the lifeworld (eg through interactions with close acquaintances, social networks, socio-cultural norms, habitus and personal reflexivity). The preceding and current paragraphs make evident therefore that all decision-making can be said to be neither perfectly rational nor irrational. Rather all human agency is inherently, and in many senses similarly, rational. Focusing on the nature of this agency in terms

of its rationality/irrationality/non-rationality however obscures the decisive social structures which determine the type and extent of knowledge available to the particular actor, and the way such knowledge is accessed/recognised/ processed.

Practical context 1: Restorative justice and offender rehabilitation

Thus far it has been noted that decision-making, both in relation to risk and more generally, is best described as: oriented by values rather than mere instrumentalism (Habermas 1987); driven by far more than purposive-rational efficacy (Weber 1968); and informed by experiential knowledge as derived from private experiences and/or in a more generalisable sense (Schutz 1972; Habermas 1971). The multi-dimensionality and complexity of these processes - not to mention the social contexts they are embedded in - represent a significant challenge to the social scientist and policy-maker; one which should not be explained away by rational, irrational or between-rational labelling.

Whereas the discussion up to this point has been at a relatively abstract level, the arguments developed will hopefully become more clearly formed and nuanced through the practical policy contexts explored from here onward. Three examples are briefly outlined which deal with a variety of 'risk' relationships in terms of how institutions engage with individuals: the institutional management of risky individuals in society (restorative justice); institutions trying to persuade members of the public to change the way they consider risk (extending working-life and pension deferral); individuals working within institutions dealing with risk (investment finance).

The multi-dimensional structuration which bears upon action, as referred to above, is patently evident within the context of restorative justice. This approach – to the criminal behaviour often characterised as a risk to society in many senses – is a more relational, social contextualising approach amongst stakeholders than some alternative approaches to crime (McLaughlin et al. 2003). Yet by its future-orientated, conciliatory approach the criminal act is still posed as deviant (irrational) and correctable through effective communicative action and knowledge exchange (Marshall 2003). The limited effectiveness of restorative justice may be partly explained by its failure to comprehend criminal activity as inherently rational agency, thus blinding itself to the potency of structuration.

Conceptualising agency through the multi-layered socialisation of the actor is central to its effective analysis6. The capacity for actors to think about the consequences (social and otherwise) of their actions and to make decisions in a more general sense is vitally dependent on the effective maturation and integrity of their prefrontal cortex (Anderson et al. 1999). Impairment to such neurological functioning inhibits moral judgement and makes ‘anti-social’ and/or violent behaviour more likely (Greene and Haidt 2002). Prima facie

this might lead analyses towards decidedly psychological or even phrenological avenues. However the work of Schore (1999; 2001) highlights the extent to which social environments and stimulation during infancy drive the development of this and other parts of the brain’s decision-making apparatus. Hence what might be construed as malevolent or psycho-pathology is in fact socio-neurologically-influenced decision-making.

By recognising the manifold ways in which prior social experiences influence the 'innate', and moreover the ways in which socially-mediated information is processed, the problematic disjuncture between the psychological and the social is bridged. Thus the primary layer of social structuration, which bears on the maturation of the prefrontal cortex, is followed by a complex lattice of further experiential learning and stimulation within an array of social contexts – from the familial to the institutional. These socialisations form the proverbial classrooms in which ideal-typical assumptions are formed as to the dependability (or otherwise) of authority figures/groups and the outcomes (positive or negative) of certain actions towards these. Of course the nature of these very experiences is determined by both the qualities of the persons involved as well as the inclusion/engagement or exclusion of the actor within these learning contexts. Amidst these ongoing experiences a range of attitudinal positions are determined (Schutz 1972) at both cognitive and affective levels.

Such experience-based formulations of societal expectations (rooted in class, gender, ethnicity and age) and the actor’s cognitive and emotional responses to these, in relation to others, are the basic apparatus on which certain modes of decisions/behaviour (labelled by society on occasions as ‘criminal’ or ‘benevolent’ – flawed or appropriate) might be understood. These social factors (alongside other socially influenced mitigators such as substance misuse or mental health problems) thus determine the way information regarding certain environmental contingencies is processed. Meanwhile the contemporaneous socio-economic factors which influence the comparative appraisal of certain avenues of behaviour and understandings around these underline the extent to which ‘the social’ bears on the availability and nature

of information. This multi-layered lattice of social experience will thus determine the ex-post attitudinal position of the (criminal) actor.

Practical context 2: Pensions and planning for later life

The extent to which consequences are recognised and considered in a particular sense, and the stance of the actor towards other stake-holders, will be very much driven by prior, biographical experiences. The potential effectiveness of restorative justice programmes, or other forms of policy-making such as pension reforms, is thus very much contingent not only on the quality and content of the communication (ie the transfer of knowledge) but the way this knowledge is interpreted, entertained (or ignored) and

processed by the actor (eg perpetrator or retirement planner). Once again this reception and processing of knowledge (or ambivalence) is perfectly rational given the socio-biographical experiences of the actor, but may be far from satisfactory for the policy programme. This understanding makes clear that affecting behavioural change is not as simple as reorienting misaligned or inappropriate behaviour by the impartation or exchange of knowledge. As suggested above, the fetishisation of knowledge is problematic as it is relatively ineffectual in resonating with attitudes and behaviour – for human actors are experiential rather than cognitive beings.

That lived experiences are more potent and concrete bases of knowledge for actors than abstract notions (Schutz 1972) is clearly apparent in decision-making in later life regarding pensions. Policy makers such as the UK Department of Work and Pensions are keen to encourage the extension of working life amongst older adults and the deferment of claiming state-pensions. Yet recent research suggests that in spite of statistics showing that life expectancy is steadily increasing, planning around older age and retirement is beset by a ‘health pessimism’ (Vickerstaff et al 2008). The desire to maximise short-term income due to concerns about death shortly following retirement precipitates short-termist or fatalistic approaches rather than the long-term view which actuarial analyses would commend (ibid).

On the face of it, this ignorance of generalisable data would appear irrational. Yet the qualitative responses within the research underline the concreteness of lived experiences. Respondents referred to former colleagues or relatives who had died shortly after retiring and these more direct experiences proved more compelling than abstract population trends (ibid). The application of this more private, anecdotal knowledge would seem unscientific, yet the problem with actuarial models for individual actors is that they are probabilistic. In the same way that an individual smoker could be the exception and live well past one hundred years (Alaszewski and Brown 2007), the pensioner who (against the ‘odds’) does not defer their pension and dies at 66 may be making an exceedingly 'rational' decision. For definitive ascriptions of substantive (rather than procedural) rationality or irrationality can only be made ex-post the outcome. That health pessimism or cynicism towards state and financial institutions was more prevalent amongst lower socio-economic strata reaffirms the importance of experiential knowledge – and indeed its probable validity given inequalities in life-expectancy and marginalisation of poorer older people. Pre-learnt attitudinal positions towards the reliability of state institutions for positive outcomes (in terms of pensions and indeed more generally) may thus be decisive and negate the possibilities for ‘knowledge’-led behavioural change.

Practical context 3: Investment decisions within financial institutions

Further limitations of rational techniques for decision-making in the face of uncertainty are highlighted by Zinn (2008), who cites research conducted by Borges et al (1999) which found that lay people making stock market decisions based on ‘recognition heuristics’ (the companies with which they were familiar) were more successful than the more ‘refined’ approaches of mutual funds. Furthermore it is clear that those working within financial institutions rely on instinct (Keynes 1936) and emotions (Pixley 2004) due to the time-constraints and inherent ‘unknowables’ latent within investment decisions. Thus foci within the public sphere on the irrational or irresponsible processes of recent decision-making within a newly uncertain financial climate provide only limited understandings (Pixley 2008) due to the impossibility of purely calculative decisions.

Whilst appraisals of decisions are able to be critical of actor-'rationality' retrospectively, as with pension planning this ignores the extent of ex-ante uncertainty, multiple potential modes of problem solving, and the multiplicity of potential outcomes which might have resulted. The difference between ‘good’ decisions (with positive outcomes) and ‘bad’ ones (leading to negative consequences) can thus be seen as less contingent on the nature of the decisions being made but once again the social contexts of these decisions. The social construction - and subsequent demise - of investment confidence or trust in the likelihood of positive outcomes highlights the extent to which financial decisions are innately and fundamentally social endeavours (Simmel 1990; Ingham 1996), the outcomes of which are socially rather than individually contingent.

Concerns with the rationality, irrationality or between-rationality of financial decision-making thus distract from the social systems and norms (eg of confidence or scepticism - bullishness or bearishness) which drive these decisions and indeed their outcomes. The way social/relational structures are under-girded by the institutional and legal frameworks, and in turn come to legitimate their enactment or modification (Habermas 1976; Black 2008), bears extensively on the form and content of decision-making. Yet this is obscured by the focus on individual actors which rationality-based considerations of risk engender. The historical fluctuations between the lifting and reimposition of restrictions around the short-selling of financial instruments (FSA 2008) make apparent the influence of social constructions of confidence on behavioural controls which in turn affect legal and social norms and expectations.

That the Chief Executive of the UK Financial Services Authority describes the current economic context as having "given rise to disorderly markets" (ibid: 1) underlines the social embeddedness of beliefs as to what is orderly (markets are never truly orderly) and what is uncertain (Polanyi 1944; Pixley 2008). The perceived reliability and predictability of markets, and corresponding investor confidence, is constructed via prior experiences, interactions and

familiarity within the institutions, alongside positive feedback regarding the dependability of an array of ‘signs’ (Schutz 1972). These communicative signals – in the form of linguistic or more abstract (eg price) phenomena – are interpreted by the actors to have specific meaning (ibid) and implications for action. Yet which signs are focused upon, how these are interpreted, and how these are then related to meaningful action are very much socially determined and beyond the control of any individual or group of actors (ibid; Habermas 1987).

Conclusion: to know all is to consider all as rational

The independence, fluidity, unpredictability, contingency and potency of this ‘lifeworld’ (Schutz 1972; Habermas 1987), as it bears on individual action, represent an immense challenge to both public institutions charged with governing risk – as well as social scientists. Institutions are innately hampered in managing how individuals experience or create contexts of risk and uncertainty due to the primacy and complexity of (socialised) experience for human action. These bases of action are more nuanced and ‘private’ (Habermas 1971), and thus beyond the instrumental and generalisable understandings of bureaucratic organisations (Brown 2008). A corresponding mutual incomprehensibility makes plain the utility of the social scientist in bridging and interpreting between the two.

The basic thesis of this paper is that ventures to adequately understand human action (in order to be able to fulfil this interpreting role) within risk contests are often impeded by labels of rational, irrational, non-rational or between-rational. Descriptions, analyses or evaluations of individual decision-making/action in terms of rational/irrational/non-rational criteria have been seen to be problematic at philosophical, logical and sociological levels. The superiority of instrumental applications of scientific knowledge for purposive-rational interests has been seen to be untenable and indeed inaccurate in assessing behaviour. This renders ascriptions of rational or irrational as tautologies – self-referential, analytical cul-de-sacs which offer little explanatory contribution. Most importantly these labels have been seen to hinder effective analyses of the modes by which ‘the social’ bears on behaviour. It has been argued that by considering all human behaviour as inherently rational the tautological problem is overcome and moreover research stands to illuminate the manner in which prior and current social structures and contexts influence human agency.

Whilst ideal-typical distinctions between more cognitive or affective components of decision-making may be analytically useful (in terms of their specificity) in some senses, focusing on rationality/non-rationality as a basis for considering how actors behave in relation to risk and uncertainty obscures the multi-layered structural influences on their agency through prior and more immediate experiences. The knowledge applied within decision-making,

alongside the more affective or innate reactions which facilitate this, are all acquired through prior socialised experiences. Hence what might be misconstrued as psychological determinants – of how stimuli are responded to – are in fact learnt tendencies and capacities acquired from previous socialisation. Social structures (not least class, gender, ethnicity and age) will determine the variety, nature and extent of these learning contexts from which complex formations of ideal-typical assumptions - in forms of experience-formed knowledge, habitus and more innate reactions - are derived. Social structures not only determine (independent of the current experience) the potential reception and processing of information but also the availability and format of knowledge in the specific risk context.

The greater extent to which both these aspects of structuration are comprehended, the more the inherent rationality of the agency will be accessible. Hence any ascription of irrationality can be simply interpreted as indicative of a limited grasp of the salient social variables. In a not dissimilar fashion by which Rothstein (2006) suggests that the application of risk tends towards assisting institutions rather than society, considerations of the rational, irrational or non-rational would seem to enable relatively straightforward explanations for government, media, and other institutions at the expense of effectual understanding how individuals act within society. Rationality is in this sense a 'civilising' tool - in an Eliasian (1982) sense - which drives conformity in line with Enlightenment goals and scientific generalisability (by stigmatising deviation), whilst at the same time robbing social actors of the purpose, meaning and understanding of their own actions.

There are of course a number of limitations to the argument set out here, not least in that by criticising the ontological and epistemological position of certain analyses a similarly precarious philosophical position is being assumed. However this paper does not seek to offer a philosophically robust assessment so much as to foster a discussion and reflexivity towards the unproblematic way in which rationality is often applied. By highlighting these assumptions and indeed the socially-blinkered analytical positions they encourage, a more complete and effective analysis of human action in relation to risk becomes possible.

References: Alaszewski, A. and Brown, P. (2007) Risk, uncertainty and knowledge. Health, Risk and Society. 9(1):1-10 Archer, M., Bhaskar, R., Collier, A., Lawson, A. and Norrie, A. (1998) Critical Realism: essential readings. London: Routledge

Anderson, S.W., Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D. and Damasio, A.R. (1999). Impairment of social and moral behavior related to early damage in the human prefrontal cortex. Nature Neuroscience (2): 1032-1037. Black, J. (2008) Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes. Regulation and Governance 2: 137–164 Borges, B., Goldstein, D.G., Ortmann, A., & Gigerenzer, G. (1999). Can ignorance beat the stock market? Name recognition as a heuristic for investing. in G. Gigerenzer, P.M. Todd, and the ABC Research Group, Simple heuristics that make us smart. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 59-72 Brown, P. (2008) Legitimacy chasing its own tail: Theorising clinical governance through a critique of instrumental reason. Social Theory and Health 6:184-199 Department of Health (2004) Choosing Health: Making healthy choice easier. London: TSO Elias, N. (1982). The Civilising Process: State formation and civilisation. Oxford: Blackwell FSA = Financial Services Authority (2008) FSA statement on short positions in financial stocks. [internet site] Available at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2008/102.shtml> Accessed 26 April, 2009 Furedi, F. (2005) Politics of Fear: beyond left and right. London: Continuum Giddens, A. (1994) Beyond Left and Right: the future of radical politics. Stanford: Stanford University Press Gigerenzer, G. (2007) Gut feelings. New York: Viking. Greene, J. and Haidt, J. (2002) How (and where) does moral judgment work? Trends on Cognitive Sciences 6 (12): 517-23 Gray, J. (2009) The Original Modernisers. in: J. Gray (ed.) Gray’s Anatomy – Selected Writings. London: Allen Lane. pp. 163-75 Habermas, J. (1971) Toward a rational society: student protest, science and politics. London: Heinemann Habermas, J. (1976) Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon

Habermas, J. (1984) Theory of Communicative Action. Volume One: Reason and the Rationalisation of Society. Cambridge: Polity. Habermas, J. (1987) Theory of Communicative Action. Volume Two: Lifeworld and System: a critique of functionalist reason. Cambridge: Polity. Ingham, G. (1996) Money is a social relation. Review of Social Economy 54(4):507-29 Kant, I. (1929) Critique of Pure Reason. New York: St. Martin’s Press Kemshall, H. (2006) Crime and risk. in: P, Taylor-Gooby and J, Zinn (eds.) Risk in Social Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 76-93 Keynes, JM. (1921) A Treatise on Probability, London: Macmillan Keynes, JM. (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.

London: Macmillan Marshall, T. (2003) Restorative justice: an overview. in: G, Johnstone (ed.) Restorative Justice: A reader. Uffculmbe: Willan McLaughlin, E., Fergusson, R., Hughes, G. and Westmarland, L. (2003) Restorative Justice: critical issues. London: Sage. O’Neill, J. (1995) The Poverty of Post-Modernity. London: Routledge

Pilgrim, D. (2007). New ‘Mental Health’ Legislation for England and Wales: Some Aspects of Consensus and Conflict. Journal of Social Policy 36: 79-95 Pixley, J. (2004) Emotions in finance: distrust and uncertainty in global markets. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Pixley, J. (2008) Banking on Uncertainty. Paper presented at Sociology Of Risk and Uncertainty stream of the ISA Conference, Barcelona – September 7, 2008 Polanyi, K. (1944) The great transformation: Economic and political origins of our time. Popper, K. (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Basic Books Porter, R. (2001) The Enlightenment. London: Palgrave-Macmillan Rothstein, H. (2006) The institutional origins of risk: a new agenda for risk research. Health, Risk and Society 8(3):215-221

Sandywell, B. (1996) Presocratic Reflexivity: the construction of philosophical discourse c. 600-450BC. Logological Investigations – Volume 3. London: Routledge Schore, A. (1999) Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum Associates Schore, A. (2001) The effects of early relational trauma on right brain development, affect regulation, and infant mental health. Infant Mental Health Journal 22: 201-269 Schutz, A. (1943) The problem of rationality within the social world. Economica 10(38): 130-149 Schutz, A. (1972) The Phenomenology of the Social World. London: Heinemann Simmel, G. (1990) The Philosophy of Money. 2nd edition. London: Routledge Swidler, A. (1973) The concept of rationality in the work of Max Weber. Sociological Inquiry 43(1): 35-42 Tulloch, J. (2008) Risk and subjectivity: experiencing terror. Health, Risk and Society 10(5): 451-465 Vickerstaff, S., Loretto, W., Billings, J., Brown, P., Mitton, L., Parkin, T. and White, P. (2008) Encouraging labour market activity among 60-64 year olds. London: Department of Work and Pensions Weber, M. (1968) Economy and Society. Volume One. New York: Bedminster Woolgar, S. and Pawluch, D. (1983) Ontological Gerrymandering: The Anatomy of Social Problems Explanations. Social Problems 32(3): 214-227 Wynne, B. (1996) May the sheep safely graze? A reflexive view of the expert–lay knowledge divide. in: S. Lash, B. Szerszynski, and B. Wynne, (eds.) Risk, environment and modernity. London: Sage, pp. 44–83. Zinn, J. (2008) Heading into the unknown: Everyday strategies for managing risk and uncertainty. Health, Risk and Society 10(5):439-50 1 Habermas (1984) offers a succinct review of Weber’s work in this regard – p. 164-8.

2 Schutz (1943: 133) refers to the conceptualisation, formulated by William James, of those notions

which exist around the fringes of our concepts. In other words our actions are never purposeful in

simply one direction, rather the wills of our action are always tainted with other reasoning and concerns.

For example Mersault, the main character in Camus’s ‘The Outsider’, notes that "De toute façon, on est

toujours un peu fautif" – one’s motives are never pure or straightforward.

3 This basic schema for illustrating the circularity of reason within tautological concepts is borrowed

from Pilgrim (2007). 4 Innate is applied here in quite a broad sense: including those actions which as Tulloch’s (2008)

account makes clear are basic reflexes – and other behaviour which might best be represented by

Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, conceptualising the agent outside of mere objectivism and subjectivism

but rather between voluntary and deterministic. 5 Tulloch, an established social-scientist carrying out research related to risk, was a casualty of the

bombing of a tube train in London on 7 July, 2005. He gives an account of his post-trauma experiences

in this illuminating Health, Risk and Society article. 6 NB The interaction between the social environment and genes is also vital, as made evident by the

work of Michael Rutter amongst others, however this is beyond the remit of the present paper.