Basic Income for Immigrants? Reflections on the Pull Effect of Social Benefits

BASIC INCOME STUDIES An International Journal of Basic Income Research

Vol. 7, Issue 1 RESEARCH ARTICLE June 2012

Basic Income for Immigrants? The Pull

Effect of Social Benefits on Migration*

Àlex Boso Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Mihaela Vancea Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract – Despite the large number of studies in the past two decades about the

basic income proposal, its relationship to the process of international migration has

not yet been comprehensively addressed. In this article, we explore the feasibility of

implementing a basic income that would include, in addition to citizens, those

immigrants with more than one year of residence. The main objective of this study is

to examine the hypothesis that basic income produces a pull effect on migration. The

analysis focuses on the behaviour of agents seeking to migrate because of a basic

income in a possible destination country. Using theoretical arguments and empirical

analysis, we question the magnitude and even the existence of this pull effect of basic

income. In our view, there are no sufficient grounds to think that introducing a basic

income would lead to an increase in immigrant population.

Keywords – international migration, migration policy, pull effect, social welfare,

territorial boundaries

* An earlier version of this article was published in Spanish in Revista Internacional de Sociología 69 (3), 2011, pp. 699–723. The authors acknowledge the permission by the publishers and editors of RIS for reprinting this translation in Basic Income Studies.

Copyright ©2012 De Gruyter. All rights reserved.DOI: 10.1515/1932-0183.1234

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1. Introduction

This article explores whether a basic income proposal that includes the

immigrant population could fit within the finite set of politically possible

scenarios. The notion of political feasibility depends, in part, on the intentional

and intelligent production of desired states. One aspect of politics concerns the

routine struggles for power within a range of limits that are accepted and

understood by the different actors involved. Within these limits, political agents

encounter different possible outcomes; outside of these limits lays the realm of

political “impossibilities” that agents try to avoid turning into their own problem

(Elster, 2006). Following Spinoza ([1670] 2004), the routine behaviour represents

the politicised politics, while the struggle for the creation of these routines

represents the politicisation of politics. In the first case, political struggle takes

place in common agreement about the boundaries of the possible; in the second

case, the political struggle is about redefining these boundaries.

The path followed by the basic income debate in the last 20 years is precisely

the one that leads from the politicisation of politics to politicised politics. Basic

income has evolved from being confined only to small academic circles to

becoming part of the social debate (Raventos, 2007). The progression of the idea

has been noticeable in recent years at both Catalan and Spanish levels, as well as

more broadly across Europe and the world. Since 1986, Basic Income European

Network (BIEN), in 2004 renamed as the Basic Income Earth Network, has

fuelled the debate and research on basic income. In Spain, Red Renta Basica

(RRB), the local section of BIEN, performs a similar task. The same goes for other

sections of this organisation around the world. Countless symposia, conferences

and scientific meetings have been held around the proposal. Some Nobel Prize‐

winning economists have defended proposals emerging from the concept of

basic income.

European institutions like the European Parliament or the European

Commission discussed the proposal on various occasions – for instance, through

the parliamentary group The Greens European Free Alliance or the social action

platform The European Anti‐Poverty Network (EAPN) – with some scholars

raising the possibility of a basic income for the entire European Union. The

Belgian, British, Dutch, French and Irish governments, and even several regional

governments (including the Catalan), have commissioned reports discussing the

merits of this proposal. Several countries in the South, such as Brazil, East Timor,

Mongolia, Nigeria and South Africa, have also manifested an active interest in

the proposal. In the case of Brazil, a law has been in force since 2005 to

implement a long‐term basic income. The basic income proposal has featured in

2 Basic Income Studies Vol. 7 [2012], No. 1, Article 7



election campaigns in countries such as Australia, Belgium, Finland, Germany,

Holland, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the US and

several political parties have adopted them as part of their electoral programme;

in some of these countries, such as Ireland and the United Kingdom, there are

parliamentary groups formed by different political parties, and which support

basic income.

In Catalonia and Spain, trade unions such as Workers’ Commissions

(CCOO) and General Workers Union (UGT) and parties like the Spanish Socialist

Party (PSOE), United Left (IU), Initiative for Green Catalonia (ICV) or the Left

Republican Catalan party (ERC) all have discussed the basic income proposal.

ICV has incorporated it into its electoral programme. By contrast, the PSOE made

a programmatic proposal in this regard between 2001 and 2003, but ultimately

failed to adopt basic income officially. In Spain, basic income has also been

debated in the Andalusian, Basque and Catalan Parliaments and in the Congress

of Deputies (October 2007). In short, the basic income proposal has become part

of the political debate on social welfare, both in Europe and the rest of the world.

The political and social viability of a basic income proposal is an empirical

question that must be studied and resolved case by case. Much research is

primarily concerned with the analysis of the support that the proposal might

receive from the leading social and political forces, as well as with the study of

the distribution of power resources between these forces. However, one aspect of

basic income feasibility, despite its occurrence throughout academic debates, has

been scarcely addressed. One prevailing criticism of basic income is that it could

lead to a massive influx of immigrant population from poor countries to those

rich countries that implement this measure. The purpose of this article is to

examine this question.

2. Basic Income and Migration: The Current State of Affairs

Since the terms “basic income,” “immigrant“ and “territorial boundaries“ can

have different meanings, we first define the key concepts used in this article. We

refer to the most commonly accepted definition of basic income as an income

unconditionally guaranteed to all individuals, without the necessity of any

resources test or to perform any type of work (Van Donselaar, 2009; Offe, 2008;

Raventós, 2007; Purdy, 2007; Van Parijs, 2006; Van Parijs and Vanderborght,

2006; Pisarello and Cape, 2006; Pinilla, 2004, 2006; Fitzpatrick, 1999). The

immigrant population, who are potential beneficiaries of this proposal, are

defined as those persons who reside in a country other than their country of birth

3Boso and Vancea: Basic Income for Immigrants?



for a period equal to or greater than one year. This definition comprises both

individuals who hold a regular administrative status and individuals who live in

an irregular situation, provided that the latter can prove through some type of

record the time they spent in the destination country.

The types of boundaries in which we are particularly interested are those

involving the territorial demarcation of contemporary states. These boundaries

have a legal significance: they indicate the law that people are subject to and

which individuals and institutions exercise authority over the territory; they

define the body of entitled citizens and the agents responsible for income

redistribution (Kymlicka, 2006, p. 45). In the absence of a legitimate global

government, capable of effectively restricting states’ power over migration

policies, or a transnational entity capable of collecting and redistributing income

in a comprehensive, efficient and legitimate manner on a global scale, to

speculate in detail on these alternatives may be regarded as a sterile task.

But can the traditional welfare state really constitute the distribution unit of

a basic income? In the academic debate, three specific proposals are under

discussion in response to this question. A first solution provided in the literature

is to offer a global basic income on a planetary scale (Jordan and Duvell, 2003;

Pogge, 2001, 2005, 2007). The second solution, a younger sister of the first one, is

to designate the European Union or NAFTA as the main distribution units of a

suprastate basic income (Howard, 2006, 2007; Pioch, 2002, Schmitter and Bauer,

2001; Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2001). Finally, a third proposal is to leave the

task of distributing the basic income to state or regional governments (Terwitte,

2009; Levy, 2008; Offe, 2008; Pinilla, 2006; Arcarons et al., 2005).

Some authors have proposed a global basic income in the form of a Global

Resources Dividend (GRD) aimed at eradicating poverty in the world, as part of

a broader strategy that includes radical measures such as a Tobin Tax (Pogge,

2007, 2005, 2001; Frankman, 2004, 1999). This proposal seems difficult to achieve,

economically and politically, under current conditions (Howard, 2006; Pioch,

2002, Van Parijs, 1992).

As Howard (2007, 2006) and Pioch (2002) emphasise, from a political

standpoint the second option above does not offer better prospects for basic

income implementation. For example, at the European level the economic and

institutional diversity of the member states virtually precludes the harmonisation

necessary for implementing a “euro‐dividend.” The design and management of

social welfare policies still remains confined to the national level. Besides, the

tight economic and political constraints imposed by European integration and




enlargement tend to reduce the ability to develop generous welfare policies at

the state level (Pioch, 2002).

This last point notwithstanding, and taking into consideration all existent

alternatives, Howard (2006) and Pioch (2002) suggest that introducing a basic

income at the national or state level is more affordable than doing so at the

regional or global level. However, once we focus on the state level, most authors

immediately assume that a serious dilemma arises between, on the one hand,

developing social welfare policies (especially, the basic income) and, on the other

hand, instituting egalitarian immigration policies. Philippe Van Parijs and

Yannick Vanderborght present this dilemma as follows:

Is it feasible today to implement a generous basic income in case of

open borders? Of course, it is not. But this is not something that can

be said only about basic income. Any generous minimum income

subsidy or financial assistance for low‐skilled jobs is also vulnerable

to the challenge of selective immigration, which might seriously

compromise their viability. To the extent that the inequality of living

conditions continues to be pervasive worldwide, a cruel conflict will

persist between the requirement of solidarity towards those who

knock on our doors and the need for solidarity with respect to the

most vulnerable individuals of our population. (Van Parijs and

Vanderborght, 2006, pp. 137–138)

We can restate the reasons behind Van Parijs and Vanderborght’s view as

follows: (i) a basic income that is not accompanied by a restrictive immigration

policy might create a pull effect on the selective migration of prospective net

beneficiaries; (ii) selective migration will make a social security system

unsustainable and will also harm the most vulnerable in the society, so (iii) it will

only be feasible or desirable to implement a basic income at the state level by

discouraging selective immigration through entrance restrictions or by imposing

conditions on access to basic income.

The main objective of this article is to discuss the potential pull effect of basic

income, which appears shared by most academics yet it has not been analyzed in

depth.

Two types of arguments attempt to counter the assumption that basic

income implementation entails a prospective pull effect. The first argument

challenges opponents for committing a slippery slope type of fallacy: not only

basic income but any social policy measure that improves the living conditions in

rich countries might constitute a pull factor. However, most critics would shy

away from resisting a social policy designed to improve the living and working




conditions of young people in a developed country by arguing that this measure

would cause a massive influx of young immigrants. This type of reasoning could

be applied to any social policy implemented in rich countries.

The second counterargument is programmatic and consists of showing that,

given the global relevance of the basic income proposal, there is no reason not to

advocate a basic income in the Global South. We could even consider the

application of a basic income in these countries as a way to curb the (individually

and socially) costly processes of international migration.

Simply put, it would be more efficient to redistribute income than people.

Frankman (2004) and Pogge (2005, 2007) have advocated the need for a global

redistributive principle that would ensure to all people a decent standard of

living in their country of birth, an income that will exempt them from the

necessity of having to move to another country in order to have access to a fair

share of resources.

While both arguments appear to be reasonable enough, they leave important

issues unresolved. In our view, assessing the potential social impact and, in

particular, any potential pull effect of a basic income that includes immigrants

should be taken further, both in analytical and empirical terms. In the remainder

of this article, we discuss the basic income pull effect thesis by analysing its

theoretical foundation and empirical validity.

3. The Neoclassical Economic Theory of Migration

Are people exclusively determined by their expectations of income in their

decisions to migrate? And what is the theoretical reasoning and empirical

evidence that supports the view that basic income produces a pull effect?

The deterministic link between basic income and the expected massive

influx of immigrants is particularly supported by neoclassical economic theory.

From the pioneering work of Ravenstein (1889, 1885) to relatively recent

developments, such as the work of Borjas (1999), the economic migration model

is based on the assumption that the decision of an individual to migrate is

governed by the rational comparison of the relative costs and benefits of staying

in the region of origin and of moving to another destination. Within this

theoretical perspective, we can reasonably concur that basic income might

constitute an important incentive for the immigrant population.

According to this utilitarian scheme, individuals rationally decide to migrate

when the cost‐benefit calculation results in an expectation of net income from the

simple action of moving to another place. Since individuals generally expect to




receive this kind of reward from earned income, migrating can be considered a

kind of investment in human capital. In other words, people choose to move

where they can be more productive, according to their abilities and skill level.

However, individuals also have to bear various costs associated with the fact of

migrating: travel costs, subsistence costs previous to receiving the first salary,

efforts to learn a new language and culture, the difficulty of adapting to a new

labour market, and the psychological costs of being uprooted (Massey et al., 1993

p. 434).

As defined by the classical models of Sjaastad (1962), Todaro (1976, 1969)

and Borjas (1999), this process can be represented analytically in the following

equation:

n

ER(0) = ∫ [P1(t) P2(t) Yd(t) – P3(t) Y0(t)] e‐rtdt – C(0),

0

where ER (0) is the expected net income as a result of migrating, calculated just

before the moment of leaving the country of origin (time 0); t is the time; P1(t) is

the probability of avoiding deportation from the destination place (P = 1.0 for

immigrants with a regular administrative situation and P <1.0 for immigrants in

an irregular administrative situation); P2(t) is the probability of finding

employment in the destination society; Yd(t) is the income obtained if the

immigrant gets a job in the destination society; P3(t) is the probability of finding a

job in the place of origin; Y0(t) is the income obtained in the place of origin; r is

the discount factor; and C(0) is the total sum of the costs of moving to another

place (including psychological costs).

Note that most authors with a neoclassical economic perspective on

migration do not include future immigrants’ expected income from the social

protection systems of possible destination welfare states in their models. Most

authors of this tradition believe that immigrants move because of their

expectation of earned income, while other types of benefits have no effect on

their decision to leave the country of origin. The neoclassical model of migration

does not capture a potential pull effect of a basic income, therefore. However,

authors who hypothesize that basic income might generate a significant pull

effect on migration can modify the factor Yd (t) of the equation such that, in the

case of P2 (t) = 0.0, there would still exist an expectation of income in the

destination country.

Few studies in the sociology of migration literature explore the welfare

magnet hypothesis. As outlined above, following the neoclassical explanation of

migratory flows, all those conditions that allow immigrants to obtain greater




benefits in the country of destination would be part of the pull effect. Therefore,

we could predict an increased flow of immigrants in those regions or countries

characterised by higher social benefits. That is, all social policies in high‐income

countries, whether in the form of monetary provision or other types of

expenditures (e.g., education, health or housing), pull people living in low

income countries towards emigrating.

However, the few cross‐sectional studies that have attempted to test the

hypothesis of welfare states’ pull effect have not been able to produce conclusive

results regarding the weight of this factor in choosing a particular destination

country. Some studies show that, in the case of the US, there is no statistically

significant relationship between the decision to migrate and the various social

protection systems, some more generous than others, of the different federal

states (Kaestner, Kaush and Van Ryzin, 2003; Levine and Zimmerman, 1999).

Other studies have found some positive, albeit modest, evidence of the

relationship between these two variables (McKinnish, 2005). Zavodny (1997) has

analysed immigrant population settlement in different US states, and concludes

that immigrants’ distribution does not respond to the generosity of the welfare

state but rather to the settlement of previously established foreign populations.

Research by Mayda (2005) and Pedersen, Pytlikova and Smith (2004) has

examined migration flows to different OECD countries by country of origin.

These studies have demonstrated the importance of traditional factors such as

economic opportunities, geographical proximity, language or existing social

networks (Epstein and Gang, 2006). Recently, Naera’s (2005) study of asylum

seekers’ applications in European countries and Lopez‐Casanovas and Garcia’s

(2006) research based on an update of existing OECD data have reached similar

conclusions. None of these efforts have served to reinforce the hypothesis of the

existence of a self‐selection process consistent with a destination country’s social

benefits as elements of attracting immigration. In other words, once we control

for other factors, the welfare magnet hypothesis does not seem to hold.

It is surprising, then, that the academic debate on the relationship between

basic income and immigrant population does not match these recent

developments in the sociology of migration. Neoclassical theories of migration

have been widely criticized by anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists,

geographers, and even some economists, as being simplistic and incapable of

explaining current population movements – let alone able to predict future

population movements.

When we examine the recent increase in international migration, we must

pay particular attention to three causal factors. First, the data show that the role




of family and community networks is essential in understanding all phases of the

migration process. Second, explanatory models of migration must also take into

consideration historical and institutional factors, for most migratory movements

are rooted in institutional decisions that occurred in the past. This is the case, for

example, for migration from the Algerian population to France, Turks to

Germany, or Ecuadorians to Spain. Third, the decision of a person to emigrate

depends to a large extent on her belief that carrying out an autonomous life in

her country of origin is impossible, in addition to the demand for labour in

potential destination countries.

The empirical confirmation of the hypothesis of a possible pull effect of the

basic income presents several difficulties. The first difficulty is the absence of

empirical cases to test this hypothesis. In other words, any research that wants to

evaluate the “magnetism” that a society with basic income could generate over

potential immigrants is empirically conditioned by the lack of cases. Technically,

we need variation in our dependent variable to make good causal inferences

(King, Keohane and Verba, 2000). To properly evaluate the impact of a basic

income proposal that would include also the immigrants within its target

population – to predict, for example, its pull effect – we would need to compare

societies that have implemented a basic income for immigrants with societies

that have implemented a basic income for only their citizens, as well as societies

that have never implemented such a policy measure.

Aside from a pilot project in the Namibian village of Otjivero, where

inhabitants have received a basic income since 2008, there is only one place in the

world that has institutionalised a basic income. Alaskan citizens from the early

1980s have received an annual basic income, without any condition other than

their legal residence. In 2009, the grant amounted to $3,269, which can be an

important component of a household’s income. For example, a family of five

individuals would annually receive $16,345. Although the number of immigrants

did not significantly increase either in Alaska or in Otjivero, the results of these

two cases because of their particularities (small scale, natural resources, etc.) are

not directly transferable to other social settings.

The second methodological difficulty resides in the fact that almost no

survey data exists that provide us with information on individuals’ reasons to

move from one country to another, which might allow us to quantify the event.

There exist few immigrant population surveys. In the few available surveys

either the reasons for moving to another country do not appear as specific items

in the questionnaire or the questions are vaguely formulated. Moreover, we

would need to survey not only immigrants about their reasons for leaving the




country of origin, but also those people who choose to stay in their own country

of origin.

One of the few recent surveys that provide us with relevant information is

the National Immigrant Survey, conducted in 2006 by the National Statistics

Institute (INE) with a representative sample of the immigrant population in

Spain (N = 15.500). Table 1 shows the response rate of the immigrant population

to the question about reasons to emigrate from the country of origin.

Table 1. Reasons for first migration experience (%)

Retirement 2.0

Employment change 5.6

Lack of employment 21.5

To find a better job 36.0

Political reasons 3.4

Religious reasons 0.3

Training or educational reasons 8.9

Quality of life 35.1

Personal reasons (family reunification, etc.) 33.7

Cost of living 11.4

The weather 7.4

Temporary stay in a transit country 1.4

Other reasons 14.4

Source: Personal extrapolation from the National Immigration Survey data (INE, 2007).

Note: Multiple‐answer question

While it is true that among the surveyed population no reason stands out as

the main motivation for migrating, it is also obvious that ensuring the material

basis for a decent standard of living constitutes a decisive reason to migrate.

Around 36 percent of the sampled individuals say they emigrated, for the first

time, to seek a better job; 21.5 percent for being unemployed; 35.1 percent to

improve their quality of life; and 11.4 percent because of living costs. However,

family reasons – mainly family reunification – are also relevant as a motivation to

migrate to another country. Political, religious, environmental and even

educational or job training are all less significant.

The data presented in Table 1 makes clear that the major motivation for

migrating is the expectation of earning an income, followed by improving one’s

quality of life. However, it is necessary to distinguish between the reason for

migrating as such and the choice of destination country, an often overlooked




aspect in the explanatory models of migration inspired by neoclassical economic

theory. For example, a person may decide to emigrate to find work but choose to

immigrate to a country because of a family member who lives there. The

hypothesis of welfare states’ pull effect assumes that future migrants have a good

knowledge of the social protection systems of potential target countries that

allows them to rationally evaluate different options. However, the available data

suggest that immigrants have little knowledge of unemployment benefits, health

care or education systems in prospective destination countries prior to their

arrival, especially compared with their knowledge about employment

opportunities or wages. It is estimated that between 65 and 80 percent of

immigrants knew nothing about admission conditions and migration regulation

of the European countries they migrated to (Eurostat, 2000, p. 88).

The latest European enlargement presents an interesting case study. In May

2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,

Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the European Union, followed by Bulgaria

and Romania in January 2007. The differences in income, unemployment or

social spending between the EU‐15 and the new member state countries were

substantial. The European Union imposed transition periods of up to seven years

(the so‐called 2 +3 +2 formula) to workers coming from the new member states,

because of concerns about a welfare magnet and the possible negative effects on

the labour markets. Only Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom opened their

labour markets immediately in 2004. Judging by the available data, the increase

in immigration from these countries was moderate in most cases, to the point

that in 2006 and 2007, seven member states (Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,

the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) decided to lift their restrictions, while

others (Belgium, Denmark, France and Germany) simplified their procedures

(Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 2008).

Each time the European Union extended its borders to countries with low

incomes and poor social protection systems, the subject of a potential increase in

population movements from less developed countries to states with more

generous social protection services featured prominently in public debate. A

number of variables and mediating factors influence the decision to migrate.

Without downplaying job search as the main motivation for migrating, the

European experience suggests that geography, language, country size or social

networks matter considerably when deciding to migrate to another country. As

we discussed above, historians, anthropologists and geographers have argued

that migrants’ behaviour is strongly influenced by historical experiences and

family and community dynamics that are not captured by the neoclassical




economic model. Many of these determinants would not be affected by a basic

income implementation in a potential destination country.

Wallerstein (1974) and, more recently, Morawska (2009) have shown that

international migration occurs particularly between former colonies and

coloniser states. Cultural, linguistic and administrative links, investment,

transport and established social networks generate a structure of opportunities

and incentives that may be decisive in the decision to migrate to a particular

country (Castles and Miller, 2003). Figure 1 shows how 59.5 percent of the

immigrant population in Spain originates from neighbouring countries or from

countries with a historical colonial relationship. In addition, 13.3 percent of the

immigrant population originates from former destination countries of intense

emigration of Spanish people after World War II.

Figure 1: Immigrant population in Spain by historical typology (%)

Source: Personal elaboration based on data from the National Immigration Survey (INE,

2007)

If the generosity of social protection systems were a significant explanatory

variable, as the hypothesis of the basic income pull effect suggests, we would

expect Ecuadorians to migrate to Sweden and not to Spain. Instead, we observe

the opposite pattern with a ratio of 378 Ecuadorian migrants to Spain for each

Ecuadorian migrant to Sweden.




Spain and Ireland are among those European Union countries that invest

less in social protection. Considering the low weight of social expenditure as a

percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in both countries, compared to

that from other states (Figure 2), it is difficult to explain why these countries

receive a high percentage of immigrant population. The argument that social

benefits are a major incentive for immigration does not seem to be supported by

the evidence.

Figure 2: Public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP by the percentage of

immigrant population in various EU countries

Source: Personal elaboration based on data from the Eurostat, 2007 (N=28)

4. The Role of the Family and Social Networks

The neoclassical model fails to capture a key fact noted by several studies,

namely that decisions to migrate in many cases are made by the family rather

than individuals (Vertovec, 2009; Hugo, 1994; Stark, 1991; Taylor, 1987). On the

one hand, in situations of uncertainty, a family may decide to send one or more

members to work in another region or country, to maximise their income and




livelihood options, while other members stay at home or work in the local labour

market. On the other hand, studies have emphasised the importance of social

networks for migration decisions. Social networks or social capital facilitate the

arrival of new immigrants by providing jobs, housing or other needs (Sassen,

2007; Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; Massey, 2005, 1990a, 1990b; Castles and Miller,

2003; Portes and Böröcz, 1989; Gurak and Caceres, 1992). The case of the

immigrant population in Spain illustrates this. Figure 3 shows that 8 out of 10

immigrants already knew someone locally when arriving in the destination

country.

Figure 3: Did you have someone to turn to when you arrived in Spain?

Source: Personal extrapolation from the National Immigration Survey data (INE, 2006)

Moreover, nearly 70 percent of interviewed immigrants, who had someone

to turn to when arriving in Spain, had family members who were already

residing in the country (Table 2). About 30 percent of those interviewed

contacted friends, while the percentage of immigrants who directed themselves

to acquaintances, businessmen, legal agents, intermediaries or other nonstate

actors is marginal. Since links between family and friends are generally defined

by strong reciprocal relationships, the available data reinforces the hypothesis

that social networks are crucially important in the decision to migrate.

Nevertheless, family or friendship networks seem to be a necessary but not a

sufficient condition for migrating.




Table 2: Whom you have turned to when you arrived in Spain? (%)

Family 69.3

Employers or legal agents 2.8

Intermediaries or unofficial agents 0.7

Friends 30.1

Acquaintances 8.0

Others 1.8

Source: Personal extrapolation from the National Immigration Survey data (INE, 2007).

Note: Multiple-answer question.

In recent years, the sociology of migration is pointing to the crucial role that

social networks play at different stages of the migration process. There is enough

empirical evidence to suggest that such networks improve the ability of people to

engage in international migratory flows. The data provided in Table 2 shows that

having a family member, friend or acquaintance who resides in a prospective

destination country or region is a key factor in the final choice of a person to

migrate.

Clearly, the assumption that expected welfare state income is a necessary

and sufficient condition for the increase in international migration

underestimates other micro and macro social aspects that influence migration

flows. To further illustrate this point, we briefly describe in the next section the

case of the Minimum Insertion Income in the Basque Country and analyse its

effect on selective migration.

5. Basic Income in the Basque Country

The basic income proposal was included in the Social Rights Charter of the

Basque Country after a vibrant process of social activism and civic participation.

It was initially developed as a popular legislative initiative in 1996, was

subsequently debated and amended in the Parliament, and was finally approved

in 2000 as Law 10/2000. Paradoxically, during this process the social movements

that brought the Charter to the Basque Parliament tried to withdraw the basic

income proposal on several occasions because the amendments proposed by the

parliamentary groups distorted the initial proposal. The basic income proposal

that was included in the final text, despite keeping its original name, does not

meet the requirements of the standard basic income proposal outlined at the

beginning of this article. Despite its name, the basic income in the Basque




Country shares many features with the minimum insertion income, although it

remains the social benefit with the broadest coverage in Spain.

The Charter is governed by three main principles: first, the restoration of the

universal rights of citizenship to all those persons who, for lack of access to a

gainful employment in the labour market, do not have sufficient income to live a

dignified life; second, the recognition of citizens’ rights to a share of the social

product in the form of a replacement income for those people who tried but

failed to find work; and third, the division of work time among the economically

active population, in accordance with the principles of solidarity and equality.

The Charter explicitly states that every adult individual, registered in the public

labour office and with registered residence in any municipality in the Basque

Country for at least one year, is entitled to a basic income equivalent to the

minimum interprofessional wage at the time.

This last requirement of official residential registration, coupled with the fact

that the Basque minimum insertion income offers the most comprehensive

coverage of all social benefits in Spain, means this case is of particular interest for

our analysis. During the parliamentary debates prior to the approval of the

Charter, intense discussions took place about whether this basic income would

generate a strong pull effect, not only for foreigners but also for Spanish citizens

from other autonomous communities lacking such a comprehensive social

protection system. Empirical evidence supports the views of those persons who

argued that such an effect would not occur.

Figure 4 presents the average growth rate of the foreign population in Spain

between 1998 and 2008, disaggregated by region, based on municipal census

data. Note that the current percentage of international immigrant population in

the Basque Country is 5.44 percent, well below the total immigrant population in

Spain (11.4 percent). Furthermore, as shown in Figure 4, the growth of the

foreign population in autonomous communities with less developed social

protection systems, such as the Balearic Islands, Castilla la Mancha or La Rioja,

has been considerably higher than in the Basque Country. In fact, reaching a

value of 0.23 points, the Basque Country approximates the average growth rate

of the foreign population in Spain for the period observed. Most importantly,

taking into account the general trend in the rest of Spain, we observe no

excessive immigration growth following the adoption of the Charter. In other

words, we find no trace of the “phantom” of a basic income pull effect.




Figure 4: Average growth rate of immigrant population in Spanish autonomous

communities (2002–2009)

Source: Personal elaboration based on data from the Official Registration Office, INE

2002–2009

Even with basic income and Social Emergency Aid,1 two tools that boost the

level of social protection system in the Basque Country, the immigrant

population registers a lower level than in many other regions. The difference can

be explained by distinct labour market dynamics, in particular the relative

decline of agricultural and construction activities and the lower rate of female

labour force participation in the Basque Country. The variation in immigrant

1 Social Emergency Aid is sporadic financial benefits for persons whose resources are insufficient to meet specific expenses. These social benefits are necessary to prevent, avoid or mitigate situations of social marginalization, and they are regular or special in character.




population between the Spanish autonomous communities thus lies primarily in

the distinct characteristics of internal labour markets.

There is some ambiguity about interpreting the data concerning the use of

Basque welfare state services by the immigrant population. According to a recent

study by the Basque Government (2008), in 2004 23 percent of basic income

beneficiaries and respectively 26 percent of Social Emergency Aid beneficieries

were immigrants from outside the European Union. These rates are much higher

than the relative weight of this group during that year in the Basque Country,

which was a mere 2.8 percent of the total population.

Apparently, this finding could reinforce the hypothesis that basic income

exercises some level of magnetism on selective migration, which could endanger

the welfare system over time. Survey data of the Soziologikoen Kabinetea

Prospekzio (June 2008) shows that this appears to be the opinion of the majority

of the Basque people. Only 9 percent of the Basque population believes that

immigrants pay more taxes than they receive, while 40 percent think that

immigrants receive appropriate or even insufficient social assistance. However,

these opinions do not conform to the reality. By contrast, taking into account the

tax revenue from labour income, in 2006 the fiscal contribution of the immigrant

population was estimated to be 23.5 percent higher than that of the native

population (Basque Government, 2008). This difference is mainly explained by

the higher activity rate among the immigrant population, but also because the

time period in which the immigrant population disposes of social aids tends to

be shorter. Therefore, the presence of the immigrant population in the Basque

Country is a key element for maintaining the social protection system.

The results of the Basque Country case reinforce the idea that we do not

have enough empirical evidence to rule out the hypothesis that there is no

relationship between the existence of social benefits in destination states and

individuals’ decision to migrate.

6. Conclusion

In the years to come, the protection of migrant populations’ social rights can

proceed along two routes: either Global North societies reset and revitalize the

notion of citizenship, so that it includes the population permanently residing in a

particular country, regardless of its origin; alternatively, citizenship becomes a

purely formal concept, which not only excludes foreigners from the enjoyment of

fundamental social rights but progressively becomes useless in combating the

increased vulnerability of the entire working population.




The first of these options implies difficult political and social challenges in

ensuring a set of constituent rights that covers all people living in a given society,

without excluding those who were born elsewhere but reside in the country. This

solution requires not only a basic income, but also legislative and institutional

changes to protect the immigrant population from exploitation and

discrimination at the workplace; to simplify access to residence, nationalisation

through naturalisation or dual citizenship; to ensure decent and safe housing

that safeguards privacy and family life; to provide adequate health care beyond

access to emergency services; and to limit the control of state borders and remove

arbitrary barriers imposed against those people fleeing from poverty.

However, the trend in Northern countries is to restrict migration policies

and introduce severe measures trying to dissuade potential economic migrants,

in the assumption that these people would come quickly and in large numbers

driven by the alleged pull effect of an unconditional income, in turn making the

welfare system of these countries unsustainable. A common argument against

the protection of immigrant population’s social rights, both in academia and in

certain mass media, is its prospective pull effect. The basic income debate is an

example of how neoclassical economic arguments pervade migration theory and

migration policies. This article has presented empirical evidence that shows how

the majority of the destination states fail to implement their migration policies,

by operating implicitly with a sociology of migration inspired by the neoclassical

economic theory. This is a sociology that presents a frozen image of social life in

which fully informed individuals decide to migrate by rationally comparing a

wide range of migratory offers.

This is not to deny the importance of the economic factor in the decision

taken by an individual to cross the borders of a state. But while economic

opportunity is a leading motivator, human beings’ urge to move is mainly

associated with their inability to achieve a decent standard of living in their

countries of origin. Basic income would not worsen the conditions of those living

in disadvantaged countries. Instead, basic income might indirectly revitalize

them (for instance, through remittances).

Moreover, following the logic of the neoclassical theory of migration, the

mere existence of economic disparities between different areas already generates

migration flows. This suggests we should be careful in attributing the

introduction of a basic income in a rich country as having significant weight on

the decision of a person in a poor country to migrate. The rapid increase in

poverty in recent decades in the South is already a powerful migration engine,

independently of the application of a basic income in the North. If poor countries




would have a minimum level of social existence, the pull factor of social policies

such as a basic income would hardly exist. Basic income is not a necessary

condition for increased migration from one country to another country, since

such migration flows already exist regardless of a basic income being

implemented. In addition, the arguments and empirical data seriously call into

question the idea that the basic income constitutes a sufficient condition.

The case of the Basque Country shows that, under normal conditions, the

arrival of an immigrant population is a function of the bottleneck produced in

specific work activities, in which there is a manifest lack of manpower adapted to

them. The new contingent of foreign‐born workers is often younger, with higher

educational levels, and higher activity rates than the native population. The

immigrant population not only curbs the aging trend in most Western societies,

but partly explains the economic development of these countries and plays a key

role in maintaining their social protection systems. In sum, the arguments and

empirical data presented in this article conflict with the commonly held view that

a basic income at the state level would be unsustainable because of a prospective

pull effect on migration. In fact, the evidence presented in this article raises the

question of whether a basic income would even be feasible, in most countries in

the North, without the contribution of the immigrant population.

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Àlex Boso

Department of Political and Social Science

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

C/Ramon Trias Fargas, 25‐27

08005 Barcelona

Spain

Email: [email protected]

Mihaela Vancea

Department of Political and Social Science

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

C/Ramon Trias Fargas, 25‐27

08005 Barcelona

Spain

Email: [email protected]




Basic Income for Immigrants? Reflections on the Pull Effect of Social Benefits

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