Australia's citizen soldiers, 1919-1939 : a study oforganisation, command, recruiting, training and equipment

Author:Neumann, Claude

Publication Date:1978

DOI:https://doi.org/10.26190/unsworks/18061

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AUSTRALIA'S CITIZEN SOLDIERS, 1919-1939:

A STUDY OF ORGANIZATION, CO~~~D,

RECRUITING, TRAINING AND EQUIPHENT

by

Claude Neumann

A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts,

Department of History, Faculty of Hilitary Studies, University of Nev1 South Hales

at Duntroon. De.cernber, 1978.

All sources for this thesis have been acknowledged, and the thesis is my own composition. It has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other university or institution.

C. Neumann

Summary

The main problem investigated is how successful

Australia's citizen soldiers would have been in fulfilling

either their anti-invasion or their anti-raid roles between

1919 and 1939. The organization, command, training,

equipment, social composition, recruitment and retention

of Australia's citizen soldiers are examined in an effort

to discover the solution to this problem.

The conclusion reached is that Australia's citizen

soldiers could not have fulfilled their roles, the nature

of which was widely debated by British and Australian

defence planners because of their differing threat

perceptions. Inter-Service rivalry over money also

encouraged this debate.

Basically, the A.M.F. did not have the equipment and

trained troops to enable it to concentrate in time to

repel a Japanese raid or invasion. Motor vehicles could

have provided this mobility but their expense was pro­

hibitive. However, in other respects the Military Board

failed to make the best use of its resources. Slight

changes in organization and the command structure might

have made the C.M.F., once concentrated, more efficient and

better able to fight the Japanese. More attention paid to

ensuring that training was imaginative and interesting then

might have led to higher retention rates, thereby eliminating

the expensive and wasteful requirement for constant

recruiting campaigns.

Abbreviations

AA

A.A.A.

A.A.O.

A. G.

A.G.P.S.

A.H.Q.

A.I.F.

A.L.P.

A.M.F.

A.N.L.

A.N.U.

A.W.M.

BP

B [r] de

C.A.R.O.

C .A. S.

C.F.

C.G.S.

C.I.D.

C.I.G.S.

C.M.F.

C.N.S.

c.o.

CP

C.P.D.

C.P.P.

CRS

Australian Archives

Australian Archives' Accession

Australian Army Order

Adjutant-General

Australian Government Publishing Service

Army Headquarters

Australian Imperial Force

Australian Labor Party

Austra·lian Military Forces

Australian National Library

Australian National University

Australian War Memorial

Brisbane Permanent Accession

Brigade

Central Army Records Office

Chief of the Air Staff

Citizen Forces

Chief of the General Staff

Committee of Imperial Defence

Chief of the Imperial General Staff

Citizen Military Forces

Chief of the Naval Staff

Commanding Officer

Canberra Permanent Accession

Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates

Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Papers

Commonwealth Record Series

D.M.O. & I.

F.L.C.

Fld

G.O.C.

H.M.S.O.

H.Q.

H.R.A.

I.G.

M.B.I.

M.D.

M.H.R.

M.L.

M.O.

M.P.

MP

M.U.P.

N.C.O.

n.d.

n.p.

n.pub.

O.U.P.

P.F.

P .M.F.

Q.M.G.

R.A.A.

R.A.A.F.

R.A.F.

R.A.N.

Regt

Director of Military Operations and Intelligence

First Line Component

Field

General Officer Commanding

His/Her Majesty's Stationery Office

Headquarters

Historical Records of Australia

Inspector-General

Military Board Instruction

Military District

Member of the House of Representatives

Mitchell Library of N.S.W.

Military Order

Member of Parliament

Melbourne Permanent Accession

Melbourne University Press

Non-Commissioned Officer

No date

No place

No publisher

Oxford University Press

Permanent Forces

Permanent Military Forces

Quartermaster-General

Royal Australian Artillery

Royal Australian Air Force

Royal Air Force

Royal Australian Navy

Regiment

R.N. Royal Navy

S.M.H. S~dney Morning Herald

SP Sydney Permanent Accession

S.U.P. Sydney University Press

U.A.P. United Australia Party

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION i

CHAPTER ONE. THE CITIZEN SOLDIER TRADITION IN AUSTRALIA BETWEEN 1788 AND 1918 1

CHAPTER TWO. THE GREAT DEBATE: THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA AGAINST RAIDS OR INVASION, 1919-39 32

CHAPTER THREE. THE ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND OF THE CITIZEN SOLDIER, 1919-39 80

CHAPTER FOUR. RECRUITMENT, RETENTION AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE IN THE MILITIA, 1919-39 123

CHAPTER FIVE. THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE CITIZEN FORCES, 1911-39 170

CHAPTER SIX. THE TRAINING OF THE CITIZEN SOLDIER, 1918-39

CHAPTER SEVEN. THE EQUIPMENT OF THE CITIZEN SOLDIER, 1918-39

CONCLUSION

APPENDICES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

193

234

274

276

295

When men set out from their own country to encounter strife and perils in foreign lands and some disaster befalls them .•• the survivors still have left their native soil, their city, and their fatherland, so that they are not all utterly destroyed. But for those who are to incur peril in defence of what they most prize, shrines and country, parents and children, and all else, the struggle is not the same nor even similar. For if they save themselves by a stout defence against the foe, their enemies will be intimidated and disinclined to attack them in the future, but if they make a poor showing •.. no hope of safety will be left. Those, therefore, who are to contend for all these precious stakes must fail in no preparation and no effort, but must take thought for many and varied activities, so that a failure may at least not seem due to their own fault •.••

Aeneas Tacticus

i

INTRODUCTION

This thesis seeks to evaluate how successful

Australia's citizen soldiers were in fulfilling their roles

between the two World Wars. Usually, armies are raised

in order to defend the state against what are considered

to be the major threats to that state's security. The

threats may be internal or external and, in the nineteenth

century, citizen soldiers had been raised in Australia to

counter both threats.

The Citizen Forces of the inter-World War decades

reflected the traditions of their predecessors. It is

necessary, therefore, briefly to outline the history of the

citizen soldier in Australia prior to 1918 before examining

the differing threat perceptions of the inter-war years.

Certainly, British and Australian defence planners held

mixed and at times incompatible strategic concepts, yet

out of this debate emerged a role for the citizen soldier.

To put it briefly and simply for the moment, this

role was to repel invasion at the most; and a minor raid

at the very least. This thesis thus considers the

command, organization, training and equipment of the citizen

soldier. It will be argued that by 1939, the Army Mas

definitely not in a position to repel a Japanese landing

in strength. Indeed, it may be aruged that the main

function of the Militia was to supply commanders for

Australian Expeditionary Force divisions.

How far the training of such commanders in Australia

fitted them for campaigns overseas is a point which should

be considered elsewhere. There is no doubt that the

ii

potential ability of an army to perform successfully in

battle should stem from the actual training received and

perhaps also from the calibre of the individual being

trained. Otherwise, the effort appears to be worthless.

An attempt has thus been made to analyse the effectiveness

of such training in the hope of revealing some of the

strengths and weaknesses of the Citizen Military Force.

The major justification for this study is that for

too long historians have concerned themselves mainly with

the actions of military forces in battle~ Often, little

attention is paid to the fact that the forces involved

were shaped and moulded by their pre-war organization, command,

recruiting, training and equipment. It is true, as Tacitus

remarked, that wars are exciting to write about, but

perhaps the more mundane peacetime activities of armed

forces preceeding battle are equally worthy of examination.

A more specific justification is that, until this decade,

the Australian armed services were virtually ignored by

scholars. Only the Official War Histories and narratives

of various units, usually A.I.F. ones, existed, as well as

a few rather general works concerned more with defence

planning and strategy.

1Although these descriptions may be superficial, as J. Keegan, The Face of Battle (Reprint, London, 1977}, p. 29 claims. In Australia at least, however, there are few accounts of armed forces in peacetime in comparison with the plethora of histories dealing with Australia's particip­ation in battles overseas. See J.N.I. Dawes and L.L. Robson, Citizen to Soldier Australia before the Great War Recollections of Members of the First A.I.F. (Carlton, 1977} pp. vii & ix for similar comments.

iii

At this point it seems advisable to ~~offer a few

definitions. The first, and most important, definition

to consider is what is meant by the term 'citizen soldier'.

A 'citizen soldier' may be defined as: neither a

professional nor a mercenary soldier but a civilian who

normal!~ undergoes part-time training only, but who may be

called upon to perform full-time duty in times of emergency.

A professional, permanent or regular soldier is a person

who makes soldiering his career and serves continuously.

While such definitions are generally true, they raise some

difficulties. For instance, does Lieutenant-General H.

Gordon Bennett's service during the First World War mean

that he should not be considered a citizen soldier during

the 1920s and 1930s, merely because he served throughout the

war? To take another case, does Field Marshal Sir Thomas

Blarney's service in the Permanent Forces, both before and

after World War I, disqualify him from being considered a

citizen soldier during the 1930s, even though he commanded

a Militia division in that capacity?

Obviously not; but such considerations must be borne

in mind when discussing the inter-war Citizen Military

Forces. -For example, with Blarney, who served in the

Permanent Military Forces from 1906 to 1925, there must be a

good case for arguing that he really was a permanent, and

not a citizen, soldier. Of course, given his performance in

the two World Wars, both Australia's regular and her citizen

soldiers like to claim him as their product. In truth, he

naturally must have benefitted from his training both as

a permanent and as a citizen soldier.

iv

Blarney obviously emerges as atypical: an unusual

'hybrid' who ought to be considered as such. Even if

Blarney should be considered a special case, perhaps our

definition of the 'citizen soldier' should be altered to

include the phrase, 'and has never served in a regular

force in' peacetime'.

As far as the Military Board was concerned the

demarcation was much more simple. A soldier was a citizen

soldier when he served part-time in the C.M.F. or Militia

and a regular when he served continuously in the P.M.F.

This practice will usually be followed, but, as far as

possible, a note will be made whenever Blarney, or a similar

'hybrid', is mentioned.

The remaining definitions are not as complicated.

Together the C.M.F., or Militia after 1929, and the P.M.F.

formed the A.M.F. In the following chapters, when the

terms 'Australian army' or simply 'Army' are used, they

will refer to the A.M.F. unless the context makes it clear

that the terms are referring to the C.M.F. only. During

the 1920s and 1930s there were comparatively few regulars,

and citizen soldiers outnumbered permanent ones by as

much as fifteen to one, at least on paper. Any other

definitions will be explained, where necessary, the first

time they appear.

The citizen soldier tradition in Australia between

1788 and 1918 is discussed in the first chapter. The

emphasis is on the models provided by the nineteenth

century British and Australian colonial armies for the citizen

soldier of the 1920s and 1930s. The second chapter is

v

concerned with the debate surrounding the likely scale of

attack ~ustralia would face. Although Government policy

stipulated defence against raids as the citizen soldiers'

role, the Military Board continued to plan for defence

against invasion. The third chapter deals with the

organization and command of the citizen soldier. The

organization and command were intended to ensure that the

citizen soldier fulfilled his anti-invasion role.

Methods of recruiting, retention rates and conditions

of service in the Militia are analysed in the fourth

chapter and the social composition of the Citizen Forces

is considered in the fifth chapter. The sixth and

seventh chapters deal with the quality, effectiveness

and types of training the inter-war citizen soldier was

exposed to and the type of equipment he was given to

fight with.

Police are soldiers who act alone; soldiers are policemen who act in unison.

Herbert Spencer

Chapter One

The Citi·zeh Soldier Tradition in Australia between 1788 and 1918

Like most institutions, the Citizen Military Forces

of the inter-war years reflected the traditions of its

predecessors. The first model, which was probably a

source of strength rather than weakness, was that of the

nineteenth century British army.

THE BRITISH MODEL

For some eighty years after the foundation of the

first colony in Australia, British regular soldiers both

I ' protected the colon1sts from the traditional European foes

of Great Britain and policed the colonies by providing

guards against the Aborigines, rebellious convicts, miners

and bushrangers. Inevitably, the British troops also

formed the model for the later colonial permanent and

citizen forces. Reinforced by association on common

battlefields in Africa, Asia and Europe, as well as by the

continuing Australian political and cultural dependence on

the Mother Country, the British army's influence upon the

Australian Military Forces' tactics, training, equipment,

command and organization remained supreme until at least

1942.1

1 In fact, it was only in the 1960s, with the introduction of the Pentropic organization and the war in Vietnam, that the influence of the U.S. army began to challenge seriously the Australian r.1ilitary Forces' British orientation.

2

Such an apparently overwhelming influence raises the

question: precisely what influence did this British

tradition have? Formally, the British tradition led to

the adoption of British organization and legislation, the

use of British military training pamphlets, the purchase

of British equipment and the importation of British

officers to administer, command and instruct the colonists.

Informally, the use of British regulars as policemen and

warders gave the military a bad reputation and hence made

it difficult to attract volunteers except in times of

crisis. And, despite the example of the 'Rum Rebellion',

Australian colonial forces tended to follow the British

tradition of standing aloof from politics.

THE COLONIAL MODEL

Roles

Throughout the nineteenth century the Colonial citizen

soldier had two major roles: those of internal and external

security. As with the British regulars, the use of citizen

soldiers for internal security duties gave the military a

poor reputation. This is possibly another reason \'lhy

peacetime soldiering has never been really popular in

Australia.

When, in 1800, Governor Hunter raised Australia's

2 first citizen force of that century, he stated that the

Volunteers of the Sydney and Parramatta Loyal Associated

Companies were:

2In the early 1790s Governor King seems to have raised the first Volunteers to help guard convicts on Norfolk Island.

3

••• embodied for the purpose of assisting the civil power and His Majesty•s troops occasionally in the preservation of good order and of public and private property •••• 3

The immediate occasion for the formation of these Loyal

Associations was a plot by Irish convicts to rebel.

At some time between late 1801 and 1802 the Loyal

Associations appear to have been disbanded,4

because the

danger seemed to have passed. However, Governor King

enrolled the Volunteers again in November 1802 for at

least a week to make sure that four hundred Irish convicts . 5

were disembarked peaceably.

The next time the Loyal Associations were reformed

was in order to meet an external threat. This was in 1803

when war with France began again, following the Peace of

Am. 6 ~ens. Nevertheless, the Volunteers did not have the

opportunity of meeting the French in battle. Instead,

when Irish convicts rebelled at Castle Hill on 4 March

1804, the Volunteers were called upon to help members of

the New South Wales Corps under Major Johnston suppress

h . . 7

t e ~nsurrect~on.

3 Governor Hunter•s Orders Re Armed Associations,

7 September 1800, reprinted in the H.R.A. (Sydney, 1914), Series I, Vol.II, pp.636-7.

~ee Acting-Governor King to Under Secretary King, dated 21 August 1801 in the margin, reprinted in the H.R.A. (Sydney, 1915), Series I, Vol.III, p.260 and Governor King to Lord Hobart, 9 November 1802, ibid., p.654.

5K.S. Inglis, The Australian Colonists An exploration of

social history 1788-1870 (Carlton, 1974), p.l78.

6 Government And General Order of 9 December 1803 reprinted

in the Historical Records of New South Wales (Sydney, 1897), Vol.V, p.276.

7 General Orders Relating To The Irish Insurrection, 9 March

1804, reprinted in the H.R.A. (Sydney, 1915), Series I, Vol.IV, p.572.

4

After the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the

Volunteers were, presumably, again disbanded, because in

1819 Governor Macquarie, apparently unsuccessfully,

proposed to raise a militia cavalry and infantry force to 8

be commanded by Judge Advocate Wylde. From then until

the 1850s, with the sole exception of Governor Gawler•s

Royal Brigade of Volunteer Militia in South Australia in

1840 which soon became inactive, no more citizen soldiers

were raised in the Australian colonies. Evidently it was

felt that the British garrisons were strong enough to be

able to deal effectively with the likely internal and

external threats and the colonists were unwilling to spend 9

time and money raising citizen forces.

The situation changed drastically with the outbreak

of the Crimean War in 1854. New South Wales and Victoria

raised Volunteer Corps while South Australia passed a 10

Militia Act. But this outburst of volunteering was

overshadowed by the storming of Eureka Stockade. After the

12th and 40th British infantry regiments and police had

suppressed the miners, one hundred •Gentlemen volunteers•

8 Governor Macquarie to Earl Bathurst, 19 July 1819,

reprinted in the H.R.A. (Sydney, 1917}, Series I, Vol.X, pp.l85-7.

9 Certainly this was true of Governor Gawler•s Brigade which

had been raised as a police auxiliary. By May 1841 the Brigade had ceased to exist after its ceremonial drill in particular had been satirized by the public and press. See H.J. Zwillenberg, Citizens And Soldiers The Defence Of South Australia 1836-1901 (M.A. thesis, University of Adelaide, 1970}, Pt I, pp.27-9.

10war Office, The Land Forces of the British Colonies &

Protectorates (rev. edn, London, 1905}, pp.2, 7, 10.

5

were held in reserve during the post-Eureka Stockade

public meetings in Melbourne.11

During the 1860s this pattern was repeated. In 1861,

while the British regular garrison was occupied during the

riots at Lambing Flat, the Sydney Battalion of Rifles and

the New South Wales Mounted Rifles performed guard duty in

12 Sydney. In the same year, the Kyneton Mounted Rifle

Corps, which had been initially formed in 1860 with fifty

members, was called out by a local magistrate to help

k . h '1 13 chec r~ots among t e ra~ way gangs.

The popularity of Australia's citizen soldiers

suffered extensively again in the 1890s when they were

employed to break strikes. Both in 1891 and in 1894

Citizen and Permanent Force soldiers of the Queensland 14

Defence Force were used to control striking shearers.

Meanwhile, in New South Wales, in September and October

1890, the Campbelltown and Picton citizen soldier

companies of the Corps of Mounted Infantry patrolled

Sydney's streets as special constables during the great

. . 15 mar~time str~ke.

11 T.B. Millar, The History Of The Defence Forces Of The

Port Phillip District And Colony Of Victoria 1836-1900 (M.A. thesis, University of Melbourne, 1957), p.35.

12 D.M. MacCallum, Essays In Early Colonial Defence In New

South Wales With Particular Reference To The Volunteer Movement (M.A. thesis, University of Sydney, March 1961), Vol.I, pp.294 & 298.

lJR.n. White, 'The Kyneton Volunteers 1860-1900 1,

Sabretache, Vol.XVI, No.4 (February 1975), p.271. 1~.H. Johnson, Volunteers at Heart The Queensland Defence Forces 1860-1901 (St Lucia, 1975), pp.150, 157, 169-70.

15 Anon., A Short History of New South Wales Mounted Rifles

1888-1913 (n.p., n.d.), pp.17-18.

6

The memory of these actions lingered for a long time

within the ranks of the A.L.P. and it remained suspicious

of armed forces. It was possibly this memory which led the

Interstate Labor Conference at Hobart in January 1912 to

propose that Section 51 of the Defence Act be amended so

that citizen soldiers could not be called out: ' ••• to

interfere with workers engaged in an industrial dispute .•• ·~

Although the Parliamentary leaders of the Labor Party

opposed this resolution at the time, in November 1914 the

Fisher Labor government implemented it. Since that time

the Government has been forbidden to call out the Citizen

Forces in connection with an industrial dispute. 16

While some citizen soldiers were busy suppressing

their fellow nationals within Australia, others were busy

fighting for the glory of the Empire overseas. During the

Maori Wars many Australians volunteered for service. In

about 1863, the four regiments known as the Waikato Militia

were raised on the promise of a block of farming land on

the completion of the campaign. The Waikato Militia was 17

recruited mainly from the Australian goldfields.

Twelve years later, in 1885, despite considerable

18 controversy, New South Wales despatched an infantry

battalion and a battery of field artillery to fight the

16 See D.H. Johnson, op.cit., p.l57 and L.C. Jauncey, ~

Story Of ConscriPtion In Australia (London, 1935), pp.86, 111-12. 17

J.F. Fishburn, •some Aspects Of The Anglo-Maori Wars', Army Journal, No.322 (March 1976), p.37. 18

For opposition to the despatch of the Sudan expedition see, e.g., A. Nash, Soldiers or Citizens? {Sydney, 1885), pp.3, 6-7.

7

Mahdi in the Sudan. The Militia artillerymen were so

enthusiastic that, on one parade, thirty-two of the

forty-three men present volunteered for service with the

. 19 1 . Sudan cont~ngent. The st Reg~ent Infantry, N.S.W.,

contributed one officer and seventy-five men to the 20

contingent. Apart from a skirmish at Tarnai, where three

d d 21 . . .

privates were woun e , the cont~ngent saw no f~ght~ng.

Nevertheless, the contingent had won the Australian

Military Forces' first battle honour: SCI.ll:~i_!l, 1885.

These precedents were followed during the Boer War.

Between 1899 and 1902, 16,175 Australians served in South

Africa.22

Some of these volunteers were civilians, but 23

others, such as a squadron of the New South Wales Lancers

and elements of the 1st Australian Infantry Regiment, were

. . ld' 24 c~t~zen so ~ers.

Citizen soldiers continued to contribute to the

defence of the Empire, and also towards the defence of

Australia against external attack. The Naval and Military

Expeditionary Force, which conquered German New Guinea

19 S. Brogden, The Sudan Contingent (Melbourne, 1943),

pp.l5-16, 22-5. 20

Captain C.P. Dolan, '80th Anniversary Volunteers of N.S.W.', The Navy, Army & Airforce Journal The Staff Organ of the Department of Defence in Australia, Vol.3, No.lO (October 1, 1931), p.23. The article was reprinted from the SoM.H.

21s . • Brogden, op.cit., p.49. 22

War Office, op.cit., p.l. 23

R.L., 'Cavalry in New South Wales', The Navy, Army & Airforce Journal The Staff Organ of the Department of Defence in Australia, Vol.3, No.4 (April 2, 1934), p.9.

24 Captain C.P. Dolan, op.cit., p.23.

8

and New Britain in 1914, consisted mainly of Militiamen.25

And, apart from helping to train the 1st and 2nd A.I.F.,

many citizen soldiers also served in them:

43 . . 26 .

Out of sen~or off~cers of the Austral~an Corps in France in 1918, 25 were citizen soldiers. A similar proportion was to be found during the second world war, when posts at this level were filled in the approximate2 7 ratio of 80 citizen officers to 50 regulars.

Nor should it be forgotten that during World War II

citizen soldiers served with the four A.I.F. divisions which

fought in New Guinea and in the five Militia infantry and

two Militia armoured divisions28

which garrisoned

1. 29

Austra ~a.

Thus, throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth

centuries, Australia's citizen soldiers fulfilled their

dual roles of defence against threats to internal and

external security, a role, moreover, which after the

withdrawal of the British garrisons in 1870 they shared

with their Permanent Force comrades. But, as noted, the

unpopularity of the internal security role led to

legislation forbidding Citizen Force participation in the

25 G.R. Vazenry, Reorganization Australian Military Forces

(n.p., c.l967), p.iv. 26

These included divisional commanders, their chief staff officers, and brigade commanders.

27 s. Encel, 'The Study of Militarism in Australia', in J. van Doorn (ed.), Armed Forces and Society Sociological Essays (The Hague, 1968), p.l35.

28 None of these divisions saw action as a whole, but some

of their units and sub-units fought against the Japanese. 29

G.R. Vazenry, op.cit., p.v.

9

suppression of domestic violence proceeding from industrial

action. Henceforth, the citizen soldier's main role was to

defend Australia from her external enemies.

Social Composition

The social composition of the nineteenth century

British army naturally affected the composition of the

citizen forces raised in the Australian colonies. In turn,

the social composition of these citizen soldier units

influenced the social structure of their twentieth century

successors. To put it simply, the early Volunteers, like

the British Yeomanry, were recruited from the middle

classes. Their officers, of course, as with the British

' 30 Yeomanry tended to be drawn from the wealth~er landowners.

This social structure was already apparent in Governor

Hunter's Loyal Associated Companies. When he raised these

Volunteers in 1800 he did so from:

••• the civil officers and such housekeepers who are free men, p~lsessing property and good characters •••

30rn the heyday of the English militia:

The colonels were members of the landed gentry and more often than not sat in the House of Lords. The officers were chosen by the Lord­Lieutenants on the basis of their estate, and the soldiers were the country lads without a vote ••••

See H.J. Zwillenberg, op.cit., Pt I, p.lO & also p.ll, but the Manchester and Salford Yeomanry (of Peterloo fame) consisted aLmost exclusively of cheesemongers, ironmongers and newly enriched manufacturers. R.J. White, Waterloo To Peterloo (Peregrine edn, Harmondsworth, 1968), p.l93. 3 ~overnor Hunter's General Order of 6 September 1800 reprinted in the H.R.A. (Sydney, 1914), Series I, Vol.II, pp.595-6.

10

The officers to command these Volunteer companies were to 32

be drawn from the Civil Department. Neither the men nor

their officers were to be paid for their voluntary

services. The Government's liability was limited to

providing each man with arms and ammunition, and some 33

basic training.

Later, under Governor King, when conditionally

emancipated convicts served both in the Governor's 34

bodyguard and in the New South Wales Corps, the Sydney

and Parramatta Associations:

••• were formed out of Free Men, Persons who had s~rved thei3

5Terms, and Conditionally

Emanc~pated ••..

Perhaps as a result of this change in the social

composition of the Loyal Associations, the Government

increased its support for the Volunteers. Now:

Their only remuneration [was to] be that of being victualled from the stores while they [were] embodied, and their clothing, which [was to] be Jtplaced annually, on the King's Birthday ••••

3 2 !.!.U:.£.

33 I d d • • Governor Hunter s Or ers Re Arme Assoc~at~ons,

7 September 1800, op.cit., pp.636-7.

34 Government And General Orders of 12 October 1802,

reprinted in the H.R.A. (Sydney, 1915), Series I, Vol.IV, p.321 and Governor King To Lord Hobart, 9 May 1803, reprinted in H.R.A. (Sydney, 1915), Series I, Vol.IV, p.l64.

35 Governor King To Major Johnston, 18 February 1803,

reprinted in the H.R.A. (Sydney, 1915), Series I, Vol.IV, p.216.

36 Governor King To Lord Hobart, 1 March 1804, reprinted in

the H.R.A. (Sydney, 1915), Series I, Vol.IV, p.484.

11

In 1825, a decade after the final disbandment of the

Sydney and Parramatta Loyal Associations, Captain Edward

Macarthur, the son of John Macarthur, wanted to raise a

militia in New South Wales based on the British Yeomanry,

which was first formed in 1794. The militia's commanders

were to be drawn from men of property, who would naturally 37

have had a vested interest in maintaining the status guo.

But Edward Macarthur's proposal was not implemented, even

though he maintained that militiamen would be more

acceptable to the colonists than the British regulars,

because Governor Darling did not believe that men would

leave their families at the mercy of convict servants while

they attended dri11.38

Twenty-five years later, in 1850, Wentworth told the

New South Wales Legislative Council:

••• that a British military presence would remain [necessary] until the colony had 'a body of gentlemen to supply their place -a yeomanry, or national guard - persons who had some property, and who would fight to defend it against3~he rapine and violence of lawless mobs.• •••

Nevertheless, it was not until the beginning of the

Crimean War in 1854 that the necessary climate for the

formation of new Volunteer units developed. In July 1854

the New South Wales Volunteer Act was passed and

recruiting began at the end of August 1854.40

37 K.S. Inglis, op.cit., p.l85.

38 b"d I L ., p.l87.

39 b"d 1 I L ., p. 89.

40 D.M. MacCallum, op.cit., Vol.I, pp.SO & 52.

12

These Volunteers, and those of the 1860s, benefitted

from the enthusiasm and support of wealthy families such

as the Macarthurs, Rileys and Windeyers. To this day, the

Macarthurs and Windeyers have continued to provide

officers for the citizen forces. But, from which social

group were the Volunteers of the 1850s recruited? Duncan

MacCallum's research showed that:

••• the [Volunteer] Corps ••• was recruited from what we might dub up~er middle and lower middle class [Sydneyj men, except that it is hazardous to delineate too distinctly separate socLal classes and it is by no means clear that the Corps was solidly and consistently supported even by and within a very wide social group. It seems that about twenty were government clerks, and the rest were barristers, solicitors, surgeons, dentists, manufacturers, squatters, farmers, agents, surveyors, auctioneers, warehouse-keepers, wealthy and respectable tradesmen, bankers• clerks, la~ers• clerks, besides independent gentlemen.

The same social groups also provided the manpower for

the Victorian Volunteers. Under the 1854 regulations:

All persons desirous of serving as volunteers [had to] be approved by the Mayor and Bench of Magistrates.42

and,

Field officers [will] be named by the Government, and [will] if possible be43 gentlemen of some military experience.

In practice this meant that officers tended to come from

the ranks of Government and Civic officials. For instance,

41 Ibid., p.75.

42 T.B. Millar, op.cit., p.73.

43 . Ib~d., p.74.

13

at Geelong the Police Magistrate was invited by the

Government to command the Volunteers. Two companies were

formed and the Mayor of Geelong was appointed with the

rank of major. When the two companies were amalgamated

the Mayor resigned. He was replaced by the Sheriff of

Geelong as the major, while a member of the first

Legislative Council was elected captain.44

During 1855 a mounted company of the Melbourne

Volunteer [Rifle] Regiment was formed. In accordance with

the regulations its ranks were confined to:

'all respectable persons subject to the approval of the Mayor and Bench of Magistrates•.

In addition, while the Government was asked to supply the

ammunition, the Volunteers had to subscribe a guinea every

six months.45 For any tradesman who wished to indulge in

the pleasurable peacetime pursuit of part-time soldiering

on horseback the financial barrier was not considerable.

In 1851 the ruling wage rates for carpenters and

bricklayers were from 4s 6d to 5s and from 4s to 5s per

day respectively, without board or lodging. However, in

1853 wages for carpenters rose to £1 6s 9d per day and for

46 bricklayers to £1 2s 6d a day. In Melbourne, in 1851,

before the gold discoveries, fitters and blacksmiths were

paid about 6s a day, but by 1854 they were being paid

44 b'd 4 I ~ . I pp. 7 -5.

45 b'd I~ ., p.78. 46

J.T. Sutcliffe, A History Of Trade Unionism In Australia (Reissued edn, Melbourne, 1967), pp.40-l.

14

47 16s to 20s or more per day. Indeed, in the middle 1850s

a labourer at Port Adelaide received lOs for a nine hour 48

working day.

In later decades, tradesmen provided many citizen

soldiers. For example, on 1 May 1881 the South Australian

volunteer Military Force (which was paid} and the Rifle

Volunteer Force (which was unpaid} in the city area

consisted of:

Volunteer Military Rifle Volunteer Force Force

Well-to-do people lSO/o 51%

Tradesmen 55% 21%

Labourers and Farm Labourers 3% 3%

Others 19% 23%

95% 9SO/o

In country areas the Rifle Volunteer Force was mainly

recruited from mechanics, artisans, and clerks in country 49

stores and other businesses.

Although by the mid-1880s Governments were providing-

Volunteers with both their arms and equipment, they still

had to provide their own horses .50

Until the 1940s, this

condition remained as the price a citizen soldier had to

47 -K.D. Buckley, The Amalgamated Engineers in Australia,

1852-1920 (Canberra, n.d.}, p.39. 48

H.J. Zwillenberg, op.cit., Pt.I, p.52. 49

Ibid., Pt I, pp.l83n (table}, 184 & 215. 50--

T.B. Millar, op.cit., pp.l58-9.

15

pay if he wished to serve on horseback, rather than in the

far less prestigious infantry.

Patronage, of course, was important to the Volunteer

movement. James Fairfax, the son of John and a partner in

the firm which owned the Sydney Morning Herald, supported

the movement zealously and was a captain in it. One

company of Volunteers was drawn almost entirely from his

newspaper's employees, foreshadowing the Pals Battalions

51 of Kitchener•s New Army. James Balfour, a merchant from

Scotland, became a captain in 1864 in a Victorian artillery

company, which was commanded by James McCulloch. Balfour's

interest in politics was aroused and by 1866 he was sitting 52

behind McCulloch in the Legislative Assembly.

In Queensland too, Volunteer officers were drawn from

among businessmen, while the other ranks were mainly 53

composed of labourers, mechanics and printers. But this

did not necessarily engender respect for the officer corps.

In 1891, after suppressing striking shearers, Major Des

Voeux and his officers, who had performed a long night

march, were subsequently served a meal in the backyard of

a homestead while the manager and overseer dined indoors.

Des Voeux was furious at being treated as a hired hand

and, after complaining to the Pastoralists• Union,

received an apology from the manager. The unfortunate

manager, of course, had not known that Des Voeux was a

51 J. Keegan, op.cit., p.218.

52 K.S. Inglis, op.cit., p.226.

53 D.H. Johnson, op.cit., pp.34, 49.

16

member of the Bengal Staff Corps and the son of the 54

Governor of Hong Kong.

Although the aristocratic Des Voeux and his

55 commandant, Colonel French, perhaps believed that

Queensland's Volunteer officers were neither socially

56 distinguished enough no~ wealthy enough, there continued

to be relatively wealthy and socially distinguished units

in Australia. For instance, in March 1899 a squadron of

the New South Wales Lancers embarked for six months

training with Imperial cavalry at Aldershot. All expenses

in connection with the trip were borne by members of the

. d h . f . d 57 regLIDent an t e~r r~en s.

In South Australia, however, contrary to the English

precedent of 'gentlemen first and soldiers afterwards',

officer selection was based on the results of competitive

examinations from the early 1860s. But here respectability

replaced social status, class or patronage as the basis for

commissioning. Hence an iron worker was commissioned,

while an insolvent gentleman was not promoted, and hotel

keepers were considered insufficiently respectable to

be . 58

come off~cers.

Nevertheless, the differences between South Australia

and the U.K. or the other Australian colonies were more

54 . Ib~d., pp.l54-5.

55 Also a British officer.

56 D.H. Johnson, op.cit., pp.l26-7.

57 . R.L., op.c~t., p.9.

58 H.J. Zwillenberg, op.cit., Pt I, pp.200 & 211.

17

apparent than real. In 1885 the Rifle Volunteer Force

held a camp at Balaclava. As was the custom among English

Volunteers, •the cost of 10/- per man per day, and any

excess expenditure was guaranteed by the officers ••• •.59

The 1894 camps, foreshadowing bivouacs in the 1930s, also

cost the Government nothing. The participants brought

their own provisions and the business community made 60

donations.

During its short existence, the Australian Volunteer

Automobile Corps continued the social distinctions of the

nineteenth century Volunteers and passed them on

untarnished to the Militia light horse regiments of the

1930s. The Automobile Corps was raised on 19 May 1908 and

disbanded in 1916. During peacetime it consisted only of

officers and entry was restricted to qualified drivers who

possessed an efficient and reliable car.61

The social composition of the Militia units of the

inter-war years, in terms of broad class structure at

least, did not differ from that of the nineteenth century

Volunteers. Of course, it is to be expected that officers

will be selected from the middle classes even if for no

other reason than that senior officers, themselves drawn

almost entirely from the middle classes, will seek to

maintain the established system.

59 Ibid., p.319.

60 Ibid., p.l90.

61 Brigadier D. Macarthur-onslow, Brief History of the

Australian Armoured Corps {n.p., n.d. -photocopy available in A.W.M.), p.l.

18

Command

In the previous section on the social composition of

the Volunteers we noted that their officers were drawn

from the middle classes. In this section, we will discuss

the procedure for selecting such citizen officers in more

detail and mention the widespread use of British

instructors.

A peculiarity of the nineteenth century Volunteer

movement was that occasionally the citizen soldier was

permitted to elect his junior leaders. This •right• was

gradually lost during the latter part of the nineteenth

century when the unpaid Volunteers were replaced by

partly-paid Militiamen.

In Sydney, in the mid-1850s, the New South Wales

Volunteer Rifles were provided with their officers

through a mixture of election by the Corps and of Governor

Sir Charles FitzRoy's patronage.62

A similar situation

existed in Victoria, where under the 1854 regulations for

Volunteers, field officers were to be named by the

Government and junior officers were to be:

•.• selected at the discretion of the members of the corps, backed by the recommendation of the Bench g~ Magistrates, and approved by the Governor.

Nevertheless, the 1854 Volunteer Statute (18 Viet. No.7),

which authorised the Lieutenant-Governor to accept the

services of a Volunteer Corps not exceeding two thousand

men, clearly provided that commissioned officers would be

62 D.M. MacCallum, op.cit., Vol.!, pp.62-5.

63 T.B. Millar, op.cit., pp.73-4.

19

appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor and N.C.O.s by their 64

commanding officer.

The procedure in South Australia was different. In

February 1860 the 1st Adelaide Rifles, a Volunteer unit,

nominated its own N.C.O. candidates after a pleasant 65

dinner in the Hamburg Hotel.

Unfortunately, the election of commanders caused

problems of discipline. For example, in 1858 it took a

general meeting of the Corps to have a lieutenant of the

Royal Victorian Yeomanry Cavalry dismissed for refusing to

obey orders during a parade at which the Corps was

presented with new colours by the Governor. Both the c.o.

and the lieutenant were present at the general meeting at

which the charges were discussed and the lieutenant's

dismissal was recomrnended.66

Another instance of insubordination occurred in

Queensland in 1868, when a newly elected lieutenant called

a public meeting of his company in order to elect a new

company commander. On the Governor's instructions, the

company commander paraded the company and read a

disbandment notice. Since officers were elected by the

vote of the whole company, no doubt it seemed reasonable

for its members to think that they also had the right to

depose their officers. In the event, a few months later

64 Ibid., p.76.

65--H.J. Zwillenberg, op.cit., Pt I, p.l70.

66 T.B. Millar, op.cit., pp.81-2.

20

the Governor approved the reformation of the company, 67

although under a new company commander.

In South Australia, Volunteers developed the

unmilitary habit of calling meetings for the purpose of

censuring their officers. On occasions the censure appears

to have been deserved. At Kapunda the Volunteers censured

their captain for failing to fix the date of a parade.

Similarly, the Reedbeds at Mile End (also a Volunteer

unit) criticised their captain for disregarding both men

and horses when the troops had been on duty for a long 68

time.

Like the election of officers, the use of British

soldiers to command and instruct Australian citizen 69

soldiers could cause problems of discipline. Fortunately,

as Australia became more and more independent of the Mother

Country, the use of British commanders and instructors

decreased and the problem thus almost disappeared.

However, the appointment of British Lieutenant-General

Squires as Inspector-General in 1938 caused controversy

within the A.L.P. and the upper echelons of the P.M.F. This

question will be examined in more detail in chapter three.

The problem of discipline was a twofold one. It

concerned both the right of Australian governments to

control the British officers and the rights of those

67 D.H. Johnson, op.cit., pp.61-2.

68 H.J. Zwillenberg, op.cit., Pt I, p.l73.

69 Although occasionally the local Volunteers could be asked

to instruct the British regulars rather than vice versa, see H.J. Zwillenberg, op.cit., Pt I, p.39.

21

officers to discipline unruly Australian citizen soldiers.

In Victoria (where a British officer, usually a general,

commanded between 1854 and 1870 and again from 1883 to

0) 70 . h . 190 and 1n New Sout Wales th1s problem was particularly

acute. During the 1860s the New South Wales and Victorian

Commandants insisted upon regarding themselves as Imperial

officers. Thus they by-passed the Ministers for Defence

in order to communicate directly with the Governors.

The Commandants believed that the Governors, in their

capacities as Commanders-in-Chief, were the proper 71

authorities to report to.

Poorly managed attempts to discipline citizen officers

in Queensland in the 1880s led to the Brisbane Courier's

censure of Major Des Voeux and to the Colonial Secretary's 72

reprimanding Colonel French, the Commandant. Shortly

before he retired as Commandant, in 1891, Colonel French

prepared a report condemning the Volunteers. French

was succeeded by Major-General Owen. The report led to

Owen's being told unequivocally, in 1894, that the

Commandant was subject to direction in all matters by the

political head of the force, namely the Chief Secretary 73

of Queensland.

Efforts by Major-General Edward Hutton, when he was

Commandant of New South Wales between 1893 and 1896, to

70 T.B. Millar, op.cit., p.95.

71 Ibid., p.l51.

72 D.H. Johnson, op.cit., pp.l26-7, 133-5.

73 Ibid., pp.l60-4.

22

retire inefficient citizen officers and his public

criticism of defence cuts led the Premier of New South

Wales (Sir George Dibbs) in 1894 to write:

I am altogether opposed to the introduction of any further officers of the Imperial service for the Senior Commands and work of Colonial Defence Forces •... 74

As General Officer Commanding the A.M.F. between 1902 and

1904, Hutton committed similar sins. This time his

civilian superiors took countermeasures to curb his powers.

The result was the creation of the Council of Defence and

the Military and Naval ~cards. Although Hutton resigned

before they began operating, the government gained greater

control over the administration of the Department of

Defence because of the Boards' divided functions and

11 . 'b'l' 75 co ect1ve respons1 1 1ty.

Even though the creation of the Military Board and the

Council of Defence, where the Minister for Defence was the

chairman, resolved the question of civil control over the

A.M.F., the question of the command of Australian soldiers by

British officers had not been settled as late as World

War II. Part of the problem undoubtedly lay in the

British officers' assumptions that they were superior to

colonial officers, especially part-time ones. This ill-

feeling between the British and Australian colonial

officer corps was based on the fact that in England, the

Militia, as a reserve force, was lower on the professional

74 Quoted in ibid., p.l83.

75 See, N. Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific,

1901-14 (Sydney, 1976), pp.65, 68, 70-1, 74 especially.

23

hierarchy than the regular army. Also, regular British

officers were often socially more distinguished than their 76

Australian colonial counterparts.

The legal inferiority of the Australian colonial

citizen officer was shown by the type of commission he was

granted. Officers of the Sydney and Parramatta Loyal

. . 77 Associations received provincial comm1ss1ons. Within the

colony of Queensland, British regular officers were 78

superior to those colonial officers of the same rank and,

in South Australia:

If the senior Imperial officer was below field rank, a ruling enabled him to receive such brevet rank as would make him the senior ranking officer, in the event of Imperial and Colonial troops acting together.79

During the Boer War, temporary Imperial rank was granted

to Australian regular and citizen officers serving in South

Africa,80

the implication being that the Australian officers'

commissions were inferior to the Queen's commissions held

by British officers. This situation was not resolved until

after the First World War.

Nevertheless, the British officers did have a point.

Although they were usually granted a step in rank during

their service in the colonies, they would still often find

themselves junior to local officers of far less training

76 See D.H. Johnson, op.cit., p.l27.

77 Governor Hunter's Orders Re Armed Associations,

7 September 1800, op.cit., p.636. 78

D.H. Johnson, op.cit., p.l35. 79

·H.J. Zwillenberg, op.cit., Pt I, p.39. 80

General Orders 219 (24 September 1903} •

24

and experience. In Victoria, an amendment to the

Discipline Act in 1891 made British officers subject to

local military or civil courts. British officers fought

1 b f 11 . h" . . 81 strenuous y, ut unsuccess u y, aga1nst t 1s prov1s1on.

By the 1920s, many of the command problems discussed

above had been resolved because, as Australia became

increasingly independent, she relied less and less on

British regulars to instruct and command her citizen

soldiers. But the rivalry between British regulars and

Australian citizen soldiers was replaced to some extent.in

the 1930s by the clashes between Militia and P.M.F.

officers.

Recruitment and Training

The essential features of recruitment and training in

the nineteenth century were: the fluctuation in numbers

depending upon current threat perceptions, the effect of

the shortage of money both upon numbers and upon the amount

of training actually done, and the relatively poor

attendance at training. These were also key features of

the voluntary Militia of the 1930s. Of course, during the

era of compulsory military training, which lasted from 1911

to 1929, these features did not constitute a precedent

because youths were compelled to attend training and the

majority obeyed.

The numbers of citizen soldiers maintained in the

Australian colonies, in the nineteenth century, fluctuated

81 T.B. Millar, op.cit., p.l72.

25

widely for two main reasons. Firstly, it was difficult

to attract recruits unless there was a tangible threat and,

secondly, there was an unwillingness to spend money on

defence when economic conditions were bad or when there

was no apparent threat. The New South Wales Volunteer

movement of the 1850s revealed both these aspects. The

Volunteer Corps was raised in August 1854 (during the

Crimean War) but by 1859, although not dead, the Corps was 82

moribund. Late in 1856, after the end of the Crimean War,

the Legislative Asse~ly refused to pass a vote for the

Volunteer Corps. The most obvious reasons for the

Legislature's action were the Volunteer Corps' apparent

lack of efficiency and the disappearance of the Russian

threat. Indeed, it was argued that the Volunteers were no

longer necessary because no organization was required to

1 . . . . 1 't 83 meet externa aggress1on or to ma1nta1n 1nterna secur1 y.

The Maori Wars in New Zealand, the French scare in

1859 and fears of British involvement in the American Civil

War provided the impetus for the second Volunteer movement

in New South Wales: that of the 1860s. This pattern was to

be repeated in the succeeding decades. For instance, in

1885, as a result of the war in the Sudan and Russian moves

in Afghanistan, the major Australian colonies increased

their numbers of citizen soldiers by at least one hundred

per cent. Their defence expenditure rose proportionately.

Similarly, during the depression years of the mid-1890s

both the numbers of citizen soldiers and the amount spent

82 D.M. MacCallum, op.cit., Vol.I, pp.52, 81.

83 Ibid., p.69.

26

on defence by the Australian colonies fell: only to rise

84 sharply again in 1899 when the Boer War broke out.

The lack of money had a natural effect on training and

was to become distressingly familiar to the citizen soldier

victims of the Great Depression. In Victoria, a shortage

of money prevented official Easter camps from being held

between 1874 and 1876, and again between 1879 and 1881.

However, regimental camps were enthusiastically conducted

. . . . 85 1n 1881. Un1t funds pa1d for these reg1mental camps.

In Queensland (where pay for Volunteers undergoing

continuous training was abolished in March 1880 and where,

in 1888, pay for the Militia was reduced from sixteen days

to twelve days) the annual camp for 1892 was halved from

eight to four days for economic reasons before being 86

abolished in the following year.

Small wonder then that only 30 per cent of the

members of Queensland's defence forces attended the small

unpaid camps held in lieu of the abolished 1893 camp. Nor 87

was it surprising that no Volunteers attended.

Nevertheless, as in Victoria in 1881, so in Queensland in

1894, camps were held only because officers and men

84 For statistics on defence expenditure and on troop

strengths in the Australian colonies between 1870 and 1900 seeN. Meaney, op.cit., pp.268-75.

85 T.B. Millar, op.cit., p.l02.

86 D.H. Johnson, op.cit., pp.79, 133, 168.

87 Ibid., p.l68. On Johnson's own figures of 1,014 members,

who attended camps in 1893, out of a total of 3,330 members in the Queensland Defence Forces. This means that the attendance rate was approximately 30 per cent, not 35 per cent as he incorrectly states.

27

88 voluntarily defrayed the costs out of their pay. These

precedents were to be followed once again in the 1930s.

But the citizen soldier also faced the problem of

obtaining time off from work in order to attend training.

Again, the New South Wales Volunteer Rifles may be used to

illustrate this problem: a problem which was to re-occur

in the 1930s. One New South Wales Volunteer Rifleman, in

the 1850s, estimated that about fifty men were prevented

from parading because the drills were held during working

hours and the employers would not give these men leave.

Another member of the Corps, Captain Brownrigg, suggested

that since Saturday was a half holiday some other day might

be made available for parades. He also stated that the

Government might set an example by releasing its 89

employees. In 1861, while the Volunteers were performing

guard duties in Sydney during the riots at Lambing Flat,

instructions were given to the heads of government

departments to grant leave of absence to those Volunteers

who were in the Public Service. Private employers were 90

invited to do likewise. However, the attempt, in August

1862, to get employers to support the Volunteers by giving

. 91 employees leave to attend parades fa1led.

Since this kind of attitude was so common, it was

little wonder that attendance at parades was generally poor.

88 Ibid., p.l69.

89 D.M. McCallum, op.cit., Vol.I, p.57.

90 Ibid., p.294.

91 Ibid., p.304.

28

At a half-yearly inspection parade early in 1855 only

two-thirds of the New South Wales Volunteer Artillery

attended and attendance at the Queen's birthday parade in 92

May 1855 was even worse.

This problem was not peculiar to New South Wales.

A Queensland camp commandant, in 1898, also complained

that employers would not grant their employees leave to 93

attend camps and South Australian militiamen had faced 94

the same problem in the 1880s. Despite attempts to deal

with it by legislation the problem was still present in

the 1930s.

Equipment

Another factor which adversely affected the training

and enthusiasm of the citizen soldier in the nineteenth

century, and which continued to do so in the twentieth

century, was the lack of modern equipment. Duncan

MacCallum expressed the situation thus:

After all, premises, instruction staff and equipment significantly affected the quality and interest of the training. If rifle drill with rifles can be boring, rifle drill with broomsticks is more so, particularly if it is incompetently supervised.93

Duncan MacCallum was referring to the New South Wales

Volunteers of the late 1850s.

92 Ibid., p.59.

93 D.H. Johnson, op.cit., p.l95.

94 H.J. Zwillenberg, op.cit., Pt I, p.319.

95 Op.cit., Vol.I, p.276.

29

Yet, citizen soldiers continued to be ill-equipped.

Towards the end of the 1860s the New South Wales Volunteer

Artillery was drilling with three unserviceable 24-pounder

guns belonging to the Royal Artillery. 96 Earlier, in 1862

and 1863, Melbourne's coast guns had no powder97and in

1877 Queensland purchased a thousand obsolete Snider rifles

98 from the U.K. In fact, between 1864 and 1876 Queensland

h . d . . 99 spent not 1ng on arms an ammun1t1on.

In June 1897 the Rupertswood Battery of horse

artillery was disbanded, partly because of Sir William

Clarke's unexpected death in May 1897, but mainly because

the Victorian government refused to re-equip the battery

with modern guns. Since January 1885, Sir William Clarke,

one of Victoria's principal landowners, had raised and

maintained the battery in conjunction with the Government 100

of Victoria. In the twentieth century, although light

horsemen continued to provide their own mounts, either

animal or mechanical, this ancient tradition was not

followed. But, throughout the inter-war years Australia's

citizen soldiers had to survive with obsolete equipment

just as their colonial forebears had done.

96 Ibid., p.294.

97 K.S. Inglis, op.cit., p.227.

98 D.H. Johnson, op.cit., p.63.

99 Ibid.

100 Major W. Perry, 'The Victorian Horse Artillery An Outline

History Of The "Rupertswood Battery"', The Victorian Historical Magazine, Vo1.43, No.1 (February 1972), PP o 7 50 -1 1 7 8 0 o

30

Organization

In terms of organization, th~ nineteenth century

citizen soldier did not provide a model for his twentieth

century successors. After Federation Major-General Hutton

completely re-organized the old colonial armies in order to

standardize them and make them more efficient. In turn,

with the introduction of universal training in 1911 101

because of a widespread fear of attack by Japan, Hutton's

organization was drastically altered to accommodate the

influx of trainees.

In general, however, the nineteenth century British

and Australian colonial armies provided precedents for

Australian citizen soldiers of inter-war decades to follow.

Whether it was in making do with obsolete equipment, paying

for his camp, fighting for leave from his employer or even

while volunteering for service in 1938-39 (when an external

threat became apparent), the twentieth century Australian

citizen soldier was merely following the traditions of his

predecessors.

Of course, not all traditions survived to be followed.

By World War I little remained of the old colonial

organizations, although even the new Commonwealth

organization copied the British model (for example, the

Council of Defence was a replica of the British Army

Council)~02 Another traditional role which did not continue

101 See e.g.

'Attitudes University

102

N. Meaney, op.cit., p.l88 and D.C.S. Sissons, to Japan And Defence, 1890-1923' (M.A. thesis, of Melbourne, 1956), Vol.I, pp.32-4, 48, 54.

See N. Meaney, op.cit., p.71.

31

was that connected with the provision of internal

security. Although, during the Melbourne Police strike of

1923, ex-A.I.F. and P.M.F. members were involved in

maintaining law and order, no C.M.F. soldiers were called 103

out.

103 W. Perry, 'The Police Strike In Melbourne', The Victorian

Historical Magazine, Vol.43, No.3 (August 1972), pp.911-15, 923-4.

In the Committee's view, the crucial issue of the.inquiry is an appreciation of the long lead times for developing an Army and the consequent need to maintain a viable force irrespective of short-term strategic prospects.

Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, The Australian Army.

32

Chapter Two

The Great Debate: The Defence of Australia against Raids or Invasion, 1919-39

SERVICE RIVALRY AND SELF-INTEREST

Throughout the inter-war years, a great debate raged

in Australia over the scale of attack to be expected from

Japan. The need for each of the Australian armed services

to find a suitable peacetime role, and thereby to justify its

existence and to secure a larger amount of the rather

meagre defence vote, partly conditioned its perception of

the possible threats which faced Australia. Hence the

R.A.N., which during these decades normally received about

half of the defence vote, steadfastly maintained that

Australia faced only minor raids. In this, the R.A.N. was

strongly supported by the Admiralty which wanted a strong

R.A.N., because this meant that less money had to be spent

on R.N. ships thanks to the provisions of the Washington

and London Naval Conferences. In wartime, the Admiralty

expected the R.A.N. to come under its operational control.

The A.M.F., however, emphasized that Australia could

be exposed to invasion and so tried to build up an anti-

invasion force. In this way, the A.M.F. sought to obtain

a larger share of defence expenditure. Army leaders

consistently questioned the ability of a British fleet to

get to Singapore in time to prevent a Japanese landing in

Australia.

The R.A.A.F. was formed only in 1921 and, in its

struggle for survival, it tended to support the Army or the

33

Navy as expediency dictated. In doing so, it naturally

exaggerated the importance of airpower.

Unfortunately, Australia's political leaders were as

divided among themselves as the armed forces were. Hence,

although an anti-raid policy was officially adopted in

1932, political references to the possibility of invasion

enabled the Army to continue planning for an anti-invasion

role.

An examination of A.M.F. plans during the period

1919-39 reveals not only that the Army's leaders were

aware of the need for forward defence, especially in

Papua-New Guinea, 1 but also that they really believed in

the threat of invasion. 2 In addition, these plans show

that, by the Army leaders' own calculations, there was a

good chance that the A.M.F. would not be concentrated in

time to repel a Japanese landing in the decisive Sydney-

Newcastle area.

Although the Army's chances of initially repelling a

Japanese invasion were poor, the likelihood of such a

Japanese onslaught was quite distant. Certainly, Japan

had more fertile areas to exploit before considering the

launching of an attack on Australia. Thus, whilst the

Army's fears of invasion were real enough there was little

substance to them and little hope of a successful defence

if these fears were to become reality.

1Although Australia's citizen soldiers could not be compelled to serve beyond her frontiers until the Defence Act was amended during the Second World War.

2To judge from the amount of time and effort spent in preparing the plans.

34

Obviously, this great debate, because of its

influence upon planning, affected the organization,

training and equipment of the citizen soldier. In turn,

these aspects affected recruiting and retention rates after

the suspension of compulsory military training in 1929.

These aspects will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

ORIGINS OF THE DEBATE

The central problem in defence planning in Australia,

during the 1920s and 1930s, was the question whether

Australia faced the threat of. invasion or of only minor to

medium scale raids. This problem had occurred before and

had then provoked considerable disagreement over whether

Australia was exposed to invasion or only to raids. For

example, the 1881 New South Wales Royal Commission on

Military Defences was sharply divided over the scale of

attack threatening the Australian colonies. While

Commodore Wilson and Colonel Scratchley argued that the

Colonies were unlikely to face invasion, Colonels Downes

and Richardson envisaged a Russian attack consisting of

from two to three thousand men supported by six to eight

3 guns. In general, the Commission decided to prepare New 4

South Wales to meet both raids and an invasion, - rather

than to let her rely entirely upon the R.N. to defeat any 5

attempt at invasion, as Scratchley advocated.

3 -N.S.W. Legislative Council, Report of the 1881 Royal Commission on Military Defences, 1881, pp.27, 45-6, 78, 104, 111-12, 120. 4 Ibid., p.27.

~bid., pp.lll-12, 120.

35

This debate naturally continued during the early

decades of the twentieth century, especially after Japan's

victory over Russia in 1905, for now Australia faced a

power which did indeed possess the maritime capacity to

mount an invasion. The result was the production of a

number of defence reports after the end of the First World

War. These reports attempted to shape Australian defence

policy by discussing the probability of raids versus

invasion.

The first of these reports was that produced by a

committee under the chairmanship of the Honourable G.

Swinburne in June 1919. 6

In the introduction to its

report the Committee unequivocally stated its reasons for

Australia's continued maintenance of strong military

7 forces. The Committee argued:

The strength of the Australian Military Forces and their composition and organization are dependant on the strategical considerations determined by the Empire's foreign policy. The present state of the world and the proposed creation of the League of Nations make it impossible at the present time definitely to enunciate future policy and prescribe military obligations. Until the requirements of Australia's home defence and her other possible obligations have thus been agreed on and having in mind the responsibilities imposed by existing international conditions the Committee recommends that Universal Training should be adhered to. 8

6The other members of the Committee were: Lieutenant­General Sir C.B.B. ~Vhite, Major-General the Honourable Sir J.W. McCay, Major-General J.G. Legge and Mr C.H. Reading.

7A copy of the Swinburne Committee's report is available

in A.A.A.: MP 367/1, file 629/1/741.

8Ibid., para. 1.

36

Under the Universal Training system the Committee

estimated that within a reasonable period of time the

C.M.F. could provide six infantry and two mounted

divisions with the proper proportion of corps and lines of

communications troops. Drawing on Australia's experience

in the First World War, the Committee judged that the one

hundred and eighty thousand men of these formations would

be the most that a population of five million could be

expected to maintain during a long campaign. Not

surprisingly, the Committee also argued that a smaller

force would be incapable of holding out until Australia

was relieved from overseas. Even with eight divisions,

Australia could protect herself for only a limited period

during any temporary loss of British naval supremacy in

the Indian and Pacific Oceans.9

Because of the then current co-operation of Britain,

France and the u.s., the Committee believed that Australia

probably had at least five years in which to organize and

train the recommended eight divisions and their supporting

10 elements. Although the Committee did not specifically

name a potential enemy;1

its advocacy of the maintenance

of a Citizen army capable of placing one hundred and eighty

thousand soldiers in the field on the outbreak of war set

the pattern for future Army anti-invasion planning.

9Ibid., para. 2.

10Ibid., para. 3.

l~ut the reference to ' ••• any temporary loss of Imperial sea command in the Indian and Pacific Oceans' pointed to Japan. Ibid., para. 2.

37

The second report was the one produced by Admiral

Jellicoe. It was commissioned by the Australian government

12 and was completed by August 1919. However, it was

1 d. . 13 .

prompt y 1sowned by the Adrn1ralty and 1ts only relevance

here is that Lord Jellicoe argued that:

Japan could without attracting much attention assemble 100,000 fully equipped troops in one convoy which could operate successfully against Singapore and gain a foothold on the West coast of Australia from whence she could dominate trade routes and 14 paralyse the operations of the British Navy.

This report may well have influenced that of the Senior

Officers• Conference in the following year.

Between 22 January and 6 February 1920 a conference

of senior officers of the A.M.F! 5 produced a two volume

Report on the Military Defence of Australia! 6 Bearing in

mind that Generals White, McCay and Legge served on both

committees it was perhaps not surprising that the Senior

Officers' conclusions, and their reasons for them, were

similar to those reached by the Swinburne Committee. Like

the Swinburne Committee, the Senior Officers• Conference

also advocated the maintenance of strong military forces:

1~ee J.M. McCarthy, Air Power and Australian Defence: A Study In Imperial Relations 1923-1954 (Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, November 1971), p.l2 and N. Gow, The Formulation Of Australian Defence Policy 1918-1923 (M.A. thesis, University of Western Australia, February 1972), p.53.

13 J.M. McCarthy, op.cit., p.l3.

14 . . . 1 108 Quoted 1n D.C.S. S1ssons, op.c1t., Vo .I, p. .

1~hey included: Lieutenant-Generals Sir H.G. Chauvel (as chairman) and Sir J. Monash, and Major-Generals Sir J.W. McCay, Sir J.J.T. Hobbs, Sir C.B.B. vlliite and J.G. Legge.

1~ printed copy is available in the Pearce Papers, A.N.L., MS 1827/14 & 15.

38

Man-power alone needs to be considered to make it immediately clear that the Commonwealth of Australia, standing by itself, could not withstand any Great Power which chose to attack this continent seriously. The safety of Australia ultimately depends upon two factors, of which the first is her being [part of] the British Empire; the second is Australia's own ability to prevent an invading enemy from obtaining decisive victories pending the arrival of help from other parts of the Empire.l7

However, possibly because of the warning issued by

the Minister for Defence (Senator G.F. Pearce), when he

opened the Conference, about Australia's financial

d . . 18 h s . ff . d d th 1 t con 1t1on, t e en1or 0 1cers recommen e at on y wo

cavalry divisions, four infantry divisions, local defence

troops amounting to a fifth division and personnel for

coastal defence garrisons, together with the necessary

staffs and auxiliaries should be formed in peacetime.19

Nevertheless, this apparent difference between the Senior

Officers' Conference and the Swinburne Committee was more

one of organization than of actual numbers. Under the

Senior Officers' proposals the Field Army would have had a

peace strength of one hundred and thirty thousand and an

20 actual war strength of one hundred and eighty-two thousand.

The Senior Officers' report, which was to be cited

throughout the 1920s and 1930s by the Army as a

justification for continuing to plan against invasion, saw

11onference of Senior Officers of the A.M.F., Report on

the Military Defence of Australia, 1920, Vol.I, para.S. 18

See Chauvel's covering memorandum in ibid., Vol.I, p.3.

19 . Ib1d., para. 3.

2 ~bid., Vol.II, para. 80.

39

Japan as the only 'potential and probable enemy' in the

immediate future. Japan, which had suffered little from

the effects of World War I, possessed powerful naval and

military forces and was believed to covet Australia's great

21 1 . . natural resources. Al th1s, coupled w1th the Royal

Navy's weakness in the Far East, made it possible that

Australia would have to face a Japanese invasion which

would have to be met by the Army since the R.A.N. could not 22

be strengthened sufficiently to meet this threat.

THE DEBATE

Even while meetings of representatives of the Naval 23 24

and Defence Departments and of the Council of Defence

were agreeing with the reports of the Swinburne Committee,

Admiral Jellicoe and the Senior Officers' Conference,

concerning the possibility of a Japanese invasion of

Australia, the opposite point of view was being argued.

For example, in November 1919 the Admiralty proclaimed:

21

It is possible that we should be forced to act on the defensive in this area [the Western Pacific ]in the early phases of the war, pending the concentration of the British Imperial Fleet in these waters. During this period oversea attacks on Hong Kong will have to be reckoned with, but the invasion of Australia is highly improbable in view of the

Ibid., Vol.!, paras 6-9. 22

Ibid., paras 10-12. 23

A copy of this report initialled and dated 16 February 1920 by General Chauvel is available in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1856/4/472. 24

Council of Defence meeting of 12 April 1920. Minute in A.A.A.: CRS A2028.

40

long sea communications that wo~Sd be involved in such an enterprise.

After suggesting that Singapore would make an excellent

base 'for a fleet covering the vital Australian and East

d • I 26 dm" d h • • In 1an routes , the A 1ralty note t at Br1ta1n could

not afford to build two fleets: one to face Japan and the

27 other the U.S.

Nonetheless, even after admitting that in the

improbable worst possible case, Japan would attack in the

28 Pacific when the British Empire was threatened elsewhere,

the Admiralty still felt able to argue that:

No navy, however large, can guard vast stretches of coastline like those of Australia, Canada, South Africa, and India, and it is strategically unsound to immobilise ships solely for the purpose of dealing with diversionary raids ••• More serious undertakings in the shape of organised invasion are not possible in the time at the enemy's disposal during which he can expect to have command of the local ~9ea before the arrival of the main fleet.

The Admiralty hoped that, except in the most adverse

circumstances of a two front war, the British fleet could

30 reinforce any part of the Empire within six to eight weeks.

25 Empire Naval Policy And Co-Operation. Outline of Empire

Naval Policy Prepared By The Admiralty To Form A Basis For Discussion At The Imperial Cabinet, 1921 (London, February 1921), p.6. But the document was originally prepared in November 1919. See ibid., pp.8 & 9: the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was due to expire in July 1921. A printed copy of this document exists in A.A.A.: CRS A981, item Defence 350, Pt I.

26 Ibid., p.6.

27--Ibid., p.lO. In the Admiralty's opinion, these were the

only two remaining formidable powers because Germany had been eliminated as a naval power and there was 'little fear of rivalry from either France or Italy'.

28 Ibid., p.ll.

29--Ibid., pp.ll-12. 3o--Ibid., p.l2.

41

In June 1921, the Committee of Imperial Defence

echoed this Admiralty document as far as a Japanese 31

invasion of Australia was concerned and then went further

and maintained that the probability of a raid on Australia

in 1921 or the likelihood of its success was even less

than it had been prior to World War I. This was both

because of the development of Australia's armed forces and

because the German navy had been destroyed. Thus there was

32 now less chance of Britain's becoming involved in Europe.

Indeed, the Committee of Imperial Defence estimated that

Singapore and Hong Kong were far more likely to be attacked

33 by Japan than was Sydney.

Then, on 13 December 1921 the Quadruple Treaty was

signed. Under its provisions, which were to remain in

force for ten years and thereafter until terminated by one

. 34 power on twelve months' not1ce, Japan, the United States,

the British Empire and France undertook to respect 'the

rights of the others to their territorial possessions and

, , , , , , , I 35 1nsular dom1n1ons 1n the reg1on of the Pac1f1c Ocean

The Washington Agreement limiting naval armaments followed

on 6 February 1922.36

In Australia, the Quadruple Treaty

31 Committee Of Imperial Defence (143-C), Singapore,

Development Of As Naval Base. Memorandum (No.501M) by the Oversea Sub-Committee of the Committee Of Imperial Defence (Whitehall Gardens, 7 June 1921), para. 23. A copy exists in A.A.A.: CP 103/3, item Vol.lB.

32 Ibid., para. 28.

33 Ibid., paras 29-35.

34---It remained in force until Japan gave notice in 1934.

35 See N. Gow, op.cit., pp.l23-4.

36 The text of the Agreement is reprinted in N.W. Rowell,

The British Empire and World Peace (London, 1922),pp.276-99.

42

and the Washington Agreement led to a large reduction in 37

defence spending.

As a result of the Washington Agreement, the battle-

cruiser Australia had to be sunk, but the opportunity was

also taken of restricting universal training to only two

quotas per year, thereby lowering the cadre strength of

the field force to 30,000 citizen soldiers or a mere

38 25 per cent of war strength. The effect of all

this was not lost upon General Chauvel who from 1923 to

1930 in his reports as Inspector-General of the A.M.F ..

repeatedly emphasized the decline in British naval strength 39

as a result of the 1922 Washington Conference, and

implicitly or explicitly warned that Australia could be

invaded by Japan. Chauvel did not believe that the Royal

Navy would be able to send a fleet to the Pacific in time

to stop a Japanese attack on Australia, especially since

37 ·Deli~g the 1922-23 Budget Speech as Treasurer, Bruce

said:

The reduction in Defence expenditure has been made after the most careful consideration by the Government, and after consultation with the Council of Defence. The reductions which have been effected would have been impossible but for the Washington Conference.

(C.P.D., Vol.C, 17 August 1922, p.l469.) 38

For the reductions see Department of Defence, Estimates Of Expenditure, 1922-23. Explanatory Statement Prepared By D1rect1on Of The M1nister For Defence, C.P.P., Vol.II, 1922, p.l268. 39

Where Britain officially abandoned her pre-World War I policy of having a navy as large as that of her two most powerful potential naval rivals and instead agreed to equality with the U.S. Navy.

43

Japan would probably strike whilst Britain was involved in 40

Europe. As Chauvel was emphasizing that Australia's 41

defence ultimately depended upon the Army and Air Force,

the War Office, however, was supporting the Admiralty's

thesis. Certainly, the Director of Military Operations and

Intelligence at the War Office believed that Australia was

faced only with the mere possibilities of raids on certain 42

vulnerable points.

The debate among the Australian services over the

defence of Australia. intensified during the late 1920s, 43

partly perhaps because in 1925 the 'ten year rule' was 44

extended to include Japan. For example, while the

Committee of Imperial Defence was announcing this extension

40 See !.G.'s Report, Pt II, 30 June 1928, para. 1 especially.

The unclass1fied first part of each report is reprinted in C.P.P. Copies of the classified second parts are ava1lable in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1902/2/32. 41

Although during the 1920s, as Chauvel bitterly pointed out, the R.A.N. received nearly half the defence vote. See !.G.'s Report, Pt I, 15 April 1930, paras 8-9 and appendix A.

42 Unsigned letter, perhaps written by Chauvel, dated 9 August

1926 and addressed to Brigadier-General T.H. Dodds, then Australia's military representative in London, in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1810/1/80.

4~n 1919 Lloyd George decided that, for planning purposes, the U.K.'s armed forces should work on the assumption that there would be no major war for ten years. B.B. Schofield, British Sea Power Naval Policy in the Twentieth Century (London, 1967), p.lOl. But in July 1928, Churchill, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, persuaded the Committee of Imperial Defence to prescribe 'as a standing assumption that at any given date there will be no major war for ten years from that date'. M. Howard, The Continental Commitment The dilemma of British defence policy in the era of the two world wars (London, 1972), p.89.

44 The Rule was not lifted until Japanese troops landed at

Shanghai in February 1932. See J.M. McCarthy, op.cit., pp.28-30 but S. Roskill, Hankey Man of Secrets Volume II, 1919-1931 (London, 1972), pp.537-8 cla1ms that the Rule did not effectively lapse until 15 November 1933.

44

of the 'ten year rule', the R.A.A.F. repeated its 1922

. 45 statement concerning the invasion of Austral1a. The Air

Force view was that 'the biggest problem' in the defence

of Australia was to repel an enemy 'whose object is to land 46

troops and to occupy part or parts of the Commonwealth'.

By 1925, although the Washington Treaty might be expected 47

to assure peace until 1931, the enemy was seen as being

48 Japan. By March 1928 the Committee of Imperial Defence

evidently only envisaged raids by frontier tribesmen or 49

warships on the territories of the Empire. In conjunction

with the attacks by warships on ports, raids could consist

of parties of approximately two hundred men landed from 50

these vessels.

It was possibly whilst considering this report that

the Australian Chiefs of Staff produced their appreciation

45 Memorandum Regarding Australia's Air Defences (R.A.A.F.

H.Q., 20 February 1922), para. 1 in A.A.A.: MP 826/1, file 12.

46 Memorandum regarding the Air Defence Of Australia (R.A.A.F.

H.Q., 21 April 1925), para. 2a in A.A.A.: HP 826/1, file 12.

47 Ibid., para. 3a.

48 Ibid., see especially appendix IV which deals solely with

details of Japan's air strength.

It should be noted that in both these memoranda the R.A.A.F. was trying to justify its existence and hence it was in its interests to forecast the maximum scale of attack.

49 Some Principles Of Imperial Defence, Memorandum by the

Oversea Sub-Committee of the C.I.D., O.D.C. 537-M also C.I.D. 313-C (Whitehall Gardens, 12 March 1928). Approved by the C.I.D. on 22 t-1ay 1928, para. 30 in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1855/1/82.

50 Ibid., paras 31-37.

45

51 of 9 August 1928. Basically, this appreciation maintained

that trade routes would certainly be raided and that

important Australian centres could also expect to be raided.

A limited invasion, with up to three Japanese divisions,

was 'not so improbable as to allow of it being definitely

ruled out•. If the British fleet were delayed, Singapore

would be attacked, but only after Hong Kong had been

neutralized. All this would take place without a

declaration of war and when Britain was pre-occupied in

Europe.

In March 1930 the debate over invasion became more

vigorous. This was because, owing to the Depression, the 52

defence vote was cut by £500,000 for 1930-31. Naturally, 53

each Chief of Staff (as Rear-Admiral Munro Kerr admitted)

was concerned that the reductions should not be made from

his service.

Munro Kerr, an R.N. officer like his predecessor,

became Chief of Naval Staff in October 1929. He attacked

the 9 August 1928 appreciation on War In The Pacific on the

grounds that invasion was a remote contingency. If Japan

could gain naval supremacy then she would be much more

likely to blockade, than to risk invading, Australia. 54

51 1 f h . . h . f. . . Copy no. o t e Apprec1at1on War In T e Pac1 1c 1s 1n A.A.A.: MP 1185/5, file 1846/4/363. Excerpts from the Appreciation were reproduced in the Defence Committee's minutes for 1930 in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol.l.

52see Minutes of the Meeting of the Defence Committee on

6 March 1930, p.2 in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol.l.

53 . Ib1d., p.3.

54 . Ibld. I pp. 4 & 5.

46

Munro Kerr's solution was to have the Army increase its

fixed defences, at the expense of its field forces, and to

broaden the Air Force's coast defence vote.55

In this way,

the three services would not all be concentrating upon the

remote contingency of invasion to the detriment of defence

against raids, which were far more probable and against

. h ld . . 56 wh1ch t e R.A.N. cou not guarantee 1mmun1ty.

Of course, both the Chief of the General Staff,

Chauvel, and the Chief of the Air Staff, R. Williams, were

quick to disagre~ with Munro Kerr's assessment that the

1 ld . t 1" . t . . 57 Roya Navy cou 1nsure Aus ra 1a aga1ns 1nvas1on.

Further arguments at meetings of the Defence Committee on

20 and 26 March 193058

did not lead to any progress.

Chauvel and Williams frankly doubted the Royal Navy's

ability to come to Australia's aid when most needed,

especially since the base at Singapore was still

incomplete,59

while Munro Kerr continued to insist that

' ... there was not the slightest danger of invasion of

1 . 1 . . . d ' 60 E 1· f Austra 1a un ess Br1ta1n was w1pe out. ven

Singapore were not available, Munro Kerr argued that Japan

55 b"d .L2:._., p.5 •

56 . d 5 6 Ib1 . , pp. & •

57 b"d .L2:._. , p.6 •

58Minutes of which are available in A.A.A.: CRS A2031,

Vol.l.

59Minutes of the Meeting of the Defence Committee on

20 March 1930, pp.2-3 in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol.l. 60

Ibid., p. 2.

47

61 would not attempt an invasion and British warships could

62 operate from Australia or the Solomon Islands anyway!

Obviously, the controversy over raids or invasion did

not suddenly disappear after March 1930. Moreover, the

Army's appreciations came increasingly into conflict with

Government policy. Thus, in June 1930, Scullin was told

that not only could the R.N. no longer be completely relied 63 64

upon, but that Australia was also exposed to invasion and

that the Army provided a cheaper solution to the problem of 65

defending Australia than naval or air forces.

Despite reminders by the Military Board that the Army

. . 1 h ld Wh' . . 66 ex1sted ult1mate y to up o the 1te Austral1a Pol1cy,

Scullin was not sufficiently impressed and compulsory

military training, which he had stopped in November 1929,

remained suspended and the R.A.N. continued to receive the

greater share of the much reduced defence vote during 67

1930-32.

61 Ibid., p.3.

62 Minutes of the Meeting of the Defence Committee on

26 March 1930, p.2 in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol.l. 63

Military Board, Information For The Prime Minister On His Visit Abroad, 5 June 1930, Pt 1, p.3 in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1855/1/131.

64 Ibid., e.g. Pt II, p.5.

65 Ibid., Pt I, p.4.

66 Ibid., Pt I, p.l.

67 For expenditure statistics see appendix A. As far as the

Chief of the Air Staff was concerned, the Labour Government did not change defence policy. See These Are Facts The Autobiography Of Air Marshal Sir Richard Williams (Canberra, 1977), p.200.

48

On 15 February 1932, the United Australia Party

government which succeeded Scullin's A.L.P. government,

decided to end the controversy between the Services and 68

agreed upon an anti-raid policy. The reasons for the

adoption of this policy were given by J.G. Latham to the

British Chiefs of Staffs at their 103rd sub-committee

meeting on 2 June 1932. At the time Latham was Australia's

Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs.

Latham's main point was that the U.A.P. government believed

that Japan was the only potential invader and beca~se of

her current involvement in Manchuria and Shanghai the risk

of an invasion of Australia, for many years, would be 69

small. But he also mentioned his Government's doubts as

to whether Japan could mass the necessary shipping to

. . 70 . . mount an 1nvas1on, although the 1928 Apprec1at1on War In

The Pacific had indicated that Japan possessed sufficient

shipping to launch a three division invasion of Australia,

and stressed the financial aspects of Australia's defence

which was not helped by the competing claims of the three

. 71 serv1ces.

68 ·cabinet Submission, Defence Policy And Its Relation To The

Figures To Be Submitted For Limitation At The Disarmament Conference, p.l in Pearce Papers, A.N.L., MS 1927, 2/459.

69 C.I.D. (Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee), The Defence Of

Australia (vfuitehall Gardens, 30 August 1932}, 372-C, also C.I.D. Paper No.C.O.S. 298, appendix II, p.l7 in A.A.A.: CRS A981, item Defence General 59, Pt III.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid., appendix II, pp.l6 & 18.

It therefore appears to the Australian Government that it would be better to provide efficient protection against raids rather than inefficient measures against invasion.

Italics in the original on p.l8.

49

Perhaps not surprisingly, considering how long this

bitter debate had already lasted, the U.A.P. government's

decision to follow an anti-raid policy did not stifle the

controversy. Indeed, the Chief of the General Staff,

Major-General J.H. Bruche, throughout 1933 and .1934

continually criticized Australia•s under-estimation of the

72 Japanese threat and over-reliance on the R.N. Yet, in a

major policy statement on the defence of Australia

delivered by the Minister for Defence, G.F. Pearce, to the

Millions Club in Sydney, Bruche's advice was ignored.

Instead, Senator Pearce chose to praise the British Chiefs 73

of Staff and the Committee of Imperial Defence and to

emphasize the dire effects of a naval blockade of Australia:

'If Australia's markets were closed and her exports and

imports stopped by enemy action she could be forced to sue

for peace without a single enemy soldier coming within 74

sight of her shores.' To anticipate criticism from

supporters of the invasion theory, Pearce admitted that if

the British main fleet were not available then an enemy 75

could launch an invasion of Australia.

72 See Major-General J.H. Bruche, The Defence Of Australia,

23 March 1933 in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1855/1/165, and Defence Committee Agenda No. 7/1934: Proposal To Equip The Defences Of Sydney With 15-inch Guns, 2 March 1934 and Defence Committee Agenda 7/1934: Equipment For Coast Defences. Statement By Chief Of The General Staff On Minute By Defence Committee Dated 2nd Harch, 1934; 5 March 1934, both in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol.3. 73

Statement Of The Government's Policy Regarding The Defence Of Australia, 25 September 1933, p.2. A printed copy is available in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 749/1/20. 74

Ibid., pp.3-4. 75

Ibid., p. 9.

50

Possibly in an attempt to silence the invasion

theorists, the Lyons' government invited Sir Maurice Hankey

to visit Australia to advise the government·. 76

This Hankey

77 did in October and November 1934. Unfortunately, his

arguments were familiar and appear to have been concerned

mainly with quietening Australian fears about the Singapore

strategy. Thus Hankey argued that all Australia had to

fear were sporadic raids by cruisers, armed merchant

1 b . 78 . h d' . d' vesse s or su mar1nes, w1t lan 1ng part1es not excee 1ng

79 a few hundred men, . because Japan would not risk landing an

expedition in Australia unless she was sure that she could

protect the expedition's long and vulnerable

. . 80 commun1cat1ons. Naturally, this entailed the destruction

of the British main fleet first and there was no question

that the British fleet would arrive in the Far East in time 81

and would be successful if the worst happened.

76 s. Roskill, Hankey Man Of Secrets Volume III 1931-1963 (London, 1974), p.l20: Hankey's d1ary entry for 9 August 1934. J. McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-39: A Study In Air And Sea Power (St Lucia, 1976), pp.26 & 55 maintains that Bruce, then High Commissioner in London, was instrumental in getting Hankey to visit Australia.

77 See J.M. McCarthy, Air Power and Australian Defence,

pp.38-9 & 84-5.

78 . . k h . Report By S1r Maur1ce Han ey, Secretary To T e Comm1ttee Of Imperial Defence. On Certain Aspects Of Australian Defence, 15 November 1934, para. 20 in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol.3.

79Any air attack on Australia would be by planes carried on

board these ships. The limited numbers of costly and vulnerable aircraft carriers would be reserved for service with the main fleet. See ibid., para. 35.

80 Ibid., para. 20.

81 Ibid. , para. 22.

51

General Bruche's and Colonel Lavarack's replies82

to

Hankey were predictable. Both reiterated their doubts

about Singapore and whether or when the British fleet would

. . 83 . arr1ve 1n the Far East. The Ch1ef of the Naval Staff,

84 Vice-Admiral G.F. Hyde, on 21 March 1935, replied to the

Army's criticisms by re-emphasizing that only naval forces

could prevent a blockade or invasion of Australia. 85

Of course, underlying the repetition of these

different strategic assessments was the competition between

the two Chiefs of Staff for funds for their Armed Service.

Hence, despite J.M. McCarthy's claim that:

... Hankey's visit led to the first comprehensive debate among the Services and the government on the efficacy of the Singapore strategy. It led also to a sharp questioning of the government's sea power orientation, and the wisdom of seeking 86 security inside the Imperial defence framework.

it is not surprising that Hankey actually contributed

82 Lavarack wrote as C.G.S. designate.

83 Memorandum by The Chief Of The General Staff On Report On

Certain Aspects Of Australian Defence by Sir Maurice Hankey •.. , 5 March 1935, 14pp. in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vo1.3. Memorandum by Colonel J.D. Lavarack ..• Chief Of The General Staff Designate, On Report On Certain Aspects Of Australian Defence By Sir Maurice Hankey ... , 14 March 1935, 6pp. also in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vo1.3.

84 The only R.A.N. officer to be appointed C.N.S. in the

period 1911-48. Traditionally, R.N. officers were appointed. 85

See Comments By The Chief Of The Naval Staff On Memorandum By The Chief Of The General Staff, On Sir Maurice Hankey's Report, 21 March 1935, Spp. and Comments By The Chief Of The Naval Staff On Memorandum By Colonel J.D. Lavarack, Chief Of The General Staff Designate, On Sir Maurice Hankey's Report, 21 March 1935, 6pp. Both documents are in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol.3.

86 Air Power and Australian Defence, p.84.

52

virtually nothing either to the debate or to its solution.

Already, in February 1932, the U.A.P. government had

decided upon an anti-raid policy and in March 1932 the

Military Board had anticipated Hankey's proposal to

re-organize the Army to deal with raids.87

As if Hankey had never been, the controversy continued

until Singapore surrendered to the Japanese on 15 February

1942. For example, on 2 December 1935, in a speech

delivered at Mosman N.S.W., the Minister for Defence

Archdale Parkhill mentioned defence against invasion and

88 the Senior Officers' Conference of 1920, but made it quite

clear that the U.A.P. government looked to British sea

power as Australia's first line of defence against

. . 89 . 1' . 1nvas1on and that 1t was government po 1cy to g1ve

priority to defence against raids.90

At about the same time, the Army evidently felt the

need to explain its position. The result was a

memorandum of approximately fifty pages entitled: A Common

Doctrine On The Organisation And Employment Of The

Australian Military Forces, which was issued by the Chief 91

of the General Staff. This memorandum was basically an

87 See CAB 21/397 Council of Defence Agenda, No.l/1935,

Australian Army Organization, paras 3-9, and Ch.3 for the organization of the First Line Component. 88

Archdale Parkhill, Statement of the Government's Policy regarding the Defence of Austral1a (Mosman, 2 December 1935), pp.l2-13. A copy is available in A.A.A.: CRS A981, item Defence 59, Pt I.

89 Ibid., pp.l0-11.

90 Ibid., pp.l3-15.

91 A draft copy is available in A.A.A.: MP 826/1, file 14.

53

attempt to convince the government that a larger and much 92

better equipped army was both necessary and desirable.

To this end, the usual doubts about the likelihood of the

British fleet's arriving in time in the Far East were 93

expressed and the, by then traditional, Labor Party theory

that submarines and aeroplanes could defend Australia was 94

challenged.

In mid-1936 the Military Board and the Minister for

Defence again clashed fiercely. The dispute arose from

the Board's proposed priorities for the new three year Army

programme to start in 1937-38. While the Minister wanted

to purchase coastal guns, the Board claimed that anti-

aircraft defences and mobile land forces were needed in 95

order to prevent raids on the guns. Naturally, the

Minister won and, instead of having at least a small

portion of the field army partly equipped with modern

weapons, Australia ended up having a few coast guns without

range-finders and other essential items.

Ostensibly, the main feature of this dispute was not

the usual one about the scale of attack, but really over

how to implement the Government's anti-raid policy. In

fact, however, while the Military Board was militarily

correct in arguing for mobile troops to repel enemy landing

92 A Common Doctrine ••• , pp.SOA-52.

93 Ibid., pp.l7, 23-4, 29.

94 Ibid., pp.40 & 43.

95 Priorities Under New Army Programme: Attachment To

Defence Committee Minute No. 48/1936, Appendices 1-5, June to August 1936 in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol.4.

54

parties sent to destroy the coast artillery, it probably

also hoped that once a section of the Army was modernized

it could press for further modernization and a larger field

army. Indeed, a cynic would perhaps argue that no matter

what the Government's policy was, the Board was determined

to have a large, well-equipped army.

Nevertheless, especially a cynic would be bound to ask

what size raids were envisaged. Here we probably have the

key to the problem. A General Staff memorandum of

19 November 1936 assumed that:

••• raids against the main ports [which the coast guns were obv1ously supposed to protect] would include surprise landings by hostile forces, not exceeding an Infantry Brigade and attached troops in each case, possibly repeated at regular intervals during the first year of war ••• 96

vfuile the Military Board may have been thinking of raids

on this scale, the Minister could well have had a very

different idea: he may have envisaged small landing parties

of two hundred men drawn from the crews of the bombarding

enemy vessels. 97 But, it should be emphasized, the conflict

was probably more the result of a clash over Government

96 . d . d General Staff Memorandum On The Per1o Requ1re For The Supply Of War Material By Industrial Mobilisation in A.A.A.: MP 729/6, file 47/401/19. The phrase was underlined in the original document.

97 The infantry brigades of the Japanese 5th and 18th

Divisions, which took part in the attack on Malaya in 1941, seem to have included between 5,200 and 7,000 men each. See L. Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust (Canberra, 1968 reprint), p.l33 n.4. However, the actual strength of the peacetime 1936 A.M.F. infantry brigades probably would not have been much more than 1,000 men. Thus, again we have no clear conception of the numbers of attackers envisaged.

55

defence policy, than a simple misunderstanding concerning

the size of landing parties.

In drafts prepared late in 1936 for the 1937 Imperial

Conference the Army went further than it had done before

and, as well as envisaging the usual Japanese invasion and 98

capture of Sydney or Melbourne, even contemplated the

absence of the British main fleet possibly for 'several 99

years after the outbreak of war'. Simultaneously, the

Army urged that Britain be pressed to define a raid. Quite

imaginatively, the Army seriously proposed that on the

outbreak of war Darwin could be attacked by from 2,000 to

3,000 Japanese reservists storming ashore from the Japanese 100

fishing boats always present in northern Australian waters.

The immediate response to this scenario is unknown,

but in a letter to the Melbourne Junior Chamber of

Commerce on 13 May 1937, H.V.C. Thorby (as the acting

Minister for Defence) repeated that the Government saw

bombardment (possibly accompanied by landings) against the

main ports as the most likely threat. Reassuringly, he

added that the Government was not neglecting more serious

98 Statement By The Government Of The Commonwealth Of

Australia For The Imperial Conference 1937 On The form and scale of attack to which Australia is liable, para. 8 in A.A.A.: MP 729/6, file 12/402/1.

99 Ibid., para. 4.

100 Statement By The Government Of The Commonwealth Of

Australia For The Imperial Conference, 1937 On The definition of a "Raid". and The specification of the maximum and minimum scales on the main Australian Ports, paras 5-8 in A.A.A.: MP 729/6, file 12/402/1. But see also the tri-service Darwin Defences. Report of Sub­Committee, para. 9 in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol.4 for a similar scenario.

56

1 d • 1 • h • . I 101 an 1ngs 1n t e nature of 1nvas1on • However, in a

speech on 24 August 1937 Prime Hinister Lyons confirmed

that the Army should give priority to defence against raids

because sea power alone could not prevent raids, although

adequate Imperial naval forces would make the danger of 102

invasion remote.

Preparation for defence against invasion, according

to the U.A.P. Government and the R.A.N., involved building

up the R.A.N. so that in conjunction with the R.N. it could

deter or defeat at sea any attempt at invasion. Defence

against raids, however, presumed the use of both naval

vessels and coastal artillery with military garrisons. The

Australian army, of course, believed that it should be

increased and equipped so that it could provide the main

defence against invasion and the R.A.A.F. maintained that

it could supplement defence against both raids and invasion.

During 1938 the controversy continued. The Government

adhered to a basically anti-raid policy, but, within

101 A copy of the letter is available in A.A.A.: MP 431/1,

file 929/19/491. 102

Outline of Australian Defence Policy. (Extract from Prime Minister's Speech of 24th August, 1937). Copy in A.A.A.: AA 1971/216. Compare Imperial Conference, 1937 Summary Of Proceedings (London, H.M.S.O., June 1937), p.l7; a copy of wh1ch 1s available in A.A.A.: CRS A816, item 11/302/3:

••• The basis of Australian defence policy was described as participation in Empire naval defence for the protection of sea-borne trade, as a deterrent to invasion and as a general measure of defence against raids, combined with local defence to provide a further deterrent to and a defence against invasion and raids. The great importance from the Australian point of view [of] the Singapore base was noticed •••

57

Parliament, the Council of Defence and the Defence

Committee, this policy was criticized. On 28 April 1938,

in reply to a question by U.A.P. Independent Percy Spender,

Tharby said:

The Government's defence policy provides for defence against both invasion and raids. As raids are the most probable form of attack, the completion of the defence against this contingency is the immediate objective of policy. The new defence programme will provide adequate defence against raids and, at the same time, will afford a deterrent to and a 103 substantial measure of defence against invasion.

On 5 May 1938, Spender countered with:

••• For many years past the basis for our defence policy has been primarily to rely on Great Britain in case of need, and merely to protect ourselves against sporadic raids by other nations. I suppose it is no longer disloyal to say that in the event of any major conflict in Europe, Great Britain c~uld not render assistance to Australia •.• lO

and, 'we should not simply rely on the possible source of 105

invasion being sporadic raids'.

Within the Council of Defence, Hughes (again Minister

for External Affairs) retained his independent position

and was concerned about defending Australia against 106

invasion, while R.G. casey (Treasurer), General Blarney

and Admiral Colvin (Chief of the Naval Staff) upheld the

Government's policy of providing for defence against

103 C.P.D., Vol.lSS, p.647.

104 Ibid., p.906.

105 Ibid., p.908.

106 Summary Of Proceedings Of Council Of Defence Meeting,

24 February 1938, pp.4 & 8 in A.A.A.: AA 1971/216, item 24 February 1938.

58

. 107 . . sporad1c raids. In the Defence Comm1ttee, the class1c

pattern re-emerged with each Chief of Staff supporting his

own service. When Major-General Lavarack maintained that

the Army should be capable of dealing with raids up to a

mixed brigade in strength, Admiral Colvin disagreed that 108

such large-scale raids were contemplated, and Air Vice-

Marshal Williams argued that the R.A.A.F. would be able to 109

deal with such raids far more quickly than the A.M.F.

Not surprisingly, the three Chiefs of Staff, who alone

formed the Defence Committee, were still at loggerheads 110

five months later. The result was that the Military 111

Board's plans to upgrade the Army were not even considered!

During late 1938 and early 1939, support for the

invasion theorists increased. Firstly, British Lieutenant-

General E.K. Squires, in his first report as Inspector-112

General of the A.M.F., urged that the A.M.F. be organized

in peacetime so as to be able, once it was mobilized, to 113

repel not only raids but also an invasion. Unfortunately,

107 Ibid.

108 Notes Of Discussion At Meeting Of Defence Committee Held

On Tuesday, 1st March, 1938, p.2 in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol. 4.

109 Ibid., p.4.

11--o-See Secretary {Defence Committee}, Minutes Of Defence

Committee At Meeting Held On Tuesday, 16th August, 1938. No. 45/1938- Australian Defence Policy in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol.S.

111 Ibid.

11_2_ A copy of this report, with a covering note from Squires

to the Minister for Defence, dated 16 December 1938, is available in A.A.A.: CRS A816, item 51/301/6.

113 Ibid., paras 1 & 6.

59

while Squires went into some detail to describe the current

and future composition of the Militia he did not reveal why

an invasion of Australia was likely.

Secondly, the Committee of Imperial Defence admitted

that the fleet sent to oppose the Japanese in the Far East 114

could be inferior to it. Although this should have come

as a shock to those who supported an anti-raid policy, the

situation changed only slightly. Lavarack again urged the

modernization of the Army (through the provision of tanks,

motor vehicles, anti-aircraft artillery and anti-tank guns) 115

so that it could meet an invasion, while the Naval

Board's only concession to the bad news was to repeat 116

previous British assurances and to press again for the 117

purchase of a capital ship and a dock for its maintenance.

Nevertheless, in the face of the deteriorating

strategic situation, by mid-1939 the Australian Chiefs of

Staff agreed that while 'preparations to meet the maximum 118

scale of attack [i.e. invasion] need not be attempted',

it was advisable to increase Australia's defence

114 Summary Of C.I.D. Paper 468C on Singapore, 6 February

1939 in A.A.A.: CRS A981, item Defence 331, Pt III. 115

Major-General Lavarack, Defence Programme - Army Appreciation. For resistance to major attack, 28 February 1939 in A.A~A.: CRS A816, item 14/301/108.

116 Secretary (Naval Board) to the Secretary (Dept of Defence) ,

for the Minister, The Basis Of The Defence of Australia, 7 March 1939, paras 5 & 7-9 in A.A.A.: CRS A816, item 14/301/108.

117 Ibid., para. 16.

118 Review Of Australian Defence Policy By The Chiefs of

Staff, 27 May 1939, pp.2-3 in A.A.A.: AA 1971/216, item Agendum No. 9/1939.

60

preparations to meet a medium scale of attack (i.e. major

landings) rather than only minor scale attacks (i.e. minor 119

landings) as hitherto.

Part of the explanation for the agreement between the

Chiefs of Staff in their 1939 review probably lies in the

fact that each service would need to be expanded in order 120

to meet a medium scale of attack and also that two of the

three Chiefs of Staff were Englishmen, Admiral Colvin and

Lieutenant-General Squires. Only Air Vice-Marshal S.J. 121

Goble was Australian. N~turally, English officers could

be expected to have more faith in British government

assurances than Australians, who were dependent upon these

same promises for their security.

Unfortunately, the measure of apparent agreement

which the Chiefs of Staff had obtained in their 1939 review

did not last once the question of finance was discussed

during Council of Defence meetings in June-July 1939. For

instance, the Second Naval Member claimed:

•.• that the Navy was not up to the authorized scale to meet even the Minor Scale of Attack, but, he believed that the Army was in some 7especr~2up to it and in other respects above lt ...

The outbreak of World War II in September 1939 did not

end the controversy. Indeed, only six months before Pearl

119 Ibid., pp.l-2.

120 Ibid., pp.3-4.

121 Acting C.A.S.: 15 December 1922-9 February 1925,

7 December 1932-12 June 1934, 28 February 1939-8 January 1940.

122 Summary Of Proceedings Of Council Of Defence Meeting -

5th July, 1939, p.28 in A.A.A.: AA 1971/216, item 5 July 1939.

61

Harbour Admiral Colvin was still arguing that provided

Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies held out,

Australia would be liable to suffer from only intermittent 123

raids.

MINOR QUESTIONS

The great debate of the 1920s and 1930s was whether

the Australian services would need to repel only minor or

medium scale raids or a full scale invasion. Under this

major question a number of others naturally were subsumed.

They included guns versus aircraft, forward defence and

expeditionary forces.

Guns versus Aircraft

This dispute was over the relative merits of coastal

guns and aircraft in the defence of important ports.

Although the subject has already been covered in 124

J .M. r.lcCarthy' s thesis it is mentioned here again because

of the effect it had on the A.M.F.

The controversy arose in Great Britain and, by late

1927, papers were being written extolling the virtues of

. . f . f . h d ~ 125 ant1-a1rcra t guns over a1rcra t 1n t e efence OI ports.

123 War Cabinet Minute, Sydney, 15 May 1941. (1073)

Supplement No. 1 to Agendum No. 135/1941 - Singapore Conference - April 1941. Washington Staff Conversations -March 1941 and message from Quealy to Sinclair on 27 May 1941: Amendments to War Cabinet Minute No. 1073 - Singapore Staff Conference- Washington Staff Conversations in A.A.A.: CRS A816, item 37/301/88.

124 Op.cit., pp.l31-4 especially.

125 Note On The Air Defence Of Ports, which was sent to the

C.I.G.S. and was based on the letters of General Ashmore and Colonels Brind and Hill, n.d. but c.l927, in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1855/1/76.

62

A memorandum was written by the Chief of the Imperial

General Staff concluding that aeroplanes could only 126

supplement fixed gun defences, not replace them.

The opposite argument was put by the Australian Chief

of the Air Staff, R. Williams, in 1928. He maintained that

aircraft were superior to anti-aircraft guns for defence

against air attack and that aeroplanes could sink enemy

vessels whilst they were still hundreds of miles away from

the coast guns. Of course, Williams wanted some of the

£3 million, about to be spent mainly on the re-arming of 127

Australia's fixed defences, for the R.A.A.F.

However, the Defence Committee, which consisted of the

three Chiefs of Staff, rejected Williams' plea. Whilst

admitting that there were 'very good grounds for developing

the R.A.A.F.', Williams' peers, Lieutenant-General Sir

H.G. Chauvel and Rear-Admiral W.R. Napier, made it quite

clear that this should not be at the expense of the re-

armament of the coastal artillery which was 'the only 128

reliable means of attacking ships'.

126 The respective roles of fixed defences and aircraft in

coast defence. Memorandum by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, War Office, 3 November 1927. A Staff Corps lieutenant-colonel despatched a copy to the Secretary (Dept of Defence) in January 1928. Chauvel eventually initialled the copy, probably early in 1928. This copy is now in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1855/1/76.

127 R. Williams, Local Defence Of Australian Ports,

11 January 1928, paras 1 & 3-4 and Appendix A - Aircraft In Defence in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol.l.

128 Minute of Meeting Of The Defence Committee held on

16 January 1928, Local Defence Of Australian Ports. Remarks Of Defence Committee On Air Board Memorandum Of 11/1/28, para. 1 in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol.l.

63

Similarly, in April 1928, during a discussion of

C.I.D. paper 304-C on Singapore, Chauvel and Napier agreed

with their counterparts in the U.K. that aeroplanes were

as yet an unproven weapon, whereas Williams apparently

copied his British counterpart in advocating the 129

substitution of aircraft for coastal artillery. Williams,

when considering C.I.D. paper 309-C on the defences of 130

South Africa, reiterated the points he had made in his

memorandum of 11 January 1928, whilst Napier and Chauvel

recommended that guns 'with such aircraft co-operation as

may be determined upon', rather than mainly aircraft should 131

provide the defences for Australia's vital ports. Thus,

the Army's 'quick preventive war' against the Air Force 132

pre-dated Salmond's visit to Australia later in 1928.

Already, by early 1927, the Military Board had been

forced into making that difficult choice between equipment

and personnel because of the diminishing defence vote. It

129 Lieutenant-General Chauvel (C.G.S.), Rear-Admiral Napier

(C.N.S.), Group Captain R. Williams (C.A.S.), C.I.D. 304 -C (Singapore), 11 April 1928 in A.A.A.: HP 729/2, file 1855/ 1/181. See also These Are Facts, pp.200-201.

130 C.I.D. 309-C(South African Defences), 11 April 1928, in

A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol.l. 131

Ibid. 132

Contra J.M. McCarthy, Air Power and Australian Defence, pp.l31-4, where he implies that the Army plumped for coastal artillery only after Salmond's 1928 report and also after Williams' comments in March 1932. Admittedly, no orders for new coast guns seem to have been placed until about 1933 and they certainly were not fully effective on the outbreak of World War II.

64

decided to concentrate temporarily on the provision of

133 materiel rather than on the training of personnel.

As the defence vote continued to decline, units were

disbanded, the controversy between the services over their

roles worsened and the attractiveness of investing in

permanent equipment, rather than fluctuating manpower, must

have greatly increased. In this way, both the major dispute

(raids versus invasion) and the minor one (guns versus

aircraft) affected Army defence planning and equipment

procurement to the detriment of the A.M.F. The development

of mechanized units, for example, would have been more

useful in the defence of Australia against raids or

invasion, and also for any overseas expeditionary force,

than a few coast guns.

Forward Defence

Throughout the inter-war years, while the services

were quarrelling over their roles and the level of threat

to Australia, plans were being discussed for the despatch

of an Australian garrison to Singapore and for the defence

of Papua and New Guinea and the surrounding islands. But

little was done before the Second World War because, under

section 49 of the Defence Act, citizen soldiers were not

133 Minutes Of Meeting Of Defence Committee held on 19 May

1927, Army. The Extra Financial Provision Required For The Year 1927-28, para. 4 in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol.l.

65

required to serve outside the Commonwealth or its

134 territories unless they volunteered to do so.

At a Council of Defence meeting on 30 August 1923,

Generals White and Chauvel mentioned the possibility of

Australia's being asked to provide a garrison for Singapore

. . 11 . . 135 f . 1n peacet1me, as we as 1n wart1me. In act, 1n August

1932, the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the C.I.D. did

suggest that Australia organize her military forces in

such a way as to make possible the prompt despatch of

reinforcements to Singapore, among other places, during 136

wartime. But it was not until February 1941 that the

understrength 8th Division A.I.F. arrived in Singapore and

thereby became involved in the whole problem of Imperial

defence.

Meanwhile, the problems connected with the defence of

New Guinea and with Japan's occupation of the ex-German

Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands exercised the minds

of Australia's defence planners and politicians. This was

134 It was not until late in 1939 that the Defence Act was

amended to embrace the territories of Papua and Norfolk Island: see G. Long, To Benghazi (Canberra, 1961 reprint), p.28 n.9. New Guinea, of course, was held under a League of Nations' mandate and was thus not a Commonwealth territory. In 1920 the Senior Officers' Conference had urged that compulsory trainees be made liable for overseas service because: Australia could perhaps be better defended overseas,when formed the League could require Australia as a member to undertake certain duties overseas and, as the Mandatory Power, Australia would be obliged to defend the ex-German territories when necessary. Op.cit., Vol.l, para. 20.

135 Minutes Of Meeting Of Council Of Defence On 30/8/23, pp.3-4

in Army Archives (Melbourne): MH 1/10. 136

C.I.D. (Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee), The Defence Of Australia (Whitehall Gardens, 30 August 1932), 372-C (also C.I.D. paper no. c.o.s. 298), paras 48-51 in A.A.A.: CRS A981, item Defence General 59, Pt III.

66

to be expected because, at their closest, the Japanese and

137 Australian mandates were only 285 miles apart. But again,

before World War II started, few effective measures were

taken, partly because technically the mandated territories

were supposed to remain unfortified.

In 1924, the Council of Defence admitted that an

enemy attack on the mandated territories would probably be 138

successful and combined operations would be required to 139

recapture the territories. The Council also considered

that the Japanese could launch submarine and cruiser raids,

as well as military expeditions, from bases in the Caroline 140

Islands. For the 1928 Appreciation War In The Pacific,

the Naval Staff prepared a paper on the effect Japanese

submarines operating from Pelau and Truk would have on 141

trade in Australian waters. During World War II, Truk

was an important Japanese naval base.

Ten years later, in 1938, Hughes expressed the opinion

that Japan would use Formosa as a base for an attack on

Australia, and the Marshall and Caroline Islands as bases

137 L. Wigmore, op.cit., p.l.

138 Council of Defence Sub-Committee, Agenda 7/24 - Mandated

Territories - Defence Measures. Notes By Military Member Of Sub-Committee, paras 1-4 in A.A.A.: AA 1971/216, item 13.

139 Defence Of Mandated Territories, Council Of Defence Agenda

No. 13/24, para. 15 in A.A.A.: AA 1971/216, item 13 and Islands To The North-East Of Australia - Strategical Aspect, pp.5-6 in A.A.A.: AA 1971/216, item 13.

140 Ibid., p.2.

141 The paper, Japanese Submarines And Trade Operations was

attached to Appreciation War In The Pacific, 9 August 1928 in A.A.A.: MP 1185/5, file 1846/4/363.

67

142 for raids. However, in his first report as Inspector-

General of the A.M.F., Squires made only a passing

reference to the concept of forward defence, within the

context of Imperial defence, when he noted that the Service 143

Boards were studying the defence Qf Papua and New Guinea.

But he also prophetically warned:

It must be recognized, however, that, at some future date, changed circumstances may necessitate the despatch 2£ Australian troops to those territories.!

Less than three months later, it was Lavarack's turn

to sound a warning. After pointing to Japan's amphibious

operations in China as an instance of Japan's ability to 145

launch a large scale raid or invasion of Australia,

Lavarack correctly claimed that Japan had secretly developed

bases in the Caroline Islands. Of course, this drastically

shortened the notice of attack Australia could expect and

also allowed the Japanese to increase the size of their 146

initial landing force.

The policy of relying upon the Royal Navy for

protection meant that the Australian government and armed

services had to give some thought to the defence of the

142 Summary Of Proceedings Of Council Of Defence Meeting

24th February, 1938, p.l6 in A.A.A.: AA 1971/216, item 24, February 1938.

143 First Report By Lieutenant-General E.K. Squires ••.

Inspector-General Of The Australian Military Forces, 16 December 1938, paras 59-60 in A.A.A.: CRS A816, item 51/301/6.

144 Ibid., para. 60.

14_5_ Major-General Lavarack (C.G.S.), Defence Programme- Army

Appreciation. For resistance to major attack, 28 February 1939, para. 3 in A.A.A.: CRS A816, item 14/301/108.

146 Ibid., para. 4.

68

Suez Canal, as well as being concerned with forward

defence in the Pacific. In reply to a question asked by

the Department of the Prime Minister, Colonel J.D. 147

Lavarack, · on 30 July 192 9, repeatedly emphasized the

importance of the Suez Canal for the movement of a British 148

fleet into the Pacific to protect Australia. On 26 Barch

1930, Rear-Admiral Munro Kerr expressed the contrary view.

He maintained that if the Suez Canal were blocked this

still would not prevent a British fleet from arriving in

the Pacific in time to threaten a Japanese expedition or 149

its communications.

Nevertheless, just over three years later, and in

stark contrast to the bitter arguments over whether a

British fleet would arrive in time at Singapore, the 150

Defence Committee expressed unusual and inexplicable

confidence in the United Kingdom's judgement. The

Committee said:

••• It is of special concern to Australia that the safety of the Canal should be assured in future Treaty negotiations but the Committee feel sure that the need for effecting adequate defence measures for the safeguarding of the Canal requires little emph'l~ising to the United Kingdom Government ••.

147 . Who was D1rector of t·1ilitary Operations and Intelligence

at the time. 148

Defence Of Suez Canal in A.A.A.: CRS A 2031, Vol.l. 149 .

Minutes of the Meeting of the Defence Comm1ttee on 26 March 1930, pp.2-3 in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol.l. But Lieutenant­Commander T. Ishimaru of the Imperial Japanese Navy would have strongly disagreed with Hunro Kerr. See Ishima~u's Japan Hust Fight Britain (London, Harch 1937), pp.l98-201.

150 Unless the Chiefs of Staff recognised their complete

inability to do otherwise. 151

Minutes Of The Meeting Of The Defence Committee Held On ... 9th May, 1933, p.4 in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol.2.

69

Of course, Australia had been involved in the Suez

Canal region in 1885 and during World War I, and was to

help defend it again in the 1940s on the basis of plans

drawn up during the inter-war decades. The question of

expeditionary forces naturally was linked to the concept of

forward defence and also to that of the great debate.

Certainly, in his report on Australian defence in November

1934, Sir Maurice Hankey combined these questions. He

rejected the extreme raid and invasion theories but

advocated the concentration of expenditure available for

the Army on the improvement of its efficiency and ability

to mobilize quickly, rather than on the maintenance of its

size, so that it would be able to provide expeditionary

forces in wartime to protect the Royal Navy's

. . . 1 d. h 1 152 commun1cat1ons, 1nc u 1ng t e Suez Cana .

Expeditionary Forces

Planning for the forward defence of Australia through

the use of expeditionary forces began in 1922 during the

Chanak crisis, \vhen it seemed likely that Australians might

be sent to help the British, should the British clash with

Mustapha Kernel's Turkish troops on their march on Istanbul.

Although Plan 401, as the plan to despatch an expeditionary

force overseas was called, received no official recognition

and remained a closely guarded secret, it was used to raise

152 Op.cit., paras 26 & 28-9.

70

153 the 6th Division A.I.F. in September 1939.

Plan 401 provided for four different expeditionary

forces ranging from an infantry or cavalry brigade group 154

to a complete division. In 1924 Chauvel estimated that,

within ninety days of a decision to raise an expeditionary

force, Australia could embark a maximum of one division 155

and one cavalry brigade group, albeit without tanks, 156

anti-aircraft guns or gas masks. The 1924 Overseas Plan

401 had given preference to veterans of the First World War

but by 1932, because of the passing of time, Militia units

became responsible for raising a quota of recruits for the 157

initial expeditionary force.

By 1934 Australian and British interests and

Australian concepts of forward defence and expeditionary

force planning had become intertwined. In November 1934

153 Lieutenant-General Sir Carl Jess, Report On The Activities

Of The Australian Military Forces 1929-1939 (n.d. but c.l946), Append1x 18, pp.88 & 90. See also H.Q. 5th District Base, Second Australian Imperial Force Instructions to Recruiting Officers, 10 October 1922 in A.A.A.: ~~ 367/1, file 469/2/772.

154 Hemorandu."ll. from the C.G.S. (Australian Section) to the

C.I.G.S., War Office, 18 February 1924, para. 4 in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1925/1/250.

155 Ibid., para. 3.

156 Ibid., pp.2-4. Also: C.I.G.S., War Office to The Chief of

the Commonwealth Section, Imperial General Staff, Dept of Defence, Helbourne, 6 August 1924; memoranda from H.G. Chauvel (Chief of the Australian Section, Imperial General Staff) to C.I.G.S., War Office, 2 October 1924 and 25 May 1925. All in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1925/1/250.

157 Nemorandum from Hajor-General Bruche (Chief of the

Australian Section, Imperial General Staff) to C.I.G.S., War Office, Overseas Plan 401, 28 February 1934 in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1925/3/29. A copy of Re-Draft Of Plan 401 (revised to 1 March 1932) exists in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1925/3/28.

71

Hankey and the Defence Committee recommended that the

organization of the A.M.F. be reduced to the scale

recommended in 1932 namely three cavalry brigades, two

infantry divisions, four mixed brigades and garrison troops.

The reasons given included: the lack of money to maintain

any larger organization, the greater efficiency it would

provide against raids and its adequacy as a basis for the 158

despatch of an expeditionary force. The Defence Committee

talked in Chauvel's terms of despatching one division 159

overseas within three months, while Hankey, as mentioned

previously, envisaged the employment of the expeditionary

force to garrison the Suez Canal and possibly also other 160

bases along the Royal Navy's lines of communications.

Shrewdly, Hankey reminded his audience that Australia

relied upon the Royal Navy to provide her first line of 161

defence.

A Common Doctrine On The Organisation k~d Employment

Of The Australian Military Forces foresaw the use of the

field army in Europe, as garrisons for Royal Naval bases,

as a participant in combined operations, or for the direct

defence of Australia, depending upon the strategic 162

situation. Similarly, the draft statements composed for

158 Report By Sir Maurice Hankey •.• On Certain Aspects Of

Australian Defence, paras 28-30 and Minutes Of The Meeting Of The Defence Cornmi ttee Held On :r.londay, 5th Novero.ber, 1934, And Wednesday, 7th November, 1934, p.2 in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol.3. 159

Ibid., p.3. 160

Op.cit., para. 28. 161

Ibid. 162

Paras 101-4.

72

the 1937 Imperial Conference made it quite clear that the

establishment of British naval supremacy in the Western

Pacific and Indian Oceans was the quid pro quo for the

despatch of Australian land and air expeditionary forces

abroad. However, the R.A.N. probably would be available 163

immediately for operations.

Although the Army envisaged that Australia might

garrison a few important naval ports in the Middle or Far 164

East in peacetime, its main concern ~vas to secure more

money for itself relative to the R.A.N. by demonstrating

how the lack of local forces, namely the A.M.F. and R.A.A.F., 165

could increase the burden on the Imperial Forces in wartime.

The Army also argued that stronger land and air forces

would make them as capable as the R.A.N. of contributing to 166

Imperial Defence.

The importance of Plan 401 and forward defence was

demonstrated on 12 February 1938 ~Then, in a review of the

Army's defence preparations, Lavarack wrote:

163 Statement By The Government Of The Commonwealth Of

Australia For The Imperial Conference, 1937 On A formal agreement on Imperial Defence as a whole and an arrangement between the United Kingdom Government and the Australian Government for mutual assistance in peace and war, paras 10-12 in A.A.A.: MP 729/6, file 12/402/1. 164

Ibid., paras 14 & 16(C). 165

Ibid., para. 4. 16~ 'Ibid., paras 9-16, but especially para. 13.

73

Priority of provision of requirements is to be given to defence against raid and the organization necessary for the despatch overseas of one division ..•. l67

But there still remained a link with the great debate for

the very next sentence read:

••• The existing nucleus Hilitia organization ••• of seven divisions ... is to be retained as a basis for expansion for defence against invasion. 168

ARMY PREPARATIONS

Although the question of raids versus invasion was

never resolved, the Army, because of its predilection,

wrote its mobilization plans on an anti-invasion basis.

An enormous amount of work was involved in the preparation

of these plans by the commander and staff of each

headquarters. For example, Mobilization Standing Orders 169

Australian Military Forces consisted of twenty-five

foolscap pages of definitions and instructions on the

format and content of mobilization orders, while a set of 170

the 3rd Military District's mobilization orders, which

dealt only with mobilization against raids, contained fifty

typewritten foolscap pages outlining the main plan. In

addition, there were nearly thirty subsidiary plans

167 Council of Defence Agendum No. 1/1938. Army, Hemorandum

By The Chief Of The Army Staff On Army And The Development Required Therein To Meet The Policy Of The Government, para. 1 in A.A.A.: AA 1971/216, item 24 February 1938.

168 Ibid.

169 A copy is available in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1925/1/89.

170 A copy of

District. April 1939

Australian Military Forces. Third Hilitary 3rd 01strict Mob1l1zat1on Orders 1939 issued in is available in A.A.A.: MP 385/8.

74

dealing with everything from graves' registration to

postal services.

Naturally, the compilation and revision of such

orders and instructions was a continuous process and it was

not surprising that they were incomplete as late as the 171

beginning of 1939. Nevertheless, by the Saturday

afternoon of 2 September 1939, when Adjutant-General Jess

despatched coded telegrams proclaiming the precautionary

stage of mobilization, the plans were complete enough for

his son (then a Militia private in the 6th Battalion 'The

Royal 11elbourne Regiment' ) to receive his marching orders 172

within just over three hours.

The 1920 Senior Officers' Conference laid the

foundations for the A.M.F.'s anti-invasion planning during

the inter-war years. The Senior Officers argued that the

capture of Sydney or Melbourne would enable Japan to

achieve her aim of imposing her policy upon Australia,

whilst the seizure of Fremantle (in conjunction with the

occupation of Singapore) would place the Japanese Navy in

an advantageous position to attack any reinforcing British 173

fleet. Hence the Senior Officers planned for the

171 C.B. Laffan {Secretary to the Military Board) to Secretary

(Dept of Defence), Emergency Measures - Statements Of State Of Preparedness And Proposed Action, Statement "A" Existing State Of Preparedness Of The Army, 17 February 1939, para. 9 in A.A.A.: CRS A816, item 30/301/6. See also Lieutenant-Colonel T.E. Weavers (Chairman, Mobilization Committee), Development Of National Planning, 12 August 1938, reprinted in Lieutenant-General Sir C. Jess, op.cit., pp.98-108 on the state of planning and the problems encountered up to then.

172 Lieutenant-General Jess, op.cit., p.97.

173 Op.cit., Vol.I, Pt II, paras 9-10. See also Vol.II, P~IV, paras 73 & 77.

75

concentration of the A.M.F. in the strategically vital

areas arolli~d Sydney and Melbourne, with local forces (in

the form of three mixed brigades} being left to garrison

1 d . d 1" 174 Queens an , Tasman1a an Western Austra 1a.

By mid-1923 these recommendations had been accepted

and both cavalry divisions and three of the four infantry

divisions of the A.r·1.F., upon mobilization, vlere to be

concentrated at Rutherford (near Maitland} and at Liverpoo1:75

But then there ensued a controversy reminiscent of the

great debate; only this time the location of the attack,

rather than the scale of attack was the issue.

At a Council of Defence meeting in August 1923,

Chauvel announced that he envisaged a raid on Sydney and

174 Ibid., Vol.II, Pt IV, paras 72-3.

175 Memorandum from the Secretary (to the Military Board} to

the Secretary (to the Air Board}, 5 June 1923, para. 3 in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1821/1/141.

For the peace stations of these forces see ibid., para. 2 and for the allotment of field army troops to mobilization centres, see the Principles Of Mobilization, 13 June 1923 in Army Archives (Melbourne}: MH 1/20.

A distinction must be drawn between mobilization and concentration:

Mobilization is the process by which an armed Force passes from a peace to a war footing. The mobilization of a unit therefore means its completion for war in men, animals and stores.

Whilst the place of Mobilization is: The place detailed in Formation

Mobilization Orders where Concentration and Mobilization are effected.

And, the place of concentration is: The place at which troops are moved after

Mobilization, when they are ready for service. In many cases, hov1ever, it is the same as the Place of Mobilization.

(Mobilization Standing Orders. Australian .Hilitary Forces 1921, paras 1, 7 & 8. A copy is available in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, 1925/1/89.}

76

176 Newcastle covering a landing elsewhere. Nevertheless,

in June 1926, Major-General Bruche (whilst urging that the

1st Division's place of mobilization be moved from

Rutherford to the area west of Sydney) argued that the

177 Sydney area was the most likely place for an enemy attack.

In 1929, however, Chauvel concluded that the Newcastle-

Maitland area was slightly more vulnerable than Sydney and, 178

therefore, more likely to be attacked. But both Chauvel . 179

and Bruche, as well as the Adjutant-General, basically

agreed that the political, economic and strategic

importance of Sydney and Newcastle meant that they simply

had to be defended.

The 2nd Military District's Lines of Communication

outline plan, which was delayed until 1933 because of the

uncertainty over the future organization of the A.M.F. in 180

1932, reflected the current conventional wisdom. The

plan's aim was to maintain the field army in operations

'in either or both of the two principal strategic areas

176 ·Minutes of Meeting of Council of Defence on 30/8/23, p.4

in A.A.A.: CRS A2029, item 30/8/23. 177

Bruche, however, rated the threat to NevTcastle as only very slightly below that to Sydney. See Major-General J.H. Bruche (Corrrnanding the 1st Division) to the Secretary (Department of Defence), Hobilization - 1st Division, 29 June 1926 in A.A.A.: HP 729/2, file 1925/1/279.

178 C.G.S., Appreciation- The Concentration Of The Australian

Land Forces In Time Of War, c. 20 September 1929, paras 4-6 in A.A.A.: MP 826/1, file 43.

179 A.G. to the C.G.S., Plans Of Concentration, October 1929,

paras 4-5 in A.A.A.: MP 826/1, file 43. 180

Major-General J.H. Bruche (C.G.S.) to A.G. and Q.M.G., Strategic Concentration: Plan For The Organization Of The Lines Of Com.rnunication, paras 1-3 in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1937/1/17.

77

referred to in the Plan of Concentration, i.e., SYDNEY and 181

NEWCASTLE'. Victoria was to be the field army's main

supply base with imports from the U.K. being channelled

182 through that State. The series of plans which followed

confirmed the strategic importance of Sydney and Newcastle.

Having established to its own satisfaction that

Australia was liable to invasion and that the most likely

area for such an attack was Sydney-Newcastle, the Army

next considered the question of warning time. While it

was accepted that raids could be launched with little, if

. 183 any, warn1ng, the amount of warning of an invasion was

debatable. In 1929 Chauvel estimated that it would take

nine to ten weeks for the Japanese to land three divisions

at Sydney or Newcastle. He expected these divisions to be 184

reinforced within approximately two months. By the mid-

1930s, following the secretive and efficient manner in

which the Japanese had attacked Shanghai in 1932, the

amount of expected warning of an invasion had fallen to less 185

than one month.

In fact, it would have been immaterial whether the

A.M.F. had received three months' or one month's notice of

181 . . . . Strateg1c Concentrat1on. Organ1zat1on Of The L. Of C.,

A.H.Q., Melbourne, 11 May 1933, Pt I, para. 1 in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1937/1/17.

182 Ibid., Pt I, para. 6.

183 C.G.S., Appreciation- The Concentration Of The Australian

Land Forces In Time Of War, c. 20 Septewber 1929, para. 3 in A.A.A.: MP 826/1, file 43.

184 Ibid., para. 12.

185 A Common Doctrine ••. , para. 83.

78

a Japanese invasion. In 1923 it was estimated that the

Army would require between four and six months' training

d . . d . . 186 an preparat1on 1n or er to meet an 1nvas1on, and by 1936

187 this had only dropped to th~ee months. Although enemy

raiders would give little or no warning, in 1938 Lavarack

maintained that the .Hilitia would require from ten to

t d b 'l' . . . 188 wenty-one ays to mo 1 1ze on an ant1-ra1d bas1s. Thus,

even by its own estimates, the Australian Army believed

that its preparations were inadequate.

Th 1 d . . . d b 189 . e never so ve 1nvas1on versus ra1 s de ate v1tally

affected the command, organization, training and equipment

of the ~1ilitia. Failure to solve this controversy resulted

in an army which was incapable of meeting either raids or

invasion. However, while it was technically feasible, a

Japanese invasion of Australia was unlikely for historical 190

and economic reasons. Japanese raids, of course, were

altogether another matter.

186 C - ~1ilitary, para. 3 in the Agenda for the Heeting of

the Council of Defence on 22 March 1923 in Army Archives (Melbourne) : M.H 1/10.

187 Minutes By Defence Committee At Meeting Held On Monday

26th October, 1936 And Thursday 29th October, 1936, pp.4-5 in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol.4.

188 Council Of Defence Agend~~ No. 1/1938. Army, Memorandum

By The Chief Of The Army Staff On Army And The Development Required Therein To Heet The Policy Of The Government, para. 13(e) in A.A.A.: AA 1971/2/6, item 24 February 1938.

189 Despite masterly attempts to resolve the dile~una by

considering both aspects. See e.g. Prime Minister Bruce's second reading speech on the 1924 Defence Equipment Bill. C.P.D., Vol.l07, 27 June 1924, p.l707.

190 Since the 1890s Japanese expansion had primarily been

north and \vest not south, and ~ialaya and the Netherlands East Indies were far richer than Australia in natural resources, as well as being much closer to Japan.

79

In general, Australia's army officers were correct

to doubt bland British assurances concerning the despatch

of a battle fleet to the Far East. On technical grounds

alone, at no stage could this fleet have been reasonably

expected to defeat the Imperial Japanese Navy. When, in

the 1920s, the R.N. was powerful enough to send such a

fleet, there were no established fuelling points nor a

base at Singapore to make it effective. By the end of the

1930s, when the base at Singapore was ready for use, the

R.N. had lost its margin of superiority and was heavily

committed in Europe: precisely as Australia's military

officers had fruitlessly argued.

•.• Certes, says he, I have already chose my officer . ••• a great arithmetician, ••• That never set a squadron in the field, Nor the division of a battle knows More than a spinster; ••• mere prattle, without practice, Is all his soldiership.

Othello, Act I, Scene I.

80

Chapter Three

The Organization and Command of the C1tizen Sold1er, 1919-39

Against the background developed in the previous

chapter, the citizen soldier had to be organized and

commanded. The effectiveness of this system developed to

provide efficient citizen soldiers and units invites

evaluation. Only those aspects which directly bear on this

evaluation, or are necessary for an understanding of the

topics treated elsev-1here in the thesis, will be examined

here. But as the social composition of the Militia may

have had an effect on the system of command, this too will

be discussed briefly in chapter five.

The training and equipment of Australia's citizen

troops, as well as their system of organization and co~~and,

obviously affected their ability to fight during the inter-

World v~ar decades. These aspects, equipment and training,

1 will be considered in later chapters. Here, we are

concerned solely with command in its very broadest sense of

the control of the Citizen Force organization.

Naturally, the experience of both the pre-war A.M.F.

and of the A.I.F. helped to shape, at all levels, the

organization and command of the post Horld War I A.M.F.

Equally, British methods and traditions continued to be

follmved.

1chs 6 & 7.

81

ORGANIZATION

Despite the prolonged debate, in the inter-war years,

over the scale of attack which Australia was likely to

2 suffer, the A.M.F. was organized as an anti-invasion force

for most of this period. It was not until the mid-1930s

that the A.M.F. was re-organized to repel raids. There

was, of course, no real organization for the Plan 401

expeditionary force because C.M.F. or Militiamen could not

3 be compelled to serve overseas.

Throughout the inter-World War years, the pre-war

system of Military Districts was retained, 4

but the

recommendations of the Swinburne Co~~ittee and Senior

Officers' Conference led to a number of changes in

organization to meet the A.M.F.'s anti-invasion role.

Most importantly this included the change to a divisional

organization for the A.r1.F. This was the result of the

Australian army's acquaintance with the divisional

organization during t~7orld War I. r~ixed brigades of all

arms had been the pre-1914 A.~!.F. 's largest fighting

2 See ch.2.

3rbid.

4These had been organized in 1905 (Official Year Book of

the ComBonwealth of Australia, No.l2, 1919, p.lOOO) and were almost identical with the six States. The only really important differences were that Broken Hill in N.s.w. belonged to the 4th t-lilitary District (South Australia) and part of northern N.S.W. to the 1st Military District (Queensland). The alterations had been made for administrative convenience; otherwise the traditional boundaries of the pre-Federation colonial armies were preserved. Thus, N.S.~v. was the 2nd Military District, Victoria the 3rd, ~·Jestern Australia the 5th and Tasmania the 6th. See C.E.W. Bean, The Story of Anzac (12th edn, Sydney, 1941), Vol.I, ?.22, n.3.

82

formations. But even before the end of the First World

War the influence of the A.I.F. was being felt on the

A.M.F. For instance, in August 1918 C.M.F. units were

ordered to bear the numbers of the A.I.F. units abroad in

order to perpetuate the memory of the A.I.F. 5

Schemes to increase the size of the A.M.F. were also

based on Australia's experience during World War I, when

she had sent abroad and maintained five infantry divisions

and the equivalent of tr.vo mounted divisions. In January

1919 the :r-~embers of the Military Board urged that the

6 A.M.F.'s war establishment should be fixed at 300,000 men,

and by mid-1919 the Q . .H.G. expected that Australia would

maintain six infantry divisions and two mounted divisions. 7

This view was upheld by the Swinburne Committee's report

which decided that Australia should be able to maintain

six Citizen Force infantry divisions and two mounted

divisions under universal training. With their proper

proportion of corps and lines of communication troops

8 these divisions were estinated to require 180,000 men.

The Senior Officers' Conference gave slightly

different advice. The Senior Officers recommended that the

field army, which was to repel invaders seeking a decisive

5 l-1.0.364 (3 August 1918).

6Minute by the C.G.S. to the Secretary (to the Military Board), dated 15 January 1919:14/19. Strength of the Australian Military Forces in the Agenda For Heeting Of Military Board To Be Held On 21 January 1919.

?Minute by the Q.M.G. to the Secretary (to the Military Board), dated 16 June 1919: 114/19. Return Of Equipment From Abroad - D. 411/1/107 in the Agenda For Special ~leeting Of Military Board To Be Held On 27 June 1919.

8s · b · 2 Wln urne Cornm1ttee report, para. .

83

battle around Sydney or Melbourne, should consist of two

cavalry divisions and four infantry divisions. Three mixed

brigades (a potential division) and three light horse

regiments were to be raised for local defence, as well as

a fifth divisional staff, a spare (sixth) divisional staff,

and a proportion of the required extra divisional and lines

9 of communication troops.

As the Division was 'the recognized basis of the

organization of all modern armies', the Senior Officers

proposed a corresponding divisional organization. 10 By

'modern armies' the Senior Officers undoubtedly meant the

British army and, naturally, the Senior Officers planned

to copy the British army's war establishment of 23,000 men

per infantry division and 9,500 per cavalry division. 11

Altogether, the Senior Officers suggested a total

peace establishment of 130,000 soldiers (with a war

establishment of 270,000 men, of whom only 180,000 would

be actual fighting troops~2 ) The formations were to be

distributed as follows:

9 Vol.II, paras 72-3.

10rbid., para. 74.

11rbid.

12 rbid., para. 80.

Military District

1st (Queensland)

2nd (N. S. W.)

3rd (Victoria)

4th (South Australia)

5th (Western Australia)

6th (Tasmania)

84

Formation

Portion of 1st Cavalry Division and 1st Division.

Local force: a light horse regiment and a mixed brigade.

Remainder of 1st Cavalry Division and 1st Division, as well as 2nd Division.

Corps troops: a light horse regiment

All of 3rd Division and most of 2nd Cavalry Division and 4th Division.

Remainder of 2nd Cavalry Division and 4th Division.

Corps troops: a light horse regiment.

Local force: a light horse regiment and a mixed brigade.

Local force: a light horse regiment and a mixed brigade.l3

With some minor adjustments, to be noted later, this

organization and distribution remained in existence

throughout the inter-war years, despite the lack of personnel

with which to man these formations.

Military Board Instruction ~ 1 of 13 October 1920 and

the conference of District Commandants on The Re-Organization

Of The Military Forces, held in Helbourne on 7 December 192074

merely amplified the recommendations made by the Senior

1~his table has been condensed from the table in ibid., Vol.II, appendix 1.

1~opy no. 26 of the Programme, Agenda and Notes on the Agenda of this conference is available in A.A.A.: NP 367/1, file AA 549/4/26? - the file no. is uncertain.

85

The Basic Higher Organization of the A.M.F. between 1921-39

--

I ~""!/, ( ~-;I f'l f. R Y. l I I I I I

.-----------~----~--------~-----~--------1-------~-------

DIV 1510N.

BRIGADE.

REG l ME: fl T.

BATT ALl ON (/f\J{ R.S.M.

a/QM. <;'Ad{ R .Q t'l ). R .S. it

'YQ_ M. R Qr·l~ -·- --l---------1----------·---+-·----·------=-::...:,__-

TR1\!NlNG AREA.

. I ----------1 ~ I

:..__.--

-,\-:o I 1 . ..--. --· -·- ·-·-·-,

N.CO. 1,,~/;·ucfCJ;~

~-------.! ___________ ---------·------

NOT[~.-

--·-···- ... --~···--··--·· '"-· -· .. -·-40·--. --·- .. -·--·--

( 3) (I J.:.lnn.~i of ~HJj)j)l_y. ----------- ·---------- ·--- ··---

86

Abbreviations and further notes

a/Adjt. Assistant Adjutant.

Adjt. Adjutant.

a/Q.M. Assistant Quartermaster.

A.O. Area Officer.

Q.M. Quartermaster.

R.Q.M.S. - Regimental Quartermaster-Sergeant.

R.S.M. Regimental Sergeant-Major.

S.O.U.T. - Staff Officer Universal Training.

Fixed machinery included administration

and the supply of clothing, arms and equipment.

This diagram has been drawn from appendix C X of M.B.I.crl (13 October 1920).

87

Officers' Conference concerning the A.M.F.'s organization

and distribution. But what did this organization look ..

like and what were its strengths and weaknesses? The above

diagram illustrates the basic higher organization of the

A.M.F. during the inter-war decades.

This system of command and organization, which

officially carne into being on 1 May 1921, was weak. It

failed to provide for the fulfilment of its main aim: the

successful repulsion of an invasion around Sydney and

Melbourne, through the swift mobilization and concentration

of forces. After all, the landing at Gallipoli had

. ..... . demonstrated the relative weakness of invaders, v~s-a-v~s

defenders, during the initial assault and how relatively

easy it was to contain an invasion at the beachheads,

provided the defenders could arrive in force in time.

By 1938, Army Headquarters had to deal directly with

no fewer than thirteen subordinate formation headquarters 15

in addition to four permanent and three temporary

educational establishments. As General Squires remarked:

••• there [was], from a military point of view, neither reason nor justification for maintaining [such] a system ... [since i]t must inevitably lead to congestion of work at Army Headquarters, and to delay in dealing with formations' requirements; and it impose[d] the maximum of difficulty in the way of a proper co-ordination of the activities and administration of the Military Forces, e.g. by [the necessity to hold] periodical conferences of 16 commanders, or representatives, of the formations.

15These included the headquarters of: two cavalry divisions, four infantry divisions, six District Bases (four of which also functioned as the headquarters of mixed brigades), and one independent command {Darwin) . 16First Report By Lieutenant-General E.K. Squires .•• Inspector-General Of The Australian Military Forces, 16 December 1938, para. 30.

88

Apart from all these defects in the peacetime

organization there was yet another which could have had a

far more harmful effect in time of war. In peacetime, the

Military Board at Army Headquarters directly controlled

each of the seven divisions; there were therefore no higher

peacetime command appointments than those of divisional

17 commander. However, in vrartime it was obvious that, at

least initially, two corps would have to be formed, one

corps to protect Sydney and the other Melbourne.

This appears to have been the logic behind the

peacetime distribution of the divisions. The concentration

of major formations from the lst and 2nd Military Districts

around Sydney would have produced a corps of one cavalry

division and two infantry divisions in addition to corps

troops. Likewise, the concentration of the main

formations in the 3rd and 4th Military Districts around

Melbourne would have resulted in a corps of similar size

and composition.

The slight extra cost of maintaining two corps

headquarters in peacetime ought to have been more than

offset by the increased speed with which the ~.M.P.'s

troops could have been committed to battle against the

invaders. This was the Australian army's function or

raison d'etre. The improvisation of corps, as well as a

field army, headquarters during the prelude to, or during

the actual attack itself, would have been potentially

17see Major W. Perry, 'General Sir John Nonash', Army Journal, No.296 {January 1974), pp.22-3 for the training benefits which could have been derived had the A.H.F.'s divisions been organized into two corps.

89

disastrous if it had been tested. Unluckily, the

available extant documents do not reveal whether the idea

of having corps headquarters functioning in peacetime was

mooted and, if it was, why the suggestion was dropped.

Perhaps it was the cost or the dearth of staff officers.

In 1922, as a result of the Washington Conferences,

the Federal Government decided to restrict universal

training to the more populated areas and to reduce from

seven to two the number of quotas called up for Citizen

18 . d h . 1 19 Force duty. It was ra1se to t ree 1n 925. Although

the divisional organization was retained, it was reduced to

a skeleton force considerably below war establishment~ 0

When on 1 November 1929 universal training was

suspended and voluntary service re-introduced, the

divisional organization was retained but the peace nucleus

was reduced from 48,000 c.rLF. soldiers to 35,000

Militiamen. Financial considerations caused the peace

nucleus of Militiamen to be further restricted to 30,000 in

1931. Not until July 1936 was the Militia's establishment

raised to 35,000 men again. In November 1938 authority was

granted to double the Militia's training strength to

21 70,000 men.

18 Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No .16,

1923, p.6l8. 19

Ibid., No.20, 1927, p.558. 20

Ibid. 21

Ibid., No.32, 1939, pp.233-4. See ch.4 of this thesis for the problems connected with the recruitment and retention of the authorized numbers of personnel.

90

Throughout the years 1919 to 1939, units were almost

continually being disbanded or re-raised as the authorized

strengths of Australia's part-time forces fluctuated

widely. For example, it has not always been realized that

financial restrictions caused the disbandment of a few

units months before the A.L.P. came to office and suspended

compulsory military training on 1 November 1929. Australian

Army Order 353/1929 stated:

It is notified for information that the following Infantry Battalions and Training Areas ceased to be maintained as from 1st July, 1929 0 ••

Formation Battalion Training Area

Localities Closed as Places

Appointed for Training

1. 2.

1st Division 33rd

1st Division 41st

2nd Division 54th

4th Division 7th

4th Division 21st

3.

33

41

54

7

21

4.

Armidale Tamtvorth Lismore Grafton Bathurst Orange Castlemaine Kyneton Mary borough Warrnambool Hamilton

This meant that one-twelfth of the sixty infantry

battalions were disbanded. Simultaneously, two of the

twenty-three light horse regiments were disbanded and two

country batteries of field artillery were moved to Sydney.

This was done to cut costs, and although the numbers of

soldiers in the seven disbanded units did not exceed 1,500

men out of a total peacetime training strength of nearly

91

48,000, this was merely the beginning~ 2 From 1 July 1930,

two additional light horse regiments and nine infantry

b . . 23

attal1ons were d1sbanded.

Although the motive for these reductions was financial,

the suspension of compulsory military training on 1 November

1929 by Prime Minister Scullin not only expressed his

. f. . 1' . 24 b 1 f lf '11 d 1 . pac1 1c 1nc 1nat1ons ut a so u 1 e ong-stand1ng

A.L.P. policy. Since the conscription referenda of 1916

and 1917 the A.L.P. had been opposed to conscription for

overseas service and from this traumatic experience flowed

its opposition to compulsory military training for home

defence. As expressed at the 11th Commonwealth Conference

of the Australian Labor Party, the Constitution was to be

amended to prevent the conscription of Australians for

military service, and the Defence Act was to be altered to

delete all clauses concerning compulsory training and to

forbid any move to participate in an overseas war without

. 25 a decision by the Austral1an people.

22see ibid., No.22, 1929, pp.576-7 and Department of

Defence;-Estimates Of Expenditure, 1929-30. Explanatory Statement Prepared By Direction Of The Minister For Defence, irregularly numbered, p.2.

23 Department of Defence, Estimates Of Expenditure, 1930-31.

Explanatory Statement Prepared By Direction Of The Minister For Defence, p.7.

24see J. Robertson, J.H. Scullin A Political Biography

(Nedlands, 1974}, pp.215-16 but see also pp.52 & 62 for Scullin's defence of compulsory training in 1918-19.

25official Report Of Proceedings Of The 11th. Commonwealth

Conference Of The Australian Labor Party - held at Canberra on 11 May 1929.

92

26 However, contrary to the views of J. Robertson and

27 G. Long the A.L.P. did not abolish compulsory service when

it gained office in October 1929. It merely suspended the

operation of the relevant clauses of the Defence Act by

. 28 executive act1on. This method of stopping compulsory

training had the advantages that it could take effect

immediately and that it precluded any attempt by the

Nationalist majority in the Senate to block it.

With the worsening financial situation and the

suspension of compulsory military training, a number of

proposals were made to alter the A.M.F.'s peace

organization drastically. In general, these proposals were

unsuccessful. For example, at the Council of Defence

meeting in Melbourne on 12 November 1929, the Defence

Committee suggested that the current peace organization of

the A.H.F. 's field troops into: two cavalry divisions, four

infantry divisions and three mixed brigades should be

reduced to: two cavalry divisions, two infantry divisions

and four mixed brigades. This new, smaller organization

was necessary because fewer men would be available under

voluntary training and because of the cut in the defence

vote.29

2 Ebp. cit., pp.l80 & 213.

27 . 13 Op.c1t., p .•

2 ~ee D. Cowie, An Empire Prepared a Study of the Defence Potentialities of Greater Britain (London, 1939), p.92 and Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, No.4 (16 January 1930).

29 M.L. Shepherd (Secretary of the Department of Defence) to

the Secretary (of the Military Board), Voluntary Training Scheme, 18 November 1929 in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 929/19/566.

93

The Adjutant-General, ~1ajor·-General T. H. Dodds, in

February and March 1932, proposed to reduce the number of

headquarters and therefore of staffs. This rationalization

of commands would have resulted in savings since, although

under voluntary training the number of citizen soldiers had

dropped from 50,000 to 30,000, the peace organization of

the A.M.F. had remained approximately the same as under

compulsory service. In fact, there had been only a slight

reduction in the permanent staff of formation headquarters.

But, on 4 April 1932, the Minister for Defence, Senator

G.F. Pearce, ruled that no major change should be made to

the Militia's peace organization until the results of the

. 30 D~sarmament Conference were known.

Pearce's judgement here naturally conformed to the

Cabinet's decision of 15 February 1932 when Cabinet, after

agreeing that the Army's role was:

••• to be based on provision for defence against raids •.. supplemented by the organization necessary for the despatch of an expeditionary force of one Division within a reasonable period of say three months ... ,

had asserted that:

Upon the results of the [Geneva] Disarmament Conference being known, the

30 ( . . Major-General T.H. Dodds to the Secretary of the M~l~tary Board), Peace Organization, 12 February 1932 in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 849/3/160. Also, Major-General T.H. Dodds to the Secretary (of the Military Board) , Peace Organization District And Formation Commands, Harch 1932 and E. Fetherston-haugh (acting Secretary to the Military Board), Board Minute on Agenda No.24/1932, 8 March 1932, both in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 849/3/162.

94

Government will further review the basis of Defence Policy and the form of administration and organization. 31

Perhaps not surprisingly in view of the Geneva

Disarmament Conference's failure, the Australian army's

organization was not reviewed. In November 1934 the

Defence Committee was still arguing that the Army ought to

be re-organized on the scale recommended in 1932, namely:

three cavalry brigades, two infantry divisions, four mixed

brigades and garrison troops. Not only would this

organization be ' ... more appropriate to the financial

provisions made by the Government for Army Defence ... ' but

also: '~Vith a strength of 35,000, [the J smaller numbers of

units with bigger peace establishments would provide a

better force and lessen difficulties on ... mobilization.'

Also, provided there was no corresponding reduction in the

Army's appropriations, this new, smaller organization

would be more efficient in countering raids whilst

retaining the ability to send an expeditionary force

32 overseas.

In his report Hankey endorsed the Defence Committee's

recommendations,33

because they fitted in with Bri·tish

31 . f . J.G. Latham and G.F. Pearce, ~hnute or Cab1net on: Defence Policy And Its Relation To The Figures To Be Submitted For Limitation At The Disarmament Conference, 12 February 1932. (Approved by Cabinet, J.A. Lyons, 15 February 1932) in Pearce Papers, A.N.L., MS 1927, 2/459.

3 ~inutes Of The Meeting Of The Defence Committee Held On Honday, 5th November 193 4, And Y.Vednesday, 7th November, 1934 in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol. 3. Vice-Admiral Sir F. Hyde (C.N.S.), Major-General J.H. Bruche (C.G.S.), Air Commodore R. l.Villiams (C.A.S.), Colonel T.J. Thomas (Finance Secretary) and Colonel Sir M. Hankey (Secretary of the C.I.D.) were present at these meetings.

33op.cit., paras 27-30.

95

perceptions of the likely scale of attack facing Australia

and with British ideas on the naval defence of the Empire.

The First Line Component was formed in 1935. It was

composed of two infantry divisions, three cavalry brigades

and four mixed brigades with the necessary fortress and

"11 t It . t 1 "d 34 anc1 ary roops. s ma1n purpose was o repe ra1 s.

With this exception (the organization of the First

Line Component in 1935 out of the field forces to be raised

upon general mobilization) and some shuffling around of

smaller units, the outline organization and distribution of

the major A.M.F. formations remained constant throughout

the 1920s and 1930s. Nevertheless, within the units

themselves there were a number of changes as the Australian

army tried to follow the British army in keeping abreast of

modern military thought and technology. 35

A brief examination of some of the changes in

organization within A.M.F. units will adequately illustrate

inter-World War military trends. Most importantly these

included increased mobility, through the use of mechanical

traction and increased firepower by the utilization of

improved weapons. Changes in the organization of

Australian light horse regiments and infantry battalions

reflect these improvements.

Naturally, A.M.F. units continued to follow the

traditional British army model. From 1921 Australian light

34 . F1rst Report By Lieutenant-General E.K. Squires ... , para. 3.

35 A discussion of the A.M.F.'s equipment will be found in

Ch.7.

96

horse regiments were organized very much like those of the

British cavalry. Up to 1928 a light horse regiment

consisted of two sabre squadrons and a headquarters

squadron (or wing from about 1924}. A machine-gun troop,

armed with two Vickers medium machine-guns, was attached

to the headquarters squadron or wing, while one Hotchkiss

36 light machine-gun was provided for each sabre troop.

But, as from 1 July 1928, the firepower of Australian

light horse regiments was increased, when the regiments

were re-organized on the basis of one machine-gun squadron

37 and one sabre squadron, each of four troops. In about

1933 the organization of Australian light horse regiments

reverted to a headquarters squadron and two sabre

38 squadrons.

It must be emphasized that the above changes in

organization were changes in the peacetime training

organization. In 1929, the theoretical wartime

organization of a cavalry regiment, based on British

military manuals, was: a headquarters wing,two sabre

squadrons and one machine-gun squadron. This machine-gun

squadron included three troops of four machine-guns each

36see Anon., 1 RNSNL An Outline History of the Regiment-1885-1954 (n.p., n.d.}, p.7 and Anon., 12/16 HRL Regimental History (n.p., n.d.}, p.l9, both in A.A.A.: SP 539/1-3, and 'Regimental History Part III', The Lancer (1974), p.24.

37 P.V. Vernon (ed.}, The Royal New South Wales Lancers (Sydney, 1961}, p.l85.

381 Regimental History Part III', The Lancer {1974), p.24.

97

39 and one troop with four anti-tank weapons. At the time,

neither Britain nor Australia possessed proper anti-tank

weapons. Sir John Slessor, describing manoeuvres at

Aldershot between 1925 and 1928, aptly summarized the

situation:

..• On this side of the bridge a trooper lay on his tummy in the grass by the road, his rifle at his elbow; on the other side of the road was a little yellow flag, the anti-tank gun of the 'twenties.40

However, during the 1930s the peacetime organization

of some light horse regiments underwent further changes as

the A.M.F. attempted to increase their firepower and

mobility. As a result of the partial motorization of the

1st Cavalry Division, in 1936 the 16th Light Horse

Regiment formed a light car troop in Armidale. The role of

this troop, with its establishment of eighteen all ranks

d . t'l't' . 41 an n1ne cars or u 1 1 1es, was reconna1ssance.

The l/2lst and 16th Light Horse Regiments became

motorized machine-gun regiments, as from 1 November 1936,

and in their new roles each regiment's peace organization

became a headquarters and three squadrons. Altogether

there were to be 317 soldiers in each regiment, armed with

36 Vickers machine-guns mounted in 30-cwt lorries, while

39Major W.J.M. Locke, Staff Corps, 'Co-operation of All Arms (Being notes for opening Lecture of a Series arranged by the United Service Institution of N.S.W., for candidates sitting for the Citizen Force Half-Yearly Promotion Examination)', The United Service Journal, Vol.XXVIII, No.1 (~1ay 19 2 9) 1 P • 2 7 •

40These Remain A Personal Anthology Memories of Flying, Fight1ng and Field Sports (London, 1969), p.ll2.

41 •Regimental History Part III', The Lancer (1974), p.26.

98

cars, utilities and motor-cycles provided the transport

42 for the headquarters at all levels.

Before the Second World War the majority of Australian

light horse units were not motorized because of Australia's

lack of equipment, especially of motor and armoured

vehicles. This shortage of equipment inevitably led

Australian and British cavalry divisional organizations to

diverge. While Australian officers were well aware of the

advantages to be gained by raising similarly organized

armoured car units, they also realized that local resources

and tactical conditions meant that Australian troopers

would have to rely upon their horses for much longer than

their British counterparts would have to do. 43

The outline organizations of the A.M.F.'s infantry

battalions, like those of the light horse regiments, were

affected by modern military developments though to a

lesser extent because of the shortage of both manpower and

equipment. Again the British army provided the model.

Even before the introduction of voluntary service in

November 1929 the training strengths of infantry battalions

varied from 100 up to 500 or 600 men. Because of this

there were few infantry battalions whose organization was

complete with a headquarters, a headquarters company and

four other companies. Instead, some battalions had only a

42P.V. Vernon (ed.), op.cit., pp.l99-201.

43see e.g. H.G. Chauvel (as C.G.S.) to the A.G. and the Q.M.G., War Organization Of A Cavalry Division, 19 March 1930 in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1937/1/23. Colonel J.D. Lavarack (D.M.O. & I.} to all major H.Q.s, 11 Modern Formations 1931 11

, A.H.Q. Melbourne, 5 February 1932 in A. A.A.: r1P 729/2, file 1954/1/157.

99

headquarters and a headquarters company, while in

addition some infantry companies were organized on a

th . t d f f 1 t b . 44 ree, 1ns ea o a our, p a oon as1s.

Since few of the A.M.F.'s infantry battalions were

organized on the higher training establishment, this meant

that they bore only slight resemblance to the theoretical .

British war establishment model. An infantry battalion was

supposed to contain a headquarters wing of three groups

(administration, anti-tank, and supply and transport), a

machine-gun company and three rifle companies. 45 In

Australia, because of the lack of anti-tank weapons, the

second (anti-tank) group of the headquarters wing was not

raised. Similarly, two of the four platoons of the

h . . . d 46 mac 1ne-gun company were not ma1nta1ne .

It was in order to overcome this problem of

fluctuating personnel strengths that, in November 1929,

provision was made for the peacetime establishments of

47 A.M.F. infantry battalions to vary:

44A Brief Narrative Of The Organization, Strength And Training Of The Australian Military Forces Since Federation (copy No.2, 31 December 1929), para. 50 in Military Board Proceedings, Vol.l, 1928, folder 18. Internal evidence suggests that this document was originally produced in 1928.

See ch.4 for a discussion of the difficulties in recruiting and retaining infantrymen as opposed to light horsemen.

45Major W.J.M. Locke, op.cit., p.22.

46see Establishment of Citizen Force Units 1929/30 (Circular Memorandum MB 674/1929), 21 November 1929 in A.A.A.: SP 459: file 463/1/44.

47 Ibid.

Establishment

Normal

Higher

Lower

Officers

25

31

19

100

Other Ranks

310

408

212

Total

335

439

231

Even a decade later the strength of an infantry battalion

could fluctuate widely. On 1 October 1938 the 59th

Infantry Battalion consisted of a headquarters wing, three

rifle companies and a support company containing about

230 men altogether. With the same organization, except

that the headquarters wing had been divided into a battalion

headquarters and a headquarters company, the battalion

entered camp at Seymour on 3 April 1939 with 1970 men. 48

Following British army policy to increase the

firepower of infantry battalions, a mortar platoon was

added to the training establishments of the A.r.i.F. 's

infantry battalions. The mortar platoon was incorporated

in the machine-gun company which was then renamed the

49 support company.

The other arms and services, for example the artillery

and service corps, experienced similar changes in

organization to meet the introduction of new ideas and

equipment, especially motor vehicles. Thus, while the

48Lieutenant-Colonel A.R. Etheredge, 'The Hume Regiment 1938-1940', in Lieutenant-Colonel F.D. Trainor (ed.), The History of 59 Infantry Battalion "Hume Regiment" 1915-1956 {n.p., n.d.), pp.l6-17.

49 . Major-General J.H. Bruche (C.G.S.) to A.G., Training

Establishments: Infantry, 11 April 1934 and C.B. Laffan (acting Secretary to the Military Board) , 3-Inch Mortar -Training In, A.H.Q. Melbourne, 1 May 1934 both in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 849/3/383.

101

outline organization of the A.M.F. as a whole changed

50 only slightly during the inter-World War decades,

increasing firepower and mobility caused major changes in

organization within A.M.F. units. But it should be

emphasized that it was the sheer lack of manpower which

caused infantry battalions to be organized on three scales·

in the 1930s. This lack of manpower possibly also accounts

for the wide divergence between peace and war establishments.

For example, the war and training establishments for

infantry battalions, light horse regiments and field

artillery brigades of the A.M.F. in the mid-1930s 51 were:

Unit War Establishment Training Establishment

Officers Other Officers Other Ranks Ranks

Infantry Battalion (at 'normal' establishment) 32 795 25 384

Light Horse Regiment 26 624 19 253

Field Artillery Brigade 23 677 19 312

50The 'command' organization recommended by Lieutenant­General E.K. Squires, in his 1938 report as Inspector­General of the A.M.F., was not brought into operation until October 1939. See G. Long, op.cit., pp.28-9. It lasted until 1972 when a 'functional' scheme of organization and command superseded it.

51Australian Military Forces. Training Establishments. Militia Forces. 1934-35. (Melbourne, 1934}, pp.lS-16, 21, 48, and War Establishments. Australian Military Forces. Volume II. Units Of A Division. (Melbourne, 1933), PP • 2 6 I 3 3 I 71.

102

COMt-1AND

As in the period before 1914, C.M.F. units ultimately

came under the control of the P.M.F. officers who formed

the Military Board. There was no specific C.M.F.

representation on the Military Board during the 1920s and

1930s. Indeed, the pre-First World War practice of having

representatives of the C.M.F. summoned as consultative

members of the Military Board had fallen into disuse, 52

possibly as a result of the running down of the C.M.F.

during World War I, as the demands of the A.I.F. increased,

or perhaps simply because the President of the Board, then

the Minister for Defence, ceased to summon the C.M.F.

representatives. In this connection it ought to be noted

that the Minister who established the Board, J.W. McCay,

was a C.M.F. officer.

In the event, the C.M.F. did not obtain a full

representative on the Military Board until Major-General

G.F. Wootten was appointed on 4 February 1948. Even then,

political pressure had to be brought to bear on the P.M.F.

officers, who vigorously opposed the appointment of a

C.M.F. representative on the grounds that it was unnecessary.

The failure to have a citizen soldier serving on the

Board meant that C.M.F. soldiers' interests were to some

52 See J.W. McCay, Memorandum By The Minister Of State For

Defence On The Administration And Control Of The Defence Forces Of Australla, Helbourne, 2 November 1904 ln C.P~, Vol.2, 1904, pp.357--60 and Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No.1 (7 January 1905) for the provision made for C.M.F. representatives to be summoned as consultative members of the Military Board. James Rowell was such a member in 1910: S.F. Rowell, Full Circle (Melbourne, 1974), p.l.

103

extent neglected. This is hard to understand in view of

the fact that the P.M.F. never numbered more than a

fraction of the strength of the citizen troops during the

inter-World War decades. 53 Both these points were

emphasized during and after the Second World War. For

example, on 23 July 1945, in a letter to the Minister for

the Army, General Blarney (who had been both a P.M.F. and a

C.M.F. officer) supported his case against the restoration

of the Military Board with four major reasons. 54 The last

of these reasons was that prior to World War II, the Board

had:

•.. alienated the militia forces from the permanent forces, partly by reason of the fact that the whole control was vested in the permanent officers, without militia representation, and, since the Australian Army must necessarily consist almost entirely of militia, this was a very serious fault in the organization of the governing body.

H.B.S. Gullett, the Member for Henty, on 4 June 1947 made

a similar point when he asked the Minister for the Army,

c. Chambers, whether:

•.. In view of the dependence of the Army on the citizen soldier ... does not [the Minister] ... believe that a citizen .•. soldier should be appointed to the Military Board?55

While the :r-1ili tary Board, however ineffectually,

strove, during the 1920s and 1930s, to discharge its duty

538 d' ee appen 1x B.

54A copy of the letter is available in A.A.A.: CRS A2671, item 513/1945.

55 C.P.D., Vol.l92, p.3332.

104

56 of supervising the administration of the Army, other

bodies connected with the control of the A.M.F. fell into

disuse or were altered. One example concerned the post of

Insp~ector-General of the Military Forces. As his title

implied the Inspector-General was to keep a continuous

check on the well-being of the forces; 57 however, his

impartiality and hence his usefulness were destroyed

during the 1920s when the offices of Inspector-General and

Chief of the General Staff were combined. General Chauvel

held the post of Inspector-General between 1920 and 1930

and, in June 1923, he succeeded General Brudenell White

as Chief of the General Staff.

This led to the ludicrous situation where Chauvel, as

Inspector-General, produced reports on the state of the

A.M.F., for which he was responsible as Chief of the

General Staff, along with the other members of the Board,

namely: the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General and

Finance Member. 58 When Chauvel retired in 1930, as a

further economy measure no Inspector-General was appointed,

thereby saving the extra £500 per annum Chauvel had been

paid in addition to his salary as Chief of the General

Staff.

It was not until June 1938 that the A.M.F. received

its next Inspector-General. This was the British General

56 J. w. McCay, t-1emorandum ..• On 'I'he Administration And

Control Of The Defence Forces Of Austral1a, Melbourne, 2 November 1904 and Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No.l2, 1919, p.lOOO.

57 Ibid.

58Australian Military Regulations 21, 27, 30 as amended to include Statutory Rules of 14 December 1927.

105

Squires, whose appointment was heavily criticized by the

Labour Party on nationalistic grounds. In September 1938,

Curtin, Ward and Collings attacked the government, both for

importing British officers to command in Australia and for

59 paying them far greater salaries than Australians. But

the appointments could be defended by the Country Party

Minister for Defence, H.V.C. Thorby: in his view British

officers simply had more experie~ce than their Australian

counterparts. 60

The selection of a British officer for appointment to

the revived post of Inspector-General may have been due to

a combination of the following reasons rather than to any

one of them. There is little doubt that, as the A.L.P.

61 feared, the U.A.P. - Country Party government tended to

b d d . . 62 b h . 1 1" tl e epen ent on Great Br1ta1n, ut t ere 1s a so 1t e

doubt that generally, British officers had wider experience

of military affairs than Australians, although Long would

be quite right in arguing that they lacked specialized

knowledge of local conditions. 63 And if it were true, as

Rowell (who became Squires• staff officer) claimed, that

there were clashes of personality between the two senior

59 C.P.D., Vol.l57, pp.47, 137, 161.

60Ibid., pp.l37--42.

61see c. Neumann, Parliamentary Attitudes To Defence And The Australian Armed Forces From 1933 To 1939 (B.A. Hons thesis, University of New England, 1972}, passim for party attitudes towards the Anglo-Australian defence relationship in the 1930s.

62 G. Long, op.cit., p.27.

63 Ibid.

106

members of the Military Board (Lavarack, who was C.G.S.

and Jess, who was A.G.}64

then an independent Inspector-

General would almost certainly have had to be drawn from

outside the A.M.F. Given the nature of Australia's

relationship with Britain in the 1930s, this officer could

only have come from the Imperial army.

Whatever the reasoning behind the revival of the post

of Inspector-General, the results were beneficial in that

it opened the way for major changes in the A.M.F.

Unfortunately, World War II intervened before any of

Inspector-General Squires' recommendations could be

implemented but his 'co~~and' system of organization was

introduced in October 1939.

Also unfortunate was the lack of citizen soldier

representation on defence policy making bodies in the 1930s.

The Council of Defence was established in 1905, at the same

time as the Military and Naval Boards and the post of

Inspector-General, to deal with questions of policy.

Originally, as with the Military Board, expert advisers

and representatives of the Citizen Forces were eligible to

65 attend as consultative members.

De facto citizen soldier representation on the Council

of Defence in the 1920s was secured by the appointment of

General Monash as a member. Monash, however, at the time

64 s.F. Rowell, op.cit., p.39.

65J.W. Z..lcCay, Nemorandum ..• On The Administration And Control Of The Defence Forces Of Australia, Helbourne, 2 November 1904, Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No.1 (7 January 1905) and Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No.l2, 1919, p.lfrOO.

107

was on the unattached list holding no command. 66 When

Monash died on 8 October 1931 no citizen soldier replaced

him on the Council,67

but this was immaterial because the

Council did not meet between November 1929 and November

1934. 68

Perhaps the reason for the failure to call the Council

together in these years was connected both with the fact

that, during the Depression, economics took precedence

over all other spheres of government activity,and with the

establishment of the Defence Committee. This Committee,

which consisted of the three Chiefs of Staff and an officer

from the Secretariat of the Department of Defence, was

formed on 15 May 1926 by ministerial direction and more

formally constituted by regulation on 8 March 1929. The

Defence Committee's functions included the tendering of

advice to the Minister for Defence on defence policy, the

co-ordination of the operations and requirements of the

three Service Boards in their administrative sphere, and

the determination and division between the Services of the

69 defence vote.

Connected with the lack of Citizen Force representation

on the higher command and policy making bodies was the

whole question of the relationship between the C.M.F. and

66 h . See e.g. T e Army L1st Part I. Active L1st And 1 January 1927), p.8.

of the Australian Military Forces, A.A.M.C. Reserve (Melbourne,

67 rbid., l February 1934, p.8.

68c.P.D., Vol.l45, p.466.

69P. Hasluck, The Government And The People 1939-1941 (Canberra, 1965), p.439.

108

the P.M.F. Theoretically, the P.F. were supposed to

instruct and staff C.F. units, 70 whilst the C.F. provided

their own commanders. This was adequate initially, when

there were many ex-A.I.F. officers available (and it was

Defence Department policy to give A.M.F. commands to

officers who had served in the A.I.F.), 71 but eventually

C.F. commanders tended to be superseded by P.F. officers.

After 1 May 1921, District Commandants were no longer

appointed and the command of troops within the Military

D. . t 72 f d . . . 1 d . d 1str1c s was trans erre to D1V1s1ona an M1xe

Brigade commanders. 73 Although Pearce, as the Minister

for Defence, was able to thwart Brudenell White's intention

that these commands should be shared between C.F. and P.F.

officers so that the latter received most of them, he was

unsuccessful in thwarting other arrangements made by

Brudenell White. In particular, Pearce was unable to

prevent the commanders of the six District Bases, which

were located in the State capitals, being drawn exclusively

from the Staff Corps during the period between 1922 and

70conference At Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, Commencing lOa.m. On 7th December, 1920 On The Reorganization Of The Australian Military Forces, agendum 4, p.l in A.A.A.: MP 367/1, file AA 549/4/26? - the file no. is uncertain.

71Adjutant-General V.C.M. Sellheim to the Secretary (to the Military Board), Lieut-Colonel T. Hancock V.D., 23rd Light Horse - Retirement, 12 August 1920 in Military Board agenda No.227/20, 25 August 1920.

72 See above, n.4.

73A Brief Narrative Of The Organization, Strength And Training Of Th8 Australian Military Forces Since Federation, para. 43.

109

1939, as had been recommended by Brudenell White. 74 That

the District Base commandants were all drawn from the P.F.

was in keeping with the administrative function of the

75 P.M.F. because the District Bases were simply supply

. . 76 organ1zat1ons.

As a P.F. officer, Brudenell White probably believed

that P.M.F. officers would be more efficient than C.F. ones

and he was also probably concerned to ensure that there

would be sufficient appointments for permanent officers to

enable them to have a proper career structure. Certainly,

Brudenell White's adjutant-general voiced such sentiments

in December 192o. 77

When and why did P.M.F. commanders begin to supplant

C.M.F. commanders? On 30 April 1926, when Colonel

(Honorary Brigadier-General) R.L. Leane, a C.F. officer,

relinquished command of 3rd Infantry Brigade, a P.F.

commander became Commander, Field Troops 4th Military

District and Base Commandant. Thus, effectively, the 3rd

Infantry Brigade passed into the hands of the P.F. officer

who was also Commandant of the 4th District Base. This

change was supposed to enhance the status of the troops in

74Major-General C.B.B. White {C.G.S.), Re-organization­Appointment Of Corrmanders And Staffs, 27 September 1920 in Military Board agenda No.227/20. Date of meeting, 12 October 1920.

75Military Board to Minister for Defence, Re-Organization Of The Permanent Forces in Military Board agenda No.252/20. Date of meeting, 8 September 1920.

76s d · b ss ee 1agram a ove, p. .

77conference At Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, Commencing lOa.m. On 7the December, 1920 On The Reorganization Of The Australian Military Forces, agendum 4, p.6.

110

South Australia and to cut costs. 78

A year later Major-General J.J.T. Hobbs retired and

relinquished command of the Headquarters 5th Division and

13th Mixed Brigade. Again the Staff Corps officer

commanding the District Base received command of the Mixed

Brigade as well. This time the reasons were to reduce

expenses slightly and to increase the efficiency of the

training and administration of the troops by removing the

79 current dual system of command.

Even earlier this fate seems to have befallen the 12th

M. d . d 80 1xe Br1ga e. Thus, between 1925 and 1927, at least

three quite large formations passed from the command of

C.F. officers into the command of the Staff Corps. Nor did

the process stop there, for by 1934 the coiiLllland of the 4th

Division had gone to a P.F. officer81 and in 1937 Captain

A.D. MacDonald was administering command of the 56th

Battalion. He was the first Staff Corps officer to command

a Militia unit. 82

But it must be acknowledged that C.F. officers did

hold staff appointments during this period. For instance,

78Adjutant-General Sellheim to Secretary (of the Military Board) Command Of Field Troops Located in 4th Military District, 3 March 1926 in Military Board agenda No.28/1926~ Date of meeting, 10 March 1926. See also appendix C for a table of the A.M.F. 's Formation Commanders between 1922 and 1939.

79Adjutant-General W. Coxen to the Secretary (of the Military Board), Command Of Troops, 5th Military District, 24 May 1927 in Military Board agenda No.64/1927. Date of meeting, 25 May 1927. See also appendixC.

80rbid. It seems to have occurred sometime in 1925.

81rbid.

82 ) A.A.O. 177 (31 August 1937 .

111

in 1926 C.F. staff officers were posted to the District

Bases83

and on 14 January 1939, Brigadier Street, as

Minister of State for Defence, approved the creation of

more than a dozen ne'v Militia staff officer appointments. 84

The increasing influence of the Staff Corps was

bitterly opposed by some C.F. officers: most notably by

Major-General H. Gordon Bennett in a series of articles on

Australia's defence which appeared in The Sunday Sun P~d

Guardian during November and December 1937. Bennett

charged that attempts were being made to exclude C.F.

officers from high command and pointed out that, at the

time, only two of the four infantry divisions were

commanded by Hilitia officers. 85 On 19 December 1937,

after the Military Board had tried to stop him from

publishing further criticisms, by invoking the Defence Act

and Military Regulations, 86 Bennett continued his argument.

This time he attacked the P.F. for taking more than their

f • h f , I 87 a1r s are o K1ng s Honours.

83Adjutant-General Sellheim to the Secretary (of the Military Board), Staff Appointments- District Bases­Militia Officers, 13 November 1926 in Military Board agenda No. 187/1926. Date of meeting, 1 December 1926.

84Major-General C.H. Jess (A.G.) to the Secretary (of the Military Board), Militia Staff Appointments, 23 November 1938 in Military Board agendum No.l54/1938. Date of meeting, 7 December 1938.

85 '"No More Monashes": General Hits Staff Corps', The Sunday Sun And Guardian, 28 November 1937, p.3.

86Editorial, 'Military Gags General Bennett', The Sunday Sun And Guardian, 12 December 1937, p.3.

871 t-1ust The P. B. I. Buy Experience With Blood? 1 , The Sunday Sun And Guardian, 19 December 1937, p.3.

112

It was true that permanent soldiers received a

disproportionately large share (in comparison to their

relative numbers) of military honours, but citizen soldiers,

of course, were eligible to receive civil as well as

military honours. Bennett was saved from bein9 placed on

the Retired List, court martialled, or charged and tried

in a civil court under section 73 of the Defence Act by the

bl . 't h' h d d h' t' 1 88 newspaper pu 1c1 y w 1c surroun e 1s ar 1c es.

Section 73 of the Defence Act related to the unlawful

disclosure of military information.

Although Bennett ceased to write articles for

newspapers openly he maintained his criticism of the Staff

Corps. In a letter written to Percy Spender M.P., on

89 18 October 1938, he attacked P.F. plans to raise a small

mobile regular force on the grounds that it could not

possibly defend Australia, because the enemy could easily

outflank it by landings, as the Japanese had demonstrated

in China. This criticism was not warranted because a small

mobile regular force would have had a better chance of

repelling a raid than the slow-moving C.F. units of the

F.L.C. and no P.F. officer would have claimed that a small

f ld b bl f 11 . . . 90 regular orce wou e capa e o repe lng an 1nvas1on.

88see e.g. Military Board agenda Nos 114, 117 and 129 of 1937. The dates of the meetings were, respectively: 6, 9 and 22 December 1937.

89A copy is available in Lieutenant-General H.G. Bennett, Correspondence 1924-1941, Vol. M.L. MSS 807/2, items 195-6.

90squires, for instance, advocated the formation of a regular force of two brigades with a peacetime establishment of 7,500 men. G. Long, op.cit., p.29.

113

Continuing with his opposition to the constitution

of a small mobile regular force, Bennett then commented

further to Spender:

The scheme [for a small regular force] is so unsound that one wonders what is the object of our regular officers in advocating it. Surely it must merely be that they are trying to make more jobs for themselves ...

Confessing that he might be biased, Bennett maintained

that citizen soldiers and officers were intellectually

superior to, and more efficient than, their regular

counterparts. In letters to P.C. Spender and Lieutenant­

Colonel T.W. White M.P. on 26 May and 1 June respectively, 91

Bennett repeated his complaint that the Staff Corps would

eventually obtain all the senior co~nands, leaving the

Militia with none.

In the face of Bennett's damaging public criticisms

the Military Board naturally tried to defend itself. Its

detailed defence need not delay us here but the points it

made about Bennett are worth recording. Following the

publication of Bennett's article in The Sunday Sun And

Guardian on 28 November 1937, the Board maintained that:

.•. There is no jealousy of Militia officers, and it is absurd to suggest that officers with the training of our permanent forces are not capable of producing a reasonable proportion of men with the characteristics required of a commander.92

91c · ·1 bl · op1es are ava1 a e 1n Correspondence 1924-1941, and 303 respectively.

Lieutenant-General H.G. Bennett, Vol. M.L. MSS 807/2, items 287

92 c.B. Laffan (Secretary to the Military Board) to the Secretary (DeparL~ent of Defence), 30 November 1937 in Military Board agendlli~ No. 114/1937. Date of meeting, 6 December 1937.

114

The latter statement was undoubtedly correct, but the

former was questionable. For a variety of reasons

discussed below, Staff Corps officers had good reason to

be jealous of Militia officers, and probably were.

With the publication of Bennett's article of

5 December 1937 in the same newspaper, the Board

scathingly commented:

The article is the culmination of propaganda and outside influence on the part of this officer over a considerable period to secure appointment in higher command in the military service.93

And then added:

Irrespective of his personal views regarding Australian Defence ... he is not considered by the Military Board, nor many brother senior officers, to be temperamentally suited for high command, whilst the article shows he is loyal to neither the crown nor the military authorities.94

Finally, the Board claimed that the timing of the articles

revealed that Bennett was trying to embarrass or influence

95 the government. Certainly the Board was right to be

suspicious of Bennett's use of political influence. He had

secured his promotion to major-general through the

93 secretary to the Military Board, Board Minute On Agendum No. 114/1937, 6 December 1937 in Military Board agendum No. 114/1937. Date of meeting, 6 December 1937.

94 Ibid.

95secretary (to the Military Board) to the Minister for Defence, Board Hinute On Agendum No. 117/1937, 14 December 1937 in Military Board agendum No. 117/1937. Date or meeting, 9 December 1937. And in the middle and late 1930s the Government v1as very touchy about Service officers commenting on defence policy: These Are Facts, pp.225-6.

115

intervention of W. M. Hughes. This v1as after the Military

Board had informed Bennett that there was currently no

vacancy on the establishment for a major-genera1. 96

It is also probable that the members of the Board were

jealous of Bennett's rapid promotion. They were all older

than Bennett but very much junior to him in army seniority. 97

As with many other members of the Staff Corps their A.I.F.

ranks had not carried over to the same extent as in the

Militia, 98 and Lavarack definitely considered that:

•.• The promotion of Citizen Force Officers is generally rather more rapid than is warranted by their experience ..• 99

Poor pay (including compulsory unpaid holidays during the

Depression), a poor press during the anti-war 1920s, and

the traditional hostility between base-staff officers and

front-line commanders and between amateurs and

professionals all contributed to exacerbate the rivalry

and jealousy between citizen and regular soldiers in

Australia between the two World Wars. 100 This jealous

96 F. Legg, The Gordon Bennett Story (Sydney, 1965), p.l46. However, Bennett • s promotion to major-general was no·t backdated to 18 November 1926, the date on which he assumed command of the 2nd Division, as Legg quotes Bennett as saying. See The Army List of the Australian Military Forces, Part I, Act1ve List (f-1elbourne, 1 February 1939), p.278.

97 't F. Legg, op.c1 ., p.l52.

98 rbid., p.2 and G. Long, op.cit., p.lO.

99Major-General J.D. Lavarack (C.G.S.) to the Secretary (to the Military Board) Examination For First Appointment And Promotion Of Officers In The Citizen Forces, 19 November 1935 in Military Board agenda No. 114/1935. Date of meeting, 20 November 1935.

100see F. Legg, op.cit., pp.2-3 and G. Long, op.cit., pp.ll-12.

116

rivalry continued throughout the Second World War and

still exists.

Bennett, however, was not the only senior C.M.F.

officer to clash with the Staff Corps. In the 1920s,

Temporary Colonel J.D. Richardson (C.M.F.) and Brevet

Colonel E.M. Williams (Staff Corps) quarrelled repeatedly

with each other over light horse training. When the

voluminous correspondence containing their mutual

recriminations reached A.H.Q., in 1927, both Chauvel (the

C.G.S.) and Bruche (the A.G.) saw the quarrel as a rather

101 petty one. And in 1938 Brigadier S.G. Savige (C.M.F.)

requested the removal of his Brigade Major because the

Brigade Major had consistently forgotten his role as a

Staff Officer and had usurped Savige's functions as a

commander. 102

Apart from the relations between Militia and Staff

Corps officers, A.M.F. commanders faced other problems and

changes dealing with their status and independence.

Following the abolition of the rank of brigadier-general

in the British army in 1921, it was abolished in the A.M.F.

From 1 May 1921, in the A.M.F., only the honorary rank of

101 Correspondence in A.A.A.: MP 367, file 629/3/18.

102 ' d' S S ' ( d' lOth I f t B ' d ) Br1ga 1er . G. avJ.ge comman 1ng n an ry r1ga e to G.O.C. 3rd Division, Melbourne, 7 June 1938 in 3rd Div Arty & Inf. Year 1921 to 1938. No.6. Bundle Files. Files No. 417/20/31. (A.W.M.).

117

brigadier-general was granted, although officers who had

previously held that rank retained it. 103 The rank of

brigadier-general was replaced by that of colonel-

corunandant. In 1928, the rank of colonel-commandant was

superseded in turn by that of brigadier, in both the

British and Australian armies.

But if this was an example of the continued British

influence on the A.M.F., there were other instances where

the independence of the Dominion forces came to be

recognised:

Kings Regulation 217 (x} provided that officers of the [British] Regular Forces serving in a Dominion should have precedence of and command over colonial officers of equal rank. This provision was cancelled in 1919 and the substituted para. (x} provided that they should take rank with officers of the permanent Dominion Forces according to dates of their respective ranks, but have precedence of and command over colonial off~cers ~ 04 equal rank who were not permanent off1cers.

British Army Order 331/23 again cancelled para. (x) and then

the precedence of British regular officers, serving in the

Dominions or colonies, came to be governed by Dominion or

1 . 1 1 . 105 co on1a regu at1ons. These amendments effectively

103 . 1 h ( h '1' See AdJutant-Genera to t e Secretary to t e M1 1tary Board) Rank of Brigadier-General in A.M.F. Consequent On Abolition Of Such Rank In the British Army, 11 March 1921 in Military Board agenda No. 120/1921. Date of meeting, 16 March 1921; and Adjutant-General to the Secretary (to the Military Board) Rank Of Brigadier General - Amendment to A.M.R., 23 April 1921 in Military Board agenda No. 179/1921. Date of meeting, 27 April 1921.

104Adjutant-General Sellheim to the Secretary (to the Military Board) Precedence And Comrr,and Of Officers Of The Regular Forces ~men Serving In Australia With The Military Forces - A.M.R.24 - Amendment, 27 November 1923 in Military Board agenda No. 193/1923. Date of meeting, 28 November 1923.

lOSibid.

118

increased the status of Australia's C. F. officers, as v7ell

as of her P.F. officers, because in the A.M.F. all active

officers were on the same seniority list. 106 It did not

matter whether they belonged to the Militia or to the

Staff Corps.

Another question of rank and status troubled the

Australian army's C.M.F. officers during the 1920s. This

concerned ranks for commanding officers. When the A.M.F.

was organized into divisions in 1921, the training

establishments provided that each commanding officer of a

unit (such as a light horse regiment or an infantry

battalion) was entitled to the rank of lieutenant-colonel.

However, with the reduction of forces on 1 July 1922 the

establishment was reduced. Therefore only a certain

proportion of commanding officers could draw the pay of a

lieutenant-colonel. This practice was continued, and in

1926 in a cavalry brigade of three light horse regiments

only one commanding officer received pay as a lieutenant-

colonel, whereas in an infantry brigade of four battalions

only two of the commanding officers were paid as lieutenant-

colonels. Naturally, this anomalous situation, where some

commanding officers were majors and others were lieutenant-

colonels, led to complaints by C.M.F. officers. A

typically bureaucratic compromise was reached which cost

the Government nothing:

106see any of the gradation lists of A.M.F. officers in the references cited in appendix C.

119

On 23/1/25, the Minister [ of Defence], on the recommendation of the Military Board (Agenda No. 256/1924}, approved of Majors in command of L.H. Regiments or Infantry Battalions, who had qualified for promotion to Lt.-Colonel but for whom vacancies in the rank of Lt.-Colonel did not exist, being promoted to the rank of Lt.-Colonel but to be supernumerary to the establishment, with pay and allowances of Major, until such time as they could be absorbed in the higher rank (M.B.I. A.B/1925).107

Age is the final problem concerning A.M.F. commanders

108 to be discussed in this chapter. By 1937, Australia

had the dubious distinction of having officers who were

even older than those in the British army. For example,

the average age of members of the British Army Council was

52 years, whereas for members of the Military Board it

was 53 years. Retiring ages in the A.M.F. and the British

109 army then were:

107Adjutant-General Sellheim to the Secretary (to the Military Board} ComrrLanding Officers Of Battalions. ETC­Re Pay Of Lieut.-Colonel, 2 February 1926 in Military Board agenda No. 9/1926. Date of meeting, 17 February 1926. See also Adjutant-General Sellheim to the Secretary (to the Military Board) Promotion Of Officers Commanding Battalions, E-tc., 2 December 1924 in Military Board agenda No. 256/1924. Date of meeting, 17 December 1924.

108For other problems, such as officer training, see ch.6, and for the difficulty of obtaining suitable officers, see ch.4.

109orawn from the S.M.H. as reprinted in The Navy, Army, Air and Munitions Journal The Staff Organ of the Department of Defence in Australia, Vol.6, No.l2 (15 December 1937), p.ii of the unnumbered covers.

120

Staff Corps Militia British army

Rank Years Years Years

Major-General 62 62 60

Colonel 60 58 57 Lieutenant-

Colonel 60 56 55

Major 55 55 50

Captain 55 50 45

Lieutenant 55 48 45

However, in July 1938, the British army further reduced the

age limits of its officers. The age limit for major-generals, llC

for instance, was set at 57 years and that for colonels at 55.

There is a natural, but unfortunate, tendency in

armies during peacetime to stretch out the process of

promoting officers to senior ranks. Of course, promotion

cannot be as rapid in peacetime as in wartime, where the

weeding out of less efficient and less successful officers

is often both ruthless and permanent. Nevertheless, the

value of even a forty year old lieutenant is questionable.

He certainly cannot reasonably be expected to lead an

infantry platoon into action because, even at that

comparatively young age, he is unlikely to be physically

as fit as his twenty year old soldiers. J.F.C. Fuller, a

British major-general, made this very point when he wrote:

These then are the three pillars of generalship - courage, creative intelligence and physical fitness; the attributes of youth rather than of middle age.lll

110H. L•Etang, The Pathology Of Leadership (1970 repr., London, 1969), p.l24.

111 1 h. . d h . c d f h ~enera s 1p Its D1seases an t e1r ure A Stu y o t e

Personal Factor in Command (T.ondon. 1933). o.32.

121

But, as usual, there are exceptions. The forty year

old lieutenant could probably render more satisfactory

service in an area where his experience would count for

more, and his physical fitness for less, than in the

infantry. In short, he may be better placed commanding a

transport platoon. ~~d there are instances where old

commanders have done better than younger ones and young

commanders have broken down whilst older ones have not.

It \vas one of the two younger divisional commanders vlho

broke down after the British advance into Belgium on

10-11 May 1940112 and Field Marshal Radetsky led the

Austrlim armies in Italy to victory in 1848-49 when he was

over eighty years old.

In his first report as Inspector-General of the A.M.F.,

Squires remarked that the ages for retirement in the Staff

Corps, and by implication for the Militia as well, were

too high. Indeed, he claimed that ' .•• under the present

system, officers are retained in the Service beyond the

ages at which they are fitted to carry out efficiently the

duties of their rank.• 113 He therefore advocated reducing

the ages for retirement, for both Militia and Staff Corps,

to:

Lieutenant-General 62 years

Major-General 60 years

Colonel 57 years

Lieutenant-Colonel 53 years

Major and below 50 years. 114

112H. L'Etang, op.cit., p.l24.

113 d. 3 Appen 1x II, para. .

114 Ibid., para. 9.

122

These ages were, however, higher than those just

introduced in the British army but they could be accepted

because, in the A.M.F., there was a more limited field

from which to select senior officers and, in peacetime,

there was no liability for service overseas under adverse

1 . t' t' . d't' 115 c 1ma 1c or ac 1ve serv1ce con 1 1ons.

Judging from their performance in both World Wars,

Australia's senior commanders during the 1920s and 1930s

were at least competent, but their age and the rivalry

between them would have as adversely affected the defence

of Australia then, as it hampered the operations of the

2nd A.I.F. In addition, the organization of the A.M.F.

was faulty in that it failed to provide Corps or even

higher headquarters in peacetime. This not only meant that

Australian officers never received the experience of

handling more than a division (and an understrength one at

that) in peacetime, but also that according to the planning

of that era two Corps and one Army headquarters would have

had to have been scraped together in the face of an enemy

invasion. This would have been totally unsatisfactory.

Moreover, it will now be shown that the commanders even

failed to inspire the raw material of the Australian army.

llSibid.

People don't quit the Guard and Reserve because they're overworked; they quit because they're bored.

The Wall Street Journal, 9 August 1977

123

Chapter Four

Recruitment, Retention and Conditions of Service in the Militia, 1919-39

In the years 1919-1939 the A.M.F. suffered from a

severe shortage of manpower. Shortage of money aggravated

this manpower problem, but the underlying reason was that

the A.M.F.'s commanders could not inspire recruits to

continue serving.

The shortage of money was a legacy of Australia's

enormous war debt and the assessment that the signing of

the Quadruple Treaty made war with Japan unlikely for at

least ten years. The Great Depression of 1929 further

reduced the amount of national income which could be

devoted to military expenditure, whether for salaries and

wages or for capital equipment.

While the shortage of money was severe enough, the

lack of manpower (coupled with poor training and equipment)

would have crippled the Military Board's plan to defeat

the Japanese invaders on the beaches around Sydney and

Newcastle. This chapter, however, will concentrate on the

problems associated with recruiting and the methods used

to recruit citizen soldiers between 1918 and 1939.

Closely connected with the question of recruitment

were the conditions of service within the Militia and the

efforts made to retain the services of part-time soldiers.

These aspects will therefore also be examined in this

chapter. Much of the evidence cited here is derived from

Victorian militia units because their records are still

124

extant, whereas the files on units located in other states

1 have been largely destroyed.

The manpower problem became particularly acute once

the Scullin government suspended compulsory mil_itary

t . . 2

ra1n1ng. Until then compulsorily enlisted trainees

provided the C.M.F. with the bulk of its strength from

1918 to 1929.

Any large fluctuations in the numbers of citizen

soldiers between the end of World War I and November 1929

were the result of government decisions to vary age groups

to be trained. The strength of the Citizen Forces in the

1920s dropped markedly from a peak of about 124,500 men on

31 December 1921 to a minimum of approximately 35,600 troops

3 a year later. The explanation for this drastic change was

that C.M.F. training had been virtually suspended from

1918 to 1922 pending the re-organization of the A.M.F. and

4 the results of the Washington Conference. The figures for

those years were paper ones.

Not all C.M.F. personnel in the 1920s were compulsory

trainees. In the 1st Division there were only 135

volunteers out of a total actual strength of 12,106

5 soldiers on 1 June 1921, but in light horse regiments up

1A possible explanation for this is that Army Headquarters was located in Melbourne until the 1960s and greater care was therefore taken to preserve the records.

2 The reasons for the suspension were briefly discussed in ch. 3.

3see appendix B.

4 See ch. 6 for details.

5Table A, issued with 1st Division Routine Orders on 18 June 1921. A copy is available in A.A.A.: CRS 1194, item 04.13/2022.

125

6 to 90 per cent of the troopers were volunteers.

Nevertheless, overall, out of nearly 47,500 soldiers in

1929, 7 almost 6,900 were volunteers. 8

There were a number of reasons why the light horse

regiments consisted so largely of volunteers. Traditionally,

cavalry was considered to be the socially elite arm and the

fact that light horsemen had to provide their mounts

reinforced this belief. In addition, light horse regiments

tended to be raised in country areas where universal

training did not apply in the 1920s, because it was

cheaper to administer units close to the major headquarters,

which were located in the State capitals. The reason why

light horse units were raised in country areas was that

with increasing urbanization and motorization fewer good

horses were to be found around the major cities.

Despite compulsory military training, the Citizen

Military Forces of the 1920s faced recruiting and retention

problems. On 1 June 1921, the 1st Division had a paper

strength of 13,508 men, however, of these only 12,106 were

actually in touch with the Division. 9 Indeed, in spite of

official denials, 10 even before World War I there had been

6Major R.~~ Hall, The Australian Light Horse (North Blackburn Victoria, September 1966), p.48.

7The discrepancy between this total and that given in appendix B is due to a difference in the method of calculation.

8 G. Long, op.cit., p.14 n.2.

9Table A, issued with 1st Division Routine Orders on 18 June 1921.

10 See e.g. Official Year Book of the Corr@onwealth of Australia, No.7, 1914, pp.945-6.

126

significant opposition to compulsory military training,

either from conscientious objection or from disinclination.

Between 1 July 1911 (when the compulsory service system

was inaugurated) and 31 January 1914, there were 22,402

prosec~~~ons with 19,317 convictions. These figures

included prosecutions against parents who failed to

register their boys, employers who penalized their

employees for attending compulsory parades and those with

multiple convictions. Up to 31 January 1914, 234,030

males had registered for service and, of them, only

123,933 were liable for training. 11

Most of the opposition to universal service carne from

the senior cadets, aged 14 to 18 years, rather than from

12 the adult citizen forces, aged 18 to 26 years. This

situation continued during the war and post war years. By

the late 1920s prosecutions for the citizen forces were

13 running at between one and two thousand per annum.

Another indication of the lack of popularity of compulsory

training was the formation of a provost body in 1912 to

k d b d. . 14

trac own a scon 1ng tra1nees.

11rbid., p.946.

12see Adjutant-General Jess to Secretary (Department of Defence) Offences Against Compulsory Training Provisions Of Defence Act, 30 September 1938 in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 752/1/2 and L.C. Jauncey, op.cit., pp.49-54.

13Adjutant-General Jess to Secretary (Department of Defence) Offences Against Compulsory Training Provisions Of Defence Act, 30 September 1938.

14G.R. Vazenry, Military Forces of Victoria 1854-1967 (n.p., n.d.), p.l2-7.

127

Given this lack of enthusiasm for compulsory military

training, compounded by anti-war and anti-conscription

sentiment, it is little wonder that the C.M.F. had

difficulty in attracting volunteers in the 1920s. In a

minute to the Secretary of the Department of Defence dated

20 October 1927, Adjutant-General Bruche wrote that few

N.C.O.s were willing to continue serving once their three

years•obligation had been fulfilled and that technical

units in Queensland and Tasmania had been unable to get

many former trainees to re-engage as volunteers.

Permission had been granted in 1926 for these units to

re-enlist ex-trainees as volunteers so that their

establishments could be completed. Similarly, voluntary

enlistment was authorized for bandsmen, cooks and

tradesmen because such specialists could not be obtained

from the young trainees. Major-General Bruche saw an

increase in the daily rate of pay as a necessary

inducement to stimulate the flow of volunteers, but, in

view of the lack of money for defence, he maintained that

the available sums could be better spent on the forces

generally rather than on increasing pay in order to

attract volunteers.15

The Citizen Forces also suffered from that perennial

disease of all peacetime citizen armies: the citizen

soldiers' failure to attend drills. On 6 August 1929 the

colonel administering command of the 1st Division informed

15A copy of Bruche's minute is available in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 929/19/566.

128

the Secretary to the Military Board that in some units

attendance at compulsory home training parades varied

between 60 and 70 per cent. The colonel considered that

this state of affairs arose because trainees were being

allowed to fulfil their obligations at special parades

called after the end of each training year. 16

The result of this poor attendance was that the

strength of weak platoons was so reduced that:

•.. the training [was] materially affected and the platoon officers and N.C.O.'s. [did] not get the opportunity of practical 17 experience in handling their commands.

In turn, this lack of practical experience would have

adversely affected the performance of the troops in battle,

and, after all, success in battle is the ultimate aim of

all military training.

The practice of allowing trainees every reasonable

opportunity to fulfil their obligations, by attending

special drills called at the end of the training year,

occurred because of the constant unpopularity of compulsory

military training. In essence, this procedure was designed

to reduce the number of prosecutions for being absent

without leave and thereby reduce the criticism of

1 . . 18 compu sory tra1n1ng. Indeed, it was the unpopularity of

lG f h' ' ' '1 bl ' A A A MP 431/1 A copy o t 1s m1nute 1s ava1 a e 1n . • . : . , file 929/19/566.

17 Ibid.

18see e.g. Prosecutions Of Persons Liable To Be Trained Under Part XII Of The Defence Act For Offences Against That Part Relating To Universal Training {Circular Memorandum M.B.309/26), A.H.Q., Melbourne, 10 June 1926 and minute from Minister for Defence to Secretary (Department of Defence), 10 J'une 1926, both in A.A.A.: ~1P 431/1, file 929/19/566.

129

universal training, together with the shortage of money,

which had killed the more intensive compulsory military

training schemes recommended by the Swinburne Committee

and the Senior Officers' Conference. 19

All these problems concerning recruitment, attendance,

retention and pay were compounded after November 1929 with

the introduction of a purely volunteer militia. No longer

could the militia rely on a stream, although an irregular

one, of recruits. Much of the irregularity previously had

been the result of Government decisions to vary the

numbers called up in view of financial circumstances and

changing strategic assessments, as in 1922.

Although the peacetime establishment of the Militia

was reduced from 48,000 to 35,000 men in 1929, and later

. 3 0 20 h '1' . h 1 1n 1931 to a mere 0,00 troops, t e M1 1t1a as a w o e

21 was nearly always understrength in the early 1930s. ~ Yet

the census held on 30 June 1933 revealed that Australia had

954,000 males between the ages of 18 and 35 years and it

was estimated that 65 per cent of these men were unmarried

or widowers without children. 22 The same census reported

481,249 'unemployed' and 171,092 'employed part-time' out

19N. Gow, op.cit., pp.46-52 and 85-96 especially.

20official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No.32, 1939, p.233.

21 d' See appen 1x B.

22official Year Book of the Commonv1eal th of Australia, No.32, 1939, p.234.

130

of a total of 2,100,000 'wage and salary earners•. 23 Why

then did not more men join and remain in the Militia?

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

One of the possible reasons why Australian males did

not enlist in the Militia in the 1930s was because of the

conditions of service, which demanded certain age and

medical standards of them and which inadequately rewarded

their sacrifice of personal freedom and time. Throughout

the 1930s medically fit Australian men between the ages of

eighteen and forty years were eligible to enlist in the

Militia. The initial period of engagement was for three

2~ years but a soldier could successively re-enlist annually ·

25 until he reached the retiring age of forty-eight years.

From 1930 to 1934 the normal annual training

requirement was sixteen days: eight days home training and

an eight day camp. Home training was so called because the

training was carried out at the local ('home') depot. In

1935 the training requirement was reduced to six days horne

training and a six day camp. It remained the same until

1939 when a twelve day camp was added to the six days home

.training to make a total of eighteen days training for the

26 year.

23L.J. Louis & I. Turner (eds), The Depression of the 1930s ~.Melbourne,l968), p.89. These figures refer mainly to males.

24After 1937 the re-engagement period was raised to two or three years.

25official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, Nos 23-32, 1930-39.

26Ibid.

131

Privates in the C.M.F. in 1929 received 4s per day

and this rate was initially retained for the Militia. 27

During 1936, in an effort to increase the numbers of

Militiamen, the daily rate of pay for troopers,_ sappers,

gunners and privates was raised to 8s per day. This sum

consisted of Ss basic pay and 3s efficiency allowance. To

secure the efficiency allowance a soldier had to attend the

required number of_ commanding officers' parades during

home training, or obtain leave and attend other parades in

lieu, and had to undertake the statutory camp training. 28

In the mid-1930s, a corporal received 9s per day while a

sergeant received lOs, a lieutenant lSs and a lieutenant-

colonel £1 17s 6d per day. For artillerymen and engineers

pay was normally available for a maximum of twenty-five

days per year, whilst for all the other arms pay was

usually available only for sixteen days. Thus an infantry

corporal would not earn more than £7 4s Od in a normal

29 training year.

Even at the beginning of World War II an unmarried

volunteer Militia private was still receiving Bs a day,

whilst his conscripted comrade was being paid only Ss per

day, as were A.I.F. privates before embarkation. 30 The

daily rate, and the fact that pay was available only for

so few days a year, meant that Militia pay compared very

27 A.A.O. 542 (19 November 1929).

28 M.B.I. A.52 (16 July 1936).

2 9 ' 1 ' F . ' 1 R 1 t ' And I t t' 19 3 5 M1 1tary 1nanc1a egu a- 1ons ns rue 1ons (amended to 1939), regulation 134.

30G. Long, op.cit., pp.65-6.

132

unfavourably even with the low basic wages of the 1930s.

The table below gives the weighted average basic weekly

wage rates fixed by the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation

and Arbitration for the six State capital cities: 31

Date s. d.

1 August 1931 67 6

1 August 1933 63 4

1 November 1933 63 4

1 February 1934 63 9

1 May 1934 65 0

1 September 1934 66 0

1 March 1935 66 0

1 June 1935 66 0

1 September 1935 66 0

1 December 1936 68 0

1 March 1937 70 0

1 .. Tune 1937 70 0

1 July 1937 73 0

1 September 1937 73 0

1 December 1937 76 0

1 March 1938 77 0

1 June 1938 77 0

1 September 1938 77 0

1 December 1938 78 0

1 March 1939 78 0

1 June 1939 79 0

1 September 1939 79 0

The low militia pay was insufficient to attract volunteers

from among the unemployed. This was at a time when between

13 and over 20 per cent of the predominantly male

31Quarte~ly Summary of Australian Statistics, Bulletin nos 124, 133, 136, 140, 148, 156 (June 1931-~une 1939).

133

Australian workforce was unemployed. 32 But there were

many other reasons which also made service in the Militia

unattractive.

THE MILITIA CO~~NDING OFFICERS' CONFERENCES, t1AY 1932

Early in 1932, the new U.A.P. Minister for Defence,

Sir George Pearce, directed the Military Board to convene

a series of Militia Commanding Officers' Conferences to be

held in each Military District. These conferences were to

have three aims: firstly, 'to obtain the views of

commanding officers on the results of the system of

voluntary enlistment', secondly, 'to afford [the commanding

officers] the opportunity of freely discussing the results

[of voluntary enlistment]' and thirdly, to consider

33 suggestions concerning the voluntary training system.

Although these Conferences had not been convened for

the purpose of discussing universal training, 'but to

consider means of making the present voluntary system

satisfactory and workable', naturally most Commanding

34 Officers drew comparisons between the two training systems.

For all, universal training was superior to voluntary

3213 per cent in 1929, see C.B. Schedvin, Australia and the Great Depression A Study Of Economic Development and Policy 1n the 1920s and 1930s (University of Sydney, 1970), p.l28. Over 20 per cent according to the 30 June 1933 Census. See J. Curtin, 'The Census and the Social Service State' in G.V. Portus (ed.), What The Census Reveals (Adelaide, 1936), p.l57.

33A.A.O. 72{31 May 1932).

34Proceedings of Conference of Commanding Officers 3rd Division, 30 May 1932. A copy is available in 3rd Div. Arty & Inf. Years 1921 to 1938. 6. Bundles of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.}. See Blarney's comments in particular.

134

training and a few advocated a return to some form of

cornpulsion. 35 But three other Commanding Officers had

argued prior to the Conference that a revival of universal

training would prove unpopular. 36

Agreement was not to be found among the Commanding

Officers in the other Military Districts. Those in South

Australia, 4th Military District, and Tasmania, 6th

Military District, agreed with Blarney's Victorians that

voluntary training was not a success and argued forcefully

for a return to universal training. 37 But the Commanding

Officers in Queensland, 1st Military District, resolved

that the voluntary system should have a further trial

because it was showing signs of success, and the Militia

commanders in New South Wales, 2nd Hilitary District, with

one dissenter, resolved that:

~ •• the system. of voluntary training [is] satisfactory, provided that there is introduced a system of compulsory cadet 38 training for boys from 14-18 years of age.

The reasons for these differing attitudes towards

universal training are not difficult to find. They

obviously reflect the personal experience of each officer

35rbid.

36conference Of Commanding Officers Precis Of Written Reports Of Co~nanding Officers, 3rd Division in 3rd Div. Arty & In£. Years 1921 to 1938. 6. Bundles of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.). These reports were written by all Commanding Officers of the 3rd Division prior to the Conference, which was held on 30 Hay 1932.

37 h ' C f t . A A A MP 431/1 See t e var~ous .on erence repor s ~n ..• : , file 929/1/127.

38 Ibid.

135

under each of the two systems of training. Fortunately,

however, the Militia commanders did agree that, if

voluntary training were to be retained, then pay should be

increased and new and better fitting uniforms issued. A

majority of Militia commanders, those in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd

and 5th Military Districts, also decided that the co-operation

of employers should be gained so that employees would be

39 granted time to attend camps.

Before continuing it seems advisable to examine in

more detail the Militia commanders' complaints about the

voluntary citizen force of the 1930s. Both at the

Conference itself, and in their written reports prior to it,

almost all the commanding officers of the various 3rd

Division units represented there lamented their soldiers'

failure to attend parades, the high turnover rate, the

poor quality of recruits and the fact that a trained

reserve was not being created as had been the case under

. 1 . . 40 un1versa tra1n1ng. At least three of the six Tasmanian

commanding officers represented at their conference, which

was held on 1 June 1932, would have agreed with the 3rd

D • • • 1 ff • 41 1v1s1on s o 1cers.

The commanding officers of the 3rd Division compared

the Militia of the 1930s unfavourably with the militia

which had existed prior to the introduction of compulsory

39Ibid.

40conference Of Commanding Officers Precis Of Written Reports Of Commanding Officers, 3rd Division.

41see the Report in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 929/1/127.

136

military training in 1911. They argued that the present

shortage of personnel was because of the comparatively low

pay, the highly organized and diversified sport in contrast

to that of earlier times and pacifist propaganda.

Nevertheless, some of the 3rd Division's officers conceded

that voluntary training did have a few advantages. These

included better esprit de corps, better officers, since

only the capable and enthusiastic now received commissions,

and the stimulation of civic interest in an effort to

b . 't 42 o ta1n recru1 s.

During the following seven years, the comments made

by the commanding officers of the 3rd Division were

frequently reiterated. For exru~ple, on 15 October 1936,

Major L.N. Roach wrote to the c.o. of the 39th Battalion

complaining that there was a dearth of recruits at Hawthorn

and Kew, in Melbourne, because of apathy and the influence

f r r • • 4 3 h ' 1 th o Peace organ1zat1ons. Meanw 1 e, more an a year

earlier, on 12 February 1935, the Commanding Officer of

the Darwin Defences had written to the Secretary to the

Military Board44 informing him that general apathy and

lack of interest were the main reasons for the poor

response to recrui·ting for a Militia unit at Darwin.

Among the other reasons which the c.o. advanced were: the

tropical climate, the insistence by the average ex-A.I.F.

42see in 3rd Files.

Precis Of Results Of Voluntary System, appendix 1, Div. Arty & Inf. Years 1921 to 1938. 6. Bundle of File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.).

43 rn 24/39th Bn. Years 1936-9. 1. Bundle of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.).

44 rn A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 849/3/481.

137

soldier that he had undergone sufficient soldiering and,

as far as the 'floating' population was concerned, the

unwillingness to enlist for perhaps a year or two and then,

upon leaving Darwin, to discover that they had gone

somewhere where they could not continue serving. After

obtaining only eleven potential recruits, of v.rhom two were

possibly medically unfit and five were over forty years

old, the attempt to form a unit was abandoned in March 1936.

The subject of Militia uniforms received considerable

attention in 1936. On 27 July 1936 the 3rd Division's

Commander Royal Artillery claimed45 that the blue jackets

on issue to Militiamen of the Royal Australian Artillery

were unsuitable for field training, and that soldiers who

had completed their recruit training should not have to

wait for their issue of clothing. Meanwhile, in April and

May 1936 there had been some correspondence concerning the

wearing of Caps, Field Service. It was established that

these caps were unpopular with the troops and a deterrent

to recruiting because civilians made derisive co~~ents

46 about the caps. It is now time to examine the validity

of the Commanding Officers' assumptions as to why men did

not enlist in the Militia in the 1930s.

45 In 8th Aust. Fld Regt. Year 1936. 15. Bundles of Files. File No. 417/20/31. Part II (A.W.M.).

46see the correspondence by the Staff Captain (Royal Australian Artillery, 3rd Division) to the 2nd, 4th and 8th Field Brigades on 22 April 1936 and the correspondence by the c.o. of the 8th Field Brigade (Royal Australian Artillery (Militia)) to the Royal Australian Artillery, 3rd Division on 11 May 1936 in 8th Aust. Fld Regt. Year 1936. 15. Bundles of Files. File No. 417/20/31. Part I (A.W.M.).

138

THE CENTRAL QUESTION: WHY DID MEN NOT ENLIST IN THE MILITIA IN THE 1930s?

From various references we have seen that throughout

the 1930s commanders blamed poor rates of pay, the lack

and unattractiveness of uniforms, pacifist propaganda,

apathy and the lack of co-operation by employers or civic

bodies for the dearth of volunteers.

To an extent it is arguable that the commanders'

beliefs were quite incorrect and were derived from a

failure to appreciate what type of person they were

seeking. This aspect will be considered later, in the

following chapter on the social composition of the Militia.

In many cases, the commanders' complaints were

demonstratively unjustifiable. Only in some instances did

employers refuse to co-operate with the Militia in granting

their employees leave to attend camps and there are

examples of generous employer support for !.filitia training

throughout the 1930s. In 1930, the Commercial Banking

Company of Sydney, the Australian Bank of Commerce and the

Bank of New South Wales were prepared to give their

employees the necessary leave each year, on full pay, to

47 attend camps, while in the mid-1920s Messrs Mills and

Ware Ltd, biscuit and cake manufacturers of Fremantle,bore

the whole cost of printing the 28th Battalion's recruiting

booklet entitled 'Australia Expects -•.48

47 Commandant of the 2nd District Base to the Secretary (to the Military Board) on 11 August 1930 in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 929/1/44.

48 see A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 849/3/713.

139

Nor were these isolated instances, for in 1938 the

3rd Division was able to supply Army Headquarters with an

extensive list of Victorian firms which had helped Militia

. t. 49 b . 1 . . . . recru1 1ng y: grant1ng emp oyees serv1ng 1n the M1l1tia

full pay whilst they were away in camp, making up the

difference between civil and military pay, and helping in

other ways such as allowing Recruiting Officers to address

50 their employees.

Commonwealth public servants could obtain leave with

full pay for the purpose of attending camps or parades in

which their unit was participating. The leave so granted

was not deducted from recreation leave. 51

Section 118A of the Defence Act (1903-27 and 1903-39)

gave any employee enlisted in, or attempting to join, the

C.M.F. or Militia some measure of protection against his

employer's demands. The employer could not, without fear

of court action and a substantial fine, reduce the

serviceman's wages or dismiss him from his job because he

had enlisted (or had been compelled to engage, under the

universal training scheme) in the Mili·tia. But it t..rould

49 some firms vrhich had not helped recruiting were also mentioned.

50 see Files.

3rd Div. Arty & In£. Year 1921 to 1938. 6. Bundle of File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.).

51cornrnonwealth Public Service Regulation 51, 1936 amendment, in A.A.O. 243 (31 October 1936}. Victorian state public servcnt were not as fortunate. If they were granted leave to attend military training this leave was either deducted from their annual holidays or else their pay was made up only to their usual wage. See Lieutenant-Colonel N.G. Browne (Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, 3rd Division), memo to all Units of the 3rd Division,20 August 1936 in H.Q. 3rd Aust. Div. Years 1922 to 1938. 12. Bundle of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.).

140

probably have been difficult to prove in court that an

employee had been dismissed, had lost wages or had been

otherwise victimized solely because he had joined the

Militia. During the Great Depression of the 1930s it would

have been particularly difficult to secure a conviction

because any employer could easily have justified his

action by pointing to the current economic situation.

The Militia C.O.s were also peculiarly blind to a

particular problem which affected the unemployed. On

7 December 1933, M.L. Shepherd, Secretary of the Department

of Defence, informed the Secretary of the Department of

the Prime Minister that Queensland, South Australia,

Western Australia and Tasmania all reduced, by varying

degrees, the amount of assistance given to the unemployed

if they attended Militia camps. Victoria had not yet

announced an official policy and only New South Wales

ignored the Militiaman's earnings whilst he was in camp. 52

Thus the unemployed had no incentive to attend Militia

camps instead of doing relief work. The situation was

eventually remedied and by 1939 Militia earnings were

. d h b . 'd 53 ~gnore w en sustenance was e~ng pa~ .

As with their attacks on the lack of support from

employers and civic bodies, the Militia C.O.s were

exaggerating when they claimed that pacifist propaganda

was a serious deterrent to recruiting. Certainly there

were attempts to discourage men from enlisting. For

52 rn A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 929/19/998.

53 See generally correspondence in ibid.

141

instance, on 1 August 1934 (international anti-war day)

the Victorian Council against War issued a pamphlet which

drew a parallel between the events of July 1914 and those

of twenty years later when Chancellor Dollfuss was murdered

by Austrian Nazis. Other leaflets produced for this

occasion contained anti-capitalist and anti-war stories for

children. 54

To encourage attendance at anti-war, anti-fascist and

anti-capitalist meetings in Melbourne, in November 1934 the

youth section of the Victorian Council against War printed

a brochure which attacked Australian defence expenditure.

Among the proofs of 'Australia's Part In The Present War

Plans' were:

••. Recent attempts to attract the youth to the Militia by brighter uniforms, increase in military pay and appeal to employers to

55 encourage their employees to JOIN THE ARMY.

This was fair comment because the Militia C.O.s were using

precisely these methods to recruit citizen soldiers.

Indeed, this comment was more balanced than some of

Edd • d I f • tt • t • 56 J.e War s 1ery u erances on recru1 1ng. On

~7 September 1936 he attacked the current recruiting

campaign in these terms:

As a matter of fact this [U.A.P.] Government has adopted a recruiting policy •... The Minister probably is aware of this new recruiting system. Recently this Government made arrangements with the Government of New South Wales to sack from 16,000 to 18,000 men who were employed on relief work, and then this government arranged for a steaming oven

54 see copies in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 812/1/53. 55 Copy in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 812/1/66. 56Eddie Ward was the Labour M.H.R. for East Sydney.

142

to be conveyed through the streets of Sydney w1der the noses of those unemployed men believing that by such methods they would 57 be induced to join up with the military forces.

Ward represented the extremist element of the anti-

militarism present within both the New South Wales {Lang)

and Australian Labor Parties. 58

Although the Victorian Council against War was a

Communist Front organization, the Communist Party of

Australia distributed propaganda openly. For instance,

during a recruiting march by the 13th Heavy Battery Royal

Australian Artillery {Militia) on 25 September 1936 in

Newcastle, the Newcastle District Branch of the Australian

Communist Party distributed a leaflet containing this

appeal:

•.. Does this Demonstration to-day remind you of 1914-1918? The~armongers are again busy. What is behind the marching of men, brass bands, and swell uniforms?

- CONSCRIPTION -of our youth for another world massacre ..•.

PARENTS. Stop the warmongers training your children for cannon fodder .... 59

On this occasion the Communist Party was not the only ·'

group to protest vigorously. The Christian Socialist

Movement, which also objected to militia training on

57 C.P.D., Vol.l51, p.268.

58 · 1 C N . t .. See, 1n genera, • reumann, op.c1 ., pass1m.

59A copy of this leaflet is available in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 849/3/713.

143

Sundays as desecration of the day set aside for Christian

worship, opposed the recruiting march because it disguised

the real horrors of war. 60

There were other types of protest. On 23 July 1935,

the 39th Battalion reported to the Headquarters of the lOth

Infantry Brigade not only that the local paper (the Kew

Advertiser, which was distributed free of charge), almost

always publicized 'Anti-War' activities, but also that

'Anti-War' and 'Anti-Fascist' posters had been stuck on

the doors of A Company's drill hall during the previous

week. The Kew police station was informed of the

. 'd 61 1nc1 ent.

About a month later, on 30 August 1935, the Brigade

Major of the lOth Infantry Brigade wrote to the 24th,

37th/52nd and 39th Battalions:

••. agents or members of the "Anti War League" have approached some members of the M.F. with a view to compelling them by intimidation to sever their connection with the forces. This has been done both by personal contact with the soldier himself and also by approaching his parents.

The Brigade Major then asked for reports on past and

f t . . d f . '1 k. d 62 u ure 1nc1 ents o a s1m1 ar 1n .

Some slight support of the Brigade Major's claim has

been given by Brigadier Sir Frederick Galleghan. According

60 Newcastle Morning Herald, 26 September 1936.

61see in 37th/39th Inf. Bn. Years 1923 to 1939. 11. Bundles of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.).

62 rbid. This document appears to have properly belonged to some 24th Battalion confidential correspondence of the years 1923-35 and to have been misfiled.

144

to Brigadier Ga1leghan, after the First World War, in

Newcastle (where he served until 1936) officers never went

alone in trams on parade nights. They preferred to walk.

Gangs of louts thought it good sport to corner a C.M.F.

officer on a tram and subject him to insults in front of

the other passengers. 63

Earlier, on 20 September 1935, Major A.J. Boase (of

the 3rd Division's General Staff) wrote to all 3rd Division

units claiming that a paper called The Sentinel (dated

12 August 1935), which was issued by the Militiamen's

Welfare Committee, had been distributed recently at various

training centres. He wanted the men who had distributed

this literature arrested by the police and his memorandlli~

outlined the procedure to be followed when anyone vias

h . h d t 'l't' 64 caug t present1ng sue propagan a o M1 l 1amen.

Previously, on 16 October 1934, he had warned the

headquarters of a number of 3rd Division units against

re-enlisting ex-Corporal S.A. Goodman of the 4th Field

Brigade. Goodman had been convicted of smuggling and was

k C . 65 a nown ommun1st.

63 r.D. Chapman, Iven G. Mackay Citizen and Soldier (Melbourne, 1975), p.l33. Compare ~nth S.F. Rowell, op.cit., p.201, where Rowell maintains that after World Har I no regular soldier would willingly travel in uniform on public transport. Galleghan became a brigadier in October 1945.

64 rn 37th/39th in£. Bn. Years 1923 to 1939. 11. Bundles of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.). This item also seems to have been part of the 24th Battalion's confidential correspondence.

65 rbid. This copy of Major Boase's memorandum ended up in the 24th Battalion's possession.

145

But how seriously did Communist Party activities

interfere with recruiting for the Militia? This question

is difficult to answer in retrospect because of the limited

amount of reliable evidence still available. However, the

extant evidence suggests that the Communist Party's

activities did not greatly affect recruiting for the

Militia. In fact, although the General Staff devoted two

full printed pages of the November 1936 Australian

~ntel~ig~nce _Diary to a description of the Communist Party's

attempts to discourage recruiting and of that party's

efforts to infiltrate the Army, Airforce and Navy

66 generally, the General Staff itself did not admit that

the Communist Party was successful.

In the above Diary, the General Staff claimed that:

••. In addition to the spate of literature, "victory" marches, demonstrations and meetings were held. These generally attracted very little public attention and must have been a serious disappointment to their organizers and sponsors. A march and meeting held at Newcastle, New South Wales, may be quoted as a typical example. After some five weeks' preparation of a committee specially appointed for the purpose and allegedly representative of most of the principal unions, "the torchlight procession and mass rally" was held. The procession consisted of one band and 70 people and the mass rally held in the Newcastle Stadium was attended by about 150.67

If the General Staff's claim that the Communist Party

was not very successful in its anti-military activities

was correct, then it is possible that the Militia commanders

66Imperial General Staff {Australian Section), Australian

Intelligence Diary (Melbourne, 27 November 1936'), ~t !I (Seri~l No. il/1936), pp.l72-4.

67 Ibic!., p.l72.

146

may merely have been using the communists as a popular

scapegoat for their own lack of success in attracting and

retaining recruits. If the General Staff's claim about

the communists' lack of success was incorrect, then either

the General Staff incorrectly assessed the communists•

effectiveness or the General Staff deliberately

underestimated the communists' achievements in its own

interests of preserving a facade of military order. In the

latter case, the Army as a whole would have benefitted from

arguments both with the Militia commanders perhaps using

the Communist Party as a scapegoat and the General Staff

belittling the Party's success in order to show how

efficient the Staff was.

It is also possible that the demonstrations held in

Newcastle could have had a much wider impact than the

small number of participants indicated, particularly if

communist pressure w·ere concentrated in a particular area.

However, because of the possible propaganda element in

newspaper reports much extant evidence cannot be accepted

as being reliable. Nevertheless, by examining the

Communist Party's membership and the circulation of its

literature it may be possible to guess the likely extent

of its effectiveness.

There were only 2,824 active Communist Party members

in 1934, but, a year later, there \vere probably more 68 and

68A. Davidson, The Corn.'Uunist Party of Australia A Short History (California, 1969), p.69 n.58. See also R. Gollan, Revolutionaries and Reformists Communism and the Australian Labour Movenent 1920-1955 (Canberra, 1975), p.31.

147

through its front,the Movement Against War and Fascism,

the Communist Party reached many more Australians. This

was especially so when the U.A.P. government unsuccessfully

attempted to prevent Egon Kisch, a Czech writer, from

entering Australia to address the Movement's rallies at the

end of 1934.69

Another of the Communist Party's fronts,

the Unemployed Workers' Movement, claimed 31,000 members in

1931 and its membership continued to increase until 1936. 70

In 1934, 74,000 people voted for Communist Party

candidates in the Senate elections, 71 while during the 1937

Federal elections the Party distributed three million

leaflets and posted 150,000 posters supporting the A.L.P.

72 against Lyons. Despite these achievements, and although

some communists did enlist in the Militia 'to deprive the

73 bourgeoisie of a monopoly of arms', the Communist

Party's success in deterring men from enlisting in the

Militia was not as great as the Militia commanders implied.

But Communist Party propaganda of this sort must have

had some effect, however incalculable:

The Soldiers' Creed "Captain, what do you think, 11 I asked

"Of the part your soldiers play?" But the captain answered, 'I do

not think; I do not think, I obey! 11

69A. Davidson, op.cit., p.61.

70ib ... ~-,

71Ibid. I

72 Ibid. I

p.60.

p.65.

p.76.

73 H. McQueen, 'The Social Character of the New Guard', Arena, No.40 (1975), p.84. The ex-digger mentioned there was in the Militia i.n the 1930s and became a Nilitia sergeant at Wonthaggi (conversation with H. McQueen on 9 January 1976).

148

"Then if this is your soldier's creed," I cried,

"You're a mean, unmanly crew; And for all your feathers and

gilt and braid, I am more of a man than you! 11

"For wha·tever my place in life may be, And whether I sv-lim or sink,

I can say with pride: "I do not obey;

I do not obey - I THINK!" 74

A further indication that Hilitia commanders were perhaps

exaggerating the effect of communist activities on Militia

recruiting was that the influence of right-wing activities

was not mentioned, although on at least one occasion the

24th Battalion's drill hall was temporarily occupied by

f . 75 asc1sts.

From the available evidence it appears that throughout

the 1930s Militia commanders failed to appreciate, or

exaggerated, the true influence on recruiting of low pay,

unobtainable or unattractive uniforms, pacifist propaganda,

apathy and the lack of public support by employers and

civic bodies. Certainly, the pay was low and the populace

apathetic, although the latter is difficult to prove. But,

once a credible enemy had emerged in September 1938, 76

Militia nt~ers rapidly increased from 35,000 to 43,000 in

74 Ernest Crosby, 'For the Children', The Communist, Vol.l, No.25, 10 June 1921, p.5.

75 h . 1 J. Het er1ngton, B amey Controversial Soldier (Canberra, 1973), p. 63.

76This enemy, of course, was Nazi Germany not Imperial Japan which had been the subject of intensive Australian defence planning in the 1910s, 1920s and 1930s.

149

December 1938 and to 70,000 in March 1939. 77 It should

also be remembered that some employers did support the

Militia, much to the disgust of pacifists and conununists, 78

and that pacifist propaganda possibly was not very

effective.

Nevertheless, some ex-servicemen did endorse the

Militia commanders' point of view. For instance, the

Honorary State Secretaries of the Diggers Association of

Queensland, in a letter to Archdale Parkhill (the Minister

for Defence) , on 12 September 1935 emphasized the need for

increased pay and Regimental uniforms in order to attract

more recruits. The Secretaries claimed that these two

features had emerged during a lengthy debate on voluntary

training at a recent meeting of their association. 79

More importantly, the Secretaries attached a copy of

a statement by a Militia N.C.O. as to why voluntary

training was not a success. After mentioning that

enlistments were approximately 70 per cent of full strength,

while attendance was only about 50 per cent of enlistment,

the N.C.O. wrote:

Poor attendance [is] due largely to monotonous repetition of drill elements resulting in non­efficiency, and now an eager move seems apparent on part of instructors to increase efficiency of [N.]C.O's and men.

7 7 . 26 h' . . h G. Long, op.c1t., p .• T 1s enormous 1ncrease 1n t e number of volun·teers definitely was not entirely the product of Major-General Blarney's recruiting drive, as G. Long claims here.

78E.g. the ~\lorkers' Voice of 11 March 1939, p.l, claimed that employees at McKay's harvester works, Sunshine, received, 'along with their pay, militia publicity material and a pink card asking them why they had not joined'. 79Letter in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 929/19/115.

150

Men take no interest, neither is any interest taken, in their personal capabilities. Men most adapted or fitted for any particular thing [are] not necessarily chosen for it.

Criticism of the lack of, and poor tailoring of, the

overcolourful uniforms followed, as well as a scathing

attack on the quality of instructors. The N.C.O. claimed:

Men left largely to own devices. [N.]C.O's left to instruct and given responsibility of training men.

No provision for social side of sporting instincts.

Snobbishness of some permanent staff men. [Militia] regarded as something inferior and looked down on and often ridiculed.

No regard for volunteer officers.

Snobbishness of some officers and inclination to forget all work learned in ranks. Men often know more about work than officers.

The N.C.O. concluded with a derogatory comment on the bias

of examination boards and the scarcity of text books from

which to study for promotion. 80

Although it is difficult to discover how valid this

anonymous N.c.o:s criticisms were, a few observations are

worth making before considering the Adjutant-General's

reply. If this N.C.O. belonged to a specialist or

technical arm, such as artillery or signals, it would not

have been surprising for the N.C.O.s and men to know more

about their work than an officer who might have been

recently commissioned or been posted from the infantry or

80 Letter in ibid.

151

cavalry. Nevertheless, training is usually the

responsibility of an officer. 81

Rivalry between regular and citizen soldiers has been

f t . . f t . 82 a ea ure 1n many arm1es or cen ur1es. Permanent

soldiers regard themselves as professionals and reserve or

militia troops are merely tolerated as bungling amateurs.

The snobbishness of some Militia officers will be

discussed in the following chapter, and the question of

uniforms has already been examined. Major-General Jess

(then Adjutant-General) replied to the charges made by the

anonymous N.C.O. on 12 November 1935. In his answer to

the Secretary of the Department of Defence, Jess argued

that the poor attendance at parades and the poor quality

of instruction were exceptional and were probably the

product of local conditions. But he did admit that it was

sometimes difficult to obtain efficient officers for

isolated detachments.

81 But compare this with the following comment on the British army:

"Well, George, now we're back home I suppose you and me will be able to resume command of our Companies." Thus, one of a couple of Company Sergeant-Majors leaning on the rail of a troopship bringing a Guards battalion home from Egypt, as she was warped alongside the quay at Tilbury one far-off day between the wars. How right he \vas.

Sir John Slessor, op.cit., p.l09.

82ouring the Napoleonic Wars, English militiamen were called 'feather bed soldiers' by their regular comrades. R. Palmer (ed.}, The Rambling Soldier (Harmondsworth, 1977}, p.27. In the 1940s A.I.F. soldiers referred to militiamen as 'chockos' (chocolate soldiers) and 'koalas'. R. Mathews, Militia Battalion at \'Jar The History of the 58/59th Austral~an Intantry Battalion in the Second World War {Sydney, 1961), pp.4-5, while during· the 1960s and 1970s the derisive term 'cut-lunch corrunandos' came to be applied to members of the C.M.Fo

152

Jess maintained that delays in providing uniforms

were being overcome and that regimental tailors had been

appointed to units to ensure that uniforms fitted properly.

However, recruits were still not to be issued with uniforms

immediately upon enlistment for reasons of economy, because,

after a few parades, some recruits lost interest. The

irony in this argument apparently escaped the Adjutant-

General. Surely, the very lack of a uniform would tend to

diminish interest and one of the main duties of an

instructor is to stimulate and maintain student interest.

More pertinently, he pointed out that soldiers seemed to

prefer colourful uniforms and that this was implicit in the

Digger's Association letter of 12 September 1935. 83

Major-General Jess also had difficulty in believing

that Militia commanders, and all Militia units were led by

Militia officers at the time, would allow members of the

permanent cadre staff to act towards the Militia rank and

file in the manner described by the anonymous N.C.O.

However, Jess was a senior regular officer and hence his

inability to conceive of such a situation was not

surprising.

Referring to the criticisms concerning exams and the

availability of text books, Jess justifiably questioned an

N.C.O.'s ability to make judgements embracing the whole

Militia and maintained that the shortage of text books was

83 rmplicit here is the assumption that Australians like uniforms. It is this writer's belief, based on the reactions of school cadets and C.M.F. soldiers in N.S.W. in the years since 1965, that this assumption is generally correct.

153

very likely caused by the failure of previous recipients

to return them. 84 Strangely, although considerable

attention was paid to social and sporting activities in

the Militia, Jess did not mention this fact.

Clearly, the anonymous N.C.O. 's major valid charge

was the poor quality of instructors and leaders, and the

boring training. Obviously, this criticism related more

to reasons why men left the Militia than to why they did

not enlist initially. Prior to examining the efforts made

to encourage recruiting, it would seem advisable to

discover whether recruiting or retention was the Militia's

main problem.

RECRUITING OR RETENTION: THE MAJOR PROBLEM?

Although poor pay, unattractive uniforms, pacifist

propaganda, apathy and the lack of employer co-operation

were all rather unjustly blamed for the lack of volunteers,

a glance at the figures makes it obvious that the

Militia's real problem was one of retention rather than

recruitment. Between 1 July 1931 and 30 June 1938 about

72,500 Militiamen were discharged, whilst approximately

78 500 . . . d 85 h h ff. . t , recru1ts JOlne . T us t ere were su 1c1en

recruits to fill the Militia establishment of between

84Jess' comments are in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 929/19/115.

85see appendix D. The discrepancy between appendices D and F (where during the years 1 July 1931 and 31 December 1938, only 66,000 discharges are shown) is due to the fact that all figures in appendix F are approximations only.

154

30,000 and 35,000 men during the years 1930-38. 86 That

the Militia's establishment was not filled was because the

volunteers did not serve for long.

The percentage of discharges to total strength, which

was normally under establishment anyway, varied from a

peak of over 43 per cent in 1932/33 to a low 25 per cent in

1936/37.87

Although a recruit initially engaged for three

years, and despite the fact that under section 40 of the

Defence Act a soldier could be required to pay up to £2 if

88 he requested his discharge before completing his term,

very few Militiamen served three or more years before

discharge.

The Adjutant-General's admittedly incomplete

89 calculations of February 1939 yield these percentages.

Between 1 July 1931 and 30 June 1936, about 21 per cent of

those discharged had completed three or more years of

service, while over 26 per cent had served for less than a

year. From 1 July 1936 to 31 December 1938, approximately

34 per cent of discharged personnel had served for three

or more years, whereas nearly 22 per cent had remained in

the Militia for less than a year. Thus there was a marked

improvement in the retention of citizen soldiers for at

least their initial period of engagement in the late 1930s.

During the 1930s, the attendance of Militiamen at

camps was not impressive. From 1930/31 to 1937/38

86see above, pp.l29-30 and appendix B.

87 d' Appen l.X D. 88However, the sa.•11e section also included provision for the waiving of the fine.

89 d' F Appen 1.x •

155

participation in Militia camps varied from 67 to 75 per

90 cent of the Militia's total strength. The effect of this

on training will be examined in a later chapter. Here it

is sufficient to note that not only did Militiamen

generally fail to fulfil their obligations, in terms of

the length of service, but also they did not even do the

amount of annual training to which they had voluntarily

agreed.

As early as mid-1935 the Military Board recognized

that retaining Militia personnel and securing their

attendance at camp was a greater difficulty than

recruiting them. 91 Unfortunately, the idea persisted that

there was a dearth of recruits. Therefore the Goverr~ent

and the Army tended to launch recruiting campaigns instead

of making an effort to retain the troops already enlisted. 92

The reasons which the Hilitary Board gave.in 1935,

for the high turnover rate in the Militia, were almost

identical with the reasons given for the lack of recruits. 93

Perhaps this v1as another indication of the way in which the

separate problems of recruitment and retention were

confused.

The Military Board believed that the main factors were:

94 the reluctance of employers to allow employees to attend

90 d' Appen lX E ..

91Minute by C.B. Laffan (Secretary to the Military Board) to the Secretary (of the Department of Defence) on 24 July 1935 in A.A.A.: ~ilP 431/1, file 929/19/115.

92 see the next section in this chapter.

93see the introductory paragraph of the section on 'Why Did Hen Not Enlist In The Militia In The 1930s?' 94Particularly those with small scale businesses.

156

camp and occasionally their outright opposition, the

obvious inadequacy of the camp pay of 24s 95 (especially

when compared with the Federal basic wage of almost 67s) ,

other attractions such as sport, cars and cinemas, the

mobility of the unemployed and seasonally employed;

attendance at technical schools by the more ambitious and

the fear among casual workers that if they obtained leave

for camp their employers could find that they were

superfluous. 96

A few members of the 8th Field Regiment applying for

their discharge justified the Board's contention. Among

the various reasons they gave for requesting discharge

were: the lack of a uniform in which to attend camp, a

desire to join the Royal Australian Naval Reserve (in one

instance), illness, a change of employment (to another area

or to night work), and the lack of spare time because of

the pressure of business or study. 97

SUGGESTIONS FOR INCREASED RECRUITING ili~D RETENTION

To stimulate recruiting and retention the Military

Board recommended: an increase in a private soldier's

camp pay to 8s per day, 98 the modernization of the Military

Forces, the opening of additional country centres for units

95 . t ld' . d 4 d f . d A pr1va e so 1er rece1ve s per ay or a s1x ay camp.

96 See above, n.91.

97Their applications for discharge may be found Aust Fld Regt. Year 1936. 15. Bundles of Files. 417/20/31. Part II (A.W.M.).

in 8th File No.

98This was the old pre-universal training militia private's scale of pay!

157

(although this would entail increased administrative

costs), greater efforts at publicity as well as the

provision of more attractive uniforms. This was despite

the fact that the Board itself had discovered that,

whether the old or new style uniforms were worn, the

t t . h f t' . '1 99 urnover ra e 1n t e orma 1ons was s1m1 ar.

100 However, the anonymous N.C.O.'s charges apparently

were valid and at first units, then the Military Board

itself, began issuing streams of instructions on recruit

training. Some discussion of these orders is necessary

here although training in general will be examined in a

later chapter.

In his Training Instructions 1935/36, Captain D.A.

Hall (Adjutant and Quartermaster of Signals 3rd Division)

wrote: 101

•.• The Immediate Object of the training for the ensuing six months is to increase the efficiency of Officers and N.C.O.s as instructors. It should then be possible to hold recruits obtained by a special 11 campaign ...

From mid-1937 until the outbreak of the Second World War,

the Military Board repeatedly issued similar instructions

on the need to provide interesting and progressive training

. d t t . . t 102 1n or er o re a1n recru1 s.

99 see above, n.91.

100see above, pp. 149-50.

101see 3rd Aust. Div. Sigs. Year 1935 to 1938. 13. Bundles of Files. Part III. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.).

102 . See M.B.I. G.33(25 June 1937), M.B.I. G.21(25 May 1938) and M.B.I. G.l7(26 May 1939).

158

Simultaneously, other steps were taken to increase

the numbers of recruits and the retention rate. In 1936,

h 1 d t . d 103 h f as we ave a rea y men 1one , ·t e rate o pay was

increased and, at the same time, a welfare and betterment

allowance of three shillings per head of the unit strength

was given to each C.O. This allowance was intended to be

spent on publicity, and on assisting social, athletic and

sporting activities within units. As well, additional

money was provided for: publicity; renovating and

improving drill halls; the holding of ceremonial parades,

reviews, tattoos, displays, annual military competitions,

inter-unit small arms competitions; and to enable privates

and junior N.C.O.s (instead of limited numbers of officers

and senior N.C.O.s only) to attend courses and week-end

bivouacs. It was also planned to fill vacancies in the

Australian Instructional Corps, which consisted of

specially selected P.M.F. soldiers. The greater

availability of courses and instructors was designed to

k . . . t t' 104 rna e tra1n1ng more 1n eres 1ng.

The Military Board also ordered that defunct or

dormant unit welfare committees were to be revived and

d h d . f h . 1 't' ff' 105 repeate t e ut1es o t e reg1menta recru1 1ng o 1cers.

The latter were to supervise recruiting generally within

their units (although commanding officers ultimately

remained responsible for maintaining their units at peace

establishment); while the welfare committees were designed

103 See above, p.l31.

104 M.B.I. A.52(16 July 1936). 105see A.A.O. 542 (19 November 1929).

159

to obtain the support of local civic and other public

b d . f h . 106 h' 11 o 1es or t e un1ts. T 1s was a part of ~he 1936

campaign to increase the Militia to 35,000 men. The 1936

campaign was followed, in 1938, by the establishment of a

recruiting secretariat under Major-General Blarney (in a

. . 1 . t ) t . th . 1 . . 1 0 7 f . 4 2 0 0 0 c1v1 capac1 y o 1ncrease e M1 1t1a 1rst to ,

and later, in 1939, to 70,000 troops.

RECRUITING PUBLICITY AND THE RECRUITING CAMPAIGNS OF 1936 AND 1938

The 1936 recruiting campaign was designed to raise the

Militia from its current strength of 26 to 27,000 men to

its authorized strength of 35,000 men. This recruiting

drive followed Italy's successful conquest of Ethiopia,

and Germany's re-occupation of the Rhineland in March

1936. 108 The 1938 recruiting campaign which was directed

by a Cabinet Committee under the chairmanship of

h . . f 1 ff . 109 f 11 d W.M. Hug es, as M1n1ster or Externa A a1rs, o owe

the events which culminated in the Munich settlement of

September 1938.

Throughout the decade 1929-39, units (both during and

between the 1936 and 1938 recruiting drives) used various

kinds of publicity to obtain volunteers. While the methods

used (summarized below) were spectacularly successful, the

lOGM.B.I. A.52(16 July 1936).

107M.B.I. A.88(1 December 1938).

108J. Francis, 'The Citizen Military Forces' 1 Australian Al.lTlV Journal, No.41 (October 1952) 1 p.8.

109see M.B.I. A.88(1 December 1938) for a description of the recruiting organization for this campaign.

160

general problems remained. The Militia required a higher

retention rate rather than more recruits. 110 The huge

turnover in personnel was unproductive and uneconomic.

Little advanced work could be done: it was necessary to

train new batches of recruits every few months.

It was also made difficult to maintain the supply of

uniforms and equipment. Indeed, on 18 May 1939, the

Brigadier commanding the lOth Infantry Brigade wrote to the

3rd Division bitterly complaining about the lack of

uniforms, equipment, staff and accommodation in the 52nd

Battalion's area. He warned that unless something were

done soon the troops raised since December 1938 would

leave, and that the Citizen Committees (which had recruited

these men} were becoming angry because of the way in which

111 their recruits were being neglected.

Almost as much of a problem was the fact that while

the desired total number of recruits were relatively easily

obtained during the recruiting campaigns, the recruits did

not always volunteer in the required numbers in every

locality. For example, on 22 March 1939, Major-General

Hardie (commander of the 1st Division} had to seek

permission from the Military Board to continue enlisting

soldiers into specified units of his division (because

those units were understrength}, although the total

divisional establishment had been exceeded by over 600

110see above, the section entitled, 'Recruiting or Retention: the major problem?'

11137th/39th. Inf. Bn. Years 1923 to 1939. 11. Bundles of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.).

161

troops and there was a waiting list of 325 volunteers as

11 112 we .

The 1st Division had exceeded its establishment

because, on 10 February 1939 the Military Board had

broadcast, for political reasons, radio message A.288,

which stated that no recruits volunteering at existing

113 military centres were to be turned away. Earlier during

the same recruiting drive, this problem of distribution had

become apparent. By 3 March 1939, the 2nd Military

District had exceeded its peace establishment by just over

2,000 men, whereas the 3rd Military District was still

about 1,400 troops below establishment. 114

Since the other Military Districts also still

required recruits, the nation-wide campaign had to continue.

And because in national broadcasts, the press and

Parliament it was difficult to explain why recruits were

urgently needed throughout Australia, with the exception of

New South Wales (the 2nd Military District), there was no

simple immediate solution to this problem of the

distribution of volunteers.

Many methods were used to recruit Militiamen in the

decade before the Second World War. On 11 December 1929,

the Colonel commanding the 9th Infantry Brigade wrote to

the 2nd Division suggesting that recruits for the Militia

112 correspondence in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 761/1/635.

113 rbid.

114c.B. Laffan (Secretary to the Military Board) to the Secretary (Department of Defence), on 10 March 1939, in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 761/1/859.

162

could be obtained by returned soldiers. He wanted

prominent military officers to give talks to sub-branches

of the Returned Sailors and Soldiers' Imperial League Of

Australia on 'The Present Militia Training, and how

R t d S ld • h 1 • t 1 115 , , , e urne o 1ers can e p support 1 . The d1V1s1onal

commander ordered contact to be established between the

League's sub-branches and commanding officers and

. t. ff. 116 f d 1' 5 d recru1 1ng o 1cers. A ew ays ear 1er, on an

6 December 1929, Major C.C. Easterbrook (Adjutant of the

1st Division's Army Service Corps) had written circular

memoranda to non-effective soldiers, serving members and

members of the old 1912 quota outlining the conditions of

service in the Militia and urging them to enlist. 117

During the 1936 recruiting drive, posters bearing

pictures of an infantry sergeant were displayed in most

railway stations and post offices throughout Australia.

As well, trams in Brisbane, Sydney, Newcastle, Melbourne,

Ballarat, Bendigo, Adelaide, Perth, Fremantle, Hobart and

118 Launceston were to carry these posters for a few weeks.

Between 18 and 25 September 1936 the 3rd Division

planned to run an information bureau at Melbourne's

showgrounds, with the object of keeping:

115A.A.A.: SP 459/1, file 527/2/44. I

116Assistant Adjutant & Quartermaster-General of the 2nd Division to 9th Infantry Brigade on 18 December 1929 in A.A.A.: SP 459/1, file 527/2/44.

117A.A.A.: SP 459/1, file 527/2/47.

118Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson (Director of Organization and Personal Services) Recruiting Posters - Supply and Exhibition, 26 June 1936 in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file A761/l/150.

163

•.. the Militia prominently before the public, [and of supplying] oral information and pamphlets, etc. to all applicants in regard to nature of training and conditions of · service and enlistment, pay, duration of parades ...

Since there were vacancies only for the infantry battalions,

the bureau was to stress the advantages of infantry

t . . 119 ra1n1ng.

Meanwhile, the Signals 3rd Division had successfully

been involved in trying to raise their strength too. Many

techniques were used. They included: a competition among

N.C.O.s and signallers for silver cups and medals for those

who brought in the highest and second highest number of

recruits respectively, between 11 August and 30 November

1936; 120 diagrams showing the number of recruits required

and the remaining vacancies; the appointment of a

recruiting officer who distributed recruiting literature

to banks, insurance companies and other firms; radio

broadcasts by courtesy of the Vacuum Oil Company; the

appearance of articles and photographs in newspapers and

the formation of a special recruiting staff which gave

lectures and interviewed applicants. By these means

sixty-six new Militiamen were enrolled, but the abrupt

cessation of the campaign (when the unit reached its

'permissible strength') affected the unit's morale. The

119Lieutenant-Colonel N.G. Browne (Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, 3rd Division) Militia Recruiting Information Bureau: Royal Agricultural Society Show Ground, 17 September 1936 in H.Q. 3rd Aust. Div. Years 1922 to 1938. 12. Bundle of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A. W .l-1. ) •

1203rd Aust. Div. Sigs. Years 1935 to 1938. 13. Bundles of Files. Part II. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.).

164

Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the Signals 3rd Division

also noted, in his report of 29 September 1936 to the

Headquarters of the 3rd Division, 121 that the completion

of the new Signals Depot was the best recruiting agency and

that serving members of the unit brought in more recruits

than press or other general publicity.

The abrupt termination of the Signals 3rd Division's

recruiting effort was probably due to the unexpectedly

rapid rate of enlistment. In general, recruiting for

prestigious (e.g. cavalry) and technical (e.g. signals and

artillery) arms has always been far easier than for the

relatively unsophisticated infantry.

In later recruiting drives the same techniques were

used. For instance, in his camp report of 10 February 1938

to the Headquarters of the 3rd Division, Lieutenant-

Colonel Simpson (who commanded the Signals 3rd Division)

mentioned that reports and photographs of his unit's camp

between 29 January and 6 February 1938 had appeared in the

122 Age, Leader, Argus, Sun and Herald.

The Headquarters of the 3rd Division, during January

and February 1939, arranged for Australian Broadcasting

Commission radio announcements on forthcoming events in

Militia drill-halls. 123 A year earlier, on 23 February

1938, Captain J. Silverman {Officer Commanding D (support)

Company 46th Battalion) had appealed to his troops to

121Ibid.

122Ibid., Pt I.

12324th/39th Bn. Years 1936 to 1939. 1. Bundle of Files. File No. 417/20/31 {A.W.M.).

165

enlist at least one recruit each. The soldier who

obtained the largest number of recruits during March and

A '1 19~8 . d . f 10 124 pr1 J was prom1se a pr1ze o s.

Again, as part of the late 1938 recruiting campaign

to raise the Militia to 70,000 soldiers, the 46th

Battalion held a march on 19 December 1938 and, on

10 December 1938, its band had been present at.the opening

of the Brighton Municipal Baths. The troops who marched on

19 mb 1938 t 'd 125 Dece er were no pa1 .

But Militia public relations was not limited to

newspaper articles, radio announcements, recruiting

marches or posters. Throughout the 1930s, Militia units

also held numerous gymkhanas, tattoos, band competitions

and public artillery, machine-gun, signalling, drill and

thl t . t't' 126 a e 1cs compe 1 1ons. Although this general, and

traditional, type of publicity probably gained few

recruits, as C.B. Laffan, Secretary to the Military Board,

admitted on 21 November 1938 when he wrote:

••• throughout the Citizen Forces ... irrespective of the general [Army] propaganda it must be the unit appeal and personal contact in the area which obtains the recruits.l27

it did help make other Australians aware of the Militia's

existence.

12446th Aust. In£. Bn. Year 1938. 5. Bundles of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.). By the 1970s this had risen to $100 for the soldier obtaining the largest number of recruits, in any one year, for Sydney University Regiment.

125Ibid.

126A.A.A.: SP 459/1, files 412/1/63-412/1/406, for the period 1929-44. 127 rn A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 929/19/777.

166

It has been argued that retention, not recruiting,

was the main cause of the lack of Militia manpower during

the decade before the Second World War. It also appears

that the poor quality of instructors and boring training

wereresponsible for the high turnover among Militia

personnel. Although this question of training will be

discussed in a later chapter, it is worth mentioning here

that in June 1937 the Military Board felt constrained to

emphasize the elementary point that:

The average recruit joining the Militia today is better educated than the recruit of bygone days, and it will be found in most cases that it is unnecessary to detail minutely the

128 various positions or movements to be taught ....

Naturally, once the decline had begun it was

difficult to stop since the lack of manpower would tend to

detract from realism in training and make some activities

impossible. For example, if a battalion has an effective

strength of only two companies, battalion-sized manoeuvres

either are not carried out or are unrealistic. For the

commanders the exercises become unrealistic because it is

far easier to control a unit at half-strength than a unit

at full strength, and for the soldiers the lack of realism

is shown by the necessity of pretending that, in battle,

their flanks would be covered by the battalion's other

(and currently non-existent} companies. l'md guns cannot

be fired if there are too few gunners.

This situation, of course, would tend to reduce the

amount of interesting training even more, and, when faced

128M.B.I. G.33{25 June 1937).

167

with this problem, the Militia's commanders may have been

induced to concentrate on tackling recruiting rather than

retention. Consciously or sub-consciously, the commanders

may well have argued that once their unit possessed

sufficient trained personnel, then more ambitious, larger

scale and advanced training could be undertaken. When this

occurred, the retention problem would disappear.

Unfortunately, because the vicious circle was never really

broken, units did not obtain sufficient soldiers for

advanced training and the turnover in troops remained very

high throughout the 1930s.

Part of the retention problem may also have been

caused by the Commanding Officers' failure to realize what

type of person they really required and by their acceptance

of any willing recruit, however unsuitable for the Militia

in general (or for their particular command) in their

desperation to fill their establishments. 129 Basically,

the commanders required reasonably intelligent, fit young

men who were both reliable and free of any other time-

consuming ties (whether these were study, dependent

relatives, hobbies or sports) and who were likely to remain

in their present locality. In the Depression of the 1930s

the last condition ideally meant that the recruits should

already have steady civilian employment.

The sheer volume of recruits reveals that many

Australians were prepared to join the Militia during the

129This problem has risen again in the 1970s when Citizen Military Force (later Army Reserve) co~~anders once more 'played the numbers' game' and accepted all volunteers, no matter how unsuitable, in order to maintain the strength of their units.

168

1930s, but only some of the Commanding Officers• beliefs

as to why more did not enlist and remain in the Militia

were valid. The Militia commanders exaggerated the effects

of Communist and pacifist propaganda, and the lack of

t . b 1 d . . b d. 130 co-opera 10n y emp ayers an c1v1c o 1es. Certainly

by the late 1930s the Militia was receiving plenty of

bl . · t 131 b t the 1 d lack f · f pu 1c1 y, u ow pay an o smart un1 orrns

(together with the poor quality of the training) adversely

affected recruiting and retention.

On the vexed question of apathy, it would appear that

in general the population was not prepared to sacrifice

much personally (of course, this was at a time when

economic sacrifices were still being daily demanded in any

case) in order to help build an effective citizen army.

Not until Munich was Australia generally seen to be

directly threatened as a member of the British Empire ru,d

Commonwealth, and not until 1942 was the Australian

mainland actually attacked and threatened with invasion.

Manchuria, China, Abyssinia and Spain were remote areas of

little concern to most Australians still struggling to

overcome the physical and mental shock of the Depression.

130Admittedly, this latter claim was more justifiable. For instance, while the municipalities of Hawthorn, Kew and Caulfield helped enormously in trying to obtain recruits for the 37th/39th Battalion during the 1938 recruiting campaign, the Malvern Council refused to aid the same unit. Reports dated 2 & 22 March 1939, H.Q. 37th/39th Bn in 24th/39th Bn. Years 1936 to 1939. 1. Bundle of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.).

131E.g. stations 2BL Sydney, 2NC Newcastle, 2NR Grafton and 2UE broadcast items on the Militia about once a week between 1936 and 1938. In 1936, only radio 2BL was involved in these broadcasts. Notices to 2nd Division Routine Orders 1936-38 in 55th/53th (sic.) Aust. Inf. Bn. Years 1923 to 1927. 28. Bundle of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.).

169

The Militiaman's low social status, which Gavin Long

neatly summarized thus:

.•. Peace-time military service conferred little prestige; indeed, an Australian who made the militia a hobby was likely to be regarded by his acquaintances as a peculiar fellow with an eccentric taste for uniforms and the exercise of petty authority,l32

would not have encouraged Australians either to enlist or

to continue serving. Further sources of discouragement

and lowered social prestige included the Government's

faint-hearted attitude towards the need for increased

expenditure in order to strengthen the armed forces

generally and the attacks made by Labour M.P.s, in

particular those by Eddie Ward, on senior military

ff . 133 o 1cers.

132o "t 11 12 p.Cl ., pp .. - .

133c. Neumann, op.cit., passim.

I believe, then, that we must choose a general, not because of noble birth as priests are chosen, nor because of wealth as the superintendents of the gymnasia, but because he is temperate, self-restrained, vigilant, frugal, hardened to labour, alert, free from avarice, neither too young nor too old, indeed a father of children if possible, a ready speaker, and a man with a good reputation.

Onasander, The General

170

Chapter Five

The Social Composi t.ion of the Citizen Forces, 1911-39

THE FAILURE OF 'DEMOCRATIZATION', 1911-19 _.----------------------------------~----------

In chapter one it \vas argued that the Volunteers

preserved the social distinctions of the nineteenth century

British army and provided the model for the Hilitia in the

1930s. To be sure, despite the opposition of the first

Federal Hernbers of Parliament to 'the dominance of a rr.ilitary

caste' or the existence of militarism, and a general feeling

among Members that the Australian armed services should be

'democratized', the traditional social distinctions

continued to be preserved, although on an ever decreasing

scale. By 'democratizing' was meant the abolition of all

unnecessary pomp, ceremonial and gold braid and the

selection of officers on merit rather than on social

1 background . Perhaps the most striking example of the

preservation of traditional social distinctions was the all

officer Australian Volunteer Automobile Corps, where entry

2 was restricted to drivers possessing their own motor cars.

The introduction of compulsory military training in

1911 should have had the effect of 'democratizing' the

military in that youths of all social classes were now liable

for service. Hmvever, there is some evidence that this was

1 N .• Meaney, op.cit. , pp. 57-8.

2see ch. 1. Although one could argue that it was based upon a new technology.

171

not quite the case. For instance, on 29 July 1914,

Major G.A. Rourke (C.O. of the 17th Infantry) complained:

That for trainees who were sons of wealthy, ~istocratic, or political parents, the whole [dompulsory training] scheme would break down of its own weight. It ¥Tas always easy for exempting a man if an excuse was desired; but he strongly objected to receiving instructions from Melbourne stating that a certain individual under his command had been granted an exemption without the matter e~er being referred to him as commanding officer.

As Major Rourke added:

It was [indeed} contrary to the letter and the spirit of the [Defence] Act that wealthy youths could obtain exemption, either by political or social influence, while the sons of poorer men were compelled to do their training, irrespective of whatever personal inconvenience it might cause them.4

This may have been an isolated series of cases but Jauncey

later also implies that prosecutions under the Defence

Act for failure to attend training were more likely to be

directed against working class boys than against boys of

5 the upper classes.

Despite the introduction of universal training, the

traditional class bias in selecting officers also

continued. 6 On occasions it was evident even in the A.I.F.

For example, in 1915, Private Savige, later a General,

3Quoted in L.C. Jauncey, op.cit., p. 43.

4Ibid.

5Ibid., p. 85.

6 B. Gammage, The Broken Years Australian Soldiers In the Great War (Canberra, 1974), p. 241.

172

believed that selection for officer training was largely

a matter of influence rather than merit. In his diary he

wrote:

On the second-last day we were lined up when the Adjutant called out "Private , one pace forward." Two men stepped out. The Adjutant looked puzzled and then said, "I want , the son of a certain mining manager." The right one was selected and marched into

7 the officers' school the following Monday.

Nor ~7ere Savige 's suspicions unfounded. On 8 Noverober

1917 Keith Murdoch wrote to General Birdwood:

As you know I am one of the very last to ask for anything in the way of personal favours, but I am sorely tempted to ask you now \'ihether anything can be done in the following case:-A young Melbourne lad, public school boy (Melbourne Church of England Grammar School) , brother of a lad killed at Anzac, is with the Fourth Division's aiDmunition column. He has brains, a good education, ambition, and I think many of the best qualities for good work as an officer. His father, the Hon. Theodore Fink, is a member of the Victorian State War Council, one of the most influential and best known of Melbourne men, chairman of directors of the Melbourne Herald and other companies, and a good Australian patriot ..•. a

Unfortunately for Gunner Thorold Fink, Bird-.;·IOod did not

respond favourably to Murdoch's request, and he managed

to obtain only the rank of bombardier before returning to

Australia on 14 January 1919. Wilfrid Kent Hughes,

however, had been more successful when he approached his

uncler Brigadier-General Frederic Hughes, about

transferring from the 7th Battalion A.I.F. to his uncle's

3rd Light Horse Brigade. On 1 April 1915 he ceased to be

7auoted in W.B. Russell, There Goes A Man The Biography of Sir Stanley G. Savige (London, 1959), p. 31.

8 Keith Murdoch papers, A.N.L., MS 2823/23.

173

a platoon sergeant and became a 2nd lieutenant and

orderly officer, or practically aide-de-camp, to his

uncle. 8a

The social selection for rank was true for the A.I.F.

as a whole, as L.L. Robson9 has shown. The commercial,

clerical, professional and pre-war army occupational

groups provided significantly large numbers of officers.

Men employed in primary production included officers and

N.C.O.s in proportion to the overall number of men from

these occupations in the A.I.F. but men from the ranks

of labourers and miners were significantly under-

represented among the N.C.O.s and officers. Extremely few

labourers became officers in the A.I.F. 10

Obviously, on purely pragmatic grounds, it was

perhaps to be expected that the better educated would

provide the officers and N.C.O.s (especially in cases

such as in the Engineers, Medical and Veterinary Corps

whereprofessional qualifications were, of course,

essential). However, the discrepancies are too large to

be explained entirely in this way and anyhow the best

educated do not necessarily make the best junior leaders

on the battlefield. 11 In L.L. Robson's sample, 12 labourers

BaF. Howard, Kent Hughes A Biography of Colonel The Hon. Sir Wilfrid Kent Hughes (South Melbourne, 1972), p. 14.

9 'The Origin and Character Of The First A.I.F., 1914-1918: Some Statistical Evidence', Historical Studies, Vol. 15, No. 61 (October 1973), pp. 737-49.

10rbid., p. 748.

11This is implied in J. Keegan, op.cit., p. 272.

12op.cit., p. 748.

174

provided 24 per cent of the other ranks, but only 15 per

cent of the N.C.O.s and 3 per cent of the officers; while

professional men provided 20 per cent of the officers, 6

per cent of the N.C.O.s and 4 per cent of the other ranks.

There are further grounds for suspecting that citizen

officers in both World Wars were not always selected on

merit. In World War I two-thirds of the most senior

citizen force officers came from a professional or business

background; in World War II the proportion rose to

three-quarters. Of these First World War senior citizen

force officers, 25 per cent were educated at state

secondary schools, while 40 per cent of Second World War

senior citizen force officers were educated at state

secondary schools. The expansion of state secondary

education since 1910 partly explains this increase. 13

Of the 1914-18 group (of sixty senior citizen force

officers), forty-five attended private schools. Twenty-

four of the sixty went to Headm~sters' Conference

schools and twelve came from four top schools in Sydney,

Melbourne and Brisbane. Of the 1939-45 group (of eighty

senior citizen force officers), fifty-three attended

private schools. Twenty-nine of them went to Headmasters'

Conference schools and fifteen attended five leading

schools in Sydney, Melbourne, Perth and Adelaide. In

addition, twenty-one were university graduates and twenty­

seven had other tertiary qualifications. 14

13s. Encel, ~.cit., pp. 144-5.

L4fbid., p. 145.

175

Naturally, the labouring classes were again under­

represented as this table illustrates: 15

Civilian occupations of senior 1914-18 1939-45 citizen force officers group group

Professional 26 39 Business (directors and managers) 14 23 Farmers and graziers 14 4 Government officials 6 8 Others 6

60 80

Significantly, however, by World War II the proportion of

farmers and graziers becoming senior citizen force officers

had dropped from 23 to 5 per cent. The day of the local

grazier leading his 'employee-Volunteers' into action

seemed over. Nevertheless, perhaps inevitably, class bias

in the selection of officers had continued during the

1920s and 1930s.

THE SOCIAL SELECTION OF OFFICERS BETWEEN THE WARS: THEORY

On 18 October 1926, in a letter to Lieutenant-Colonel

Wiltshire, Captain W.G. Laver suggested ways in which the

- d b d . 16 C.M.F. couL e rna e more attract1ve. Laver was

interested only in the officers and N.C.O.s. In his view,

tailored uniforms and more public displays were the

answer. Lord Mayors, State and Federal Governments were

to recognise senior officers of the C.M.F.

15Ibid.

16 In 37th/39th. Inf.Bn. Years 1923 to 1939. 11. Bundles of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.). However, this letter seems to belong to some 24th Bn confidential correspondence.

176

Admittedly, Captain Laver was writing at a time when

suitable officers were apparently difficult to obtain17

and when compulsory military training was in force. At

this time the volunteer element in units other than

light horse regiments tended to be confined to N.C.O.s

and officers, because trainees who had completed their

obligatory service (and who had not gained any rank) were

d . . 18 not encourage to cont1nue serv1ng. Nevertheless, it

does seem that Captain Laver was extremely conscious of

the social status of officers and N.C.O.s and that he

would have wanted recruits to have his middle class values

and attitudes. It is important to note here that all

Australian C.M.F. officers w~re commissioned only after

having served in the ranks. 19

Almost a decade after Captain Laver wrote his letter,

a Militia N.C.O. confirmed that some officers were

conscious of their social status. He was concerned

about the failure of voluntary training and attributed

this failure largely to the lack of interest shown by

instructors. He ended his scathing remarks about

instructors with the claim that some officers were

17see Lieutenant-Colonel P.M. McFarlane (Director of Organization and Personal Services) Provision of Officers for the Citizen Forces, (Circular Memorandum M.B. No. 558/1926), 9 Septerrber 1926. 37th/39th. Inf.Bn. Years 1923 to 1939. 11. Bundles of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.).

18Major-General Bruche to the Secretary (Department of Defence) on 20 October 1927 in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 929/19/566.

19under the terms of the Defence Act (1903-27 & 1903-39) Section llA.

177

snobbish and were inclined to forget all the work they

had learned while serving in the ranks. In fact, the men

ft k b t th t . . th th ff' 20 o en new more a ou e ra1n1ng an e o 1cers.

In a minute to the Secretary of the Department of

Defence on 12 November 1935, 21 Adjutant-~eneral Jess

replied to the N.C.O.'s criticisms by claiming that:

Some cases of snobbishness must be presumed to occur in any large organization ... but this trait is sternly repressed .•. [when] brought to notice.

However, Major-General Jess had earlier written, in the

same minute, that the N.C.O. 's comments 'could only apply

locally', while admitting ·that in the case of isolated

detachments it was often difficult to obtain suitable

officers. As a member of the Military Board and as a

senior regular officer responsible for administering the

Militia, Jess could hardly have adrni·tted the justice of

the N.C.O. 's claims in any case.

Yet there is clearer evidence for both the social

consciousness and social selection of Militia officers at

this time. On 12 June 1936 the C.O. of the 20th Light

Horse Regiment argued for the formation of a light car troop

20 This anonymous N.C.O. 's letter was attached to a letter addressed to the Minister for Defence (Archdale Parkhill) by the State Secretaries of the Diggers Association of Queensland on 12 September 1935. A copy may be found in A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 929/19/115. See above, pp. 149-50.

21 rn A.A.A.: MP 431/1, file 929/19/115. See above, pp. 151-3.

178

t Sh t th th S 22 a eppar on ra er an eymour.

After mentioning that Seymour was an industrial town

with a majority of railway employees, the Major wrote:

It is noted that permission is given to use motor trucks or large cars, which certainly allows a greater range of choice in enlistment but against this it is submitted that a better type of man would be procured from amongst light car owners.

The possession of a light car would imply a certain degree

of leisured wealth, as opposed to a truck owner who may

well have had to earn his living through the use of his

vehicle. Naturally, wealthy single men would be more

likely to drive light two-seat cars than men with families

who would require a larger vehicle. 23

At a time, 1 March 1935 - 1 December 1936, when the

basic weekly wage in Melbourne was 66s,24

a new Morris

8/40 cost £298 (plus sales tax) ; 25 a Morris 25/80 h.p.

£442 10s; 26 a six cylinder Oldsmobile sedan £432 27 and a

Packard '120' standard sedan £685 (plus sales

22 rn a minute to the 3rd Cavalry Brigade. A.A.A.: MP 358/3, file 106/2/235.

23During the First ~~Torld War, and in fact until early in the Second World War, the British army used modified civilian light cars for liaison, co~~unications and reconnaissance. As in other fields the Australian army followed suit. Major-General R.N.L. Hopkins, Australian Armour A History Of The Royal Australian Armoured Corps 1927-1972 {Canberra, 1978), pp. 12-13 & 21; B.H. Vanderveen (ed.), The Observer's Army Vehicles Directory To 1940 (London, 1974), p. 181; B.H. Vanderveen {ed.), The Observer's Fighting Vehicles Directory World War II (London, 1969), p. 126 and B.H. Vanderveen (ed.), A Source Book of Military Wheeled Vehicles (London, 1972), p. 44.

24Quarterly Summary of Australian Statistics, Bulletin No. 148 (June 1937), p. 74.

25 S.M.H., 29 October 1936.

26 Ibid., 16 October 1936.

27 Ibid.

179

tax) . 28 Even secondhand cars were relatively expensive.

In 1936, a late 1933 model Hillman Minx roadster was

advertiied for £185 29 and a late 1935 Hillman Minx sedan

30 for £265. However, secondhand Austin 7 h.p. cars could

cost as little as £68 (for a roadster) 31 and £85 (for a

saloon). 32

But any doubts as to the C.O. 's motives are dispelled

when we see how he deliberately mentions the social back-

grounds of the two soldiers he recommends for command of

the troop. The Major wrote:

For cormnand of the Troop I 'l.vould recommend Sgt. G. Ferguson, M.G. Tp. 20 L.H. Sgt. Ferguson's people are landowners living in the district, and, while still retaining his interest in the property, he is acting as Agent for a firm of Stock and Station Agents, and living in Shepparton. He is one of the smartest N.C.O 's in the Regiment, and one whom I would have no hesitation in recommending for Commissioned rank.

For rank of Troop Sgt. I would recommend L/Cpl. James. James' people are well known in Shepparton, his father being a member of the Town Council and an ex-Mayor. James is of Public School education, and possesses an Air Pilot's Certificate, and I regard him as a prospective officer.33

Both James and Ferguson were clearly members of the upper

middle class or above as indicated by their families'

occupations.

28rbid., 3 November 1936.

29 {Melbourne] Age, 26 June 1936.

30Ibid.

31 b'd I 1. • , 27 June 1936.

32 Ibid.

33 See p. 178 n. 22.

180

The c.o. of the 20th Light Horse Regiment was not

alone in his opinion of who would make suitable recruits

and leaders. On 25 May 1936, the Assistant Adjutant and

Quartermaster-General of the 2nd Cavalry Division wrote to

h 3 d 1 . d 34 t e r Cava ry Br1ga e:

Personnel. It is desired that you should include, as far as possible, men of the Light Horse type as opposed to the townsman .... The scouts definitely should be country men.

There can be no objection to the order that the scouts

should be raised from among the rural population, because

it is reasonable to assume that countrymen would be more

used to observing movement in the bush than urban dwellers.

But the reasoning behind the recruitment of N.C.O.s and

officers from the rural 'light horse type' is suspect.

The Assistant Adjutant maintained that this v1as

necessary so that when they were promoted, these commanders

would be suitable for postings elsewhere within the

Regiment. Therefore the commanders should be able to

participate in ordinary cavalry training. Nevertheless,

this statement, when coupled with the later one in the

same minute:

Full advantage should be taken of this opportunity to secure a really good officer for this troop. He should be judged from a cavalry standpoint first, and from a knowledge of motors second.

34This was in reply to a minute from the Light Horse Regiment dated 12 May 1936. in A.A. A.: .t'JP 385/3, file 106/2/229.

c.o. of the 20th Both minutes are

181

forces one to realize that not only is the horse cavalry

spirit being carefully guarded against the advent of

motorization, despite the Military Board's advocacy of

. . 35 b 1 h h . . , motor1zat1on , ut a so t at t e soc1al compos1t1on of

the light horse units is being as carefully preserved. 36

Of course, this was in keeping with the British army's

practice. For instance, the textbook Cavalry Training

(Mechanised) 1937, p. 13 argued:

It is of the greatest importance that all leaders should be trained: 1. To act quickly and make

rapid decisions; with this object officers will be encouraged to hunt 37 and ride across country.

In fact, Australia's senior Citizen Force general

endorsed this point of view. Writing to Lieutenant-

Colonel H.C. de Low on 7 June 1935, Major-General Bennett

stated:

••. The present system of selecting officers from amongst those vlho have served in the ranks is wrong. It would be better to select officers according to their personality, character and position, and then to train them for their task. In this way men in the ranks would have greater respect for their officers.

Without being snobbish in any way I believe that the Australian working man has more respect for a 'sahib' who is a true gentleman and has education and breeding, and would [r]ather serve under him than under one of his own class. The remedy for this lies vli th the politician who, unfortunately, believes in so-called

35see ch. 7.

36 It will be recalled that light horsemen had to have some means since they had to provide their own mounts.

37 Quoted from T. Wintringham, New Ways of War (Harmondsworth,

August 1940), p. 34.

182

democracy and is not willing to jettison the democratic principles introduced with the Universal Training Act.38

THE SOCIAL SELECTION OF OFFICERS. BETWEEN THE WARS: PRACTICE

Despite the fact that Australian citizen officers

had to have served first in the ranks, the British tradition

of the 'gentleman officer• 39 was firmly upheld in Australia.

Hence it is not surprising that the social backgrounds

of senior citizen officers tended to be middle class, i.e.

engaged in commerce or the professions, or upper class,

wealthy landowners, and that they tended to be educated

at private schools and universities.

Brigadier E.F. Lind went to Melbourne University and

was commissioned in Melbourne University Rifles in 1911

before serving with the 1st A.I.F. and then holding a

40 series of A.M.F. commands. Colonel E.S. Anderson

attended Helbourne Church of England Grammar School,

served with the 1st A.I.F. and worked for B.H.P. while

continuing to serve with the A.M.F. after 1922. 41 His

namesake, Lieutenant-Colonel G.H. Anderson, gunner

commanding officer, also served in the 1st A.I.F. and

d b . . d . h. A M ' 42 manage a roadcast1ng stat1on ur1ng lS •. F. serv1ce.

38 In Lieutenant-General H.G. Bennett, Correspondence 1924-1941, Vol. M.L. MSS 807/2, item 69.

39J. Keegan, op.dit., p. 220. See also, C.B. Otley, 'Militarism And The Social Affiliations Of The British Army Elite', in J. van Doorn (ed.), op.cit., pp. 84-108.

40J.A. Alexander (ed.), Who's lilho In Australia (XIth edn, Melbourne, 1941), p. 417. The ranks men·tioned are those held in 1941.

41Ibid. I p. 75.

42 Ibid. I p. 76.

183

Cavalry traditionally has attracted the social

elite, such as the wealthy MacArthur-Onslows, and it is

therefore to be expected that cavalry divisional commander

Major-General J.D. Richardson should have attended Sydney

Grammar School and Hawkesbury Agricultural College. He

was a grazier and a dairy farmer. 43 Major-General G.J.

Rankin was also an A.M.F. cavalry divisional commander

44 and a farmer. Both generals had served in the 1st A.I.F.

h ld S d ld h . 45 Between t e two lvor Nars a y ney a erman, an arc 1 teet,

a dentist, an accountant, a company director, a grazier

and a civil engineer commanded the Royal New South ~'7ales

Lancers. One of these c.o.s rose to command the 1st

Cavalry Division in the 1930s and another commanded the

4 h 1 . d 46 t Cava ry Br1ga e.

While infantry divisional co:rrl!'"Ilanders, Hajor-Generals

Sir I.G. Mackay and H.G. Bennett also had expensive

educations, other infantry commanders carne from poorer

backgrounds. Mackay, the son of a Presbyterian Minister,

went to Newington College, St Andrew's College and Sydney

University before lecturing at Sydney University and

later becoming headmaster of Cranbrook Schoo1. 47

43 rbid., pp. 565-6.

44 rbid., p. 559.

45This was H.V. Vernon whose grandfather had commanded the Regiment bet\veen 1903 and 1906 and whose son was to cornmand it in 1951-52. See, P.V. Vernon (ed.), op.c~t., pp. 334-6, 339 & 344.

46 rbid., pp. 339-42.

47who's Who In Australia, 1941, p. 445; A.W. Bazley & G. Long. 'Iven Giffard Mackay: Citizen Soldier', Australian Army Journal, No. 218 (July 1967), pp. 2 & 11; I. Chapman, op.cit., passim.

184

Bennett, the son of a school teacher, attended Melbourne's

Hawthorn College before becoming an accountant. 48 Brigadier

S.G. Savige attended Korumburra State School, as well as

having a private tutor, and had a hard struggle to develop

his own small business, 49 while Major-General lvlorshead,

the son of a miner, was educated at State schools in

Ballarat before attending Melbourne Teachers' College.

Prior to World War I he taught at The Armidale School

and between the Wars was a manager with the Orient Line. 50

As might be expected of a University Regiment, the

C.O.s of Sydney University Regiment, like those of the

Royal New South \•Jales Lancers, came from the social elite.

Of the six C.O.s of the Regiment, during the 1920s and

1930s, only one attended a public school. The remainder

were educated at private schools. Three of these C.O.s

were lawyers, one was a medical officer, one a bacteriolo-

51 gist and one a N.S.W. government analyst.

In practice, as well as theory therefore, the Citizen

Forces' officers were drawn from the social elite during

the 1920s and 1930s, although social status and expensive

formal education are not necessarily the prerequisites for

successful military leaders or commanders. The social

composition and rank structure of Militia units followed

the pattern set by the officer corps.

48vnw's Who In Australia, 1941, p. 108; F. Legg, op.cit., passim.

49who's Who In Aus·tralia, 1941, p. 589; W.B. Russell, op.c1t., passim.

50J.H. Moore, Morshead -a biography of Lieut. General Sir Leslie Morshead (Sydney, 1976), passim.

51A.B. Lilley, §_ydney UnJ.versity Regiment (Limited edn, n. P.· , 19 7 4) , pp. 54-6 5.

185

THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION AND RANK STRUCTURE OF MILITIA UNITS

Some evidence of the social composition of Militia

units is provided by the accidentally preserved records

of Victorian units. Three units of the 3rd Division went

to camp early in 1938 and their records of absentees

are extant. The 3rd Division's Signals had a strength

of 205 men. Of these, 85 failed to attend camp. They

represented 49 trades or professions, ranging from a

university student to a debt collector. 52

Because no ranks were given in Captain Hall's report,

one cannot say more than that this sample of almost 41

per cent of the unit's strength was drawn from men

representing a large variety of trades, including

electricians, motor mechanics, woodworkers and a musician.

This wide range of trades was to be expected in a

technical unit. 53 Most members, to~ seem to have been

employees. Certainly the 18 clerks were employed in a

collection of large and small businesses, and Captain

54 Hall implied that most absentees were employees.

Between 7 and 12 February 1938, the 37/39th

Battalion held a camp of continuous training at Mornington.

52captain D.A. Hall, Report On Attendance Camp Of Training (Appendix A, Schedule Of Trades Etc. Showing The Number Absent From Camp), Signals 3rd Division, Albert Park Reserve, South Melbourne, 31 March 1938 to H.Q. 3rd Division in 3rd Aust. Div. Sigs. Year 1937. 18. Bundles of Files. File No. 417/20/31. Part II. (A.W.M.).

53Though not the musician of course.

54 See above, n. 52.

186

134 of the battalion's total of 302 members were absent,

. h . h 1 55 w1t or w1t out eave. The absentees came from these

trades:

Salesmen and travellers 20 Mechanics and engineering trade employees 15 Food trades (grocers, butchers, bakers, dairymen,

market gardeners) 19 Building and allied trades 13 Labourers 18 Clerks 11 Hairdressers 4 Miscellaneous (possibly mainly labourers or clerks) 34

134

It is impossible to discover now whether there was

any rational reason for distinguishing between barbers and

hairdressers or between travellers and travelling salesmen

for example. In general, however, the officers and

N.C.O.s seem to have come from the more prestigious trades

or to have been wealthier. For instance, one of the two

absent lieutenants was a jeweller, while the other was an

estate agent. The estate agent apparently owned a small

business which he ran with the help of his brother, who

was a captain.

The warrant officer owned a boot-making business,

while the corporal florist also owned his enterprise.

The mantle manufacturer corporal worked in his father's

factory. Some privates also possessed their own

businesses. This was certainly the case with one of the

carriers and the grainer, as well as with one of the

carpenters and a traveller.

55Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding 37/39th Battalion, Report On Attendances. Camps Of Continuous Training. (Including Proforma "A"), H.Q. 37/39th Battalion, Hawthorn to H.Q. lOth Infantry Brigade, 5 April 1938 in 37th/39th. Aust. Inf. Bn. Year 1937 to 1938. 16. Bundles of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.).

187

This would seem to contradict the general proposition

that rank and social position were often linked. But, it

is perhaps significant that only one labourer, out of the

thirteen absentee labourers, held any rank whatsoever

and that was the minor appointment of lance-corporal.

Admittedly, in common with the rest of the absentees, the

labourers had enlisted only comparatively recently56

and many had not attended much home training. In one

instance, indeed, a labourer had paraded for only half

a day out of the six days prescribed for home training.

The 8th Field Brigade held its camp of continuous

training at Seymour between 21 and 26 February 1938. At

that time the 8th Field Brigade, a field artillery unit,

had a total strength of 292 men consisting of 17 officers,

59 N.C.O.s and 216 other ranks. A total of 124 artillery-

men, 3 officers and 121 rank and file, were absent from

the camp. Most of the absentees, 96 in fact, had enlisted

during 1935, 1936 and 1937. 57 Here again 1 with the 103

members of the Brigade absent with leave, there appears

to be a correlation between rank and social position or

wealth. This is not to say that rank was solely a

function of social status because, obviously, some of the

leadership and man management qualities of a successful

businessman were equally important to military commanders

whether in peace or war.

56The majority in 1935 and 1936.

57c.o., 8th Field Brigade, Report On Attendances- Camps Of Training. (Including Proformae "A" & "B"), H.Q. 8th Field Brigade, North Carlton, 1 April 1938 to R.A.A., 3rd Division in 3rd Div. R.A.A. 8th Fld Brde. Year 1937. 17. Bundles of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.).

1B8

Once again, labourers tended not to hold rank or to

hold only the most junior N.c.o. positions. A lance­

sergeant, who was a labourer, was the exception. But a

lance-sergeant, after all, was merely a substantive

bombardier, or corporal in the infantry, vlho received

the pay of a bombardier together with the duties and

privileges of a sergeant. With the exception of the

lance-sergeant, the labourers appear to have completed

little home training and to have enlisted within the

last three years. However, an engineer, who enlisted

five months after the lance-sergeant labourer in 1932,

held the higher rank of sergeant.

Significantly, the staff sergeant tailor was a

master tailor, whereas the other tailors and the pressers,

who also seem to have been tailors, held lower ranks.

There is no question of seniority b~sed on long service

here either, because the sergeant, who was also a tailor,

enlisted nearly a year before the staff sergeant. But, in

this case, the man was probably deliberately selected

for his craftsmanship and placed in his posting of unit

tailor immediately upon enlistment. Units vlere permitted

to recruit their tailors in this way because the tailors

obviously did not need to know any infantry or artillery

tactics in order to be able to discharge efficiently

their function of altering and repairing uniforms.

Fittingly, the artificer sergeants were similarly

drawn from munitions, and gun and carriage, inspectors.

These were technical craftsmen's ranks. The three

189

lieutenants also held responsible positions in civil

life. One owned a news agency, another managed Harrison's

Soft Drinks, while the third was a radio inspector. Of

the two brigade quartermaster-sergeants, one managed a

garage and the other was a moulder.

As with the 37/39th Battalion, so in the 8th Field

Brigade there seems to have been a correlation, not

necessarily causal, between civil occupation, social

standing and Militia rank. The twenty-one wBrnbers of the

8th Field Brigade, who were absent \'lithout leav:; from the

camp at Seymour, also exhibit the same connection.

Practically all of the twenty-one had enlisted during

1935 and 1936, and, as the table below indicates, their

civil occupations and military rank appear to have been

equally lowly. Was this because they were mainly young

men just beginning their civil and military careers? The

extant documents do not specifically say so. However,

the recruiting drive of 1936 attracted young men rather

than older ones.

SEE OVER FOR TABLE

190

.Trade Rank

Lance Bombardier

Gunner Driver

Boot Trade Butcher Electrician Engineer Grocer Labourer Mechanic Pastry Cook Pattern Cutter Presser Rope Trade Salesman Textile Worker Upholsterer

1 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 .1.

1

It is also probable that the trade classifications here

were those given by the Militiamen themselves. Hence arose

the peculiar distinctions between textile operators and

textile workers given for members of the 8th Field Brigade

who \'lere absent with leave.

The Central Army Records Office in Melbourne holds

records of service which prove that the experience of the

three Victorian Militia units, cited above, was not unique.

58 Although records for N.S.W. officers only are extant,

they show that farmers, graziers, teachers, engineers,

doctors, dentists and ministers of religion provided

many officers. Of course, the majority of the officers

of the last three professions· were specifically recruited

to make use of their special qualifications within the

A.M.F. It should also be emphasized that the professions

58And these mainly for officers on the Reserve of Officers anyway.

191

listed may have been those held at the time when the

officers were transferred to the Reserve of Officers

rather than those held when first commissioned. 59 A

medical student, a miner, a turner, a police constable

and a photographer were among those who received

commissions although, unfortunately, not all the officers

have their civil profession or employment shown. Many of

the officers,too, were first commissioned during World

War I. 60

Fortunately, the records of service for other ranks

are slightly better preserved. These show that, for most

States throughout the 1930s, the Militia tended to recruit

single men from the 18 to 21 years age group. This was

particularly the case during the late 1938 and 1939

. . d . 61 recru1t1ng r1ves. Of course, by then such young men

would have had no direct experience of combat during the

First World War.

Even these records indicate a correlation between

rank and social standing. Of the three Militiamen known

to have been commissioned62 between 1933 and 1940, one

was a news agent's assistant and later assistant town

clerk, one a wool clerk and the third an engineer.

Similarly, the warrant officer class II was a saddle

tree manufacturer, while the band sergeant was a builder's

59c.A.R.O., Officers' Record of Service (A.M. Form A.98), surnames beginning with A, E, Y and Z.

60Ib. -ld..

61 C.A.R.O., Other Ranks' Record of Service (A.A.F. A.7), boxes 75 & 76.

62 h . d f . 'b. d b 76 From t e1r recor so. serv1ce, ~., ox .

192

contractor and one staff sergeant a chemist. The other

staff sergeant was a painter. 63

There is little doubt that the Militia of the 1930s

followed the traditions of the nineteenth century British

army and Australian Volunteers when it came to preserving

social distinctions. Basically, the officers were

recruited from the better-off socio-economic classes

while those less fortunate provided the junior N.C.O.s and

privates. Some officers approved of this situation.

Of course, leaving aside any ideas of natural justice,

the correlation between rank and social status in itself

may not have been bad. However, it may be doubted whether

men with prestigious commercial or professional backgrounds

invariably or even mostly, provided the most effective

military leaders, as the British found to their cost during

World War I.

63 rbid.

Today we have naming of parts. Yesterday,

We had daily cleaning. And tomorrow morning,

We shall have what to do after firing. But today,

Today we have naming of parts ..•.

Henry Reed, A Map of Verona

193

Chapter Six

The Training of the Citizen Soldier, 1918-39

During the inter-\i'Jorld vJar decades Australian army

leaders consistently argued that Australia faced the

possibility of invasion. In this way Australia's citizen

soldiers acquired an anti-invasion role: in particular,

the duty of repulsing Japanese landings in the Sydney­

Newcastle area~ But there was general agreement among

Australian soldiers that the training of the A.M.F. during

the 1920s and 1930s was not effective enough to enable it

to defeat an invasion, or even a large scale raid consisting

of a couple of thousand men. This chapter will examine

why this was the case, but we start with a note on the

nature of the evidence.

h . h . t 2 . d In t e prevlous c apter on recrultmen lt was argue

in passing that dull, repetitive or boring training might

have contributed significantly towards the high turnover

rate of Militia personnel. This problem will be reconsidered

here. However, the nature of the extant evidence makes any

analysis extremely tentative.

The bulk of the evidence for the training of the

citizen soldier is, of course, derived from military reports

usually written for the next higher headquarters at that

higher headquarters' request. For the 1920s and 1930s,

Chauvel's reports as Inspector-General, Military Board

Instructions and reports from various Victorian citizen force

1see ch. 2.

2see ch. 4.

194

. . f h 'd 3 un1ts prov1de most o t e ev1 ence.

The reason for relying so heavily upon such evidence

is that during the period betv;een the two World Wars

there was no comprehensive and relatively independent

inquiry, on the scale of the Millar report, into the

. t' f 4 c1 1zen orces, and many of the ex-Militia personnel

contacted by the writer either failed to reply or could

not recall their training in detail or had enlisted only

when war seemed inevitable in 1939. Speeches in Hansard,

newspaper reports and journal articles, however, provide

a useful supplement to official reports, on the rare

occasions when they are concerned with the actual process

of training the citizen soldier.

Since the citizen forces were organized, commanded

and equipped along British lines, 5 it is not surprising

to discover that their training copied that of the British

army. British training manuals were used, but the

tactical training (like the command, organization and

equipment of the citizen forces) was adapted to suit

Australian requirements where necessary.

THE EFFECTIVENESS AND AMOUNT OF TRAINING

Because the Militia never faced the ultimate test

of battle, on Australian shores, it is difficult to

gauge how effective it would have been. However, various

3The reports from these Victorian units were accidentally preserved and are now located in the Australian War.Hemorial.

4committee Of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces, Report (Canberra, March 1974). In passing, it may be noted that most recent C.M.F. and ex-C.M.F. members seemed quite satisfied with their training, ibid., annex C, p. 19 and annex D, pp. 10-ll. ----

5see chs 3 & 7.

195

sources indicate that in 1939 the Militia would have

been unable to fulfil its role of repelling a Japanese

invasion. In 1947, H.B.S. Gullett, a pre-1939 Militia-

man, stated in Parliament that:

From personal experience, I can say that the standard of the militia in pre-war days was so low that on the eve of the war the militia forces could not have undertaken the simplest military operation against a trained force with the least chance of success •••. They were a paper army, good for nothing for practical purposes except in the minor degree that they served as a training ground for officers.6

Another personal view has been expressed by Lieutenant­

Colonel E.G. Keogh7 (who served with the 24th Battalion

A.M.F. from 1923 until the outbreak of the Second World

War in September 1939, when he enlisted and fought with

various A.I.F. units and formations). According to him,

the training of soldiers under universal service was

• ••. a bloody waste of time ... ', although the training of

officers was quite good. ~~1en he arrived in the Middle

East he went on a staff course where he found that he:

•.. knew a dam[n] sight more about org[anization], staff work and tactics than the British regular regimental officers.B

Dr F. Kingsley Norris (who joined the Australian

Army Medical Corps as a provisional Captain in a Cavalry

6 C.P.D., Vol. 193, p. 273.

7This was his rank on retirement from the Australian Army after ~·Jorld vJar II.

8Letter to the writer dated 10 April 1974.

196

Field Ambulance in 1923 and who, twelve years later,

rose to command the 2nd Field Ambulance) 9 would have

agreed with Lieutenant-Colonel Keogh about the training

of citizen officers • In his autobiography he wrote:

••. Although our exercises were based on the lessons of World War I, so fundamental had been the principles that later when we were challenged in the desert, in the mountains and in the jungle, we realized how sound had been our training under the direction of [Colonel] Rupert Downes.lO

In 1950 the Directorate of Military Training expressed

the regular army's point of view in an article in the

Australian Army Journal. 11while the Directorate agreed

with Gullett and Keogh that the general standard of

Militia training was low, it did not agree that the training

of officers was even reasonable, let alone good. The

Directorate bluntly claimed that:

On paper the Militia Forces tin Australia in 1939] comprised a respectable array of formations and units. On the ground, however, these formations and units were too weak to provide useful experience for the leaders and not much more than elementary training for the troops.

These assertions clearly reveal that all was not well

with the training of citizen soldiers in Australia bettveen

the wars. What were the reasons for this? Did it have

9F. Kingsley Norris, No Memory For Pain an autobiography (Melbourne, 1970), pp. 90 & 100.

10Ibid., p. 91. Colonel Downes was the Deputy Director of Med1cal Services and the senior Army medical officer in Victoria. His military career had begun as a trumpeter in Sir Rupert Clarke's private artillery: 'The Rupertswood Battery', ibid., p. 90. See also ch. 1.

ll . · f 'l't T . . A H Q 'Tl B . f DJ.rectora1:.e o M1 1 ary ra1n1ng, . . . , 1e as1s o Expansion For War', Australian Army Journal, No. 12 (May 1950), p. 7.

197

anything to do with the amount of training, its objectives,

quality or type, and was the necessity for training

recognized?

During the 1920s the 2~ount of prescribed training

fluctuated greatly: a legacy of the First World War, when

the training of the A.I.F. had priority. Between 1

November 1915 and 1 July 1920, the home training of the

Citizen Forces was suspended for varying periods. 12 In

fact, it was not until 1920-21 that compulsory military

training was again prescribed. In that year the following

periods of training for citizen soldiers were authorized:

there was a half-day compulsory parade for the 1896, 1897

and 1898 quotas, although the N.C.O.s were permitted to

attend eight days home training. Four days compulsory

home training was ordered for the 1899, 1900 and 1901

quotas, while the 1902 quota had to do eight days continuous

training and four days home training. Voluntary

personnel were authorized to do eight days home training~ 3

Since all these different periods of prescribed training

refer to the amount for the whole year, it is clear that

the 1896, 1897 and 1898 quotas were being mustered

merely for inspection rather than for proper military

training.

Home training, as has already been mentioned, refers

to military training done at night or at weekends, usually

12 r.G.'s Report, Pt I, 31 May 1921, para. 51.

13Ib. ' ~., para. 50.

198

at the depot of the unit to which the soldier belongs.

Continuous training, however, is training undertaken on

successive days at a camp.

Unfortunately, the need for economy destroyed even

the inadequate programme outlined above. By July 1921,

all training for the 1896, 1897 and 1898 quotas had been

cancelled. The 1899, 1900 and 1901 quotas had their camps

cancelled and their home training reduced to four days.

Meanwhile, the 1902 and 1903 quotas had their training

reduced to four days home training and an eight day camp.

But, in December 1921, the 1899, 1900 and 1901 quotas each

lost a day's home training and the 1902 and 1903 quotas

had their camps reduced to six days. By February 1922,

however, all camp training had been cancelled. 14 Thus was

set the pattern which was to be repeated constantly during

the succeeding years.

The drive for economy was stimulated by the financial

burdens incurred during the First World War; 5 the downswing

in Australia's trading cycle which occurred in 1920-21; 6

and the possibility of electoral defeat if defence expenditure

17 were not reduced. In addition, the Country Party sought

economies in defence expenditure so that the savings could

be redirected into the rural sector~ 8 The short-lived

14Ibid., Pt I, 31 May 1922, para. 25.

15 See e.g. C.P.D., Vol. 97, p. 11587.

16E . . 1 ~.A. Boehm, Twent1eth Century E.::onom1c Deve opment In Australia {Camberwell V1.ctoria, 1971), p. 19. C.B. Schedvin, op.cit., p. 52.

17 R. Thornton, 'The Semblance Of Security: Australia And

The Washington Conference, 1921-22', Australian Outlook, Vol. 32, No. 1 {April 1978), pp. 68-9.

18 N. Gow, OP.cit., p. 126.

199

optimism surrounding the signing of the Washington

Conference treaties in December 1921 and February 1922

also helped stimulate retrenchment in defence expenditure.

By then (February 1922), only voluntary training

was being done~ 9 the voluntary weekend bivouacs proving

20 especially popular. Fortunately, however, by mid-1922

four days home training and six days camp training had

been authorized~ 1 Probably as a result of Chauvel's

d . 22 . . f h . . recommen at1on, camp tra1n1ng or t~e C1t1zen Forces was

increased from six to eight days during 1924~ 3 The citizen

soldier's training obligation remained at twelve days per

year, made up of four days home training and an eight

day camp, until Scullin's A.L.~ Government suspended

compulsory military service on 1 November 1929 as part of

A.L.P. policy. Simultaneously, all remaining camps for

24 the financial year 1929/30 were cancelled.

Chapter four contains detailed information about the

usual training periods during the 1930s, but it should

be re-emphasized here that the reduction in the period of

compulsory training, and also in the numbers of citizen

soldiers7 5 during 1921-22 was a result of the success of

19I.G. 's Report, Pt I, 31 May 1923, para. 60.

20 Ibid., para. 72.

21Ibid., Pt I, 31 May 1924, para. 18.

22 Ibid.

23Ibid., Pt I, 31 Hay 1925, para. 1.

24 Ibid., Pt I, 15 April 1930, para. 10.

25 d. See appen 1x B.

200

the Washington Conference of that year~ 6 The small

increases, both in the duration of continuous training

and in the size of the Citizen Forces in the mid-1920s

were part of the Bruce-Page Government's defence measures

f 11 . th 19 2 3 I ' 1 C f 2 7 o ow1ng e mper1a on erence. By then it had

been realized that the Washington Conference had not

solved the problem of Australia's future security and the

improved economic situation permitted an increase in defence

d. 28 expen 1ture.

During the 1920s and 1930s the amount of training

undertaken by citizen soldiers fluctuated widely. Especially

in the early 1920s and early 1930s when little, if any,

continuous training was prescribed, the actual amount of

training was patently insufficient to produce properly

drilled soldiers~ 9 Training objectives during these years,

however, did not change.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES AND THE TYPES OF TRAINING IN PRACTICE

The overriding objective of citizen soldier training in

the 1920s and 1930s was to produce efficient units capable

of repelling both raids and an invasion. It was to this

end that most planning and organization were directed~ 0 It

is little wonder, therefore, that the Military Board laid

26official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 16, 1923, p. 618.

27G. Long, op.cit., p. 9.

28 R. Thornton, op.cit., pp. 81-3.

29 See e.g. I.G.'s Report, Pt I, 31 May 1923, para. 58 and ibi~., Pt I, 15 Apr1l 1930, para. 36.

30 See above, chs. 2 & 3.

201

dmvn organization as one of the two aims of its training

instructions for 1920-21. The Board wanted the Citizen

Forces properly organized on the new divisional system,

which finally came into operation on 1 May 1921;1 so that

all units would be able to gain the maximum benefit from

32 the new training system.

The Military Board's second aim was to inaugurate a

new training system, under which the two phases of training

(namely individual and collective training) ~would be more

distinct than was possible u~der the previous system.

During the individual training stage the recruits were to

·be drilled by instructional staff in camps, while the

collective training phase was to be carried out by the

1 . 33 re evant un1t.

Organization and the inauguration of the new training

system were the two particular aims of the Military Board's

training instructions for 1920-21, but more general

training objectives, in the form of five principles, were

also included. Training had to be elementary, thorough,

progressive and of such a nature as to best establish the

organization of units and inculcate esprit de corps and

discipline. Training also had to be carefully planned and

prepared by all leaders to ensure that the best use was

made of the limited amount of time available and training

31 X 45 (5 April 1921). M. B. I. A 32 T 2 (26 October 1920). M. B. I. G 33 Ibid.

202

was to be done economically so that the results were

commensurate with the costs: 4

Notes on special courses of instruction for Citizen

Force officers and suggested syllabi followed;s but they

need not concern us here. Of far greater impo~tance was

the Military Board's definition of the general aim of all

training in its training instructions for 1921-22.

After quoting, in great detail, from the British Field

Service Regulations, Vol. II, Sec. I, that:

Success in War depends more on moral than on physical qualities. Neither numbers, armament, resources, nor skill can compensate for lack of courage, energy, determination, and the bold offensive spirit which springs from a national determination to conquer. The develop­ment of the necessary moral qualities is, therefore, the first object to be attained in the training of an Army. Next in importance are organization and discipline, the training of the mind and body, and skill-at-arms. The final essential is skilful, resolute and understanding leadership in every grade of Command ..•.

The Military Board boldly stated that:

The foundation of success in battle is training; that of training is organization, whilst the foundation of organization is a proper chain of responsibility.36

The Military Board's concentration upon material rather

than moral prerequisites is interesting and perhaps reflects

the difference in resources between a large regular

imperial army and a relatively small home defence citizen army.

34 Ibid.

35 d' G See appen 1x .

36 T M.B.I. G 61 (29 May 1921).

203

Throughout the inter-World War decades the Board

faithfully adhered to the concept that success in battle

was the ultimate aim of all military training~ 7 In

themselves, the training objectives laid down by the

Military Board appear to have been sound, but were they

put into practice?

The extant evidence shows that units did try to put

the Military Board's instructions on training into practice.

At a superficial level the Board's recommendations were

carried out through their repetition in unit orders. For

instance, the 5th Battalion's Standing Orders proclaimed

that training must be elementary, thorough and progressive,

while long periods of close order drill were to be avoided

b h d. 38 ecause t ey were te 1ous. The 16th Battery's Routine

Orders set out the training syllabi for gunners and

39 drivers for the unit's 1923 camp. These syllabi covered

most of the subjects which the Military Board, in 1920, had

suggested Citizen Force field artillery units should

40 study. Any subjects which were omitted in the 16th

Battery's camp training may already have been covered

during the unit's home training or, in the case of physical

training for example, may have been carried out between

reveille and 8.30 a.m. when the real training for the day

began.

37see also M.B.I. G.33 (25 June 1937).

38undated copy in A.A.A. : MP70/6, file Al6. See also appendix H.

39see appendix I.

40see appendix G.

204

Printed material was also used to fulfil the Military

Board's instructions by the help it gave in improving the

tactical training and knowledge of the A.M.F.'s leaders.

For instance, officers' aide-memoires were produced

(although that compiled by Major-General Gordon Bennett,

when he commanded the 2nd Division between 1926 and 1931,

was not approved of by the Director of Military Training,

41 who produced his own version a few months later apparently) .

Nevertheless, by 1938 these tactical cards were available

f 1 d . 'b . 42 or genera 1str1 ut1on.

Still on the subject of tactics, in 1935 the lOth

Infantry Brigade produced a series of training notes, which

covered the general topic of 'Protection'. Under this theme

the roles of flank and advanced guards were discussed as

well as protection against attack by aircraft and armoured

f . h . h. 1 43 1g t1ng ve 1c es.

Even on more practical levels, as was to be expected,

the Military Board's instructions were usually faithfully

followed. Naturally, the tactical exercises held to train

Militia officers were based on the Military Board's

appreciation of the likely roles for the A.M.F. The 2nd

41 F. Legg, op.cit., p. 147.

42see covering minute dated February 1938 by the Director of Military Training to all H.Q.s and a copy of an aide­memoire in A.A.A. : SP459/l, file 546/1/3671.

43copies were distributed to the 24th, 37/52nd and 39th Battalions, as well as to: Brigade H.Q. and the 4th Australian Field Artillery Brig·ade and lOth Field Engineer Company. A set of these notes 1s available in 24th Aust Inf Bn. Year 1935. 8. Bundle of Files. File No. 417/20/31 {J\.W.l-1.).

205

Military District's Senior Militia Officers' tactical exercise,

which was held from 25 to 28 January 1935, envisaged the engagement

of the A.M.F. in the repulsion of a Japanese landing (of approximately

20, 000 men with 54 field guns and 72 machine-grns) in the vicinity

f S ~ 44

o yaney.

'!he opening narrative contained the familiar argument that

Britain probably would not be able to send a fleet east of the Suez

canal, in this insta."lce, because Britain had gone to Germany 1 s aid,

under the tenns of the Locarno Pact, when Germany was attacked by

France for re-arming. While the United States maintained her

neutrality, Northland, which was suspected of having an alliance

with France, decided to take advantage of the situation and invade

al. 45 Austr 1a.

Senior Militia officers from the 1st and 2nd Divisions, as well

as from the 11th Mixed Brigade, participated in the exercise. 'Ihe

Staff Corps directing staff was led by the Chief of the General Staff

. 46 'th ch 1 d . . . t . . th th J.n person. W1 su ea ersrup, 1 t was no surpr1smg at e

exercise was based on b"le familiar invasion scenario.

Again, in the 4th Division's Senior Officers 1 tactical exercise

without troops, held in the 'Ibrquay area between 7 and 9 May 1937,

Japcu1 \vas the ene..rny. 'Ihe opening narrative proclaimed:

Relations betvveen P..DSTRALIA and NA.VALIA, an overseas first-class Power, have been strained chiefly o..vi.11g to Empire trade preferences arising out of the ottawa Conference. 4 7

44see A.A.A. : MP431/l, file 929/24/91. Japan, incidentally, vlas thinly disguised as Northland.

45Ibid.

46Ibid.

47A copy of the exercise narrative is available in A.A.A. file A42.

MP70/6,

206

As if that was not s:pecific enough, fictitious names such as Major

Fujiyama., Major Yukio Tani and Colonel I.Y. Batamato were used~B

Hat~ever, this time the Australian officers had to see themselves as

Japanese corrmanders attacking Qu.eenscliff from an advanced base which

had be . ed . . 49 en se1z 1n Tasman1a.

'Ihe exercise tested the use of anroured fighting vehicles

(including both tanks and anroured cars), anti-tank guns, anti-

aircraft wear:ons and reconnaissance aircraft in the phases of war.

Of oourse, this \vas in addition to examining the senior officers'

ability to plan the deployment of the older infantry, artillery and

1 . h h . 50 1g~t orse un1ts.

'Ihe Military Board's 'Special Training Instructions 1936-37' had

s:pecified that tactical exercises without troops were to be oonducted

in coastal areas, or in wooded country wib"'l. similar vegetation, until

such tirne as formation comnanders felt that their officers were

capable of instructing other ranks in the problems of beach defence

and of attack and defence in wooded areas. Then, camps were to be

held in coastal areas~1

'Ihe reasons for oonducting camps in coastal areas obviously lay

in the Military Board 1 s appreciation that the A.M. F. should becorre

familiar with the terrain it would have to operate in, in order to

fulfil its anti-invasion and anti-raid roles~2 The 'S:pecial Training

Instructions for 1938/39 1 were even rrore explicit. Not only did they

state that:

48Ibid.

49Ibid.

50Ibid.

5] ~l.B.I. G.SQ {1 July 1936).

52 Ibid.

207

Where· practicable, units will conduct training jn

coastal areas, with st:ecial reference to the role that they are likely to be called up:m to t:erfo:r::m after mobilization.

But also that:

Where formations have not already held camps on the site selected for their mobilization, it is desired tl1at consideration be given to the advisability of doing so next year. 53

FollCMing these instructions, in 1937 and 1938 various battalions

in the . 5th . Mili ta_ry District studied the problem of beach defence

during carrps at their war stations. 'Ihe 11th and 16th Battalions

familiarized themselves with the defence of FDttnest Island, and

the 28th and 44t.~ Battalions with the seaside around Rockingham~4

In fact, the training undertaken by these battalions should have

been quite exciting. In one early noming e.,.'{ercise, the 11th

Battalion engaged and sank targets rroored at sea with small anus

fire. 'Ihe 16th Battalion carried out a similar beach defence exercise,

55 as well as opp:Jsing a landing of troops from H.M.A.S. Yarra.

Meanwhile, on Australia's easte.rn coast, troops were being

taught ha.v to launch a seaborne assault. On 31 January and 1

February 1937, about five hundred Militiamen, including ITEmbers of

Sydney University Regiment, participated in a landlng exercise at

Jervis Bay. 'Ihe soldiers were landed from the cruisers H.M.A.S.

Australia, canberra and Sydney, while three destroyers provided

56 additional supp:Jrt. No doubt the scene was remL"liscent of C-allit:oli.

53M.B. I. G. 21 (25 May 1938).

54Brigadier (Commandant 5 M.D.) to the Secretary (of the Military Board) Permanent Units And Establis:b.ments - 5 M.D. Inst:ector-Ge."leral's Corrments, H.Q., SWan Barracks, Perthr 13 December 1938 in A.A.A. : .HP 729/6, file 2/405/3.

55 Ibid.

56Major (Brevet Lieuta~ant-Oolonel) J.E. Lee (General Staff, 2nd Division) '"Anzac Cove", A Naval lmd Military Occasion', The Citizen Soldier Of Australia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (June 1937) , pp. 22-.3 & 28.

208

'Ib be sure these units would not have needed the Military

.Board 1 s reminder that training should be both interesting and

progressive~? Artillery and infantry units co-operati.11g with the

R.A.A.F. would also have found it difficult to make training

uninteresting, especially since aircraft were still a novelty. Since

the R.A.A.F. 1 s role was to oo-operate with the Arrrrj in local defence,

it is not surprising that there are rrany instances of Airforce - Army

co-operation in training during the inter-W:>rld War decades.

During 1926-27, for instance, some artillery brigades had

aircraft directing their fire~8 In January 1934, the anti-aircraft

battery comnanded by Major M. Gibson succeeded in shooting dawn a

silk sleeve target towed by a westland Wapiti general purpose

59 aeroplane. 'Ihis event occurred off North Head, Sydney. On 18 August

1937 R.A.A.F. Hawker Demons from Richmond dropped supplies during

Sydney Universit.y Regirrent's annual camp at Liverpx>l~O

But even basic infantry training could be made both interesting

and realistic, if a little imagination were used, as the following

examples illustrate. In order to exercise section COirrra.J.J.ders in:

leading their sections, indicating targets, judging distances a.J.d

57 M.B. I. G. 33 (25 June 1937}.

58eaptain (Staff Corps; Brigade Major, 3rd Divisional Artillery} to 2nd, 4th and 8th Brigade Australian Field Artillery, extracts from the Annual Report of the Chief Instructor Artillery Schools of Instruction for the year 1926-27, 21 July 1927 in 8th Field Regt. Year 1925. 10. Bundle of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.).

59 I. M::.:>ore, 1 Anti -Aircraft' , The Navy , Arrrrj and Air Force Journal, 'Ihe Staff Organ of the Depart:rrent of Defen.ce in Australia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (l Marcil 1934), pp. 3-4. The article originally ap:p=ared in the S.M.H.

60'Ihe Citizen Soldier Of Australia, Vol. 1, No. 4 (September 1937} , p. 23.

209

fire control, while simultaneously practis.L1g the whole section in

the use of ground in tr.e attack and in co-operation between Lewis

mac..,.ine-gunners and riflemen, Sydney University Regirrent conducted a

series of platoon live-fire attacks in August 1933. These attacks,

which involved D.~e use of ball ammunition against enemy rosi tions

.represented by targets, were carried out at the Green Hills field

f . . dn 61 1rmg range near Sy ey.

'IWo years later, cables, microphones and amplifiers, to be

replaced in 1937 by the more mobile radio telephones and amplifiers,

were being used as teaching aids. During an attack exercise, the

assaulting troops walked along the cable, while their comnanders

delivered their orders through the microphones. The soldiers not

participa.ting in the exercise were gathered around the amplifiers and

thus benefitted by being able to hear, as well as see, what was

going on, and ho.v an attack should be conducted~2

So that its officers and N.C.O.s could be trained in battle

practice and fire control, A Corrpany 34th Illawarra Infantry Battalion

built a landscaped 25 yards miniature range. The background

represented a rrountainous mining district with scale m:rlels of houses

and bridges. r-Dveable targets and rrodels forced the practising

, ~ . 63 troops to cnange LO.rrnat1ons.

61Article in The Navy, P..rmy and Air Force JoUinal, The the Depart:rrent of Defence in Australia, Vol. 2 , No. 8. p. 7.

Staff Organ of (1 August 1933) ,

62J.D. 'Ihornpson, 'Amplifiers For .Ant¥', 'Ihe Navy, .Ant¥, Air and Munitions Joun1al, The Staff Organ of the Depa.rtrrent of Defence in Australia, Vol. 6 (15 Decerrber 1937), p. 9. 'Ihis article was originally published in the Sun.

63J.J. Hiles, 't-liniature Battle Practice Range At Bulli, N.S.W. ', The Navy, Arnry and Air Force Journal, The Staff Organ of the D=partJTP...nt of Defence in Australia, Vol. 2, No.4 (1 At)ril 1933), p. 22.

210

Certainly, the miniature range and Sydney University

Regiment's live-fire platoon attacks should have met the

Military Board's requirements for interesting and realistic

training, while the 11th and 16th Battalions' exercises

and the tactical exercises without troops fulfilled the

Board's demands for anti-invasion training. However, it

must be emphasized that these examples contain some of the

highlights of citizen soldier training between the two

World Wars. The other, and less frequently publicized

side included: the dullness of close order drill, the

sheer hard work involved in studying for promotion

examinations and in planning and organizing camps and

exercises, and the boredom of waiting for one's turn to

shoot on a hot and dusty firing range.

When properly carried out, the types of training in

themselves do not seem to have adversely affected citizen

soldier training during the 1920s and 1930s. Rather, it

was the quality of training which produced the poor results.

THE QUALITY OF TRAINING

Citizen soldier training between 1929 and 1939 was

characterized by its extremely poor quality. The quality

of training was poor in t~vo main respects. It was neither

up-to-date nor, more importantly, was the general standard

of instruction, at any level, good.

Concurrently with its efforts to keep the A.M.F. abreast

of modern military technology, by the purchase of small

samples of the latest military equipment (such as tanks

211

d . . f )64 h .. an ant1-a1rcra t guns , t e M1l1tary Board also struggled

to bring the A.M.F.'s training up-to-date. Two examples

will suffice. In 1936 the Board reco~mended that

concealment from aerial observation was to be practised

whenever possible, even at the expense of sacrificing

1 regularity in the layout of [a] bivouac•~ 5 In the same

year, the Board ordered formations to arrange for signal

units equipped with radio-telephones to demonstrate their

use for the benefit of commanding officers and staff

officers. The Board wanted these officers to become

familiar with the use of radio-telephones because of 'the

growing importance and rapid development of radio-telephony

as a means of command and inter-communication in the

field'~ 6

However, in many ways Militia training remained old

fashioned because, like most armies whose last experience

of large-scale modern warfare had been during 1914-18,

the A.M.F. tended to emphasize the so-called lessons

derived from those years~ 7 Not only was this tendency quite

64 See ch. 7.

65 M.B. I. G. 50 (1 July 1936).

66Ibid.

67The exponents of armoured warfare in these armies: German (Guderian), British (Fuller and Liddell Hart), French (de Gaulle) and Russian (Tukhachevsky) all had stiff battles in their attempts to have their ideas accepted by more conservative senior officers. Significantly, it was Guderian's careful blending of the motor and the horse \vhich made the blitzkrieg such a success, although von Seeckt 1 S and von Beck's contributions to the development of German infantry tactics must not be forgotten.

212

natural, but also the A.M.F. had no real alternative. It

simply did not have the money with which to purchase

expensive modern mechanized vehicles and Australia did not

possess the oil, as far as was known at the time, nor had

Australia developed the industry, required to support a

68 motorized army.

Perhaps the most outstanding example of training being

based directly upon the experience of World War I occurred

with the Subject 'E' (Military History) examination for

first appointment and promotion of Citizen Force officers.

For each triennium, from 1922 until 1939 at least, when

military history was abolished as an examinable subject

. . . . h . . 69 for promot1on to capta1n or maJor 1n t e C1t1zen Forces,

two topics alternated. They were: 'Operations of the

Egyptian Expeditionary Force in Palestine from 28 October

to 31 December 1917' and 'Operations of the British

Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium from the outbreak

of the war to the transfer of the B.E.F. from the Aisne

to Flanders, October 1914'? 0

Significantly, both campaign studies were concerned

with periods of mobile warfare rather than \vith the

relatively static battles at Gallipoli or in Flanders.

Possibly this was because the Military Board felt that more

could be learned from mobile than from static operations

68 See ch. 7.

69Director of Military Training to all major H.Q.s, Examination Of Officers For Promotion - Citizen Forces, 23 September 1938 in A.A.A.: MP431/l, file 765/5/1785.

70see M.O. 372 (6 Seoter:~.ber 1924), A.A.O. 361 (31 December 1931) and A.A.O. 235 (30 November 1934).

213

since, for example, logistics problems are much simpler

when the forces involved are in fixed positions. Possibly

too, the selection of the Third Dattle of Gaza and the

pursuit to Jerusalem as the subject for study had some

71 relevance to Plan 401. But, more plausibly, the Board

foresaw the necessity for Citizen Force officers to be

proficient in executing counter-attacks if the A.M.F.

were to be able to repel invading Japanese.

Nevertheless, it is still somewhat surprising that

von Lettow-Vorbeck's brilliant defence of German East

Africa (later Tanganyika now Tanzania) was not studied.

That campaign would have provided many valuable insights

into 'bush' or close country warfare: the very type of

72 warfare applicable to Australia's east coast. Of course,

it is possible that ignorance led to the neglect of von

Lettow-Vorbeck's operations but ignorance could not be

the excuse for the failure to study the results of the

Boer War campaigns, in which J.G. Legge, Chauvel, V.C.M.

73 Sellheim, and Brudenell White had served in their youth.

A more likely explanation is that Australia's traditionally-

minded, conservative senior regular officers, in common

with their professional peers overseas, could not contemplate

defending Australia by guerrilla tactics.

In other ways, however, the Board did make an effort

to see that Militia training remained reasonably up-to-date.

71see ch. 2.

72 see above, p. 206.

73R.L. Wallace, The Australians at the Boer War (Canberra, 1976), pp. 4, 61-2, 81 and 83.

214

One method was through the collection and distribution of

. information about developments in warfare abroad. Unfort-

unately~ because of the Imperial connection, information on

developments in modern warfare was sought only from other

British armies. Thus, P.M.F. officers and warrant officers

were frequently sent abroad to train in England or India?4

Their experiences were passed on to Militia units either

in the form of written reports or by personal contact.

In 1937 the Headquarters of the 5th Battalion, Victorian

Scottish Rifles, received three reports from officers training

abroad. One report dealt with the division in attack and

defence and with the tactical handling of machine-guns? 5

the second report with the tactical handling of anti-tank

rifles and guns? 6 while the third report was a commentary

upon operations by the Indian army's Peshawar Brigade? 7

The Board's idea of circulating reports of officers

training abroad was good but, unluckily, while British

tactics were quite sound they were neither brilliant nor

74 See e.g. I.G.'s Report, Pt I, 31 May 1928, appendix B and ibid., Pt I, 31 May 1929, appendix A.

75 Extracts from A Report By An Officer Training At The Staff College, Quetta in A.A.A.: MP70/6, file A39.

76oirector of Military Training to all major H.Q.s Anti­Tank Guns And Rifles. Report Of Officer Training Abroad (includes Notes By Comdr. 6 Inf.Bde. On The Tactical Handling Of The A.T. Rifle And A.T. Gun), 6 December 1937 in A.A.A.: MP70/6, file A39.

77Extracts From Report Of An Officer Training Abroad in A.A.A.: MP70/6, file A39.

215

radical during the inter-World War decades. And, in the

1930s, Australia's major potential enemies (Germany and

Japan) began evolving more sophisticated tactics in Spain

and China in order to take greater advantage of the modern

weapons then being perfected, such as the tank and aeroplane.

The result for the A.M.F. was that, while its training was

relatively modern by British standards, granted the crippling

shortage of really up-to-date mechanical equipment especially,

its tactical knowledge and ability lagged well behind those

of the Germans or Japanese by the beginning of the Second

World War. This is not to say that the training of all

Japanese or German forces was uniformly good or modern.

It is simply that, in general, their training was more

up-to-date and thorough than that of Australian or U.K.

armies.

Even by itself, the relative obsolescence of the A.M.F.'s

tactical training might have hindered its operations against

the Japanese, had they stormed ashore around Sydney in

1939. To be sure, the Military Board made little effort

to acquire a knowledge of Japanese tactics (by sending

observers to China for example) in the 1930s and, with one

notable exception, training of British forces in Malaya up

to the beginning of 1941 (when the Australians arrived)

had shown little imagination and initiative? 8

78see L. Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust (1968 repr. Canberra, 1957), pp. 10 & 67. On p. 10 vJigmore is perhaps too critical of the Australian army's failure to develop tropical bush warfare tactical doctrine in the 1930s. After all, the Army expected to face the Japanese on the beaches, grass and woodlands around Sydney and Newcastle, and not in the tropical rainforests of Malaya, New Guinea or Queensland.

216

At all levels the general standard of military

instruction in the Militia between 1929 and 1939 seems to

have been poor. This naturally adversely affected the

general quality of training and is clearly revealed in

many official reports. The reasons for the poor standard

of instruction are not difficult to find. In part they

stemmed from the high turnover of personnel, itself a

symptom of the poor quality of instructors? 9 and in part

from the simple fact that part-time soldiers are rarely

likely to have the time to gain the knowledge that their

80 competent regular comrades possess.

Chauvel, in his reports as Inspector-General during

the 1920s, made clear his concern for the training of

junior leaders~ 1 although he was usually satisfied with

the standard achieved in the available time~ 2 The comments

in his 1928 report are typical:

79

Generally speaking, the importance of· the training of junior leaders has received full consideration, and very satisfactory progress has been noted in the standard reached. The knowledge of their work displayed by these officers and non-commissioned officers is, on the whole, very good, and is mainly brought about by the amount of voluntary work they have put in at schools, courses, etc.83

See ch. 4. The low retention rates meant that relatively inexperienced soldiers were far more likely to become instructors than would have been the case had the turnover rates been lower.

80The Millar Report, paras 7.2 and 7.~ made it clear that, in peacetime, different training standards must be expected from reserve, as opposed to regular, soldiers.

Bl h . . . d ff' d ff' b 1 'Tat 1s, non-comm1ss1one o 1cers an o 1cers e ow the rank of major.

82see pp. 197-200.

83 I.G.'s Report, Pt I, 31 May 1928, para. 31.

217

But on this occasion he then added:

There is still a notice2ble lack in the power of command. This is only natural with the little time available for training these junior leaders in the actual control of their sub-units, and shows the necessity for devoting all available time durin~4 collective training to this purpose.

Even in the 1920s, however, the general standard of

instruction could not have been very good because Chauvel,

in his reports, highlights other problems which must have

had an adverse effect on the ability of instructors to

teach their soldiers the correct lessons. The shortage of

. 85 h . 1 . . . 86 d th . 1nstructors, t e1r re at1ve 1nexper1ence an e1r poor

preparation prior to teaching87 could, on occasions, have

led to disaster in battle. Because of the inexperience

and lack of prior preparation by instructors, not only

was valuable training time wasted, but also incorrect

tactical lessons were taught. For example, there was a

tendency to teach obsolescent linear tactics instead of

the modern group tactics~ 8 and the failure to carry the

automatic weapons available on all tactical training

84 Ibid.

85rbid. I 31 Nay 1921, para. 53 and ibid. , 31 May 1923, para. 81.

86 rbid. , 31 May 1926, para. 31.

87Ibid., 31 May 1927, paras 30 & 32.

88Ibid., 31 May 1926, para. 31.

218

exercises meant that the soldiers did not become as

familiar with the use and employment of these weapons as

h . h 89 t ey m1g t. Chauvel even claimed that the:

Lack of interest in field training is generally traceable to failure to preserve scrupulously the organization demanded by modern group tactics 90

But perhaps the most outstanding example of the

inexperience of co~~anders was the necessity for Chauvel

to remind them that boots needed to be 'broken in' before

t bl t h 1 d . t 91 roops were a e o marc ong 1s ances. Experienced

commanders would not have required this elementary

reminder. These faults and problems became increasingly

apparent in the 1930s.

The concern of the Military Board to retain newly

enlisted personnel has already been noted in passing in

chapter four. The Board's comments will be examined in

greater detail here because they illustrate similar points

to those made by Chauvel. This was to be expected, given

that the overall turnover in personnel was greater in

the 1930s than in the 1920s.

In mid-1937 Commanding Officers were told that recruit

training had to be interesting and progressive, and that

only competent officers and N.C.O.s should supervise such

training~ 2 The obvious inference to be drawn is that

many Militia officers and N.C.O.s were incompetent. Indeed,

89 rbid. and ibid., 31 May 1927, para. 36(b).

90 b'd 32 ~- , para. .

91 rbid., para. 37.

92 M.D.I. G.33 (25 June 1937).

219

the Board was so concerned to retain newly enlisted

personnel that it ordered the training of recruits in squads

by members of the regular Australian Instructional Corps,

supervised by the adjutant (usually also a permanent

soldier), during certain defined periods wherever possible.

The previous practice of enlisting recruits in twos and

threes and handing them over to inefficient N.C.O.s for

93 their initial training was to cease.

that:

Just as importantly, the Board felt obliged to emphasize

The average recruit joining the Militia today is better educated than the recruit of bygone days, and it will be found in most cases that it is unnecessary to detail minutely the various positions or movements to be taught. What is required is a short explanation in a few words of the object or use of the movement, a good demonstration pointing out the barest salient points, execution and practice, and the pointing out of mistakes. Such a method of instruction is quick, easy for the instructor, less boring for the soldier and within the capacity of Militia instructors. It is a matter of 11 talk less, correct more".94

Evidently, the Board did not hold a high opinion of Militia

instructors. Like Chauvel, the Board had to remind

Militiamen not to waste valuable training time, and also

had to stress the aim of military training again:

The object of all military training is to prepare the Army for war. Success in battle is the ultimate aim, and this must be borne in mind when syllabuses (sic.) of training are being prepared. With the very limited time at the disposal of C.O.s it is essential that full value be obtained from every moment available and that no time should

93 rbid.

94 rbid. See also appendix J for the suggested infantry recruit training syllabus.

220

be wasted on matters having no bearing on 95 the preparation of their commands for war.

The Board's poor opinion of Militia instructors was

justified. Their inexperience and lack of prior preparation

led to some incredible oversights. For instance, Formation

Commanders were told to ensure that all officers and

N.C.O.s received instruction in map reading during 1937-38

because a general weakness in this subject, in all arms,

had been evident in 1936-37~ 6 Apparently this weakness was

not eradicated because exactly the same observation was

97 made about map reading in May 1939.

But there were even greater and more elementary

weaknesses. In May 1938 the Military Board had to remind

Militia commanders of the necessity for including wet

weather programmes in camp syllabi. Unexpected wet

98 weather the previous year had caught some units unprepared.

The Board also felt obliged to remind Militia commanders

that:

The idea that instruction in anti-gas training can be confined to specialists must

be discarded. Training and re-training in anti-gas

action must b7 ~s thoro~~h and universal as weapon tra1n1ng .••.

A year later, when discussing field works, the Military Board

evidently felt forced to make the elementary point that:

95 M.B.I. G.33 (25 June 1937).

96 rbid.

97 M.B.I. G.l7 (26 May 1939).

98M.B.I. G.21 (25 May 1938).

99 rbid. See also appendix K for a suggested anti-gas trainfng syllabus.

221

••• The importance of field works to Infantry ..• cannot be over-stressed. Earth, trenches and wire are the shield of the modern infantryman. They give him security in the face of fire from the ground and air, and enable him to use his weapons to the best advantage.lOO

Obviously, the lessons of World War I still had not been

d . h 101 r1ven orne.

Perhaps the very fact that the Military Board, in its

Special Training Instructions for 1939/40; 02 had to repeat

many of its previous comments concerning recruit, and

realistic, training, serves better than anything else to

illustrate that there was little progress in the standard

of instruction during the 1930s. As in the 1920s, this

d h h f . 103 h . . . was ue to t e s ortage o 1nstructors, t e1r 1nexper1ence

and lack of preparation before teaching; 04 compounded, of

course, by the high turnover rate (which, in itself was a

reflection of the poor standard of instruction).

With such poor quality instruction and relatively

old-fashioned tactical training, it is little wonder that

training in general was so poor that many recruits quickly

left. If the Militia had had to face a Japanese invasion

in 1939 there is little doubt that it would have suffered

100 M.B.I. G.l7 (26 May 1939).

101If indeed they ever have. During the Boer War Australians found digging distasteful (see R.L. Wallace, op.cit., pp. 256, 259 & 261) and even to-day Australian Army Reserve soldiers maintain that dislike and often refuse to dig.

102M.B.I. G.l7 (26 May 1939).

103 Ibid.

104M.B.I. G.33 (25 June 1937).

222

unacceptable casualties because of its poor training. Thus

it seems clear that the general poor quality of training

adversely affected its outcome, as three of the post-World

War II judgements already cited claimed. But was the

magnitude of this training problem recognised, and if so,

what was planned to overcome it?

RECOGNITION OF THE TRAINING PROBLEM AND THE MEASUP£S TAKEN

TO OVERCOME IT

Both inside and outside the Army the problem of

ineffective training owing to poor instruction was recognised

and measures were suggested to overcome it. From the very

beginning of the post-World War I training of the C.M.F.,

Chauvel was aware of the problem of training competent

commanders and instructors.

In his first report as Inspector-General he warned:

••. The provision of training for Senior Commanders and Staffs will present some difficulties to the General Staff, as time goes on, and those officers with war experience drop out from the higher positions, their places being taken by officers with war experience in lower commands and appointments only. The more so, as for some time the camps of training must be limited to elementary training, and will present no opportunities for the handling of large bodies of troops •.•. '

As a partial solution to this problem, Chauvel suggested

these steps:

(a) The establishment of Courses for Senior Officers •..

(b) The re-establishment of the system of an Annual Staff Tour in each of the larger Military Districts.

105I.G.'s Report, Pt I, 31 May 1921, para. 38.

223

(c) Lectures and debates in conn~xio~ 106 with the United Service Inst1tut1ons.

Although these recommendations were partly carried

out7° 7 a year later Chauvel felt compelled to repeat

that:

•.. It is quite impossible to train officers or even non-commissioned officers without troops to handle.l08

And he returned to the same theme in 1927:

••• The training of senior officers is only possible at present by means of exercises conducted without troops and is being done

109 by divisional and brigade exercises •...

Paradoxically, Chauvel also frequently claimed that there

was a grave shortage of officers and N.C.O.s~10 In 1924,

for instance, the C.M.F. was 700 officers below its

establishment of 2,786~ 11 How could this situation arise?

106Ibid.

107see ibid., 31 May 1923, para. 63 for the information that lectures were organized by the United Service Institutes. In fact, in 1929, General Gordon Bennett conducted a war game, based on the assumption of a successful Japanese attack on Newcastle, in the United Service Institute's rooms in Sydney. 'A War Game', The United Service Journal, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1 (May 1929), pp. 13-16. Sydney University also provided extension lectures on strategy and Imperial Defence. 2nd Division Routine Orders, 24 February 1928 and 2nd District Base Routine Orders, 28 August 1928.

108I.G.'s Report, Pt I, 31 May 1922, para. 14.

109Ibid., 31 May 1927, para. 27.

110Ibid., 31 May 1924, para. 15; ibid.; 31 May 1926, para. 24;--rbid., 31 May 1927, para. 12;--rbid., 31 May 1928, para.-s-and ibid., 31 May 1929, para~.

111Ibid., 31 May 1924, para. 15.

224

The paradoxical situation had arisen because the

limited period of compulsory training did not enable the

k d f 'l t . th 1 t . t . ll2 ran an 1 e o rece1ve more .an e emen·ary 1ns ruct1on.

This, in turn, meant that few trained troops were

available for more senior commanders to exercise. In

addition, the prospect of training successive batches of

raw recruits each year disheartened potential and serving

officers and N.C.O.s, especially when coupled with the

refusal of their applications to attend courses and schools

113 of instruction because of the shortage of money.

During the debate on the 1926 estimates, Major-General

Sir Granville Ryrie, who commanded the 1st Cavalry Division

between 1923 and 1927, tried to make Parliament aware of

this grave training problem. He argued:

••• Another difficulty is that, under existing conditions, we get only a regimental camp,

and there is no means of training officers of the higher ranks who require training as well as the men. We have no training for brigadiers or divisional commanders. If we had briqade camps in the city centres, to which men could be brought once a year and given the full twelve days' training continuously, we should increase efficiency and reduce expense.ll4

Although this might have provided a solution for the largely

volunteer cavalry, it was not adopted since Chauvel

logically insisted upon as thorough a training as possible

{within the limited amount of time available) for junior

leaders, on the grounds that:

••• It has very rightly been said that the measure of an Army's success will often be the efficiency of the leaders of the smallest

112Ibid., para. 13.

113 Ibid., paras. 13 & 14.

114 C.P.D., Vol. 114, 10 August 1926, p. 5181.

225

units, and that the best senior con~anders are usually those officers who received the most thorough grounding as subalterns~ .. ~ 15

The Military Board also recognised the problem posed

by poor instructors as we saw in the preceeding section.

Indeed, the Special Training Instructions themselves were

an attempt to overcome the problem. However, on a more

practical level, when money was available for training, the

Board conducted ten-day courses especially designed to

train junior leaders of all branches~16 This was in

addition to the usual specialist artillery and promotion

courses.

By late 1938 and early 1939, even the Sydney Morning

Herald was concerned about the shortage of efficient

Regular and Militia officers and N.C.O.s available to train

the vastly increased numbers of troops. The nev1spaper

also claimed that this lack of efficient leaders led to

117 retention problems. But, a year before, the most

scathing comments about Militia training during the 1930s

had been made. Surprisingly, they were made by the third

most senior A.M.F. officer, Major-General Gordon Bennett

(C.M.F.), who ranked after Major-Generals Thomas Glasgow

(C.M.F.) and Brudenell White (P.M.F.). All three officers

115I.G.'s Repor~, Pt I, 31 May 1927, para. 28.

llGM.B.I. G.33 (25 June 1937).

117see these articles drawn from the S.M.H.: 'Grave Shortage of Officers', The Navy, Army, Air and Munitions Journal 1 The Staff Organ of the Department of Defenc<o: in 1.ustralia, Vol. 7, No. 11 (15 Novewber 1938), pp. 3-4; 'Increasing Militia', ibid., Vol. 8, No. 1 (16 January 1939), pp. 3-4 and 'Training the--Militia', ibid., Vol. 8, No. 4 (15 April 1939), pp. 6-8.

226

were on the Unattached List in 1937~18 In a series of

articles, Bennett strongly criticized infantry and senior

officer training and compared the A.M.F. to the Chinese

119 army. While, as already mentioned, the Military Board

eventually managed to stop Bennett from publishing further

damaging articles, one member at least (the C.G.S.,

Lavarack), admitted that the lack of regular command and

staff courses for senior officers had perhaps been the

most legitimate of Bennett's complaints~ 20

But Lavarack had already realised that the tactical

training of senior Militia commanders was insufficient to

allow them to lead their formations in the field121 a~d

he had wanted to establish a permanent school to teach

tactics to Staff Corps and Militia officers, over a year

122 before Bennett's newspaper articles appeared. Nevertheless,

118The Army List of the Australian Military Forces, Part I, Active List (Melbourne, 30 September 1937).

119 In particular see '"No More Monashes": General Hits Staff Corps', The Sunday Sun And Guardian, 28 November 1937, p. 13 and 'Must The P.B.I. Buy Experience With Blood?', ibid., 19 December 1937, p. 3.

120In a minute to F.G. Shedden (Secretary, Department of Defence) on 8 February 1938 in Military Board agendum No. 101/1937. Date of meeting, 18 November 1937.

121Major-General J.D. Lavarack to the Secretary (of the Military Board), Training Of Commanders And Staffs, 23 September 1935 in Military Board agendum No. 88/1935. No date of meeting.

122Major-General J.D. Lavarack to the Secretary (of the Military Board), Tactical Training Of Officers Of Staff Corps And Militia, 4 February 1936 in Military Board agendum No. 8/1936. No date of meeting, but this minute was withdra\vn at Lavarack' s request. See Military Board agendum No. 101/1937. Date of meeting, 18 November 1937.

227

Bennett's criticisms may have spurred on the opening of

. 123 the Conunand and Staff School in 1938. Thus regulars,

citizen soldiers and newspaper editors recognised the

problem posed by poor instructors, and measures were taken

to overcome the problem by conducting special courses and

by issuing special instructions. Nonetheless, the quality

of instruction remained poor. The reasons for this will

be examined below.

REASONS WHY THE QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION DID NOT IMPROVE

Chauvel blamed the lack of money for the failure to

improve the quality of instruction. As he wrote in 1928:

Financial limitations permit of elementary training only being given to the rank and file, and restrict the amount of training 1 ~ 4 it is possible to give to leaders and staffs.~

This was after he had pointed out forcefully that:

••. In 1913 our population was 4,940,952, our national wealth was approximately £2,000,000,000, and our total budget amounted to £25,412,000 of which £2,277,088 was considered necessary expenditure on the Army .

••. at the moment our population is 6,232,000 our national wealth over £4,000,000,000, our budget £76,533,983, of which £1,500,000 is devoted to the needs of the Army. .•. the value of money has depreciated in post-war years by some 60 per cent, leaving an effective allocation for the Army of approximately £1,000,000, as compared with £2,277,000 in

1912-13.125

123For the School's aims etc. see Major-General ~avarack, Training Of Commanders And Staff: Establishment Of Command And Staff School, 17 November 1937 and F.G. Shedden (Secretary, Council of Defence) Council of Defence Agenda

Army Command And Staff School 1 22 February 1938, both in A.A.A.: AA1971/216, item 3/1938.

124r.G. 's Report, Pt I, 31 May 1928, para. 8. _ ___:.. __ ___,~. 125rbid. , para. 5.

228

Chauvel also argued that there was an urgent need to improve

conditions of service for officers and N.C.O.s in order to

induce sufficient good men to volunteer to become junior

leaders, and he constantly praised the self-sacrifice of

those citizens who did so~26 During the 1920s the C.M.F.

was forced to rely upon volunteers to provide its leaders

because compulsory trainees were obliged to serve only

thirty-six days spread over three years. Evidently, this

was not long enough to encourage men with suitable personalities

d d . . b 1 d 127 an e ucat1on to str1ve to ecome ea ers.

Not unexpectedly, Chauvel's ex-brother officers in

Parliament agreed with him. During the debate on the 1924

Defence Equipment Bill, Sir Granville Ryrie mentioned in

passing the need to improve conditions of service for

officers by ensuring that they were granted the rank

. h h . d 'b'l' . 128 commensurate w1t t e1r cornman respons1 1 1t1es. In the

same debate Senator Elliott also argued that citizen

officers were at least entitled to decent treatment129 and

that the 1922 reduction in the defence estimates was

'directly responsible for the present backward nature of our

preparations', which included training as well as the

. . f . 130 d' 1 s· prov1s1on o equ1pment. More 1rect y, Senator 1r

Thomas Glasgow flatly stated:

126rbid., 31 May 1926, para. 21 and ibid., 31 May 1927, par~2 for example.

127 b'd 10 12 ~.,paras & .

128 C.P.D., Vol. 107, 16 July 1924, p. 2132.

129rbid., Vol. 108, 20 August 1924, p. 3325.

130Ibid., p. 3329.

229

••. Despite the excellent fighting material which is furnished by the manhood of Australia, it is necessary that provision should be made for as much training as the resources of the country will allow ..•. I hope that in future sufficient funds will be available to enable those officers and non-commissioned officers to under~o a sufficient course of training .•.. 31

Such statements, however, cannot be accepted uncritically.

It is always easy to blame the shortage of money for

failings which may be due to other causes, particularly

those inherent in any administrative system. In fact,

there is some evidence that the lack of money was not

altogether to blame. For instance, occasionally at least,

more attention was paid to social status than to other

attributes when selecting citizen officers132 and, on

Chauvel's own admission, an increase in the length and

duration of training (from ten days per year for two years

to twelve days per year for three years) failed to secure

a corresponding increase in the number of volunteers

seeking to gain rank.

When, in 1922 (following the conclusion of the

Washington Conference) , the numbers undergoing training

and the duration of the training of Australia's citizen

soldiers were sharply reduced, Chauvel was extremely

. . 113 3 d . 1 . d h . . th 1 1 d cr1t1ca an 1mp 1e t_at an 1ncrease 1n e engt1 an

duration of training would induce more trainees to strive

. 134 . . . . 135 f to obta1n rank. The 1ncrease 1n tra1n1ng, rom a

131 b'd 1 ~·, Vo • 110, 11 Jtme 1925, pp. 54-5,

132 See ch. 5.

133I.G.'s Report: Pt I, 31 May 1922, paras 9-16.

134 b. ~ I 1CL. I 31 May 1924, paras 12, 13 & 18.

135wnich was effective from 1924.

230

total of twenty days to thirty-six days, was classed as

. b Ch 1136 . . . h h m1nor y !auve , 1n compar1son w1t t e pre-World War

I universal training system where all male British subjects

between the ages of 18 and 25 years had to serve sixteen

137 days per year in the Citizen Forces unless exempted.

Undoubtedly it did not have the effect of vastly increasing

the numbers of trainees willing to accept the responsibilities

f k h 1 1 • 138 1 o ran • Contrary to C auve s expectat1ons, t1ere was

an increase of 6 per cent in the deficiency of officers

with but a slight improvement in the numbers of N.C.O.s in

1926~ 39 By the following year, even Chauvel admitted that

the three-year term of training offered no incentive for

trainees to try to obtain rank140 and in 1928 the Citizen

Forces were still short of 608 officers and 1,771 warrant

and non-commissioned officers to complete their current

bl . h 141 peace esta 1s ment. This shortage remained, although

overall between 1922 and 1929 the number of citizen officers

increased from 2,302 to 3,104~ 42

136r.G.'s Report, Pt I, 31 May 1925, paras 1-3.

137oefence Act 1903-1912, Pt XII, Sees 125a-d and 127 (1) a-c.

138 See e.g. !.G.'s Report, Pt I, 31 May 1925, paras 3 & 24.

139rbid., 31 May 1926, para. 24. Part of the increased deficiency, of course, may have been owing to the increased establishment of officers demanded by the increase in the numbers of citizen soldiers being trained.

140rbid. I 31 May 1927, para. 12.

141rbid. I 31 May 192 81 para. 8.

142 rbid. I 31 May 1929, para. 16.

231

Nevertheless, the lack of money did contribute

towards the failure to obtain good instructors. Had not

the perceived need for economy and public and Parliamentary

opposition (on economic and moral grounds) succeeded in

destroying the Swinburne Committee and 1920 Senior Officers'

Conference Plans, then universal training would have

consisted of up to ten weeks of continuous training for

recruits. This might have provided suitable trainees with

h . . b ff. d 143 1919 t e 1ncent1ve to ecome o leers an N.C.O.s. In ,

the Swinburne Committee had advocated that compulsory

trainees do twenty-one weeks of continuous training,

spread over the first four years as follows: thirteen weeks,

four weeks, three weeks and one week~44 This recommendation

was repeated by the Senior Officers' Conference in the

f 11 . 145 o ow1ng year.

During the 1930s the shortage of money became acute

because of the Depression. This also probably contributed

towards the failure to improve radically the standard of

instruction through the running of courses. At that time,

officers and N.C.O.s managed to reach their standard of

training only by attending part-time courses and training

146 without pay. In fact, it was common practice for

Militia units to raise their own funds in order to purchase

143N. Gow, op.cit., pp. 45-52, 85-·6, 93 & 96.

144see para. 11 of the Swinburne CoiTmittee's report in A.A.A.: MP367, file 629/1/741.

145Report on the Military Defence Of Australia, Vol. II, paras 103-4 in the Pea.rce Papers, A.N.L., MS 1827/15.

146 Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel E.G. Keogh to the writer, dated 10 April 1974.

232

. f b' 147 rat1ons or camps or 1vouacs. For example, Lieutenant-

Colonel S.G. Savige, C.O. of the 24th Battalion between

1928 and 1935, wrote to Major McArthur on 7 August 1931:

..• With the general Regimental Dance at Surrey Hills I also concur that 50% of profits be used for bivouac purposes. I also concur with the request from Keogh that dances be held at Camberwell and from Donald that dances be held at Ringv1ood where the whole of the

148 profits go towards their bivouac fund •..

In both decades between the two World Wars, an

extremely high turnover of personnel, though for a variety

149 of reasons, meant that training tended to be elementary

and hence dull, boring and repetitive. But, more

importantly, it also meant that instructors tended to be

inexperienced.

Keogh's and Gullett's assessments of citizen soldier

training between the two World Wars seem to have been

basically correct, while the Directorate of Military

Training's comment might have been deliberately exaggerated

for effect, and might also have reflected Regular Army

147Ibid.

148In 1923-1935 Confidential Correspondence 37th/39th Inf. Bn. Years 1923 to 1939. 11. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.).

149 h d . Or, as H.B.S. Gullett p rase 1t:

misfiled under Bundles of Files.

•.. Before the [Second World] war, men in infantry battalions were trained in the use of only a few weapons, such as rifle, bayonet, Lewis Gun and hand grenade. Having acquainted himself with those weapons, an infantryman's technical training was complete ..••

C.P.D., Vol. 193, 26 Sep·tember 1947, p. 273.

233

prejudice against the Citizen Forces. After all, Australia's

citizen soldiers, admittedly with further training,

performed creditably in the Second World War. At that

time there were eighty citizen soldiers, as opposed to

fifty regulars, filling senior command positions such as

those of divisional commanders, their chief staff officers,

d b . d d 150 an r1ga e comman ers. And many Militiamen, though

fewer than initially expected, volunteered to serve with

151 the 2nd A.I.F.

Reasons for the poor standard of training of citizen

soldiers included: the small amount of tirne actually spent

training and the quality of the training which was done,

in particular, the standard of instruction. Although

newspaper editors, Parliamentarians, Regular and Citizen

Force officers recognised that the instructors required

further training in order to increase their knowledge and

improve their standards, little was done because of the

lack of money with which to run additional courses.

The elementary level and poor standard of training

had two major effects. Firstly, it discouraged men from

remaining in the Militia, thereby compounding the

problem and, secondly, it ensured that the Militia could

not have successfully fulfilled its major role of repelling

a Japanese invasion, had one occurred at any time between

1919 and 1939.

150s. Encel, op.cit., p. 135. See also G. Long, The Final Campaigns {Canberra, 1963), pp. 73-4.

151 E.g. see G. Long, To Benghazi, pp. 55, 61-2.

I wish my mother could see me now, With a tripod under my arm, And a spare parts case and condenser tube Around my neck for a charm. Atop of a spluttering four wheeled "Liz", With a thirst that isn•t for tea -And I used to be in the cavalry once -N.S.W. Lancers once, But now I am M.G.

Corporal W.F. Molineux

234

Chapter Seven

The Equipment of the Citizen Soldier, 1918-39

Although, as already mentioned, the debate over

whether Australia faced the threat of invasion, or merely

minor to medium scale raids, was never really resolved,

the Citizen Forces retained their basic anti-invasion

role throughout the inter-World War decades. Here was a

basic contradiction in policy: while the Citizen Forces

were sufficiently well armed with rifles and machine-guns

to repel minor raids consisting of up to two hundred men,

they were never adequately equipped to defeat an invasion.

For one thing, as has already been shown, the lack of

heavy equipment would have prevented the Citizen Forces

from being able to concentrate troops, not only to meet an

invasion, but also, unless very fortunate, to deal with

raids.

Why this was so seems clear: reliance on horses and

railways sharply reduced the Australian army's power to

concentrate, and to strike when it had concentrated.

Improvement could come only through motorization and

mechanization.

This chapter will examine the effects of the shortage

of equipment on training, the modernization of the citizen

soldiers' equipment and the reasons for its shortage

and obsolescence. At the end of this chapter comparisons

will be made between the equipment of the Imperial Japanese

and Australian armies in order to assess how successful the

A.M.F. would have been had it been able to concentrate in

235

time to counter a Japanese invasion.

At this point it may be advisable to define the terms

'motorization' and 'mechanization'. These terms are

usually regarded as being synonymous 1 although attempts

have been made to differentiate between them. Brigadier-

General H. Rowan-Robinson of the British army, for instance,

wrote in 1929:

•.• Mechanization signifies the replacement of the old army by armoured mobile fighting power. Motorization, on the other hand, merely implies the transport of men in 2 machines mainly for strategic purposes .••.

Almost forty years later R.M. Ogorkiewicz made much the

same point: he agreed that:

Like the infantry, the artillery of the armoured divisions was initially only motorised, that is truck or tractor drmvn, and not mechanised, i.e., equipped with vehicles

3from which it could fight on the

move ••.•

For the purpose of this thesis mechanization is

defined as the carriage of troops and equipment in

armoured motor vehicles, and motorization as the transport

of men and arms in unarmoured motor vehicles. Thus the

1see e.g. The Concise Oxford Dictionary Of Current English (5th edn, London, 1964}, pp. 755 & 788. It should be noted, though, that the Military Board did not draw any distinction either. See e.g. a Brief Summary Of Mechanization Policy of Military Board in A.A.A.: MP431/l, file 849/3/257~ and Secretary (to the Military Board} to the Secretary (of the Department of Defence) Army Mechanization And Tank Types Proposed And In Use, 16 March 1938 in A.A.A.: MP729/6, file 52/401/11~ and C.B. Laffan (Secretary to the Military Board) Artillery Mechanization, 22 August 1939 in A.A.A.: MP431/l, file 931/2/833.

2 Further Aspects of Mechanization (London), p. 11.

3Armoured Forces A History of Armoured Forces and their Vehicles (London, 1970), p. 49.

236

essential difference between mechaniz~ticn and motorization

is not the substitution of motor for animal power but the

use of armour. After all, a tank is simply:

•.. a mobile gun carrier, a means of increasing the effectiveness of heavy crew-operated weapons through the mobility of the armoured vehicle .••. 4 ·

The terms 'mechanization' and 'motorization' will be used

in this more precise technical sense here.

EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES

During the 1920s and 1930s only one item of equipment

was really available in quantity. This was the .303-in.

Short Magazine Lee Enfield rifle, the basic infantry

5 weapon. The situation was far from satisfactory when it

came to small arms a~~unition, machine-guns, grenades,

wireless sets, artillery, gun ammunition, respirators

and vehicles.

Stocks of small arms ammunition varied considerably

as the ammunition was fired and not replaced, or as the

older cartridges deteriorated. In 1922 and 1923 Chauvel

stated that sufficient small arms ammunition was available~

4Ibid., p. 10.

5 In 1919 the Swinburne Committee (paras 31 & 34 in A.A.A.: MP367/l, file 629/1/741} and in 1938 the Defence Committee and Military Board (Shedden, Secretary of the Council of Defence, Capacity Of The Small Arms Factory For The Production Of Rifles, 13 July 1938, Council of Defence agendum No. 14/1938 in A.A.A.: AA1971/216} argued for a reduction in the annual output of rifles at the Lithgow Small Arms Factory because there were sufficient stocks with which to meet raids or an invasion. Between 1921 and 1930 Chauvel usually noted that the stock of rifles was satisfactory. See I.G.'s Report, Pt II, 31 May 1921, para. 2; ibid., 31 May 1922, para. 7~ ibid., 31 May 1924, para. 7 an~ibid. 31 May 1924, para. 15.----

6Ibid., 31 May 1922, para. 9 and ibid., 31 May 1923, para. 9.

237

But, only four years later, the Council of Defence was

reluctantly forced to accept a reduced reserve of 150,000,000

rounds of .303-in. ammunition? Previously the approved

reserve had been twice as much (300,000,000 rounds) although

stocks were far lower~ By 1931 the problem of deteriorating

small arms ammunition had become serious. About 11,000,000

rounds of Mark VII ammunition made in 1918 were unserviceable:

more than 7,000,000 other rounds manufactured in 1918

and 1921 could be fired from machine-guns only and an

additional 1,774,000 rounds produced in 1918 had to be

used soon. Thus, out of a total stock of 120,000,000 rounds;

nearly one-sixth was of dubious value. The quality of this

ammunition would hardly have inspired confidence had the

A.M.F. been forced to use it in battle. Worse was to come.

In 1932/33 no small arms ammunition was purchased for the

Army's stocks and the 3,000,000 rounds issued free by the

Small Arms Factory did not cover the 12,500,000 rounds

10 expended. Now, not only was a Militiaman likely to receive

unserviceable ammunition but he also was likely to run short

of it in action.

Unfortunately, Australia's stocks of small arms

ammunition also suffered from another defect: one which

could have created grave logistics problems in battle.

7 . Council of Defence meeting on 23 June 1927 in A.A.A.:

MP729/2, file 1851/2/243.

8see I.G.'s Report, Pt II, 31 May 1924, para. 17.

9Q.M.G. C.H. Brand to Secretary (Military Board) Small Arms Ammunition, 7 August 1931 in Military Board agendum No. 82/1931. Date of meeting, 12 August 1931.

10Minutes of the Meeting of the Defence Committee on 9 May 1933, p. 5, agendum Nc. 17/1932 Small Arms &~unition, in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol. 2.

238

The stocks contained two types of .303-in. ammunition;

the low velocity Mark VI round and the more modern high

velocity Mark VII round. Since the Mark VII round, because

of its higher velocity, had a flatter trajectory, rifles

had to be sighted to fire either the Mark VI or the Mark

VII ammunition. They could not use both types of ammun-

ition equally accurately, thereby creating the additional

logistic burden of matching rifles and ammunition.

The stocks of Mark VI ammunition were gradually

replaced with Mark VII rounds and the problem of matching

rifles and ammunition diminished. In 1919 this problem

had been very grave indeed because, while the available

rifles were sighted to fire Mark VII ammunition, only

about 30 million rounds of Australia's total stock of

approximately 220 million rounds of small arms ammunition

11 were of the Mark VII type. Thus, even with so basic an

item as small arms ammunition, the A.M.F. faced potentially

disastrous problems12 during the inter-war decades.

The major problem with machine-guns during the 1920s

seems to have been not so much the lack of guns but the

13 shortage of reserves and spares. The production of the

first Australian-made Vickers machine-gun in 1929 by the

14 Lithgow Small Arms Factory eased the shortage, but by the

11 See Swinburne Committee report, para. 34.

12E.g. in the event of continual misfires or severe shortage of ammunition during battle.

13see I.G.'s Report, Pt II, 31 May 1922, para. 8; ibid., 31 May 1923, para. 8 and ibid., 31 May 1924, para. 1~

14o.P. Mellor, The Role Of Science And Industry (Canberra, 1958), p. 324.

239

late 1930s the obsolete Lewis and Hotchkiss light machine­

guns were wearing out~ 5 Yet the first of the new Bren

light machine-guns were not manufactured in Australia

until 1941;6 although four Czech models arrived in 1937~7

Obviously, the lack of spares and reserve machine-guns

might have been critical in battle.

The shortage of other arms and equipment, while

perhaps not as vital,with the exception of gas masks, would

certainly have cost the A.M.F. many unnecessary battlefield

casualties. During the 1920s, the Australian army lacked

grenades. There were no hand or rifle grenades in

Australia in 1921~8 In 1922-23 there were only 200 rifle

19 grenades: a figure which had risen to more than 12,000

by 1924 with an additional 8,000 practice grenades on

order~ 0 Yet by 1928 Chauvel was again complaining about

the grave shortage of 21 grenades. But just how serious

was this shortage? In numerical terms, the deficit was

extremely large since, in the 1920s, the war establishment

of the A.M.F. was calculated at 180,000 fighting troops

and at no time du~ing the 1920s were there fewer than

15 Summary Of Proceedings Of Council Of Defence Meeting,

24 February 1938, p. 3 in A.A.A.: AA 1971/216.

1 6 ] 1 . 32 4 D.P. Me. or, op.c1t., p. .

17warrant Officer J.H. Welch, 'Machine Guns Their History and Development', Australian Army Journal, No. 28 (September 1951), p. 43.

18I.G. 's Report, Pt II, 31 May 1921, para. 8.

19 Ibid., 31 f.1ay 1922, para. lOi ibid. , 31 r-1ay 1923, para. 10.

20 Ibid., 31 May 1924, para. 18.

21Ibid., 30 June 19281 para. 35.

240

35,000 citizen soldiers. 22

Both in 1921 and in 1922, Chauvel emphasized that

without grenades the divisions lacked 'an essential part

of their fighting and training equipment•~ 3 while in 192.3

he mentioned that, in any heavy fighting in France during

the First World War, grenades had been used at the rate of

24 20,000 per division per day. During the 1920s, the Field

Army was supposed to be able to mobilize six divisions.

Naturally, it would have been very difficult to teach

soldiers how to use grenades when there were few, if any,

to practise with. But, at the cost of greater casualties

perhaps, the A.M.F. might still have been able to repel an

invasion or raids without grenades. In open warfare, for

example, grenades would have been used less often than in

the trench and siege warfare conditions of World War I on

the Western Front.

The lack of gas masks, however, 'N'ould have been

critical. Australia had no anti-gas respirators in 1924 25

and, by mid-1928, only 17,100 complete respirators had

26 arrived from England. Ten years later, the stock of

anti-gas equipment was less than a quarter of what was

estimated to be necessary for the First Line Component

22 d' See appen 1x B.

23r.G. 's Report, :i?t II, 31 Hay 1921, para. 8 and ibid., 31 May 1922, para. 10.

24 rbid., 31 May 1923, p. 4 n.T.

25Letter from Chauvel to the C.I.G.S. (War Office, London) 2 October 1924 in A.A.A.: MP729/2, £ile 1925/1/250.

Z6I.G.'s Report, Pt II, 30 June 1928, para. 36.

241

b 'l' . 27 up::m rro J. J.zation.

While it was true that the amount of gas which could be

sprayed by the small spotter planes on board Japanese

cruisers was limited, nevertheless, even a small quantity

of gas might have caused panic among the defe~celess

citizen soldiers thereby allowing the raiders to achieve

h . b. . 28 f h' . t eJ.r o JectJ.ves. 0 course, t J.s was assumJ.ng that the

Militia concentrated in time to repel the raiders: an

29 unlikely event anyway.

Obviously the dearth of gas masks would also have

prevented Australia from using gas in battle, although its

value as a weapon was recognised~ 0 The Military Board, in

1939, argued that:

••• the use of gas would have enormous defensive value against raids and major landings, especially in areas where troops would not be available to resist 31 an enemy during or shortly after landing .•. -

27Q.M.G. O.F. Phillips to the C.G.S., Defence Against Gas: Policy To Be Adopted, 27 April 1938 in A.A.A.: MP729/6, file 9/402/10.

28o 1 . 1939 d. d k d h 1' n y J.n January J. Lavarac conce e t at Austra J.an ports might now be liable to attack by a single carrier. Previously, attack by carrier-borne planes had always been dismissed. Air Raids Precautions - Memorandum By Chief Of The General Staff, Dated 27th January, 1939, agendum No. 20/1939 and supplement, p. 1, para. 1. Minutes of Defence Committee meeting. Date of meeting, 10 March 1939 in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol. 5.

29 See ch. 2.

30 rn World War I gas shelling was almost twice as effective in producing casualties as conventional artillery ammunition, although, contrary to the popular belief of the 1920s and 1930s, gas killed relatively few people during the First World War. I.V. Hogg, Gas (New York, June 1975), pp. 134-6.

31c.B. Laffan (Secretary to the Military Board) to Secretary (Department of Defence) Defensive Use Of Gas, 5 April 1939 in A.A.A.: CRS A816, item 9/301/89.

242

However, the shortage of anti-gas equipment was not the

sole problem in this case. On purely military grounds,

Australia was incapable of uslng gas warfare because there

were no facilities for the local production of gas or for

the provision of the necessary munitions to deliver it:2

Equally serious was the continual deficit of all types

of artillery and their ammunition. In fact, this shortage

was so serious that it would probably have prejudiced a

successful defence of Australia against either raids or

invasion, during the 1920s and 1930s. The problem was publicly

recognised. In Parliament, on 25 June 1925, Senator Graham

claimed that there was insufficient heavy artillery

ammunition to last for 24 hours: 3 His claim was supported

by Senators Needham34 and Gardiner, 35 who cited General

Monash, Mr Bowden 36 and Senator Drake-Brockman37 as the

authorities for their statements deploring the under-equipped

state of Australia's armed forces.

38 In 1924 Australia had no anti-aircraft guns and the

first four guns did not arrive from Britain until 1928~ 9

32rbid.

33 C.P.D., Vol. 110, p. 393.

34 rbi~., Vol. 111, 26 August 1925, p. 1683.

35 rbid., 9 September 1925, pp. 2288-90.

36 . . f f 9 b 1923 16 J 1925 Mlnlster or De ence, Fe ruary to anuary .

37commander, 4th Infantry Brigade (A.I.F.), 5 October 1918 to 20 June 1919 and Corrn1ander, 4th Infantry Brigade, 1 May 1921 to 30 April 1926.

38chauvel to the C.I.G.S. (War Office, London) para. 2, 2 October 1924 in A.A.A.: MP729/2, file 1925/1/250.

39 I.G.'s Report, Pt II, 30 June 1928, para. 26.

243

Five years later these 3-in. guns were still the only

mobile anti-aircraft artillery available in Australia40 and,

towards the end of 1938, by which time these World War I

model weapons were obsolete~ 1 their numbers had merely

doubled. But, whereas the eight 3-in. mobile anti-aircraft

guns were located in Sydney, Australia's only four complete

searchlights were situated in Melbourne~ 2 The scarcity of

anti-aircraft guns would obviously have made it impossible

to rely upon them alone to drive off even cruiser-borne

planes.

Throughout the inter-war decades, too, the Australian

army possessed no anti-tank weapons. This was despite the

fact that as early as 1924 Chauvel had argued for the purchase

of 3.7-in. pack howitzers. These were required for the close

support of infantry in open warfare: particularly in order

43 to suppress enemy machine-guns and to destroy enemy tanks.

40Major-General J.H. Bruche {C.G.S.) to the Secretary {Department of Defence) Fixed Defences. Order Of Priority And Anti Aircraft Defence, para. 3, 10 April 1933 in A.A.A.: MP729/2, file 1855/1/164.

41D.P. Mellor, op.cit., pp. 228, 231-2.

42c.B. Laffan {Secretary to the Military Board) to the Secretary {Department of Defence) Defence Measures For An Immediate Emergency, 27 September 1938, para. 2{c) in A.A.A.: CRS A816, item 30/301/6. The two 3-in. anti-aircraft guns at Darwin were fixed. See above, n. 40.

43 I.G.'s Report, Pt II, 31 May 1924, para. 3b.

244

They were not bought. Another request for these howitzers

in 1933 met with the same fate? 4 Had the Japanese landed

tanks in Australia, the A.M.F. would have been forced to

use a proportion of its artillery in the anti-tank role, as

the Germans had had to do during World War r? 4a But there

was insufficient Australian artillery, in any case, for

guns to be easily diverted from their usual role of providing

fire support for infantry or cavalry. Nevertheless, the

potential threat posed by Japanese armour was real enough.

At Shanghai, in the latter part of February 1932, the

Japanese unsuccessfully employed about 24 Medium and Renault

NC tanks in unsuitable terrain45 and, in April 1933, they

laid down the world's first landing ship dock: the Shinshu

46 Maru.

At no time during the 1920s and 1930s did Australia

. h '11 47 d tl 1 acqu1re any .eavy art1 .ery an 1ere was a ways a

shortage of 60-pdr medium guns, 6-in. medium guns and howitzers,

18-pdr field guns and 4.5-in. howitzers with which to repel

44Major-General J.H. Bruche (C.G.S.) to Secretary (Defence Committee) Preparation Of A Three Years' Defence Programme. Army Programme. (Defence Committee agendum No. 24/1933), 30 November 1933, para. 6 in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol. 2.

44aJ. Weeks, Men Against Tanks A History of Anti-Tank Warfare (Newton Abbot, 1975), p. 25.

45R.E. Jones, G.H. Rarey & R.J. Icks, The Fighting Tanks From 1916 to 1933 (Re-issue,Old Greenwich Conn., 1969), p. 150. The terrain in Australia and in other parts of China was more suitable for mechanized warfare.

46A.J. Watts & B.G. Gordon, The Imperial ~apanese Navy (New York, 1971), p. 482.

47 senator Graham, see above,p.242 & n.33, was probably referring to a~~unition for the A.M.F.'s medium guns. These were the A.M.F. 's 'heaviest' artillery and were not true heavy artillery which has a calibre of 8-in. or more.

245

an invasion~ 8 And, although the 1919 Swinburne Committee

had advocated the accumulation of a small war reserve of

1,000 rounds per field gun by 1 July 1924 to enable the

A.M.F.'s artillery to take to the field~ 9 before 1939 the

reserves of gun ammunition do not appear to have reached

this recommended leve1~ 0 In their report, the Senior

Officers mentioned that during major battles in the First

World War field artillery had often fired more than 500

rounds of 18-pdr ammunition per gun each day and they also

argued that the acquisition of medium artillery was

necessary in order to suppress enemy field gun fire~ 1

The ability of Australia's coastal guns to fulfil their

harbour defence role was even less than the ability of the

field guns to fulfil their fire support mission. At least

the A.M.F.'s 18-pdrs and 4.5-in. howitzers would have been

able to provide the infantry with some support, had they

48see e.g. I.G.'s Report, Pt II, 31 May 1921, paras 4-5; ibid., 31 May 1922, para. 11; ibid., 31 May 1923, para. 12; ibid., 31 May 1924, paras 3 (d) & 22; ibid., 31 May 1925, para. 3(c) and Summary Of Proceeding Of Council Of Defence Meeting, 24 February 1938, p. 4 in A.A.A.: AA 1971/216.

49swinburne Committee's report, 30 June 1919, para. 35.

50see e.g. I.G.'s Report, Pt II, 31 May 1921, para. 9; ibid., 31 May 1922, para. 12; ibid., 31 May 1923, para. 12; ibid~, 31 May 1924, para. 22; ibid., 31 May 1926, para. 13 ana-­Summary Of Proceedings Of Council Of Defence Meeting, 24 February 1938, p. 4 in A.A.A.: AA 1971/216.

51vol. 2, paras 29 & 34 in Pearce Papers, A.N.L., MS 1827/15. See also General Staff Memorandum On The Period Req~ired For The Supply Of War Material By Industrial Mobilisation, 19 November 1936 in A.A.A.: MP729/6, file 47/401/19, for an estimate of the amount of ammunition which would be used by the artillery of the First Line Component during the first year of an anti-raid type war.

246

reached the battlefield in time. Admittedly, the shortage

of gun ammunition and the lack of medium and heavy ordnance

would have severely restricted the amount of friendly gun

fire available, thereby making the citizen soldiers' task

of repelling the invaders so much more difficult. However,

in some cases, coast guns were absolutely incapable of

defending their ports against enemy raiders.

To take one example: at Fort Largs, near Adelaide,

between 1923 and 1927, there were only three serviceable

high explosive lyddite shells available for the coast guns.

Even supposing that these ancient shells had actually

struck a raiding cruiser, and this was doubtful because

the depression range finders were out of commission, the

impression made on the warship's armour plate would probably

h b 1 . . bl 52 ave een neg 1g1 e. Lieutenant-Colonel V.A.H. Sturdee

53 noted in 1934 that Fort Largs still required searchlights.

Without them, of course, the engagement of targets at night

would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible.

The situation at other ports was not very different

during the same period; 4 and although in the mid-1930s

52Major A.B. Hastings, 'Coast Artillery 1854-1962' in Major-General A.G. Wilson et al, South Australian Artillery 1840-1966 (n.p., c. 1967)1 p. 85 and Lieutenant Simpson (Staff Corps, Officer Commanding lOth Battery Royal Australian Garrison Artillery) Annual Report on Conditions of the Coast Defence of Fourth District Base, Fort Largs, 26 September 1923 in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1855/1/68.

53Report in A.A.A.: MP 729/2, file 1855/1/218.

54see e.g. Lieutenant-Colonel G.F. Wilkinson, Captain C. Round-Turner R.N., Major E.F. Harrison, Report On Coast Defences, 31 May 1921, Pt 1 in A.A.A.: CRS A2030, item 21/12/23 and I.G.'s Report, Pt II, 31 May 1921, paras 20-21; ibid., 31 May 1922, para. 15; ibid., 31 May 1923, para. ~); and ibid., 30 June 1929, paras 7-9 and 14-16.

247

efforts were made to modernize Australia's coast artillery

not all of the new equipment was installed or fully

operational by the time World War II broke out~ 5

The shortage or lack of weapons also forced citizen

soldiers to exercise with token arms at various times

during the inter-war decades. For instance, in 1925

C.M.F. infantry units were ordered to carry Lewis Guns on

platoon exercises when they were available and, if none

was available, token machine-guns were to be represented.

In this way, the Lewis Gun sections and their leaders

ld . ff . . 1 . . 56 wou rece1ve e ect1ve tact1ca tra1n1ng. Similarly,

in 1938, Army Headquarters decreed that token anti-tank

rifles should be carried by troops during tactical exercises~ 7

As far as tactical training was concerned, the substitutior

of token weapons could be quite successful but, in some

cases, for example when it was a matter of wireless sets

55see Summary Of Proceedings Of Council Of Defence Meeting, 24 February 1938, p. 3 in A.A.A.: AA 1971/216; C.B. Laffan (Secretary to the Military Board) to Secretary (Department of Defence) Defence Measures For An Immediate Emergency, 27 September 1938, para. 2 (a) in A.A.A.: CRS A816, item 30/301/6 and Army Defence Development Progr~rnrne 1937/38 to 1940/41 Report On Progress to 31st December 1938, paras 2-3 in A.A.A.: AA 1971/216, item Meeting 25 January 1939.

56 . { . f . 1" Lleutenant-Colonel J.D. Lavarack D1rector o Ml 1tary Training) Maintenance of the Organization of Units During Collective Training (Circular Memorandum M.B. 594), 16 December 1925 in 8th Field Regt. Year 1925. 10. Bundle of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.).

57Major J.M. Hoare {Brigade Major, lOth Infantry Brigade) to 24th, 37th/39th & 52nd Battalions, Anti-Tank Rifle Training, 25 August 1938 in 37th/39th Aust Inf Bn. Year 1937.to 1938. 16. Bundles of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.).

248

and gas masks, there could be no real replacement.

Soldiers, at any rate, require the actual piece of equipment

in order to learn how to operate and maintain it efficiently.

Overall, the shortage and obsolescence of equipment must

have adversely affected training because it did not permit

the citizen soldier to familiarize himself, in peacetime,

with the items with which he was expected to go to war.

Certainly the Military Board believed that modern equipment

would help to make Militia training· much more interesting

d . 58 an attract1ve. Previous chapters have shown the link

between retention rates and training.

But what caused this shortage of equipment and why was

it not replaced or modernized before it became obsolescent?

In other words how did the situation described below by

the then Minister for the Army arise? In 1952 J. Francis

wrote that:

••• The pre-war Artillery was still horsed and largely consisted of obsolescent 18-pr. guns - there was no anti-tank artillery - no anti-aircraft batteries ..•.

••. as late as 1939 he [the Militia infantryman] had his rifle and the Lewis Gun and Vickers Gun of World War r.59

ATTEHPTS AT MODERNIZATION

Lack of money and Britain's inability and unwillingness

to fulfil Australian orders quickly contributed towards the

shortage and obsolescence of the A.M.F.'s equipment through-

58Major-General Jess (Adjutant-General) to the Secretary (of the Military Board) Volunteer Militia Training, 12 July 1938, para. 8 in Military Board agendum No. 106/1938. Date 14 July 1938 (Taken Out Of Session) •

59 'The Citizen Military Forces', Australian~rmy Journal, No. 41 (October 1952), p. 12.

249

out the inter-war decades. During the 1920s and for much

of the 1930s the dearth of money was directly responsible

for the state of the Australian army's equipment but

after 1935-36, when more money became available, the main

brake on the re-equipment and modernization o£ the Militia

was Britain's inability and unwillingness to supply

Australia with military equipment while she was supplying

other markets and re-arming herself.

That there was a shortage of money is clear. Between

1918 and 1938 the amount of money available for the A.M.F.

under ordinary votes and appropriations varied between

slightly less than £1,000,000 60 to more than £2,000,000. 61

In part this shortage was, of course, due to the crushing

financial legacy of the First World War. Although in

1923-24 £1,545,454 were spent by the Army under ordinary

votes and appropriations, £32,922,571 were spent on military

1 d . 1 62 war re ate servlces a one.

This is not to claim that the money which was available

was spent wisely. In chapter two the rivalry and self-

interest of the Services were noted and in 1946 Senator

Brand outlined the amateurish manner in which the defence

vote was allocated among the Services during the inter-war

era. He said:

••. During the whole of those seven years [i.e. 1927-33 when Brand was either an associate or full member of the Military Board] it was the practice of the Minister

60 In 1919-20, 1931-32 and 1932-33.

61 In 1936-37 and 1937-38. See also appendix A.

62 rbid. and Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 18, 1925, p. 611.

250

for Defence for the time being to send for the heads of the three services and say to them, "Here is £7,000,000 for you to divide" or "There is £5,000,000 g~ailable. Arrange your own allotments." •••

Similarly, estimates were arbitrarily reduced:

••. If we decided that, say, £4,500,000 was required; and submitted estimates to the Minister accordingly, we generally found that a blue pencil was struck through the estimate and we were instrucG~d to reduce it to, say £1,500,000 ....

These procedures could hardly have been expected to

produce a cost effective solution to the problem of

defending Australia. And indeed they did not, as each

Service fought to secure its share of the defence vote

by implementing its own scheme to defend Australia against

what it perceived to be the major threat. But even on a

single service level it will be shown that political

constraints forced expenditure on inessential items

occasionally.

Attempts to obtain modern wireless sets from Bjrtain

between 1921 and 1923 were unsuccessful because of the

65 lack of money. Although in 1923 Chauvel had emphasized

that it was necessary to obtain more technical equipment

including wireless sets for the A.M.F. in order to complete

mobilization requirements~ 6 there was still a dearth of

67 sets a year later. Modern portable wireless sets apparently

63c.P.D., Vol. 187, 4 July 1946, p. 2200.

64 rbid.

65see correspondence in A.A.A.: CRS A457, item QA 208/I.

66 I.G.'s Report, Pt I, 31 May 1923, para. 23.

67Ib. ' _._~a., Pt II, 31 May 1924, para. 3 (d).

251

were not issued to the A.M.F. until about 1927~ 8 and even

then there remained grave shortages for mobilization

requirements~ 9 Even in the 1930s Militia signalmen still

used flags, Lucas lamps and heliographs;o in addition to

wireless sets.

The modernization of the A.M.F. was also delayed by

the shortage of money. Quartermaster-General C.H. Brand,

in 1931, wanted to fit rubber padded wheels to the sixteen

field artillery batteries and sections which were normally

drawn. by motor transport. This was necessary because the

carriages and gun limbers, which had been designed to be

hauled at slow speeds by horses, were suffering from the

effects of being towed at higher speeds by lorries and

tractors. Unfortunately, the Military Board felt obliged

to spend the £12,400 involved on military clothing instead71

no doubt to help increase voluntary enlistments.

On purely military grounds the wisdom of this decision

may be questioned. After all, on the battlefield, artillery

was potentially of more value than clothing. But, in this

case, political considerations might have been paramount.

Scullin's Labour Government had suspended compulsory

military training,and to encourage voluntary enlistment

68 rbid., Pt I, 31 May 1926, para. 27{i) and ibid., 31 May 1927, para. 4 0 (a) •

69 rbid., Pt II, 31 May 1928, para. 32.

70see e.g. Officer Commanding H.Q. Wing (H.Q. Wing 39th Bn to 39th Bn) Report on Bivouac held 22/26 DEC 34 in 39 Aust. Inf Bn. Year 1934. 9. Bundles of Files. File No. 417/20/31 (A.W.M.).

71Quartermaster-General C.H. Brand to the Secretary (of the Military Board) Mechanization Of Field Artillery: Fitting Of Rubber Padded Wheels To Carriages, Etc., 1 April 1931 in Military Board agenda No. 44/1931. Date of meeting, 14 April 1931.

252

more attractive uniforms had been promised. At the time

Lieutenant-General Sir James McCay, ex-commander of the

5th Division A.I.F., had ridiculed the idea. He wrote:

..• "Pay and a pleasing uniform" is to be the cry. Officers are to scour highv1ays and byways, with a purse in one hand and a tailor:s pattern in the other, uttering

72 sweet no1ses to attract customers ....

Nevertheless, even here the Military Board was faithful

to the progressive plan prescribed by the Senior Officers'

Conference in February 1920 7 ; and endorsed by the Council of

74 Defence in April 1920 and later approved by the Government,

just as the Board had been in 1926 when it had suggested

sacrificing the munitions purchasing programme temporarily,

rather than reducing the number of troops, in order to save

£120,000? 5 The Senior Officers' first priority had been the

establishment of a seven division organization? 6

The result of the decision to spend the £12,400 O!l

clothing was serious. Even as the Second World War broke

out, field artillery carriages and trailers were still being

converted and no medium ordnance had been modified for

77 haulage by tractors.

In general, the modernization of the A.M.F. through

motorization was obstructed by the lack of money because

72 •Labour's Defence Policy', Argus, 15 November 1929.

73 Report, Vol. I, para. 3.

7 4 f h '1' d - . Of A See Secretary o t e M1 1tary Boar , Reauct1on rmy Votes, 11 January 1926 in Military Board Proceedings, Estimates, 1926, Vol. 3.

75Ibid.

76 Report, Vol. I, para. 3.

77 C.B. Laffan (Secretary to the Military Board) Artillery Mechanization, 22 August 1939 in A.A.A.: HP431/l, file 931/2/833.

253

the Military Board was as keen to follow the British army's

78 lead in the area of motorization as in other spheres. By

the early 1930s, the shortage of money, and therefore of

motor vehicles, had become so acute that some field artillery

batteries had had to revert to horse traction, when the

Australian Army Service Corps was re-organized on a motor

b . 79

transport as1s.

The high cost, too, ensured that the A.M.F. was able to

afford very few armoured fighting vehicles. Hence, in 1927

only four Vickers Medium Mk II A (Special Pattern) tanks were

bought for £72,000 80 and ten years later only eleven Vickers

Light Mk VIA tanks were bought~ 1 For the same reason,

private vehicles were hired to simulate armoured cars~ 2

But, if there was a shortage of motor transport because

of the dearth of money, this problem also adversely affected

the repair of horse drawn vehicles~ 3 However, as the 1930s

drew to a close and more money became available, the A.M.F.

suffered more and more from Britain's inability and

unwillingness to supply the equipment ordered by Australia,

because of her own re-armament programme and desire to retain

her influence and markets in foreign countries.

78see e.g. Board Minute On Agenda No. 144/1924, 1 1924 following Military Board agenda No. 144/1924. meeting, 6 August 1924.

September Date of

79see the arguments in A.A.A.: MP431/l, file 849/3/372.

80Brigadier D. Macarthur-Onslow, op.cit., p. 4.

81Tb'd 5 .L l ., P •• -- -82see Hajor-General R.N.L. Hopkins, op.cit., pp. 18-19, 21, 23.

83 I.G.'s Report, Pt II, 30 June 1928, para. 38.

254

For instance, late in 1938 Britain did not envisage

being able to supply Australia with: anti-aircraft fire

control instruments, searchlights, anti-aircraft guns,

anti-tank guns and anti-tank rifles, until at least 1940

in most cases~ 4 Even in 1939 the 9.2-in. coast guns were

not operational because Australia still awaited delivery of

fire control instruments. A similar situation existed with

85 anti-aircraft weapons.

However, even in the 1920s Britain had not always

delivered equipment on time. Because of this, the 1st Anti-

Aircraft Battery had had to train with Lewis machine-guns

86 during its first camp • Its 3-in. anti-aircraft guns

87 arrived during the following year. Nor was all the equipment

supplied by the U.K. of good quality. Some horse drawn

tran~port vehicles, received as part of a consignment of

post bellum equipment, were unserviceable because of unseasoned

88 timber and dry rot.

This post bellum equipment refers to the seven divisions'

worth of heavy equipment, which Britain sent to Australia in

the early 1920s as replacements for the war-worn equipment

which the A.I.F. had abandoned in Europe and the Middle East

at the end of World War I, when it returned to Australia.

84 ( 1' . h ' . . L d ) Cablegram from Bruce Austra 1an H1g Co~~1SS10r.er ~n ·On on to Prime Minister (copied to Minister and Department of Defence, 27 August 1938), 26 August 1938 in A.A.A.: MP729/6, file 47/401/102.

85summary Of Proceedings of Council Of Defence Meeting, 25 January 1939, p. 18 in A.A.A.: AA 1971/216, item Meeting 25 January 1939.

86I.G. 's Report, Pt I, 31 May 1927, para. 38 (c).

87 Ibid., 31 Hay 1928, para. 37(e).

B 8rbid., 31 Hay 1922, para. 22.

255

The post bellum equipment was drawn from the huge war

surplus stockpiles.

Britain's slowness in fulfilling Australian orders

after 1935 was only partly due to her rearmament programme.

Her desire to exert political influence and retain markets

in foreign states also contributed to the slowness with

which equipment was delivered to Australia. Thus, we see

that in 1938, Turkey and Finland were supplied with Blenheim ~·

aircraft89

and four submarines were being built for the

Turkish navy at the outbreak of war~ 0 In 1939 too, Vickers

MkVI light tanks were supplied to the Egyptians~ 1 At that

time, these tanks, the design of which dated back only to

1935, were far from obsolescent. In fact, in the absence of

heavier tanks, these vehicles were used extensively in France

and the Western Desert in 1939-40~ 2

89J. McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-39, p. 109.

90H.T. Lenton & J.J. Colledge, Warships Of World War II (London, 1964), p. 153.

91c. Kerr, Tanks In The East The Story of an Australian Cavalry Regiment (Melbourne, 1945}, p. 19.

92The Royal Armoured Corps Tank Museum, The Inter War Period 1919-1939 (Reprint, Bevington, 1974), pp. 18 & 36. As late as 1936, at a time when British regular divisions were deficient in infantry tanks, mortars, Bren guns, anti-tank rifles and anti-tank guns, 36.5 per cent by value of the U.K.'s exports of arms and anununition were to countries outside the British Empire. See P. Dennis, Decision by Default Peacetime conscription and British defence 1919-39 (London, 1972), p. 96 and League Of Nations, Statistical Year-Book of the Trade In Arms And Ammunition (Geneva, 1938), p. 34.

256

We have already discussed the shortage of money in a

general way. Specifically, the cost of individual armoured

and motor vehicles was high. For example, the £72,000 spent

on four Vickers medium tanks, with an additional engine and

spares, in 1927 represented almost 1 per cent of total

current defence expenditure for 1926-27~ 3 In 1935, the cost

of a Light Tank MkVI, landed in Australia together with a

few spares, was £7,000 and the cost of a Machine-gun

carrier was estimated at between £900 and £1,000~ 4 In

comparison, new light lorries cost more than £600 each in

95 1925 and artillery tractors, Dragon Mk IIIs, £3,500 each

while, in 1935, 3-in. mortars cost about £200 a piece and

Bren light machine-guns £175~ 6 Thus, in 1935, one light

tank cost the equivalent of forty Bren guns: a sufficient

number to equip an infantry battalion at war strength, with

one per section, or six peacetime battalions, with one per

97 platoon.

However, overall, the lack of money available for

expenditure on defence and the U.K.'s inability and unwilling-

ness to fulfil Australian orders effectively retarded the

modernization and replacement of obsolete A.M.F. equipment

and the acquisition of new weapons, such as anti-tank guns,

anti-tank rifles, motor transport and armoured fighting

93see n. 80 and appendix A.

94Major-General J.D. Lavarack (C.G.S.) to Q.M.G., Orders For Certain Equipment Included In Three Years Plan, 31 October 1935 in A.A.A.: MP729/2, file 1812/1/33.

95 f h . Memo. to the Secretary of the Department o t e Pr1me Minister from the Official Secretary (Australia House, London), 25 June 1925 in A.A.A.: CRS A458, item 1000/1, Pt II.

96 See n. 94.

97 See G. Long, To Benghazi, p. 52.

257

vehicles. The next section will examine motorization and

mechanization in Australia and how it could have helped solve

the A.M.F.'s crucial problem of concentrating in time to meet

a Japanese invasion.

MOTORIZATION AND MECHANIZATION

It would seem obvious that the only way in which the

A.M.F. could have concentrated in time to repel a Japanese

landing around Sydney or Newcastle was by motorization or

mechanization. Reliance upon railways and horse drawn

transport might have meant that the A.M.F. would not be ready

. . 98 d . . bl 1 . 1n t1me an a1r transport was not a v1a e a ternat1ve

because of its limited carrying capacity; 9 while the movement

of citizen soldiers and their equipment by sea would have

been unlikely to succeed if opposed by the invader's warships,

even if such movement had been quicker than by rail.

98see Major-General J.H. Bruche (C.G.S.) to A.G. & Q.M.G., Strategic Concentration: Plan For The Organization Of The Lines Of Communication, 11 May 1933 in A.A.A.: MP729/2, file 1937/1/17, for a discussion of how the lack of unified railway gauges and the concentration of N.S.W. railway facilities in SydHey and Newcastle, virtually the potenti::il front line, affected the siting of depots and reserves. This plan, from its integral tables, obviously did not envisage mobilization being completed in less than a month.

99A study undertaken for the Defence Committee in 1938 indicated that sixty-nine of the larger civil aircraft available in Australia and New Guinea had a total passenger capacity of 742. See Wing Commanders A.H. Cabby & W.D. Bostock Lieutenant-Colonel J. Northcott, Co~~ander J.C.D. Esdaile, Use Of Civil Aircraft In Time Of War, 14 September 1938, para. 9 and the appendix especially, in A.A.A.: CRS P~2031, Vol. 5.

258

Unfortunately, lack of money to spend on the purchase of

relatively expensive motor and armoured vehicles prevented

this solution from being adopted. Yet attempts were made

to move in this direction and these will be examined here.

In 1925 Quartermaster-General Coxen had estimated

that approximately 3,000 motor vehicles would be required

for the general mobilization of the Field Army exclusive

of Non-Divisional and Line of Communication troops~00 This

was at a time when only 247,557 motor vehicles were registered

in the whole of Australia~01

The impressment of civilian vehicles appeared to be

the only way in which the Army's demand for ~otor transport

could be met, granted that only a limited amount of money was

available. Hence, during the decade before the outbreak of

the Second World War, the A.M.F. carried out a partially

successful census of Australian civilian motor vehicles

. bl f . d . . 102 su1ta e or 1mpressment ur1ng wart1me.

Another problem connected with motorization was how to

get the Army used to operating with motor vehicles. Again,

shortage of money precluded any attempt at wholesale

motorization and so the policy of introducing a few vehicles

at a time into the A.M.F. was adopted~ 03 A training nucleus

of motor vehicles was necessary because prior to the First

100Q.M.G. Coxen to the Secretary (of the Military Board) Motor Transport, 17 February 1925 in Military Board agenda No. 36/1925. Date of meeting, 18 February 1925.

101 ff. . 1 k f th c l+h f " t 1' 0 1c1a Year Boo o e ommonwea ~ o ~us ra 1a, No. 19, 1926, p. 304. This figure is for 1924-25.

102see A.A.A.: MP431/l, files 931/2/430 and 931/2/504.

103 rn 1924, Brief Summary Of Mechanization Policy Of Military Board, p. 1 in A.A.A.: MP431/l, file 849/3/257.

259

World War there had been no motor transport in the Australian

104 army, and, although the Australian Army Service Corps had

operated motor vehicles in France during World War r7° 5

while in the Middle East a few Australian armoured and light

106 cars had been used quite successfully against the Turks,

it was not until 1926 that the A.M.F. received its first post

war motor vehicles. These consisted of one 30-cwt lorry per

District Base, excluding the 6th, and eight Hathi tractors

h 1 d . '11 107 to au me 1um art1 ery.

Two years later, in 1928, some artillery units were

motorized in the 2nd and 3rd Military Districts, and motor

vehicles were substituted, as far as possible, for horse

transport in camps. Since no more motor vehicles were

acquired until 1930, when only four second-hand Morris six-

wheelers and four new Vulcan six-wheelers were bought, the

104captain J.T. Marsh (Director of Supply and Transport, Army Service Corps) The New Transport System, lecture delivered at the Royal United Services Institute, Melbourne, on 26 April 1913 in A.A.A.: MP367/l 1 file 631/1/132. However, motor vehicles were used for other than transport purposes in the A.M.F. For example, during its brief existence between 1908 and 1916, the Australian Volunteer Automobile Corps was used mainly for reconnaissance and mapping work. Brigadier D. Macarthur-Onslow, op.cit., p. 1.

105colonel W.H. Tunbridge (Director of Mechanical Transport Services, A.I.F.) History of the Australian A.S.C. Mechanical Transport Branch In The Great War 1914-1918, in A.A.A.: MP367/l, file 631/1/132.

106Major-General R.N.L. Hopkins, op.cit., pp. 12-13 and Captain E.H. James 11 The Motor Patrol .. The History of the 1st Australian Armoured Car Section, n.d. in A.A.A.: SP539/2.

10 7 · - Of h ' t' P 1' Of M'l't B d Br1er Summary Mec an1za 10n o 1cy 1 1 ary oar , p. 1 in A.A.A.: MP431/l, file 849/3/257.

260

few available motor vehicles were run down. This led to

demands by the Australian Army Service Corps, in the early

1930s, that all artillery units revert to horse traction,

thereby enabling the Service Corps to be properly organized

on a motor transport basis. This had been the Military

Board's policy all along and was based upon British army

practice~ 08 Of course, as more vehicles were bought the

situation began to improve. However, even in 1936, when it

was decided to convert two light horse regiments in each of

the two cavalry divisions to motorized machine-gun regiments,

l.'t h' . '1' d 1 . 109 was necessary to 1.re cl.Vl. 1.an-owne motor orr1.es.

The hiring of civilian motor trucks for military purposes

had occurred previously in 1933 when, following British army

policy;lo the Military Board had decided to form a cavalry

armoured car regiment by converting a light horse regiment~11

The trucks, with suitable attachments, were used to simulate

112 armoured cars. Both the 1st, as the 19th Light Horse

108 rbid., pp. 1-2. See also above, p. 253 and n. 79.

109P.V. Vernon (ed.), op.cit., pp. 199-200 and Major R.J.G. Hall, op.cit., p. 49.

110see Mechanization Of Army Units in A.A.A.: MP43l/l, file 849/3/257. In Britain, in 1920, eight Territorial Army cavalry regiments were converted to armoured car companies. But it was not until about 1929 that the first two regular British cavalry regiments switched from horses to armoured cars, although by 1939 all except one Dragoon regiment had been absorbed into the Royal Armoured Corps. A.H. Franks, Tanks How they are made, Identification, History, Tactics (London, 1943), p. 32 and R.M. Ogorkiewicz, op.cit., p. 429.

111This was the 19th Light Horse Regiment. See Military Board to H.Q., 2nd Cavalry Division, Melbourne, Formation Of Armoured Car Regiment, 1 September 1933 in A.A.A.: MP431/l, file 849/3/372.

112organization Of Militia Armoured Car Regiments. General Staff Proposal. Provision and Location of Units, in A.A.A.: MP431/l, file 849/3/400.

261

Regiment had become, and the 2nd Armoured Car Regiments

received Ford-engined armoured cars late in 1939. The

armoured bodies had been built at the South Australian

railway workshops. Although useful for training, these

vehicles were unsuitable for operations~13 This was because

these armoured cars consisted merely of a heavy steel-plate

box welded onto a standard commercial heavy lorry chassis.

Not surprisingly, their cross-country performance was

extremely limited~14

The delay in equipping the units with armoured cars,

h . h 1 d t h h' f . '1' d 1 . 115 1 w 1c e o t e 1re o c1v1 1an-owne orr1es, was part y

also because Australia was unable to produce the necessary

bullet-proof stee1116 and therefore had to import all her

requirements from the U.K~17 As early as 1932 the Munitions

113Major-General R.N.L. Hopkins, op.cit., p. 28; Brigadier D. Macarthur-Onslow, op.cit., p. 10; The Navy, Army, Air and Munitions Journal The Staff Organ of the Department of Defence in Australia, Vol. 8, No. 11 (15 November 1939), p. 5. A photograph of the four armoured cars delivered to the 2nd Armoured Car Regiment in Sydney, in November 1939, appeared ibid., Vol. 8, No. 12 (15 December 1939}, p. 17.

114rbid., Vol. 8, No. 11 (15 November 1939), p. 5.

115The precedent had been set by enlisting light horsemen with their horses. In the case of the 19th Light Horse Armoured Car Regiment this policy was adhered to: only now men with trucks, instead of horses, were recruited. Major-General R.N.L. Hopkins, 'Origins Of The Australian Armoured Corps', Stand-To, Vol. 4, No. 2 (March-April 1954), p. 9.

116 1' 1 . h . bl . h h d . Austra 1a was not a one 1n avJ..ng pro ems \·11 t. t e pro uct1on of armour plating at this time. According to Gc::neral H. Guderian, Panzer Leader (trans. C. Fitzgibbon, lOth impression, London, 1970), p. 31, the first sheets of armour plate produced in Germany in 1933 ' ... splintered like glass •.• •.

117Mechanization Of Army Units, paras 25--6 in A.A.A.: MP431/l, file 849/3/257.

262

Supply Board had constructed an improvised armoured car

body out of mild steel and placed it upon a four-wheeled

30 t h . 1 b G 1 M · · dll8 -cw c ass1s ent y enera 1otors L1m1te • Unfortunately,

it was not until March 1935 that a proper armoured car as

opposed to a mock-up was built at Maribyrnong, passed some

preliminary tests at Victoria Barracks in Melbourne and

then joined the 19th Light Horse Armoured Car Regiment at

h . . . 1 119 Hors am to carry out act1ve serv1ce tr1a s.

It must be emphasized that the role of these armoured

cars and the units equipped with them was reconnaissancef 20

similarly with the light car troops which were attached to

h 1 d . . . 121 t e cava ry lVlSlons. They were not expected to be able

to attack the enemy or to help support infantry assaults,

which was the proper role for tanks.

Although the leaders of the A.M.F. were well aware of

the need to provide their soldiers with armoured protection,

. h f f h' . 122 d d 1n t e orm o mac 1ne-gun carr1ers an armoure support,

i.e. tanks; Government policy concerning the scale of

118rbid., para. 26.

119The Navy, Army & Air-Force Journal The Staff Organ of the Department of Defence in Australia, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1 April 1935) 1 P• 24.

120Major-General J.H. Bruche (C.G.S.) to A.G., Cavalry Armoured Car Regiments, 21 March 1933 in A.A.A.: MP431/l, file 849/3/400 and The Navy, Army, Air and Munitions Journal The Staff Organ of the Department of Defence in Australia, Vol. 7, No~ 1 (15 January 1936), p. 6.

121c.B. Laffan (Secretary to the Military Board) Formation of Light Car Troops of Light Horse Regiments, June 1936 in A.A.A.: MP385/3, file 106/2/227.

122see e.g. Improvised Armoured M.G. Carrier, Extract From Statement On Mechanization Policy Made By C.G.S. in June 1934 in A.A.A.: MP431/l, file 938/2/429.

263

123 attack and the shortage of money, as well as inter-service

. 1 ~ 124 d h 1' . r1va ry IOr money, ensure t at Austra 1a at no t1me

between 1919 and 1939 possessed more ·than a section of four

Vickers MkiiA (Special Pattern) medium tanks based in Sydney,

with two sections each of five Vickers MkVIA light tanks

operating in Sydney and Melbourne~25 'l'his was no more than

a training nucleus. As for machine-gun carriers, a few Light

Dragons may have been built or purchased prior to World War

126 b h h . . f . f h. 1 II, ut t e mec an1zat1on o 1n antry mac 1ne-gun p_atoons

had to wait until locally produced Bren Gun Carriers were

available, and this was after the war had begun~27

123see especially Lavarack's comments, dated 27 January 1938, scrawled against The Employment, Organisation And Training Of Light Tank Units In Australia, Memorandum by Major R.N.L. Hopkins, Notes for the D.M.O. & I. in A.A.A.: MP729/6, file 50/401/46 and his comment, written on 23 May 1938, on Major H. Durant's Notes On Bren Carriers - Major Hopkins (which were addressed to the C.G.S.) 19 May 1938 on the same file.

124see ch. 2. For example, the Military Board's proposal to form a permanent mechanized brigade to meet an invasion was thwarted when the C. N. S. and C .A. S. ··blocked discussion of this issue in the Defence Committee by claiming that the basis of Government policy for defence against raids should remain unchanged. The three Chiefs of Staff formed the Defence Committee and, in this instance, inter-service competition for money evidently was so strong that it prevented any discussion of the C.G.S.'s proposals. See Minutes Of Defence Committee At Meeting Held On Tuesday, 16th August, 1938. No. 45/1938 -Australian Defence Policy, 16 August 1938, paras 1-4 and annex E. in A.A.A.: CRS A2031, Vol. 5.

12 5 . d' h 0 1 't 4 5 10 Br1ga 1er D. Macart ur-ns ow, op~., pp. - , •

126 . f h . . 3 d . . See D1rector o Mec an1zat1on to H.Q. r D1str1ct Base, International Motor Show, 26 April 1939 and Show Cards For Defence Exhibit in A.A.A.: MP431/1, file 931/2/461.

127 Colonel V.A.H. Sturdee, Mechanization Of Infantry M.G. Platoons, 22 June 1939 in A.A.A.: MP729/6, file 37/401/129.

264

Two factors detracted from the obvious superiority

of motor transport over other forms of land transport,

especially rail and horse drawn transport, in Australia

. ~ ld 12 3 pr1or to ~or · War II. These were the lack of a local

supply of oil and doubts about Australia's ability to

maintain a motorized force in wartime. In 1928, and

again in 1929, Chauvel emphasized Australia's reliance upon

. t d f 1 ~ . 1 . 1 129 1mpor e ue ana mo~or ve11c es. The Senior Officers'

Conference in 1920 expressed doubts about Australia's

ability to operate large amounts of armour and motor

130 transport. These doubts were probably justified because,

1"1 apart from a minute quantity of oil produced from shale,~

Australia had to import all her oil fuel from overseas

132 before 1939. The amount of fuel stored locally at any

time was barely sufficient for Army requirements, let alone

those of the R.A.N. or R.A.A.F~ 33

128As early as 1919 a Committee of A.I.F. Officers involved with motor transport during World War I had stressed this superiority. See the Committee's report to the Chief of Staff A.I.F., Re Mechanical Transport for Post Bellum Army, 11 June 1919, paras. 1-9 in A.A.A.: !··1P367/l, file 631/1/132. For statistics illustrating this superiority, see appendix L.

129 I.G.'s Report, Pt I, 31 ~1ay 1928, para. ll(b) and ibid., 31 May 1929, para. 22.

130vol~ II, para. 79.

13138,000 gallons of crude oil in 1934. Operations ceased at the e~d of January 1935. Official Year Book of the CoiT~onwealth of Australia, No. 32, 1939, p. 574.

132In 1937 about 9, 000 gallons of crude petroleum oil v1as produced in Australia. Official Year Book of the Cominonv1eal th of Australia 1 No. 32, 1939, p. 575. See appendix M for the amount of fuel imported into Australia in the early 1930s.

1338 ~. J ee appenctlX l,.

265

Efforts were made to overcome the problem of having

to import all oil requirements. The Navy, for example, had

134 oil fuel storage tanks built at Darwin and Sydney, while

the Army watched the unsuccessful experiments with

'prod~cer-gas road vehicles•,135with interest.

The A.M.F. tried to overcome the problem of spare

parts by purchasing motor transport vehicles which were in

demand commercially in Australia, and hence for which there

were considerable stocks of spare parts available at the

agents.l 36 Never~heless, this handicapped the development

of a motorized force in that commercial vehicles were not

really suitable for use as front-line transport because

of their lack of cross-country performance and because it

would have been impossible to standardize on one type or

make.

Hm·lever, even this policy of using corarnercial vehicles

where possible did not make Australia independent of

overseas suppliers, because very few motor vehicles were

built locally. In the early 1930s, for example, Australia

built most of her own motor bodies, but imported virtually

137 all chasses. This was at a time when motor car spare

parts were beginning to be produced in Australia thanks to

134 C.P.D., Vol. 148, p. 1967.

135These were charcoal driven motor vehicles. See A.A.A.: MP431/l, file 931/2/323.

136see e.g. Hechanical Narfare Committee, Types of r1.T. Vehicles Required For General Service Transport And Technical Purposes On Mobilization, p. 1, Minutes Of Second B.eeting Held In Board Roor:t, A.E.Q., 9 October 1931 in H.Q. 3rd Div. Years 1929 to 1938. 19. Bundles of Files. File No. 417/20/31. Part II (A.W.M.) and Mechanization Of Army Units, para. 16 (iii} in A.A.A.: r·1P431/l, file 849/3/257.

137 d' 0 See appen J..X ,

266

the Scullin government's imposition of a tariff~ 38

As with the eventually successful effort to establish

a local aircraft industry, any attempt to form a motor

industry in Australia would have met with strong opposition

from the U.K., which naturally wished to retain the·

Austra.ll·an market1. 39 Th d'10.C' lt f · 1 t' .e 1I~1cu yo 1mp emen 1ng

this option possibly prevented the A.M.F. from trying to

lessen, or eliminate, its massive dependence on overseas

suppliers of motor vehicles, thereby severely restricting

the scope of its policy of motorization.

During the inter-World War decades the A.H.F.'s most

serious problem was how to concentrate in time to meet

the invader in the vicinity of Sydney and Newcastle. An

obvious solution was to increase the speed of concentration

by using more modern technology such as motor vehicles

instead of 140 This solution, however, rendered horses. was

impracticable largely owing to the shortage of money and,

as well, to Australia's heavy dependence on overseas

supplies of fuel and motor vehicles. Similar problems

ensured that the citizen soldier was left without much

armoured protection or support either.

138n.P. Mellor, op.cit., p. 25. Motor car axles, for instance, were produced by the Ordnance Factory at Maribyrnong.

139J. McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-39, p. 115.

140Another solution, apparently not implemented, would have been to increase intelligence or coastal surveillance activities in order to increase the likelihood and amount of warning of an attack.

267

THE JAPANESE LAND AND THE A.H.F. DEPLOYS

For the purposes of this comparison between the

equipment of the hlo rival armed forces, the follm,Jing

assumptions will be made. The first is that, despite the

reasoning which made both contingencies unlikely, the

A.M.F. would have been able to concentrate and deploy in

the Sydney - Newcastle area and the second is that the

Japanese would have started to land in strength in the

same area.

It must be emphasized that it was not until the late

1920s and early 1930s that the Japanese began to acquire

real proficiency in the art of assault landings. At the

same time the Japanese army vlas modernized. Hence, until

then, the invasion and defence would probably have been

very much in the style of Gallipoli. In that case, the

A.H.F. would perhaps have had some slight chance of holding

out, until rescued by the British fleet. Of course, the

odds would have been weighted in favour of the Japanese

because of the A.H.F.'s shortage of grenades and, more

especially, its lack of heavy artillery. If the Japanese

had used gas, or the A.M.F.'s supply of gun ammunition or

machine-guns, because of the lack of reserves of both items,

had run out, then the balance would have tilted even more

heavily in favour of the Japanese.

But, from the late 1920s onwards, with the modernization

of the Japanese forces, the A.M.F.'s chances of success in

battle against the invaders would have been drastically

reduced. It was not that Japanese military equipment was

necessarily better than the British equipment used by the

268

A.M.F., simply that the Japanese had far more equipment. 141

Briefly stated, the A.M.F. was inadequately armed and

equipped until well after 1939.

Not until the late 1920s did the Japanese begin

establishing Special Naval Landing Units. Until then, naval

personnel had been used to form scratch landing parties.

Naturally, there had been problems because such personnel

lacked the specialized skills, which included some infantry

training, necessary to carry out a successful opposed

landing. From 1932 onwards, Special Naval Landing Units were

utilized extensively in China142

and, by 1941, they had

developed into battalion groups of approximately 1,200 to

1,500 men accompanied by a few light tanks or armoured

143 cars. Meanwhile, Japan's expertise in the conduct of

large scale operations overseas was demonstrated in February

1932 when she landed approximately three divisions at

. .144 Shangha1. As already mentioned, in 1933 the Japanese laid

down the Shinshu Maru, the world's first landing ship dock~45

141see volumes such as: J. Weeks, infantry weapons (London, February 1972) i I.V. Hogg, The guns: 1939/45 (London, 1970); R. Dilley, Japanese Army Uniforms And Equipment 1939-1945 {London, September 1970); and Brigadier J.A. Barlow & Lieutenant-Colonel R.E.W. Johnson, Small Arms Hanual {reprint of 3rd edn, London, July 1960), for descriptions of British and Japanese infantry and artillery weapons.

142 War Department, Handbook On Japanese Military Forces {Washington, 1 October 1944), p. 76.

143 • • 11A L. W1gmore, op.c1t., p. •t.

144Hajor-General S. 'V'Ioodburn Kirby, _S_i~n:...,g~a_.p,_o_r...;.e_: __ T_h_e.;___C_h_a_i_n_O_f Disaster (London, 1971), p. 20.

14 5 r'. G d . t A.J. Watts & B.u. or on, op.c1 ., p. 482. seems to have remained the sole example of her the Japanese fleet until 1941. Ibid., p. 483.

But she class in

269

Concurrent with this development of landing forces

and their specialized vessels was the formation of

mechanized units. In 1925 the first two tank companies

were established, the second of which \vas only an

experimental unit~46 while in about 1927 the Japanese

signed a contract for the local production of French

Renault NC tank~47 and in 1928-29 Vickers Armstrong Limited

148 produced Vickers Medium C tanks for Japan. As already

noted, approximately twenty-four Japanese Type 89A

Medium149 and Renault NC-1 tanks were used unsuccessfully

at Shanghai in February 1932 because of the unsuitable

f h . 150 nature o t e terra1n. In 1932 too, a Crossley-Vickers

armoured car was imported by Japan to strength the Naval

d . h h .151 Lan lng Force at S ang a1.

By 1931, Japanese designed tanks were in production

and, two years later, the first three tank regiments,

each containing t'venty tanks, were formed. By 1937 Japan

152 had built more than one thousand tanks. These Japanese

146 0 , . . . 250 R.M. gorKleWlCZ, op.Clt., p. .

147P. Chamberlain & C. Ellis, Pictorial Histo~y Of Tanks Of The World 1915-45 (London, 1972), p.l34. P.M. Roland, Imperial Japanese Tanks, 1918/1945 (Kings Langley, 1975), pp. 5-9 describes the British and French medium tanks bought by the Japanese during the decade following World War I.

148R.E. Jones, G.H. Rarey & R.J. Icks, op.cit., p. 147 but K. Hacksey & J. Batchelor, Tank A History of the Armoured Fighting Vehicle (London, 1970)~ 95 claim that only one Vickers Hedium C went to Japan, in 1926.

149P.lVf. R 1 d 't p. 12 1 o an, op.c1 ., .

150R.E. Jones, G.H. Rarey & R.J. Icks, op.cit., p. 150.

151 . 1 . Lleutenant-Genera Tom1o Light Tanks and Tankettes 1

,

p. 2 of unnumbered pp.

Hara, 'Japanese Co~bat Cars, AFV/Weapons Profile, No. 54,

152 R.H. Ogorkiewicz, op.cit., PP· 251-3.

270

tanks were certainly as good in quality as the four

Australian Vickers Medium Mk II A (Special Pattern) and

eleven Vickers Light £.1k VI A tanks~53

Had the Japanese landed tanks in quantity then, with

no anti-tank guns the A.M.F. would have been hard pressed

to avoid defeat on Chinese lines. Bennett, indeed,

compared the A.H.F. with the Chinese army~54

After the war with China began in 1937, the Japanese

perfected the technique of giving close-support to ground

forces with carrier-borne aircraft. By then too, the

A.M.F.'s dearth of mobile anti-aircraft guns had become a

serious handicap because the new Japanese carrier-borne

155 naval aeroplanes were far superior to the R.A.A.F.'s

Hawker Demon fighters and Avro Anson general reconn&issance

153see, in general, ibid., p. 255, but for statistics consult K. ~-1acksey &-y:-Batchelor, op.cit., pp. 54 (Vickers I'-ledium Mkii) , 57 (Vickers !1edium C, Japanese Type 8 9A and Type 92), 62 (Japanese NC-31: improved Renault NC-27s) and 85 (Japanese Type 95 and Vickers Light HkVIC).

154 The Sunday Sun And Guardian, 28 November 1937.

155such as the Nakajima B5N (Kate), Aichi D3A (Val) and Mitsubishi A5M (Claude). For the history and performance of these planes see e.g. R. Cross, The Fighter Aircraft Pocketbook (London, 1962), pp. 83-5 and K. Munson, Bombers Patrol ~.nd Transport Aircraft 1939-45 (London, 1969) I PP• 24 I 26 I 29 I 102 I 104 and 106-7 •

156 bombers.

271

Completely exposed to Japanese naval air attacks, with

no anti-tank weapons with which to oppose Japanese tanks,

and only a few of its own tanks to support its hard-

pressed infantry against the assults of Japanese infantry

and armour, it is unlikely that the A.M.F. would have

succeeded in confining the Japanese to the beach-heads

around Sydney and Newcastle. Even if the A.M.F. had

managed to do so, it probably would not have been very

long before Japanese naval aircraft, through attacks on

the few vulnerable railway tracks and also on the A.M.F.'s

horse drawn carts, forced the A.M.F. to retreat because of

the lack of supplies. This is assuming that the A.M.F.

did not run out of vital items, such as gun ammunition,

in the meantime anyway. ~~ '- ._ .-

While in the 1920s the A.M.F. may have had a slight

chance of repelling a Japanese invasion, by the late 1930s

it was so woefully short of modern equipment that this

156Performance figures for these aircraft may he found in R. Cross, op.cit., pp. 69-70 and D. Gillison, Royal Australian Air Fo~ce 1939-1942 (Canberra, 1962), p. 721. On 28 August 1939 the R.A.A.F. possessed: 82 Ansons, 54 Demons, 7 v!irraways and 21 Seagull amphibians (not one of which was a front-line aircraft), as well as 82 trainers. Ibid., p. 57.The Akagi and Kaga, completed in 1925 and 1928 respectively, operated 60 aircraft each, while the Soryu, which was completed in 1937, operated 57 planes. D. Macintyre, Aircraft Carrier the majestic weapon (London, 1963), pp. 29 & 32. Thus these three big Japanese carriers alone would easily have been able to cover an invasion of Australia in the absence of U.K. or U.S. intervention.

272

chance had disappeared. But, throughout the inter-World

War decades, the A.M.F. was sufficiently well-equipped

to repel minor landings of a couple of hundred men.

Nevertheless, shortages of ammunition or fire control

equipment meant that the coast artillery's capacity to

engage raiding enemy warships successfully was almost non-

existent in some ports and the lack of sufficient motor

vehicles probably would have meant that the Citizen Forces

would have reached the scene of a raid, in strength,

after it was over. Similarly, this shortage of motor

transport would have lessened the A.M.F.'s chance of

concentrating in time, in strength, to meet an invasion on

the coast.

The small size of the defence vote prevented the

Australian army from being modernized, between the World

Wars, to the extent that the armies of Britain and Japan

d . dl57 v1ere mo ern1ze . It was Britain's unwillingness and

inability to supply the A.M.F. with equipment and Australia's

almost total dependence upon the importation of oil fuel

thathelped to curb the modernization of the Australian

army through mechanization and motorization, rather than

any lack of awareness of the military advantages of such a

change.

\'·ihen the Second V'lorld '\Tar began the Militia was not

even well-equipped by 1916 standards for it had no heavy

artillery and insufficient gas masks, as well as being

157Althougll in 1933-34 the British army had been as badly equipped as the Australian. R. Hig~am, Armed Forces In Peacetime Britain, 1918-1940, a case study (London, 1962), p. 238.

273

critically short of many other necessary items. Naturally,

these shortages of equipment also adversely affected the

training of the lower ranks of the Citizen Forces.

274

CONCLUSION

At no time during the inter-vvorld War years vlere

Australia's citizen soldiers capable of fulfilling their

roles, which were to repel invasion at the most and a

minor raid at the very least. In fac'c, throughout these

years British and Australian defence planners held

different and at times incompatible strategic ideas. The

controversy over the scale of attack Australia was thought

likely to have to face led to wide variations in the

citizen soldiers' perceived roles. Some saw them as

repelling a major invasion consisting of three Japanese

divisions in the initial wave and others as countering minor

raids containing a few hundred troops.

The reasons why Australia's citizen soldiers would

have been unable to defeat the Japanese invaders, whatever

their strength, were that they would not have been able to

concentrate in time to meet either a minor raid or an

invasion and they lacked the necessary modern equipment with

which to destroy Japanese aircraft and armoured fighting

vehicles or to defend themselves against possible gas attacks.

Because of Australia's war debts and the Great

Depression there was insufficient money to spend on equipping

the A.M.F. with the mechanical transport which would have

enabled the citizen soldiers at least to concentrate in

time. Similarly, the lack of money prevented the citizen

soldier from being armed with modern armoured vehicles, anti­

aircraft and anti-tank weapons. Indeed, at times, there

were shortages of such hasic items as gas masks, machine­

guns, grenades and all calibres of ammunition.

275

There were weaknesses, however, which could have

been remedied at no great cost. One weakness concerned

the organization of the A.M.F. which lacked corps head-

quarters in peacetime. These would have had to be

improvised literally on the battlefield.

Other weaknesses were evident in the spheres of

training, command and retention. Not only were obsolete

tactics occasionally taught but also uninspiring training

largely contributed towards the extremely high turnover

among citizen soldiers of the 1930s. This meant that, as

during the short-service compulsory training system of the

1920s, at any given time the A.M.F. mainly consisted of

young inexperienced soldiers being drilled by young

inexperienced commanders. Ultimately, the main function

of the Militia proved to be the supplying of commanders for

Australia's Expeditionary Force divisions.

Another factor which '\rmuld have lessened the A. H. F. 's

chances of success in battle around Sydney and Newcastle

was the poor personal relationship between a few senior

regular and citizen officers. Certainly their antipathy,

it was claimed later, troubled the 8th Division A.I.F. in

1 Malaya;

Poorly organized, equipped and trained it is unlikely

that Australia's citizen soldiers would have been able to

withstand a major battle against the ruthless and relatively

well-equipped Japanese, even if they had reached the invasion

beach-heads in time. Yet this was the primary function that

had been assigned to the A.M.F. by the Military Board.

1 See e.g. F. Howard, op.cit., pp. 84-5.

276

Statistical Note to Appendices B, D, E and F

The discrepancies in the tables in these appendices

appear because the numbers of Militiamen were constantly

changing and because of the usual problems connected

with statistics such as differing data bases, methods of

calculation, rounding and simple arithmetical errors.

277

Appendix A

Defence Expenditure (excluding war expenditure): 1919-39 (£'000)1

Central Naval Military Air Munition Other Total Administra-tion

946 . 1,341 1,460 1,482 1,545 1,558 1,548 1,526 1,494 1,466 1,240 1,195

Services Supplya Branch ·

47 140b 278b 179 223 398 429 572 517 549 498 392 326 320 409 536 783

89 693 961 n.a. n.a. 574 558 433 462 383 358 249 234 180 321 416 451 496 728

874 734 920 n.a. n.a. 336 186 191 101 163 43 50 30 22 397 479 723 589

3,942 5,664 6,311 3,785e 3,852e 5,288 6,317 7,779 7,259 6,397 4,679 3,688 3,052 3,021 4,021 5,293 6,828 7,639 9,357

1919-20 1920-21 1921-22 1922-23c 1923-24c 1924-25 1925-26 1926-27 1927-28 1928-29 1929-30 1930-31 1931-32 1932-33 1933-34 1934-35 1935-36 1936-37 1937-38d 1938-39

28 28 30 27 28 25 24 20 22 20 22 25 32 33 53

1,986 2,756 2;692 2,124 2,084 2,394 3,568 5,027 4,658 3,808 2,515 1,778 1,447 1,499 1,637 2,511 3,035 3,127 3,094 5,329

995 978

1,237 1,329 1,811 2,232 2,182 4,389

1,163 1,930 2,816 1,260

1,390 3,159 17,006

.1official Year Books of the Commomveal th of Australia, 1920-39, and T.B. Millar, Australia's Defence (2nd edn, Carlton, 1969), p. 196.

;Notes The figures refer to:

a 'Hilitary-Additions, New Works, Military Stores etc.' until 1924-25.

b Includes civil aviation.

c Not comparable with other years, not available in the same categories.

d Estimated (not actual) expenditure. The outbreak of World War II in September 1939 prevented the publication of the actual defence expenditure figures for 1938-39.

e Including war expenditure figures of £2.lm and £2.7m respectively, the total actual defence expenditure for 1922-23 was £8,150,000 and for 1923-24, £9,423,000.

278

Appendix B 1

Training Strengths Of The A.M.F.

Date

30 June 1918 30 June 1920 31 December 1920 31 December 1921 31 December 1922 31 December 1923 1 February 1925 1 February 1926 1 August 1926 1 August 1927 1 February 1929 30 April 1930 31 I:-larch 1931 31 H.arch 1932 31 Harch 1933 31 Harch 1934 31 March 1935 31 December 1935 31 December 1936 31 December 1937 31 December 1938

Permanent Forces

4,014 3,154 3,178 5,140 2,073 1,703 1,697 1,740 1,750 1,748 1,755 1,669 1,556 1,536 1,540 1,668 1,800 1,810 2,032 2,319 2,795

Citizen Forces

105,204 99,018

110,577 124,489

35,649 36,900 37,192 43,533 42,884 42,887 46,176 25,785 29,726 28,285 26,423 28,006 27,462 26,270 34,031 34,624 42,895

Total

109,218 102,172 113,755 129,629

37,722 38,603 38,889 45,273 44,634 44,635 47,931 27,454 31,282 29,821 27,963 29,674 29,262 28,080 36,063 36,943 45,690

1These figures are derived from the Official Year Books of the Commonwealth of Australia, Nos 12 to 32, 1919-39. The figures do not include Chaplains, Reserve of Officers, Unattached List of Officers, Engineer and Railway Staff Corps, Rifle Clubs, Army Nursing Corps, Area Officers or Senior Cadets.

279

Appendix C

Table Of Formation Commanders

Formation 1922 1924 1926 1927 1928 1934 1935 1937 1939

1st Cavalry Division M r1 M g M M t-1 M M znd Cavalry Division M M I1 M H M M M M 1st Division sc sc sc sc sc sc sc sc sc 2nd Division M .l'-1 M H H H M M M Jrd Division .f\1 M H !-1: M !11 H H I1 !th Division H H .f\1 t-1 H sc sc sc sc Uth Mixed Brigade sc sc sc sc sc sc sc sc sc ~th Mixed Brigade )'.1 H sc sc sc sc sc sc sc 13th r--Iixed Brigade f-1 .f\1 H M sc sc sc sc sc Field Troops, 4th Military District sc sc sc sc sc sc

Key: M - a Militia, or C .F., commander. sc = a Staff Corps, or p. F. I commander.

= not applicable.

This table has been drawn from the Officers' List of the Australian Military Forces, Part I, Active List (Melbourne, 1 December 1922), passim and The Army List of the Australian Military Forces, Part I, Active List (Melbourne, 31 March 1924, 1 January 1926, 1 January 1927, 1 March 1928, 1 February 1934, 1 August 1935, 30 September 1937 and 1 February 1939), passim.

280

Appendix D

The Turnover in the Numbers of Militiamen1

Year Ended 30 June

1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938

Total Strength-

28,129 26,379 27,855 27,078 26,295 35,226 35,157

Enlistments Discharges

8,805 10,436 9,735 11,465

11,813 10,358 10,073 10,827

9,916 10,678 18,227 8,801 10,005 9,913

Percentage of Discharges to Total Strength (approx.)

37.1 43.5 37.2 40.0 40.6 25.0 28.2

1This table has been drawn from a table in a minute written by the Secretary (to the Military Board) to the Secretary (of the Department of Defence), Recruiting-~1ilitia Forces, 24 July 1935 in A.A.A.: MP431/l, file 929/19/115 and from a table in another minute addressed by the Secretary (to the Military Board} to the Secretary (of the Department of Defence), Council of Defence Agendum No. 17/1938 - Report On Progress Of Defence Development Programme 1937/38 - 1940/41, 3 October 1938 in A.A.A.: CRS A816, item 44/301/1.

281

Appendix E 1 Militia Attendance At Camps

Year

1930/31 1931/32 1932/33 1933/34 1934/35 1935/36 1936/37 1937/38

Nwnber of Militiamen attending Camp

20,280 18,542 19,454 20,388 19,780 18,871 26,417 25,339

Percentage of Militiamen attending Camp to total Militia Strength (approx.)

69 67 73 74 70 70 75 73

1The sources for this table are the minutes cited in appendix D.

282

Appendix F

Militia Forces: Discharges and the Length of Service1

(Approx. calculations for the period 1931-38).

Period Total Length of Service Discharges Under 1 yr 1-2 yrs 2-3 yrs

1 July 1931 to 44,380 11,730 13,856 9,535

30 June 1936

1 July 1936 to 21,980 4,800 5,600 4,156

31 December 1938

66,360 16,530 19,456 13,691

'---

3yrs and over

9,259

7,424

16,683

1with minor corrections this table is copied from one sent by Major-General Jess (Adjutant-General) to the C.G.S. on 7 February 1939 in A.A.A.: CRS A816, item 51/301/6.

283

Appendix G

Suggested Training Syllabi For The Citizen Forces1

1. Light Horse

Type of Training Hours Allotted

Physical Training Squad Drill Without Arms Squad Drill With Arms, and Care of Arms Fitting, Cleaning, and Care of Equipment Fitting, Cleaning, and Care of Saddlery Riding Instruction Troop Drill, Mounted Silent Drill, and Dismounted Duty Pitching and Striking Tents, etc. Guards and Sentries Musketry Instruction and Preliminary

Standard Tests Miniature Cartridge Practice Judging Distance Visual Training Instructional Range Practices Inspection at Termination of Training

6 7 ~ 5 ~ 1 2 6 3 4 2 2

17 2 2 2 6 1

The total of 69 hours was to consist of 45 hours' camp training and four days' home training at 6 hours per day. All the recommended textbooks dated from c. 1914-15.

2. Field Artillery

Type of Training

Physical Training Squad Drill and Musketry Gunnery and Gun Drill

(up to Section Gun Drill) Signalling (Semaphore) Ammunition Fitting, Cleaning and Care of

Saddlery and Harness Riding Instruction Driving Instruction

Hours Allotted

Gunners Drivers

6 6 12 12

35 8 4 4 4

8 8 16

15

The total of 69 hours was to consist of 45 hours' camp training and four days' home training at six hours per day.

284

3. Infantry

Type of Training

Physical Training Squad Drill vJi thout Arms Squad Drill with Arms, and Care of Arms Fitting, Cleaning and Care of Equipment Section Drill Bayonet Fighting Pitching and Striking Tents Guards and Sentries Musketry Instruction and Exercises,

Preliminary Standard Tests, and Miniature Cartridge Practice

Judging Distance, Visual Training Inspection at Termination of Training

Hours Allotted

6 9

10 2 6 4 2 3

26

1

The total of 69 hours was to consist of 45 hours' camp training and four days' home training at 6 hours per day. The prescribed manuals were dated mainly 1912, 1914 and 1916.

1 T M.B.I. G

containea. Corps and

2 (26 October 1920). The Instruction also suggested training syllabi for the Army Service Garrison Artillery.

285

Appendix H

Drill

By its very nature drill, both with and without

arms, however well taught and hmvever necessary in order to

be able to move large numbers of troops quickly from one

place to another, tends to become dull and boring quite

swiftly. The repetition of the same, or similar, movements,

not only suppresses individual thought and action, but

also induces boredom.

Of course, the main argument in favour of close

quarter drill is that it inculcates obedience and discipline,

and discipline, it is thought, is the foundation for

success in battle. In the French Foreign Legion, for

instance, the first thing a recruit had to learn was La base

de la discipline:

Discipline being the principal strength of armies, it is essential that all superiors receive from their subordinates absolute obedience and submission on all occasions. Orders must be executed instantly without hesitation or complaint. The authorities who give them are responsible for them and an inferior is only permitted to make an objection after he has obeyed.l

While an Australian part-time soldier certainly would not

have been expected to learn a similar code by rote, the

Australian Milita~y Regulations supported the substance

of this disciplinary code.

1 A.R. Cooper, March or Bust Adventures in the Foreign Legion (London, 1972), p. 160.

286

Appendix I

16th Battery Australian Field Artillery. Camp of Continuous Training, 9-14 April 1923

1. Syllabus Of Training For Gunners

Monday 9 April 1923

As may be ordered.

8.30

10.30 11 to

1.30 2.30

3.15 4 to

Tuesday

to 10.30 a.m.

to 11 a.m. 12 noon

to 2.30 p.m. to 3.15 p.m.

to 4 p.m. 5 p.m.

10 April 1923

Description of Q.F. 18-pdr .and carriage.

Section gun drill. Stripping and assembling of

breech mechanism. Section gun drill. Lecture: organization of a

battery. Knotting and lashing. Section gun drill.

Wednesday 11 April 1923

8.30 to 10 a.m. 10 to 10.45 a.m. 10.45 to 12 noon 1.30 to 3 p.m. 3 to 4 p.m. 4 to 5 p.m.

Section gun drill. Knotting and lashing. Fuze setting. Section gun drill. Laying Instruction in Lewis gun. Section gun drill.

Thursday 12 April 1923

8.30 to 10 a.m. 10 to 11 a.m. 11 to 12 noon 1.30 to 5 p.m.

Section gun drill (recapitulation) • Lecture: lines of fire~ Fuze setting. Battery manoeuvre

(embracing section gun drill).

Friday 13 April 1923

8.30 to 9.30 a.m. 9.30 to 10.30 a.m. 10.30 to 11 a.m. 11 to 12 noon 1.30 to 5 p.m.

Laying. Section gun drill. Lecture: sequence of orders. Section gun drill. Construction of gun pits and

emplacements.

Saturday 14 April 1923

As may be ordered.

287

2. Syllabus Of Training For Drivers

Monday 9 April 1923

As may be ordered.

8.30 to 1.30 to

3 to 4 4 to 5

Tuesday

12 noon 3 p.m.

p.m. p.m.

10 April 1923

Riding school. Stripping, description, and

assembling of harness and saddlery. Lecture: horsemastership. Commands and signals.

Wednesday 11 April 1923

8.30 to l2 noon 1.30 to 5 p.m.

Driving drill. Driving drill.

Thursday 12 April 1923

8.30 to 10 a.m.

10 to 10.45 a.m. 10.45 to 12 noon

1.30 to 5 p.m.

Stripping, cleaning and assenillling of harness and saddlery.

Lecture: animal management. Practice in laying out a bivouac

and horselines. Battery manoeuvre.

Friday 13 April 1923

8.30 to 10 a.m.

10 to 10.45 a.m. 10.45 to 11.15 a.m. 11.15 to 12 noon

1.30 to 2.30 p.m. 2.30 to 3 p.m. 3 to 3.30 p.m. 3.30 to 4 p.m.

4 to 5 p.m.

Driving drill - employing men and drag ropes. (For instruction in co~~and and signals).

Lecture: stable management. Knotting and lashing. Disposal of harness and saddlery

in bivouac. Fitting a saddle and bridle. Knotting and lashing. Dismounted drill. Lecture: marches and march

discipline. Le\vis gun instruction.

Saturday 14 April 1923

As may be ordered. 1

1These syllabi are misleadingly filed under 1926 16th Battery Routine Orders, in 1923-33 A.W.M. file no. 417/20/31 Box 33.

288

Appendix J

Infantry Recruit Training Syllabus 1

A two hour parade was to be divided as follows:

Time

0 to

15 to 20 to 50 to 60 to 75 to 85 to 90 to

in Minutes

15

20 50 60 75 85 90 120

Fall in and Squad Drill lesson under the senior instructor.

Rest. Lesson, other than Squad Drill. Smoke. Squad Drill lesson completed. Lecturette. Rest. Lesson, other than Squad Drill.

In a course of twenty nights' training, each of two

hours'duration, a recruit completed:

29 periods of Squad Drill each of 15 minutes; 47 lessons, each of 30 minutes; 10 ten minute lecturettes; 1 night of examinations before passing into

the ranks.

The forty-seven lessons consisted of:

Rifle training 17 Lewis gun 14 Miniature range 7 Bayonet training 4 Section leading 3 Tests of elementary training 2

1orawn from M.B.I. G. 33 (25 June 1937).

289

Appendix K

Suggested Anti-Gas Syllabus For Six Hours' Course For Militia Personnel

Subject

1. Introduction - Short explanation, history and reasons for training in anti-gas measures.

2. The Respirator - Action of, care and cleaning.

3. The Respirator - Fitting and inspection.

Time Allowed (minutes)

20

30

30

4. Gas chamber test~ 20

5. Drills. (In periods not exceeding 30 minutes each). 90

6. Work, whilst wearing respirator (digging, marching, etc.). 10

7. Various types of gases - recognition of, and first aid. 40

8. How gas attacks are made. 20

9. Collective protection - sentries and alarms. 20

10. Tests of elementary training. 30

11. Revision. 20

330

Changing over between lessons and rest periods 30

Total - 6 hours 360

1 Dravm from a copy attached to a covering memorandum by Major A.J. Boase (General Staff, 3rd Division, Melbourne) dated 3 January-1936 and despatched to all 3rd Division Units, in 8th Aust. Fld Regt. Year 1936. 15. Bundles of Files. A.W.M. file no. 417/20/31. Pt 1.

290

Appendix L

Animal, Motor and Rail Transport

'A Force of 4 Divisions {with animals only on half-

rations) requires a daily lift of 900 tons. Such a lift

would require one or other of the following alternatives:-

Type Number Radius Road-space Required (miles) {miles)

Broad Gauge Trains 1 Light Railway Trains 3 3-ton Lorries 300 30 6 30-cwt. Lorries

(pneumatic cord tyres) 600 40 16 Ford Vans 2,500 50 42 a A.T. Carts 3,150 10 13 Camels 45,000 10 126 (single1 file) '

a i.e. horse drawn Army Transport carts.

1From this table, which unfortunately bears no date or title but which is located in MP367/l, file 631/1/132, it can be seen that 30-cwt lorries would probably have been the most flexible vehicles with a good radius of operation and vlould not have taken up too much road-space.

291

Appendix M

Imports of Fuel into Australia1

Type 1929-30 1930-31 1931-32 1932-33 1933-34

Crude petroleum - million gals 122 93 49 58 58 - value £ 1,118,332 823,575 448,651 486,302 448,341

Petroleum spirit etc.

- million gals 240 171 156 181 208 - value £ 7,429,485 4,054,265 2,622,414 3,218,209 2,852,649

1official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 28, 1935, p. 201.

292

Appendix N

Fuel Requirements for Mobilization1

Just before the start of World War II a 'mechanization

committee' made these calculations:

Stage of Mobilization Total Motor Vehicles

Limited Mobilization (existing War Establishment) a

General Mobilization (existing ~var b Establishment)

Limited Mobilization (fully motorized)

General Mobilization {fully motorized)

Extra for New Units, proposed invasion policy

4,264 MC 12,278

4,573 MC 14,750

5,195 MC 17,010

5,556 MC 17,776

3,398 MC 8,267

Petrol Required for 12 months' war in Australia

~18,000,000

}21,500,000

}25,500,000

~29,500,000

~13,500,000

Remarks

Based on 4 gallons per day per vehicle and 2 gallons per day per HC.

MC = motor cycle a, bheavily dependent on horses.

Since stocks of petrol were estimated at between fifty and

one hundred million gallons (although at the time there were one

hundred million gallons available, this was an extraordinarily

favourable situation) it can be seen that had general mobilization

on a fully motorized basis taken place, with the addition of the

new motorized units, the A .. M.F. alone would have required about

forty-three million gallons of the available fifty to one

hundred million gallons in order to be able to operate for one year

in Australia. Of course, this assumes that no petrol tankers

would be able to evade any blockade the Japanese might have

imposed and that Japanese naval and air power would not have

293

destroyed many of the storage tanks along the coast in

Sydney and Darwin for instance.

1 The table and the estimates are drawn from, General Staff Memorandum. Mechanization Policy - December, 1938, paras 10-11 in A.A.A.: MP729/6, file 37/401/124. The situation had improved slightly since 1928, see Q.M.G. Coxen to Secretary (of the Military Board) Bulk Storage Of Motor Spirit And Lubricants On Mobilization, 9 ~1ay 1928 in Military Board agenda No. 35/1928. Date of meeting) 16 May 1928.

~otor bodies ~uil t in ~ustralia ~ No. ~ Value £

Imported motor bodies ~ No. ~ Value £

Imported chassis - No. - Value £

294

Appendix 0

Motor Bodies Built, and Bodies and Chassis Imported-into Austr~lia

1929-30 1930-31 1931-32 1932-33

46,409 10,417 6,323 13,532 3,118,987 864,209 450,510 1,100,504

6,556 137 61 108 697,862 14,007 7,360 12,233

61,981 9,367 4,146 15,776 5,807,024 721,893 355,415 1,306,830

1933-34

26,302 2,112,439

1,116 86,899

32,924 2,528,969

1official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 28, 1935, p. 201.

295

Select Bibliog~aphy

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

For accessions and series of the Australian Archives,

the date range ?f the series or accession, not the dates

of its contents, is given. There are, of course, great

variations between the date ranges of the series or

accessions and their contents.

Only the more important papers and works consulted

have been included in the bibliography in order to keep

it to a reasonable length. Works forming part of a

collection, archival or published, are not cited individually.

296

Unpublished Official Records

(1) Archival

ARMY ARCHIVES, CHANCERY HOUSE, MELBOURNE

MH 1/10

MH 1/lOA

MH 1/13

MH 1/18

MH 1/20

MH 1/35

MH 1/61

MH 1/76

MH 1/77

MH 1/78

Meetings of Council of Defence.

Military Forces of the Commonwealth. Report of the Minister for Defence on the Progress of Universal Training to 30th June 1912.

Defence Policy - 1919. Report by Mr Swinburne's Committee.

Handbook dealing with the Military Aspect of Imperial Defence (Imperial Cabinet, June 1921).

The Principles of Mobilization.

Council of Defence meeting, 12 November 1929.

Mechanization Policy.

C.I.D. Landing Attacks: Present Situation as Regards Material and Personnel.

Universal Training.

Rates of Pay: 6th Division, Militia & A.I.F. Reserve - 1939.

AUSTRALIAN ARCHIVES, WHARF ST, BRISBANE

BP 133/1 Queensland Government, Chief Secretary's Department. Headquarters Queensland Defence Forces, Office of the Camp Commandant. Personal papers of Colonel Howell Gunter relating to defence policy, c. 1886-1900.

AUSTRALIAN ARCHIVES, PARKES, CANBERRA

AA 1971/216

CP 78/22

Department of Defence. Council of Defence Records, 1884-1950.

Governor-General's Office. General Correspondence, 1912-27.

CP 78/23

CP 103/3

CP 290/15

CP 317/7

CP 359/1

CP 360/1

CP 360/5

CP 360/13

CP 447/2

CP 447/3

CRS Al

CRS A431

CRS A432

CRS A457

CRS A458

297

Governor-General's Office. Correspondence Relating To The War Of 1914-1918 ("War Files"), 1914-19.

Prime Minister's Central Office. Correspondence and Other Papers Relating to Imperial and Economic Conference, 1921-32.

Prime Minister's Department. Papers extracted from the Records of the Governor­General, 1903-26.

Prime Minister's Department. Secretary's Copies of Cables sent and received through Governor-General, 1918-19, 1920, 1922, 1926.

Prime Minister's Department:. Personal Papers of Rt Hon. W.M. Hughes, 1914-15.

Prime Minister's Department. British Empire and Foreign Countries, Reports forwarded by Governor-General, 1919-22.

Prime Minister's Department. Copies of Cables from Secretary of State, 1922-23.

Prime Minister's Department. Outward Correspondence, 1920-22, 1926.

Prime Minister's Department. Correspondence Files, Secret and Confidential Series (Second System), 1918-26.

Prime Minister's Department. Correspondence Files, Secret and Confidential Series (Second System), 1926- .

Departments of External Affairs [I] and Home and Territories. Correspondence Files, Annual Single Ntnnber Series, 1903-38.

Department of Interior [II]. Correspondence Files, Annual Single Number Series, 1946- .

Attorney-General's Department. Correspondence Files, Annual Single Number Series 1929- .

Prime Hinister's Department. Correspondence Files, Nulti.-nurnber SA:cies, First System, 1921-23.

Pri.me Minister's Department. Correspondence Files, Multiple Number Series, Second System, 1923-34.

CRS A461

CRS A659

CRS A663

CRS A664

CRS A816

CRS A981

CRS All08

CRS All94

CRS Al606

CRS Al608

CRS Al952

CRS A2028

CRS A2029

CRS A2030

298

Pri~me Minister's Department. Correspondence Files, r.1u1 tiple Number Series, Third System, 1934-50.

Department of Interior. Correspondence Files, Class 1, 1939-50.

Department of Defence Co-ordination. Correspondence Files, 'O' Multiple Number System (Primary Numbers 01-0224). Unclassified, 1940-57.

Department of Defence [II]. Correspondence Files, Multiple Number System (Class 401), 1924-40.

Department of Defence [II]. Correspondence Files, Hultiple Number System (Class 301) (Classified), 1935-57.

Department of External Affairs [II]. Correspondence Files, Alphabetical Series, c. 1927-42.

Prime Minister's Department - Pacific Branch. Volumes of 'Correspondence and Papers' relating to External Affairs [assembled by the Director, Pacific Branch (Major E.L. Piesse)], c. 1920-21.

Department of Defence [II]. Library Material, Single Accession Number Series with Decimal Classification, c. 1923- •

Prime Minister's Department. Correspondence Files, Two-number System with Letter Prefix, Secret and Confidential Series (Third System), 1926-39.

Prime Minister's Department. Correspondence Files, Secret and Confidential Series (Fourth System), 1939-45.

Department of Defence. Correspondence Files, Multiple Number System (Primary Numbers 401-700) ("Old Military"), 1917-29.

Council of Defence [II]. Council of Defence Minutes, 1918-20.

Council of Defence [II]. Council of Defence [Minutes of] Meetings, 1923.

Council of Defence [II]. Council of Defence [Minutes], Ordinary Meetings, 1923- •

CRS A2031

CRS A2032

CRS A2219

CRS A2671

CRS A2939

299

Defence Committee. Defence Committee Minutes, 1929- .

Council of Defence [I]. Council of Defence Minutes, 1905-15.

Department of Defence [I] - Director of Military Intelligence and Prime Minister's Department - Pacific Branch. Volumes of Papers on "External Relations", 1918-23.

Department of Defence. War Cabinet Secretariat. War Cabinet Agenda Files, 1945-46.

Prime Minister's Department. Correspondence Files, Secret and Confidential Series (First System), 1917-18.

AUSTRALIAN ARCHIVES, MIDDLE BRIGHTON, MELBOURNE

MP 70/2

MP 70/3

MP 70/4

MP 70/5

MP 70/6

MP 70/7

MP 95/3

MP 367/1

MP 38 5/3

MP 385/4

Department of Army, Southern Command. Secret correspondence, 1935-41.

Department of Army, Southern Command. Security classified (security) correspondence, 1939-41.

Department of Army, Southern Command. Confidential correspondence, 1936-41.

Department of Army, Headquarters Victorian Line of Communications Area. General correspondence, 1927-45.

Department of Army, Southern Command. Victorian Scottish Regiment (5th Battalion -Militia}. Miscellaneous records, 1926-41.

Department of Army, Southern Command. Circulars, 2 February 1939 - 25 July 1941.

Department of Defence [II], Military Board. Monthly intelligence summarie:: 3rd Hilitary District, 1923-36.

Department of Defence [II], Central Administration. General correspondence, 1917-29.

Department of Army, Southern Corrmand. General correspondence, 1919-46.

Department of Army, Southern Command. Security classified (security) correspondence, 1939-41.

MP 385/6

MP 385/7

'

l-1P 385/8

MP 431/1

MP 508/1

MP 729/2

MP 729/6

MP 729/7

MP 826/1

MP 1142/1

MP 1185/5

300

Department of Army, Southern Command. Confidential correspondence, 1939-40.

Department of Army, Southern Command Classified [secret and confidential] correspondence, 1941-50.

Department of Army, Southern Command. Mobilization .and Defence Schemes, 1937-41.

Department of Defence [II], Secretariat. General correspondence [relating to A.M.F.], 1930-39.

Department of Army, Army Headquarters. General correspondence, 1939-42.

(unaccessioned} Department of Defence [II]. Classified correspondence, 1906-36.

(unaccessioned}. Department of Army. Secret correspondence, class 401 series, 1937-45.

{unaccessioned). Department of Army, Army Headquarters. A.I.F. classified correspondence, class 421 series, 1939-42.

(unaccessioned). Department of Army, Secretary's Branch. Commonwealth Defence Schemes, c. 1905-39.

(unaccessioned). Department of Army. Correspondence relating to rifle ranges and training depots, 1913-62.

(unaccessioned). Department of Navy. General correspondence series, 1911-20.

AUSTRALIAN ARCHIVES, VILLAWOOD, SYDNEY

SP 459/1

SP 539/1

SP 539/2

SP 553/l

Department of Army, Eastern Command. Correspondence, 1923-50.

Department of Army, Eastern Command. H.Q. I B.R.A.A.C. Notes re History of Unit, 1934-60.

Department of Army, Eastern Command. H.Q. I B.R.A.A.C. Publications containing references to Unit, 1900-34.

Department of Army, Eastern Co1nmand. H.Q. Coast Artillery. Records of Fortress Installations (N.S.W. Coast), 1934-50.

SP 820/20

SP 820/36

SP 820/43

SP 820/47

SP 848/1

SP 848/2

SP 848/3

SP 926/1

SP 926/2

301

Department of Defence, Commonwealth Military Forces. 2nd M.D., 5th Battalion, Ist Inf. Regiment. Instructions re new organization, for Clothing and Equipment, 1921. '

Department of Defence, Commonwealth Military Forces, 2nd M.D., Ist Battalion. Company Roll Book - H.Q. Wing, Groups 1-3 Ist Battalion East Sydney (Citizen Forces), 1929.

Department of Defence, Co~~onwealth Military Forces, 2nd M.D., Ist Battalion. The Army List of the Australian Military Forces, c. 1926.

Department of Defence, Commonwealth Military Forces, 2nd M.D., 24th Infantry, 2nd Sydney Battalion. Nominal Roll Book, 1885-1921.

Department of Army, Eastern Command Library. The First Australian Infantry Regiment Militia (N.S.W.) Historical Record and Jubilee 1854-1904.

Department of Army, Eastern Command Library. Photographs: Royal Family, H.Q. Staff, Buildings, Landing at Gallipoli, etc. 1

c. 1900-46.

Department of Army, Eastern Command Library. Miscellaneous Mounted Chart.s, P::esentat.;i.on.s, etc., 1894-1951.

Department of Army, Eastern Con~and. I Fixed Defence Bde., Royal Australian Artillery. Equipment History Books (Army Book 402), 1901-61.

Department of Army, Eastern Command. I Fixed Defence Bde., Royal Australian Artillery. Record Book of Depression Range Finder Mark III, 1932-44.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL, CANBERRA.

417/20/31 (Old Rack 21). C.M.F. Unit Records, 1914-39. A.W.M. Reference 207/1/20. A.A.A.: MP78 (Located in A.W.M.]. Department of the Army, General Correspondence Files.

302

CENTRAL ARMY RECORDS OFFICE, CHANCERY HOUSE, HELBOURNE

Records of Service of Officers and Other Ranks, 1919-39.

SECRETARIAT OF THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE, RUSSELL OFFICES, CANBERRA.

Minutes and Proceedings of the Military Board, 1905-07 & 1919-39.

Papers of Historical Interest, 2 Vols.

{2) Non Archival

Macarthur-Onslow, Brigadier D. Brief History of the Aus·t.ralian Armoured Corps. n.pub., n.p., n.d. Photocopied manuscript in A.W.M.

Peacock, R.K. Traditions of the Australian Military Forces. n.pub., Melbourne, 1939. Typescript 1st copy in A.W.M.

Australian Military Forces. Training Establishments. Militia Forces. 1934-35. Government Printer, Melbourne, 1934.

War Establishments. Australian Military Forces. Volume I. Units Of A Cavalry Division. A.H.Q., Melbourne, 1933.

War Establishments. Australian Military Forces. Volume II. Units Of A Division. A.H.Q., Melbourne, 1933.

Imperial General Staff (Australian Section). Australian Intelligence Diary. Pt II (Serial No. 11/1936.) A.H.Q., Melbourne, 27 November 1936.

Australian Army Orders, 1925-39.

General Orders, 1903.

Military Board Instructions, 1925-39.

Military Orders, 1905-24.

2nd District Base Routine Orders, 1928.

2nd Division Routine Orders, 1928.

303

UNPUBLISHED UNOFFICIAL PAPERS

Lieutenant-General H.G. Bennett, Correspondence 1924-1941, Vol. M.L. MSS 807/2.

Keith Murdoch Papers, A.N.L., MS2823.

Pearce Papers, A.N.L., MS1827 & 1927.

PUBLISHED OFFICIAL DEBATES, PAPERS AND REPORTS

The Army Lists of the Australian Military Forces, Part I. Active List And A.A.M.C. Reserve, 1 January 1926, 1 January 1927, 1 March 1928, 1 February 1934 and 30 September 1937. Government Printer, Melbourne, 1926-28, 1934 and 1937.

The Army Lists of the Australian Military Forces, Part I. Active List, 1 August 1935 and 1 February 1939. Government Printer, Melbourne, 1935 and 1939.

Bladen, F.M. {ed.). Historical Records Of New South Wales. Vol. V. William Applegate Gullick, {Government Printer) 1 Sydney, 1897.

Committee Of Inquiry Into The Citizen M.ilit<=Jry Forces. Report. A.G.P.S., Canberra, March 1974.

Comrnonwealth of Australia. Parliamentary Debates, 1919-50.

Parliamentary Papers, 1904 and 1919-39.

Commonwealth Statistician. Official Year Books of the Col.11r.lonweal th of Australia. Co;:nrnom~Teal th Bureau of Census and Statistics, Melbourne and Canberra, 1908-40, Nos 1-33, 1908-40.

Quarterly Summary of Australian Statistics. Corr~onwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra, 1931-39, Bulletin nos 124, 133, 136, 140, 148, 156, June 1931 - June 1939.

Jess, Lieutenant-General Sir Carl. Report On The Activities Of The Australian Milit~ry Forces 1929-1939. n.pub., n.p., n.d but c. 1946.

League of Nations. Statistical Year Book of the Trad~ In Arms And Ammunition. Geneva, 1938.

304

Library Committee of the Commonwealth Parliament. Historical Records Of Australia. Sydney, 1914-17, Series I, Vols II, III, IV & X.

N.S.W. Legislative Council. Report of 1881 Royal Commission on Military Defences. 1881.

Officers' List of the Australian Military Forces, 1 April 1920~ Government Printer, Melbourne, 1920.

Officers'f_ List

Officers' Lists

of the Australian Military Forces, Part II. Reserve List. Retired List. Honours And Awards, 1 March 1921. Government Printer, Melbourne, 1921.

of the Australian Military Forces, Part I. Active List, 1 December 1922 and 27 March 1924. Government Printer, Helbourne, 1922 and 1924.

Staff And Regimental List of the Australian Military Forces, 1 July 1919. Government Printer, Melbourne, 1919.

War Department. Handbook On Japanese Hilitary Forces. ~vashington, 1 October 1944.

War Office. The Land Forces of the British Colonies & Protectorates. Revised edn. H.M.S.O., London, 1905.

PRINCIPAL NEWSPAPERS CONSULTED

[Melbourne] Age, 1919-39.

The Sunday Sun And Guardian, 1937.

Sydney Morning Herald, 1919-39.

Workers' Voice, 1936-39.

Workers' v·Jeekly, 1934-39.

BOOKS

11 Albatross"

305

[E.L.Piesse]. Japan and The Defence of Australia. Robertson & Mullens Ltd, Melbourne, 1935.

Alexander, J.A. (ed.). \'lho's ~\Tho In Australia. XIth edn. The Herald And Weekly Times Ltd, Melbourne, 1941.

Amos, K. The New Guard Hovement 1931-1935. M.U.P., Carlton, 1976.

Andrews, E.M. Isolationism And Appeasement In Australia Reactions to the European Crises, 1935-1939. A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1970.

Anon. A Short History of New South Wales Mounted Rifles 1888-1913. n.pub., n.p., n.d.

Australian National Defence League (N.S.W. Division). Australia's Defence.Sydney, 1925.

Barclay, G. St. J. The Empire Is Marching A Study Of The Military Effort Of The Br1tish Empire 1800-1945. Weidenfeld And Nicolson, London, 1976.

Barlow, Brigadier J .A. & Johns on Lieutenant-Colonel R. E. U. Small Arms Hanual. 3rd edn reprint. John Murray, London, July 1960.

Bean, C .E. \v. Anzac To Amiens A Shorter History Of The Australian Fighting Services In The First World War. 4th edn. A.W.M., Canberra, 1961.

-------------. The Story of Anzac. 12th edn. Angus & Robertson Ltd, Sydney, 1941, 2 Vols.

Bidwell, S. Gunners at War A Tactical Study of the Royal Artillery in the •rwentieth Century. Arrovl Books Ltd, London, 1972.

Boehm, E.A. Twentieth Century Economic Development In Australia. Longman Australia Pty Ltd, Cawberwell Victoria, 1971.

Bond, B. Liddell Hart A Study of his Military Thought. Cassell, London, 1977.

Brogden, S. The Sudan Contingent. The Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1943.

Buckley, K.D. The Arnalgamated Engineers in Australia., 1852-1920. A.N.U. Press, Canberra, n.d.

C::.Jmpbell, E. The Rallying Point My Story Of 'rhe New Guard. M.U.P., Carlton, 1965.

306

Campbell, P., Mills, R.C. & Portus, G.V. (eds). Studies In Australian Affairs. Macmillan, Melbourne, 1930.

Chamberlain, P. & Ellis, C. Making Tracks British Carrier Story 1914 to 1972. Profile Publications Ltd, Windsor Berkshire, 1973.

-------. Pic·torial History Of Tanks Of The ~·lorld 1915-45. Arms And Armour Press, London, 1972.

Chapman, I.D. Iven G. Mackay Citizen and Soldier. Melway Publishing Pty Ltd, Melbourne, 1975.

Cooper, A.R. March or Bust Adventures in the Foreign Legion. Robert Hale & Company, London, 1972.

Cowie, D. An Empire Prepared a Study of the Defence Potentialities of Greater Britain. George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1939.

Cross, R. The Fighter Aircraft Pocketbook. B.T. Batsford Ltd, London, 1962.

(ed.)~The Bomber Aircraft Pocketbook. B.T. Batsford Ltd, London, 1964.

Davidson, A. The Communist Party of Australia A Short History. Stanford University, California, 1969.

Dawes J.N.I. & Robson, L.L. Citizen to Soldier Australia before the Great l'Var Recollect.ions of Members of the First A.I.F. M.U.P., Carlton, 1977.

Dennis, P.

Dilley, R.

Decision by default Peacetime conscription and British defence 1919-39. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1972.

Japanese Army Uniforms And Equipment 1939-1945. Almark Publishing Co., London, September 1970.

Doorn, J. van (ed.). Armed Forces And Society Sociological Essays. Mouton, The Hague, 1968.

Ellis, H.H. The Defence Of Australia. The Endeavour Press, Sydney, 1933.

L'Etang, H. The Pathology Of Leadership. Reprint. William Heinemann Medical Books Ltd, London, 1970.

Franks, A.H. Tanks How they are made, Identification, History, Tactics. Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd, London, 1943.

307

Fuller, J.F.C. Generalship Its Diseases and their Cure A Study of the Personal Factor in Command. Faber and Faber Ltd, London, 1933.

--------, Hajor-General J.F.C. Lectures On F.S.R. III (Operations Between Mechanized Forces).

Gammage, B.

Sifton Praed & Co. Ltd., London, 1932.

The Broken Years Australian Soldiers In The Great War. A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1974.

Gillison, D. Royal Australian Air Force 1939-1942. A.W.~1., Canberra, 1962.

Gollan, R. Revolutionaries and Reformists Communism and the Australian Labour Movement 1920-1955. A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1975.

Guderian, General H. Panzer Leader. Trans. C. Fitzgibbon. lOth Impression. Michael Joseph, London, Harch 1970.

Hall, Major R.J.G. The Australian Light Horse. Dominion Press, North Blackburn Victoria, SepteQber 1966.

Hasluck, P. The Government And The People 1939-1941. Reprint. A.W.M., Canberra, 1965.

Hetherington, J. Blarney Controversial Soldier. A.W.M. & A.G.P.S., Canberra, 1973.

Higham, R.

Hogg, I.V.

Armed Forces In Peacetime Britain, 1918-1940, a case study. G.T. Foulis & Co. Ltd, London, 1962.

The Military Intellectuals in Britain: 1918-1939. Rutgers University Press, New Jersey, 1966.

Gas. Ballantine Books, New York, June 1975.

The guns: 1939/45. Macdonald & Co. Ltd, London, 1970.

Hopkins, Major-General R.N.L. Australian Armour A History Of The Royal Australian Armoured Corps 1927-1972. A.W.M. & A.G.P.S., Canberra, 1978.

HoNard, F.

Howard, M.

Kent Hughes A Biography of Colonel The Ron. Sir Wilfrid Kent Hughes. Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1972.

The Continental Commitment The dilelTh"'TI.a of British defence policy in the era of the tHo world wars. Temple Smith, London 1 1972.

(ed.). The Theory and Practice of War Essays Presented To Captain B.E. Liddell Hart. Cassell, London, 1965.

Ing-lis, K.S.

308

The Australian Colonists social history 1788-1370. 1974.

An exploration of H. U. P., Carl ton,

Ishimaru, Lieutenant-Commander T. Japan Must Fight Britain. Trans. Instructor Captain G.V. Rayment. Hurst & Blackett Ltd, London, March 1937.

Jauncey, L.C. The Story Of Conscription In Australia. George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1935.

Johnson, D.H. Volunteers at Heart The Queensland Defence Forces 1860-1901. University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1975.

Johnson, F.A. Defence by Committee The British Committee Of Imperial Defence 1885-1959. O.U.P., London, 1960.

Jones, R.E., Rarey G.H. & Icks, R.J. 1916 to 1933. Re-issue. Greenwich Conn., 1969.

The Fighting Tanks From WE Inc., Old

Keegan, J.

Kerr, C.

The Face of Battle. Reprint. Jonathan Cape, London, 1977.

Tanks In The East The Story of an Australian Cavalry Regiment. O.U.P., Helbourne, 1945.

Kingsley Norris, F. No Memory For Pain an autobiography. Heinemann, Helbourne, 1970.

Kingston-McCloughry, Squadron-Leader E.J. Winged Warfare Air Problems of Peace and vlar. Jonathan Cape, London, 1937.

Kristiansen, G.L. The Politics of Patriotism. The Pressure Group Activities of the Returned Servicemen's League. A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1966.

Legg, F. The Gordon Bennett Story. Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1965.

Lenton, H.T. & Colledge, J.J. Warships Of v1orld War II. Ian Allan, London, 1964.

Lester, J.R. Tank Warfare. George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1943.

Liddell Hart, Captain B.H. Paris or The Future of War. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd, London, 1925.

Lilley~ Lieutenant-Colonel A.B. Sydney University Regiment. Limited edn. The Hilitary Historical Society of Australia, n.p., 1974.

309

Long, G. The Final Compaigns~A.W.M., Canberra, 1963.

To Benghazi. Reprint. A.W.M., Canberra, 1961.

Louis, L.J. & Turner, I. (eds). The Depression of the 1930s. Cassell Australia Ltd, North Melbourne, 1968.

Macandie, G.L. The Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy.

McCarthy, J.

Government Printer, Sydney, 1949.

Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-39: A Study In Air And Sea Power. University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1976.

Macintyre, D. Aircraft Carrier the majestic weapon. Macdonalc, London, 1968.

Macksey, K. Tank Warfare A History of Tanks in Battle. Rupert Hart-Davis, London, 1971.

& Batchelor, J. Tank A History of the Armoured Fighting Vehicle:--Macdonald, London, 1970.

Martel, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Le Q. In the Wake of the Tank The First Eighteen Years of Mechanization in the British Army. Sifton, Praed & Co. Ltd, London, 1935.

Mathews, R.

Meaney, N.

Mellor, D.P.

Millar, T.B.

Moore, J.H.

Munsun, K.

Nash, A.

Militia Battalion at War The History of the 58/59th Australian Infan.try Battalion in the Second World War. 58/59th Battalion Association, Sydney, 1961.

The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14. S.U.P., University of Sydney, 1976.

The Role Of Science And Industry. A.W.M., Canberra, 1958.

Australia's Defence. 2nd edn. M.U.P., Carlton, 1969.

Morshead - a biography of Lieut. General Sir Leslie .Morshead. Haldane Publishing Co. Pty Ltd, Sydney, 1976.

Borrbers Patrol And Transport Aircraft 1939-45. Blandford Press, London, 1969.

Soldiers or Citizens? lvilli.:u-n Dymock, Sydney, 1885.

Neale, R.G. (ed.). Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49 Volume I: 1937·-38. A.G.P.S., Canb2rra, 1975.

310

Ogorkiewicz, R.M. Armoured Forces A History of Armoured Forces and their Vehicles. Arms And Armour Press, London, 1970.

--------------. Design and Development of Fighting Vehicles. Macdonald, London, 1968.

Okumiya, M. & Horikoshi, J. Zero! The Story of the Japanese Navy Air Force 1937-1945. Cassell & Co. Ltd, London, 1957.

Palmer, R. (ed.). The Rambling Soldier. Penguin Books Ltd, Harmondsv10rth, 1977.

Portus, G.V. (ed.). What The Census Reveals. F.W. Preece & Sons, Adelaide, 1936.

Robertson, J. J.H. Scullin A Political Biography. University of Western Australia Press, Nedlands, 1974.

Robson, L.L. The First A.I.F. A Study Of Its Recruitment 1914-1918. M.U.P., Carlton, 1970.

Roland, P.M.

Roskill, S.

Imperial Japanese Tanks 1918 1945. Argus Books Ltd, Kings Langley, 1975.

Hankey Man of Secrets Volume II 1919-1931. Collins, London, 1972.

Hankey Man of Secrets Volume III 1931-1963. Collins, London, 1974.

Rowan-Robinson, Brigadier-General H. Further Aspects of Mechanization. William Clowes and Sons Ltd, London, 1929.

--------------, Major-General H. Imperial Defence A Problem in Four Dimensions. Frederick Muller Ltd, London, 1938.

Rowell, N.W.

Rowell, S.F.

The British Empire And World Peace. O.U.P., London, 1922.

Full Circle. M.U.P., Carlton, 1974.

The Royal Armoured Corps Tank Museum. The Inter War Period 1919-1939. Reprint. n.pub., Bevington, 1974.

Russell, W.B. There Goes A Man The Biography of Sir Stanley G. Savige. Longmans, London, 1959.

Schedvin, C.B. Australia and the Great Depression A Study Of Economic Development And Policy In The 1920s And 1930s. S.U.P., University of Sydney, 1970.

311

Schofield, B.B. British Sea Power Naval Policy in the T-wentieth Century. B.T. Batsford Ltd, London, 1967.

Seeckt, General von. Thoughts of a Soldier. Trans. G. Waterhouse. Ernest Benn Ltd, London, 1930.

Sellwood, A.V. The Saturday Night Soldiers The stirrinq story of the Territorial Army. 1st edn -1966. White Lion Publishers, London, 1974.

Slessor, Sir John. These Remain A Personal Anthology Memories of Flying, Fighting and Field Sports. Michael Joseph, London, 1969.

Spender, P. Politics and a Man. Collins, Sydney, 1972.

Sutcliffe, J.T. A History Of Trade Unionism In Australia. 1st edn 1921. Macmillan Of Australia, Melbourne, reissued 1967.

Temple Patterson, A. (ed.). The Jellicoe Papers Selections from the private and official correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe. Vol. II, 1916-1935. The Navy Records Society, London, 1968.

Trainor, Lieutenant-Colonel F.D. (ed.). The History of 59 Infantry Battalion "Hume Regiment" 1915-1956. n.pub., n.p., n.d.

The Unit History Editorial Committee. "White over Green". Angus And Robertson, Sydney, 1963.

Vanderveen, B.H. (ed.). The Observer's Army Vehicles Directory To 1940. Frederick Warne & Co. Ltd, London, 1974 .

. The Observer's Fighting Vehicles Directory -------- World War II. Frederick Warne & Co./ London, 1969.

--------. A Source Book of Military Wheeled Vehicles. Ward Lock Ltd, London, 1972.

Vazenry, G.R. Military Forces Of Victoria 1854-1967. Private publication, n.p., n.d.

Reorganization Australian Military Forces. Private publication, n.p., c. 1967.

Vernon, P.V. (ed.). The Royal New South Wales Lancers 1885-1960. Halstead Press, Sydney, 1961.

Wallace, R.L. The Australians at the Boer War. A.W.M. & A.G.P.S., Canberra, 1976.

Hatts, A.J. & Gordon, B. The Imperial Japanese Navy. Doubleday & Co. Inc. , ~e\·, York, 19 71.

Weeks, J.

Werner, M.

White, R.J.

Wigmore, L.

312

infantry weapons. Pan/Ballantine, London, February 1972.

Men Against Tanks A History of Anti-Tank Warfare. David & Charles, Newton Abbot, 1975.

The Hilitary Strength Of The Powers. Victor Gollancz Ltd, London, 1939.

lila ter loo To Peterloo. Peregrine edn. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1968.

The Japanese Thrust. Reprint. A.W.M., Canberra, 1968.

[Williams, Air Marshal Sir Richard]. These Are Facts The Autobiography Of Air Marshal Sir Richard Williams. A.W.M. & A.G.P.S., Canberra, 1977.

Wilson, Major-General A.G. et al. South Australian Artillery 1840-1966. n.pub., n.p., n.d. but c. 1967.

Wintringham, T. New vlays of ·war. Penguin Books, Harmonds­worth, August 1940.

Woodburn Kirby, Major-General S. Singapore: The Chain Of Disaster. Cassell, London, 1971.

ARTICLES

Anderson, Lieutenant G.R. 'MUR- The Regiment and its History'.

Anon.

The Military Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, December 1969, pp. 5-13.

'Grave Shortage of Officers'. The Navy, Army, Air and Munitions Journal The Staff Organ of the Department of Defence in Australia, Vol. 7, No. 11, November 15, 1938, pp. 3-4.

'Increasing Militia' The Navy, Army, Air and Munitions Journal The Staff Organ of the Department of Defence in Australia, Vol. 8 1

No. 1, January 16, 1939, pp. 3-4.

'Regimental History Part III'. The Lancer, 1974, pp. 17-27.

'Some Questions Concerning Australian Defence'. The Naval Review, Vol. XVII, 1929, pp. 747-65.

'Training the ~1ili tia' • The Navy, Army, Air and Munitions Journal The Staff Organ of the Department of Defence in Australia, Vol. 8, No. 4, April 15, 1939, pp. 6-8.

313

'A War Game'. The United Service Journal, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, Hay 1929, pp. 13-16.

Bazley, A.W. & Long, G. 'Iven Giffard Mackay: Citizen Soldier'. Australian Army Journal, No. 218, July 1967, pp. 3-17.

Black, Major A.R. 'The Second Time Around. Can Australia Survive?' Defence Force Journal, No. 1, November/December 1976, pp. 7-18.

Burness, P.B. 'New South Hales Cavalry 1854-1935'. Sabretache, Vol. XVI, No. 4, February 1975, pp. 246-54.

Colley, A.G. 'Australia's Enemies'. The Australian Quarterly, Vol. IX, No. 4, December 1937, pp. 84-91.

Cowie, D. 'Aus·tralia' s New Army' . The Army Quarterly, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, October 1939, pp. 56-67.

'The Defence Of Australia'. The Army Quarterly, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, April 1938, pp. 70-9.

Directorate of Military Training, A.H.Q. 'The Basis of Expansion For War'. Australian Army Journal, No. 12, May 1950, pp. 5-9.

Dolan, Captain C.P. '80th Anniversary Volunteers Of N.S.v7. '. The Navy, Army & Airforce Journal The Staff Organ of the Department of Defence in Australia, Vol. 3, No. 10, October 1, 1934, pp. 22-3.

Duncan, Major-General N.W. 'Mediums Marks I-III'. AFV/Weapons Profile, No. 12.

Fishburn, J.F. 'Some Aspects Of The Anglo-Maori Wars'. Army Journal, No. 322, March 1976, pp. 29-48.

Francis, J.

Gow, N.

'The Citizen Military Forces'. Australian Army Journal, No. 41, October 1952, pp. 5-12.

'Australian Army Strategic Planning 1919-39'. Australian Journal Of Politics And History, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, August 1977, pp. 169-72.

Hara, Lieu·tenant-General Tomio. 'Japanese Co:rr.bat Cars, Light Tanks and Tankettes'. AFV/Weapons Profile, No. 54.

Hiles, J.J. 'Miniature Battle Practice Range At Bulli, N. S. vJ.'. The Navy, Army and Air Force Journal The Staff Organ of the Department of Def~nce in Australia, Vol. 2, No. 4, April 1, 1933, p. 22.

Hopkins, Major-General R.N.L. 'Origins of the Australian Armoured Corps'. Stand-To, Vol. 4, No. 2, March-April 1954, pp. 9-13.

Hyslop, R.

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'War Scares In Australia In The 19th Century'. The Victorian Historical Journal, Vol. 47, No. 1, 183rd issue,February 1976, pp. 23-44.

Keogh, Colonel E.G. 'The Study of Military History'. Army Journal, No. 293, October 1973 1 pp. 35-51.

L.,R. 'Cavalry In New South Wales'. The Navy, Army & Airforce Journal The Staff Organ of the Department of Defence in Australia 1 Vol. 3, No. 4, April 2, 1934, pp. 8-10 & Vol. 4 1

No. 5, May 1, 1934, p. 5.

Lee, Major (Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel) J.E. '"Anzac Cove", A Naval And Military Occasion'. The Citizen Soldier Of Australia, Vol. 1, No. 1, June 1937, pp . 2 2- 3 & 2 8 •

Locke, Major W.J.M. reo-operation of All Arms'. The United Service Journal, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, May 1929, pp. 21-8.

MacCallum, D. 'The Early "Volunteer" Associations in Ne~,.;

South Wales and the Proposals in the First Quarter of the Nineteenth Century'. Royal Australian Historical Society Journal And Proceedings, Vol. 47, Pt 6, 1961, pp. 352-67.

McCarthy, J. 'Air Power and Australian Defence 1923-1939'. The Victorian Historical Magazine, Vol. 42, No. 3, August 1971, pp. 618-31.

McDougall, D. 'The Australian Government and the Sino­Japanese War, 1937-1939'. Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol. 62, Pt 4, March 1977, pp. 251-9.

McQueen, H. 'The Social Character of the New Guard'. Arena, No. 40, 1975, pp. 67-86.

Moore, I. 'Anti-Aircraft'. The Navy, Army and Air Force Journal The Staff Organ of the Department of Defence in Australia, Vol. 3, No. 3, March 1, 19 3 4 1 PP • 3-4 o

Observer. 'Australian Defence Policy'. The Australian Quarterly, No. 26, June 1935, pp. 65-74.

Perry, W. 'Lieutenant General Henry Douglas Wynter An Officer of the Australian Staff Corps'. The Victorian Historical Journal, Vol. 43, No. 2, May 1972, pp. 837-72.

'Lieutenant-General Sir John Dudley Lavarack Australia's 14th Chief Of The General Staff'. The Victorian Historical Journal, Vol. 46, No. 2, May 1975, pp. 365-408.

,

315

'The Police Strike In Melbourne'. The Victorian Hist.orical Magazine, Vol. '"43, No. 3, August 1972, pp. 896-935.

Major E.W.O. 'Major-General Sir Charles Rosenthal: Soldier, Architect and Musician'. The Victorian Historical Magazine, Vol. 40, No. 3, August 1969, pp. 101-60.

Major W. 'General Sir John Monash'. Army Journal, No. 296, January 1974, pp. 22-39.

'Major General M.F. Downes, C.M.G. A Biographical Sketch of a Colonial Commandant'. The Victorian Historical Hagazine, Vol.---;rl, Nos 3 & 4 1

August-November 1970, pp. 424-70.

'The Victorian Horse Artillery An Outline History Of The "Rupertswood Battery"'. The Victorian Historical Magazine, Vol 43, No.-1, February 1972, pp. 749-81.

Primrose, B.N. 'Equipment and Naval Policy 1919-42'.

Quisair.

Australian Journal Of Politics And History, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, August 1977, pp. 163-8:

'Australian Defence Policy: The Air Aspect'. The Australian Quarterly, No. 29, March 1936, pp. 48-53.

Richmond, Admiral Sir Herbert. 'Imperial Defence'. The Army Quarterly, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, October 1933, pp. 11-30.

'An Outline Of Imperial Defence'. The Army Quarterly, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, July 1932, pp. 260-79.

Robertson, Brevet Major H.C.H. 'Simplicity In Fire-Plans'. The Army Quarterly, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, July 19 3 2 , pp . 3 31- 6 .

Robson, L.L. 'The Origin And Character Of The First A.I.F., 1914-1918: Some Statistical Evidence'. Historical Studies, Vol. 15, No. 61, October 1973, pp. 737-49.

Sandes, J. 'The Defence Of Australia'. The Australian Quarterly, No. 20, 14 December 1933, pp. 11-27.

Scrutator [J. Scott Halliday?].'Australian Defence Policy: A Naval Comment'. The Australian Quarterly .. No. 27, September 1935, pp. 54-9.

Simington, Margot. 'The South1.vest Pacific Ir>lands in Australian Interwar Defence Planning•. Australian Journcl Of Politics And History, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, August 1977, pp. 173-7.

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i!:RRA'rA

p.i. 1.23: 'argued.' not '2ruged 1•

p.6. lLSZ::lO: 'L::tbol.::-:' 1 not 'Labor'.

P.B. n.27: 'Sociological Essays' not 'Sociolo_e;ice.l ::;s.:>ays'.

P.46. 1.3: 'role' not u;vote'.

:P.53. 1.5: 'Labour' not 'Labor'.

p. 104. l. 4:

P.l26. l. 5: p -139. n.Sl:

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T) e 247 o 1.14: D .250. l. 22:

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'prosecutions' not 'prosectuions'.

'servants' not 'servant'.

'a gunner' not 'gunner•·. I+ F!S vroops ••.. ' not 'troops .... ' '

'substitution' not 'substitutio 1 •

'Britain' not 1 3irtain'.

'Bostock,Lieutenant-Co1onel J.Horthcott' not 'Bostock Lieutenant-

Colonel J.Northcott•.

'assaults' not 'assults'.

'Johnson, Lieutenant-Color:.el' not 1 Johnson Lieutenant-Colonel'.

•Hagazine' not 'Journal'.