Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Science

Department of International Relations

ANALYSIS OF INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS: THE CASE OF

KURDISH ISSUE IN TURKEY

Fırat ÇAPAN

Master‘s Thesis

Ankara, 2015

ANALYSIS OF INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS, THE CASE OF KURDISH

ISSUE IN TURKEY

Fırat ÇAPAN

Hacettepe University Graduate School Of Social Science

Department Of International Relations

Master‘s Thesis

Ankara, 2015

iii

DEDICATION

To My Beloved Fiancée, YELİZ

iv

ÖZET

ÇAPAN, Fırat, Devlet İçi Çatışma Analizi, Türkiye‟nin Kürt Meselesi Örneği, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara; 2015.

Bir devlet içi çatışma örneği olarak Kürt meselesi Türkiyenin barışçıl bir çözüm

bekleyen temel meselelerinden biridir..Bu çalışmada devlet içi çatışma ve

savaşın nasıl tanımlandığı çözümünün neden zor olduğu, açıklandıktan sonra.

devlet içi çatışmaların nasıl sınıfladırıldığı ile bu çatışmaların temel sebeplerinin

ne olduğu tartışılmıştır. Daha sonra Kürt meselesinin bügüne kadar geçirdiği

evreler incelenmiş, Türkiyedeki Kürt meselesinin bir devlet içi çatışma örneği

olarak nasıl tanımlanabileceği, ve devlet içi temel çatışma sebeplerinin

Türkiye‘deki Kürt meselesi açısından ne kadar açıklayacı olduğu tartışılmıştır.

Son olarakta devlet içi çatışmanın temel sebeplerinin Kürt meselesi açısından

nasıl aşılabileceği ve kalıcı barışa nasıl ulaşılabileceği maddeler halinde

açıklanmıştır.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Devlet İçi Çatışma ,Kürt Meselesi, Barış Süreci

v

ABSTRACT

ÇAPAN Fırat, Analysis of Intra-State Conflicts, The Case of Kurdish Issue In Turkey Master Thesis, Ankara, 2015

As an intra-state conflict Turkey‘s Kurdish issue is one of the primary issues that

necessitate to an immediate settlement. In the thesis, after the questions of ―how

Intra-state conflict and war are being defined and why their resolution is

challenging‖ are being answered. Both the classifications and root causes of

intrastate conflicts are explained. Then the evolution of Kurdish Issue is analyzed

and Kurdish issue is evaluated within the context of Intra-state conflicts and the

question of whether the root causes are explanatory for Kurdish issue or not is

addressed. Lastly the ways to reverse the root causes of intra-state conflicts and to

achieve an endurable peace is suggested in respect to Kurdish issue.

Key Words

Intra-State Conflict, Kurdish Issue, Peace Process

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

KABUL VEONAY………………………………………………………….……. i

BİLDİRİM …..…………………………………………………………………... ii

DEDICATION ………………………………………………………………...... iii

ÖZET …………………………………………………………….…...……......... iv

ABSTRACT ………………..……………………...…………………………......v

TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………..………vi

INDRODUCTION ……………………………………………….……………... 1

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY………………….………………………….... 4

CHAPTER 1

INTRA-STATE WAR AND CONFLICT: DEFINITION AND ROOT CAUSES

1.1.INTRODUCTION ..........…………………………….…………........ 6

1.2. DEFINITION OF INTRA -STATE CONFLICT AND WAR;

…………………………………………………………….…………... 7

1.3.TREND AND IMPORTANCE OF INTRASTATE CONFLICT IN THE

WORLD POLITICS ..........................………………………………….. 9

1.4. THE TYPES OF INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS .………..…................ 12

1 . 4 . 1 . Ideological Intra-state Conflicts ……………………..…. 14

1 . 4 . 2 . Ethnic/Identity Based Conflict ………….……...…..….....15

1 . 4 . 2 . 1 Ethno Political Conflict ……………..................… 17

1.5. THE ROOT CAUSES OF INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS ….….18

vii

1.5.1 Structural Factors ……………………....………………….......18

1.5.1.1 Weak State ……………………….……………...…......... 19

1.5.1.2 Security Dilemma ……………………………………...… 19

1.5.1.2.1 Inter-societal Security Dilemma ………..…........ 23

1.5.1.3 Ethnic Geography …………….………………..….......... 25

1.5.2 Political Factors .................................................................................. 27

1.5.2.1 Discriminatory Political Institutions …………..…...….... 27

1.5.2.2 Exclusionary National Ideologies ………...……….…… 29

1.5.2.3 Intergroup Politics ……………..……………………….. 30

1.5.2.4 Elite Politics ………………..……………………………. 30

1.5.3 Economic And Social Factors …………………………...…….…..... 31

1.5.4 Cultural And Perceptual Factors …………………..………............. 34

1.5.4.1 Cultural Discrimination …………………...……………… 34

1.5.4.2.Group Histories and Group perception of Themselves and

Others …………………………………………………….……………….. 35

CHAPTER 2

RECONSIDERING KURDISH ISSUE;ROOT CAUSES OF AN INTRASTATE

CONFLICT

2.1 INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………....37

2.2 HISTORICAL LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT ..………………............ 39

2.2.1 The Ottoman Legacy ……………….…………………..................... 39

2.2.2 Legacy of the Republic ……………...…………………………..........42

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2.2.3 Last Insurgency of Kurds; Emergence of PKK ……........................ .45

2.3 DEFINING KURDISH ISSUE AS AN INTRA-STATE CONFLICT...…...46

2.4 ETHNIC/IDENTITY AND IDEOLOGICAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT

………………………………………………………………………………….......48

2.5 ROOT CAUSES OF KURDISH CONFLICT ……………………….......... 50

2.5.1 Structural Factors …………………………………...……........….... 50

2.5.1.1 Weak State …………………………………………………..……... 50

2.5.1.2 Security Dilemma of Kurdish Issue ….……..………..………......... 51

2.5.1.3 Ethnic Geography of Kurds …………………………...…………... 54

2.5.2 Political Factors ………………………………………….….................... 56

1.5.2.1 Discriminatory Political Institutions ………….………....... 56

1.5.2.2 Exclusionary National Ideologies ……...……………..…... 57

1.5.2.3 Intergroup Politics ………………………..……….…........ 59

1.5.2.4 Elite and Kurdish Issue …………………………...…......... 60

2.5.3 Economic and Social Factors ………..………….………......................... 62

2.5.4 Cultural and Perceptual Factors …..…………………..……………….. 63

2.5.4.1 Cultural Discrimination of Kurds …………….………........63

2.5.4.2. Group Histories and Group Perception Regarding to Kurdish

Issues …………………..…………………………………..…….... 65

CHAPTER 3

PATH TO PEACE; REVERSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF KURDISH ISSUE

3.1. INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………….…... 69

ix

3.2. ENDURABLE/STABLE PEACE ………………………………....... 70

3.3 CONDITION TO REVERSE ROOT CAUSES ……………………. 71

3.3.1. Reversing the Structural Factors …..…………………….......72

3.3.1.1 Institutionalization ……………………..………………...... 72

3.3.1.2 Timing …..…………………..…………………………….. 75

3.3.1.2.1 Ripe Moment …..…………………………......... 76

3.3.1.3 Security Guarantees..…………………….……………….. 77

3.3.2 Reversing Political Factors ……………………………......... 79

3.3.2.1 Identity Recognition ……...……………………..…..…..... 79

3.3.2.3 Self Rule …………………………………..…………..….. 82

3.3.2.4 Powerful Leadership ……………………….………........... 84

3.2.3 Reversing Cultural And Perceptual Factors …………......... 86

3.2.3.1 Truth And Reconciliation.…..………………………........... 86

3.2.3.2 Discourse …………………………….......…………............89

CONCLUSION ………………...…………………………………………….…………..93

BIBLIOGRAPHY ….…………………………………………………………………....99

AUTHENTICITY REPORT……………………………………………………………106

ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM……………………………………………………107

1

INTRODUCTION

Except the example of Japan and Poland which are mostly termed as homogenous

states, most of the world states today – and in the history as well, are multinational

and multiethnic. The concept of ―Nation State‖ which spread all over the globe after

the French Revolution can barely deal with the problems of multi-ethnicity and

domestic dissidents within the states. Most of the conflicts are intra-states and the

war between and among the states is something rare, especially in the era of post-

World War II. The collapse of Soviet Union boosts the trend of intra-state conflicts

and resurgence of ethnic outbreak in most part of the world. The number of states in

terms of the membership to the United Nations increased to 189 in 2000, which were

159 in 1990. The Intra-states of conflicts has variety of types such as ethnic,

ideological, class or religious. Sometimes It is difficult to perfectly define the types of

the conflict in question and further it might be some mix of all these. The collapse of

Soviet Union and the end of bipolar world has decreased and loosed the attention

on the class and ideological conflicts and most world politics focus is on ethnic and

religious conflict now. In other words the post-Cold War era conflicts are

generally identity-based. For that reason it is not a coincidence for some scholars

to dub this era as the ―age of identity‖ It is not just an invented or abstract term that

postmodernism lent t o us, but the conflict of identities is something real and

experienced throughout the world like Kashmir, Srilanka, Northern Ireland, Cyprus,

Israel and Turkey. The important aspect of these conflicts are that they resist to

resolution and they are intractable. Most of these conflicts last a long time and

when violence emerges they happen to be bloody and leave behind a victimized

population. Further they bear very high cost on populations, if not resolved.

One of the most important aspects of intra-state conflict is that in the pre conflict,

during conflict, and post conflict era the conflicting or warring parties have to live

together, if separatism is not the outcome. The dispute may be about a territory,

gaining governmental power or economical resources. Whatever the dispute is about,

the dynamics of intra-state conflict, the way to deal with it or resolution of it is different

from that of interstate conflict. So the researcher or practitioner ought not to approach

2

with the same tools that are being used for inter-state conflict. To resolve cleavages

between or among states is different from those waged between state and groups or

between two groups. As stated above since it is anticipated that the groups will live

together in the post conflict era, mostly the process is more fragile to carry a peace

initiative in intra-state conflict and the resurgent of conflict is more likely in such kind of

initiative. In addition to that the second factor that makes the intra-state conflict more

intractable is the power asymmetry between conflicting and warring parties. States in

general are reluctant and unwilling to make concession to an insurgent group. On the

other hand, for a weak conflicting party with respectively low number of staff and cost,

they gain large by inflicting a small attack on the state. When asymmetry gap is narrow,

the likelihood of a solution is higher. In other words when power balance is obtained it

leads to a more sustainable relations.

Turkey seeks to find a peaceful solution to its long decade and intractable problem

Kurdish Issue. The former initiative of AK party government failed due to the lack of

organized preparations, amateur peace processes, which had started in 2009 and end

in 2011 after PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) members staged an ambush and killed 13

Turkish soldier in the Silvan province. In the meanwhile with the failure of initiative, the

armed conflict escalated in to a very intense confrontation that account for more than

700 dead within fourteen months from 2011 to 2012 which is the highest death rate that

unprecedented in 13 years. The detention of Kurdish activist with the conviction of

being the member of illegal organization KCK (The Union of Communities in Kurdistan),

The PKK raids, Turkish military operation to the bases of PKK and the widespread

death fasts of Kurdish prisoners in 2013, led to a stalemate and similar developments

dragged the conflict in to a stagnate condition for the parties. Later on prisoned PKK

leader Abdullah Öcalan‘s called the prisoners to end the hunger strike and the followers

listened to this call. Since then the situation deescalated and government launched a

peace talks with Abdullah Öcalan that boosted hopes among public. The public

expectation is that three decade old conflict which marked with bloody memories will

end. During the time of writing thıs thesis, talks were going on with Abdullah Öcalan

and in 21 March 2013 of Newroz celebration his letter was read by BDP parliamentary

members to the mass that were gathering for the celebration, and in this letter he

3

addressed the PKK members and called to a fully withdrawal from armed struggle and

urged the militants to retreat from Turkish borders and move to the Northern Iraq.

Considering all above mentioned, the thesis is an attempt to explain the Kurdish issue

in the intra-state conflict theory and propose a way out to the issue. The research

question of thesis is ―can Kurdish issue and the root causes of the conflict be explained

within the intra-state conflict theory framework and how can the root causes of the

issue be transformed to attain an endurable peace?

In the first chapter, the thesis seeks to clarify the dynamics of intra-state conflict,

examines what sort of intra-state conflict are present, and studys what are the root

causes of Intra-state conflicts. This part will constitute to a theoretical background for

the next two chapters.

The research questions of first chapter are:

▪ What we mean by Intra-state conflicts and war and why they are in rise?

▪ What kinds of Intra-state conflicts exist and what are the main differences?

▪ What are the root causes of Intra-state conflict?

In the second chapter, first the Kurdish issue is being analyzed in terms of historical

legacy and then the issue is analyzed in terms of intra-state conflict definition and the

root causes of Kurdish issue is also being examined.

The research questions of second chapter are:

How Kurdish issue evolved to the present time?

What types of Intra-state conflict corresponds with Kurdish issue?

Are root causes explained in the first chapter relevant and explanatory for

Kurdish issue ?

4

The last chapter provides a roadmap for reversing the root causes of conflict with

analysis of Kurdish issue in these respects.

The research question of last chapter is: What policies must be adopted to reverse the

root causes and reach an endurable peace?

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study based its arguments and draws the conclusions from the basic resources on

Intra-state conflicts and war, peace processes and Kurdish issue, are being assessed

form the perspective and lenses of those resources. The thesis methodology will follow

the methodology that has been adopted by peace and conflict resolution studies. The

first feature of this methodology is the normative approach to social conditions. It implies

the value-laden characteristic of the peace studies in which peace is uncontested good

and must be the main

objective and war and conflict is clearly refer to a bad situation.1 Some schoolars has

been using the analogy between medical and peace studies and states that ―Like

medical scientists in respect of disease and physical suffering, peace researchers saw

violence and war as an evil to be controlled or eliminated, and made an ethical

commitment to that end‖2 With the same token the assumption that the paece studies is

founded upon is that the existing social structure is not a fate or destiny and open to

change by human action. The normative methodology leads to a proactive mode of

action in research that make the studies useful for practioner in addition to theoretical

contributions. The second aspect of peace stduies methodology is its interdisciplinary

and multi-disciplinary facet. As Attack maintains ―Peace theory is still very much a

compilation of theories and concepts derived from other disciplines, such as

international relations, political science, sociology, philosophy and theology‖3 When

peace is matter any of method is justifiable to use. Thus in the thesis for instance the

aprroach of ―Realism‖ that relates to power, security dilemma, and overcoming the

1 Attack Iain , Peace Studies and Social Change, Development Education In Action ,Issue 9, Autumn 2009

p 2. 2 McSweeney, B ‗Introduction: Comments on Morality and Peace Research‘ in McSweeney, B (ed.) Moral

Issues in International Affairs: Problems of European Integration, Macmillan Press,London, (1998) p.1 3 Attack Iain , Peace Studies and Social Change, Development Education In Action , Issue 9, Autumn

2009 p 2

5

security dillema was utilized. Likewise Marxism a theory that highly make references to

structural factors or economical inequalities was touched upon in the thesis without

directly naming it. In other words the means to achieve an end, which in the thesis is

reaching an endurable peace in Kurdish issue, relating to normative methodology were

employed throughout the thesis particularly in the third chapter.

6

CHAPTER 1

INTRASTATE CONFLICT AND WAR; DEFINITION AND ROOT CAUSES

Only dead have seen the end of war

Plato

1.1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to analysis the intra-state conflict, war, trends of wars, types of

intra-state conflict and root causes of intra-state conflicts. Since most of the states are

multiethnic, the existence of different groups within states and claims they propound,

such as autonomy or independence has become a point of attention and caution for

international and internal politics. Firstly the chapter attempts to clarify the definition of

intra-state conflicts and war and explains why it is important for global politics. Trends in

world politics, the ―globalization‖ process and emergence and increasing importance of

minorities in politics are other cases in point. To understand this phenomenon and trends

the chapter delves in to the types of internal conflicts and the conditions that give rise to

those internal troubles. Distinctive studies emphasis different classifications and this

diversity stemmed from their focus point in the conflict. The chapter employs the

classification of ―identity/ethnic based‖, and ―ideological based /conflict over central

government‖ as the focus of conceptualization, while referring to other classification as

well such as, the Correlates of War project Classification to compare and clarify that

different conceptualization. Correlates of War Project Classification are also providing the

tool to distinguish Intra-state wars from the intra-state conflicts that have not reached to

the degree of intra-state wars. On the other hand for operational classification to the

Kurdish Issue, the identity/ethnic based, and ideological based distinction appeared to be

7

satisfactory, since the thesis is not a deep study of the theory of intra-state conflict and

war. Moreover identity/ethnic based‖ –ideological based conflicts / classification is widely

referred in seminal studies and texts of peace and conflict studies.

Later on, the chapter analyzes the causes and the condition in which internal conflict

and war emerge. Those causes are classified in to four sections. First is the ―structural

factors‖ of intrastate conflict. Under the structural factors of intra-state conflicts, ―weak

state‖ security dilemma, ethnic geography has been analyzed. Second is the ―political

factors‖ in which exclusionary national institutions, discriminatory national ideologies,

intergroup politics and elite politics were examined. As a third element, economic and

social factors were analyzed. Lastly the ―cultural/perceptual‖ factors was investigated

which cover ―cultural discrimination‖, ―group histories‖ and ―perceptional factors‖.

Followings are the details of above mentioned.

1.2. THE DEFINITION OF INTRA-STATE WAR

Varranes states that ―It is clear that vast majority of armed conflicts, which have plagued

the world in the last two decades are within states rather than between states‖4 Ye t

there are no consensus on the terms regarding internal conflicts. Civil war, Internal war,

Intra-state war are some of terms that are sometimes being employed scholarly. Another

challenge regarding the terms is that even with same concept sometimes scholars

imply different meanings.5 For example Wallersteen uses civil wars for those kind of

conflicts which arerelated to a conflict over govermental power rather than territorial

issues.6 When it comes to territorial related conflicts, he prefers the term ―State

Formation Conflicts‖. Yet some other studies use Intra-state conflict that encompasses

all types of internal conflicts regardless of whether it is over seizing a territory or

4 DeVarennes,Fernande(2003),―Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflicts:A Comparative Analysis of Content

and Approaches‖, Darby,JohnandRogerMacGinty(ed.), Contemporary Peacemaking:Conflict,Violence and Peace Processes Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; NewYork: PalgraveMacmillan, pp.152-153. 5 Throughout the study intra-state conflict or Intra-state war were used interchangeably. With intra-state

conflict, violent confrontations or tensions that have high potential of violent confrontation were meant where intra-state war implies the conflicts in which 1000 thousand conflict related deaths have been taken place yearly within the border of a state. 6 Wallensteen, Peter (2002),Understanding Conflict Resolution; War, Peace And Global System, Sage,

London.

8

govermental power. Thus a coup d'étator a religious confrontation ıs both being studied

under the title of intrastate conflict. Brown prefers the terms of Internal conflict and he

defines it:

By internal conflict,we mean violent or potentially violent political disputes whose

origin can be traced primarily to domestic rather than systemic factors and where

armed violence takes place or threatens to take place primarily within the borders of

a single state.Examples include violent power struggles involving civilian or military

leaders; armed ethnic conflicts and seccessionist campaigns; challenges by criminal

organizations to state sovereignty; armed ideological struggles and revolutions7.

As seen in the definition, there are multiple types of a domestic troubles and conflics. In

some cases when the state is weak, the groups fight among each other with their own

tools, without any intervention of govermental powers. Unlike traditional wars in those

conflicts civilians are direct subject of the war. Moreover, they are not only subject to

wars, but at times also directy involve in the fights that borne out in Rwanda and Bosnia

and elsewhere. There as on civilian become victim on those war stems from the fact that,

mostly it is extremely difficult to distinguish civilians -that are the bases for groups to

recruiting fighters-from the real members of rebellious group.

The criaterias has been put for intra-state war by the ―Project of Corralates of War‖

(COW) is as follows:

Intrastate wars are wars that are fought within state borders between a government and non-government forces (civil war), or at least two non-government forces (inter-communal war). While there are two types of intrastate wars, these data only describe civil wars. In order to be classified as a civil war, the central government should be actively involved in military action with effective resistance for both sides, and there should be at least 1000 battle related deaths during the civil war8.

It can be infered from the definition that ‗civil war‘ is a subtype of intra-state war that the

state is a primary party. When the state is not a party in the war according the project

conceptualization the term of inter-communal war is prefered. The ―Project‖

7Brown E. Michea (1996), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge, MIT, p.1.

8Sarkees Meredith Reid and Schafer Phil (2000),―The Correlates of War Data on War: an Update to 1997‖

Conflict Management And Peace Science, Vol. 18, No 1, pp.123-144.‖HE CORRELATES OF WAR DATA

ON WAR: AN UPDATETO 1

9

conceptualization ―intra-state war‖ will be employed throughout the study and

differences will be left to the section of the ―types of intra-state war‖.

1.3 TRENDS AND IMPORTANCE OF INTRA-STATE CONFLICT IN WORLD POLITICS In traditional meaning war is a concept that defines a fight among two or more states. In

modern time, the armed struggles mostly occur within state itself. Wayman and Singer

define three types of wars. Those are ―Inter-state‖, ―Intra-state‖ and ―Extra-state‖ wars9.

Here Intra-state wars imply a conflict within state and they used ―civil wars‖

interchangeably with intra-state wars. Cold War era is respectively a peaceful period

regarding to Inter-state wars. From 1953 Korean War to the end of Cold war, only a few

inter-state wars have been taken place. ―Inter-state wars are less than 25% of the total

196 wars since 1945 to 199610. From 1998 till the present day 47 wars have occurred in

which UN intervened, only three of them were inter-state wars (Chad-Libya, Iraq-Kuwait

and Eritrea-Ethiopia).11 On the other hand the internal problems of states during Cold

war had become an area of proxy wars between two super powers. The Interstate

conflicts were intervened by the US or Soviet Union in accordance to their perceived

goals. Some examples are the intervention to the Guatemala in 1954, The Dominican

Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 by the US and Hungary in

1956 Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979 by the Soviet Union12. Thus it

would not be wrong to assert that Intra-state wars are not a characteristic of post-Cold

War era. There have been tensions inside states during Cold War as well. However they

were supressed by a greater conflict of ―West‖ and ―East‖. In other words, those

tensions were earthed up by ideological confrontation of the ―Liberal World‖ and the

Communist World.‖ The stability of order and maintainence of borders were enhanced

9Frank Whelon Wayman, J. David Singer (2003),Inter-State, Intra-State and Extra State Wars: A

Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution Over Time, 1816-1997,International Studies Quarterly,p. 49. 10

Dietrich Jung, Klaus Schlichte (1999), ―From Inter-State War to Warlordism: Changing Forms of Collective Violence in the International System‖ in Wiberg Hakan and P. Scherrer (ed.) Ethnicity and Intra-state Conflict: Types, Causes and Peace Strategies,Ashgate: Asgate,p.35. 11

Yılmaz Muzaffer Ercan (2007), ―Intra-State Conflict in the Post-Cold Era”, International Journal On World Peace, Vol.24, No 4 December, p.12. 12

Wallensteen, Peter (2002), ―Understanding Conflict Resolution; War, Peace And Global System‖,Sage, London.

10

by geopolitics of Cold War, rather than by the norms of ‗international order‘.13 On the

other hand the Cold War period was also marked by decolonization struggles and

national groups focused on the ―imperial‖ enemy which suspended the internal

cleavages to a later time. However with the end of decolonization process, demarcation

of the borders by colonial rules, has not always corresponded to ethnic divisions of the

countries. Indeed it is impossible to locate every ethnicity into a distinctive territory. As

we mentioned before most of the nations are multiethnic and there are great varieties of

minority problem and dozens of them are accounted for armed conflicts. Scherer states

that ‗If we look underneath the structures of some 200 states there is an extraordinary

multitude of perhaps 6500 up to 10.000 nations, nationalities, and people as ethnic

entities of diverse size‖14 That is to say end of the Cold War led to the unearthing of

divisions within states that were undergrounded or surpassed by a greater ideological

divison of West and East. The Incidents in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and

ultimate dissolution of it, the case of Rwanda and new states that have emerged after

the dissolution of the Soviet Union led to an awakening about domestic, ethnic, religious

division within states. The supressed conflicts of the former period have surfaced in the

new era. Today Intra-state wars claim more deaths than any other kind of wars. The

main threat to peace comes from those kind of conflicts rather than from the war

between major inter-state wars.15 The sufferings it creates are high and it claims mostly

civil lives. In addition to deaths, displacement of population and crossing of the refugees

across the borders - sometimes in huge numbers – brings about extra problems to be

dealt with. In occasions their impacts spill over to the borders and give rise to

international problems between neighboring states, when their security is becoming

endangered. Even worse they might lead to regional conflicts between number of states

when their interests are at stake. Thereby a domestic trouble may spark a conflict that

will not stop inside the border and create international problems, which might threat

international order.

13

McGarry, John; O‘Leary, Brendan (1993),"Introduction: The macro-political regulation of ethnic conflict",The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts. London: Routledge,p.1. 14

Scherrer P. Christian (1999), ―Towards a Comprehensive Analysis of Ethnicity and Mass Violence: Types Dynamics Charecteristics and Trends‖ in Wiberg Hakan, Scherrer P. Christian(ed), Ethnicity and Intra-state Conflict, Types, Causes and Peace Strategies, Ashgate: Asgate, p.54. 15

Yılmaz Muzaffer Ercan(2007) ―Intra-State Conflict in the Post-Cold Era”, International Journal On World Peace, Vol.24, No 4 December, p.11.

11

Another aspect of Intra-states war is that it lasts longer then traditional types of wars

that take place between states. The conflicts in Angola, Turkey, Philippins Columbia are

instance of intractable war that last more than 20 years.

But why inter-state wars do not last as long as do intra-state wars? And why do their

numbers diminish?

If a war is between states, international actors are more prone to intervene to those type

of conflicts since they poses big threat to international order. As liberal tradition of

thought argues that states are more dependent to each other, which makes a war more

costly and more unlikely. If it happens, international actors are more less reluctant to

intervene to preclude repercursions on international order. ―The norms of peaceful

behaviour‖ that dominates the international interactions among states is another

explanation propounded by liberals for declining number of interstate wars. Realists on

the other hand argue that the decline stems from the power relations and great powers

seek to keep the status quo intact for the maintenance of order.16 These assumptions

are not mutually exclusive and presumably all of them are valid to explain the decline of

interstate wars.

Then what accounts for longevity of Intra-state wars and their increasing numbers?

Firstly the states are mostly reluctant to submit to any armed group and the power

asymetry between state and armed group makes it intractable. The states are also

resistant to outside intervention to their own problems, which is embodied in

international treaties as ―non-intervention principle‖17. The resolution through mediation

and third party interventions are mostly considered by states as last options. Power

asymetry, nonintervention and reluctancy of states to recognise another legitimate

power within its territory account for the longevity of intra-state conflicts.

16

Dietrich Jung, Klaus Schlichte (1999), ―From Inter-State War to Warlordism: Changing Forms of Collective Violence in the International System‖ in Wiberg Hakan And P. Scherrer (ed.) Ethnicity and Intra-state Conflict: Types, Causes and Peace Strategies.: Asgate p. 35. 17

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.(UN Charter Article 2(7)) http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml

12

The process of globalization in which the nongovermental organizations have emerged

as powerful actors, and which have weakened state sovereignty over domestic issues

also contributed to the rise in the number of Intra-states wars. Not only legal NGOs

have gained importance, but also ―illegal‖ or armed organization have broadly made

the use of globalization process. The groups have gotten the chance to voice loudly their

demands on international arenas and mobilise the mass toward their cause thanks to

the developments in telecommunication industry. State hardly can control their borders.

So the weakening of the state and the emerge of non-state groups as actors gave rise to

new forms of interactions. However, this interaction are not always friendly.

Lastly principally Interstate conflicts are dealt with International Organization particularly

via United Nations. The parties generally recognised members of these organizations,

but the intra-state issues are principally left to the legitimate states, unless the state calls

for the intervention from international organizations. When coming to Intra-state, wars

indeed mostly one side is not a recognised member and is not eligible to appeal a

supreme body. It is not to say that there are no rules for domestic problems and an

anarchical situation prevails, but for states these internal issues are matters of

expediency rather than principles and laws.That is why the problems like human rights

violations and humanitarian intervention are subjects of deep discussion.

Intra-state conflicts and wars are the main issue of the stability of international order in

recent decades and it seems that they will remain to be centre of concern in the coming

decades.The methods to cope with these challanges will be the main issue of

international politics.

1.4 THE TYPES OF INTRA-STATE CONFLICT

Not all intra-state conflicts are identical. There are great deals of differences among

various types in terms of their motivational roots, geographical aspects, parties involved

etc .For example Scherer define and categorizes a number of types such as; ―Anti-

Regime Wars or Political and Ideological Conflicts: State versus Insurrection‖, ―Ethno-

nationalist Conflicts: State versus Nationalist Group,‖ ―Decolonization wars or Foreign-

State Occupation‖, ―Inter-ethnic Conflicts‖. The classification done by ―Correlates of War

13

Data Project‖ (COW), which was first introduced in 1972 and later updated in 1994 and

1997, is another very insightful classification in the sense that its generalization and

scope is well designed. It defines intra-state wars that are between or among the groups

within internationally recognized territory of a state and subdivide them in to two groups.

One is ―Civil War‖ that fought against the regime of state and any armed conflict that are

involved. The other is ―Inter-communal Wars‖, which is a conflict between the non-state

or non governmental groups within a state. For a conflict to be considered a civil war, it

must involve a) military action internal to metropolis of state system member, b) active

participation of national government, and c) effective participation of both sides and a

total of at least 1000 battle deaths during each year of war.18

Intra—StateWars

Civil Wars

1 ) For Central Control

2 ) Over Local Issues

B. Inter-Communal19

Further COW (Correlates of War) Project grouped ―Civil Wars‖ in to two categories

according to the motives behind non-state actors. Whether the conflict is over local or

regional affairs or it is over the control of central government is the base of classification.

In conflict over the control of self-government the aim of insurgents is to overthrow

existing regime and replace it with which they perceive more friendly and receptive to

their interests whereas conflict over local issues is a struggle to modify a regime‘s

treatment of a particular region that populated by a minority group, and to replace the

local regime with a more friendly one or ultimately to secede from the larger political

18

Scherrer P. Christian (1999), ―Towards a Comprehensive Analysis of Ethnicity and Mass Violence: Types Dynamics Charecteristics and Trends‖ in Wiberg Hakan, Scherrer P. Christian(ed.), Ethnicity and Intra-state Conflict, Types, Causes and Peace Strategies, Ashgate,p.61. 19

Ibid, p.128.

14

unity in order to set up their own state20. Although categorizations abounds, as a last one

to refer here is ―Ideological intra-state conflicts and Ethnic/Identity Based Intra-state

conflicts‖ division. Arguably Civil wars for ―central control‖ and ―over local issues‖,

classification of COW here are replaced by different names, while in reality it refers to

the same. Thus the distinction of ―Ideological/Conflict over central control and

ethnic/identity based conflict‖ is broad enough and satisfactory to utilize for our aim.

Details and discussion of all the types are beyond the scope and aim of the thesis, only

this generally referred classification in academic resources classification will be

highlighted in the next section

1.4.1 Ideological Intra-State Conflicts/Conflict Over Central Control

In the ideological intra-state conflict, the issue in question regards to the holding of

government power and the main concern is the regime type and social political system.

The conflicting parties mostly hold opposite ideology and their understanding of how the

government and the regime type should be is incompatible. The opposition‘s aim–

regardless of whether it is an armed or a civil movement- is to replace the incumbent

government and change the socio-political order. In this kind of conflicts, the territory is

not an issue of concern and each party seek the support of all populace. The loyalties of

individuals are not fixed; in contrast, it is substantially flexible. The opposing sides

struggle and battle over the control of state rather than parcel out one part of it. The

issues are mostly, if not always, about economic problems, political and social

conditions, social order, regime type etc. So the parties seek to win the hearts and

minds of population regardless of their ethnic affiliations. Thereby whole country is an

area of struggle and the same populations are the subject of political mobilization and

activities for both sides. Military success is not enough unless the political support is

gained.21 The root of the conflict is competing ideologies of parties and their world view

rather than their fixed ascriptions. Loyalties are more vulnerable to transformation over

time in ideological conflicts. To clarify distinction it is appropriate to give example here.

20

Ibid, p.129. 21

Kaufmann Chaim, ―Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars‖ International Security, Vol. 20, No 4 (Spring, 1996), p.139.

15

The conflict in Northern Ireland which is between Protestant Unionist and Catholic

Republicans, can be considered as an ethnic conflict. While the conflict in Afghanistan

between Taliban whose political goal is to establish an Afghanistan ruled by their

understanding of Islamic principles and government, must be considered as an

ideological conflict. In the former one the conflict is more related to the territorial issue.

On the other hand in the later conflict the issues in question are control of governmental

power and with which world view the country is going to be ruled.

1.4.2 Ethnic/Identity Based Conflicts

Not all ethnic differences lead to conflict. There are numerous examples of

heterogeneous states that ethnic or religious groups live in harmony. Ethnicity itself is a

contested term, but it is yet a very crucial concept in domestic and international politics.

As Allison states: ―ethnicity remains one of the most elusive and mysterious aspects of

social structures, but also one of the most fundamental and important‖22.Horrowitz states

that ―Ethnic affiliations provide a sense of security in a divided society, as well as a

source of trust, certainty, reciprocal help, and protection against neglect of one‘s own

interest by strangers‖23. When ethnicity and identity becomes the source of conflict, it

makes the conflict more intractable and resistant to resolution. This stems partly from

the fact that the ethnic identities –even though not static- are more stable and strong

than other affinities. Wolf Defines ethnic conflicts as:

…that in which the goals of at least one conflict party are defined in (exclusively) ethnic terms, and in which the primarily fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions. Whatever the concrete issues over which conflicts erupts, at least one of the conflict parties will explain its dissatisfaction in ethnic terms- that is, one party to the conflict will claim that its distinct ethnic identity is the reason why its members can not realize their interest, why they don‟t have the same rights, or why their claims are not satisfied. Thus ethnic conflict are a form of group conflict in which at least one of the parties involved interprets the conflict , its cause, and potential remedies along an actually existing or perceived discriminating ethnic divide24.

22

Allison, Lincoln (2003) ―Ethnicity‖ In I Mclean and A. McMillan (ed.), The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 178. 23

Donald L. Horpowitz (1994), ―Democracy In Divided Societies‖ in Diamond Lary and Marc F. Plattner (ed.) Nationalism Ethnic Conflict And Society, John Hopkins University Press London,p. 49. 24

Karl Cordell & Stefan Wolff (forthcoming), Ethnic Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Responses.Cambridge: Polity.

16

The rigidity of affinity is the main difference with ideological conflicts. On occasion the

conflict or war itself strengthens the loyalties to ethnic identities. The memory shaped by

suffering and victimization psychology generated by the war memories awakens the

ethnic consciousness. Unlike ideological conflicts, conflicting party in ethnic conflicts

pursue to gain the hearts and minds of their own populations, rather than seeking

support from rival group‘s constituents. Especially in times of tension and escalation,

their bases for support are their own community. Efforts to collaborate with and gain the

hearts and minds of other group‘s members, proven to fail since their identity are at the

center of dispute.

To reiterate ethnicity is not fixed and subject to change as well like ideologies, but since

it derives its base from blood, race, culture, common descent or religion, once the ethnic

identity is formed it becomes quite resistant to change.25 As Horrowitz states ―ethnic

group is not just a trade union‖26 When identity asserted, proponents of that identity are

in most part reluctant to compromise.27

The ethnic group that perceives its conditions as unfair and underprivileged will tend to

hold the idea that they have exposed to injustice by the system because of their identity.

Whether it‘s real or a matter of perception, the group pursues political changes through

different means, which are not always friendly, and calls for transition. This transition

may ranges from the democracy to the recognition of cultural rights, to federalism or

autonomy to demand for secession.

When the matter is identity, the legitimacy of the state and its laws, fall under question.

State system is perceived to be unfavorable for the group. Thus the laws considered to

be breakable by the ―oppressed‖ ethnic or identity groups28

Another aspect of ethnic conflict which differs from ideological based conflict is related to

territoriality. Mostly if not always, the ethnic group attributes their identity to a particular

25

Yılmaz Muzaffer Ercan(2007), ―Intra-State Conflict in the Post-Cold Era”, International Journal On World Peace, Vol.24, No 4 December, p.14. 26

Donald Horowitz (1985), Ethnic Groups in Conflict: Group Comparison and the Sources of Conflict,University of California Press, Berkeley, p.104. 27

Weinstock, Daniel ―Is Identity A Danger to Democracy‖, in Primoratz Igor, Pavkovic, Aleksander(ed.) Identity, Self-Determination And Secession Aghate Burlington 2006 p15 28

Ibid,p.13.

17

territory that they reside. Thus, a claim for self-rule–ranges from strengthening the

democratic governance to autonomy, to independence - arises within the group. The

claims for the ―home land‖ are perceived to be associated with commonness and identity

of the group. Moreover the issue of territory may drive the claims to the extent that the

minority group asks for self-determination. According to a study, by the 2006 there were

26 ongoing violent self-determination conflicts and more 55 ethnic groups that pursued

this task through nonviolent means, additional 40 use both methods. In total there are

120 territorial concentrated ethnic groups globally that seek greater degree of

independence from the host states.29

1.4.2.1. Ethno Political Conflict

As it was earlier stated, to assert that any ethnic distinction leads to violence is incorrect.

There are numbers of ethnic distinctions in most of states around the world, which have

not revealed in violent forms at all. The relationship of Russian and Estonians in Estonia,

or the relationships of different linguistic groups in Canada, Belgium and France are far

from being an ethnic conflict. Instead of ethnic conflict it is more expedient to use the

terms like ―dispute, unease, or tension for such situations. In other situation the

relationship could hardly be termed as tension, let alone conflict. The conflicting

interests of different groups in Switzerland and their interaction proceed through and

handled with democratic political institutions and set ups. The distinction of pure

ethnicity and ethnicity as a political tool is thus insightful. As aforementioned, mere

ethnicity it is not the chief source of aggression and violence. Ted R. Gurr points that

ethno political conflicts emerges when groups define themselves using ethnic criteria

make claim on behalf of their collective interests against the state, or against other

political actors30. Here the ethnicity is a motivational factor for mobilizing struggle against

adversaries, rather than the central sources of conflict. As a case in point Gurr puts the

29

Wolff Stefan (2011), ―Managing Ethnic Conflict: The Merit and Perils of Territorial accommodations‖, Political Studies Review, Vol. 9, p. 26. 30

Gurr, Ted Robert, ―Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System: 1994 Presidential Address‖, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Sep., 1994), p.348.

18

Kurdish issue as an example of ethno political conflict and put it in the serious and

emerging ethno political conflicts.31

After clarifying definition and types of Intra-state conflicts and wars we will focus on the

causes of those conflicts on the next section.

1.5 THE ROOT CAUSES OF INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS32

Some studies that focus on the inter-group relation claim that most of domestic violence

stems from ancient hatred of groups towards one another33. The argument is that those

bad relationships wihin a state border were supressed by former authoriterian rulers and

later or sooner they will be surfaced. Especially the violence in Balkans, is being given

as an evidence for that argumentation. Is the ―ancient hatred‖ an enough explanation?

There are some instances that societies have experienced some sort of historical

misdoings, whereas memories remained from those days do not always translated into

to violence. So It can be argued that ancient hatred is one of source of inter-state

conflicts and other factors need to be included to the explanation. There are four main

factors that triggers Intra-state violence. Those are Structural Factors, Political Factors,

Economic/Social Factors, and Cultural/Perceptual Factors.34 Next section highlights

these factors.

1.5.1Structural Factors

There are three structural factors relating to inter-state wars. These are ―weak state‖,

―security dilemma‖, and ―ethnic geography‖35. Yet it must be keep in mind that these

factors are not mutually exclusive and they have strong links with one another.

31

Gurr, Ted Robert, ―Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System: 1994 Presidential Address‖, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Sep., 1994), p.348 32

External factors were ignored due to those factors are difficult to determine and measure mainly because the states mostly prefer to hide their agenda towards other states, and to have impact on external factors is difficult as a venue of policy prescriptions. 33

D. Kaplan Robert, Balkan Ghost, A Journey Through History, Picador, St. Martin‘s Press, 2005. 34

Brown E. Michea (1996), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge, MIT p.13. 35

İbid

19

1.5.1.1 Weak State

When the state instution fails to provide its main requirements and services, and thus

loses its legitimacy in the face of society, makes it vulnerable to conflict. When state

does not function properly or when it can not maintain stability and economic

development or when the state instutions weakened by corruption, the power vacuum

generated from these situation will push the groups to seek power for self sufficiency.

Arbitrary drawn borders by external powers, incompetences in administrations, lack of

control over borders or similar situations that state can not exert influence and lose

legitimacy lead to a ―Hobbesian kind of environment that will consequently brings about

violence.36 To put it differently, lack of govermental institutions to provide legitimacy

generate an environment conducive to violent. States are the sources of benefits,

legitimacy and coercion that keep societies united. When those functions falter, and do

not proceed properly, other forces that are beyond control and mostly violent come in to

the scene to fill the power vacuum.

1.5.1.2 Security Dillema in Intra-State War

Security dillema as a structural factor is one of the most important elements of intra-

state wars and it has been discussed broadly in studies about intra-state wars. The

concept of security dilemma was first coined by John Herz in 1951 in his book Political

Realism and Political Idealism and then British Historian referred to a similar situation in

his book History and Human Relation, even he did not use the term security dilemma.

For both scholars security dilemma is a situation of ‗tragedy‘ in which two parties without

any intend to do harm to one another, end up fighting with each other37. In this line of

thought the tragedy does not stem from something like ―ancient hatreds‖ or elites who

uses national cards. Rather it is about insecurity of groups toward each other and the

uncertainity of the situation they are in. The uncertainity leads to parties to be

suspectible of other party‘s intention and thereby perceive opponent party as having the

worst intention and will probably take action for putting this intention in to the practice in

36

Brown E. Michea (1996), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge, MIT p.14. 37

Roe Paul, ―The Intra-state Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a ‗Tragedy‖,Journal Of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No 2 (Mar., 1999), pp. 183-202.

20

a sooner time. To avoid this situation parties want to act earlier, which in turn increase

fear and doubt in other party.

Indeed security dilemma is a concept that is employed mostly by realist school of

international relations to clarify the nature of relation between states in the anarchical

set up of international system. In other words, anarchical set up is a state where there

are no sovereign powers prevailing and every state has to deal with its own security

concern, without relying on others. The concept employed first to define the relation

between states and the situations states find themselves in anarchical conditions. In the

absence of a superior authority security becomes the fundemental concern of states. To

be freed from this state of fear states seek power. The competetion over and efforts to

acquire power, provoke other parties fears and insecurities which then urge those

parties to follow suit.

Power is a relative concept and it is difficult to measure the power. Because of this fact

one party‘s defensive measures, may be perceived as agressive by other party. Namely

effort to increase security by one urges reaction by other, which consequently makes the

original party more insecure. The security of one means insecurity of other. Even if the

parties are aware of the consequences of their security seeking actions, the situation

and anarchical structure compels them to act that way. The uncertainity of the intention

and indistinguisable of defensive actions from those of offensive, lead parties to

assume the worst case scenario.38 Since all weapons have dual purpose, arms can be

both deployed for defensive and offensive purposes. The security dilemma manifests

itself very definite in arm races that a state increasing the arms leads other to act

accordingly in order to maintain the same level of security, and that circumstance later

again drives the first party in to a state of requirement to increase arms.

Although first figured to explain the interstate relations, later security dilemma started to

be utilized for intrastate condition as well. Especially after the Cold War that number of

groups find themselves in an anarchical-situation in which not any dominate group could

prevail over others. Bary Posen fot the first time applied security dilemma in to the intra-

state context. Posen argued that security dilemma problem appears in ethnic conflicts,

38

Barry R. Posen, ―The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict‖ Survival, Vol.35, No 1 (Spring 1993).

21

when the intrastate conditions becomes similar to anarchical international system. The

absence of a powerful operating goverment urges groups to seek their own security. For

intra-state conditions he states that ‗‗A group suddenly compelled to provide its own

protection, must ask the following questions about any neighbouring group.: Is that a

threat? How much of a threat? Will threat grow or diminish over time?‖39 Even though

this groups still lack many of attributes of statehood given the condition of emergent

anarchy, it is inevitable for some of them not to act the same way states act due to the

need for self help. Thus they ends up with power more than needed.

According to Posen security dilemma intensify when two conditions hold. One is the

identical aspect of defensive and offensive, military force which for a state makes it

impossible to signal its defence intent. As Posen states ―Each group will have no choice

but to assess other‟s military potential in terms of its cohesion and its past military

records‖40 Further when the parties to conflict or war are in the same size in terms of

power, we have to observe their motivation rather than the capacity. Finland, Sweden,

and Switzerland are considered to be defensive states. But this label has given them in

respect to the Soviet Union power capacity. Arguably against similarly sized states they

would have been called offensive. For intrastate conflicts especially in the close

settlements, a moderate arm capacity accompanied by a ground forces with strong

group solidarty, namey a strong identity awareness will feed security dilemma and each

party‘s capacities will appear offensive.41 This partly stems from the group‘s historical

concious about other. While evaluating other‘s offensive capacity of their identity they

asks the question ―How did the other groups behave the last time they were

unconstrained and ― Is there a record of offensive military activity by the other? and

since the historical reviews of people seldom take the direction of scholarly standarts,

the groups tend to answer this questions as the other to appear dangerous. The oral

history seldom subjected to critical scrutiny. Further in the lack of central authority, the

local politics, in order to gain power will use emotionally charged histories in their

speeches to mobilize masses. With the Posen words;

39

Barry R. Posen, ―The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict‖ Survival, Vol.35, No 1 (Spring 1993), p. 29 40

Ibid. 41

Ibid, p. 30.

22

.. the military capability of groups will often be dependent on their cohesion, rather than

their meagre military assets. This cohesion is a threat in its own right because it can

provide the emotional power for infantry armies to take the offensive. A historical record of

largescale armed clashes, much less wholesale mistreatment of unarmed civilians,

however subjective, will further the tendency for group to see other groups as threats.

They will all simultaneously „arm‟- militarily and ideologically-against each other42.

The second one that intensify security dilemma between groups is the effectiveness of

offence over defence and this is conditioned by two variables. One is technology and the

other is geography. Technology is a universal variable that effect the military potentials

of all states while geography is circumstantial. Posen puts an exception to technology

factor in respect to nuclear technology. If a group acquire nuclear power and if its

opponent follow suit, ‗groupness‘ will not effect the security dilemma, as much as it will

in non-nuclear situations. Because national sentiment would not effect the ability of

groups to launch a nuclear attack.

When it comes to geography, the anarchical state in domestic structure, creates

superiorities for the offence over deffence. The groups in order to avoid encirclement

forced to adopt offencive strategies especially when they have the ability to dominate

over some or all others. In response the others will likely follow suit,but the geography

factor is circumstantial. Hostile groups may have opponent‘s groups population living in

their lands respectively. Thus those population may serve as hostages. However mostly

offence prevail over defence due to the motivation for creating homogeneous

surroundings. Inflicting small amounts of offense creates great tactial advantages where

the group interspersed in the same land. According to Kaufmann ―the severity of ethnic

security dilemma is greatest when demography is most inter-mixed weakest when

community settlement are most seperate‖…43 In densely intermixed settlements,

determining the fronts is an impossible task and so effective defence of the front is

impossible. The mindset of parties by virtue of ambiguity turn out to the understanding

that ―before enemy attacks and drive us out, it is better to do it first‖ On the other hand

when the demographies are more homogenous and groups are seperated, Kaufman

42 Barry R. Posen, ―The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict‖ Survival, Vol.35, No 1 (Spring 1993) 43 Kaufmann Chaim, ―Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars‖ International Security, Vol. 20, No 4 (Spring, 1996) p.148.

23

claims that offensive and defensive mobilization measures are more distinguishable,

which diminishes security dilemma. Defensive vulnerabilities rise and offensive

opportunities emerge in the intermingled population settlements.44

In addition to that, according to Posen, the behaviour of International Organization

encourage offence as well. UN instead of maintaining an endurable peace first, for the

most part intervene to stop the fighting and cease fires Where a party is victorious and

other has lost but agree the terms sanctioned due to the fear of the a worse situation.

The UN thus favours victorious party and creates incentives for offensive military

actions45.

1.5.1.2.1 The Inter-Societal Security Dilemma46

However unlike Posen, Kaufmann adopts a wider approach to security dilemma, not

limiting it with the emphasis just on military security, and go beyond issues of territory in

ethnic conflicts47. In addition to that he differentiates between security dilemma for inter-

state and intrastate level and criticises straightforward analogies. He states that:―… the

neorealist concept of a security dilemma can not be mechanically applied to ethnic

conflict: anarchy and the possibility of a security threat are not enough to create security

dillema between communities which may have been at peace for decades. an ethnic

security dilemma requires reciprocal fears of group extinction‖48.

In this sense he combines the security dillema with the issue of identity. When identities

are perceived as irreconcilable and mutually exclusive, one groups attempts to preserve

identity leads to other fears of extinction or loosing identity, which in turn creates ethnic

security dilemma. Maintanance of states relies on its sovereignty while maintanence of

society relies on its identity. Threaten identities tend to be preserved and strenghten in

response to this threat.

44

Ibid, p. 139. 45

Barry R. Posen, ―The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict‖ Survival, Vol.35, No 1Spring,p. 34. 46

Roe Paul, ―The Intra-state Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a ‗Tragedy‘‖ Journal Of Peace Research, Vol. 36,No 2 Mar., 1999. 47

Ibid. 48

Kaufman, Stuart J, ―Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses and Moscow in Moldova‘s Civil War,‖ International Security, Vol. 21,No 2.

24

Some criticism has been done by constructivists on the concept of identity in the sense

that identiy is not something fixed but it is a product of a process and it changes over

time. Thus they contended that identity can not be taken as granted with refernece to

security dilemma. Their critics emphasize on the culturalist notion of such

conceptualization.49 On the other hand those critics reflected by the proponents of such

conceptualization that ―the one hand identities are chosen and not given, yet once they

are chosen they become absolute50‖.

For threaten societies, the response strengths the existing identity. In order to preserve

identity, military force utilized especially when identity strongly depends on territory. But

the additional preserving methods adopted in Intersocietal confrontations. The most

important one appears as ethnic nationalism.51 Especially when a group feels

humiliation, and being ashamed, their identity begins to symbolise a huge umbrella that

protects them against external threads. Even one will never meet with its most of

members, he/she will feel a sameness with all the members of groups. And in the times

of crisis this tendency of group members increases52. Practice such forbiding language,

changing the names of places, displacement or deportation of the population, closing

the education institutions and worship53 may lead the groups to cling more on their

identity and become more ethnic nationalist. As Weaver state ―… It (nationalism) offers

a particularly attractive mode in times of crisis and depression since the link to a glorious

past…donates immediate relief, pride and shield against shame‖54. For dominating

groups the other groups identity claims are perceived as a thread to their own identity.

The question of who we are always implies the question of who we are not too. Thus for

the preservation of identity the supression of other‘s identiy justified which in turn feeds

other groups‘s fear of extinction and serve the group act accordingly, with more

49

Roe Paul, ―The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a ‗Tragedy‘‖ Journal Of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No 2 Mar., 199, p. 192. 50

Lindholm, Helena, (1993), Introduction: ―A Conceptual Discussion‖ in Helena Lindholm, (ed.) Ethnicity and Nationalism: Formation of Identity and Dynamics of Conflicts in the 1990s. Gothenburg: Nordnes,p.15. 51

The term Ethnic nationalism sometimes may refer to something primitive and irrational and noncivilised make it worse than state nationalism or civic nationalism. My usage of ethnic nationalism here is referring to neutral notion. 52

Vamik D. Volkan (2009), ―Large-group identity, international relations and psychoanalysis,‖ International Forum of Psychoanalysis, 18:4,pp 206-213. 53

Roe Paul, ―The Intra-state Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a ‗Tragedy‘‖ Journal Of Peace Research, Vol. 36,No 2 (Mar., 1999) p.192. 54

Ibid, p. 195.

25

determination for the preservation of their identity. Nationalism of both side becomes a

issue of security, as do arms and military capacity for interstate relations. Both groups,

with the societal security dillema cling more to their identity against perceived fear in

order to preserve it. It mostly occurs between a state that seeks to establish a common

or homogenous identity and a minority ethnic or religious gruop that perceive this policy

as a threat to their survival. Roe claims that ―…while seeking to make its situation better,

by supressing or assimilating those groups which challenge its legitimacy, instead the

state comes to make it worse by taking measures which serve only to heighten

opposition to regime‖55. This is also related to state weakness which we mentioned

before. The inability to provide an broad identity brings about incompability between

state and groups. Supression stems from the weakness which in turn make state more

weak and vulnerable.

Why an ethnic groups demands, pose a threat to the existence of a state? Or why it‘s

perceived as malign? For the states most sensitive issue is territorial integrity. Demands

by an internal groups might be perceived as being seccessionist. It is argued that

accepting one demand, will be followed by other demans and consequently it will bring

about the separation of the groups. In fact those actions of state to avoid this outcome

themselves, may trigger the undesirable because those actions will most probably not

be perceived as defensive actions by minority groups.

1.5.1.3 Ethnic Geography

When a state multi-ethnic that makes it more prone to violence. Only few states like

Iceland or Japan are homogenous. It does not mean that all states that are multiethnic

experience the same kinds of problems. Ethnic composition varies and fragmatation

differs from state to state. Ellingsen explain three criteria of multiethnicity;56

The degree of fragmentation within a country

55

Roe Paul, ―The Intra-state Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a ‗Tragedy‘‖ Journal Of Peace Research,

Vol. 36, No 2 (Mar., 1999) p.197. 56

Ellingsen Tanja(2000), ―Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches‘ Brew?Multiethnicity And Domestic Conflict During And After The Cold War”, The Journal Of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44, No 2, Apr, Sage, Oslo.

26

a) The size of the largest linguistic, religious and ethnic group within a country

b) The number of linguistic, religious and ethnic group

The size of the largest minority group within a country

Ethnic affinities to other countries

The more a society is fragmented, or if it is difficult to define the ―people‖ of the state,

the more domestic violence is likely. With the same token if power is centralized in the

hands of one group and if the other groups are obstructed to hold power in govermental

institutions the opressed group will resort to violence as they don‘t see any way out of

situation but agression. According to Ellingsen, societies in which the size of the

dominant group is less than %80 of total population, has a greater propensity for

domestic conflict, than societies in which the size of dominant group exceeds 80% of the

total population,57 but that is not enough to determine domestic violence. He also argues

that conflict likelyhood is higher with several groups than with few or many groups.58 If

the power is divided between several groups, it leads to competition among the groups,

but when there are many groups or few groups, there will not be enough big group

toprovoke and initiate violence.

The size of largest minority group within a country is also an important determinant, as

an indication for tendency to intra state violence. Again Ellingsen found that countries

with a medium sized (5%-‗20%) second largest group, have approximately twice as high

risk of domestic conflict than countries with a small (less than 5) second largest ethnic,

religious or linguistic group, but when the size of second largest group is more than 20%

the incidence of violence is less frequent than the countries that has medium sized (5%-

20%) second largest group. It seems that when the group is more than 20% the

supression of the group is more difficult and more costly comparing to other situations.

Ellingsen last argument relates to Intra-state conflicts is ―ethnic affinities to other

countries‖. Many ethnic groups spread over different countries and borders. Sometimes

a minority group in one state may be majority in another state. So the groups may have

57

Ellingsen Tanja (2000), ―Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches‘ Brew?Multiethnicity And Domestic Conflict During And After The Cold War”, The Journal Of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44, No 2, Apr, Sage, Oslo. 58

Ibid.

27

their identification that is different from the identity of the state where they live It

generate suspicions and fear towards those groups in the eyes of respective states.

The weak state, security dilemma, and ethnic geography are three structural elements of

intra-state wars. Political factors of intra state conflict will be focused upon in the next

section.

1.5.2 Political Factors

There are four political elements that effect a state propensity to domestic violence.

Those are Discriminatory Political Institutions, Exclusionary National Ideologies, Inter-

Group Politics and Elite Politics.59

1.5.2.1. Discriminatory Political Institutions

Discrimination refers to differences and gaps between economic and political rights of

any particular group members compaired to other groups60. When a state system is

authoritarian and closed to some groups in the sense of accessing to power, this

generates resentment and frustration among those groups. If the institutions of

goverment like judiciary, military or police, dominated by a particular group, namely if

one group access to govermental power hampered by impilicit or explicit obstacles, the

conditions are proper to generate frustration. For instance an election system that favour

majority representation by adopting very high election threshold, will indisputably create

rage among minority groups. Such kind of political settings diminished the legimacy of

state in the eyes discriminated group members. Thus those groups might resort to

violence, if they can not articulate their frustration and anger through political channels61.

Violence becomes a way of politics for not only to release anger, but also as tools to

achieve political ends. To put it differently, violence conceived as a way of

communicating the desperation, since discriminated group does not see any way out.

Not only authoritarian system brings about discriminatory political settings, democracies

59

Brown E. Michea (1996), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge, MIT p.13. 60

Ellingsen Tanja(2000), ―Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches‘ Brew?Multiethnicity And Domestic Conflict During And After The Cold War” The Journal Of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44 No 2, Apr, Sage, Oslo. 61

Gurr, Ted R. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1970.

28

also may face those kinds of challenges. The political settings in which hidden obstacles

are existing for minority groups, to access political institutions even in democracies,

such as restrictive election system as we mentioned earlier. In addition to that the

individual rights that democracy maintains, might not satisfy the demands of a minority

group and they may call for ―group rights‖ and amendements laws accordingly. That is

why the democratic system itself does not guarantee against intra state conflict.

Democracy itself might lead to domestic troubles and destabilize the state. It has been

argued that the democracies creates opportunity for groups to mobilize conflict. There

are lines of thoughts regarding this idea. Some scholars assert that authoritarian

regimes are more prone to domestic violence, whereas others claim that, since

democracies are open and transparent, the tendency of violence is higher in

democracies. Some others on the other hand argue that in between regimes are the

most perilous in respect to domestic violence. 62

However, the authoritarian regime‘s oppression of the dissent, does not necessesarily

create a peaceful society. In that situation the troubles supressed only to be released as

soon as authoritarian regime collapse. The demise of the Soviet Union provide a good

evidence of that. Meanwhile democracies are less discriminatory but provide

opprtunities, while the authoritarian regimes are more discriminatory, but has harsh

limitation on political activity. While studying some case, Ellingsen found evidences that

―Domestic conflict is less likely in democracies than in autocraties or

semidemocraciesand domestic conflict is less likely in autocraties than in

semidemocracies‖63. We can conclude that in time of transition and while democracies

have not enhanced, it creates the situation in which the risk of violence is still high.

Further the more unequal a society is, the more it will have potential for agression.

Conversely the fairer a regime is, it is less likely to break up in violence. This is vastly

related to the regime type which was mentioned above.

62

Ibid, p.235. 63

İbid, p. 237.

29

1.5.2.2. Exclusionary National Ideologies64

If the ―people‖ that defined in the constitution of the state in question, according to an

ethnic or religious origin and not or at least perceived not to encapsulate all the citizen,

troubles may emerge about the identity of the state within ethnic groups. The citizenship

that formed to include and incorporate most people while excluding some, will be seen

by segregated population as offensive to their identity. The civic nationalism that

adopted by most of Western states is supposed to encapsulate all groups and entails

them with same rights regardless of their origin. However the civic nationalism itself is

focusing on the individual equal rights rather than groups right though some

multiculturalist civic nationalists accept limited cultural group rights as long as they are in

line with and do not harm common identiy. The civic nationalism adopt an integrative

policy rather than the policy of assimilating the minorities, but it is still limited to

individual rights mostly because the fear of seperative tendencies that may spread

among minorities.65 The definition of citizenship is the most controversial issue relating

to political factors. A definition claimed to be civic by one group may be perceived

exclusionary by the other group. Further every group may claim their version of

definition is not discriminative and most encompassing one.

The founding ideology that a state is open is thus very crucial as a determinant of

internal conflict. The more encompassing it is, the less risk of cleaveges among groups.

1.5.2.3 Inter-Group Politics66

Not all different groups in a state have negative interaction. The history of group

relations, the power of their identity, their incompatible objective and the hatred amongs

member of groups towards other group which may be derived from historical events and

experiences have effects on internal conflict. ―The emergence of new groups and

64

Brown E. Michea (1996), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge, MIT, pp.16-17. 65

McGarry John (2001), ―Northern Ireland, Civic Nationalism, and Good Friday Agreement‖ in McGarry John (ed.), Northern Ireland and the Divided: The Northern Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement in Comperative Perspective. 66

Brown E. Michael (1996),The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. Cambridge, MIT,p.18.

30

changes in the inter-group balance of power can be particulary destabilizing” 67

Moreover the change in economical situation may effect group dynamics and one group

may start to blame a particular group for their diminishing standard of life. Namely a

frustration emanates from economic crisis may be directed to a particular group, which

then destabilize group relations.

1.5.2.4. Elite Politics

In the times of troubles or crisis, elites use the opportunity to gain power against their

rivals. The above mentioned conditions turns to be opportunities to be utilized for

leading figures to mobilize masses. Benjamin Reilly argues, there is increasing evidence

from many regions of ‗elite initiated conflict‘.68 So according to this line of thought, elites

provoke the peoples and drive the situation towards conflict in order to strengthen their

positions. Moreover in severe competitive circumstances, to conduct more antagonistic

actions becomes strategic for those elites to gain power. “According to Bourdieu, it is

political leaders who emphasize the differences, who have the power of imposing the

vision of divisions that is the power of making visible and explicit social divisions that are

implicit‖69. Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and Franjo Tudjman in Croatia are good

example for elite driven conflicts. They manipulated ethnicity and used it as a tool for

their political end. In short in the conflict situations the elites are those, who make

cleavages visible or even invent new cleavages that non-exist in reality to provoke

masses.

Aleksa Djilas accounts for the war in Yugoslavia exemplify an insightful approach to the

role of elites. He points:

The nationalist ambitions, fears and frustrations of Yugoslavia‟s constituent groups. ...were not the inventions of nationalist intellectuals or political elites. However, the Yugoslav civil war would not have happened if elites…had not irresponsibly and deliberately manipulated nationalist sentiments with their propaganda and policies. The force of nationalist passions

67

Ibid,p. 18. 68

Caspersen Nina, “Elite Interests and the Serbian-Montenegrin Conflict, Southeast European Politics‖ Southeast European Politics, November 2013, Vol. 4, London, p. 105. 69

http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/26506/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/ bba173d5-10ab-4577-8d49-60d8256e778d/en/PN04.02.pdf

31

whipped up by these opportunistic leaders not only made conflict inevitable, but it also made the war extremely brutal.70

1.5.3. Economic/Social Factors71

The economic problems, income injustice, discriminatory set ups, gaps between groups,

living conditions, unemployment high inflation are basic elements that exacerbate intra-

state conflicts. Transition from one economic system to another may be destabilizing as

well. Transition from welfare system to market-based system may leave some groups

vulnerable that once had been under protection of the government supports in the form

of social and economic benefits.

Second when the economic hardship is peculiar to or coincidence with a particular

ethnic or religious group, it makes the situation graver and inextricable. The identity

element of conflict compounds with economic hardship which might be perceived as

deliberate discriminatory policy towards the group, and for group members it may signal

a threat to their existence.

Third the discriminatory economic policy makes it difficult to make a distinction between

class and identity. The line between two concepts becomes blurred due to which the

group members face segregation from economic life on the base of their identity, which

then determine their societal class. So most of ethnic conflict, if not all, have an class

component and it is not surprising that for the most part ethnic insurgent groups pursue

a leftist agenda.

The modernization of a society, unequal improvement, unsteady urbanization lead to

emergence of some groups who take advantage of this improvement, while leave others

disadvantaged. ―Even if a country‟s overall economic picture is improving, growing

inequities and gaps can aggravate intra-state tensions72‖.

70

Djilas, Aleksa (1995), ―Fear Thy Neighbor,‖ in Charles Kupchan (ed.), Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,quoted in Oberschall Anthony (2007), Conflict And Peace in Divided Societies: Responses to Ethnic Violence, Routledge, New York, p. 100. 71

Brown E. Michael (1996),The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge, MIT, p.18. 72

Brown E. Michael (1996),The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge, MIT,p. 20.

32

Developments of mass media, high education rates, bring about an awareness of

political consciousness among masses, which in turn aggravate cleavages. If a society

cannot respond the improving expectation among its members, be it social, cultural or

economical, unmet demands will result in domestic resentment and frustration.

In the following figure James C. Davies depicted how revolution emerges when

frustration arise out of unrealized expectations and needs. According to Davies a certain

gap between expectation and actual realization of demands is tolerable and he assumes

that expectations are always higher from what actually is accomplished.

Actual Performance

Need satisfaction Expected Performance

Unacceptable Revolution Gap

Acceptable Gap

Time

Figure 1.1 Satisfaction Of Needs And Revolution (Davies)73

73

Wallensteen Peter (2002), Understanding Conflict Resolution; War, Peace and Global System, Sage, London, p.41.

33

The lower line is actual performance and when the gap with the up line which is

expected performance and which is increasing, is narrow, the society assumed to

function well. But when gap expands to a degree that is intolerable, it is argued that a

revolution is close to break out in society. This may happen when economy stops to

grow after a considerable time of growing. We can apply the figure to the political issues

as well. The democratization of the world, spreading of democratic principles and human

rights led to an increasing expectation among the nations. The mass media and

education and process of globalization fostered this trend. The places where the gap

between real performance of the states regarding to enacting this principles and their

societies expectation are narrow, the tendency to domestic violence will diminish. On the

other hand when the expectation about this values increase profoundly and the political

system and institutional capacity is insufficient to respond this expectation, the

probability of rising trouble will be evidently high.

Since economic and social factors are in consideration, we will not go in details about

political issues here. Davie‘s figure shows that the societies that function well to provide

the needs has little tendency to revolutions. The industrialization process and

modernization, has expanded the need of people while the resources has kept being

scarce. So the domestic violence and in Davies terminology revolutions are easier to

outbreak with modernization and industrialization. Social and economic change of

modernization undermined old institution and orders, with replacing nothing instead.

Nevertheless not all revolutions occur with aggression and violence. In lots of place this

revolution breaks with nonviolent movements. In Ukraine, Tunisia or Egypt, the old

system replaced almost totally with nonviolent methods.

A state unable to respond the economic and social needs of some of its members

consequently will have a deficit of legitimacy of its rule.

34

1.5.4 Cultural/ Perceptual Factors

There are two cultural and perceptual factors that identified in the internal conflict

scholarly, first is cultural discrimination and the second is group histories and group

perception of themselves and others.74

1.5.4.1. Cultural Discrimination

Cultural discrimination refers to the policies of government, which aim to destroy a

particular group‘s specific characteristic such as language, religion and assimilate them

in to the majority group‘s identity. These policies may include bans over the usage of

language in education, constraints on access to educational opportunities, displacement

or replacement of population across the country to prevent a group to form a majority in

a place and to melt the ethnic group in to the broader accepted identity, etc. As the third

type of violence Johan Galtung conceptualize ―cultural violence‖75 which refers to ―those

aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence - exemplified by religion and

ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) -

that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.‖76 To Galtung ―direct

violence‖ and ―structural violence‖ gain their legitimization from cultural violence, which

then rendered acceptable in society.77 Thus cultural violence provides ideological bases

for cultural discrimination. The system of thought, the symbols, institutions, educational

system breed cultural violence which then make cultural discriminatory practice easier to

apply, legal, explicit, or implicit limitation on the improvement of a culture, language,

religion or sect, preventing them transferring their culture to next generation, unequal

treatment to the group members are all feed on internal trouble. Even in democratic

system, implicit discriminatory practice may prevail because of cultural violence.

1.5.4.2 Group Histories and Group Perception of Themselves and Others

74

Brown E. Michael (1996), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. Cambridge, MIT,p.21. 75

Two others are Direct Violence and Structural Violence. 76

Galtung Johan (1990), ―Cultural Violence‖ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 27,No 3, p. 291. 77

Ibid, p. 292.

35

Throughout the history groups have had numerous interactions which are not always

friendly. Painful and hurting histories of groups in most cases are being transferred to

another generation. Thus, perceptions to one another are formed out of this history.

Crimes committed either groups, against one another in a distant past rise grievances

and leads to the conveying of perception and stereotypes in minds of people over

decades. Each group tends to glorify itself and demonizes the other. The concept of‖

ancient hatreds‖ that is popularized by Robert Kaplan in an attempt to explain ethnic war

in Yugoslavia emphasize how past is brought to recent times and led to atrocities. When

groups are susceptible to and have distrustful perception of each other any provocation

will confirm their perception and ignite the flame for conflict. ―.. The slightest provocation

on either side confirms deeply held beliefs and provides the justification for a retaliatory

response‖78.

Some wrongdoings or killings can be justified on the ground of the self-image as to be

―victim of the incidents‖ in the distant or near history, and ―to redress injustice‖. In

addition to that this misdoings or killings can be justified on the ground of a self-image

that the group is the valiant subject of the history and carrying out those on that mission.

Myths and symbols are important parts of group‘s imagination of life. Myth is a belief

held in common by a large group of people that gives event and action a particular

meaning. The reality of the myths has not any importance. Regardless of being

accurate, the myths relates to today. It guides today. A symbol is shorthand implying of

a myth which is emotionally charged79. In other words symbols are the language of

myths. Peoples with this symbols can be easily transferred to a certain time in history

and a very different incident or context cab be perceived as resurrection of a certain past

by the group members. The observations by Reuter‘s correspondent, Andrej Gustincic

at the start of Bosnian war provide a good insight in to the use of myth and symbols in

the wars.

Do you see that field” asks a Serbian woman, pointing to a sloping by the Dirina river. “The

jihad (Moslem Holy War) was supposed to begin there. Foca was going to be the new

Mecca. There were lists of Serbs who were marked down for death.” The woman says,

repeating a belief held by towns people and gunmen. “My two sons were down on the list

78

Brown E. Michea (1996), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge, MIT, p.23. 79

Kaufman Stuart J, (2001), The Symbolic Politics Of Ethnic War,Cornell University Press, New York.

36

to be slaughtered by like pigs. I was listed under rape.” None of them have seen the list

but this does not prevent anyone from believing in them unquestioningly.80

In this chapter we tried to identify intrastate conflicts and wars, underlying causes,

trends and types. The next chapter will go further and focus on the resolution of intra-

state conflicts and wars, peace processes, strategies, principles and condition for stable

settlements of those conflicts.

80

Quoted in Kaufman Stuart J, Modern Hatred The Symbolic Politics Of Ethnic War, Cornell University Press Press, New York, 2001,p3.

37

CHAPTER 2

RECONSIDERING KURDISH ISSUE

ROOT CAUSES OF AN INTRA-STATE CONFLICT

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Kurdish issue has been one of the chief fault lines of Turkish Republic since its very

founding in 1923. Even though the root causes of the issue goes well back to last period

of Ottoman Empire, the foundation of the Republic by Mustafa Kemal in 1923 and

developments since then extensively aggravated the problem. Transition from an empire

-that ruled by dynasty and in which the source of legitimacy had been religion - to a

nation state, in which the legitimacy has been derived from the nation itself, was

presumably the main source that gave rise to the problem. Unlike the Empire, the new

state did not tolerate any different identity claims, which fall outside its determined

definition of nation within its territory.

In ―Nation and Nationalism‖ Ernest Gellner points that ―nationalism is a primarily political

principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent and he

defines nationalism as‖. A theory of political legitimacy requires that ethnic boundaries

should not cut across political ones”. 81 It would ‗not be wrong to say that the foundation

of Turkey Republic was an effort to coincide the ethnic boundaries with the politic ones.

The name of new state was Turkey and the population lives within Turkey territory‘s was

Turk. This principle was embodied in the first constitution was Turkey that was enacted

in 1924. The article 88 of the first constitution of Turkish Republic reads as; ―The name

Turk, as a political name, shall be understood to include all citizen of Turkish Republic,

without distinction of or reference to race or religion”82. As David Miller states “it is

valuable for the boundaries of political units (paradigmatically, states) to coincide with

national boundaries.”83 Yet it is hardly to find any state boundaries in which people

possess identical political or ethnic affiliations. The Turkish Republic partly achieved this

81

Gellner (2006), Ernest Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell Publication, Oxford, p1. 82

http://genckaya.bilkent.edu.tr/1924constitution.pdf 83

Quoted in http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/political-science/17-000j-political-philosophy-global-justice-spring-2003/lecture-notes/lnnational_selfdetermin1.pdf

38

task of homogenization for their non-Muslim residents by exchange of populations with

Greeks that was one of the terms of Lausanne Treaty in 1923. The state‘s aim was to

make Turkish identity as a cultural dominant identity of nation and assimilate other

identities in to Turkishness. That ideology is termed Michael Hatcher as state-building

nationalism a ―nationalism that is embodied in the attempt to assimilate or incorporate

culturally distinctive territories in a given state84‖ However Kurds did not melt (or

extensive part of Kurds) in to the Turkish identity that was prescribed in the constitution

for various reason, some of which arguably are ethnic geography of Kurds, -that hinders

pervasion of state- influence, lack of state resources and institution, and international

binds of Kurds with their neighbor brethren among others. Moreover the assimilation

efforts were rendered to be counter productive and have generated quite the opposite of

what had been desired. It gave rise to a serious competitor and challenger to Turkish

nationhood and nationalism. Kurdish nationalism which can be explained by Hetcher‘s

conceptualization as peripheral nationalism that refers to ―a culturally distinctive territory

resists incorporation in to an expanding state, or attempts to secede and set up its own

government.‖85

On the contrarily it will be an oversimplification to explain the complexity of the issue

only with nationalism of both sides. Structural factors, political factors, economic and

social factors, perceptual and cultural factors that referred in the first chapter are all their

share as the factors for emergence in the conflict. In this chapter the thesis will attempt

to analyze the historical background of the conflict, the definition of the problem as an

intra-state conflict and root causes of the conflict under the factors that were cited

above.

2.2 HISTORICAL LEGACIES OF THE CONFLICT

To understand the present it is a significant necessity to study the history. Although the

historical events that the conflict emerge out of it, is extensively differ from the current

conflict, we can track back to the history to see a consistent flow of events

84

Hetcher, Michael (2000), Containing Nationalism,Oxford University Press, New York. 85

Al Serhun,―Elite Discourse, Nationalism, and Moderation: A Dialectical Analysis of Turkish and Kurdish Nationalism‖,Ethnopolitics,Vol. 14:1 94-112, 15 Jul, 2014.

39

developments that reaches to the present time. The flow of events substantially

transformed the problem yet the core of issue has remained unchanged. The motives,

ideology, and demands behind the conflict have undergone profound changes, but the

center sources of conflict remain fixed, even in some sense they have gotten worse. As

Hamit Bozarslan states ―one can barely suggest a continuum between the Kurdish

insurrection of 1920s and 1930s and the violence of 1970s, 1980s and 1990s”.86

Nevertheless it is best to make clear that each period is strictly conditioned by previous

ones. To illustrate continuity, the issue of autonomy is a case in point. The first wave of

uphevals in Kurdish region were aimed to maintain the autonomious status of the

region, which today is one of most voiced demand of Kurdish political actors It is why

next sections are devoted to brief overview of those periods.

2.2.1 The Ottoman Legacy

The main identity of Ottoman Empire which keep the Sultan‘s subjects together was

Islam and the leader of Muslims nation was Caliphate which represented by Sultans of

the Empire. Ottoman Empire was adopted ―millet system‖ in which subjects of empire

categorized according to their religion and the statute of minority had been given non-

Muslims that granted - as Gunter writes- ―..Virtual autonomy in cultural, religious and

educational affairs.‖87 Although not considered as minority Kurds were enjoying an

extensive autonomy in their homeland which had been granted by Ottoman Sultan

Yavuz Sultan Selim in 1514, the date big part of Kurdish land was fell under the empire

rule after Yavuz‘s victory against the Safavids in Çaldıran War. Kurds had declared their

allegiances with Yavuz88and after war was ended an agreement signed between Sultan

Selim signed an agreement with 23 Kurdish emirates that granted Kurds autonomy in

their region. For a long period of time Kurdish lands were ruled by Kurdish Mirs

(emirates) and the region remained autonomous in return to providing armed forces to

86

Bozarslan Hamit (2000), ―Why the Armes Struggle, Understanding The Violence In Kurdistan Of Turkey‖ in The Kurdish Conflict In Turkey, İbrahim Ferhad and Gürbey Gülistan(ed.), St. Martin‘s Press, New York. 87

Gunter Michael M (1997), The Kurds And Future of Turkey St. Martin‘s Press NewYork, p.4. 88

Heper Metin (2007), The State and Kurds in Turkey;The Question of Assimilation,PalgraveMcMillian, London.

40

the empire during the wars. Having noted that it is important to point that Kurds- and

other ethnic groups have not had a self-consciousness about their separate ethnic

identity89. The main source of identity was religion and components of the empire divided

on the ground their religious identity. Muslim component were superior comparing to

non-Muslim component of empire though non-Muslim subject could retain their religious

cultural and ethnic characteristics within the Empire. This situation continued until

centralization policy adopted by Ottoman Sultan Mahmud the Second in the beginning of

nineteenth century. Nationalism wave in the Europe after French Revolution entail the

Empire to initiate some reforms. Some of those reforms were including centralization of

the Empire, which were undermining Kurdish emirate privileges and their semi-

independent statutes. Further the Tanzimat reforms (Noble Edict of the Rose Chamber)

that was introduced 1839 and which aimed to modernize the entire system of empire

complicated the Kurds situation. Direct tax to increase empire income was one of the

main drawbacks for local leaders and it was a direct interference of the state to their

autonomous statute.90 Moreover the Reforms had provision relating to non-Muslim

subjects, which was bringing about equal statute to them with Muslim populace of

empire. Once privileged member of the empire, the Muslim Kurds were discontent about

losing their previous positions. To put it differently the transformation of power structure

within empire brought about unfavorable consequences for Kurd‘s situation, which had

been once profoundly favorable for them to retaining their autonomous existence. In

1847 Badr Khan Beg, a strong Kurdish noble revolt against the empire mainly for

centralization policy of empire that wanted to be put in effect in the region. The revolt

was crushed by heavily army deployment to the region by the empire. Later followed

several other revolts by Kurdish notables, some of which are ―Yezdan Şer‖ revolt in

1855 Sheikh Ubeydullah revolt in 1880 among others. Even though some scholars claim

the contrary, those uprisings were far from carrying a Kurdish Nationalistic agenda, all

were indicating tribal characteristic and the chief aim was to regain the autonomous

statute and reversing centralization policies. It can be inferred that because those revolt

couldn‘t gain all the Kurdish factions‘, support the tribal and religious order affiliation was

prior to a national affiliation for Kurds in that times. In fact the revolts failings for the most

89

Akyol, Mustafa (2006), The Origin Of Turkey's Kurdish Question: An outcome of the breakdown Of the Ottoman Ancient Regime, MA thesis submitted to Ataturk Institute for Modern Turkish History, Istanbul. 90

Ibid.

41

part were due to these internal divisions. Religion was another motivation against

modernizing reforms in those revolts. That is the reason behind Abdul Hamid II‘s motive

to pursue an Islamist agenda for keeping the empire under control. He had understood

that he could not keep the Christian subject and a number of Christian subjects such as

Greeks and Serbs had already declared their independence from the empire. In 1891 he

formed a Kurdish armed cavalry group called ―Hamid‟s Regiments”(Hamidiye Alayları)

presumably tasked to maintain order in the region, hinder Armenian nationalistic

aspirations and various Kurdish revolts. To some scholars Hamidiye Regiments proved

to be the significant in the emergence of Kurdish nationalism91. In 1908 the introduction

of Constitutional monarchy by the Ittihad and Terakki Party (Committee for Unity and

Progress Party) imposed on Abdul Hamid a time of liberty enjoyed by all subjects of

Ottoman Empire. In that time first cultural, nationalist, Kurdish journals was published by

Kurds. Later on Ittihat ve Terakki (Progress and Union) Party pursued a Pan-Turkist

policy that had impacts on the Republic cadres as well. Nevertheless Kurds supported

the Ottomans in World War Ӏ and subsequent ―War of Independence‖ led by Mustafa

Kemal. Apparently Muslim identity and anxiety on an Independent Armenia was the

main motive behind this support92.

After the World War ended treaty of Sevres was imposed by allied powers to the

government in Istanbul in 1920s that designed the new setup of Ottoman lands and the

agreement stipulated in article 62 an autonomous Kurdish region with an independent

Armenia (there were other provision as well relating to Formation of Arab States)93.

Though the agreement was never implemented for variety of reasons among which the

chief ones were nonexistence of a powerful Kurdish leadership and internal division and

differences among Kurds. For example Sharif Pasha‘s attendance in Paris Peace

Conference and issuing a document jointly with Armenian representative Boghos Nubar

in which formation of an independent Kurdistan and Armenia was requested received a

harsh criticism and condemnation from tribal leaders of Kurds and they sent a telegram

to high commissioner of French in Istanbul and stressed the brotherhood and unity of

91

Gunter M. Michael (2008), The Kurds Ascending; The Evolving Solution To the Kurdish Problem In Iraq And Turkey, Palgrave McMillian, New York. 92

Beşikçi İsmail, Mustafa Kemal, Atatürk Ve Kürtler, Available at http://www.zazaki.net/yazi/mustafa-

kemal,-ataturk-ve-kurtler-324.htm 93

Yıldız Kerim, The Kurds In Turkey: EU Accession and Human Rights, Pluto Press, London, p.37.

42

Muslims. The conclusion of World War 1 brought about desperate outcome for Kurds

that they found themselves divided by four states borders.

2.2.2 Legacy of the Republic

During struggles against foreign powers in different fronts that were known as ―the war

of independence‖ Mustafa Kemal, to secure Kurds allegiances had never indicated his

nationalistic intention and secular vision that would be manifested later on the

establishing of Turkish Republic. The initial phase of war and later the Kemalist cadres

were referring to new state as ―being homeland of Turks and Kurds‖94Indeed Kurdish

support was considerably crucial for bringing in victory, In an early time in 1919 Ataturk

says that: ―As long as there are fine people with honor and respect Turks and Kurds will

continue to live together as brothers around the institution of the Khilafa, and an

unshakeable iron tower will be raised against internal and external enemies‖95.

In another occasion he states that: ―...there are Turks and Kurds. We do not separate

them, but while we are busy to defend and protect, of course, the nation is not one

element‖. 96

Meanwhile in the first Grand National Assembly- that was founded in 1920 in Ankara,

and declared to be real representative of the state against the Assembly in Istanbul

which was under the control of Great Britain at that time, there were several

representative of ―Kurdistan‖ region. Moreover the Assembly in one of the 1922‘s

sessions had discussed on a resolution for establishing an autonomous Kurdish

Region, but discussions were postponed to later time, never proved any result97

What all this incidents reveals, is that in the midst of independence war, the society

and ruling class were not ethnically biased towards Kurdish demands. However after

the victory over foreign forces and the land secured from foreign penetration, Mustafa

Kemal could then focus on internal design of the state. The multiethnic set up of the

94

Ismet Inönü quoted in Gunter M. Micheal (1997),The Kurds and Future Of Turkey,St Martin‘s Press,New York,p. 5. 95

McDowall David (1997),A Modern History Of Kurds, I.B Tauris, New York,p. 187. 96

Ibid. 97

http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/ayse_hur/1922de_kurtlere_soz_verildi_mi-1118147

43

empire was tried to replace by a single nation and identity. In 1923 Sultanate was

abolished and Turkish Republic was declared and then in 1924 Caliphate was

abolished, which was the turning point for the transformation of the identity from a

religious one to a secular one. Likewise all opposition was eliminated and Mustafa

Kemal took absolute control, so that he could implement the vision in his mind. This

vision was a secular, western nation state that was intolerant to the traditional

institutions and ethnic identities. Then a severe policy of Turkification was adopted

which had remained in effect till the late 1980s. Ismet Inonu one of the closest person

to Ataturk and his successor states that: ―In the face of a Turkish majority other

elements have no kind of influence. We must Turkify the inhabitants of our land at any

price, and we will annihilate those who oppose the Turks or ‗le turquisme‖98.

The new constitution of republic that was drafted in 1924 was an embodiment of state

nationalism that blinded against any differences within the new state. The new state was

aimed to form a system based on a centralism, secularism and nationalism.99 The unity

of language in education was enacted in 1924100. Not surprisingly those policies seed

the sow of new dissents and Kurdish revolts resurrected thereafter. In 1925 Sheikh Said,

a leader of religious sect revolt against the republic on the grounds that after the

abolition of caliphate he claims can be summarized roughly as that, Islam and its

representational body caliphate was uniting Turks and Kurds under Islamic brotherhood

motto‖, yet Turks and Kurds is meaningless. His motives have been in discussion,

whether they were religious or Kurdish nationalistic, around academic circle till recent

times. The majority of scholars stress both on Islamic and nationalistic motivation behind

the uprising101. Whatever were the motives behind; the uprising was one of the greatest

challenges to the main and foundational principle of the Republic. Despite gaining

enormous support among the Kurds the government consequently crashed the revolt

with well-equipped armed forces and hanged the organization‘s leaders.

98

Cited in Barkey Henry J., Fuller Graham E. (1998),Turkey Kurdish Question, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers,Oxford. 99

Post Jerold M. (2007), The Mind Of Terrorist; Psychology of Terrorism from The IRA to Al-Qaeda,Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p 68 100

Saatci, Mustafa (2002), ―Nation-States and Ethnic Boundaries: Modern Turkish Identity and Turkish-

Kurdish Conflict‖ Nations and Nationalism,Vol. 8 (4), pp. 549-564.

101 Bruinessen Martin, Agha, Shaikh and State, On the Social and Political Organization of Kurdistan,

Utrecht 1978

44

Later on the assimilation policy accelerated the usage of Kurdish language prohibited,

and the Kurdish names of villages and towns were replaced by Turkish ones. Beside

these nationalist arrangements, the new republic introduced secular adjustments as well

in varies areas such as on education, military, cultural and social life. In 1925 religious

schools known as madrasas were closed together with religious fraternities that were

one of main institution that Kurdish was employed and could survive and thought with

Arabic. The past Islamic laws were replaced by western law and codes. In 1928 Latin

alphabet was adopted in place of Arabic alphabet. In the same year Islam as being the

―state religion‖ was eradicated from the constitutions. Put differently both assimilating

and secularizing policy gave rise to discontent among Kurds. Because Kurds were not

only different in terms of their ethnicity, they were also tending to be more pious than the

rest of community102.

Meanwhile the academic and cultural studies were conducted to prove that Kurds were

in fact Turks. Infamous phrase ―Mountain Turks‖ were employed to for Kurds to prove

that Kurds had been forgotten their Turkish identity. The numerous studies had been

done to prove that Kurdish language is not an authentic language but a mix of Turkish,

and Persian.

In 1934 Settlement Law was adopted to resettle Kurdish population through western

cities from eastern region to make it easier the Kurds assimilation to the Turkish society,

the culture and language103 and it aimed to decrease the density of Kurdish Population in

any particular region. However, those efforts did not bear fruits for the reason that the

state resources were not enough to carry such big population relocations. Further under

article 5542 of the Law 8000 villages and town were renamed with Turkish names104

Following those widespread transformation several other rebellions broke across the

Kurdish region. Again the state harshly suppressed those uprising in which thousands of

civilian were killed by government forces. Especially in 1938 in Dersim trouble according

102

See http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/2006_09_KONDA_Toplumsal_Yapi.pdf (According to Survey The people living Souteast of Turkey define their identity more in terms of religion rather that nationality) 103

Aslan Senem, ―Citizen Speak Turkish. A Nation in the Making‖,Nationalism And Ethnic Politics, Vol. 13:2, 2007, pp. 245-272. 104

Nachmani Amicam (2003),Turkey: Facing A New Millenium, Mahchester University Press, New York.

45

to official estimates 13 thousand people were killed majority of who were civilians

(nonofficial estimates claims a far large numbers as many as 50 thousands)105.

The trouble in Kurdish region lost its momentum after World War II106until 1980s. The

transformation from single party system to multi-party system, and victory of Democrat

Party against CHP (Republican People Party) brought about partial liberation to the

Turkey. Beside Cold War urge the society to focus on internal stability against outside

threats. As we implied earlier the Super Power‘s confrontation has given priority internal

division and troubles which had had impacts on the course of Kurdish issue in Turkey as

well. Nevertheless decolonization process which was backed by Soviet Union has given

impetus to Kurdish activist as well and lead to a resurrection of Kurdish nationalism and

till the 1980s Kurdish activist pursue their cultural and ethnic demands within left-wing

groups and parties and the method were for the most part in a nonviolent forms.

2.2.3. Last Insurgency of Kurds, Emergence of PKK

During the 1960s, the demand of Kurds had been on cultural demands, and the political

figures of Kurds were participating to the politics within Turkish leftist parties. During

those times the demands were revolving around the cultural recognition of Kurds. In is

significant to point that Kurds have taken part on right leaning parties as well. Whereas

those Kurds were not revealing their Kurdishness except a few exceptions, indeed

arguably they were not representing the Kurdish political demands.

In 1980 Turkish Army intervened to the politics life107 and staged a coup d‘état which

banned all political activities and civil ruler, were replaced by army members all over the

country. Infamous ―Diyarbakır Prison‖ where Kurdish activist were kept as detainees and

received cruel and insane torture, was one of the brutal practice of military ruling.

Another practice of military ruling was the ban of Kurdish not only in state institution and

105

Aygün,Hüseyin, Dersim 1938 ve Zorunlu İskan,Dipnot. İstanbul,2009. 106

Saatci, Mustafa, ―Nation-States and Ethnic Boundaries:Modern Turkish Identity and Turkish-Kurdish

Conflict‖ Nations and Nationalism,Vol. 8 (4) 2002, pp. 549-564.

107

There were two other Coup D‘etats prior to 1980 one 1960, and an indirect one in 1971

46

public life, but also in social and private life. Those practices of the military ruling give a

violent rise to the Kurdish political activity.

In 1978 at Lice, Abdulla Ocalan and several his friends founded The PKK(Kurdistan

Workers Party) with the task of launching armed fight against the state and eventually

realizing a separate state of Kurdistan. They issued a manifesto reads as:―a radical

revolution was needed to establish an independent Marxist-Leninist Kurdistan where the

peasantry and proletariat could enjoy true independence.‖ After the military coup PKK

leader Abdullah Ocalan escaped to Lebanon and then Syria for safe heavens and

consolidated PKK‘s military capacity between 1980 and 1984 here. The organization

was gradually gaining the hearts and mind of Kurds and could recruit fighters from

peasantry and low class Kurds. PKK was both a tool of emancipation for young Kurds

from the state‘s and society‘s oppression and an organization to achieve political

objectives. In the initial phase, PKK fought with tribal and feudal structures within

Kurdish society, as well as, other left wing Kurdish Parties. In 1984 in the provinces of

Eruh and Şemdinli they launched their first strike to the Turkish army and the harsh

confrontation between government and PKK has continued thereafter. The fight

intensified in 1990s onwards and continued till the recent times. The conflict has claimed

about 45 thousand life from both sides, as well as civilians. About four thousand villages

were burned, and roughly one million people from eastern villages forced to move to

western cities that worsen the suffering of the fight and economic cost is not to mention.

Unidentified murders were common during the conflict, which was mostly carried by

hidden and unofficial structures within the state to curb Kurdish activism. Most of these

crimes have not been cleared yet.

After intensive fight of 1990s,so called low-intensive war, in 1999 Abdullah Öcalan

declared a cease fire and called PKK members to withdraw the Turkish soils after his

capture by Turkish government of the time. During some of this withdraws some

estimates that about five hundred PKK members were killed by Turkish force‘s

ambushes. This ceasefire continued till 2004. As Turkey made efforts to access the

European Union, in 2001 a number of constitutional amendments were passed in

parliament, which lifted the ban on the Kurdish broadcasting. Later on some other

amendments were enacted that pave the way to a more democratic and liberal Turkey.

47

Yet military high rank staffs were discontent and voicing concern related to unity of the

state.108 In 2002 AK Party election victory can be considered a breakthrough in the

course of Kurdish Issue. Their implicit anti-Kemalist agenda though it takes long pave

the way to the weakening of military power over the politics, which strengthen politician

hands to take initiatives regarding the Kurdish issue and to adopt policies that fall

outside the mere security scope of the issue. Nevertheless, the success of AK Party has

been far from perfect. The course of conflict goes back and forth and hovers between

escalation and de-escalation. For instance in 2012, according to International Crisis

Group around 8 hundred people were killed in Kurdish issue related incidents109 just

after the so called ―Kurdish Opening‖(later the name of initiative converted to

―democratic opening and national unity and brotherhood project) -that was initiated by

government in 2009 to reach a resolution of issue via dialogue with the stakeholders of

conflict - was proved to fail. During these initiatives the government held secret meeting

with PKK leadership in Oslo. Yet reciprocal attacks from both side against one another

and harsh discourse both representatives of government and Kurdish Movement,

brought the process to a deadlock. The level tension in 2012 was almost equaled with

the tension of 1990s in terms of life lost. Meanwhile a hunger strike by Kurdish prisoners

was staged to draw attention the long time blockage of visits to İmralı Island where

Abdullah Ocean has been kept. Ocalan calls for ending the hunger strike that were

continuing for 60 days ended the strikes and let to de-escalation of tension and later in

21 march 2013 in Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakır Ocalan‘s addressed to the crowds

in a letter and call for ultimate farewell to violence and withdrawals of PKK members

from Turkish soils. PKK limitedly abide by those calls and only a small part of members

has left the Turkey. Talks are proceeding between Kurdish political party, government

intelligence and PKK‘s leadership in Kandil with ups and downs. However those talks

have yet to conclude with a peaceful outcome. In the next chapter the ongoing talks will

be addressed, and details of course of events relating to talks left to next chapter.

108

Yavuz Hakan M , ―Five Stages Of Construction Of Kurdish Nationalism In Turkey‖ Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 7 (3), 2007, pp. 1-24. 109

Turkey:The PKK and and A Kurdish Settlement International Crisis Group Europe Report N°219 – 11 September 2012 p5

48

2.3 DEFINING KURDISH ISSUE AS AN INTRA-STATE CONFLICT

Firstly the history of Kurdish issue reveals that, Kurdish identity has been at the core of

the conflict. However, Mesut Yeğen states that:

Whenever the Kurdish question was mentioned in TSD,[Turkish State Discourse] it was

mentioned as an issue of political reaction, tribal resistance or regional backwardness, but

never as an ethno-political question. In TSD, the Kurdish resisters were not Kurds with an

ethno-political cause, but simply Kurdish tribes, Kurdish bandits, Kurdish sheikhs - all the

evils of Turkey's pre-modern past.110

But changing the names does not change the reality, through hard efforts Kurdish

identity could not have eliminated. More it gained a more powerful attraction, which

presumably would have been less fervent, if oppression had not enforced.

Secondly as the classification made by Correlates of War, Kurdish conflict fits to a ―civil

war‖ for some periods of conflict when the fight had been escalated and death toll

exceeded the correlates of war threshold of 1 thousand for each year of conflict. The

conflict never has been the inter-communal type, since Turkish and Kurdish

communities has not got into direct fought with one another except some limited

confrontations in western cities of Turkey. The conditions of COW, for civil wars as we

cited in chapter one are:

a) Military action internal to metropolis of state system member

b) Active participation of national government, and

c) Effective participation of both sides and a total of at least 1000 battle deaths during

each year of war

―a‖ and ―b‖ clearly correspond with Kurdish conflict, but the condition defined ―c‖ is more

problematic. Firstly there is a big controversy over the conflict related deaths and various

counts are given from different resources. For example, according to a Human Rights

Watch report, between 1984 and 1994 thirteen thousand people lost their life in the

conflict.111 Yearly average of which is one thousand three hundred deaths that exceeds

110

Yeğen Mesut; ―The Kurdish Question In State The Turkish State Discourse‖,Journal Of Contemporary History Sage Publication, London, Vol. 34(4), pp. 555-568. 111

http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/WR95/HELSINKI-16.htm

49

the COW provision to name the conflict ―civil war‖. According to the report some half of

those killings had taken place in last two years. Put it different the conflict between 1992

to 1994 war, far exceeded the threshold of COW yet, for the most part of the years after

1999 death toll has been below one thousand.112 So it would not be wrong to name the

conflict as civil war for the period before 2000. Thereby we can name Kurdish issue is a

conflict, which at times rises to the degree of ―civil war‖ and have the potential to reach

that level anytime in the future if peace talks fail.

2.4 ETHNIC/IDENTITY- AND IDEOLOGICAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT

Despite the fact that PKK has adopted a far leftist and Marxist agenda, and in the initial

time the main object of the organization had been founding a separate Marxist socialist

Kurdistan, it is obvious that the primary motivation of recruits to PKK had been relating to

their very identity of Kurdishness. Even though there has been Turkish and foreign

fighters within the ranks of the party, it has remained very limited. To illustrate this very

fact following is a quote from the cease-fire declaration of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan:

On the one hand, you say that the Kurds are as much owners of these lands as the Turks,

that all their national and social rights will be recognized; on the other hand, even our

name is denied. This is what led to the violence. We are surely the side that should be

least responsible. We wanted our identity. We wanted our democracy. We wanted our

culture. Can anybody live without culture? Can anybody live without democracy? What do

you expect us to do after even our name has been denied?

As we referred the difference between ideological and identity based conflict, one of the

characteristic of identity based conflict was the rigidity of affiliation. Even though Kurdish

political parties have pursued a leftist and progressive agenda, their turn out in the

elections is very limited among Turkish community. Despite achieving successes in

recent national and local elections, national percentage of votes of Kurdish political

parties does not undergo a massive change. Further support to Kurdish political parties

112

For example from 2012 one of most intensive year of conflict in terms of death tolls, some eight hundred seventeen conflict related killings took place. See http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/222-turkeys-kurdish-impasse-the-view-from-diyarbakir.pdf

50

in the western cities has remained very limited, except in some big cities where Kurds

immigrated especially in 1990s. That is to say since the main support to Kurdish political

parties came from the Kurdish community, the assumption we present earlier for

identity/ethnic based conflict that is ―though not fixed once formed, identity resists to

change‖ is very relevant for Kurdish issue as well and in terms of territoriality which is

another characteristic of identity/ethnic based conflict that differentiate them from

ideological based conflict, Kurdish issue is intensively include a territorial aspect. Kurds

for the most part densely populated in a particular region and their identity is highly

related to that region. The demands for autonomy by Kurdish political representative are

explicit indication of that fact. Territory is one of the basic issues in the conflict.

However the conflict might evolve to include some ideological conflict character as well.

The Kurdish political parties efforts to gain hearts and minds of all Turkey, the

statements that ―they do not want a separate state anymore, and the ultimate goal is

achieving democratic republic113 in which all communities coexist peacefully and

respecting and hanging Turkish flag in Party meetings and congress display a tendency

that conflict might evolve to ideological struggle over governmental structure of state.

But still the dynamics of conflict are far from being in the form of an ideological conflict.

2.5 ROOT CAUSES OF KURDISH CONFLICT;

2.5.1 Structural Factors;

2.5.1.1 Weak State;

The Weak state factor in the region has been one of the major components that breed

the conflict in the mostly Kurdish populated areas. Kurdish region has remained

relatively deficient in the sense of governmental service and related functions.

113

http://www.hawarnews.com/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2238:oecalan-war-is-at-a-stage-to-end-through-democratic-negotiations&catid=1:news&Itemid=2

51

Firstly the centralization of state affairs has significant impact on the region. The region

where Kurds are inhabited is far from center of state namely the capital and center of

political activity.114 State institution has often malfunctioned due to geographical

hardness of the region. Due to uneasiness to reach and access the geography of

Kurdish populated region Kurdish community relatively deprived of state institution‘s

service in all senses from economy to health services, to education to judiciary and so

forth. Further that deficiency in state institution‘s function has been aggravated by

ineligible and inadequate civil servant due to unwillingness of capable persons to work in

an undeveloped region.115 Yet state in military sense has been very intact and deployed

a huge number of army the region. Arguably state fills the gap of other services with

suppressive existence in the region. Moreover the huge military expenditure to curb

resistance has prevented adequate funding for other services as well. ―State with

muscle‖ can be used for Turkey for the most period of its history; however states are in

charge of other functions in addition to security as well such as judiciary, education and

health services as well.

Secondly the Kurdish region has borders with three other states (Iraq, Iran , And Syria)

that obstruct the state to fully control the region. Especially those states that are cursed

with chronic instabilities that made it difficult to hinder spillover effect and thorough

paced control of the region.

It is difficult to contemplate that Kurds live in an anarchical like state, but the weakness

of state broad areas escalate the prospects for violence. In other words the vacuum that

has stemmed from the lack of intact and legitimate state has given rise of troubles and

sporadic violence in the region.

114

Fuller Graham E, ―The Fate Of The Kurds‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 2, Spring, 1993 pp.108-121. 114

For Observation of a district governor in the region see Çağdaş Tamer İdari ve Sİyasi Anılar, Cinius Yayınları, Istanbul, 2013.

52

2.5.1.2 Security Dilemma of Kurdish Issue

Turkish Republic has come out from the ashes of an Empire that was including a good

deal of different ethnicities and nations. Most of these nations gained independence one

by one as Empire had been weakened by nationalistic wave that French Revolution

inspired in 1789 and afterwards. Three principle of French Revolution ―liberty‖ ―equality‖

and ―fraternity‖ understood by mainly Christian communities as independence rather

than civil rights.116 More, Ottoman Empire‘s dramatic dissolution and loosing great

proportion of its lands, Turkish Republic perceive any nationalist claim as a sign of

independence intention. The treaty of Sevre that envisage independence for remaining

nationalities of Empire namely the Armenian Kurds and Arabs seems to provoke the fear

of extra dissolution and lose of lands that was perceived as intolerable for late Ottoman

bureaucrats and Kemalist cadres of early Republic era. Arguably the harsh treatment of

Kurdish demands can be a result of those fears.

With the same token Kurds historical memories of treasons and broken promises made

by the governments that began with the promise of Ataturk for cultural autonomy, has

led to a disappointment and distrustfulness towards state institutions. The Governments

during the course of insurgencies has not hesitated to punish no supportive parts of the

Kurdish community. All those sufferings in the hands of state result in a great deal of

insecurity and distrustfulness among the big part of Kurdish Community and their social

and political leaders.

This entire historical legacy has aggravated present conflict, on the one hand it acts to

preserve the state territorial integrity from one side perceived as threat to the

maintaining national existence of other side; while on the other hand, the acts to

maintain the cultural and national characteristic by one side has been perceived as

threat to the integrity of state. As we mentioned, in the chapter one ambiguity of

intentions and historical records of military actions further the acuteness of Security

Dilemma.

116

Zürcher Eric J. (1993), Turkey A Modern History, I.B Tairus, New York, p. 26.

53

After PKK has emerged, the armed aspect of conflict drives both sides to harsher

measures regarding to violence and arms gaining. It is said that about four hundred

billion dollars has been the cost of conflict since 1983. The big share of which has been

spent on arms. Yet more measures have been taken, the more parties have stuck to

their identities against threats.

The anarchical state that is an important aspect of security dilemma, when the authority

weakens groups seeks for their own security and make use of this power vacuum. The

1991 Gulf War creates an anarchical-like situation in the Kurdish region of Iraq and PKK

made use of this opportunity; took root in the region, strengthen the organizational

structure of the party and find save heavens for future fight. It is not coincidence that the

most severe fights occurred in the period between 1991-1995 between state security

forces and PKK members.117 That was partly a consequence of anarchical like state of

post-gulf war. In addition the indistinguishable offence capacity from defense is relevant

in that situation as well. Presumably the Turkish Army‘s evacuation of villages was an

attempt to diminish its vulnerability and was a realization of offences advantages over

defense where the region was mostly populated by Kurds.

When we comes to the issue of identity and security dilemma, it seems that until

recently states that Kurdish and Turkish identities as mutually exclusive. Whenever

Kurdish demand for their identity recognition is referred, it follows by the claims that

those demands are undermining state identity and pave the way to partition of state118

Lastly the intermixed nature of population of Turkey, which especially raised greatly after

forced migration of villages in 1990 to western cities of Turkey, expose a high risk in a

situation of intense conflict. Today nearly half of the Kurds live in the western cities of

Turkey. According to Kaufmann ― the severity of ethnic security dilemma is greatest

when demography is most intermixed weakest when community settlement are most

seperate‖.119 Bearing in mind that the intensity of Security dilemma, future violence

might be more intense, grave and bloody from the earlier ones. The only solution as 117

Kirişçi and Winrow estimates that between 1992-1995 some 16613 including both armed forces and civilians were killed in the conflict-related fights. Kirişçi Kemal and Windrow Gareth M. (1997), The Kurdish Question And Turkey; An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict, Southgate, London. 118

For an example see http://www.kongar.org/aydinlanma/2005/499_Alt_Kimlik-Ust_Kimlik.php 119

Kaufmann Chaim, ―Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars‖ International Security, Vol. 20, No 4 ( Spring, 1996), p. 148.

54

Kauffman suggest will be the complete separation of groups to their enclaves. Kaufman

states that ―The more intense the violence, the more likely it is that separation, will be

the only option‖120

2.5.1.3 Ethnic Geography of Kurds

Kurds are considered to be the world largest nation without state. They have split

between Turkey, Iraq, Iran Syria and former Soviet Union121 According to some

estimates Kurds population is about forty million half of which lives in Turkey. A survey

has been done in 2011 revealed that there are some 14 million Kurds lives in Turkey.

Whatever the precise numbers, Kurds in Turkey approximately account for 20 percent of

the population. Kurds are major non-ethnic group has remained from the ashes of

Ottoman Empire. Although there are other ethnic groups living in Turkey as well such as

Arabs, Lazes and other groups their populations are relatively minor and they do not

constitute majority in the any specific region of Turkey. The density of Kurdish

community makes the issue more complex.

120

Ibid, p. 159. 121

Pope, Nicole And Hugh (1997), Turkey Unveiled; A History of ModernTurkey, Overlook, New York p. 247.

55

Figure 3122. Ethnic Geography of Kurds

Let us now reconsider Ellingsen hypothesis here. His assumption were ;

The degree of fragmentation within a country

a) The size of the largest linguistic, religious and ethnic group within a country

b) The number of linguistic, religious and ethnic group

The size of the largest minority group within a country

Ethnic affinities to other countries

122

Beriker Nimet Atiyas (1997), The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Issues, Parties and Prospects, Security Dialogue, Vol. 28(4),, p. 440.

56

When we consider the fragmentation within the country the dominant group is too large

namely close to 100% percent the violence is less likely. If dominant group is ―large but

not too large‖123 violence is more likely to broke. Ellingsen put the threshold of 80%

percent for too large dominant group. For Turkey dominant group is less then 80

percent, since only Kurd approximately accounts for 20%124 that make the Turkey more

vulnerable to conflict in that sense. For the second asumption Ellingsen assert that

conflict is higher with several groups than a few or many groups. The presence of many

means that no one has enough dominant to mobilize conflict. It is highly explanatory for

Turkey, after Turkey has eliminated its of non-muslim component with various methods

and there remained few groups that increase the likelyhood of conflict. Many groups

mean that non of them large enough to pose threat to internal stability. When we look at

later assumption of Ellingsen for assessing Turkey again the largest minority group is

large enough to be able to mobilize violence. He assert that the more large the minority

group, the more internal violence is likely. To put it differently, we can say that Kurds are

neither enough large to impose their will on political system nor small enough to be

completely ousted from exerting politics affect.

Lastly one of most relavant assumtion of Ellingsen for Kurdish issue is that of Ethnic

affinities to other countries. Kurds in Turkey have always had large identification with

their brethen in Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Especially the developments in Iraq have had great

impacts on Turkey Kurds. The relative emancipation of Iraqi Kurds from Saddam regime

in Iraq in 1991 has inspired Kurds in Turkey, so much so that large uprising in those

years in close region of Turkey, such as in Cizre in Newroz celebrations which cost to of

90 people life. The Kurdish insurgency mostly got their strenght from this geographical

traits of their region.

123

Ellingsen Tanja (200?) ―Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches‘ Brew? Multiethnicity And Domestic Conflict During And After The Cold War”, The Journal Of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44, No 2, (April), Sage Publications, Oslo, pp. 228-249. 124

According to CIA World factbook 2008 estimates Kurds are account for 18 percent of total population.

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html , Another survey that

conducted by KONDA revealed that Kurds made up for 17.7 percent of entire poulation. http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/2011_06_KONDA_Kitap_Basin_Bulteni.pdf There are some other estimates which claims the Kurds to form 25 percent of whole pupolation.Kreyenbroek,Philip&Allison Christine(ed) Kurdish Culture and Identity Zed Books 1996,p7 Condisering those It can be asserted that Kurds are made up between 15-25 percent of pupulation, which can agruabbly be in rise in the next years due to higher fertility rate of Kurds comparing to Kurds.

57

As a last aspect of ethnic geography, it is important to point the fertility rate of

communities. Research reveals that Kurd‘s fertility rate is higher that any other group in

Turkey125 The Kurdish population increase more highly which transforms ethnic balance

between Turks and Kurds and might aggravate internal trouble in the future. We

observed above from the Elligsen assumption that the more populated largest minority

group means more likely the violence to break.

2.5.2 Political Factors

2.5.2.1 Discriminatory Political Institutions

Prospect for conflict is low when overall political system is fair and each group

represented in political and social institutions. Conversely when those institutions are

closed to access for some specific groups where others are overrepresented, and their

interest are served system, is likely to bring about frustration, resentment and

consequently violence over time.126

When we consider Kurdish issue in that sense, the Discriminatory Political Institutions

are discernible as factors that has been fueling the conflict. From the begininig of 1990s

when the first kurdish political party with the name of HEP(Halkın Emek Partisi/People

Labour Party) came to the scene to the 2009 sucessive Kurdish parties were closed

by Contitutional court mosty on the ground of parties activities against the unity of the

state.Throughout those years many of parliament members and activist of the parties

were sent behinf bars with the same charges. Out of six political parties so far 5 have

been closed by Constitutional Court . In 2009 Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tuğluk(considered

to be the moderate figures in party were banned to carry political activities within the

rank of a party for five years. Another case in point regarding to discriminatory political

institutions is election system that widely blocks small groups to access parliament since

1982 has limited The Kurds representation in the parliament. The election system that 125

Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies (2014), “2013 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey”. Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, T.R. Ministry of Development and TÜBİTAK, Ankara, Turkey and http://www.bloomberght.com/haberler/haber/1232809-dogum-hizi-en-cok-guneydoguda-en-az-marmarada 126

Brown Michael E. (1997), ―The Causes of Internal Conflict‖ in Michael Brown E and Others (ed.) Nationalism And Ethnic Conflict, MIT Press, p.7.

58

imposes a national ten percent threshold for political parties to access the parliament

mainly become an obstruction for Kurds representation in the parliament. To overcome

that challenge Kurdish parties go on to election with independent nominees that partly

alleviate the obstacle, yet they have been still underrepresented in parliament

comparing to their overall amount of votes.

Another example to illustrate the discriminatory policy is the existence and

representation of Kurdish originated persons as city governors. As a centralized state

city governors authorities over variety of affairs are broad. Acording to a study only 54

out of 488 city governors have borned in cities where Kurds constitute majority and

among them some are not Kurd127

It is important to point here that Kurds can rise to within the state ranks and political

system, but until recently this could come true on the condition that those that rise do not

manifest their Kurdish identity and accept Turkish identity128

Broadcasting in Kurdish language in a state based TV,could be realized in 2004 and that

broadcast was only limited to 45 minutes at that time. For the long period of time Kurdish

culture and language could not be represented in any state institutions. The last

education institution where the language of instruction was Kurdish closed in 1925.

There has been indeliberate discrimination practices as well. Being less educated, the

problem of language, and the regions under development has worsened the prospects

of Kurdish citizen to acess to the political instituttions.

Despite all, the reforms that have been done for EU, accession process by Turkey partly

limited those discriminatory practice, but there are yet broad matters to be dealt with

regarding to discriminatory political institutions.

127

The origin of 134 governor couldn‘t have been identified Tezcür Güneş Murat ―Türkiyede Silahlı Çatışmanın Med Cezirleri ve Zor Bir Barış‖ in Aktaş Murat (ed.) (2014), Çatışma Çözümleri Ve Barış, İletişim İstanbul, p.171. 128

Barkey Henry J.,Fuller Graham E. (1998), Turkey Kurdish Question, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers,Oxford p.12.

59

2.5.2.2 Exclusionary National Ideology

As we mention earlier Turkey was founded on the notion of single nationality. This single

nationality excludes other identities and the state with its apparatus and resources at her

disposal, made efforts to assimilate different identities to Turkishness. There are

extensive controversies over the notion of ―Turk‖ that whether it is civic that implies

citizenship or ethnic that relates to blood. When we observe the practice of state there

are dual face of this nationalism. In one aspect it is civic in nature that it allows the Kurds

to raise in state institutions and in respect to enjoying all rights that state granted to its

citizen. In another aspect it is ethnic in regards to forced assimilation of Kurds and

repression of those who refuse to adopt this new identity.129

The main ideology of Turkish republic has been laid down By Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,

which embodied in six principles of so called ―Kemalism‖ that have been added to the

constitution in 1937. Those are secularism, republicanism, nationalism, stateism,

populism and reformism. Nationalism principle has evidently been a homogenous and

mono-ethnic in principle and when the matter regards to Kurds as Van Bruinessen

register that;

… There are strong ideological impediments to the recognition of the Kurds as a distinct ethnic group with its own culture, and further concessions are almost unthinkable. The military and civilian elites (which include „assimilated Kurds‟) are deeply committed to the Kemalist dogma that the people of Turkey are one homogeneous nation, and they perceive each denial of unity as a vital threat to the state.130

When we look at citizenship and nationality relationship in Turkey, an ambiguity is

evident. The constitution in force define this relationship in article 66 that; ―Everyone

bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk‖131 It is evident that

Turkishness defined in terms of citizenship and do not deny differentials, but impose a

higher identity. However, when we observe Turkishness in history books that students

studies in primary and high schools and question what it implies, we encounter a very

129

Ibid, p.12. 130

Cited in Heper Metin (2007), The State and Kurds in Turkey; The Question of Assimilation, Palgrave Mcmillian, London, p.3. 131

http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf

60

ethnic notion of Turkishness in those books and none of history of different ethnicities is

ever mentioned.132

Mesut Yeğen implies this ambiguity points different levels of Turkishness. He states that;

..There are different degrees of Turkishness, being a subject of the Turkish Republic,

being a Turkish subject, and being Turkish and, more importantly, that Turkish citizenship fails to overlap with or exhaust Turkishnessi n the full sense of the term. What is even more interesting is that there is a remarkablecorrelation between the different levels of state apparatus and different degrees of Turkishness. For instance, the institutions at the heart of the state (military) match themselves with being of Turkish race, while the institutions at the edge of the state (state dormitories) are content to match themselves with Turkish Republic citizenship.133

Even though discourse of government officials have been emphasizing the civic nature

of citizenship, as David Romano states ―..In practice state-building (of Turkey) was along

ethnic nationalist lines”134 which in turn fueled counter ethnic resistance of Kurds.

Those characteristic of state ideology is not only something of the past. Those

characteristics can be indicated in the current constitution in force as well. Article 42 of

the Constitution reads as ―No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother

tongue to Turkish citizens at any institution of education‖135

No matter what had been implied with word Turkishness in the mindset of founding

fathers of republic, what has been experienced and perceived by Kurds arguably was

not an encompassing identity that considers their cultural and political rights.

2.5.2.3 Inter-Group Politics

It would not be wrong that, the inter-group politics between Kurds and the rest of

population, is the most positive factors among other factors. There has been no inter-

communal hatred and fight between Kurds and Turks. The cooperation of Turks and

132

For example, the history book at 11 grade starts with ―State Understanding of Turks, Military and Turks, and so on which in fact refers to Ethnic Turks. 133

Yeğen Mesut (2004), ―Citizenship And Ethnicity in Turkey‖, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.40 No,, p.57 134

Romano David, Kurdsih Nationalist Movement; Opprtunity, Mobilization, Identity, Cambridge Press, New York, p.118. 135

Constitution Of the Republic Of Turkey, http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf

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Kurds in the history is always referred among public and the conflict indeed has been a

dispute and of Kurds and government. Even the far nationalist parties of Turkey have

not resorted to a direct rhetoric of hatred and theorization against Kurds; neither do

Kurdish parties against Turks.

However large Kurds immigration to western metropolis of Turkey led to direct

encounters of Turkish and Kurdish grassroots and resulted in competition between them

in social and economic life. Further intense fights of 1990s and PKK‘s heavy activities,

pushed Turkish Public to identify Kurds with PKK.136 Cenk Saraçoğlu in his study ―Kurds

of Modern Turkey: Migration, Neoliberalism and Exclusion in Turkish Society‖ points to

rising anti Kurdish sentiments among the Turkish society particularly among middle

class people, who have direct contact with Kurdish migrants in cities137. At times Kurdish

construction workers are being attacked by groups that motivated with nationalist

sentiments. Thereby it can be argued that Intergroup politics In Kurdish issue in near

future might deteriorated which had been constructive in the past due to less

encounters.

2.5.2.4 Elites and Kurdish Issue

Elites are those who see the opportunities in time of social turmoil‘s mobilize masses

towards political ends. When we consider the previous insurgency in the Kurdish Region

powerful and charismatic leaders roles are evident. From Bedirxhan, to Ubeydullah to

Sheikh Said, elites were very influential to initiate those insurgences. Elite‘s role can be

an explanation why after 1940s till 1980s there has been relative calm in terms of

rebellions in the region. That was partly a success of government to eliminate the

Kurdish leadership either by executions or exiles. After subsequent insurgency after

1925, which continued till 1940s, Turkey dispersed all Kurdish notables and leaders

regardless of taking into consideration whether if they had collaborated with insurgents

or not. In other words, even non participant and non-supportive figures had faced

punishment. For example a notable religious figure Said Nursi,-despite the fact that he

136

Barkey Henry (1993), ―Turkey‘s Kurdish Dilemma‖ Survival, Vol. 35, s4, pp. 57-58. 137

Saraçoğlu Cenk (2011), Kurds of Modern Turkey: Migration, Neoliberalism and Exclusion in Turkish Society, I.B. Tauris, London.

62

had never collaborated with the rebellion - was sent to exile just after Seikh Said

uprising had been crushed in 1925. However after 1960s number of Kurdish students

studying at Universities in the western part of Turkey has increased. Those students at

the same time politicized within Turkish leftist parties and began to develop national

identification. That environment was partly brought by the constitution of 1960s that was

favored social and individual rights. David Romano points that: ―Education, particularly

university education, exposed a new generation of both wealthy and talented poor Kurds

to ideas of nationalism, socialism, and the struggle of other peoples against state

tyranny.‖ 138

From that leftist circle a new Kurdish leftist movement emerged and they point the

grievances and sufferings of Kurds at the hands of state. They started to organize

demonstrations and publish journals which were mostly expressing those grievances in

a leftist-socialist jargon.

The leader of PKK Abdullah Ocalan was also a university student in the beginning of

1970s. The leadership of Kurdish resistance movement was shifting from tribal leaders

or religious notables to a relatively lower class of students and intellectuals. The

leadership of Ocalan and his character were indispensable part of PKK‘s success over

other Kurdish groups. First unlike other Kurdish group he could made use of the state

suppression to mobilize people and convince them to a violent campaign. In the course

of struggle he consolidated his power and became God-Like figure among PKK

supporters. It wouldn‘t be wrong to say that the Kurdish resistance could not mobilize

such a massive support without Ocalan powerful leadership and his ability to translate

the oppression of state into an immediate need to his personality. He state himself as:

―In this revolution,I have felt the greatest amount of pain; all those faults of history,

instead of being owned by others have fallen solely on my shoulders.―I establish a

thousand relationships every day and destroy a thousand political, organizational,

emotional and ideological relationships No one is indispensable to me‖139.

138

Romano David Kurdsih Nationalist Movement; Opprtunity, Mobilization, Identity, Cambridge Press, New York, p.42. 139

Quoted in Post Jerold M. (2007) The Mind Of Terrorist; Pschology of Terrorism from The IRA to Al-Qaeda, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

63

Öcalan could depict himself as a hope for an impoverished and weakened people by

oppression of state by virtue his powerful and undaunted character, although the conflict

would still exist even without such an influential leadership. The Kurdish conflict from

that sense has largely exacerbated and become violent by virtue of the influential elite

figures.

2.5.3 Economic and Social Factors

Beside its identity characteristic, Kurdish issue is largely related to economic and social

difficulties that the Kurdish region has been experiencing. Although state officials tend to

stress mainly socio-economic dimension of the issue, in large part due to their

unwillingness to acquiesce the issue‘s ethno politic dimension, still socioeconomic part

of the problem is evident. To illustrate this reality, consideration of economic

deterioration of the region, since the foundation of Republic is insightful. For instance

according to polls in 1927, the main Kurdish city Diyarbakır after Istanbul and Bursa had

had the third highest employment rates, in respect to industrial sector employment. Fifty

years later in 1972 Diyarbakır fall 27 sequences in the same index. In 2000 Diyarbakır

was in the 54th rank in that sense.140 The example of Diyarbakır illustrates overall

region‘s socioeconomic deterioration and the deterioration had been the result of

centralization policy of the state that decreases the regional economic balance. The

region currently is the least developed region in Turkey in terms of all socio-economic

indications such us unemployment, average per capita annual income141

industrialization, education and heath etc. 20 city of the region are the most poor cities

of Turkey.142 This economic backwardness has been growing worse owing to low

intense war. The evacuation of villages both deteriorate agriculture and husbandry and

create a huge mass of internal migration that exacerbate unemployment and unplanned

urbanization problems.

140

http://www.kalkinmamerkezi.org/kalkinma_raporlari_goster.aspx?krg=4 141

Ergil Doğu (2007), PKK; “Partiya Karkerê Kurdistan‖ in Heiberg Marianne and Others (ed.), Terror Insurgency And State; Ending Protracted Conflicts, University Of Pennsylvania Press, Pennsylvania,p.324. 142

http://www.kalkinmamerkezi.org/kalkinma_raporlari_goster.aspx?krg=4

64

When coinciding with ethnic lines socio-economic dimension of the issue as we

mentioned in chapter one make the problem more acute. People generally tend to

attribute their socio-economic backwardness to their identity which generates

opportunity for leaders to utilize these sufferings for political goals. Class dimension was

added to ethnic dimension of problem. That is partly explain why PKK adopted a

socialist and Marxist agenda. Leadership of PKK was aware of socio-economic

dimension of the problem.

Frequent promise of respective governments in Ankara to take action for the economic

developments have been rarely materialized, which make the region population

cynical.143 What is interesting, is that according to a research during the AK Party ruling

from 2002 to 2006, the region‘s destiny has worsened in a period that government

officials have been praising their economical achievement144. This is a warning sign in

the sense of Davies figure that attempts to explain revolutions. If the gap between

expected performance and actual performance rise to an intolerable extent, revolution

(in our case violence) is likely to break out. To put it different the socio-economic factors

that had extensive impact on the break out of the violence still highly valid in the Region

of Kurds and among Kurds.

2.5.4 Cultural/ Perceptual Factors,

2.5.4.1 Cultural Discrimination of Kurds

In addition to state level, the discriminatory acts in public and cultural spheres have

been evident regarding to Kurds. After the end of rebellions of 1930s Republic

Foundation Kurds were treated as they have never existed and their history and

language were tried to be made invisible from all spheres of life145. For example in 1930

the minister of Justice Mahmut Esat Bozkurt while speaking on real citizens stated that:

143

Barkey, Henry J. (2009), Preventing Conflict Over Kurdistan, Carnegie Endowment, Washington, p.59. 144

http://eski.bianet.org/static/dogu2.pdf 145

Romano David, Kurdsih Nationalist Movement; Opprtunity, Mobilization, Identity, Cambridge Press, New York, p. 15-60

65

―Turks are the only masters and owners of this country. Those who are not of pure

Turkish stock have only one right in this country, the right to be servants and slaves.‖146

―Whoever says he is a Kurd, I will spit in his face‖147 - was spelled by Cemal Gürsel the

fourth president of Turkey when he visited the main Kurdish city Diyarbakır in 1960.

Expressing the Kurdish identity was deemed to be crime and whoever has expressed

faced charges. For example in 1980 public work minister of pre-coup period Şerafettin

Elçi was served 27 mounts in prison because of an earlier interview as minister in a

newspaper in which he uttered that he was a Kurd and there were Kurds148. Even though

in the same interview he had expressed his respect to the territorial integrity of the

country he was convicted of being separatist. Indeed one of the main practices of

cultural discrimination had been the prohibition of Kurdish in public and private life. In

the former three constitution of Turkey (1921, 1924, 1960) there were not any prohibition

of language but the Turkish was being defined as ―official language of the state‖ in 1924

and 1960 constitutions (the Constitution of 1982 removed the ―official‖ and specified the

Turkish as ―the Language of State‖). But the usage of Turkish was broadly encouraged

and Kurdish was prohibited by laws that were imposing prison sentences upon any

Kurdish speaker in public life149. But the constitution of 1982 outlawed any language

rather than Turkish to be thought to Turkish citizen as their mother language150. Kurdish

names were also banned to be given to babies and cultural practices such as music in

Kurdish were practicing underground because of the prohibition. Those practice

continued till 1991 when Özal the 8th president of Turkey, abolished the law that had

prohibited the usage, and broadcasting of Kurdish. However the restriction on Kurdish

language, literature and culture had remained intact until the Turkey judicial reform

packages were passed as EU Accession requirements151. The first Kurdish language

146

Dragoş C. Mateescu (2006), "Kemalism in the Era of Totalitarianism: A Conceptual Analysis," Turkish Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 234. 147

Cited in http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12616392/index.pdf 148

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=food-summit-land-pix-tv--1116-08.rmr-2009-11-16 149

Nisan Mordechai (2002),―Minorities in the Middle East‖ Mcfarland&Company Inc, London, p. 47. 150

global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf (“No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institution of education. Foreign languages to be taught in institutions of education and the rules to be followed by schools conducting education in a foreign language shall be determined by law. The provisions of international treaties are reserved”). 151

For detailed analysis of those reforms see http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/pub/tsr.pdf

66

course was opened in 2004 and state television TRT has begun to 45 minutes Kurdish

broadcasting which mainly were on cultural matters of Kurds. In 2009 a full-fledged TV

channel broadcasting in Kurdish was set up. In 2011 the right to defend in native

language in courts was granted after the long time denial of demand By KCK (Koma

Civaken Kurdistan/, Group of Communities in Kurdistan) members to defend themselves

Kurdish in the courts152. The ban on prisoners to talk to Kurdish with their visitors in

prisons was abolished as earlier as 2011. Despite all developments on eliminating the

usage of Kurdish, education in native language is still a matter of massive controversies

and although the assimilationist practice for the most part eliminated in laws and

regulations, the assimilation of Kurdish children proceed due to invisible hindrances.

Other practices such as banning the ―Newroz‖ celebrations a festival that mostly

celebrated in Middle East and some part of Asia and in some cities reveals that cultural

discrimination though considerably has diminished is still ongoing regarding to Kurdish

issue. Moreover the rights are being interpreted in the sense of ―individual rights‖ rather

than ―group rights‖ which seems unsatisfactory regarding to for example for issues like

education in mother language.

For the most period of the Republic Kurds have been faced with discriminatory and

assimilationist policy that tried to rid the very existence of Kurds for the sake of the

uniformity of the state, and consequently derogate the cultural and ethnic characteristic

of Kurds which in turn aggravate the grievance sensed by Kurds and flame the violence.

2.5.4.2 Group Histories and Group Perception Regarding to Kurdish Issue

As we mentioned, earlier group relation of Turks and Kurds have been relatively well

while state and Kurds relations have always remained problematic. The suppression

and persecutions of Kurds at the hand of successive governments of the Republic,

merited a memory of victimhood, and grievances. This memory is confirmed by recent

incident as well. The killing 34 civilians in 2011 in Uludere province of Şırnak by Turkish

air planes bombing confirmed deeply held perception of Kurds regarding to persecution

152http://www.todayszaman.com/national_diyarbakir-court-allows-defense-in-kurdish-for-first-time-in-kck-trial_305662.html

67

and atrocities in history such as Dersim massacre, or Zilan plain operation that to one

estimates 3000 noncombatant (of rebellion) men women and children were executed153.

By the same token the demise of empire, losing of huge amount of lands and

independence of number of minorities from empire, together with intense war of 1990s,

killing of thousands of soldier and indoctrination of governmental institutions, brought

about another narrative, which is generally among Turkish public towards any Kurdish

political movement‘s demands. In some instance those perception manifested in any

Kurdish demonstrations in the form of lynch attempts mostly being legitimized on the

ground of preserving the unity of the country. As we mentioned earlier with the legacy of

violence in 1990s, Turkish public tended to associate Kurds with PKK.

A research conducted in 2014, İzmir that hosted to relatively large Kurdish immigrants

reveal a deteriorating group perceptions patterns of communities toward one another.

According to the research ―Turks viewed Kurds as rogue, whereas Kurds viewed Turks

as barbarian‖154 the research revealed that the perceptions alter depending on the

intensity of violence. To put it differently the conflict itself generates misperceptions

which in turn increase the likelihood of conflict. Namely the equation transverses here

and conflict itself gives rise to root causes. Another research made in 2011 by ―Konda‖

revealed this deteriorating patterns of perceptions. For example, one of the finding of

research was that 57.6 percent of population would not prefer to have a Kurdish spouse,

53.5 would not accept A Kurdish business partner and 47.4 percent do not look

favorably on to have a Kurdish neighbor, while rations for Kurds toward Turks are 26.4,

24.8 and 22.1 respectively155 This pattern seems to stem from the intense violent

period of 1990s, which has worsen the perceptions of both communities especially the

―Turks‖. The ―ancient hatred‖156 that propounded by Robert Kaplan to explain the ethnic

wars- particularly for war among ethnic groups living inside Yugoslavia that concluded

153

McDowall, David (1996),― A Modern History Of Kurds, I. B. Tauris, New York, p.206. 154

Bilali Rezarta and Others (2014), ―Psychological asymmetry in minority–majority relations at different stages of ethnic conflict‖, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Vol. 43, pp. 253-264. 155

Konda Biz KİMİZ‟10 – Kürt Meselesinde Algı Ve Beklentiler Raporu file:///C:/Users/HP/Google%20Drive/akademik/tam/2011_06_KONDA_Kurt_Meselesinde_Algi_ve_Beklentiler.pdf 156

Kaplan Robert, Balkan Ghost; A Journey Through History.

68

the complete dissolution of it- is not enough distant to be called ancient for Kurdish

issue. Yet the ―recent hatred‖ seems to have already been sprung due to the violence

experienced in recent past.

Similarly the Kurdish songs that glorify the fight, and fighters, loaded with the feel of

victimhood or Turkish series that favors militarism, and honor the war against PKK with

intensive usage of symbols like national flag, and martyrdom and attribution to history

etc. shape and renew the misperception that aggravate tension regarding to Kurdish

issue and make it hard to resolution.

This chapter attempt to analyses historical legacy of Kurdish issue, the definition of

Kurdish issue in terms of intra-state conflicts and war and examine the relevancy of root

causes regarding to Kurdish issue. It is found that Kurdish issue is an ethnic/identity

based conflict, which at times had escalated to civil war according to COW project.

Further it seems that many of Root causes are highly relevant in the context of Kurdish

issue, which is explanatory for the emergence of conflict and violence. In the next

chapter the thesis will attempt to shed light on the prospect to reverse the root causes.

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CHAPTER 3

PATH TO PEACE

REVERSING ROOT CAUSES OF KURDISH ISSUE

Making peace typically requires as much if not more courage and determination

than does making war.

---David P Barash&Charles P Webel

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Every war must end. People cannot live under an infinite state of war. However ending a

war is not an easy task. When referring to ending an intra-state conflict, it is far more

complex and sophisticated than an ending interstate war. First there are two or more

legitimate actor in interstate wars and both states are legally recognized and entitled to act

as an independent agent. Yet for the intra-state conflicts or wars recognition is the main

obstacle for ending the dispute. One actor is an independent internationally recognized

entity namely the ―state‖. Other actor on the other hand has not any legal (not legitimate)

bases in terms of both internal and external recognition and most likely labeled as terrorist

or rebellious group. Thus to reach and sign an agreement with an internationally

recognized agent, cannot be equated to signing an agreement with a rebellious non-state

or non-official group. Once a state starts to initiate a process of talks with such a group,

de-facto recognition and legitimacy is arguably will be attained by the group. This logic

leads states to set off the talks with rebellious group through its intelligence agencies

rather than direct governmental and political interaction with those groups. The Weberian

monopoly of state on the use of force or violence has been contested and states will tend

to avoid any direct interaction.

Second for the interstate wars once an agreement is signed parties and people draw to

their borders and interactions between societies and peoples reduces considerably.

International borders after demarcation (if any) limits encounters. However ending an intra-

70

state agreement prescribes the very system of domestic politics and post agreement

phase is of paramount importance in which mode of interaction of groups expected to be

regulated. Since the defeat in intrastate conflict might lead to the party‘s loss of existence

at all the high stakes in the conflict makes the compromise in the most cases difficult.157

Unlike the armies withdrawing to their borders, and substantial diminish of interaction

between armies, antagonists and hostile parties has to live together even long after an

agreement signed (on the condition that the agreement does not include any cessation

and dividends of borders. The agreement will shape the mode of domestic interaction

which formerly was the source and root cause of the conflict. In other words states are

very sensitive about the monopoly on the use of violence and will not be eager to share it

with another power and an intrastate agreement requires a substantial transformation of

domestic settings.

Bearing in mind these two difficulties, ending an intra-state war is not an impossible task.

In the light of successful examples, determined, committed and visionary political figures

have the power to lead a society to a stable peace. The examples of Northern Ireland and

South Africa among others, though they are not perfect, prove the very possibility of lasting

peace. Having said that, achievements in those examples has not coincidently attained. All

are consequences of planned and principled actions.

Similarly AK Party the ruling party of Turkey since 2002 initiated ―democratic opening‖

in 2009 to solve long decades Kurdish issue. In fact this initiative was one of most

radical and courage policy since the foundation of the Republic. However the so called

democratic opening was failed due to various reason and both side blame the other

side‘s actions and intentions as the reason of failure. In the meanwhile with the failure

of initiative, the armed conflicts escalated into a very intense confrontation that

accounted for more than 700 dead within fourteen months from 2011 to 2012 which is

the maximum death rate that unprecedented for 13 years. The detention of Kurdish

activist with the conviction of being the member of illegal organization KCK (The union

of Communities in Kurdistan), The PKK raids, Turkish military operation to the bases of

PKK and the wide spread hunger strikes of Kurdish prisoners in 2013 leads to stalemate

157

Licklider, Roy, ―The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993‖, American Political Science Review, 89(3),pp. 681–690.

71

condition for the parties. Later on, prisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan called the

prisoners to end the hunger strike and the hunger strike ended following this call. Since

then the situation deescalated and government launched peace talks with Abdullah

Öcalan that boosted hopes among public. The public expectation is that three decade

old conflict which marked with bloody memories will end. The talks are going on with

Abdullah Öcalan and on 21 March 2013 of Nevroz celebration his letter was read by

BDP parliamentary members to the mass that were gathering for the celebration, and in

this letter he addressed the PKK members and called to a fully withdrawal from armed

struggle and urged the militants to retreat from Turkish borders and move to the

Northern Iraq. A small part of militant has withdrawn to Turkish soils. Yet great part of

militant have remained in their bases and kept their potential for next fights. Negotiation

with Öcalan continues with back and forth but a conclusion has yet to be reached.

This chapter seeks to explore the principles that have the potentials to reverse the root

causes of Kurdish issue and be guidance for policymakers, peace workers and

researcher that devoted their lives to an endurable peace for Kurdish issue. The thesis

will just express these principles and condition.

3.2 ENDURING/STABLE PEACE

Peace is an elusive concept. It has barely a consensual general and theoretical

definition. This definition problem leads scholars to attribute adjective to the peace such

as Enduring/Stable Peace, so that they can limit the definition ambiguity.

Enduring/Stable Peace indirectly implies that instable and short living peace exists as

well. So an enduring/stable peace refers a situation after a negotiated agreement in

which parties willingness to take up arms dramatically diminish, and personal and

societal security and well-being are sustained, so much so that recurring of war is out of

prospect for a long period of time. Enduring/stable peace requires both a cessation of

violence and absence of motivation to pursue goals through violence. As for motivation it

will disappear in case of security and well being of parties. To that end a well-designed

peace agreement is of paramount importance in which the concerns of parties are well

addressed. Keneth Boulding defines ―stable peace‖ as ―a situation in which the

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probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of

the people involved.158 Negative peace, conditional peace, precarious peace is some

other concepts that refer to the lack of enduring/stable peace. Negative peace refers to

the absence of armed violence, but not necessarily absence of other types of violence

such as poverty, oppression, injustice etc.159 Whereas precarious peace imply a state of

little more than a temporary absence of armed conflict and lastly ―conditional peace‖

imply to a peace maintained by general deterrence but the prospect for war reserved for

crisis situation.160 Enduring/Stable Peace is quite the opposite of these concepts. The

reason why ―positive peace‖ of Galtung was not employed is that it refers more to an

ideational situation and more utopian to be attained whereas Enduring/Stable peace is

more practical and operational observable and measurable. Thus an agreement that

brings about an enduring/stable peace will deem to be a successful agreement. Even

though some agreements end violence for a durable time, however, do not end

prospects for violence for parties.

3.3. CONDITIONS TO REVERSE ROOT CAUSES

Understanding the conditions that lead to successful resolution of disputes and have the

potential to reverse and transform the conflict to a constructive initiative is of paramount

importance for policy makers. The condition that will reverse structural, political and

cultural/perceptual factors are analyzed separately

3.3.1 Reversing the Structural Causes

3.3.1.1 Institutionalization

Negotiation and settlement do not only aim to stop the killing, but also they build or

ideally they must build a frame in which the mode and rule of interaction are defined

regarding to state and society or state and insurgent groups relations.

Institutionalization relates to both rule of negotiation and structures incorporated in the

158 Boulding, Kenneth E. (1978), Stable Peace, Austin: University of Texas Press, p. 13. 159

https://www.transcend.org/files/Galtung_Book_unpub_Theories_of_Peace_-_A_Synthetic_Approach_to_Peace_Thinking_1967.pdf 160http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/stable-peace

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agreement for post- agreement set ups that will govern groups in the future161.

Waterman notes; ―civil wars often end in a deal and that deal is about political

institutions‖162 Institutions prescribe some behaviors and prohibit others. The essential

function of institutions are to diminish uncertainty and increase the predictability in

regards to actors behavior and rule of competition in the future, which then mitigate

the security dilemma between parties. Institutional design provides the groups with

the mean to pursue their goal other than violence. Institutionalization is the only cure

for weak statehood that rise the chaos and anarchical state thought to be increase the

propensity of violence

Institutional designs are about forming structure about the use of coercive force, the

distribution of political power and the distribution of resources. 163 And power sharing

and power dividing institutions are the most utilized tools for intra-state wars. Power

sharing and power dividing mechanism provide groups with power to have influence

on governmental issues, the lack of which most probably has given rise to the

escalation of tension. Further power sharing and power dividing institutions are the

main guarantees for protection of the particularities of the groups. This is because

power sharing and power dividing arrangements preclude the option for one party

holding sufficient power to dominate others. Moreover these institutions give

opposition group a sense of ownership to the system which previously they were

trying to destabilize because they were considering the system working against their

interest. In other words, power sharing and power dividing agreements lead to a

balance of power between contending parties and prevent power concentration in the

hand of single party164. In addition, those structures and arrangements allow the

groups identities to be accommodated in the general identity of the major group.

Johan Galtung use the term ―Feel At Home‖ to refer the situation where in the political

system every citizen finds some part of his identity represented and demonstrated in

the public and political sphere. He points the example of Switzerland where the bills

161

Hartzell Caroline A., Hoddie Matthew (2007), Crafting Peace: Power Sharing Institutions And the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania,, p. 26. 162

Quoted in Hartzell A. Caroline, ―Explaining The Stability of Negotiated Settlement to Intrastate Wars‖ The Journal Of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No 1 (Feb. 1999), p.6. 163

Ibid. 164

Hartzell Caroline A., Hoddie Matthew (2007), Crafting Peace: Power Sharing Institutions And the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, p. 25.

74

are issued in four languages. The members of four different language groups

experience their identity represented in the public sphere. Thus they build an identity

affiliation to the state and as their identity represented, they feel at home in the

country165

In the first chapter the role of weak state as a structural root cause of intra-state

conflict was emphasized. Weak state manifests itself in the lack of institutions that

provide good and services to the public. But additionally and even more they provide

set ups in which system of state could function and demand of groups are met inside

whether this demand are related to identity, governance, or elections. The opposite

of weak state can be described well as ―legitimate state‖ rather than powerful state

since power might imply military power. Legitimacy attained by the institutions that

provide the sense of belonging its citizen which than ease the tension that triggers the

conflict. Especially when conflict is an identity conflict political institution are of

paramount importance and negotiation mostly should focus on setting up institution

that pave the ways to the accommodation of these identities. Anthony Oberschall

writes that: ―Conflict management consists of building overarching, shared identities

and symbols, and providing political institutions that organize interest and divisions

that cut across ethnic lines166‖

As to emphasize the significance of power sharing and power dividing Institutions

Hartzell and Hoddie writes that:

Power-sharing and power-dividing institutions may also help enhance the credibility of former belligerents‟ commitment to peace to the extent that they compartmentalize or divide decision-making powers. Leaders will find breaking their promises very difficult if they are institutionally bound to obtain other actors‟ assent in order to change policies or make new decisions. By reducing the risk of arbitrary behavior by some set of actors, power-sharing and power-dividing institutions help enhance the negotiated settlement‟s credibility as a whole.167

The dominance and oppressions against a group are generally maintained and

prevailed over institutions. Pre-war institutions seem to be unable to prevent the

165

Drawed from the class given by Galtund in Hacettepe Peace and Conflict studies Master Programme in 2013. 166

Oberschall Anthony (2007), Conflict And Peace Building in Divided Societies: Responses to Ethnic Violence, Routledge, London and New York, p. 12. 167

Hartzell Caroline A., Hoddie Matthew (2007), Crafting Peace: Power Sharing Institutions And the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania,.p. 27.

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eruption war. Endurable peace therefore requires transformation of these institution or

building of new ones that ―...Do not contain the same failures that led to conflict in the

first place‖168. Their main characteristic must be impartiality towards different groups

so that those groups trust can be maintained and thus institutions can function

effectivelyand the most effective institutions are those which are democratic. Beside

those institutions a negotiation must take in to consideration of building institutions

that deal with past wrongdoings, truth and reconciliation commissions- election

monitoring, ceasefire observation etc. In other words institutions are not only the

mechanism that builds the future, but also tools for coming to terms with the past.

One of the primary trigger that gave rise to Kurdish issue is inefficient institutions.

Especially the centralization policy which traces back to Ottoman period result in

weakening of traditional institutional set ups. What replaced were those that unaware

of the needs and priority of the region. In the present situation, the best alternative

seems to be enact the rules that devolution of some state power to regions and

design some institutions that will made Kurds to ―feel at home‖ rather than a feeling of

alienation. In other wars the institutions must be more receptive to the needs and

demands of Kurds where they live. The institutions that the identity can be

maintained, or an arrangements on the security force that are more familiar and if

need be more specifically recruited, will diminish fears and alienation of Kurds. The

institution that allocate rights and limit the use of force169 will create an environment of

predictability. Further, legalization of ongoing peace process or a body that will

observe the disarming and demobilization of ex-fighters and guarantees for those ex-

fighters beyond doubt, will diminish security dilemma of parties. Likewise an election

system that enables the small groups to have influence on governmental issues, is of

utmost importance. Ten percent national threshold in Turkish election system is one

of the main obstacles before Kurds to have voice and power in Parliament. The feel of

weakness will trigger the security dilemma and only cure is to give each group power

that is proportional to their population.

168 Wolf, Stefan (2007), Ethnic Conflict; A Global Perspective, Oxford University Press, New York, p.156. 169 Caroline A. Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie (2007), Crafting PeacePower Sharing Institutions And the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars, The, Pennsylvania State University Press,Pennsylvania,, p.27.

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3.3.1.2 Timing

Timing is about doing what and when. In other words, it is about doing right thing at right

time. Every peace initiative must have an attentively set timetable. Hasty actions might

lead to undesired result and failures. With same token belated actions may damage the

entire process. With the course of time, expectations and understandings of actors will

change. Moreover the nature of conflict may also change. Any regulation aimed to ease

the tension that would have an impact if imposed previously might not have any impact

later or an immature and early initiative may trigger the old memories of conflict which

then result in escalation of the conflict. While carrying out a peace initiative parties to

conflict must consider the timing of each step delicately and act accordingly.

Furthermore, well organized in terms of timing and scheduled peace initiative will give a

sense of predictability to parties and hinder distrust and insecurity towards process. A

promised action taken in time will be a sign of loyalty to the process by the stakeholder

to the conflict and enhance trustfulness among parties. However postponed action will

foster suspects to the intention of the adversary. Distrust and possibility of being

cheated by opponents which aggravated by uncertainties may well be tackled by timely

actions. That is one of best ways to overcome ―Security Dilemma‖ that was explained in

the first chapter as a main source of intra-state conflict, among groups. Well timing

initiatives on the other hand decrease ambiguity and uncertainties which then decrease,

if not fully prevent, possible manipulations and provocations.

For ethnic conflict it is argued that the more opportunity for peace postponed the more it

is likely to be difficult to attain peace. The timely actions that had been scheduled earlier

will increases confidence that other side is committed to its promises.

3.3.1.2.1 Ripe Moment

The idea of ―ripe moment‖ was developed by William Zartman. The concept focuses on

the notion of ―Mutually Hurting Stalemate‖. It refers a situation, when both parties to the

conflict cannot achieve an outright victory over their opponents, the situation evolves to

77

a deadlock and continue to fight more, achieve nothing but more pain, perhaps even a

catastrophe for both sides.170 No outright victory seems likely in near future for

adversaries. As Peter Wallensteen observes “Neither side is winning within the time

framework it had expected nor with the resources it had at its disposal.”171 This situation

marks a ―ripe moment‖ for peace, which parties seek a way-out and negotiation seems

favorable and less costly than fighting. If a ―mutually hurting stalemate‖ exists and if

parties perceive a way out it is a ―ripe moment‖ for peace. However ―ripe moments‖ do

not automatically lead to searches for the solution. The moments have to be searched

and grasped by parties or by virtue of a mediator172, because ―ripe moments‖ are not

only objective occasions, but also they are related to parties perception of the existence

of such moments. Here we consider parties as rational. Otherwise not all ripe moments

will lead to initiation of peace processes. Further ―ripe moments are not always

discernible and reachable by parties‘ rational calculations. Third parties or mediators are

thus could be vital to made parties to grasp and realize ―ripe moments‖. They can

encourage the perception of stalemate to the parties and show way outs.

Zartman points out that ―Ripeness is the key to many successful cases of negotiation,

opening the way for discussions that lead to an agreement in the Sinai (1974),

Southwest Africa (1988), El Salvador (1988), Mozambique (1992), and many others‖173

Regarding to Kurdish issue it can be asserted that it is the most ―ripe moment‖ to seize

the opportunity for a peaceful solution in the history of the conflict. State and broadly

Kurdish political movement seems to realize that there is no military solution to the

conflict. Both leaders and public are in favor of a solution based on dialogue of sides.

This opportunity must be utilized by both sides as we know the nature and dynamic of

Kurdish are highly vulnerable to regional and international fluctuations. Further some

scholars point to radicalization of Kurdish youth and pro-Kurdish party members stress

the fact that they are the last generation that government can talk to‖ Actually the new

170

Wallensteen, Peter (2002), ―Understanding Conflict Resolution; War, Peace And Global System‖, Sage Publications, London, p.46. 171

Ibid. 172

I William Zartman (2001), The timing of peace initiatives: Hurting stalemates and ripe moments, Global Review of Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 1:1, pp. 8-18. 173

http://www.e-ir.info/2008/12/20/ripeness-the-importance-of-timing-in-negotiation-and-conflict-resolution/ (09.11.2014)

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generation had not had previous shared experiences with Turkish public.174 They are

more alienated than the previous generations. Thus timely action in Kurdish issue is a

crucial component of peace and sign of commitment to other side.

As we referred to Davies figure regarding to breaking out of revolution, we can apply

this principles to nonmaterial expectation as well. A period of development in terms of

democratization and extending rights has generated high expectation which requires the

continuation of reforms regarding to Kurdish issue. However, if actual performance

diminish dramatically it might cause turmoil in the near future. Thereby the actions must

be taken timely and reforms shouldn‘t fall behind the democratic trends in the world.

3.3.1.3 Security Guarantees

The absence of a high authority, or to say it differently, one parties distrust to existing

bodies and refusing its supervision, worsen the insecurity.175 The structure in which

parties left to seek for self-preservation; defined by Jervis as ... ―not evil but

tragedy176‖ the structure of the system that leads parties to pursue their survival by

their own tools exacerbate insecurity for others that generate a vicious cycle which we

defined earlier as ―security dilemma‖. In other words, even if parties share common

goals and are not greedy for gaining power, the structure in which they function, drive

them to compete with one another for power. Frequently this competition brings about

violent confrontation; what Jervis defines as tragedy rather than evil.

It is apparent that if the conflict mainly stems from security concern of the involved

parties, a negotiated agreement will be expected to involve some provision that

should ameliorate this insecurity between parties. If the security concern of the

groups is not addressed, it is unlikely to have a stable peace. Walter defines Security

guarantees as ―implicit or explicit promises given by an outside power to protect

174

Villelas Ana ―Turkey and The Kurdish Question: Reflecting On Peace Building‖ Report by Escola de Cultura de Pau, Agencia Catalana de Cooperacio al Desenvolupament .June 2011 175

Badran, Ramzi (2011), A Peace Agreement Theory: Contractıng For Sustaınable Peace, Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate School of Binghamton University, State University Of New York. 176

Jervis Robert (1976), Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton University Press, p. 66.

79

adversaries during the treaty implementation period‖177 Yet some researcher without

referring the third party, put the emphasis on building the institutions which parties

can preserve their security and existence. The most important ones are those which

relates to state power, use of coercive force, political power and control over

resources178. The first regards to security over armed aggression, the second one

regards to security for identity and the last one is security for wellbeing, all of which

described in the first chapter as the source of intra-state conflict. A fair distribution of

power on those dimensions is necessary to hinder any group to hold the ultimate

power, and utilize it to dominate and oppress other groups.

Likewise security guarantees for ex-combatant are vital component of any negotiated

agreement. A negotiation without envisioning a protection for armed units in post-war

period, beyond doubt will prove to fail, because those units will be extremely

dangerous for and spoil post war peace situation. Peace made with whom a fight has

been done and lack of considerations for ex-fighter, will drive them to use their power

to disrupt any peace agreement. Further, once they surrender and disarmed, they will

have insurance from state and national army that this will not be used against them

and they will not be attacked and annihilated. What will prevent a state to do this

against insurgent militants? In peace agreement different provisions have been

enacted for ex-fighters. Some of this agreement prescribes incorporating ex-fighter to

national army. Other agreements provide opportunity to ex-fighter to become political

figures of post war period.179

When we consider the Kurdish issue it is vital to include security guarantees for ex

fighters of PKK and also pro government village guards so that keeping arms by both

renders useless. That guarantee might be in the form of providing immunity for

―crimes‖ against the state, job, and like integrative services. Recruitment in national

security force is other option to be considered. For the high rank militants other

177

Walter, Barbara (1997), ―The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.‖International Organization, 51(3), pp. 335-364. 178

Hartzell Caroline A., Hoddie Matthew (2007), Crafting Peace: Power Sharing Institutions And the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania. 179

Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) was a left wing rebel army during Elsalvador‘s 1980-92 civil war,after peace accord in 1992 FLMN became a political party and with its leader Salvador Sanchez Ceren a former guerilla won two consecutive elections.

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alternatives such as to have a living abroad seems to be more appropriate. Whatever

the forms of this integration might be, one thing is sure that if the existence of an ex

fighter or group of them is in danger and not protected in a post conflict agreement,

they will seek and attempt to spoil any peace initiatives.

The most critical situation is that of prisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Will he be

kept in prison for all his life or not? Bearing in mind that he has a great influence on

the some part of Kurds, an arrangement for his future must be considered for an

endurable peace. Yet in relation to ―timing‖ it must be in the future that any

arrangement for Öcalan should not spark huge reaction on the Turkish public. The

timing for this must be well thought.

3.3.2 Reversing the Political Root Causes

3.3.2.1 Identity Recognition

Recognition of the identity of other side is indispensable element of pre-negotiation and

without it negotiation phase will not come to the scene. To recognize other side result in

emergence of inter-locator with whom the issues can be negotiated. Recognition does

not have to be in a formal state, but de-facto recognition is needed. In addition to that

recognition of identity lead the parties to perceive the conflict in the eyes of their

adversary since the negotiator parties supposed to response other sides demands, and

most probably accept a set of them, if not all.

Further with the recognition of identity, a kind of legitimacy attributed to the adversary,

which then result in to appreciate and assume some rights to other one of which include

an essential right, right to exist. It is the identity of parties that is non-negotiable and its

recognition during the negotiation is irreplaceable. As we referred earlier identities are

not fixed but once they are formed they are resistant to change, hence is not a matter to

be compromised on. Identities should deem to be predetermined and agreed on in pre-

negotiation period. In the initial periods of interaction, recognition does not have to be in

the formal manner yet de-facto acknowledgement of identity must be assigned to the

adversary especially when the conflict is related to ethnicity. On the role of identity

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recognition Vsevolod W. Isajiw states that: ―Identity recognition provides integrity to the

process of interethnic negotiation and in difficult cases of negotiation even one or a few actions

which symbolically detract from identity recognition will have the effect of undermining the entire

process.‖180

The path to negotiation is not a mere settlement of the specific issues, but it also

refers to the change of relationships; alterations on the mode of interaction,

moderation of attitudes, norms, customs and law as well.181 The recognition of identity

is the basic tenet of relation transformation, which eases the tension and paves the

way for negotiation of specific issues. The recognition of identity expresses the

willingness of each part to be accounted equal on the negotiation table. Power

asymmetry tames by identity symmetry which can be attained by recognition of

identities. Namely the parties are on equal footing in negotiation when identity

recognition ensured. The refusal of identities however has damaging effect and

mostly leads to escalation of tension among groups or among a group and state.

Isavij again considers that the main agent to perform the recognition of identity is the

one that is public and possesses legitimate power. Recognition of identity by

legitimate power send message to the other side that they are taken seriously as a

negotiation counterpart. Some symbolic action like adopting multilingual educational

system or TV broadcasting in minorities‘ language in state-funded media institutions

imply an implicit recognition of identity of other party. Recognition means recognition

of rights as well, because existence entails rights. The process might go in both ways;

either to give some rights to identity groups that is an inexplicit acceptance or official

acceptance; only after recognition whether implicitly or explicitly parties will accept to

solve their differences via cooperative and joint action. If the core issue of problem is

identity, recognition of it pave the way for common understanding and identifying the

problem, which at times become a very serious issues of dispute that block the efforts

to the settlement of the problem. If parties disagree on the definition and name of

problem, the efforts are of no avail.

180

Vsevolod W. Isajiw (2000), ―Approaches to ethnic conflict resolution: paradigms and Principles‖, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Vol. 24, pp. 105-124. 181

Ibid.

82

Brenda Reed singled out three elements that shows recognition is provided. These

are;

a) The party moves from self-absorption to attentiveness to others.

b) The party becomes more open, more receptive, more responsive, and

c) The party exercises and strengthens their capacity for responsiveness to

others.182

The three elements aim at transforming the relationship, which has disrupted during

the course of conflict and it is a prior necessity before the need to negotiate specific

issues. Recognition of identity is the basic feature of transforming the relationship so

that parties can encounter and discuss other remaining issues.

In addition, recognition of identity entails the acceptance of legitimate goals of other

side as well, which means they are entitled to be subject of talks later on. As a case in

point for a long period of time Israel refused to acquiesce PLO as a legitimate

representative of Palestine people and called his leader Arafat as terrorist. Thus they

wouldn‘t meet him because they refused to meet a ―terrorist‖ and did not take him in

to consideration as negotiation counterparty. Rather they meet with other supposed

PLO leaders which proved no outcome since they do not have real authority. The real

power of PLO was at the hand of Arafat and he had not wished to give concession

unless he would be recognized as a legitimate leader and allowed to come to

negotiation table. Only after Israel begin to meet recognize PLO and its real

leadership the efforts brought about 1993 Oslo accords. In Lebanon the constitution

that recognize all ethnic and religious groups and entitle them with some power on

their communities matters generated three decade long peace and stability to the

country.

For the most part of the Republic, state policy had been to deny any recognition

demands by Kurds for their identity. The main policy has been to define the issue a

problem of backwardness, tribalism183, etc. Further some attempts by politician to

name the issue as Kurdish problem, were faced with severe reactions by army

182

Brenda Reed, "Empowerment & Recognition in Mediation," [available at:http://www.mediate.com/BrendaReed/pg2.cfm, 2004.] 183

Yeğen Mesut; ―The Kurdish Question In State The Turkish State Discourse‖, Journal Of Contemporary History, Sage Publication, London, Vol. 34(4), pp. 555-568

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bureaucrats and after this reaction those attempts were relocated.184Only in 2005,

President Erdoğan voiced the Kurdish reality and explicitly named it as Kurdish

Question.185 Although later he expressed his regret186, arguably it can be said that the

Kurdish de facto identity has been recognized. However, as we stressed above there

must be receptiveness and responsiveness to the other which seems lacked in

Kurdish issue. Governments still are hesitant and ambivalent to a fully recognition.

Moreover what had done in respect to recognition does not have legal bases, which

can potential to be revoked by subsequent governments.

3.3.2.2 Self-Rule

Along the same line in the institutional design of self-rule ought to be taken into

consideration. Again Galtung eloquently states roughly ―every nation wants to be

ruled by their own kind, even if they are not kind‖ 187 Many other scholars have

pointed out the importance of self-ruling arrangements such as autonomy and

federalism. For example Stephan Saidman find that ―federalism reduces the level of

ethnic violence and Nancy Bermeo concludes that federal institutions promote

successful accommodation in the case of ethnic conflict‖188 On the other hand other

scholars argue that arrangement like territorial autonomy trigger secessionist

tendencies rather than cures the national aspirations. As for that Galtung requests the

alternative option of non-territorial autonomy which does not put the focus on

territorial base, (regional autonomy) but rather on the identity itself. Yet still there are

strong arguments regarding to territorial autonomy on the base that; territorial

autonomy enable groups to determine their own affairs while at the same time

184

In 1993 the Prime Minister Tansu Çiller attempted to remove some obstacles to express ethnic identity, but later she was persuaded by military high rank bureaucrat to abandon that policy. Heper Metin (2007), The State and Kurds in Turkey The Question of Assimilation Pagrave Mcmillian, London, p.139. 185

Akyeşilmen,Nezir ―Revisiting Kurdish Question In Turkey: A Hope For Solution‖ The Journal of Social And Economic Research, Selçuk Üniversitesi vol 25, 2013 p 89. Indeed a nonmilitary solution had been tried by Turgut Ozal. However those efforts came to an abrupt end when he died in 1993. Subsequent goverment efforts were hindered by the heavy hands of Turkish Military. Erdoğan is the first prime minister to have a policy venue free of military impact concerning to Kurdish issue. 186

http://t24.com.tr/haber/erdogan-kurt-sorunu-diyerek-yanlis-yaptim,216461 187

Drawed from the class given by Galtund in Hacettepe Peace and Con poliflict studies Master Programme in 2013. 188

Quoted in Wolf Stefan (2011), ―Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflict. The Merits and Perils of Territorial Accomodation‖, Political Studies Review, 9(1,) p.28.

84

allows the majority to maintain territorial integrity and mitigate separatist

tendencies.189 In other words, autonomy allows both state to maintain the goal to

secure territorial integrity, and minority groups to achieve their goal to decide and

direct their own affairs.

In September 2014 referendum in Scotland over the independence and staying inside

United Kingdom that resulted in favor of unity with UK, rather than independence had

provide us with a strong and convincing proof that autonomy at times strengthen the

unity of entity by accommodating different identities rather than assimilating or

excluding them. The principles of ―Feel At Home‖ and ―to be ruled by its own kind‖

that propounded by Galtung provide a wise road map for negotiators to arrange

institution that satisfy these needs. By this means for separatist wave might be eased.

It is best to make clear that, the election system of state either allows the ethnic

groups to be represented in governmental bodies or to be excluded from those

bodies. Thereby an agreement on election system should cover some amendments

that pave the way for equal representation among groups. Self-rule thus does not limit

to domestic level also can be expanded to national level as well. In other words the

more equal representation in governmental power in national level, lead to more fair

decision making on domestic level.

Lastly constitutional amendments to accommodate identity claims avert fragmentation

of a state. Drafting a new constitution that cover major amendments ranging from

language rights to election system, to decentralization on cultural and societal issues,

that grant minorities with some rights, will provide minorities what they would expect

to have, if they would have been separated, but without actual separation.

In the studies regarding to Kurdish issues, self-rule has been widely discussed.190 Yet

any arrangement of self-rule do not necessarily prescribe a secessionist outcome.

189

Badran, Ramzi (2011), A Peace Agreement Theory: Contractıng For Sustaınable Peace, Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate School of Binghamton University, State University Of New York.. 190

For examples see ―The Kurdish Question And Turkey; An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict, Southgate, London, 1997.and Gürbey, Gülistan, ―Peaceful Settlement Of Turkey Kurdish Conflict Through Aoutonomy?‖ ,in İbrahim Ferhad and Gürbey Gülistan(ed.) The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey:Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy St Martin‟s Press, Newyork 2000, p57.

85

Especially after the detention of Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, the PKK and its political

wings have moderated their goals, and began to propose a democratic solution to

Kurdish issue. Further they proposed a democratic autonomy that is not only

regarding to Kurds, but the whole Turkey. For Turkey as well, the best solution

seems to be a self-rule that is not mainly based on non-territorial options since the

half of Kurdish population are already inhabited in Western cities. Particularly in an

era that the neighbors Kurds are gaining extensive rights, Turkey needs to

accommodate its own Kurds rising expectation. As a radical proposition would be to

leave the Kurds to decide their own destination, which does not always necessarily

lead to secession, but even more integration. The political system of Turkey need to

be broaden to be able to accommodate the identity demand of Kurds so that the

principle of ―Feel at Home‖ propounded by Galtung can be attained. Another

proposition regarding to self-rule principle in Kurdish issue is to bring elections and

abolish the appointment system from Ankara city governor known as ―Vali‖ who has

great powers on city affairs, so that the duality of state and people on governmental

issues be eliminated and people become the sole source of decision making

mechanism.

3.3.2.3 Powerful Leadership

In the first chapter we define ―elite politics‖ as source of internal conflict. The idea was

that, it is elites are who trigger and drive the conflict for political and personal gains. In

other words they exploit and making use of fault lines within society.

Endurable peace also requires good leadership that has the power to lead the societies

towards peace. Powerful leaders have abilities to persuade their constituents, to start,

proceed talks, and implement the possible agreement terms, convince their constituents

to come to the terms with the past, and provide people the motivation and belief

necessary for the process. Besides, powerful leaders can prevent possible splits within

their party‘s ranks, and maintain unity against possible spoilers. Thereby a charismatic

leader has an extreme impact on achieving an endurable peace.

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Nelson Mandela with his charismatic leadership has transformed a society that has

plagued by bloodshed and painful past, to a visionary, peaceful, and tolerant society in

which blacks and whites can coexist. His white counterpart De-Klerk equally contributed

to this peaceful outcome. South Africa can be defined as a country that achieved peace

with powerful leadership. Similarly Northern Ireland troubles also have taken the route

towards a peaceful transformation, thanks to powerful leadership of both catholic and

protestant parties. In 2005 the leader of pro-IRA party Sin Fein Garry Adams call to IRA

for ultimate farewell to the arms and to use exclusively peaceful means was a decisive

moment for the course of conflict. These examples illustrates that charismatic powerful

leaders are those who have transformative impact on the masses that have deeply

affected by the legacy of war. They can call on their people to suspend their hostilities

and unite behind the peaceful transformation.

Secondly leaders by setting the stage for settlement run the risk of being accused of

treason for talking to enemy, become vulnerable to the criticism and within their group

ranks their authorities may be challenged by opponents191. Thereby powerful

leadership may require taking those risks and putting a strong political will towards

settlement. It also requires a vision for a common future for the people rather than

calculations for next elections and ―retaining office‖. In other words powerful

leadership means and necessitates risk taking for the sake of peace. Sometimes the

risk may entail to acquiesce the defeat and the only person has authority to get the

populace to swallow bitter pill is powerful leaders. Charles de Gaulle plays this role in

1961, when he recognize the independence of Algeria. Likewise did Marshal Petain in

France and Carl Mannerheim in Finland have led their communities for similar

occasion in 1940 and 1944 respectively?192 These examples obviously illustrate

determination and courage of leaders during historical moments for peace is

extremely significant to ward off dissents and opposition that are highly likely to

emerge. The role of leaders as peacemaker has not been emphasized as much as

their role as warmonger or villains in the scholarly studies. This partly stems from the

fact that violence and war draw more attention than peace initiatives. To save lives, 191

Hartzell, Caroline A Hoddie (2007), ―Crafting Peace: power-sharing institutions and the negotiated settlement of civil wars The Pennsylvania State University Press. 192

Barash David P.,Webel,Charles P. (2014), Peace And Conflict Studies Sage California, p. 206.

87

has not as much news value, as to commit killings. Nevertheless the inspiration that a

leader such Gandhi, Martin Luther K.J. or Mandela has given to their communities as

well as to the word has clearly has emphasized and proved the role of leaders in

peace initiatives.

Ongoing peace process relating to Kurdish issue apparently could be viable thanks to

powerful leaderships of both sides respectively. Influence of Erdogan on Turkish

public is indisputably crucial for the maintenance of the talks and similarly the

charisma of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan among PKK members and supporters have

great impact on the sustainability of the process. Both have the power to lead the

people that are on the opposite side of political life, towards cooperative actions

aimed at bringing about endurable peace. As we mentioned before there will be some

people or fraction that will not satisfy with the term of peace as is the case in Turkey

as well. Especially in a country that political life is highly polarized like Turkey

powerful leadership is a sine non qua of a peace solution. Otherwise the spoilers will

be ready to break the hope and ruin the process. For Turkey the role of Erdogan and

Öcalan should be reinforced, so that they can unite their supporters for the sake of

peace. In addition to that they must give messages to other side‘s to gain their trust

as happened in the case of South Africa. Powerful leadership sanctions the

emergence of new elites to instigate future conflicts since they dominate the political

area and prevent emergence of new leader. That is another elements of why the role

of Erdogan for Turkish public and Ocalan for PKK is vital component of peace. Lastly

both figures are over their sixties and they will want to be remembered as

peacemaker of Turkey rather than to be recalled as figures of bloody past. Thereby

their leadership on the issue must be more encouraged. Even though powerful

leaders are not preferable for overall democratic system, it is vital for peace.

3.3.3. Reversing the Cultural and Perceptual Root Causes

3.3.3.1 Truth and Reconciliation

As a last but not least, element of endurable peace is truth and reconciliation. Group

histories as we mentioned in the previous, might be the source of present conflicts.

88

Every war or conflict brings about extreme sufferings to the society in terms of losing

lives, displacement of peoples, mass atrocities and war crimes, casualties etc. For a

stable future, societies need to reconcile with their past. Cycle of violence mainly

continue due to grievances, anger, frustration, and desire for vengeance that rooted

in the pains of war. Societies without revealing the truth regarding to what happened

in the past, and coming to the terms with that past, will transform those conflicts to the

next generations.

That is why peace agreements generally followed by forming of a truth and

reconciliation commissions, the task of which are to deal with past wrongdoings,

encountering victims and perpetrators, heal the wounds, and creating an environment

that forgiveness could take place between different factions of the society. Any refusal

to exert this task will seed the saw of next war. Two or three groups alienated from

one another cannot leave in a state of perpetual animosity within one unity forever. To

put it differently societies which dealt with reconciliation task conceivably achieve the

unity within the society whereas those who failed to carry out reconciliation proved to

be highly divided societies. Reconciliation initiatives for the most part launched in

intra-state conflicts, where even after war ends people continue to live in one entity

together.

Lederach define reconciliation in four sequences. ―Truth‖, ―Mercy‖, ―Justice‖ and

―Peace‖193. Namely endurable peace is an outcome of those three elements. Again

powerful leaders with robust institutional bodies can persuade society and carry those

missions of revealing ―Truths‖, ―Mercy‖ ―Justice‖ and ―Peace.‖

The main problem of reconciliation regards to timing of launching truth and

reconciliation initiatives. Most of studies reveal that building such commission either

coincide with slightly after fight ends and term of peace determined or long after the

fight ends. Whenever the reconciliation mission is being carried, it is obvious that

while fighting proceed it is difficult and dangerous to launch such an initiative. That is

because pains are fresh and victim and perpetrator are uncertain to define during the

193

Lederach John Paul (1997), ―Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies Washington D:C. United States Institute of Peace Press..

89

fighting. Further such effort might trigger frustration and anger which fans flame of

conflict.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa was just initiated after fight

ended. However Peace in Northern Ireland has never initiated such a mission except

some minor efforts by some organization. It can be argued that because of

reconciliation mission has not been completed Northern Ireland remained divided

despite the fact that fight has ended.

Reconciliation paves the way to coexistence and harmony between former

antagonists. Although reconciliation seems to be distinct process from negotiation

indeed they are connected.194 Reconciliation is a continuation of negotiation and it

paves the way for peace that is an outcome of negotiation- to take roots among the

former enemies. Thereby reconciliation is a long term task whereas negotiation is

respectively a short term mission.

Institutions for the task of reconciliation sooner or later should be designed. To

include terms for reconciliation in the agreement will facilitate and give a legal basis

for such initiatives of reconciliation.

It has been extensively spelled in political and academicals circles for a need to

establish a truth and reconciliation commission for Kurdish issue. The memory of

notorious Diyarbakır prison, disappearance, killings displacements throughout 1990s

have generated sufferings, grievances and frustration, which still flaming the conflict.

In addition to near past incidents, earlier wrongdoings such as Dersim (1938) should

be addressed. Unaddressed wounds result in emergence of narratives oh history

among people that is mostly hostile and tend show an insecure discourse towards

state or the other group. Those attitudes reflected to behaviors or misbehaviors which

then lead to misperceptions among people.

A research done by Police Academy in Turkey demonstrates that one of the motives

of PKK members for joining the organization is as expressed by members

194

Rossoux Valerie (2003), ―Is Reconciliation Negotiable?‖, International Negotiations, Vol 18, pp. 471-493.

90

vengeance of a relative lost in the fight.195 Reconciliation and feeling of justice and

forgiveness evidently will curb the temptation to fight and for that to happen steps of

truth, which refers what really happened, mercy, a feeling of empathy with other side,

justice, coming to terms with the past, and peace that is endurable and stable should

be taken in Kurdish issue, but all those steps entail an environment in which fight has

stopped. While fight proceed it is impossible to carry out a reconciliation initiative, but

peace without reconciliation will render vulnerable to re-ignition of violence and the

goals of unity and harmony cannot be achieved where the society remain deeply

divided.

3.3.3.2. Discourse

Many conflicts escalate or deescalate partly because of the party‘s representatives,

leaders or proponents discourse against their adversary. Mostly rival parties use an

insulting and humiliating language towards their opponents. Sometimes the derogatory

rhetoric used by party reaches to the extent of dehumanization and demonization of the

other. The rationale behind this usage is simply that, by attributing bad and evil traits to

the adversary, unfair treatment, misdoing and injustice towards them are being

legitimized. The aggressive behaviors towards the other are being provoked by this

derogatory rhetoric. Putting the blame on the other, and avoiding responsibility and

burden of the conflict obstruct reasonable and wisely actions by parties. Moreover

presenting the world as either black or white areas - good and evil - the usage of

humiliating language, functions to tighten the ranks inside the group by eliminating

moderate and midway stances and turns the softs to the hardliners. Moreover by

employing a particular language parties or leaders manipulate and deviate from the

truth.

Likewise the discourse has effect to tame the conflict when being employed

circumspectly. A language that favors peace, and deprecate aggression, will have a

spillover effect both on supporters and opposite side.

195

Özeren Süleyman and Others (2012), ―Bireylerin Terör Örgütüne Katılmasına Etki Eden Faktörler Üzerine Bir Alan Çalışması: PKK/KCK Örneği‖ International Journal of Security and Terrorism, Cilt: 3 (2), pp..57-83.

91

In some occasion to keep silent is better than talking on the issue. Wise politicians are

aware of their impact on their constituents and must act accordingly. Non-aggressive

discourse will prepare the population to the peaceful future. Otherwise an agreement on

paper without the consent of people will fail sooner or later. Non-aggressive discourse is

an important component of consent. Further such a language will reinforce the trust of

opponent‘s population towards the one who use that language as well.

In addition to well timing, discourse is also a vital element to diminish the security

dilemma of the adversaries. Language partly if not wholly, reveals the parties intentions

and when employed mildly, it gives a clear message to the opponent of one‘s

willingness to reconcile and lessens the fears. Yet a demonizing and insulting rhetoric is

a distinct indication of the parties‘ readiness to fight which in turn fuels the suspicions of

either party. In the first chapter we referred to a Bourdieu‘s quote that reads: “it is

political leaders who emphasize the differences, who have the power of imposing the

vision of divisions that is the power of making visible and explicit social divisions that are

implicit‖196. In fact actors do that by means of language. On the other hand they also

have the power to emphasize affinities, and have the power of imposing the vision of

unity that is the power of making visible and explicit social cohesion that are implicit. It is

only a matter of how they employ the language and the kind of discourse they resort.

For a stable peace to be achieved, a discourse that highlights cohesiveness, favors

peace over violence and avoid demonizing and humiliating language, should be adopted

not only by leader, but also by people who have direct or indirect relation to the conflict.

When sides have suspicious perception toward one another, the worst meanings will be

attached to what other says. Careless use of language thus might be quite destructive

for perceptions. Parties during dialogue tend to test the other side either to validate or

adjust its initial perception197. Validation of negative perception becomes fact when the

opponent‘s discourse is inattentive and demonizing. Meanwhile fears that drive the

parties to misperceptions are validated and aggravated by the negative usage of

language, whereas those misperceptions diminish with a positive, constructive and

peaceful discourse. Simon observes that ―Activity or inactivity, words or silence, all have

196

http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/26506/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/bba173d5-10ab-4577-8d49-60d8256e778d/en/PN04.02.pdf 197

Nikolaev Alexander G. (2007), ―International Negotiations: Theory Practice and The Connection with Domestic Politics‖, Lexington, Plymouth,, p. 24.

92

message value: they influence others and these others, in turn, cannot not respond to

these communications and are thus themselves communicating‖198 Especially during the

talks parties tend to be more sensitive in regards to attaching the meaning to the words

and actions of other side. That is the reason why discourse has been put as a vital

element for reversing cultural and perceptual factors.

Parties in Kurdish issue mainly employ a harsh discourse towards other side; especially

in public statement, this harsh stance is more evident. Frequently parties blame other

side199 on the grounds of harboring ill will. This discourse effects grassroots perceptions

as well. Occasionally the harsh rhetoric reaches to the extent of demonizing the other

side, despite the fact that parties are in the process of talks. More importantly the

discourses that legitimize and stress the need for continuation of armed struggle or

counterterrorism policy, despite the fact that whether they are tactical or long term

strategies, are not clear, the effect on the public perception is destructive, because

public support is vital for a Kurdish peace. For that reason path to peace starts with a

peaceful discourse of parties.200

198

İbid, p. 24. 199

http://www.haberler.com/aydogan-akdogan-baris-dili-ni-kullanmali-6695013-haberi/ 200

Reversing economic and social factors were not touched open for those are beyond our field of study and reqire more technical elaboration.

93

CONCLUSION

Kurdish issue in Turkey has been evolving through different stages and at present it is in

a phase of opportunity for resolution. The issue with its historical dynamics is a

complicated matter with impacts on different dimension of political life of Turkey ranging

from democracy, to culture to socioeconomic condition of people etc. Arguably a

peaceful solution to the conflict will have enormous positive implication on different

areas of life in Turkey. Moreover that implication without doubt will have impact on

regional level as well.

As is the case in Kurdish issue most wars and conflicts occurs within state rather than

between states. Especially post-Cold War era give a momentum to this situation. Most

of conflicts were suppressed by greater confrontation of ideological poles. After the

confrontation between USA and Soviet Union disappear the cleavages within the states

have surfaced or gained momentum. Although Kurdish issue has its roots back to last

period of Ottoman Empire, the most intensive widespread clashes happened through

1990s.

Intra-state conflict refers to conflict the source of which is mainly domestic and violence

occurs within the border of state. However all Intra-state conflicts and wars are not in

identical form. Their type extensively varies. They can be in the form of extensive armed

conflict, between state and insurgent group, or intercommunal. It is possible to extend

the list of types. Yet the classification of ethnic/identity based intra-state conflict and

ideological based intra-state conflict, was explained due to this classification is

satisfactory enough to cover main and specify main differences. Moreover the

classification done by ―Correlates of War‖201 to distinguish the types of war provides a

helpful tool to determine whether a conflict has escalated to a civil war or not and if yes

what type of war is it.

The primary difference between identity/ethnic based conflict and ideological based

conflict is that in the former one allegiances to cause are more fixed and resistant to

transformation and for the most part issue at stake touches to territorial issue, while in

201

Sarkees Meredith Reid and Schafer Phil (2000), ―The Correlates of War Data on War: an Uptade to 1997‖, Conflict Management And Peace Science, Vol. 18 No 1, pp.123-144.‖HE

94

the later one allegiances are more flexible and the issue in dispute is mostly over the

type of governance and regime of state. As a subset of ethnic conflict ethno politic

conflicts refers to the conflicts, where motivational force emanate from ethnicity, while it

is not always necessary and immediate reason for the conflict.

Regardless of the types of intra-state conflict there are four factors specified in the thesis

that give rise to intra-state conflict. Those are structural factors, political factors,

socioeconomic factors and cultural perceptual factors. There are three structural factors.

The first weak state which refers to inability of state and state institutions to exert power,

that result in a power vacuum and anarchical like situation, which then become the

source of conflict. The second one is ―security dilemma‖, which is the outcome of vicious

circle generated by parties or groups actions that provoke the other side‘s fear and they

feel forced to follow the suit and so forth. The last structural factor is ethnic geography.

The distribution of an ethnic group over the country, the density of group or their size in

the overall population of country, and kinships in neighbour country are all elements of

ethnic geography, which determine the course of intra-state conflict. There are four

political factors. The first is ―discriminatory political institutions‖ that implies differences

and gaps between economic and political rights of the any particular group members

comparing to other groups in the political institutions, which raise grievances among

discriminated groups. The second is exclusionary national ideologies that is regarding to

narrow founding ideology of state that excludes some of elements or identities from its

citizenship definition that invoke those excluded parts to mobilize conflict. The third

political factor is intergroup relation which regards to group relation in the course of

history or newly established relations. If those relations had been negative it effects

present time and may seed conflict. The last political factor is elite politics, which explain

the conflicts mainly as an elites driven phenomenon. To this line of thought, it is elites

are who mobilise and encourage groups by exploiting the turmoil‘s and grievances the

mass experiencing: Namely it is argued that elites make explicit the fault lines to

mobilize the conflict. Economic and social factors highlight the wellbeing of a group or

society as a determinant of intra-state conflict. If ethnic lines overlap with economic

deprivation the conflict become more intractable and complex. Further if a period of

95

development follows an enormous sharp, which is quite contrary to the expectations,

this situation leads to a high vulnerability to conflict.

When we consider Kurdish issue from the lenses of above factors they seem quite

relevant and explanatory for Kurdish issue. The root causes of Kurdish issue can be

traced back to last period of Ottoman Empire. After the policy of centralization adopted

by late Ottoman Sultans Kurdish nobles and Mirs (princes) had lost their autonomy in

their region which pave the way to the subsequent rebellions throughout to the last year

of Empire. The foundation of new Republic though was not against the rights of Kurds in

initial years, later on brought about harsh sanctions in terms of Kurdish rights and

identity. Building on the principle of nation states, Kurds found themselves excluded

from the new identity of the state. Those exclusionary ideology and cultural

discrimination policies that aimed at Turkification of all Muslim elements ignite the series

of Kurdish rebellions that began from Sheikh Said insurgency in 1925, one of most

important and influential upheaval in Kurdish rebellions history. Nevertheless those

rebellions had different motivational ground and Kurdish nationalism was only one

motivational factor among others. Those rebellions were harshly crushed by

governmental forces and the series of rebellions lost their momentum in 1940s. The

years 1940 to 1960 passed with a quite silence in terms of Kurdish political mobility and

till 1960 to 1980s the Kurdish political movement followed a policy aiming at cultural

recognition and rights of Kurds within left wing and socialist Turkish parties. It is

important to point that the silence year of Kurdish political activity was also the intense

period of Cold War. The emergence of PKK has been a decisive moment in Kurdish

political movement in terms of its effect and broadness. In effect the grave oppression

exerted by 1980 military coup-detat gave a violent direction to Kurdish issue.

Throughout 1990s in the immediate post Cold War era, an intense fight was waged

between government‘s security forces and PKK. The fight went back and forth till 1999

when PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured by Turkey. Ocalan declared a cease

fire just after his detention. Meanwhile during 2000s, Turkey efforts for EU accession

pave the way for extensive reformation in constitution and laws which were mainly

regards to democratization process of Turkey and specially touching to Kurdish issue. In

2004 PKK ended the cease fire, but in 2009 the government initiated a democratic

96

opening aimed at ending log decade Kurdish conflict. As the part of the ―Opening‖ a

state based TV channel broadcasting in Kurdish and Living Language Institute that

would have departments on Kurdish language was established. The initiative ended for

various reason and parties blame the other side as responsible for halting of the

―opening‖ later the conflict escalated to a very high level in 2012 and a death fast was

launched by PKK‘s prisoners members. The demand of prisoner was the renewal of

contact and visits with Ocalan and the right to defence in mother language in the courts.

The government contact to Ocalan while the condition of the prisoner in fast became

critical. Ocalan called the end to the fasts which was observed immediately by prisoners.

In 21 March 2013 he made another call to PKK members to withdraw Turkish soil.

Although some units of PKK began to withdraw, later the withdrawals were stopped.

Talks among Ocalan, Turkish intelligence, government Kurdish party BDP and PKK

leaderships are ongoing with back and forth.

Bearing in mind this historical legacy the root causes that we propounded seems highly

relevant both in terms of historical context and current dynamics. When we consider

structural factors weak state, security dilemma and ethnic geography is very explanatory

for Kurdish conflict. The state institution remain very ineffective in Kurdish region,

Security dilemma of both side has been exacerbated by a quasi-anarchical and war

ridden environment of region and ethnic density of Kurds in the region and their relation

with their neighbour brethren are all important element of Kurdish issue.

In terms of political factors the ―discriminatory political institutions‖ such as the obstacle

on the fair representation of Kurds in parliament, which made possible by ten percent

election threshold or unintentionally exclusion of Kurds from institution because of ill

education opportunities, exclusionary national ideology, which embodied in the task of

establishing a homogenous identity within state and the principles of nation state that

grants and favour only one dominant identity within the territory of state and ―elite

politics‖ figures like Abdullah Ocalan that are mobilizing masses on these grounds are

revealing the root cause behind the conflict. ―Intergroup Politics‖ seem to be favourable

comparing to other factors. Turks and Kurds relation in history for the most part have

been favourable. However, the rising encounters of Kurds and Turks in industrialized

cities lead to competition and Intergroup politics gradually worsen.

97

When we consider socio-economic factors the Kurdish region has worsened extensively

on this terms their situation ottoman era comparing to other region. Especially because

ethnic lines overlap with socio economical backwardness the issue become more

intractable.

Lastly when we consider cultural and perceptual factors, ―cultural discrimination‖ policies

of government had been based on assimilation and Turkification of Kurds, with non-

acceptance and recognition of any cultural rights at all. Regarding to group histories and

perception factors the situation tend to be negative. National symbols, memories of

wars, indoctrination of nationalism have worsened the perception of Turks and Kurds

towards each other.

Is there a way out from the impasses of root cause? Could those factors be reversed?

The thesis proposed same policies to overcome those root causes. For structural

factors, Institutionalization, security guarantees, well timing proposed as for reversing

political factors identity recognition, powerful leadership and principle of self-rule are

recommended whereas for cultural and perceptual factors to be overcame truth and

reconciliation policy with wise discourse are suggested. When we consider Kurdish

issue those policy recommendations seems to be ignored by policy makers and

parties to conflict for an endurable peace.

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