THE ROLE OF IGADIN CONFLICT

RESOLUTION IN THEHORN OF AFRICA:THE SOMALIA CASE

BY: FANUEL LAKEW6/1/2012ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSTY

THE ROLE OF IGAD IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN

THE HORN OF AFRICA: THE SOMALIA CASE

A Senior Essay

By

FANUEL LAKEW

A Senior Essay Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirement for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts

in Political Science and International Relations

Essay Advisor

Tesfaye Molla (Ato)

Department of Political science and

International Relations

Addis Ababa University

June, 2012

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGES

ACKOWLEDGEMENT

ACRONYMS

MAP

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of the

Problem-----------------------------------------------------

1.2 Significance of the

Study-----------------------------------------------------

1.3 Objective of the

Study--------------------------------------------------------

-

1.3.1 General

objective----------------------------------------------------

---

1.3.2 Specific

objectives---------------------------------------------------

---

1.4 Hypothesis---------------------------------------------

-------------------------

1.5 Definition of

Terms--------------------------------------------------------

----

1.5.1 Conflict

Prevention---------------------------------------------------

-

1.5.2 Conflict

Management-------------------------------------------------

1.5.3 Conflict

Resolution---------------------------------------------------

-

1.6 Method and Methodology of the

Study-------------------------------------

1.7 Scope of the

Study--------------------------------------------------------

-----

1.8 Research

Questions----------------------------------------------------

--------

1.9 Organization of the Study

----------------------------------------------------

II GENERAL BACKGROUND: THE IGAD AND

CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

2.1 An Over View of Conflicts in Horn of

Africa------------------------------

2.2 IGAD and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of

Africa---------------------

2.2.1 Conflict Prevention, Management, and

Resolution Mechanism of ---

the IGAD

2.3 The IGAD- AU Relations in Conflict

Resolution-------------------------

2.4 Co operations and Interferences

among the members of IGAD in Conflict

Resolution--------------------------------------

-----------------------

2.5 IGAD as Compared with the OAS and Arab

League---------------------

III TRIBAL (CLAN) CONFLICTS AND INTER-STATE CONFLICT

IN

SOMALIA

3.1 Tribal (Clan) Conflict in

Somalia---------------------------------------------------

3.1.1 The Roots of the

Conflict------------------------------------------------------

3.1.1.1 The Pre-Colonial

Era--------------------------------------------------

3.1.1.2 The Aggravation of Tribal

(Clan) Conflict-------------------------

3.1.2 The Tribal (Clan) Conflicts in the

Post Colonial Period--------------------

3.1.2.1 The Post- Colonial

Period---------------------------------------------

3.1.2.2 The Effects of Tribal

(Clan) conflicts-------------------------------

3.2 Inter-State Conflicts in

Somalia-------------------------------------------------------

3.2.1 The Ethio-Somalia War of

2006------------------------------------------------

3.2.1.1 The Causes of the

War-------------------------------------------------

3.2.1.2 The Courses of the

War------------------------------------------------

3.2.1.3 The Consequences of the

War----------------------------------------

IV THE ROLE OF IGAD IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

4.1 The Role of IGAD in

Somalia----------------------------------------------

-------------

4.1.1 The Arta Conference of

2000-------------------------------------------------

----

4.1.2 The Eldorcet Peace

Process----------------------------------------------

---------

4.1.3 The Challenges of IGAD in Conflict

Resolution-------------------------------

4.1.4 The Efforts of IGAD in Conflict

Resolution------------------------------------

V CONCLUSION

BIBLOGRAPHY

ACNOWLEDGMENT

First and foremost I praise Almighty God for

enabling me to complete this work.

I would like to thank my Advisor Ato Tesfaye

Molla for his comments, advices and suggestions ideas

during the writing of this essay.

I would like also to express my heartfelt

gratitude to my father, Ato Lakew Gedlegiorgis, my

mother, W/o Bizunesh Meskela, Daniel Mahri and the

whole of my family for their financial and moral

support through my academic career.

For granting me access to materials I thank the

staff members of the Conflict Early Warning and

Response Mechanism of IGAD. I also thank Yohannes

Admasu and Israel Shamel for their willingness to

access their Laptop computer in doing my senior Essay.

Finally, my thanks to my supportive and loving

friends for their moral assistance in my three years

stay in the University.

Acronyms

AMISOM African UnionPeacekeeping Mission in Somalia

ARPCT Alliance for Restoration of Peace and CounterTerrorism

AU AfricanUnion

CEWARN Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

CSOs Civil Society Organizations

EU European Union

IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

IGADD Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification

IGASOM IGAD Peace Keeping Mission to Somalia

IPF IGAD Partners Forum

NGO Non-Governmental Organizations

OAS Organization of American States

OLF Oromo Liberation Movement

ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front

RECs Regional Economic Communities

SADC Southern Africa development Community

SNM Somali National Movement

SPLA Sudanese People’s Liberation Army

SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front

TFG Transitional Federal Government

TFG II Transitional Federal Government II

TNC Transitional National Government

UIC Union of Islamic Courts

UN United Nations

UNHCR United NationsHigh Commissions for Refugees

USA United States of America

USC United Somali Congress

Chapter I

IntroductionThe Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and

Desertification (IGADD) was created in 1986 with a very

narrow mandate in the order of the issue of Drought and

Desertification. While then, and especially in the 1990s,

IGADD become the acknowledged medium for regional security

and political dialogue. (IGAD, 1996: 1)

The founding members of IGADD decided in the mid- 1990s to

revive the organization into a fully-fledge regional

political, economic, development trade and security entity

alike to SADC and ECOWAS. (Ibid)

It was envisaged that the new IGADD would type the northern

sector of COMESA with SADC representing the Southern sector.

One of the primary motivations for the revival of IGADD was

the survival of numerous organizational and structural

problems that made the implementation of its goals and

principles unsuccessful. (Ibid: 2)

The IGADD Heads of State and governmental met on18 April 1995 at an extraordinary Summit in AddisAbaba and resolved to revitalize the Authority andexpand its area of regional cooperation. On 25March 1996, the Heads and government at the secondExtraordinary Summit in Nairobi approved andadopted an Agreement establishing the

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).(Ibid)

IGAD aims to develop the areas of regional collaboration,

enhance the members’ dependency on one another and encourage

policies of peace and stability in the region in order to

reach food security, sustainable development management and

sustainable development. (Ibid)

In general, there is no consensus on the states that

compromise the region, but, for this paper, I will consider

the following IGAD’s member states; Ethiopia, Eritrea,

Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan (North and South) and Uganda

because of not only geography of the region but its

politics.

The Horn of Africa countries share geographic boundary and

culture. Somalia is one of the countries in the Horn of

Africa that has a mono ethnic group. But its mono ethnic

could not protect from the instability such as civil war,

tribe war or clannism and territorial or boundary disputes.

The conflict in Somalia engenders human crisis in the

country. As it is likely to see the cases of all the Horn of

Africa countries in this senior essay, I confine my study to

Somalia.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

The Horn of Africa is one of the multi-ethnic andunstable regions in the world. Boarder conflicts

such as that of Somalia and Ethiopia, Eritrea andEthiopia, civil wars between southern and northernSudan, tribal wars in Somalia, clashes that occurbetween governments in power which want to keepthe existing status quo and nationalists motivatedgroups that struggle to manipulate and address theinterests of certain groups to break away from theexisting political entities and become sovereign,or join other states which they think ethicallycompatible have made the Horn of Africa quiteunstable. (Assefa, 2005:)

One of the countries, in the Horn of Africa, that is highly

affected by intra and inter-state conflicts--clannism,endemic clashes over resources and power and territory and

boundary disputes with the neighbor countries, is the state

of Somalia. This presents a major challenge to their

challenge to the regional organization, IGAD. Although, the

IGAD has paid attention, the complexity of the problems in

the region inhibits it from taking the needed measures.

1.2 S

ignificance of the Study

This senior essay tries to give some knowledge about the

roots of the conflicts in Somalia, as well as their

devastation. It would give a hint, at least, on how conflict

prevention, management and resolution mechanisms of IGAD

works. Moreover, the paper will try to indicate the problems

of IGAD in conflict resolution. Generally, it would give a

better understanding of the conflicts in Somalia and IGAD’s

role in these countries. It would also be important for

similar studies.

1.3 O

bjective of the Study1.3.1 G

eneral Objective

The paper tries to give some knowledge about the crucial

role of IGAD in conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa

region particularly in the fragile state of Somalia as well

as the challenges and efforts of this sub-regional

organization.

1.3.2 S

pecific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study are the

following.

To study the role of IGAD in Somalia.

To give some knowledge about the IGAD and conflicts in

Somalia

To investigate the role and challenges of IGAD in

conflict resolution in Somalia

To describe the kinds of conflict in Somalia

1.4 H

ypothesis

The INTER GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD) put

all efforts to resolve political and clan or tribal

conflicts in Somalia. However, the IGAD was not successful.

The following factors contribute to IGAD’s failure in

conflict resolution:

1. Lack of experience in conflict resolution

2. Lack of Logistic

3. Lack of coordination of national programs with regional

programs initiated by IGAD

4. Acute shortage of personal

5. Lack of resources

1.5 Method of Data Collection

This senior essay political analysis and historical

elaboration will be included. To this end, different

secondary sources will be used.

Sources: - books, journals, magazines, newspaper and

documents.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The IGAD Council of Ministers identified three priority

areas of co-operation: Conflict Prevention, Management and

Resolution and Humanitarian Affairs; Infrastructure

Development (Transport and Communications); Food Security

and Environmental Protection. Thus, the scope of the study

will focus on the Conflict Resolution and the role of IGAD

in Conflict Resolution and the role of IGAD in conflict

resolution in the Horn of Africa specifically the case in

Somalia.

1.7 Research Questions

1. What are the roots of the conflicts in Somalia?

2. How the conflict prevention, management, resolution of

IGAD works?

3. What are the problems of IGAD in conflict resolution?

4. What are the prospects of IGAD in conflict resolution in

Somalia?

1.8 Definition of Terms

1.5.1 Conflict Prevention: - It is related to

identifying the reason for conflicts and advantageous

because it enables one to deal with grievances and

demands early without the occurrences of violent

conflict. (Deng and Zartman, 1991: 302)

1.5.2 Conflict Management: - It refers to deliberate

attempts to regulate and lubricate conflict avoid its

destructive aspect. This entails first the recognition

of the grievances of groups; second, the disposition to

redress those grievances by some mutually agreed

formula; and third, the conviction on the part of all

concerned that conflict can and must be managed for the

common good politics id the most important instrument

in managing conflict. (Mesfin, 1999: 187-189)

1.5.3 Conflict Resolution: - it refers to process

that may be necessary to bring an end to an already

existing destructive conflict. (Ibid, 190)

1.9 Organization of the Study

Chapter one is an introductory part. It deals with

introduction, statement of problem, significance of the

study, hypothesis, definition of terms, method and

methodology of the study, scope of the study and research

questions. The second chapter is all about the IGAD and

conflict in the Horn of Africa. The third chapter will deal

with tribal (clan) conflict and inter-state conflict in

Somalia. The fourth chapter is about the role of IGAD in

conflict resolution in the Somalia. Finally, this is

followed by conclusion.

Chapter II

General Background: The IGAD and Conflicts in the Horn

of Africa

“The Inter Governmental Authority on Draught and Densification

(IGADD) was established in 1986, with the objective of addressing

environmental crises that led to food insecurity and famine in

the Horn of Africa.”(Kidist, 2009: P 22) For the reason that of

the existing inter-state and intrastate conflicts, the coerce for

the founding of IGADD came from UN agencies, which saw the very

strong need for a regional coordination agency to concentrate on

troubles of famine and drought.(Ibid) The founding members were

Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda. In 1993

Eritrea joined the organization after its independence. (Ibid)

The head quarter of IGAD is located in Djibouti. It is one of the

African union’s (AU) known Regional Economic Communities (RECs),

with over 200 million people and an area of 5, 222, 520 square

kilometers. (Ibid)

Even though the organization‘s narrow first scope, IGADD Summits

provided a place for meetings among member states to resolve

further issues of common apprehension including peace and

security. By 1994, the members of IGADD had come to appreciate

that the developmental problems of the region unmitigated away

from the impact of environmental deprivation. Accordingly, on

March 21 1996 IGAD member states determined to change the

organization into the Inter – Governmental Authority on

Development (IGAD). (IGAD, 2001: 41)

A declaration regenerate IGADD and broaden collaboration among

member states was accepted, and IGADD was renamed the Inter-

Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). This decision

reflected the principle that only through combined hard work

could the sub-regions development challenges--economic and

social--environmental deprivation, increasing food insecurity,

massive dislocation, and movement of people across borders be

addressed.(Bashir,2002 : II). With these efforts, three

priority areas were identified: Conflict Prevention, Management,

and Resolution; and Humanitarian Affairs; Infrastructure

Development (Transport and communications); and Food Security and

Environmental Protection.

The revival of IGAD was conceived because of the existing good

relations between member states. (IGAD, 1996: 2) The end of the

cold war led to the end of dictatorial regimes in Ethiopia and

Somalia and “the ideological differences and military

confrontations associated with it”. (Kinfe, 2006:) The newly

“emerging leaders” promoted polices of nonviolent dealings and an

original of support and co- existence. (Kidist, 2009: 23)

2.1 An Over View of Conflicts in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa has been Africa’s problem area for many

decades. Internal conflicts have been almost chronic in most of

the countries of the Horn. The secessionist conflicts in

Ethiopia, the problems of Southern Sudan, and later the almost

total disintegrations of Somalia are some of the extreme

manifestations of the problems. (Mesfin, 1999: 153-154)

As Mwaura and Kiplagat(2002: 31-32) viewed Horn of Africa as

the region has been embroiled in endless wars for more than forty

years and represents one of the most complex conflict systems in

the world. It has been the site of several armed conflicts (both

intra and inters-state), severe environmental degradation, and

general livelihood insecurity.

Indeed Horn of Africa has become common place to assert that

“Violent conflict disruptive of the state is endemic in the

region.”(Cliffe, 1991: 20) AS Cliffe (Ibid) observed,

The Horn has been faced with the same arbitrariness ofboarders inherited form European colonial rule and withthe inevitably resulting problems of state making andnation building among disparate peoples and in contestedterritory where there were cultural links with peopleacross those borders.

These features, found throughout Africa and other ex-colonial

territories, were intensified by factors specific to the Horn,

each of which further enhanced the likelihood of internal and

inter- state conflict: an ethnically homogenous state, Somalia,

whose nationalism embraced neighboring Somalia minorities;

European colonialism but also from becoming an empire, Sudan

straddling the cultural divide between Africa south of the Sahara

and the north. (Ibid)

For the Horn of Africa the situation is much more complex in

comparison with that of Rwanda and Burundi. Oddly enough only

Somalia appears to be similar to Rwanda and Burundi regards with

similarity of language and religion. The other countries of the

Horn are far more complex. Apart from religious issues that

simmer beneath the political surface, Sudan is severely torn

between north and south in a renewed conflagration of armed

conflicts. (Mesfin, 1999: 155) Djibouti exists with an

unresolved tension between the Affars and the Issas. (Thomson and

Adolf, 1981: 2)

In general, Healy (2008, _) putted the common features of

conflicts in the Horn of Africa. The first feature of conflict in

the Horn of Africa is its prevalence: there have been

consistently high levels of violent conflict throughout the

region for the best part of the last century and before. Conflict

has occurred at every level-within states, between states, among

proxies, between armies at the center and in the periphery. This

appears to have created habits of war, including reliance on the

use of force to achieve political goals, which in turn contribute

to the persistence of violent conflict. (Ibid)

Another common feature is a very poor record of governance in the

case of this sub-region. Democratic accountability has been

largely lacking. There is a history of regime change through

violent rater that peaceful means, toughened by culture

militarism. (Ibid)

While conflict takes different forms according to local

circumstances and traditions, armed rebellion of one sort or

author is always high among the options for dealing with

political grievances. (Ibid)

2.2 IGAD and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa

In politics, regions are of measured as sub-divisions of the

globe. Africa seems as region of the world polity that is made up

of different and sometimes overlapping sub – regions. Sub regions

may have corresponding organization. IGAD is also one of the sub

regions that represented the Horn of Africa. (Mwaura, Baechler

and Kiplagat, 2002: 116)

IGAD and its member states are in place to develop forums for

civil society, community based organization, and important NGOs

to participate in promoting peace efforts in Somalia and Sudan.

To this end, IGAD has created permanent secretaries to both Sudan

and Somalia to spread it peacemaking efforts. (Ibid)

It has also enlisted the aid of the international community to

these efforts. And the IGAD and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF)

consisting of twenty countries, the UN, the World Bank, and EU

have been to assist and support the two peace processes.

(Bizusew…)

The main focus of IGAD is on capacity building and awareness

creation, and on the Early Warning of conflicts. In September

2002, the prominent mission in this regard is the establishment

of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)

around the intra- state conflicts in the Horn of Africa. There

are also various forms of intra –state conflicts. Such forms are

clan (tribe) conflicts, ethnic conflicts, terrorism and others.

(Ibid, P)

In Somalia, there has been conflict between the transitional

government and Al-shahbab to control state power. The terrorists

of Al-shahbab attack the transitional government. Terrorism is

not the issue only in Somalia but also to all members of the

IGAD. Then, IGAD Heads of Governmental and state summit in

Khartoum in January 2002 approved a resolution on regional

cooperation to combat Terrorism. (Ibid)

2.2.1 Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

Mechanism of the IGAD

The issue of peace and security has been the priority in the Horn

of Africa region to harmonize and coordinate peacemaking and

building activities. (CIRU MWAURA, 2002: 100)

And, IGAD works in one of its priority area that is conflict

prevention, management and resolution in the Horn of Africa. Now

days, economic growth and poverty reduction programs are

associated with the peace and security agenda. (Ibid) So to

secure sustainable development, common security is the major

prerequisite. (Ibid)

The issue of peace and security in the Horn of Africa is

prioritized after revitalization of IGAD and its move ahead a

broader development mandate. IGAD authorized its peace and

security strategy during the 2003 summit. For the commonly

security of the collective goal of member states, IGAD had

specific agreements and mechanisms. From these, program on

conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution; and the protocol

on the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in

2003 are the programs and mechanisms. (IGAD, no date: 251-252)

Creation of a Conflict Early Warning and ResponseMechanisms (CEWARN) for IGAD has been identified with inthe peace and security agenda as a key area ofconcentration in the institution’s Conflict Prevention,Management and Resolution mandate. (Ibid)

In the Sub-region of IGAD, the prevention, management and

resolution of inter and intra state conflicts are going through

the dialogue by the aim of promoting peace, security and

stability as well as creating mechanisms to act collectively.

(Ibid)

But regarding the legal status, “the mechanism shall become an

integral part of the Inter Government Authority on Development

(IGAD).”(IGAD, no date: P 3) In this mechanism, “only member

states which have ratified this protocol are entitled to

participate in the activities.”(Ibid)

The Mechanism has twelve functions.

Promote the exchange of information and collaborationamong member states of IGAD on conflict early warningand response;

Gather, process and analyze information aboutconflicts; establish network of cooperation in earlywarning and response among member states;

Create, manage and disseminate data bases ofinformation on conflict on early warning withinregion;

Develop close cooperation among in-state earlywarning and response mechanism in the member states;

Establish collaborative relationships, includinginformation sharing with similar international andsub-regional mechanism in Africa;

Communicate such information and analysis to decisionmakers…....(Ibid, 4)

Regarding with the collaboration of the protocol of CEWARN

especially in the execution of the mandate of the mechanism, the

member states cooperate and collaborate one another. In the

establishment of CEWARN, the mechanism provides technical

assistance to the member states by the approval of the executive

secretary. The mechanism may also collaborative with inter

governmental and non-governmental organizations by the approval

of the Council of Ministers of IGAD .The mechanism may enter into

agreements with similar mechanisms. (Ibid: 5)

However, the mechanism shall have operational autonomy and headed

by a Director who shall report to the Executive Secretary.

Executive Secretary is the chief Executive Officer of IGAD. But,

the IGAD secretariat and the mechanism share personnel,

facilities, and equipment to the greatest extent possible. In

terms of utilizing documentation facilities of the Secretariat

(the executive body of the Authority) the mechanism shall use it.

In terms of accessing the documentation facilities, the member

states shall have the right to use it. (Ibid, 6)

Furthermore, the resources of the mechanism emanates from the

contribution of member states and grants, donations and

contribution from other sources that is approved by the assembly

of Head of States and Government of IGAD on the advice of the

Council of Ministers of IGAD. In co-ordination with the chief

executive officer of IGAD, the mechanism shall have the power to

ask and receive grants and donations that is related to the

performances of its functions. (Ibid, 7)

Regarding disputes settlement of the protocol, “it shall be

settled friendly or harmoniously, if not, the dispute shall be

referred to the Heads of state and Government of IGAD.” (Ibid)

Finally, “A Conflict Earning and Prevention Mechanism for IGAD

member states for implementation” is the CEWARN framework

project. (Ibid)

2.3 The IGAD – AU Relations in Conflict Resolution

Relationship between any entities can be defined in terms of co-

existence, cooperation, competition, or conflicts (Kidist, 2009:

45). “IGAD has established liaison office to the AU, mainly to

work together with the Departments of Peace and Security,

Political Affairs, and Economic Affairs. IGAD, through its

liaison office in Addis Ababa attends the meetings of AU Peace

and Security Council.”(Ibid)

In the meetings, the office gives information about the common

positions of IGAD. Subsequently the liaison office services

contact between the two organizations. On numerous occupations

the resolution of IGAD has been adopted by the AU, promoting

policy harmonization. (Ibid)

However, in order to institutionalize the relations between IGAD

and AU, IGAD has signed a memorandum of understanding with the AU

and other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to coordinate

peace and security activities in 2008.(Ibid) Additionally, IGAD

and the AU had shown significant level of coordination when the

Amazon was deployed.(Ibid)

Obviously, IGAD, through its facilitator’s office holds monthly

coordination meetings in Nairobi with the AU and the UN about the

familiar position of IGAD towards peace and security .And they

share information and agree on next steps or strategies and

assign activities to avoid duplication of work. (Ibid) During the

meeting member states are represented by their resident

Ambassadors. This all can show the cooperative relations between

the IGAD and AU.

2.4 Cooperation and Interference Among the

members of IGAD in Conflict Resolution

The IGAD member states-in particular Ethiopia, Djibouti, andKenya- have exerted substantial efforts in dealing with the

lengthened conflict in Somalia as well as the rest of the region.

The member states also showed their commitment when they agreed

to organize a peace keeping mission like in Somalia in 2005. The

member states are ready to amend the mandate of IGAD, which did

not permit sending troops to remember states. But the main

problem for their cooperation is an agreement by IGAD member

states which are sensitive about the issue of sovereignty and

internal affairs. (Kidist, 2009: 36)

Actually, the IGAD member states involved in one of its members

one another when there are conflicts in the region of Horn of

Africa that factor for the regional instability .In a sense that,

there is hostility and rivalry among them. And they interfere in

one another indirectly as the same time they also cooperate and

work together in their common issues such as boundary disputes,

tribal conflicts, the issue of terrorism and others. (Ibid)

Since 1990s, in Djibouti, still there is a kind of intra-state

conflict between the Afar and Issa on the ethnic tension. The

major contentious issue is to control the state power, and

Somalia and Eritrea interfered on it. In the other, from early

1990s-2006 in Uganda, there was civil wars on the contentious

issue of autonomy then Sudan interfered on it. In 1993-2005, in

Sudan, there was civil war between SPLA and the central

government on the question of secession and then Ethiopia and

Uganda involved in resolving the civil war. (Ibid)

Since 1991 in Somalia, there was civil war among clans, factions,

militia groups on the issue of control of state power, key towns,

and ports, and then Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya

interfere at the time in the civil wars. (Ibid) There are also

interferences among the member states.

Furthermore, from 1960s-1991, there was civil war in Kenya to

control the state power. And, Sudan and Somalia were the active

actors in interfering on the war. From 1991 up to the present in

Ethiopia, there has been intra-state conflict between the small

scale armed resistances like that of OLF and ONLF and the central

government to control state power and succeeded. Then Eritrea and

Somalia interfere on it. (Ibid)

All the above factors shows us that there are co-operations and

interferences among the member states of IGAD .As well, the IGAD

member states, however, consistently engaged their energy, time,

and resources to solve the prolonged conflict, which are

sensitive about the issue of sovereignty and internal affairs.

(Ibid,) In the other, the member states work together to solve

conflicts in the horn of Africa. Therefore, they cooperate as the

same times interfere in one of its members through IGAD and

themselves. But most of the time, the member states interfere

indirectly in another state for the sake of their political wish

as mentioned the above.

2.5 IGAD As Compared with the OAS and Arab League

The Organization of American States (OAS), according to article 7

of the Inter American treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, can take

all necessary measures to re-establish or maintain peace and

security between two or more members of the OAS. At the same, the

Arab league has the power, under article 6 of its pact, to

determine measures necessary to repulse aggression by any

offending state against a member state. (Berhanykun, 1976: 15)

Like the OAS and Arab league, IGAD can take effective collective

measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation, peace, and

stability according to the Agreement Establishing. IGAD also

works to establish effective mechanisms of consultation and

cooperation for the peaceful sentiment of differences and

disputes, and to agree to deal with dispenses between member

states with in this sub regional mechanisms before they referred

to other regional or international organization. (IGAD, 1996: 2)

IGAD operates its principles based on the sovereign equality of

all member states, non-interference in the internal affairs of

member states and peaceful settlement of intra-and interstate

conflicts through dialogue. (Ibid)

To conclude the chapter, it is about the general background of

IGAD and conflicts in the Horn of Africa. There are intra- and

interstate conflicts in this region. And to resolve these

problems, IGAD has a mechanism to play a role in collaboration

with the international organizations and member states.

Therefore, IGAD faces a lot of problems such as rivalry among

member states, financial problems and others. The next chapter

will deal about the Somalia’s intra-and interstate conflicts, and

its impacts in the Horn of Africa.

Chapter III

Tribal (Clan) Conflict and Inter-State conflict in

Somalia

This chapter will discuss about the causes, courses and

consequences of the intra-and interstate conflicts in Somalia. It

starts from the pre-colonial era up to now.

The Somalis speak the same language. They have the same religion.

And they are from similar ethnic group which is rare in the case

of Africa .Even though, this kind of homogeneity is very

important to build a nation state. But the Somalis have been

hindered by the clan or tribal wars.

There are five major clans in Somalia. These are Darood, Hawiyee,

Rahanwyeen, Issaq, and Dir. Each clan has its sub clans. In

Somalia, Clans and sub-clans play role in defining the political,

economic, social landscape of Somalia. As Laitin and Smatar

(1989, P 29) put that clannism partly related to the Somali

pastoralist culture of a centralized administrative system and

promoting loyalty to their kin and clans. Due to competition over

resources, elite manipulation, and political patronage, the clans

of Somali has divided over years.

3.1 Tribal (Clan) conflict in Somalia

3.1.1 The Roots of the Conflict

3.1.1.1 The Pre-Colonial Era

Somalia has been continuously inhabited by numerous and varied

ethnic groups, but mostly Somalis, for the last 2,500 years.

(http: // info.WorldBank.org/etools/docs/library/153065/south

western Somalia)

As Lewis(1965 :41) see the Somalis are subdivided into clans

(sometimes called tribes), each with a specific name and clan (or

“tribal”) mark, called a Sumad and in terms of the unit of land

holding, each clan is considered to be the land holding of a

specific territory. Each clan has a chief whose power is

restricted to matters concerning the groups as a whole.

Each Somali clan or clan group is known to inhabit in specific

geographic area. Within this group, each clan or group of clans

have a social structure. They have rules that govern their

interaction with other Somali clans. (http;//

info.WorldBank.org/etools/docs/library…..)

Again as Laitin and Samatar (1965, 32) explanation the word

‘tribe’ has been banned from the Somali vocabulary- although

tribalism itself has refused to go away- by a sequence of

national governments concerned to enforce on the Somalis a

determine of centralized authority in position of traditional

clan rule.

“The Somali have been called a nation of nomads whose world is

defined by a wary cycle of transhumant migrations between

composites, water wells, and grazing grounds.” (Ibid, 21) After

all this, the modern period began when the clouds of colonial

conquest gathered in 1884.

For decades, the notion of clans or tribes deferencedominated most attempts to explain violent conflicts inSomalia. In Somalia context, to continue to treatconflicts in the regions as pure political and /orethnic/ tribal conflicts and ignore the growing impactof the degradation and depletion of renewable resourcesbase can only lead to a distorted understanding of thereal situation and consequently drastically limit thepossibility of genuine conflict resolution. (Medhane,2003: 6)

3.1.1.2 The Aggravation of Clan (Tribal) Conflict in Somalia

Day after day, the number of people in each clan & group of clans

become increase. This resulted to tribal (clan) conflicts each

other for the sake of controlling state powers, lands, waters and

others. Obviously, competition over resources and the major

factor for the aggravation of tribal (clan) conflicts in Somalia.

(Kidist, 2009: 2) Clashes over resources such as water, livestock

and graying always have been a source of conflict in Somalia.

In the journal of conflict studies (Legum, 1992: 13) it shows the

main factors for the aggravation of clan (tribal) conflicts in

Somali as follows:

For the ordinary Somali in the field or the camelcamp, clan affiliation remains the main determinantof social identity. In the modern context, the clanis not longer a small group, with smaller sub-divisions, but some named (Prof.I.M Lewis) the ‘clan

family’- a much larger linkage of clans which maynumber a million or more people, all claiming acommon ancestor. All political movements in modernSomalia have a clan basis. Because of the harshenvironment inhabited by these clans; there hasalways been keen rivalry among them for access toscarce resources like grazing areas and water holes.In the modern state this rivalry for access toscarce resources has been largely transfixed formcompetition among nomadic pastorals people towinning power at the center of government.

The people of Somalia have similar religion and language if we

compare with the other Horn of Africa countries. (Mesfin, 1999:

154) But Somalia’s supposed linguistic and religious uniformity

is rent by tribal and clan division.Therefore; the potential for

horizontal conflict was not in relative terms less potent and

less dangerous those in Ethiopia and Sudan if we compare with

where religious and linguistic diversities livestock are much

more accentuated. (Tucker and Brian, 1956: 7)

In Somalia, there is competition over controlling the state

economy for a greater share of renewable resources mainly fertile

land and fresh water. The contestants evoked sub-ethnic, clan

difference and forget along these clan lives for economic gain

and state control. (Medhane, 2003: 8.)

Scarcity emanates not only from ecological duration but also as a

result of ending or limiting access to renewable resources.

Conflicts in the Horn are mainly as a result of access to

national and social resources expressed in terms of justice,

fairness, equitable sharing and equal development is the main

concern of people. With this, conflict research enters the realm

of politics, the economic control state. Hence, technical

solutions to violent conflict situations are no longer adequate.

(Ibid)

Among the national conflicts, monopoly over resources being

central, the violent conflicts in the Horn have different

manifestation displayed at various levels .But other conflicts

mainly over state political power; regional conflicts usually

over local political power i.e. war-lordism, and local conflicts,

typically over renewable natural resources. (Suliman, 1999: 38)

All these are the major factors for the aggravation of clan

(tribe) conflicts in Somalia.

3.1.2 Tribal (Clan) Conflict in the Post Colonial Period

3.1.2.1 The Post-Colonial Period

Conflicts continue to constitute one of the greatest challenges

facing the Horn of Africa. Unlike the inter-state conflicts,

which are monitored and mediated from the early stages, the

origin and escalation of internal conflicts are difficult to

trace with certainty. Internal conflicts are defined primarily as

conflicts which arise within state boarders. (Medhane, 2003: 9)

Although there are outside factors, which influence these

conflicts, there are mostly and primarily conflicts over

governance, identity and resources allocation within a particular

state. (Kumar, 1996: 12)

As the USA special envoy Howard Wolpe analyzed (at media work

shop on the 15th of February in Washington D.C) about conflicts

in Africa as follow:

Ethnicity or tribalism is not the primary for Africanconflicts and in relation to other continents; there isfundamentally nothing unique or different about thenature of conflict……….Actually, most conflicts today inAfrica have no relationship to traditional patterns ofconflicts or to ancient antagonisms. Most of groups inconflict emerged in the course of urbanization, andeconomic and social change. (Ethiopian Herald, 1997)

In the post colonial period, in Somalia, competition over

state power involved securing the major economic resources.

This coupled with economic mismanagement, corruption, and

failure to meet the people’s expectations and provide them

basic services by successive regimes led to increasing

poverty discontent. (Kidist, 2009: 10)

During the rule of General Said Barre (1969-1991), he

introduced clan based divide and rule policy to develop his

own mechanism of appointing loyal political agents from his

own clan for the purpose of guiding and controlling the civil

and military institutions .He benefited his own clan, the

Marehan clan of Darood, in the economic system. This action

of Barre’s policy led to the instigated suspicion and hatred

among the clans. In addition, the struggle for scarce

resources between different clans and sub-clans left Somalia

divide. (Laitin and Samatar, 1987: 29)

The Barre’s increasing concentration of power mainly in the

hands of his own clan, the Maheran, evoke opposition from the

other mostly much larger clans. This clan rivalry manifested

itself in the armed struggle that grew up in opposition to

Barre’s rule and which produced five rival armed camps.

(Ibid) The other factor of rivalry stemmed from the colonial

period which produced two modern linguistic groups, English

and Italian. The former Anglophone protectorate of Somaliland

complained that their religion was being neglected because of

the greater power exercised in the south by those living in

the former Italian colony. (Legum, 1992: 13)

Obviously, Said Barre attempted to destroy all clan-based

social institutions by renaming clan leaders ‘peacekeepers’

and incorporating them into the state bureaucracy. He

attacked Somali traditions by trying to claim absolute social

and political control. (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 80) The

regime sought to create dependence on the states in its

strategy to replace the can system. Both cities chosen for

the study are in northern Somalia: Hargeisa, the capital of

Somaliland, where a de facto government that provides order

and services had war continues in the rest of Somalia, Some

growth and development has occurred in the region. Since

there is no central government, the legal system in both

Hageisa and Boroma is weak; space for more traditional

conflict resolution mechanisms such as the of elders as

informal mediators of disputes has emerged.(Ibid)

For decades, in Somalia, the government’s dissolution and the

consequent eruption of clan warfare was spent by the military

and the civil service as well as coerced divisiveness among

them because of the failed state policies. (Ibid, 51)

The external powers also supported financially for the

authoritarian regimes like Said Barre in Somalia to aggravate the

internal political and tribal conflicts for their national

interests in the form of proxy. By undermining interpersonal and

communal trust, they destroyed the norms and values that

underlie cooperation and collective action for the common good,

and increasing the like hood of communal strife. (Ibid, 3-4)

Between clans and sub-clans groups, in Somalia, often the reason

for the larger structural conflict is the significant lands.

(Ibid) For instance, the pastures of the Haud in the Eastern

Ogaden are the objects of contention between two Somali clans

that is the Ogaden from Ethiopia and the Issaq in today’s

Somaliland. The conflict over the land has made fraught parties

of the Issa Somaliland and the Afar.Actually, the conflict

between the Ogaden and the Issaq seems to be inter-state conflict

because of they are found in different countries but they are

originated from the same clan. (Medhane, 2003: 6) The content of

clannism, before and after colonialism, in the contemporary

politics of Somalia is different from the rest of the African

countries.

Tribalism elsewhere in Africa refers to battlesbetween peoples who do not share a common kinshipstructure; in Somalia tribalism involves battlesamong people who do so share. A curious feature ofSomali segmentation is that is both centrifugal andcentripetal, at once drawing the Somalis into apowerful social fabric of kinship affinity andcultural solidarity while setting them against oneanother in a complicated maze of antagonistic claninterests. (Laitin and Samatar, 1987: 30)

Thus, for the future strength and welfare of Somali society,

the political and structural segmentation has many impacts

both domestically that is the politics is dominated by the

manipulation of genealogical concern on the power to whom and

how, and externally, it is difficult to accept the boundaries

that cut- off Somali internationally. (Ibid, 31)

In the post-colonial period, the case of Somalia has become

horrible more after the downfall of the Barre’s regime that

forced invoke tribalism or clan conflicts and fratricidal war

in the view of World. Somalia has been a member of IGAD, AU,

Arab League and UN. (Mesfin, 1999: 155)

3.1.2.2 The Effects of Tribal or Clan Conflicts

Because of the external and internal factors, Somalia has been

and is the most conflict ridden and volatiles state in the world,

such as the colonial history, external intervention, clannism,

Said Barre’s dictatorship and the intensification of armed

opposition that factors for the disintegration of Somalia and

absence of central government. Due to the causes, Somalia faces

all the effects of the problems. (Kidist, 2009: 10) Then, the

effect of the tribal conflicts is the main one in this study.

General Said Barre followed divide and rule policy, a number of

clan based rebel movements emerged during the late 1970s and the

1980s up to the down fall of the regime in response to the

dictatorial rule in Somalia. This shows that he used his power to

separate them. Actually, the colonial legacy comes first in

dividing the Somali clans because of the European powers-

Britain, France and Italy- partitioned Somalia into different

parts. (Zartman, 1995: 75) Therefore, the clan based rebel

movements started such as the Darood-dominated Somali Salvation

Democratic Movement (SSDF), the Isaq-dominated Somali National

Movement (SNM), and the Hawiye-dominated United Somali Congress

(USC) to down and launched military attacks against the Barre’s

regime. But the down fall of the Barre’s government led to the

total breakdown of law and order. (Ibid)

The Somali conflict had impacts on the social, political and

economic arena. But Somali suffers on humanitarian affairs

because of the political and clan differences among the clans

groups. And Somalia has faced the humanitarian crisis after the

collapse of the Barre’s regime in 1991. Accordingly, out of the

total nine million population; over 3.2 million are in dire need

of humanitarian assistance; over 1.2 mill have been displaced,

hundreds of the thousands have lost their lives as a result of

the civil wars between them that is bases on the clan and

political differences and up to 300,000 children are acutely

malnourished annually which is the highest in the word. (UNHCR,

2008)

Politically, the Britain Somaliland free since 1991 from the

administration of Said Barre. The emergency of the clan based

regional administration of Punt land in the north east started by

Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf in 1998 followed. But this kind of

administration helped to restore a relative peace in the northern

part of Somalia. However, to capture state power, cities, ports,

and other economic resources resulted in many killings, anarchy,

and eventually the flourishing of Islamist movements such as Al-

Iltihad, the UIC, and finally the Al-Shabaab because of clan

rivalry in the southern and central parts of Somalia. (Marshal,

2004: 114-115)

Clan politics is also favorable for the rise of Islamist

movements.. The Al-shababab was multi-clan unlike the other; but

it quickly adjusted to clan dynamics because the units largely

operate in the areas dominated by their own clans. The Bay and

Bokol unit of the Al-Shababab is dominated by Rhanwyen clan. The

Hawiyee clans benefited most from the state collapse; they took

the belongingness of the dwellers that lived in Mogadishu. So,

they are against any state formation in fear of losing control

over business and becoming the targets of revenge by other clans.

(Kidist, 2003: 13)

Lastly, the intra-state Somali conflicts like tribal conflict

have also the problems not only in Somalia itself but in the Horn

of Africa region and internationally. A refugee is one of the

problems. The UNHCR report for 2008 indicated that Somalia is the

third largest origin of refugees in the world next to Afghanistan

and Iraq. And this host refuges has impacts on the security

political and economic to the neighbor states. (UNHCR, 2008) As

well terrorism is the inference of the conflict that is the issue

of the international community; piracy is the worry of the

international community because of the proximity of the cost of

Somalia and the Gulf of Aden to Somalia that is a passage to pass

from Asia to Europe. This Piracy problem hindered for the

international trade flow of goods and for ships and insurance

companies. The armed smuggling and the propagation of Small arms

are the major impacts of the Somali intra-state conflicts like

that of tribal conflict. (Kidist, 2003: 37)

3.2 Inter – State Conflicts in Somalia

3.2.1. The Ethio-Somalia war of 2006

3.2.1.1 The Cause of the War

Somalia has been the conflict ridden area. Specially, after the

downfall of the Barre’s regime, Somalia failed as stateless until

now. And its failure leads to the chaos where by war loads,

Islamic group based on religion and tribe and other international

actors contributed for further worse of the situation.

(Dareskedar, 2008: 45)

The issue of security is one of the threats for Ethiopia that

occurred in Somalia. Ethiopia had the reasons to involve in

Somalia because of the threat of security. There were threats for

Ethiopia security. In the first place, the Islamic state of gulf

challenged strategically because of water share issues or spread

of militant Islamism in the region. Secondly, the agents

supported the armed opposition groups to attack Ethiopia

indirectly. Thirdly, the domestic threat of security was the

factor for the lack of development and democracy that leads to

the anarchy. (FDRE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002) The Union

of Islamic Court (UIC) created the agenda of Islamic state of

Somalia publicly. (Medhane, 2008: 42) This Islamic militancy

threatened the tolerance among the Horn courtiers.

The Ethiopian government preferred to go to war against the UIC

for the security threat by the support of the major o the

parliament notion on November 30, 2006.The reasons that Ethiopia

response the war as a means because of the UIC declared the war

of Jihad against Ethiopia, the UIC stand was against the

sovereignty of Ethiopia, the UIC again hosted the Ethiopian

opposition, and by using the armed opposition the external powers

aggressed the territory of Ethiopia. (Addis Zemen, 1999) But the

Ethiopian government thought that the war is the defensive

because of the irredentist war of UIC. (Addis Zemen, 1999) In the

other way, Eritrea’s challenges against the Ethiopian government

that bases on the revenge the Ethiopian victory of the 1988 and

2000 war and Eretria wanted to challenge to Ethiopia through the

support of the oppositions of Ethiopian government. (Weber, 2008:

151)

The rising of UIC in Somalia was a threat for Ethiopia because of

there are the Somali people lived in Ethiopia so it was the

probability of for some Somali secessionist from Ethiopia and the

rise of the Islamic government in Somalia would have for the

religious dimension in the Horn of Africa politics, so that war

protect their problems. (Dareskedar, 2008: 54)

The TFG has been supporting and is supporting by the Ethiopian

government to weaken the UIC in a sense that UIC at the same time

supported by the external powers to control Mogadishu. Ethiopian

involvement in the politics of Somalia was strengthened in

collaboration with Kenya “urged the continuation of a strained

Arab league mediated dialogue between the Somali transitional

government and the Islamists, set to resume in Sudan”. There was

also peace talks between TFG and UIC and Ethiopia actively

intervened on it but no negotiation between them. This shows that

Ethiopia highly intervened in the politics of Somalia. (ICJ,

2007: 11)

The Bush administration scrap with the Islam extremist in

different parts of the world that is called “war against terror”

and Somalia was one of the target. The USA had the objective to

force the UIC under the umbrella of ARPCT (Alliance for

Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism) and the Somalia and

interests to support ARPCT. Actually, USA facilitated the

Ethiopian involvement and peace process between TFG and UIC, USA

also pashed the UN to pass the resolution that is called

resolution 1725 (2006) that allows armed intervention in Somalia

but UIC rejected the resolution of UN and the intervention of

Ethiopia. (Marshal, 2007)

The UIC was ready to fight Ethiopia because of the instability of

political of the 2005 election, and the mass opposed against the

government. As a result of this, the UIC thought that this public

rally as the pretext and suitable condition to fight against the

Ethiopia because the government of Ethiopia becomes weakened as a

result of the mass riot. Then, UIC planned to use the opportunity

against the government of Ethiopia. Despite on, the UIC was not

successful if there was a chance to weaken the government of

Ethiopia. (Dareskedar, 2008:55)

3.2.1.2. The Courses of the War

The government of Ethiopia started to go to the war and prepared

itself by giving media coverage for the public relation task

about the political activities in Somalia. But many public

officials, members of the parliament, scholars and individuals

were given their ideas towards the war against the aggression

powers or UIC and other opposition groups. Some groups,

individuals and political parties opposed the war unlike the

government but the majority votes of the parliament allowed the

executive to take legal action against the UIC on 30 November

2006.(Ibid, 56) Ethiopia build itself militarily according to the

chief –staff (General Samora Yenus) of Ethiopia to safeguard the

territorial integrity of the state. (Addis Zemen, 1999)

Ethiopia assumes the war as a defensive attack against the

irredentist expansion of UIC and Jihadist in Somalia, and then

their expansion would have the effect on Ethiopia and in the Horn

of Africa. And them after the completed of the mission, the

Ethiopian army would have leaved the Somalia as the promise as

the Ethiopian government. But, the Ethiopian armies stayed above

the expected stay in Somalia. (Dareskedar, 2008:57)

3.2.1.3 The Consequences of the War

International organization intervened to have a negotiation

between the UIC and TFG like Arab league intervened to negotiate

the two (UIC and TFG) powers. The other organization was IGAD

that participated in facilitating negotiation between the parties

in three rounds (the first was held in Khartoum June 2006 and

they agreed for case fire and gave recognition for one other but

the second round had no significant result. The third discussion

by the efforts of different individuals, the UIC asked first the

withdrawal of Ethiopian army from Somalia as a precondition for

the discussion so the first date of discussion that was October

post pond to the December 2006. Immediately, the UN Security

Council passed resolution 1725 (2006) that is about the peaceful

and inclusive dialogue, the strengthening of transitional Federal

Institutions and its security forces and the establishment of a

“protection and training mission in Somalia.” But the resolution

did not recognize the UIC as equal as TFG rather supposed to be

subject for the charter of the TFG. (Marshal, 2007)

When the Ethiopian army intervened in Somalia as the same time

the UIC did not stop its north ward expansion towards Baidowa,

Punt land and Somaliland. On 25 October 2006 the Prime Minister

of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, announced the existence of “technical

war” against UIC in the other way the UIC declared a “holy war”

against Ethiopia. Thus, on29 October the UIC was defeated and

loosed Mogadishu and the Prime Minister also announced, to the

parliament, the successful completion of the war. After all this

the Shura Council dissolved and the fighters of UIC were

defended. (Seifert, 2008:36)

The TFG asked Ethiopian troops to stay in Somalia to get support

in restoring law and order and the Ethiopian army stayed there

for some time. In resolution 1749(2007), UN also welcomed

Ethiopia’s decision to with draw its troops from Somalia because

at the deployment of AMISOM to avoid. Security vacuum and create

the condition for the letting of emergency security measures

currently in place and withdrawal. (Ibid)

Until the January 2009, for two years, the Ethiopian army did not

withdraw from Somalia but started its full withdrawal since

October 2008. After this piracy become the dimension of the world

community rather than strengthening peace talks in Somalia.

Clearly, Ethiopia withdraws its troops from Somalia in December,

2008. The new good opportunity came to TFG and Ethiopia that was

the splits of moderate and extremist with in UIC and the peace

talks was going on with the moderate. (Dareskedar, 2008:59)

In this chapter, the intra-and interstate conflicts of Somalia is

the core issues. The Somalia peace processes are hindered by the

intra-state conflicts over twenty years particularly after the

downfall of the Barre’s regime. Furthermore, Somalia had

conflicts with its neighbors in different times. Thus, all these

factors are the main factors for the instability of Somalia.

Therefore, IGAD has been played a role in conflict resolution in

different period. So the study will focus on the role of IGAD in

conflict resolution.

Chapter IV

The Role of IGAD in Conflict Resolution in the

Horn of Africa

4.1 The Role of IGAD in Somalia

4.1.1. The ARTA Conference of 2002

In 2000, Djibouti proposed a new initiative that is based on the

civil society organizations. Though, the IGAD leaders gave their

motivation for the initiative. The initiative was in line with

the bottom-up approach authorized by IGAD in 1998. (IGAD, 2001: P

41) “There is no alternative for peace in Somalia to pushing

forward with the building block and the bottom up approach in

which the role of warlords is contained and that of civil society

is enhanced.” (Ibid)

The Somalia Reconciliation conference held in Arta, Djibouti in

2000 because of the decision of IGAD that led to the meeting

where about 400 delegates took part in several months of

deliberation. This conference attended by CSO representatives and

some Somalia clan leaders. The Arta conference refrains from

dealing by diverse powerful faction leaders. In August 2000, a

Transitional National Government (TNG) was established in the

conference that headed lay Dr. Abdiqasim Salad Hassan. Though,

there was uncertainty between the supporting of the process by

all member states and their commitment to the problems. Actually,

Djibouti and Eritrea were close allies of the TNG .The logistics

of the conference was covered by Ethiopia so it creates hostile

towards the conference. (Kidist, 2009: P 27) But, the TNG lacks

legitimacy from local clan leaders and lacked strong support from

the member states of IGAD. (ICJ, 2007: P 8)

In spite of, the Arta peace process was not successful in

stopping the continued fighting. The initiative of the member

states of IGAD was limited to endorse it. It is safe for the IGAD

secretariat and its institutional involvement was minimal

particularly the reconciliation beyond the Ethiopia and Djibouti

initiatives until 2006. But, IGAD still continued to serve its

member states in conflict resolution particularly in Somalia that

concerns on the regional issues. (IGAD, 2003: P 24)

4.1.2. The Eldorcet Peace Process

In January 2002, in Khartoum summit, the IGAD agreed to have a

new peace process under the support or backing pieces of

IGAD .They assigned the IGAD technical-committee that has the

responsibility of undertaking the peace process which was

composed of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and front line states. The

chairman designated at form Kenya because the Ethiopia and

Djibouti rivalry over the TNG, and the conference held in

Eldorcet, Kenya. (Ibid, P 26)

This peace process has three phases. In the first phase, there

are about 300 political, military, traditional, and civil society

leaders upon the conference. This created a sense of ownership by

the preparation among the Somali actors. (Ibid)

The second phase was the hindrances for the substantive issue of

the peace process. In this stage, six reconciliation committees

working on the federal charter constitution, disarmament,

demonization and reintegration, land and property, local

conflicts, economic recovery, and regional and international

issues. The reconciliation committee would have seventy five

delegates those who selected by the plenary and they report to

the plenary after dealing specific issues. (Ibid)

The third phase, the plenary discussed and approved the report of

the committee. Then, it deals with the contentions issues of

power sharing with the objective of forming a broad-based and

functioning central government. The issue of power sharing and

representation was taken seriously by the priority of the process

of peace. (Ibid)

For the exclusion of secondary actors from the outside region on

the issue of peace process like Egypt, Yemen and Libya, IGAD’s

ownership of the peace process helped to secure it. Thus, IGAD’s

peace-making activities helped to secure legitimacy for the

organization and build wider international acceptance as the sole

appropriate forum for combating conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

(Sally, 2009: P 11)

4.1.3 The Challenges of IGAD in Conflict Resolution

Somalia has been statelessness for above two decades. There are

different factors or challenges of IGAD in conflict resolution in

the Horn of Africa particularly in Somalia. The disintegration of

the Somalia was difficult for conflict resolutions because of the

factors are the issue of representation, power, and resource

sharing and reconciliation. Clannism has been the major obstacle

for the volatility of Somalia and for the challenges of IGAD

conflict resolution. The peace processes are interrupted by the

individuals, warlords and other groups who benefited from the

instability or chaos (Kidist, 2009: P 37)

The Barre’s regime left the arms and ammunition after its down

fall to the collapse state. And, there aggravated other problems

such as civil wars, poverty, and lawlessness for the

militarization of the society so because of the sense of

insecurity, the people are not willing to disarm. Reporting the

issue of land and property disputes; the colonial administration,

clan disputes, fluidity of ownership, and changing settlement

patterns were the major aggravated factors. Again, the people of

Somalia were dependent up on the humanitarian assistance from

foreign aid. (Ibid)

In the 2009 year, there was tensions between Uganda and Kenya on

the issue of territorial disputes over the Migingo islands; in

2008-09, Eritrea and Djibouti that based on the brief armed

confrontational on the issue of territorial disputes; in 2006-

2008, between Ethiopia and Somalia in the intervention of

Ethiopia, militarily in Somalia; there was full scale was in 1998

– 2000 based on the territorial dissipates; and others. (Ibid)

The strength of any organization depends on the relationship

between its member states. (Ibid) Despite on, we have never seen

harmonization and coordination among member states rather than

rivalry one another. And this rivalry shows that the region is in

crisis. This rivalry leads to the endless competition informing

and initiating peace process in Somalia. Even, Eritrea and

Ethiopia involved the proxy war in the Somalia politics by

supporting the parties of their allies. One initiative may

comfortable to the one in the contrary it is not suitable for

other member states. It is so difficult for IGAD to do its

function properly and deal with the regional security issues.

(Ibid, 38)

For long period of time, Horn of Africa faces the problems of

internal affairs of one country to another. So it is difficult to

have a common security policy and IGAD also unable to develop the

common position in Somalia. In the other may, the Horn of Africa

mostly hit and challenged by the drought, desertification, and

poverty. The other challenge is the intervention of external

powers the Arab states because of the issue of proximity of

geographic settlement and religion. These states supported these

groups indirectly. So, all these factors are difficult for IGAD

to resolve the conflict. (Ibid)

The absence of regional power is also the challenge. There is no

state in the Horn of takes the responsibility from IGAD member

states. Actually, Ethiopia is the largest populous in the Horn

and strong militarily but it lacks economic muscle to exercise

regional leadership and others may have deficiency in one part of

their capability to handle it. (Ibid, 39)

4.1.4 The Efforts of IGAD in Conflict Resolution

Obviously, Somalia has been one of the priority agendas of IGAD

and even it is the major factor for the revitalization of IGAD.

IGAD now is engaging in different efforts that have contributed

to the peaceful resolution it the Somali conflict. For instance,

the IGAD secretariat produces situation reports for regular

meeting of the organs of IGAD. It collects information and

updates and advices the council of ministers to make decision.

(Ibid, 36)

“IGAD secretariat prepares concept notes for the regular meetings

of the council of ministers. IGAD recognizes several workshops

and expert meetings to produce concept notes.” (Ibid) Now, IGAD

tries to study the peace endeavors in the region and carries out

the issues by its own experts and consultants. (Ibid) “IGAD has

established a full-time office for Somalia. It supports the TFG

II with the view to strengthening its capacity”. (Ibid)

In October, 2008, in Addis Ababa; IGAD established a Somalia

Facilitator Liaison Office. The facilitator’s office is mandates

to: “facilitate reconciliation; assist institutional and capacity

building efforts; assist the mobilization of financial and

technical recourses for the TFG II, assist the TFG II to fulfill

its mandate as per the TFG and the Djibouti agreement.” (Ibid,

37)

Reestablishing effective Institutions in Somalia is the strategic

plan that the Facilitator’s office has produced to achieve its

mandates and address the problems in Somalia. To create a system

of basic administration and provide security, the two-year

strategy (2009-2011) that designed to reestablish institutions.

But the strategy is expected to be endorsed by IGAD member

states.(Kidist, 2009: 34)

To strengthening the TFG II, the IGAD member states continue to

play different roles in Somalia. For instances, Djibouti played

an active role in hosting the conference. But Ethiopia and Kenya

are providing training to the TFG II security forces actually

they seem to follow a wait and see approach. In the other, Uganda

is playing its part by contributing troops to the AMISOM.

Finally, IGAD tried to play a great role in conflict resolution

in the Horn of Africa particularly Somalia because obviously

Somalia is a statelessness country and regarding its effort, IGAD

had a role of some of its parts that mentioned in the above.

(Ibid)

This Chapter is all about the role of IGAD in Conflict resolution

in the Horn of Africa. In addition, the chapter shows that IGAD

has been created a forum for member states to resolve their

problems by negotiation and mediation. Thus, IGAD faces

challenges in the peace process that has already mentioned.

V CONCLUSION

The Horn of Africa is obviously a conflict ridden area. Of all

conflicts in this sub-region, the Somali inter- and intra state

conflicts are cruel and unique. In Somalia, there is no central

government for the last over twenty years that resulted the civil

war. It has different consequences in Somalia and its neighbor

states like the problems of refugees, the rise of different

terrorist groups, and the problem of piracy and so on.

Consequently, the IGAD tried to resolve these devastating

conflicts in cooperation with the international community. These

included, cooperation with the AU in conflict resolution, IGAD

peace keeping mission in Somalia (IGASOM), the establishment of

Liaison Office to the AU in cooperation with IGAD, supporting

regional efforts and others. However, IGAD could not resolve

these conflicts effectively because of the rivalry and conflict

between member states extended into Somalia and the aggravated

situation, lack of acute personnel in the IGAD, lack of

experiences in conflict resolution, and others.

Obviously, IGAD is the combination of its member states are

engulfed in inter- and intra state conflicts. They intervened in

the internal affairs of one another, supporting irredentist

groups, and spoiling their relations. These problems could weaken

IGAD in playing a meaning full role in conflict resolution.

Rather, the problems of piracy, terrorism, environmental

degradation, refugees and others are becoming the features of its

member states. The other factor for the failure of IGAD in

conflict resolution is the unpaid financials contribution from

its members in time. So IGAD depends on the foreign donors and it

hampers its performances in all priority areas.

Furthermore, the pursuance of sovereign to reign supreme within

the IGAD has continued to place some constraints on the IGAD

action in the conflict resolution. The issue of neutrality often

caused hostility among its member states, affecting IGAD’s

capacity to deal with the Somali issue. So it would be unfair to

reprove the IGAD or to evaluate and scrutinize the activities of

the organizations in the abstract when it is member states who

decide on its structure, character, functions and resource.

The IGAD member states will need to eradicate all problems and

require coordination, long term engagement and commitment among

them in conflict resolution effectively.

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