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Department of Political ScienceUniversity of Hawai’i ­ Manoa

POLS 600 ­ Scopes & Methods in Political ScienceFall 2013

A paper by Geejay P MilliMasters Candidate| Political Science

Title: An Analysis of the Manus Island Detention Center: The Impact of Refugee Integration, the politics of development through aid & Australia’s neo­colonialism in the Pacific

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Table of Contents

Introduction…………………………………………………………………3

Boat people ­ Australia’s Dilemma………………………………………….4

The Pacific Solution 2001­ 2008 …………………………………………...6

The Refugee Deal 2012 ­ present…………………………………………...7

A Pacific Solution to an Australian Problem? ………………………………9

Is Papua New Guinea Ready to Integrate Refugees?..................................11

Australia’s Neo­colonialism in the Pacific…………………………………13

Scope of Research………………………………………………………...15

Conclusions…………………..…………………………………………...15

References…….…………………………………………………………..16

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Introduction

Movement of displaced groups of people has become a global issue, However in most instances the focus of international organisations, aid agencies and governmental organizations is on the plight of these displaced people/asylum seekers, and in the process neglecting the impacts the resettlement or inclusion of these people in host societies will have on the local population, which has a different dynamic of politics surrounding it. In most cases, the arrival and placement of asylum seekers is not negotiated with the local host community, as these people have arrived amidst situations of atrocities that have occurred in their own countries. In this situation, it leaves very little time for local governments to enter into consultation with their own communities. The subject of this proposal is to look at the impact the reopening of the Manus Island detention center in Papua New Guinea (PNG) has on the local community. In doing so posing questions that i hope to look at in a detailed manner later.This research proposal will describe the approaches that have been used by the Australian and PNG governments in establishing a detention facility for asylum seekers on Manus Island, how the PNG government has conducted negotiations with the local member of parliament, local leaders and the community in Manus for agreement in opening the detention center. This proposal is important in the sense that Australia has taken a ‘hardline’ stance in dealing with the arrival of asylum seekers to its shores or in Australian waters by its navy ­ this hardline stance sees all asylum seeker arrival being detained directly in detention centers outside Australia, often with a high possibility of never being resettled in Australia or any other developed country for that matter, but will be resettled in PNG and Nauru, two relatively poor third world island countries. Thus the question being posed is what are the possible impacts on the local communities with the assimilation of refugees on Manus Island?

To investigate purposefully the impacts of the assimilation of refugees into the island community of Manus and into the larger PNG society it will be useful to look at other places in the pacific where detention centers have been opened and used as processing centers for refugees arriving in Australia. It will therefore be useful to look at the detention center on the Island country of the Republic of Nauru and the Detention Center on Tasmania in Australia and the different approaches and reactions the communities in these different locations had towards the integration of refugees into their communities. However, for purposes of this paper, we will look specifically at the Manus island issue.

The major challenge the subsequent research paper from this proposal faces is the fact that not enough has been written about the communities impacted by the Manus island detention center as such leaving this proposal and the subsequent research paper starved of information and concrete sources to draw upon. It would most probably require a visit to the islands to gather information through interviews and on the ground observation of the impact of the detention center and the reaction of the locals to the integration of refugees in the community. Coverage on the impacts of the reopening of the detention center are limited to news articles, blog pieces and interviews as the detention center on Manus was reopened again recently in 2012. Therefore for purposes of this proposal and in outlining the literature review, I will be drawing information from the available sources I have acquired mostly through web searches. Another difficulty in finding sources on impacted communities is due to the fact that too much emphasis

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and attention is directed towards addressing the issues and plights of the asylum seekers, and the whole dynamics of politics that surrounds whether these displaced individuals should be given refugee status in Australia or not. Furthermore, the plight of the asylum seeker in the case of the pacific exceeds and makes irrelevant the concerns of host communities, media portrayal of the suffering of asylum seekers in most cases portray images of extreme suffering and instigate public sympathy. This is not to say that they have not suffered in every way possible. However in this case it is always important to consider and to an extent meet the needs of the citizens of one’s own country before we can be able to accommodate and adequately attend to the needs of displaced people.

This brings us to an important supposition drawn from the edited version of the book, Refugees and Forced Displacement by Edward Newman and Joanne van Selm, where they point out:

The reality, is that developing countries shoulder the social and economic strain of the vast majority of asylum seekers and people displaced through conflict and state failure. This imbalance must be recognized and acknowledged. In developed and developing world alike, the reality is that violations of international refugee and human rights laws occur on a vast scale. There has been a shift from the protection of asylum seekers to protection from them.1

This sentiment is directly reflected in the deals Australia has made with both Papua New Guinea and Nauru ­ both Third world developing nations with no means of adequately accommodating refugees. As a matter of note, in fact since the early 1980s PNG has had displaced persons seeking refuge by illegally crossing the PNG­Indonesian land border from the neighbouring Indonesian province of Papua. These refugees have been at a disadvantage for so long in PNG, many are uneducated, live in run down refugee camps, have no access to jobs and have come into conflict often with local ‘host’ communities on matters of land for agricultural purposes and other problems of similar nature. This will lead us into another aspect of argument on the topic, but before we delve into looking at Australia’s hardline stance and the issues surrounding the absurdity of the deals between Australia, PNG and Nauru, it would be useful to get an insight into the dynamics of the issue of the ‘boat people’ arriving to Australia and looking at how Australia is dealing with the issue by looking to its small and somewhat improvised pacific island neighbours.

“Boat People” ­ Australia’s Dilemma

Every year more people are being displaced as their homes are being torn apart by civil conflicts, wars or natural disasters. According to the Office for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 2013 Global Appeal update for populations of concern, figures show that a total of 35,440, 210 people were displaced. A sufficient number of these 2

displaced population have found new homes in mostly developed countries, one of them being

1 Edward Newman and Joanne van Selm, Refugees and Force Displacement (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003), 7.2 UNHCR Global Appeal 2013 update ­Populations of Concern to UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/50a9f81b27.html (excessed Nov. 20, 2013).

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Australia. Australia has had displaced persons migrate or seek refuge there for quite some time now. However, a particular trend of asylum seekers arriving by sea vessels, dubbed ­ the ‘boat people ­ has placed undue pressure on the Australian government and its citizens to a larger degree. According to a recent Australian parliamentary research paper, boats with displaced people have been arriving on Australian shores since the 1970s:

The term boat people entered the Australian vernacular in the 1970s with the arrival of the first waves of people carrying people seeking asylum from the aftermath of the Vietnam war...The first boat arrived in Darwin in april 1976 carrying five Indochinese men. Over the next five years there were 2059 Vietnamese boat arrivals...The arrival of 27 Indo­Chinese asylum seekers in November 1989 heralded the second wave. Over the following nine years, boats arrived at the rate of 300 people per annum ­ mostly from Cambodia, Vietnam and Southern China. In 1999, a third wave of asylum seekers, predominantly from the Middle East, began to arrive ­ often in larger numbers than the previous arrivals, and usually with the assistance of people smugglers. 3

This increase in the arrival of asylum seekers has become quite problematic for Australia in the beginning of the twentieth century as Australia is faced with several issues of international concern ­ such as the increasing commodifying of people smuggling ­ people smuggling, particularly of asylum seekers has become a very lucrative business with smuggling hubs in cities like Jakarta in Indonesia. This is also coupled with the issue of the dramatic and often sad cases of asylum seekers dying out at sea with capsizing of sea vessels. Asylum seekers are understandably at a disadvantage, gambling their money ­often life savings ­ in the quest of seeking safer refuge, often blinding them from seeing the dangers of taking such perilous journeys. This blindness to dangers of being ripped off, lied to and in most cases putting their lives at danger, is to them worth the trouble, as they would rather live in safer environments than to live in their own countries which are often pummeled with war and other atrocities. This influx of refugees and Australia’s attempt to somewhat ‘control’ and ‘discourage’ asylum seekers from taking these dangerous journeys has resulted in Australia taking a hardline approach to dealing with this issue of the arrival of boat people.

Australia’s approach to discouraging and combating the arrival of boat people has included the Pacific Solution under John Howard and most recently the Refugee Deal under the then Kevin Rudd government. We will look further in detail on both these approaches used by the Australian government as this discussion will give us a better grasp of understanding the politics of the pacific solution and the refugee deal between the island countries of Papua New Guinea, Nauru with Australia.

However, before going into the discussion it is important to point out that this proposal will not look at the issue of refugees and the politics surrounding the plight of displaced persons. This

3 Janet Phillips & Harriet Spinks, “Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976,” Parliamentary Libary, July 23, 2013, http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1314/BoatArrivals (excessed Nov.20, 2013).

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proposal purposely aims to look at the impacts that the resettlement and integration of displaced persons have on communities that host detention centers. The Pacific Solution ­ (2001­2008)

The Pacific Solution implemented under the administration of Australian Prime Minister John Howard was introduced as a result of increase in the uncontrolled and frequent arrival of asylum seekers to Australian shores. Under the Howard government, policy was introduced to send these asylum seekers to ‘offshore processing facilities’ to determine the reason for seeking asylum in Australia:

In response to a rising number of boat arrivals in 2001, the Howard government introduced what came to be known as the ‘Pacific Solution” whereby asylum seekers on board unauthorised ­ or irregular maritime arrival (IMA) ­ vessels were intercepted (usually by Australian navy) and transferred to offshore processing centers on Nauru and Manus Island in Papua New Guinea...Asylum seekers are not detained under Australian law, or the laws of Nauru or PNG, but are instead granted Special Purpose Visas by those countries to facilitate their stay while they await processing and resettlement of return. The processing of those people includes establishing identity, checking their health status and importantly dealing with any claims for refugee protection.4

Australia had a crisis on its hands and in finding a quick solution to its problem engaged the services of its much smaller, poorer neighbours to host the detention centers. There was much controversy and outrage towards Howard’s government in establishing these detention centers, this strategy did eventually slow the number of boat arrivals to Australia, however the costs of running the facilities and maintaining humane conditions for the asylum seekers detained there proved to be a very costly exercise for Australia. According to a presentation by John Menadue, a founder for the Center of Policy Development in Australia, expressing his sentiments on the conflictual arrangement of processing asylum seekers on Nauru and Manus, he points out how the establishment of detention centers on these islands were very costly exercises for Australia, and further attributes the decrease in the arrival of boats, which he argues directly coincides with decrease in global trends of conflicts resulting in the decrease in the movement of refugees:

It is clear that the major reason for the fall of asylum seeker numbers in the early period of the Howard government was not its own policies, but a decline in the number of asylum seekers in the world….The trend of asylum seekers to Australia followed world trends, figures show clearly that war, civil unrest and persecution determined refugee outflows, rather than any deterrent policies in destination countries such as Australia...If Tony Abbott picks up the phone to speak to the president of Nauru, as he says he would if he became prime

4 Janet Phillips , “The Pacific Solution Revisited,” Parliamentary Libary, Sepetember 4, 2012, http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/2012­2013/PacificSolution (excessed Dec. 10, 2013).

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minister (which he is now), he should remind himself that if he wants to get the budget back into surplus, the Nauru and Manus solution cost the Howard government $ 1 billion over five years.5

Having pointed this out, it is clear that Australia has and is capitalizing on the fact that both PNG and Nauru are poverty stricken and always in dire need of aid. Australia also capitalising on the fact that it is the largest aid donor to these two countries ­ therefore out of obligation and a bid to ‘please’ Australia, PNG and Nauru have committed to the agreement in establishing detention centers. This is what i would view and argue as a gross mishandling and abuse of neighbourly trust and is the manipulation of diplomatic relations ­ this sentiment will be discussed later, however it is noticed that these views have been shared by many and has been part of the outcry in public opinion and to a greater extent public sympathy for the asylum seekers particularly among the Australian public.

The pacific solution was closed by the Rudd government in 2008, according to a report in The Guardian by Helen Davidson:

Both centers were heavily criticised for the conditions asylum seekers lived in and the lack of access given to human rights organisations. The Australian human rights commission was denied assistance by the department of immigration in accessing Manus for inspection...Kevin Rudd closed both centers in 2008, by which time no asylum seeker had been held at the Manus detention center since the last refugee Aladdin Sisalem left in 2004. Sisalem was the sole detainee for 10 months at a cost to Australia of $250, 000 a month. 6

It is clear that in all these reports and presentations, little to nothing is mentioned about the surrounding local population in both island nations, this may be due to the fact that both PNG and Nauru were just used as ‘holding’ centers for the determination of the statuses of the asylum seekers ­ they were in the end either granted refugee status and resettled in either Australia or New Zealand or were sent back to their home countries ­ leaving very minimum concentration to the impact the opening of these centers had on the islands.

The Refugee Deal ­ (2012­present)

The refugee deal is the most controversial arrangement yet made between the Australian government and the governments of PNG and Nauru. This deal has been the spark to investigate further the details of the deal and the approaches, particularly the government of PNG, will take in accommodating the assimilation of refugees into Manus and PNG society as a whole. As we have seen unfold in the above discussion, the asylum seeker continues to be the

5 John Menadue, The pacific solution didn’t work before and it won’t work now, ABC The Drum, March 14, 2012, http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/3886792.html (excessed Dec. 10, 2013).6 Helen Davidson, Manus Island, a troubled history, The Guardian, July 19, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/19/manus­island­troubled­history­asylum (excessed Dec. 10, 2013).

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center of discussions and surrounding arguments on their rights as refugees. Much of media and public attention has been on whether the detention centers hosting these asylum seekers have adequate facilities to meet the standards of a healthy and liveable environment. Under the government of Julia Gillard in November 2011, the detention center was reopened:

Gillard and Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, Peter O’Neil reached an agreement in late May to begin a tender process to make the center permanent. The government wanted to raise the capacity to hold 600 asylum seekers, including families, and 200 staff.7

With the change in leadership in the Labor led government, Kevin Rudd as the new Australian prime minister continued the arrangement that Gillard had pursued. This time with a memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed with PNG Prime Minister Peter O’Neil, according to a report by the Pacific Islands Report, Rudd made a clear statement that all asylum seekers who arrived by boat to Australia would have no chance at all of being resettled in Australia as refugees:8

Mr Rudd has confirmed a deal that will see asylum seekers sent to Papua New Guinea for assessment, and if they are found to be refugees, they will be settled there...The regional settlement agreement will be effective for 12 months and there will be no cap on the number of people who can be transferred there...the package includes a significant expansion of the Manus island detention center to house 3000 people, up from the original capacity of 600.9

Papua New Guinea, to put it plainly, has entered into the deal in exchange for ‘development through aid,’ as already mentioned PNG relies heavily on Australian aid to fund infrastructure and for human and capital development. According to a 2011 World Health Organization (WHO) country profile report:

Papua New Guinea has an estimated population of around 6.7 million (2007) under the age of 15...access to widely scattered rural communities (87.5% of the country’s population live in rural areas) is often slow, difficult and expensive, only 3% of the roads are paved and many villages can only be reached on foot. Papua New Guinea has made some progress in social development in the last 30 years, however the country’s Human Development Index (HDI) has decreased from 0.5 to 0.4.10

The WHO report further reveals the socioeconomic situation in PNG:

7 Ibid,8 PNG Agrees to Resettle Asylum Seekers Headed to Australia, Pacific Islands Report via Radio Australia, July 20, 2013, http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2013/July/07­22­png1.htm (excessed Dec. 11, 2013).9 Ibid,10 Papua New Guinea­ Country Profile 2011, World Health Organization ­ Western Pacific Region, http://www.wpro.who.int/countries/png/en/, http://www.wpro.who.int/countries/png/25PNGpro2011_finaldraft.pdf (excessed Dec. 11, 2013).

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In recent years the economic parameters have shown a more stable situation and a slightly more positive trend. However this has been caused by the rising prices of mining products on the international markets rather than improved internal performance. The economic situation and the widespread evidence of deterioration in the public services, it is a widely held view that living standards for a significant number of Papua New Guineans have declined since 1990. Further, inspite of increasing costs of living, salaries have changed very little, contributing to a static or possibly worsening poverty situation especially in the urban areas.11

The statistics revealed by the WHO report is just a snapshot of the dire poverty and sorry state that the PNG socio­economic situation is in. We have not taken into account here the deteriorating health, education and other public facilities that the government has fallen short of providing for its citizens. Nor have we looked at the level of crime and law and order problems that ravage the fabrics of society ranking some of PNG’s main cities among the most dangerous cities to live in, consequently making PNG an unsafe country to live in. These are important aspects of the ‘host’ society that both governments have failed to consider carefully before reaching an agreement on the deal.

A Pacific Solution to an Australian Problem?

Public opinion surrounding the reopening of the detention centers on Manus island in PNG and the Republic of Nauru have suggested that Australia’s move in signing deals reflects Australia’s strategy of having a pacific solution to a problem that is Australian. The Australian government in formulating its hardline policies which subsequently sees asylum seekers being detained on PNG or Nauru seem to have forgotten that these countries are in no way capable of handling the processing, let alone the resettlement of these asylum seekers, be they found to be genuine refugees. Not only is Australia taking care if it’s chip­in­the­eye, but has subsequently shifted a burden on to PNG and Nauru.

Drawing back on Newman and van Selm’s (2003) argument where much of the burden in opening borders to asylum seekers has rested on the developing country causing an imbalance. They continue by pointing out that governments have constructed legal and physical barriers against the influx of asylum seekers (Newman&van Selm: 2003; 7). As in the case of the boat people, Australia has tightened its legal and border controls in a direct attempt to deter the arrivals of asylum seekers and consequently has funneled its problem to PNG and Nauru. However the argument of whether these countries are capable of accommodating refugees will be discussed later. As another aspect of arguing why Australia is using the pacific as a host for its problems, lies in its regional interests in the Pacific ­ this is a strategy to keep the Pacific at Australia’s advantage. I suspect that the deals have been made with ‘compensation’ to both nations, but Australia has played a wise card in this game, knowing fully well that the integration of refugees into the pacific island nations will not only cause added burdens and possibly raise

11 Ibid

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social and economic problems but is a way for the australian government to keep a leash on these nations, particularly PNG, who is the biggest pacific island nation. For instance, Australia and Fiji do not see eye to eye on many issues, in­fact Australia has called on Fiji and even lobbied in the Pacific Islands Forum to force Fiji into having democratic elections and has time and time again denounced Fiji’s military dictator rule. Fiji has severed ties with Australia and turned towards Asia in engaging in diplomatic and trade relations ­ a move that has worried Australia. In the instance that PNG does venture down the same path its Melanesian counterpart has, Australia will have a real problem on its hands, and this is something Australia is adamant on preventing. Thus, we will delve a bit into a brief of the events that subsequently led to Australia’s jump in proposing the ‘refugee deal’ to PNG ­ afterall an extension of Australian middle­power status. 12

Papua New Guinea has undergone some tumultuous political crisis in recent years and although being independent for 38 years PNG relies heavily on its western developed neighbor. This close partnership and relationship PNG shares with Australia spans back to pre­independence days when PNG was an Australian colony and outpost during the second world war. PNG still shares a close relationship and partnership with Australia ­ often referring to Australia as its ‘big brother’ and relying heavily on Australian aid and expertise. However, it has become evident in the beginning of the 21st century that Australia has become more patronizing and at times it’s approach has been neo­colonial in nature.

Under the leadership of the likes of Sir Michael Somare, Sir Julius Chan and Mekere Morauta ­ some of the founding leaders in pre and post independent Papua New Guinea, although maintaining close diplomatic ties, attitude towards Australia at times demonstrated reservation and discontent, often powered by a strong resentment towards de­colonialism and the desire of running national affairs without the oversight of the ‘white man’. In 2002 the National Alliance party under the leadership of Somare formed government with overwhelming support and to the alarming concern of Australia, introduced the ‘Look North’ economic policy, a policy that emphasised more multilateral partnerships with Asian countries as opposed to the traditional partnerships with Australia and New Zealand that has been the norm for most of the PNG’s trade relations history :

The prime minister (Somare) in his address to the first sitting of the new parliament, stressed that PNG must focus on utilizing international trade as an engine of economic revival, growth and industrial transformation. Captured in the policy statement on ‘Recovery and Development’ with objectives of attaining stability, unity and empowerment, with an export, economic recovery strategy as the key aspect. The export drive will go hand in hand with a new foreign policy stance based on ‘selective engagement’ in which PNG will not only Look North ( to Japan, China, South and South­East Asia) and work the

12 In the field of international relations, middle powers are states that are not super powers or great powers. Middle powers carve out a niche for themselves by pursuing a narrow range and particular types of foreign policy interest. In a way middle powers are countries that use their relative diplomatic skills in the service of international peace and stability. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_power#Middle_power_groupings (excessed Dec. 12, 2013).

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Pacific ( Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific) but also selectively pursue bilateral and multilateral arrangements both within the region and globally. 13

Australia has remained skeptical of PNG’s new turn in direction and for good reason, however both countries have remained on fairly good terms and continue to engage in mutual, diplomatic and trade relations. In late 2011 PNG went through a political impasse described as one of the worst constitutional crisis in the country’s history since independence which saw the country with two Prime Ministers, two Police Chiefs and two Governor General’s. Peter O’Neil ­ PNG’s current Prime Minister ­ eventually with overwhelming parliamentary support was voted in as Prime Minister. The Look North policy, under O’Neil has not been abandoned but considerable attention has been shifted back to Australia, among these has been the Refugee deal.

Is PNG Ready to Integrate Refugees?

To put it bluntly, PNG is in no state to integrate refugees into society, if any social impact study was done for the Manus island community, it has not been made a public document. O’Neill after signing the deal assured the PNG public that he had done so in the best interest of the country, his primary assurance that local business men and women in Manus would benefit directly from the ‘spin offs’ the reopening of the center would produce as it is apparent 14

Australia would be pouring millions into the running of the facility, especially since talks of expanding the center to accommodate the increasing number of asylum seekers arriving, however it has been argued that PNG rushed into signing the refugee deal without fully considering the consequences that could potentially roll out from that deal.

O’Neill during a public address at the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) defended his reasons for signing the refugee deal to a packed auditorium of students who were disgruntled and felt strongly against the deal:

‘We have no closer friend than Australia,’he said, listing the ways PNG had been supported since 1975. “When there is a natural disaster, Australia turns up to help, even before we ask them.” Just as Australia has been a reliable friend in times of need, so in the Melanesian way, PNG was obliged to help when Australia had problems of its own. “Now they have come to us with a problem, we have to help”...O’Neill has also gambled that the asylum seeker deal will deliver a massive dividend for his ambitious development agenda at minimal cost. On top of the A$507 million annual aid budget, Australia has now pledged to contribute up to $300million to rebuilding the Lae hospital, and PNG’s universities as well as funding scoping studies for upgrading the highway

13 Papua New Guinea Trade Policy Framework, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, October, 2003 http://unctad.org/en/docs/ditctncd200310_en.pdf (excessed Dec. 11, 2013) 1.14 O’Neill raises concern about Manus Island facility, News.com.au, November 18, 2013, http://www.news.com.au/national/png­pm­peter­oneill­raises­concerns­about­manus­island­facility/story­fncynjr2­1226762324332 (excessed Dec. 11, 2013).

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between Lae and Madang and building new law courts on Port Moresby.15

O’Neill has emerged to be among one of PNG’s most ambitious yet powerful prime ministers since independence, with over three­quarters of parliament in his government, powered by a booming mining sector, he has become rather prudent in his decisions and somewhat overly confident that these decisions will work to the benefit of the PNG people. Keeping in favorable terms with Australia is obviously a priority for the PNG government, as keeping in good terms means more funding through aid.

If the spin­offs from the reopening of the refugee center in Manus are the only benefit hoped to come from the deal, the PNG government will need to work hard now to establish further ways for the society (first on Manus then on mainland PNG) to gain access to the benefits anticipated. The local Member of Parliament (MP) of Manus Ron Knight had raised concern on the floor of parliament how local accommodation businesses in Manus lost customers, who worked in the detention center, to a Singapore based accommodation barge. O’Neill was outraged by this 16

revelation as his vented frustrations were later revealed:

“It is alarming to note that our Papua New Guinean business men and women are not given the opportunity to participate and that was the whole intention of setting up this center in the first place...the agreements are very clear and its a blatant abuse of trust. The asylum center is a permanent center, the sooner the operators of the center realize that they have become part of the community, the easier it is going to become”17

As it stands, the primary concern for Waigani is having its citizens benefit from the spin offs of 18

having a detention center. However, it seems the government has not thoroughly contemplated the actual effects and impacts the establishment of the center and move over the integration of refugees will have on the society in the long run. Many citizens have raised concerns of the strain that will be placed on the job market, the economy and the greater challenge of having access to education, health­care, and other services. Further there has been concern raised on the barrier and the racial difference that society will have to adapt to, especially since most of these refugees are Middle Eastern. PNG has had past experience with refugees, particularly from the western land border shared with the Indonesian province of Papua (West Papua). However, 19

15 Mark Barker, High Stakes as PNG’s New Strongman Bets on Asylum, The Sydney Morning Herald, August 17, 2013, http://www.smh.com.au/federal­politics/federal­election­2013/high­stakes­as­pngs­new­strongman­bets­on­asylum­20130816­2s25m.html (excessed Dec. 11, 2013).16O’Neill raises concern about Manus Island facility, News.com.au, November 18, 2013, http://www.news.com.au/national/png­pm­peter­oneill­raises­concerns­about­manus­island­facility/story­fncynjr2­1226762324332 (excessed Dec. 11, 2013). 17 Ibid, 18 Waigani located in Port Moresby­ PNG, is where the National Parliament is located and also the hub of government and bureaucratic activity in PNG. Also ‘Corridors of Waigani.’ 19 The Republic of West Papua is a proposed tribes state consisting of the West Papua region, it is not recognized by Indonesia or other countries, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_West_Papua (excessed Dec 11. 2013).

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the Papuans of Indonesia are dominantly Melanesians and integrating into society was less troublesome except for the dominant stigma that remains with them being branded ‘refugees.’Many have expressed concern of religious differences, as PNG’s nationally recognized religion is christianity, there are pockets of other religious beliefs such as Islam emerging, however they remain a minority and there is considerable public disapproval and suspicions against their practices with cases of public assault of which I have witnessed.

These are the kinds of concerns and opinions that the government of PNG would have to look into seriously if it is adamant on having refugees settle and integrate in PNG society. The PNG government has to be prepared to handle and provide adequately for its own citizens as well as for the thousands of refugees that would possibly pass through the detention center. Further it has to be prepared to encounter the possible problems that would likely result from all the social, cultural and economic factors. It does not have to look far in the Pacific to learn from the issues that could rise concerning race and societal problems.

All these intriguing yet useful questions of the impact the integration of refugees into society could have, can be further investigated using both quantitative and qualitative research methods, that in turn can be used to further plan for possible setbacks in the future.

Australia’s Neo­colonialism in the Pacific

Australia views itself as a middle­power in world politics, and even more so with its position in the pacific as a developed first world nation in the midst of improvised, poverty stricken and unstable pacific island nations. So much so, it views its position as a law enforcer to keep peace and order in the region ­ in most cases Australia has been regarded as the United States’ (US) deputy sheriff ­ keeping peace in the pacific region, thus maintaining world peace.20

Australia continues to maintain that it shares a special relationship Papua New Guinea, which is undeniable, PNG is one of the pacific countries that receives a significant amount of aid from Australia every year as well as having shared interests in economic investments and ventures particularly in the mineral resources sector. This close relationship spans to before independence when PNG was under Australian colonialism. Julie Bishop ­ Australia’s foreign minister talked on the significance of the relationship recently:

Australia and Papua New Guinea enjoy a shared relationship ­ one of mutual friendship, shared history and share geography. The Australia­PNG relationship is one of this government's highest foreign policy priorities...there is still much more we can do, including moving from stereotypes. We should not think of the relationship in terms of aid­donor and aid­recipient, rather we need to treat each other as equal partners. 21

20 Deputy Sheriff ­ a term used in the early 21st century by leaders of countries in Asia and the Pacific to describe Australia’s increasing role of intervention in regional conflicts, of which it concedes might disrupt stability and peace, particularly since Australia regards areas in pacific such as the arch of instability prone to spill overs or having a domino effect . 21 Julie Bishop, Australia­PNG: A Partnership of Equals, the interpreter ­Lowy Institute, December 11, 2013,

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Bishop’s statement reflects the relationship that PNG and Australia have had for a very long time. There was always the stereotype of PNG being at the receiving end, sharing a relationship of Australia being the aid­donor and PNG as the aid­recipient. This has in many ways spiralled to PNG often being subjected to Australia’s bullying tactics, the patronizing ‘big brother’ and the law man in regional affairs. Australia’s patronizing attitude has been clearly reflected in its diplomatic relations with PNG, that are sometimes arguably diplomatic with quotation marks, emphasising the shoving­down­the­throat approaches or requests that PNG succumbs to, just so the aid keeps coming. Australia on the other hand realizes the importance of PNG’s strategic and geographic location, PNG is the biggest pacific island nation and sits in the hub of what is referred to as the ‘Arch of instability.’ 22

PNG has often been branded a ‘failed state’ and Australia has on many occasions attempted to apply quick­fix methods to issues that have often been resolved by PNG itself. Such examples include the 2007 Enhanced Cooperation Programme (ECP) later renamed Strongim Gavaman Program (SGP) where Australian officials were placed in key government and bureaucratic positions to ‘work closely with their PNG counterparts to progress reform in the areas of economic and public sector governance, border management and transport and security, and law and justice. Focusing on providing strategic and policy advice.’ This initiative which was 23

eventually ruled unconstitutional was widely opposed in PNG, with imbalanced opinions often leaning towards accusing Australia of having a neo­colonial attitude in the Pacific. Not only has Australia imposed through the SGP in PNG but has also initiated the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) focusing on stability and peace in the Solomon Islands 24

and had led the 1999 UN peacekeeping mission to East Timor, the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET). Australia’s own insecurities and fears has greatly influenced it to 25

approach pacific island countries as illustrated above, it will be these very fears that will continue to influence and dictate it’s approach towards countries in the region.

However, with the Abbott led government, Australia, as revealed in its foreign affairs ministers statement, is playing a new chip with PNG, it has now called the ‘equal­partnership’ chip. Bishop in condemning the aid donor/recipient concept has tried to carve out a relationship that spells equality but in reality will be non­existent. This is a ‘feel good’ approach Australia is imposing on PNG to guarantee the Manus Island asylum center is in place. PNG is in no way a winner in this game.

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/12/11/Australia­PNG­Partnership­of­equals.aspx (excessed Dec. 12, 2013).22 is a proposed interconnected chain of politically unstable nation states in the Asia­Pacific region. A term that became popular in the late 1990’s especially with Australian politicians and journalists, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arc_of_Instability (excessed Dec. 12, 2013).23 Strongim Gavaman Program, Australian Government ­ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/sgp.html, (accessed Dec. 12. 2013). 24 Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, http://www.ramsi.org/about/what­is­ramsi.html (accessed Dec. 12, 2013). 25 East Timor peacekeeping mission to conclude,http://www.army.gov.au/Our­work/News­and­media/News­and­media­2012/News­and­media­December­2012/East­Timor­peacekeeping­mission­to­conclude (accessed Dec. 12, 2013).

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Scope of Research

Much more is still to be explored on the Manus Island detention center, particularly the underlying effects and impact the integration of refugees into the Manus island community and PNG society as a whole will have. Being a deal that has been recently signed, no social impact study of analysis have been carried out or conducted for that matter. Which leaves, in my opinion, the PNG government in a situation that is very much fragile and to a certain level potentially explosive. If the government of PNG is serious about the integration of refugees into the country, it is high time it gets its act together and start working on long term feasibility studies. Social inequalities between the PNG citizens and refugees will rise ­ which are norms of societies, but long term plans are necessary to safeguard the interests of the citizen and the refugee alike.

Relying on straightforward and often short sighted goals, such as the spin­off that local businesses will engage in as anticipated by the government is shallow and unrealistic in essence, it does not in anyway address the interests of the vast majority of Papua New Guineans. If PNG desires to be an influence in the region, it has to realign its strategies and approaches in diplomacy and economic ventures.

With the Manus island detention center being a recent phenomenon, for research purposes, it would benefit me greatly to actually visit the island to conduct research on the impacts on society. As it stands, there is a vast amount of literature on displaced persons, asylum seekers, and refugees ­ their rights and issues surrounding their detainment. This being the case, it has left very little space to discover the impact on the host community. Media has portrayed a very negative image of Manus island, describing it as remote, isolated, poor and dangerous. This has been the image fed to the the public mind, and thus the public and world views of the people of Manus island and PNG is very much dependent on the image of the location itself.

The major setback i will face in this research design would be funding, as well as the willingness of the locals and authorities to speak on the issue truthfully and with conviction. It would be easier (I assume) to communicate with locals in getting their take on the issue, however, i suspect those in authority, both in the detention center and government representatives of the PNG and Australia may be reluctant to openly speak on an issue that is highly diplomatic and controversial.

Conclusions

It is imperative that the PNG government take action concerning this sensitive issue. It may not seem sensitive right now, but what about ten or twenty years down the road? With the rate of arrival of asylum seekers to Manus island detention center every month, Waigani has to wake up to the fact that Australia is not going to fly these potential refugees back to Australian soil! This has essentially become a PNG problem and task. This is the time to be realistic and wake up from fantasy and illusions.

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References

Newman Edward and van Selm Joanne, Refugees and Force Displacement. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Figures at a Glance. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c11.html (excessed Nov. 20, 2013).

Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976 http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1314/BoatArrivals (excessed Nov. 20, 2013).

Parliament of Australia.The Pacific Solution Revisited: A statistical guide to the asylum seeker caseloads on Manus and Nauru Island. http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/2012­2013/PacificSolution (excessed Dec. 10, 2013).

Menadue John,“The pacific solution didn’t work before and it won’t work now,” ABC The Drum, March 14, 2012, http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/3886792.html (excessed Dec. 10, 2013).

Davidson Helen,“Manus Island ­a troubled history,” The Guardian, July 19, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/19/manus­island­troubled­history­asylum (excessed Dec. 10, 2013).

“PNG Agrees to Resettle Asylum Seekers Headed to Australia,” Pacific Islands Report via Radio Australia, July 20, 2013, http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2013/July/07­22­png1.htm (excessed Dec. 11, 2013).

World Health Organization ­ Western Pacific Region. Papua New Guinea­ Country Profile 2011, http://www.wpro.who.int/countries/png/en/, http://www.wpro.who.int/countries/png/25PNGpro2011_finaldraft.pdf (excessed Dec. 11, 2013).

Papua New Guinea Trade Policy Framework, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, October, 2003 http://unctad.org/en/docs/ditctncd200310_en.pdf (excessed Dec. 11, 2013) 1. Middle Powers. Wikipedia ­ the free encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_power#Middle_power_groupings (excessed Dec. 12, 2013).

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Barker Mark, “High Stakes as PNG’s new strongman bets on Asylum,” The Sydney Morning Herald, August 17, 2013, http://www.smh.com.au/federal­politics/federal­election­2013/high­stakes­as­pngs­new­strongman­bets­on­asylum­20130816­2s25m.html (excessed Dec. 11, 2013).

“O’Neill raises concern about Manus Island facility,” News.com.au, November 18, 2013, http://www.news.com.au/national/png­pm­peter­oneill­raises­concerns­about­manus­island­facility/story­fncynjr2­1226762324332 (excessed Dec. 11, 2013).

Republic of West Papua. Wikipedia ­ the free encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_West_Papua (excessed Dec 11. 2013).

Bishop Julie, “Australia­PNG: A Partnership of Equals,” the interpreter ­Lowy Institute, December 11, 2013, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/12/11/Australia­PNG­Partnership­of­equals.aspx (excessed Dec. 12, 2013).

Arc of Instability. Wikipedia ­ the free encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arc_of_Instability (excessed Dec. 12, 2013).

Strongim Gavaman Program. Australian Government ­ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/sgp.html, (accessed Dec. 12. 2013).

Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands.http://www.ramsi.org/about/what­is­ramsi.html (accessed Dec. 12, 2013).

East Timor peacekeeping mission to conclude. The Australian Army.http://www.army.gov.au/Our­work/News­and­media/News­and­media­2012/News­and­media­December­2012/East­Timor­peacekeeping­mission­to­conclude (accessed Dec. 12, 2013).