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2021-05-11

Ally, Enemy or Something Else? How and Why the

United States Drone Program Implementation and

Operation in Pakistan Changed their Relationship

Stone, Allison Nicole

Stone, A. N. (2021). Ally, Enemy or Something Else? How and Why the United States Drone

Program Implementation and Operation in Pakistan Changed their Relationship (Unpublished

master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB.

http://hdl.handle.net/1880/113406

master thesis

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UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Ally, Enemy or Something Else?

How and Why the United States Drone Program Implementation and Operation

in Pakistan Changed their Relationship

by

Allison Nicole Stone

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

CALGARY, ALBERTA

MAY, 2021

© Allison Nicole Stone 2021

ii

Abstract

This papers’ focus concerns the relationship between the United States and Pakistan

around the implementation, use, and regulation of militarized drones in Pakistan. In analyzing

the emergence and operation of militarized drones, this paper reconciles how their relationship

has been affected legally, militarily, politically, diplomatically, and socially. To develop these

arguments, I examine the pertinent historical evolution and statistical figures that exemplify

drones’ trajectory from a newly developed technology strictly for intelligence gathering to an

exceedingly popular weaponry system used in numerous combat situations. Subsequently, an

examination of how specifically drones have altered the bilateral relationship between Pakistan

and the United States is explored by analyzing the military impact and other tangible hard areas

of focus, including the legality of strikes as well as softer, less easily quantifiable concerns of

political, diplomatic, and social consequences.

I argue that it has been militarily successful by improving intelligence cooperation,

eliminating high-value targets, and assisting Pakistan to be better equipped at preventing future

terrorist or insurgent attacks. Further, the drone program unified the two after the triple whammy

of Raymond Davis killing two Pakistani citizens, bin Laden being found in the country, and the

Salalah incident shutting down borders and airspaces, which left the relationship on the brink of

total dissolution. Its redeeming feature was the still existent security concerns that required drone

use to respond appropriately; without which it may have been irredeemable. However, outside

the military realm the legal, political, diplomatic, and social consequences have been detrimental

to their bilateral relationship by leaving them in a state of flux as to the potential future

trajectories of their partnership.

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Where one individually falls on assessing whether it has been positive or not is ultimately

a matter of opinion based on priorities. If military strategy and security are paramount, one

would agree it has been a positive program. If one prioritizes the expansion of their dynamic

beyond transaction military arrangements, then it has failed spectacularly. This thesis argues the

former is still a victory; a relationship by any means is better than the alternative when it

concerns such a tenuous partnership.

1

Preface This thesis is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, Allison Stone.

2

Acknowledgements This thesis would not have been possible without the unwavering support and faith of my fiancé, Shawn and sister, Lisa, who never gave up faith that it would eventually be completed even amidst a long uphill battle. And to my supervisor Dr. Terriff whose endless patience, accommodation, and understanding of the struggles in life and of mental health was crucial to allowing me not only to finish but to have not given up along the way. Thank you all.

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Table of Contents

Preface ............................................................................................................................................ 1

Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... 2

List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ 6

Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................. 8

1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 8 1.2 Context of Drone Program within US-Pakistan Relationship ...................................................... 9 1.3 Question and Importance ........................................................................................................ 10 1.4 Argument and Organization .......................................................................................................... 13

Chapter 2: The Evolution of the United States-Pakistan Bilateral Relationship ...................... 16

2.1 Focus of United States Counterterrorism Post-9/11 .................................................................... 16 2.2 Why Understanding Their Dynamic is Important ...................................................................... 18 2.3 Evolution of Pakistan and the United States Relationship ......................................................... 19 2.4. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Proliferation Post-9/11 ...................................................................... 32 2.5 First Major Shift: War in Afghanistan ......................................................................................... 35 2.6 Second Major Shift: bin Laden’s Death ....................................................................................... 36

Chapter 3: Creation, Implementation, and Evolution of the UAV Program in Pakistan ......... 39

3.1 Context and Political Environment ............................................................................................... 39 3.1.1 Drones for Surveillance ............................................................................................................................. 39 3.1.2 Weaponizing Drones ................................................................................................................................. 40

3.2 Changes Precipitated by September 11, 2001 .............................................................................. 42 3.3. Creation of United States Militarized UAV Program and Types of Drones Employed .......... 45 3.4 Establishment of Drone Program in Pakistan.............................................................................. 48 3.5 Evolution of UAV Program in Pakistan ....................................................................................... 51 3.6 Analysis of Statistical Evolution .................................................................................................... 54

3.6.1 Data Strike Compilations ........................................................................................................................... 55 Table 3.6.1 Strike Totals 2004-2020 .................................................................................................................. 55 Table 3.6.2 The Bush Years .............................................................................................................................. 57 Table 3.6.3 Obama 2009 .................................................................................................................................... 57 Table 3.6.4 Obama 2010 ..................................................................................................................................... 58 Total CIA drone strikes: 128 .............................................................................................................................. 58 Total reported killed: 755-1108 .......................................................................................................................... 58 Table 3.6.5 Obama 2011 ..................................................................................................................................... 58 Table 3.6.6 Obama 2012 ..................................................................................................................................... 58 Table 3.6.7 Obama 2013 ..................................................................................................................................... 58 Table 3.6.8 Obama 2014 ..................................................................................................................................... 58 Table 3.6.9 Obama 2015 ..................................................................................................................................... 59 Table 3.6.10 Obama 2016 ................................................................................................................................... 59 Table 3.6.11 Trump 2017 ................................................................................................................................... 59 Table 3.6.12 Trump 2018 ................................................................................................................................... 59 3.6.2 Target Composition ................................................................................................................................... 63

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Table 3.6.13 ........................................................................................................................................................ 63 3.6.3 Civilian Casualties ..................................................................................................................................... 65

3.7 Logistical Evolution ........................................................................................................................ 69 3.8 Questions of Pakistani Level of Involvement ............................................................................... 71 3.9 Current State of Program in Pakistan and What it Means Going Forward ............................. 75

Chapter 4: Military Considerations of the Drone Program and Their Resulting Effect on the United States-Pakistani Partnership and the International System of States ........................... 80

4.1 Military Context .............................................................................................................................. 80 4.2 Military Success .............................................................................................................................. 81

4.2.1 Improved Intelligence ................................................................................................................................ 82 4.2.2 Eliminate Terror Threats ............................................................................................................................ 82 4.2.3 Better Prevent Future Attacks .................................................................................................................... 83

4.3 Operation Neptune Spear Relevance ............................................................................................ 85 4.4 Operation Neptune Spear Origins ................................................................................................. 92

4.4.1 Operation Mission Details ......................................................................................................................... 95 4.4.2 Operation Aftermath .................................................................................................................................. 97

4.5 War in Afghanistan’s Relevance ................................................................................................. 102 4.6 Pertinent Aspects of War in Afghanistan ................................................................................... 103

4.6.1 Origins ..................................................................................................................................................... 103 4.6.2 Troop Surge ............................................................................................................................................. 105

4.7 Sources of Tension ........................................................................................................................ 106 4.7.1 “Safe Haven” Geographically .................................................................................................................. 106 4.7.2 Opposing Positions on Taliban ................................................................................................................ 107 4.7.3 Contrasting End Goals ............................................................................................................................. 108

Chapter 5: Legal and Normative Considerations of the Drone Program and Their Resulting Effect on the United States-Pakistani Partnership and the International System of States ... 113

5.1 Context of Legality ........................................................................................................................ 113 5.2 Domestic Legality .......................................................................................................................... 116

5.2.1 CIA Versus Department of Defense: Covert Versus Clandestine Action ............................................... 117 5.3 International Legality ................................................................................................................... 118

5.3.1 State Sovereignty ..................................................................................................................................... 118 5.3.2 Right to Self-Defence .............................................................................................................................. 121 5.3.3 Laws of Symmetry and Proportionality ................................................................................................... 124 5.3.4 Who Can Be Targeted? Targeted Killing Versus Signature Strikes ........................................................ 126

5.4 Would More Lawful Changes Better Solidify the Relationship? ............................................. 129 5.5 Proliferation of the Technology Testing Relationship in the International System ............... 132

Chapter 6: Political, Social, and Diplomatic Considerations of the Drone Program and Their Resulting Effect on the United States-Pakistani Partnership and the International System of States ........................................................................................................................................... 136

6.1. Political and Diplomatic Context ................................................................................................ 136 6.2. Political vs. Military Tension Guiding Action ........................................................................... 139 6.3. Public Opinion in Support and Against ..................................................................................... 142

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6.3.1. Opposition in Pakistan ............................................................................................................................ 144 6.3.2. Support in Pakistan ................................................................................................................................. 147 6.3.3. Opposition in the United States .............................................................................................................. 148 6.3.4. Support in the United States ................................................................................................................... 150 6.3.5 Why Public Opinion Matters and it Means for their Relationship .......................................................... 152

6.4. Drones Inspiring Radicalization? ............................................................................................... 154 6.5. Diplomatic Incidents .................................................................................................................... 157

6.5.1 Gora Prai Airstrike ................................................................................................................................... 158 6.5.2 Angoor Ada Raid ..................................................................................................................................... 160 6.5.3 Kurram Border Skirmish ......................................................................................................................... 162 6.5.4 Raymond Davis Killings in Lahore ......................................................................................................... 162 6.5.5 Datta Khel Incident .................................................................................................................................. 165 6.5.6 Salalah Incident ....................................................................................................................................... 166

Conclusion: Where Does This Leave the Relationship? .......................................................... 174

References .................................................................................................................................. 180

6

List of Figures Table 3.6.1. The Bush Years

Table 3.6.2. Strike Totals 2004-2019 Table 3.6.3. Obama 2009

Table 3.6.4. Obama 2010 Table 3.6.5. Obama 2011

Table 3.6.6. Obama 2012 Table 3.6.7. Obama 2013 Table 3.6.8. Obama 2014 Table 3.6.9. Obama 2015 Table 3.6.10. Obama 2016 Table 3.6.11. Trump 2017 Table 3.6.12 Trump 2018 Table 3.6.13. Casualty Composition

7

“War created bizarre allies, while peace itself could be divisive.” Ian Rankin, Blood Hunt1

1 Ian Rankin. “Blood Hunt.” Headline Book Publishing. Scotland, UK.

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Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Introduction

The international system, in which states, non-state actors and institutions all exist and

work, is involved and complicated. It is partly attributable to there being no overriding power to

dictate rules and enforce peace and security. The state of global security in the post-9/11 world is

marked by terrorism, counterterrorism, and the advent of militarized unmanned aerial vehicles,

known colloquially, and henceforth periodically, as drones. Religiously motivated terrorism

undermines traditional defences centered on the deterrent threat of “capture, imprisonment,

injury or death.”2 While these threats may deter a political or nationalist group, a religiously

motivated suicide bomber, for example, it will not, as they have no fear of death nor injury. This,

understandably, makes defending against their actions more difficult because avoiding death is

not a motivating factor. What is there to fear, if not death? This quandary galvanized the need for

new solutions among military, defence, and intelligence repertoires.

The increased decentralization of terrorism has had two profound effects on

counterterrorism. First, conventional military responses of putting boots on the ground via the

army or special operations forces or air power via piloted aircraft are less effective against a

disparate enemy. They are options that serve targeting a group much better, people in a confined

area where close-range weaponry will hit their target or where bombs or missiles can be

launched from the air. A decentralized enemy is much harder to target through these

conventional means, especially as the importance of focused intelligence tracking and

surveillance increases. This concern leads to the second meaningful change: the targeted killing

2 Richard Warnes. 2009. "‘Re-Imagining Counter-Terrorism’: The Importance of Counter-Ideology as

Part of the Wider Response to Terrorism." Building Terrorism Resistant Communities. 55.1: 295

9

of individuals becomes paramount over targeting centralized groups. The decentralized and

disparate network of terrorists active today is separated by geography but united in belief. The

proliferation of drones served a natural response to this emerging need in the international

system, particularly against groups like al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Haqqani network as they

spread where peoples they were already targeting, spread into more territory –like Pakistan.

1.2 Context of Drone Program within US-Pakistan Relationship

For the twenty years since the first drone strike in Pakistan, there has been a steady

increase in their use by the United States.3 Used most frequently in the tribal areas in the

Northwest bordering Afghanistan,4 their use has resulted in as many problems as it seeks to

solve.

While employed as a counterterrorism tool against the country’s terror threat including

the Taliban and al Qaeda in the area, and anyone else considered a terrorist or threat, no

affiliation necessary,5 its effectiveness is not as decisive and clear-cut. The determination of said

effectiveness is especially unclear given the uneasy relationship the two countries share. Since

Pakistan’s independence in 1947,6 the country has always had a complicated relationship with

the United States. At times more friend than foe, while at others more foe than friend, they can

still be considered reluctant, but necessary, allies. Pakistan has long relied on United States’ aid –

both financially and for food and weaponry resources alike7— and the protection it affords them

3 Mahmood Ahmad. 2014. "The Use of Drones in Pakistan: An Inquiry into the Ethical and Legal Issues." Political Quarterly. 85.1: 65 4 Amnesty International. 2013. “Will I Be Next?” US Drone Strikes in Pakistan.” Amnesty International Publications. 9 5 Ahmad 2014, 65 6 Husain Haqqani. 2013. Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, The United States and an Epic History of Misunderstanding. PublicAffairs: New York, New York. 1 7 Haqqani 2013, 57

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to stand against India. Conversely, the United States has long found that Pakistan’s geographical

location as the bridge between the Middle East and Asia makes them a crucial partner in keeping

a foothold in the area,8 a necessary security ally in a volatile region and central in suppressing

Iranian influence. This relationship is further complicated when the emerging use of militarized

weapons is brought into the fold.

1.3 Question and Importance

This thesis strives to respond to the following question: how has the evolution of the

United States militarized unmanned aerial vehicle program in Pakistan informed their bilateral

partnership’s health and evolution?

This research’s principal intent is to assess what factors within this bilateral relationship

have been decided and driven by the drone program but doing so also requires understanding the

significance of other closely tied issues. Most significantly, the causal effect of the series of

border incidents in the late 2000s to early 2010s, the bin Laden raid, and the war in Afghanistan

will be analyzed, as they exerted pressure on the relationship and nearly brought them to the

breaking point with drones being one of the few things preventing that from happening. In

exploring this question, it helps to understand better how the most seminal feature of their

relationship in the last two decades has come to define it and whether that has been to its

betterment, detriment, or even been ineffectual.

This papers’ central focus concerns the relationship between the United States and

Pakistan on the implementation, use and regulation of militarized drones in Pakistan. An

essential problem driving a wedge between the countries is as simple and as complicated as the

fact that they are security allies with different security priorities. Assessing the relationship

8 Haqqani 2013, 50

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concerning militarized drone use, which in recent years has been at the forefront of their

securitizing tools, explains many aspects of their relationship.

What makes this topic so important is its ongoing relevance, and what makes it so

interesting is its complexity. On the one hand, Pakistani state officials frequently publicly

denounce drone use, while in private support and endorse them.9 It is an issue that encompasses

concerns for international law, diplomacy, military, politics, state-society relations, interstate

relations, as well as ethics and morality in war and non-war zones.

It is also a subject filled with public concern and misconception. Mainstream media

perpetuate a widespread opinion that Pakistani citizens staunchly oppose their use. In truth,

however, a growing number of reports that show their use is supported, as will be examined.

After all, more often than not, the biggest haters of Taliban, al Qaeda, ISIS, and Haqqani

network militants are those subjected to their rule,10 a factor often overlooked in popular

depictions where an entire group of people are categorized as terrorism supporters or

perpetrators11 as though the line is always clearly delineated.

There are also marked differences socially, politically, and culturally between residents

of large Pakistani cities where government and military offices are and the rural or tribal

residents who are more directly affected by drone use.12 These differences can often translate to

distinctions in levels of support. The varied support creates problems for the Pakistani

government in assessing the narrative they wish to convey even to their people about the support

or denunciation of drones. Of course, this then translates into an even more complicated situation

when the United States is looking for either permission or cooperation in launching strikes.

9 Haqqani 2013, 60 10 Amnesty International 2013, 15 11 Rob Crilly. 2016. “Why many people in Pakistan support American drone strikes.” Telegraph. 12 Amnesty International 2013, 14

12

When there are such disagreements and variation in opinions within Pakistan itself, it makes

working with the United States on establishing guiding principles, rules, or drone use laws overly

complicated. For this reason, understanding how Pakistanis feel about American drone use is the

essential first step. It then allows one to examine the diplomatic, political, and military alliance

between the United States as it concerns drone use.

Finally, there has been an increasing dispersal of perpetrators as jihadi-driven terrorism

has spread geographically. The problem is no longer primarily confined to the Middle East, not

that it ever really was. There are increasing concerns over homegrown terrorism, a phenomenon

that has increased since 9/11,13 as people are leaving their countries to fight with ISIS and other

groups, and as more regions are facing the increasing concern of being attacked. Terrorism

driven by fervent ideology, be it religious, political, or otherwise, will never be eradicated

through military operations alone. It is undoubtedly an important initiative, however. United

States counterterrorism and counter insurgent capabilities as they exist today are on the heels of

two separate wars lasting well over a decade each that drained resources, killed their men, and

saw the explosion of drones. Looking to the future, the indicators are that their use will be hugely

important as the geographic areas affected by them are expanding as the targets are increasingly

disparate. For all these reasons, understanding the varied ramifications of the United States drone

program in Pakistan on their bilateral relationship’s health and vitality is essential. Not just in

gaining better insight into a critical Western-Middle East alliance, bettering predictive ability for

understanding future relationship developments but as setting a precedent for the technology

everywhere, by anyone.

13 Ally Pregulman and Emily Burke. 2012. “Homegrown Terrorism.” Centre for Strategic and

International Studies. 1

13

These complicating factors will be analyzed on their merit throughout as it becomes clear

that while drone technology is a comparatively straightforward weaponized technology, its

implementation, target criteria decisions, and use are not.

1.4 Argument and Organization

This thesis will argue that while United States militarized unmanned aerial vehicles in

Pakistan have been detrimental to their prospects of a more robust, multifaceted alliance

extending beyond security interests, it has been the most powerful tool in preventing the

dissolution of their relationship by supporting the status quo when it may have otherwise

elapsed.

In developing this argument, the rest of the thesis will continue as follows; chapter two

will explore the pertinent historical evolution of the relationship between the United States and

Pakistan. Next, chapter three will follow the path of creating drones from a newly developed

technology for intelligence gathering purposes only to the most popular weaponry system now

used in various combat situations. It will then analyze the statistics and trends concerning when,

where, how often, and against whom they are used in Pakistan and how the associated civilian

casualties have altered those figures. While contextual, this information is also critical to

recognize the program’s scope during its more prolific years and how it could be as significant to

their relationship as the ensuing chapters will argue it was and is.

Subsequently, this thesis will transition out the historical, factual, and statistical context

of the program’s creation and evolution into the analysis of how specifically drones have altered

the bilateral relationship between Pakistan and the United States. Chapter four describes the

military impact and argues the program has been quite successful in this regard as intelligence

was improved, al Qaeda and its affiliates were appropriately targeted, and both countries

14

improved their ability to predict and stop future militant or terrorist attacks. In analyzing the

military aspect of their drone partnership, the operation that led to Osama bin Laden’s death and

the War in Afghanistan will be also be explored, as they are consequential to understanding the

full picture.

After that, the second more tangible “hard” area of focus, the legality of strikes, will be

unpacked. This fifth chapter will look at the pre-existing international law that regulates their use

and how that reflects onto the relationship. The focus will lay on the most critical legal

considerations of the right to self-defence, symmetry and proportionality laws in war, state

sovereignty, and targeted killings versus signature strikes.

Lastly, chapter six will analyze the “softer,” less easily quantifiable concerns of their

relationship’s political, diplomatic, and social dynamics and what that means for their

partnership’s success or failure. In this chapter, the bin Laden raid plus five instances of border

disputes, international incidents, and military operations will be analyzed in the context of their

political and diplomatic consequences. These events resulted in strained relations that were

resolved only through political and/or diplomatic solutions. Incidents include the Gora Prai

airstrike, Angoor Ada raid, Kurram incident, Raymond Davis killings in Lahore, bin Laden raid,

Datta Khel and the Salalah incident. It will prove how the triple whammy of Raymond Davis, bin

Laden, and Salalah within a matter of months brought the relationship to a breaking point. While

diplomacy was the redeeming feature to resuming their normal relationship in the wake of many

of these instances ultimately, the military alliance and those same common security interests that

fostered the advent of the drone program in the first place are still what keeps it together now and

has been the relationships’ one saving grace.

15

Fundamentally, this thesis will argue that the drone program in Pakistan has been a

benefit militarily and detrimental legally, politically, and diplomatically. Whether one thinks the

positive military cooperation outweighs the consequences in the other regards is subjective. The

argument will be made that while it does not negate the other areas where it has been a negative

factor in their relationship, drones have still been a limited success overall. Its success is

primarily because it has been the connection vital to binding their relationship together at a time

when it may well have deteriorated past the point of return otherwise. This conclusion is argued

for two primary reasons; one, while their relationship continues to be too military and security-

focused to the detriment of the overall potential that a more wholesome agreement could have, it

is nonetheless a relationship that is still holding. Two, the joint incidents of Raymond Davis’s

killing of two Pakistani citizens, bin Laden being secretly found and killed in the country, and

the Salalah incident shutting down borders and airspaces, the relationship was on the brink of

total dissolution. Its redeeming feature was the still existent security concerns that required drone

use to respond appropriately; it may have been irredeemable without it. While their relationship

has not necessarily improved because of drones, maintaining the status quo is still an

achievement in the wake of so many internal and external factors threatening the relationship.

There is already too much dissidence, and therefore any relationship is better than none to serve

as a launching pad as one cannot improve from nonexistence; there must be a foundation on

which to build, and the military success and cooperation around drones serve as that basis.

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Chapter 2: The Evolution of the United States-Pakistan Bilateral Relationship

2.1 Focus of United States Counterterrorism Post-9/11 When the planes hit New York and Washington on September 11th, 2001, and the world

system as it existed was forever altered, it also changed the United States and Pakistan’s

relationship. Arguably the most significant consequence of that attack was the involvement it

spurred from the United States, which would become inextricably entwined with, and at the

forefront of, the initiatives to combat terrorism. It led, of course, to the declaration of the Global

War on Terror on September 20th, 2001, by then United States President George W. Bush, who

launched it against an “amorphous and elusive enemy”14 in the pursuit of eliminating the threat

originating from those responsible for, or who facilitated, the 9/11 attacks and those who posed a

threat to the United States and its interests. It is an endeavour that, despite the successful

elimination of many of the people responsible for the attacks and those who perpetuated ongoing

terrorist activity, is still an enduring and prominent issue. The so-called war initially began with

the official declarations of war against Afghanistan and Iraq, which were launched in 2001 and

2003, respectively. While the latter officially ended in 2011, the former is still ongoing, albeit in

altered capacities.

While Iraq and Afghanistan formed the initial epicentre of counterterrorism efforts, it has

not remained confined to those territories. Within the broader United States anti-terror campaign,

the focus began to branch out into Pakistan and Yemen and away from Afghanistan and Iraq,

initially as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) gained power and prominence on the

world stage. This broadened focus has further expanded with the emergence of groups including

14 Jude Howell. 2006. "The Global War on Terror, Development and Civil Society." Journal of

International Development. 18.1: 123

17

the Islamic State (also known in the Islamic Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Islamic State in

Syria (ISIS)). As there were no official declarations of war or even unofficial acts of war against

those states, it became clear the United States was fighting individual and some group actors, not

only the centrally organized guerilla groups of days passed. Warfare in the twenty-first century

has not been perpetuated solely by armies or even by organized militias. While those still have a

role to play -see al Qaeda or the Taliban- it is also a war waged against individual perpetrators of

terror unaffiliated from influential and notorious groups often united by ideology but

independent in affiliation. This has demanded the advent and proliferation of new technological

tools to aid in waging such a war.

Consequently, the broadened pressure on United States counterterrorism resources and

tactical efforts precipitated the emergence of militarized unmanned aerial vehicle use.

Colloquially referred to as drones, they are understood to mean “remotely piloted unmanned

aerial vehicles (UAVs) equipped with surveillance technology and accurate missiles that are able

to loiter over terrorist and insurgent strongholds for long periods to identify and strike targets.”15

Pakistan re-emerged as a focal point of United States counterterrorism policy in 2001

when American counterterrorism efforts expanded in the wake of the USS Cole bombing, US

Embassy attacks, and September 11th. Pakistan’s importance to United States’ interest originated

because it served as a hotbed for al Qaeda central and the Haqqani network, provided a haven for

fleeing Afghani targets, and was a country the United States felt they could pressure into

working with them to further their interests in the region, and in improving their security

situation. The primary focal point of their new contemporary relationship became the unmanned

aerial vehicle program. While the creation, implementation, and current use of UAVs in Pakistan

15 Megan Smith and James Igoe Walsh. 2013. “Do Drone Strikes Degrade Al Qaeda? Evidence From

Propaganda Output.” Terrorism and Political Violence. 25: 311

18

will be fully unpacked in chapter three, for now, it is necessary merely to say that the advent of

their use has been a cause of tension, both between the two countries and as created tension

within Pakistan itself.

2.2 Why Understanding Their Dynamic is Important

The 9/11 attacks brought the advent of new world order in many ways, as it ushered in an

era dominated by terrorism, counterterrorism, and upheaval through much of the Middle East.

The United States and its allies launching wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would come to be a

hallmark of the international system for the nearly two decades following and still has no end in

sight. In doing so, it also ushered in a new era in the United States-Pakistani relationship. With

the declaration of war against Afghanistan, the United States’ need for Pakistan to again be a

close ally was resurrected. Their close geographic proximity was chiefly important as it afforded

the American military straightforward access to Kabul and eastern Afghanistan.16

These countries are fascinating because their dynamic has elements of both a strong ally

and an enemy that can shed light on both aspects. This duality offers an exciting opportunity for

examining which aspects are most affected by drones. Does drone cooperation better their

partnership-like ways, or does disagreement over them worsen their tensions?

A 2012 poll conducted by the Pew Research Center found that Pakistani citizens have

among the most unfavourable opinions of the United States in the world. Only twelve percent

claimed a favourable view, while eighty percent declared an unfavourable one.17 The chief

complaint was the perception that the United States acts unilaterally in world affairs.18 This

16 Hussein Shaheed Soherwordi. 2010. “Pakistan-US Policies on the ‘War on Terror’ and the Taliban: Allies at Loggerheads.” Pakistan Horizon. 63.2: 58 17 Pew Research Center. 2012. “Chapter 1: Views of the U.S. and American Foreign Policy.” 1 18 Pew Research Center. 2012, 2

19

impression is especially unflattering for the United States as in 2000, a time pre-9/11 and its

subsequent wars, twenty-three percent of citizens held a favourable view.19 By 2007 that figure

dropped to fifteen percent, with sixty-eight percent having an unfavourable view.20 With 2012

figures having sat at twelve and eighty respectively, it does not say much for Pakistan’s opinion

on the United States evolved role in the region. By 2015, the last year conducted, it had

rebounded some from the documented all-time low of eleven in 201121 up to twenty-two

percent22 though that still sits lower than it did pre-9/11. More specifically, many expressed

opposition to the United States’ efforts in the region and in Pakistan itself. Over sixty percent say

they oppose the United States’ counterterrorism efforts 23 and nearly seventy-five percent

consider the US to be their country’s enemy.24 Only seventeen percent support the United States

conducting UAV strikes in conjunction with the Pakistani government to eliminate the leaders of

extremist groups.25 Taken as isolated data, all of this opposition would suggest a relationship on

the verge of collapse or even appear to be the figures more appropriate between enemy states,

not ones with some measure of a holding alliance. Despite this, their relationship is still intact

because while important in a democratic system, they are united by more than just public support

or derision.

2.3 Evolution of Pakistan and the United States Relationship

19 Ibid, 2 20 Ibid, 2 21 Pew Research Center. 2015. “Global Publics Back U.S. on Fighting ISIS, But Are Critical of Post-9/11 Torture.” Pew Research. Pew Research Center Global Attitudes and Trends. 1 22 Pew Research Center 2015, 2 23 Ibid, 3 24 Ibid, 3 25 Ibid, 4

20

In the over seventy years since Pakistan gained independence from the British in 1947,

they have had a complicated and evolving relationship with the United States. It is a relationship

best described as too singularly focused, mutually exploitative, and ever-changing. In a

relationship often marked by change, one common thread has been the presence of aid.

Between 1960 and 2002, Pakistan received over seventy-three billion dollars26 in various

development aid from other nations, with the United States providing over forty-five percent27 of

that total, amounting to over thirty billion dollars. This is a staggering percentage of overall aid

to come from one nation, mainly because there were years when the United States provided

Pakistan with zero money altogether. The most significant decrease, and then cessation of

funding, occurred beginning in 1985 and carried through until 2001 as punishment for their

covert nuclear program.28

2001 ushered in a new era of funding wherein money was allocated predominately for

military expenses and as reimbursement for counterterrorism costs the Pakistani military

amassed as it shifted away from aid earmarked for development or economic support.29 Fiscal

support was offered under the auspices of the Coalition Support Fund,30 a program specially

created to facilitate the reimbursement of logistical and operational expenses accrued fighting

terrorism on American-led missions. By 2007, after a reassessment of the effectiveness of their

financial support, the United States Department of Defense changed the focus of military aid to

be used to assist the military with constructing a counter-insurgency force and to training

26 S Akbar Zaidi. 2011. “Who Benefits from US Aid to Pakistan?” Economic and Political Weekly. 46.32: 104 27 Zaidi 2011, 104 28 Ibid, 105 29 Ibid, 105 30 Ibid, 105

21

Pakistani forces in what is now formally known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.31

Through said Coalition Support Fund, over nine billion dollars of counter-insurgency operation

expenses were reimbursed in the first ten years alone.32 A significant number given the

previously earmarked thirteen billion in general military aid and six billion six hundred million

in economic assistance.33 These sums are, by any standard, significant.

Further, there have been questions raised about whether the money was used per this

mandate as no strict parameters were ever explicitly enforced. What has become clear in

hindsight is that the aim of the funding to Pakistan has not yet been reached, as terrorism is still a

prolific problem in the country. Then again, neither has the United States come close to

achieving their end goals in the so-called Global War on Terror, so it would be hypocritical to

call one a failure and not the other.

The financial support allotted for military expenditure and the amelioration of

counterinsurgency efforts provided to Pakistan in the last eighteen years has been based on

helping themselves by helping Pakistan. Pakistani counterinsurgency initiatives and intelligence

gathering have been crucial in the success of drone operations, as will be proven, and is why it is

such a vital component of understanding the impact of drones. Employing their help to the extent

that they have something to hold over the Pakistani government’s head and using them for their

purposes in dangling the purse strings of a significant portion of their military budget means that

they hold enough leverage to enforce their will, to a point at least. Questions of where that point

lies, and the degree of strings attached have been the epicentre of strain on the relationship.

31 Ibid, 106 32 Shuja Nawaz. 2011. “The Pakistan Dilemma What the Military’s Recent Behavior Says About U.S.-Pakistan Ties.” Foreign Affairs. 33 Nawaz, 2011

22

In theory, aid is said to have been given because the United States wanted Pakistan’s help

in eradicating al Qaeda and the Taliban from the region and ensuring what they consider to be a

nuclear Pakistan’s security and stability.34 However, in practice, the matter is less clear as many

have argued aid has made the situation worse.35 Some Pakistani citizens have expressed outrage

in their belief that all the United States’ efforts in their country have forced them to fight

someone else’s war while they have been left to suffer the casualties of it,36 an argument that will

be explored in-depth in chapter six. Statistically, there does seem to be some merit, as, in 2003,

there were one hundred and eighty-nine deaths of Pakistani citizens caused by terrorism-related

violence.37 By 2007 that figure had risen to three thousand five hundred and fifty-nine people.38

It eventually peaked in 2013 with nearly twenty-five hundred in that year alone.39 By 2018 it had

since settled back to sixty-four percent below 2013 figures, but the country still ranked number

five40 on the 2018 Global Terrorism Index, which measures the impact of terrorism. There are

further concerns that because such a large quantity of aid has been given for military spending

and not economics or development, the military has been strengthened disproportionately to their

democracy.41

Aid, however, has not been their only source of common ground. During the 1970s and

‘80s, the countries shared a close partnership united in their efforts against the Union of Soviet

34 Ibid, 103 35 Ibid, 103 36 Ibid, 107 37 Ibid, 107 38 Ibid, 107 39 Institute for Economics and Peace. 2018. “Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism.” Vision of Humanity. Institute for Economics and Peace. November. 23 40 Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018. 25 41 Ibid, 108

23

Socialist Republics in Afghanistan.42 At the time, neither wanted a Soviet presence in the region,

and that common goal resulted in a fruitful partnership. It was a mutually beneficial agreement as

it afforded the Americans a crucial ally geographically, while for Pakistan it helped them acquire

advanced weaponry they could use against India and the Soviet forces next door if needed.43 The

Americans were looking for the opportunity to “avenge the Vietnam War and bleed the Soviet

Red Army”44 by enlisting the help of the Mujahedeen, Islamic guerilla fighters, or jihadists,

trained by the ISI and funded by the CIA.45

This relationship deteriorated when Pakistan began refocusing on its own security goals

due to its geographic sphere’s proximal security threats and foreign involvement. In choosing the

route involving arming themselves with nuclear weapons, the United States was alienated, and

relations ceased. The 1990s became marked by sanctions, withholding of funds, and little

positive interaction as American punishment for the secret nuclear program. After lifting the

“democracy sanctions”46 after 9/11, their relationship improved significantly as they cooperated

to introduce the drone program to target mutually agreed upon marks. They became so improved

that by 2004 (the first drone strike), the United States even recognized said relationship by

declaring Pakistan a major non-NATO ally.47

The 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, while entirely devasting, is a benchmark that can gauge

the status of their relationship at the time because the United States responded swiftly and

comprehensively to the disaster. On October 8th, 2005, an earthquake occurred at 8:00 am

42 Soherwordi, Hussein Shaheed. 2010. “Pakistan-US Policies on the ‘War on Terror’ and the Taliban: Allies at Loggerheads.” Pakistan Horizon. 63.2. 54 43 Ibid, 55 44 Haqqani 2013, 3 45 Haqqani 2013, 3 46 Peshan Pajeendra Gunaratne. 2013. “US Drone Strikes and their Impact on International Security in a Post 9/11 World.” Journal of the Royal Artistic Society of Sri Lanka. 58.2: 83 47 Pajeendra Gunaratne 2013, 83

24

Pakistan Standard Time in the Pakistan administered area of Kashmir. This 7.6 magnitude

earthquake is considered the deadliest earthquake in the region since the 1935 Quetta earthquake,

with a death toll somewhere between seventy-three thousand48 and one hundred thousand.49

There was an additional sixty-nine thousand to seventy-five thousand two hundred people

injured and over two and a half million displaced.50 With most education institutions in the area

destroyed, over eighteen thousand students were killed, most hospitals and health care providers

were killed, and communication and utility infrastructure were decimated.51 It was

unquestionably “the worst natural calamity in Pakistan’s history.”52

In its immediate aftermath, the United States was one of the first foreign peoples on the

ground. They pledged three hundred million dollars for the emergency humanitarian relief and

reconstruction53 of the country as well one hundred and ten million dollars allocated for military

support, with an expected one hundred million additional from private contributions.54 Supplies

and people were also sent to help on the ground with assistance ranging from military aircraft,

blankets, medicine, health care professionals, military personnel, water containers, water

purification units, health kits, cutting saws, among others55, all providing vital assistance.

At the time, the United States earned itself much goodwill from its quick and thorough

response. They were both the first ones there and contributed the most. This swift action did not

48 Office of the Spokesman. 2005. “U.S. Response to Pakistan’s Earthquake.” US Department of State Archives. 49 S.H. Zaidi. 2006. "Response of Government and Society to the October Earthquake." Pakistan Horizon 59.4: 42 50 Zaidi 2006, 46 51 Major-General Farooq Ahmad Khan. 2011. “The response to the earthquake in Pakistan.” Humanitarian Practice Network. 52 Khan, 2011 53 Office of the Spokesman 2005 54 Office of the Spokesman 2005 55 Ibid.

25

go unappreciated. Reasons to help were twofold: in part done out of a sense of humanitarian

obligation and a “do-gooder” mentality. Former Secretary of State John Kerry articulated in a

speech at the United States Agency for International Aid (USAID) headquarters that,

I was in Pakistan right at the time after the earthquake. I went up into the mountains, up near K2, flying up in the helicopters, working with the Navy, watching all the supply lines that you all helped to create and deliver. And I met children who came out of the mountains at age 12 and 13 and 14. And for the first time in their lives, they were going to school, wearing a uniform, interested in the possibilities of a future. That's what we brought them. It was amazing.56 These comments reflect the narrative the United States likes to paint of themselves where

they are do-gooders out saving the world, a mentality that makes people feel good and

perpetuates an image they wish to project.

The second reason for helping is because there is the growing recognition that one of the

most successful ways to most reduce some types of terrorism at a fundamental level is stamping

out poverty,57 one of its “root causes.”58 There is by no means a linear causal trend between

poverty and terrorism59 and it is a debated field of study in its own right, but the argument goes

that military action can kill terrorists, but raising people out of poverty can help kill the ideology

of terrorism. And so, fostering that goodwill, practicing humanitarian aid in an impoverished

country, showing up after a devastating natural disaster that demolishes nearly all schools in an

entire region all foster goodwill and helps create a more enriched climate. As Secretary of State

Kerry further said in the same speech at USAID headquarters,

56 States News Service. 2013. “Remarks by Secretary of State John Kerry to The United States Agency

For International Development (Usaid) Headquarters.” 57Merrick M. Yamamoto. 2017. “Terrorism Against Democracy: Based in Part on Stansfield Turner’s University of Maryland Course” Terrorism & Democracy Center for International & Security Studies, University of Maryland. 58. 58 Yamamoto 2017, 58 59 Walter Enders and Gary A. Hoover. 2012. "The Nonlinear Relationship between Terrorism and Poverty." The American Economic Review. 102.3: 270.

26

I will make this argument to my colleagues on the Hill anywhere and everywhere, and I'm going to enlist you and many other people in this effort - we need to point out to people that in this world we're living in in the 21st century, a world in - undergoing mighty transformation, this is in the interests of our country and our future if you don't want to send troops somewhere in the future to fight the conflict that comes about because we didn't do this now. (Applause.) And we've seen that. Developing water capacity for people in some parts of the world keeps people from killing each other. It keeps tribes from going out and disintegrating and creating a failed state. I've seen that. I've been in Sudan, South Sudan, where today people are fighting over water. So we need to understand the connection of all of these things to our security, to our business opportunities, to our economic future, to America's leadership role in the world. That's what's connected here. You look at the Maghreb today, you take a country like Egypt or Jordan or many of the countries in the Middle East, you've got 60 percent of the population under the age of 30, 50 percent under the age of 21, 18 - it's about 40 percent under the age of 18. If we don't build health capacity or education capacity or governance capacity with those folks, then everybody here knows how ripe those people will be for someone to walk in with a religious extremist point of view and strap a suicide vest on them and send them out to do harm because they don't have anything better to offer to the world.60

While he was generally speaking to the importance of international humanitarian aid and

humanitarian assistance, it holds true to this case. It is a point further reiterated by S.H. Zaidi, a

senior political analyst in Karachi who wrote,

Humanitarian assistance doesn't just save lives; it helps fight the War on Terror. According to post tsunami polls conducted by the Maryland based, non-profit group, Terror Free Tomorrow, support for Osama bin Laden dropped by half as a result of international assistance to tsunami victims in the world's largest Muslim nation … the void left by the Pakistan government, the United States and the international community has been filled by Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the Al-Rasheed Trust, both groups linked to al-Qaeda, as well as the leading radical Islamic party in Pakistan. Moreover, many so-called radical Islamic parties were in the forefront of the relief effort in Pakistan.61

This goodwill narrative was only one side of the equation, however. At the time a subset

questioned American motives and said, "The Americans are [providing relief in Pakistan] to

damage the solidarity of the country and will work for materializing their ulterior motives.”62

60 States News Service 2013 61 Zaidi 2006, 49 62 Husain Haqqani and Kenneth Ballen. 2005. “Earthquake Relief: If We Don't Help Pakistan, Al-Qaeda's

Friends Will.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

27

This goodwill versus ill-will dichotomy was not isolated to this moment in their history

and as will be demonstrated throughout this paper, is a common overriding narrative of their

relationship. This is especially true in public responses to drone strikes, key border skirmishes,

the Salalah incident, and the bin Laden raid; all actions some staunchly supported, and others

vehemently opposed, a goodwill versus ill-will dichotomy.

A significant turning point in their relationship occurred with the United States’ first

targeted UAV strike in Pakistan in 2004 when Naik Muhammad Wazir was killed near Wana, in

the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).63 Naik was a high-profile enemy of the

Pakistani army who had recanted on a crucial peace treaty earlier that same year.64 The US

agreed to the assassination as it was a “good will kill”65 done to forge a working relationship that

allowed for UAV use going forward. This is an important milestone because it succeeded in

allowing the groundwork for their agreement to be laid. The agreement stipulated that the Inter-

Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Pakistan’s army and intelligence agency, would only

allow the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to operate within the (then) FATA.

Additionally, any targets also had to be a mutual enemy of both nations.66

These regulations were twofold. Firstly, it ensured the United States did not have free

access to kill whomever they wanted; it had to be an enemy of the state of Pakistan as well.

Secondly, it helped reduce the likelihood the United States would gain intelligence on Pakistan’s

nuclear facilities or the mountainous regions wherein Kashmiri militants would train against

63 Yolandi Meyer. 2014. “The legality of targeted killing operations in Pakistan.” The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa. 47.2: 229 64 Christine Fair and Ali Hamza. 2016. “From elite consumption to popular opinion: framing of the US drone program in Pakistani newspapers.” Small Wars and Insurgencies. 27.4:593 65 Fair and Ali Hamza 2016, 593 66 Ibid, 593

28

India’s possible attacks.67 It has also been reported that the ISI told the United States government

and the CIA that the program must never be discussed because it was important the Pakistani

public believe that the ISI were the ones conducting such operations.68 If this were unconvincing,

then the public would lose confidence in the ISI and their ability to be an infallible and sole

provider of Pakistan’s security,69 an unacceptable situation.

Consequently, in the early years of the program, the Pakistani public knew

extraordinarily little about UAV operations in their country. In part because the ISI and military

took credit for any strikes70 and in part because Pakistani media is so heavily censored. It is

censored by the government who exerts considerable control to the extent that there is one

television station, the Pakistan Television Company, which is allowed to broadcast freely71 and

in rural areas, only one radio station, the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation, also government

censored, even gets a signal.72 Such censorship translates to the average Pakistani citizen only

knowing what its government wants them to know. As a by-product most were ignorant of

United States military and intelligence involvement in their country in the program’s early years.

This ignorance started to change as the program ramped up. In the beginning, when only

a limited number of strikes were launched, it was much easier to cover up but when the United

States began conducting upward of one hundred or more attacks a year, it became apparent that it

was not merely the Pakistani military conducting said operations. This shift made their

relationship much more complicated as it now involved the interplay of multiple governments,

intelligence agencies, and civilian input.

67 Ibid, 593 68 Ibid, 593 69 Ibid, 593 70 Ibid, 580 71 Ibid, 581 72 Ibid, 581

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What becomes clear in examining the history of the United States’ actions in Pakistan is

that pre-9/11, they were either ignoring or categorically misunderstanding the ramifications of

Pakistan’s support of the Taliban and other causes of radical Islamists because it suited their

purposes. In other words, they did not want to be dragged into a situation that, at the time, had

nothing to do with them. At the time, the Taliban and other Islamic militants were not a direct

threat to them, so turning a blind eye was in line with their disinterest in the matter. Their Middle

East concerns were focused more centrally on oil, Iran, the Israel-Palestine peace process, not

Pakistan’s political alliances. This changed post-9/11 when their goals shifted and there was an

expectation that Pakistan conducts a one hundred and eighty-degree turn simply because they

asked or pressured them. This was not only unrealistic; it was also very self-serving. While

dangling the purse strings of a large source of another country’s military funding can afford

some leeway and influence, it does not make one the puppeteer of their decisions and actions.

Pakistan had its reasons it considered in its self-interest, for example, wanting the Taliban to

have power in Afghanistan and making security decisions independent of the United States. The

later chapters will more comprehensively analyze the political, legal, and diplomatic

consequences of these inconsistent US military actions and expectations in Pakistan.

In the last couple of years under former President Donald Trump, drones in Pakistan have

been drastically reduced to near nonexistent. The relationship is still too fragile, however. On

January 4th, 2018, the United States again announced a suspension of nearly all security-related

aid to Pakistan. As President Trump tweeted, it was done as punishment for Pakistan giving

“safe haven to those terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan.”73 This dynamic marks a reversion to pre-

9/11 dynamic before the hunt for a common enemy brought them together. When this break last

73 Shuja Nawaz. 2018. “Trump’s Flawed Pakistan Policy: Why Islamabad is Unlikely to Change.” Foreign Affairs.

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occurred, it was spurred by Pakistan’s 1990s nuclear weapon development program. Contrary to

the decision then, where many in the international community collectively wanted to thwart

Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation plans, today there is criticism over this recent ultimatum because

the factors that drew them together again after 9/11 are still valid and to ignore that will not solve

anything.74

The repeating patterns displayed in a historical examination of their relationship reveal

that the inefficiencies all boil down to two fundamental problems. First is that their relationship

is almost entirely one-dimensional, focused solely on security concerns.75 What could, or should,

be a flourishing partnership based around trade, economics, culture, technology, and the military,

is instead only focused on the latter. This is especially problematic because it leads to the second

problem: their security concerns and interests often clash.76 They are united by only one cause,

and even on that, they rarely agree. This unfortunate reality lays the groundwork for a vexing and

often unproductive partnership.

As is evident, their dynamic has elements of both a close alliance and incompatible

tensions. There is a partnership wherein both are motivated to eradicate terror threats from the

region, and this brings them together and ensures some measure of cooperation. The United

States gains much from Pakistan’s cooperation to grant them access in the border region to

Afghanistan and to have a somewhat dependable ally in a region where they have many enemies.

Conversely, Pakistan gains much from the United States financial support for military

expenditure and having an ally with so much power, militarily, economically, and politically.

When intelligence is shared, and military cooperation occurs, there is proven success, such as in

74 Nawaz 2018 75 Shehzad Qadi. 2012. “US-Pakistan Relations: Common and Clashing Interests.” World Affairs. 175.1: 72 76 Qadi 2012, 72

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the early years of the program when comparatively few civilian casualties were killed, as will be

discussed in chapter two. These elements ensure their partnership and show the powerful impact

UAV use can have when they work together and are transparent in their goals, methods, and

results.

Conversely, the United States and Pakistan at times interact more as if they are states in

conflict with each other rather than partners. When there is a breakdown in cooperation or when

interests do not align more mistakes historically seem to have occurred such as one of the most

famous strikes in Pakistani history on October 30th, 2006, when between eighty-one and eighty-

three people were killed, eighty to eight two of which were civilians.77 This occurred when a

madrassa was hit by a drone strike killing children as young as eight.78 The United States

allegedly believed it was a Taliban training camp while the Pakistanis maintained it was a

school. The protests and negative responses were swift and far-reaching, as the death of children

often invokes. At the time, the Pakistani government publicly claimed responsibility –as they

always did at that point, because they allegedly thought the backlash would be lesser. Several

years later, the truth emerged when former ISI Director General Asad Durrani publicly

confirmed in August 2011 that the drone attack was conducted by the United States to

“effectively sabotaged the chances for an agreement in Bajaur and that it was ‘a very clear

message’ from the CIA not to enter into any more such peace agreements.”79

This situation is one example that proves that despite Pakistan being willing to claim

responsibility at a time when their relationship was better when intelligence interests do not

align, and the United States pursues theirs regardless, the damage can be catastrophic. Whether

77 The Bureau. 2019. “The Bush Years: Pakistan Strikes 2004 – 2009.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Bureau Global. 78 The Bureau 2019 79 Ibid.

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or not it was a capricious way of exerting power and sending a message, instances when

intelligence and interest did not align, the casualty rate was higher, arguably as there was more

room for mistakes or missed intelligence as will be demonstrated when analyzing the statistical

information to follow in chapter two.

These times of breakdowns in their partnership and sources of conflict have shown UAV

use’s potential pitfalls. Just as they can easily be a powerful tool for good to better target specific

people and cut down on civilian collateral, they can just as quickly be a source of further

conflict, laws broken, and political toes stepped on. Having both elements within the study of

one relationship answers interesting questions about the potential future of their use and what it

means for their tumultuous but holding partnership.

2.4. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Proliferation Post-9/11

The in-depth details on the creation, implementation, and proliferation of the unmanned

vehicle program in Pakistan will be unpacked at length in chapter three, as will thorough analysis

of what that means for their relationship and interaction with the broader system of states. What

is essential to understand is where it falls in the historical evolution of their relationship. When

the drone program appeared on the heels of little positive interaction and no common ground,

their dynamic changed as it gave them a prevailing security threat they had to work together to

overcome.

Since the early advent of the technology, unmanned aerial vehicle use has increased

significantly. By 2011 there had been nearly two hundred strikes by the United States in

Pakistan, and by 2014 there were upwards of four to six hundred.80 With a proliferation rate this

80 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann. 2011. “Washington’s Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan.” Foreign Affairs. 90.4:13

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large, it often provokes a corresponding call from people demanding rules be created to outline

when, where, and how they can be employed, so there is not utter lawlessness. Given the call to

action around a topic that is one, well known; two, hugely political and polarizing; and three, has

yet to be formally enshrined within international law, it creates a proverbial red flag that needs a

further understanding of what this means for Pakistan, the bilateral relationship, and the

multilateral international system.

Most strikes in Pakistan occurred within the area formally (as of November 2018), known

as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). While the regulations and laws may change

going forward with the FATA’s reintegration into the rest of the country, strikes were

historically in the FATA during the time it was governed as a distinct region. Consequently, the

FATA’s legalities are the legal standard strikes during that period are held to in examining the

legal repercussions in chapter five.

Located in the country’s northwest region it was governed under the Frontier Crimes

Regulations (FCR).81 The FCR was a relic of the colonial era that outlined that legally neither

Pakistan nor any foreign peoples could enter the FATA unless one of its agency personnel was

with them.82 In other words, even the Pakistani government could not grant the United States

government or military permission to conduct UAV strikes, or any other form of involvement, in

the region. Lack of lawful government authority to approve access means, as will be explored

later when examining the legality of the UAV program in the country, means that while discreet

and unofficial permission was granted, officially it was an illegal program, as the Pakistani

government had no authority in the region.

81 Fair and Hamza 2016, 587 82 Ibid, 587

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It is an interesting situation to analyze because UAV proliferation has been so expansive,

so quickly, that it raises major security concerns. Peshan Gunaratne, an attorney-at-law of the

Supreme Court of Sri Lanka and scholar, once wrote that since,

Over 50 countries have purchased surveillance drones or started their own development programmes to step up military capacity … even the U.N. has also expressed its interest … it is credible to deduce the fact that drone strikes have not only set a precedent, but has also sparked a global arms race.83

This passage clearly articulates the path that UAV proliferation may be on or, at minimum, a

path some believe is possible, which, if true, is cause for quick action and legal regulation. The

mass proliferation of the technology in all manners-from increased quantifiable numbers of the

technology to the number of countries which possess it, to the countries, sub-state actors, and

enemy combatants that employ it would all beget not just clarification of its acceptable use but

clearly defined rules and regulations. While international law can help in its regulation, if the

technology continues to proliferate at a pace as rapid as it has the last fifteen years then

international law must work more hastily.

Drones may become the next arms race, not because that power struggle is inevitable but

because we, as the international system, making it appeal made it viable, and because history has

shown that those with cutting edge weaponry have power and prestige; that those things are

worth pursuing and should be sought. Rapid proliferation may also mean there is little hope of

ensuring the technology remain out of the hands of perceived enemy states such as Iran or the

People’s Republic of Korea, as evident by their use in Iran when ISIS employed them against

Syrian opposition and civilians. Should that occur, there might be fatal consequences of the

destabilization of regional and international peace.84 This is why the practical consequences of

83 Gunaratne 2013, 87 84 Gunaratne 2013, 88

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this issue are as significant as the theoretical ones. While international laws of war, including the

prohibition of chemical weapons, genocide and other such egregious acts, do not deter everyone,

they still exist because the wider international community thought them vital, necessary and that

the upholding of these laws is paramount to reflect not just legal boundaries but moralistic and

humanitarian boundaries as well. This could very well be a similar path for militarized

unmanned vehicles going forward.

2.5 First Major Shift: War in Afghanistan

Progressing through this paper to comprehensively understand the complexities of their

relationship as it pertains to UAVs, there are two other factors always to be aware. These are the

war in Afghanistan and the United States’ assassination of Osama bin Laden. While an extensive

examination of the details of either of these events are entire fields of study unto themselves and

are extraneous to the goal of this paper, the essential details are necessary to understand insofar

that the relationship between the United States and Pakistan does not exist within a bubble,

impervious to the influence of outside factors. These countries work within an international

system with other players, rules of decorum and action, legal and normative guidelines to adhere

to, and other events and interactions with actors that alter their relationship.

As is clear, the relationship between the United States and Pakistan is complex and

varied. In turn, they have been allies and at many others on opposite sides of a given situation.

While never at war with each other, there have been plenty of sources of tension and conflict.

Chief among them was the war in Afghanistan. More details will be discussed throughout as

Afghanistan has relevance to each facet’s relationship to be discussed. However, it is vital to

keep in mind that the United States has employed many of the same counterterrorism tactics in

36

both Pakistan and Afghanistan and has historically relied on Pakistan to facilitate much of its

relationship with Afghanistan.

2.6 Second Major Shift: bin Laden’s Death

A second extraneous factor that has heavily informed the relationship between the United

States and Pakistan as it presently exists was Osama bin Laden’s killing. When bin Laden was

found and later executed in Abbottabad by twenty-four members from the Red Squadron of the

United States Navy Seal Team Six85 on May 2nd, 2011, the response was emphatic. This singular

event matters so much because they already had a tenuous-at best-relationship. It was based on

the unified aim to defeat and eradicate jihadi militants and end the al Qaeda threat. His discovery

there, especially never having been reported, raised red flags that jihadists may have infiltrated

the Pakistani military or that there were military members sympathetic to their cause.86 There

was also concern that the ISI and government were negligent in their counterterrorism efforts,

which they still publicly asserted was a priority.87

Furthermore, one cannot underplay the ramifications of a government being left

embarrassed after being proved incorrect of ten years’ worth of assertions that bin Laden was not

within their borders and angry over not being involved in a foreign military operation occurring

on their soil without their permission. There was also outrage among the citizens of both

countries. On the American side, some were skeptical and angered that the cause of much of

their plight; their peoples’ deaths, could be hiding out in an allied country mere minutes from a

military academy and supposedly without the knowledge of said allies’ government. On the other

85 Mark Bowden. 2012. The Finish: The Killing of Osama Bin Laden. Atlantic Monthly Press: New York, NY. 209 86 Peter Tomsen. 2011. “Pakistan: With Friends Like These…” World Policy Journal., 85 87 Tomsen 2011, 85

37

side, Pakistani’s were unappreciative that foreign military service could invade their airspace, set

foot in their territory, spend forty minutes in a firefight, and return to Afghanistan all before any

Pakistani military personnel could make it to the scene, all while being done without their

knowledge or approval. The consequences of this single assassination created a severely

damaging rift that may never be fully conquered.

Moreover, after bin Laden’s death, the United States carried out their strikes in Pakistan

without alerting Islamabad.88 An actual example of this is a strike on June 13th, 2017 that killed a

Haqqani Network commander in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and was done without the ISI or

government’s knowledge.89 The Pakistani military took exception to this, with the Chief of Army

Staff General Javed Bajwa publicly condemning the strike and espousing Pakistan’s ability to

deal with such threats if “actionable intelligence is shared.”90 This is counterproductive towards

pursuing a more encompassing and fruitful relationship and raises questions of legality and

diplomacy. A more fulsome analysis of bin Laden’s death and its consequential nature will be

explored in chapter four when examining the military impact, but for now, it is sufficient to say

that neither his death nor the war in Afghanistan was not only blips on the radar but rather the

cause of profound changes in dynamics at the times they occurred.

Ultimately, the prevailing pattern that emerges in examining the evolution of their

relationship is the reality that they are partners based near exclusively on their security interests

and yet that itself is also cause for disagreement. As stated, they are united by only one cause,

and even on that, they rarely agree. This conundrum lays the groundwork for a vexing and often

88 Adam Weinstein. 2017. “Future of the US-Pakistan Alliance in the War on Terror.” Pakistan Horizon.

70.3: 98 89 Weinstein 2017, 98 90 Ibid, 99

38

unproductive partnership that carries with it a fragility that drones themselves challenge, as will

be explored in the sequential chapters.

39

Chapter 3: Creation, Implementation, and Evolution of the UAV Program in Pakistan

3.1 Context and Political Environment

3.1.1 Drones for Surveillance

The technologically advanced, militarily commanded, intelligence-led, lightning rod of

debate and fervour that is the United States militarized unmanned aerial vehicle program they

employ extensively throughout the Middle East and elsewhere is remarkably different from its

humble beginnings only short decades ago. The earliest iteration of the unmanned aircraft was

called the Gnat 750 and was deployed in Eastern Europe in the mid-1990s under President Bill

Clinton’s administration.91 It was used predominately in Serbia and Bosnia due to senior

administration personnel, particularly then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin

Powell, seeking to provide better intelligence information on the region’s happenings.92 At the

time, the military and intelligence command were beginning to recognize a persistent problem in

the quality of intelligence they were able to acquire and the unreliability of consistently finding

on the ground information.

General Powell issued two orders to Rear Admiral Michael W. Cramer, then director for

intelligence for JSOC; one, to find a system that could provide them with more accurate

intelligence on the ground, and two, to more comprehensively understand why the United States

needed better technological systems for tracking mobile weapons.93 The latter was a problem

they had already encountered during Operation Desert Storm, where the United States military

91 Richard Whittle. 2014. Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution. New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company. 73. 92 Whittle 2014, 73 93 Ibid, 73

40

forces had trouble determining where Iraqi Scud ballistic missiles were and how the Iraqis were

hiding them.94

The recognition of these emerging problems precipitated the investment into the new and

untested technology of remotely piloted aircraft that could conduct surveillance operations for

them in a much more cost-effective, prompt, and stealth manner. Consequently, on July 12th,

1993, a memo was signed entitled “Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) Program”95

which ushered in the creation of said aircraft. The following year, the Gnat 750 flew over Bosnia

having launched from a military base called Gjader in western Albania.96 The more advanced

and technologically capable successor of the Gnat 750, the Predator, was officially rolled out

only two months after that.97 The Predator is the vehicle that formed the drone program as it

stands today and propelled the United States into an entirely new era of counterterrorism,

intelligence, and technological capability.

3.1.2 Weaponizing Drones

The principal catalyst for the turning point from a surveillance vessel exclusively to one

of surveillance with missile capabilities was a perfect storm of Osama bin Laden, the Central

Intelligence Agency, and Charles E. Allen. The latter was a forty-year veteran of the CIA and the

assistant director of central intelligence for collection.98 After Osama bin Laden declared war on

the United States in January 1998, and his group, al Qaeda, subsequently bombed United States

embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya on August 7th, 1998 resulting in the

deaths of two hundred and thirteen people and injuries to more than four thousand five hundred,

94 Ibid, 73 95 Ibid, 79 96 Ibid, 81 97 Ibid, 88 98 Ibid, 143-145

41

a shift occurred.99 The hunt for bin Laden, who had already been on their radar, was kicked into

overdrive. Human intelligence (HUMINT) had reportedly been able to locate bin Laden at

several different points during the months that followed the terrorist attacks. The concern was

that there was too big a lag in the reporting to ensure with the degree of certainty deemed

sufficient to warrant the launch of a cruise missile without fear of collateral damage or concern

that bin Laden would have already moved in the time since his location was first verified.100

The increasing exasperation felt by those in intelligence and government circles led to the

idea of outfitting the Predator with better technology that would allow the aircraft to loiter above

a location for twenty-four hours or more101 and produce and relay the kind of “actionable

intelligence”102 that President Clinton required before he would order a strike against bin Laden

or anyone else. This was an idea that Charles E. Allen was working to push to his colleagues at

the CIA. Those above him at the agency were initially resistant primarily to the idea since they

would be the ones footing the financial bill of three to four million dollars, a sum much more

consequential to them, in contrast to the Pentagon’s budget’ the organization Langley bosses felt

should be footing the bill for the program.103 Ultimately, despite Langley’s reluctance, the

broader Counterterrorism Security Group approved the development of the Predator program104

with the central mission to locate bin Laden. The mission’s success or failure was to be the

launching pad of discussion of what would follow and whether the program would be expanded

or disbanded.

99 Ibid, 143 100 Ibid, 145 101 Ibid, 146 102 Ibid, 146 103 Ibid, 149 104 Ibid, 149

42

3.2 Changes Precipitated by September 11, 2001

It is not an overstatement to say that in the wake of 9/11, there was an enormous change

for the country, especially in the fields of national defence and security and consequently its

approach to counterterrorism. Quite simply, counterterrorism became the “preeminent”105 United

States policy goal after 9/11. One attack precipitated an entire chain reaction beginning with the

collective effort between the United States and her allies to bring the perpetrators of said attacks

to justice. Beginning with the September 20th, 2001, announcement by then United States

President George W. Bush, the War on Terror was launched against an “amorphous and elusive

enemy”106 in the pursuit of eliminating the threat originating from those responsible for and who

facilitated the attacks against those who posed a threat to the United States or its interests. It

would be both a war of arms and a war on ideas,107 and of foremost importance, ushered in the

proliferation and expansion of a new weapons system that could, theoretically, target those

responsible with precision and care -drones.

Led by the United States, the War on Terror initially began with the conventional wars in

Afghanistan and Iraq launched in 2001 and 2003, respectively. This period in the program’s

evolution saw the United States undergo a quick and vast overhaul in how counterterrorism was

understood and the strategies to implement. This overhaul began with revamping intelligence, a

tool that forms the foundation of everything. When the 9/11 Commission Report revealed that

intelligence had failed when it came to preventing the attacks108 and that many agencies had

105 Christine Fair, Keith Crane, Christopher S. Chivvis, Samir Puri and Michael Spirtas. 2010. “How Effective Have U.S. Policies Toward Pakistan Been?” Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State? RAND Corporation. 106 Jude Howell. 2006. "The Global War on Terror, Development and Civil Society." Journal of

International Development 18.1: 123 107 The White House. 2006. United States National Security Strategy. 9 108 The National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 2004. 254

43

information that an attack was imminent,109 it showed that the problem was not a lack of

knowledge. The problem was with “stovepipes,”110 whereby agencies were not sharing

information, and any perpetrators were often able to slip through the cracks. Thus, the National

Counterterrorism Center’s creation was intended to break down said stovepipes of interagency

interaction and ensure no incidents rivalling that attack can ever occur again.

President Bush’s administrations’ response to re-emphasize the importance of

intelligence and overhauling the way the various apparatus interacted meant a vast increase in

information sharing about terrorists, their movements, and any planned attacks. As the

Department of State articulated, “Effective intelligence exchange allows countries to act pre-

emptively to counter terrorists before they act. It closes an important seam that terrorists exploit

to their advantage.”111 With inter-agency and cross-boundary intelligence cooperation one can

connect the dots that may have otherwise gone unnoticed and expose criminal dealings. While

intelligence has by no means been perfected, as there is a plethora of attacks that have occurred

that show it can still fail, it has succeeded in preventing planned attacks anywhere close to the

scale of 9/11, as was the goal.112

This focus on intelligence continued to be of utmost importance under President Obama’s

administration. Daniel Byman, a Senior Fellow at Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings

Institution, goes so far as to argue that President Obama had “established a national security

machine adept at identifying and disrupting terrorist networks.”113 This strategy was based on an

intelligence campaign whereby United States intelligence agencies partner with other countries

109 Ibid, 254 110 Jonathan Stevenson. 2006. "Demilitarising the ‘War on Terror’." Survival. 4.2: 51 111 United States Department of State. 2002. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001.viii 112 United States Department of State 2002, viii 113 Daniel Byman. 2015. "Beyond Counterterrorism." Foreign Affairs. 94.6: 11

44

worldwide. Upon having located terrorists, the next phase of activity is implementable whereby

they are either apprehended114 or, when that is not possible, killed through drone strikes.115

The most obvious example of the first reprioritization were the wars launched in

Afghanistan and Iraq. Afghanistan was explicitly launched to dismantle al Qaeda, remove the

Taliban from power, and apprehend those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. The fundamental

reason for going to war was in the name of counterterrorism. That is as clear an example of

military-based counterterrorism as there could be. Further, when the Iraq invasion began in

March 2003, one of the stated reasons for going was concern over terrorism and potential ties

that Saddam Hussein may have had to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. These two examples are

significant as they are representative of the pinnacle of the military-focused United States

counterterrorism plan post-9/11. This mentality is what laid the foundation for drones.

While not as demonstratively militarily powerful as formal wars, the use of militarized

drones has become one of the most significant changes to come out of the post 9/11 period.

Drones are heralded as a valuable unconventional tool touted for their ability to target new

asymmetric enemy combatants. They filled the void when the United States was overextended in

Afghanistan and then Iraq but still required the monitoring and elimination of other equally

essential targets elsewhere. Being outside the scope of their ongoing wars made it difficult to

continually employ special operations forces that were needed elsewhere and where said targets

lived in hard to access areas, such as the former FATA region of Pakistan. Consequently, there

was a pressing need to find practical, workable, and reliable solutions to terrorism other than

expanding boots on the ground, an utterly untenable option. The military did not have the labour

force, or will, to continually send regular or special operations forces to so many international

114 Byman 2015, 11 115 Ibid, 11

45

locations to apprehend or execute suspected terrorists. To address this situation, militarized drone

use expanded to fill this void.

It was an excellent counterterrorism tool in the modern era of “warfare,” wherein the

enemy is much less regulated and amorphous than the organized militaries, militias, and

cohesive guerilla groups that dominated warfare historically. Facing religious extremists, suicide

bombers, and militants with vast networks of supports to help hide them required a more evolved

strategy than what had previously worked against a more cohesive enemy who was

geographically bound together.

3.3. Creation of United States Militarized UAV Program and Types of Drones Employed

After months of the Predator spent deployed in Afghanistan monitoring and even finding

bin Laden116 without achieving the goal of finding evidence so incontrovertible to justify a

missile strike, a ground-breaking idea was presented. The idea to create what was called a “see

it/shoot it”117 option. Essentially, to arm drones.118 As Richard Whittle wrote in his book on the

Predator’s evolution, “the effect of putting weapons on the Predator would be nothing short of

revolutionary. Soon the drone would be much more than just a persistent eye in the sky. Armed,

it would be a remote killing machine.”119

The early months of 2001 ushered in the testing and training of Hellfire missiles to be

added to Predator aircraft. After this testing proved successful, the question arose on how best to

implement them as there was an increasing number of reports from the CIA, FBI, and other

pertinent branches of an emerging looming threat from al Qaeda who were believed to be

116 Whittle 2014, 161-163 117 Ibid, 162 118 Ibid, 163 119 Ibid, 163

46

planning a major attack.120 The command center was moved out of Germany and into the United

States to facilitate better access for American intelligence, military, and government officials to

the data and pilots.121 This move has remained this way to the present despite the actual drones

needing to be launched geographically close to its targets, mainly in the Middle East and North

Africa.122

After all of these operational and logistical changes were made to more effectively

operate newly weaponized Predator drones equipped with Hellfire missiles, they were set to

begin operations in Afghanistan, monitoring and potentially eliminating bin Laden, al Qaeda,

and other perceived threats on September 25th, 2001.123 Of course, in a cruel twist of fate, only

two weeks before they were set to launch, al Qaeda succeeded in the attack US officials had

feared imminent when they hijacked those planes on September 11th, 2001.

As drones’ needs changed to accommodate weaponry, so too did the vessels that would

house them. Historically, the United States Air Force flew the MQ-1 Predator remotely piloted

aircraft in combat for twenty-one years from 1996-2017.124 The leading drone used in combat

currently is the MQ-9 Reaper manufactured by American company General Atomics.125 The

United States Air Force have used the Reaper drone to support military operations for the last

twelve years, though only exclusively since 2017 when the Predator was retired.126 The

Predator’s shift to the Reaper was precipitated by the latter’s “increased speed, high-definition

sensors and the ability to carry more munitions. These combat attributes allow the MQ-9 to

120 Ibid, 211 121 Ibid, 215 122 Craig Whitlock. 2012. “Remote U.S. Base at Core of Secret Operations.” The Washington Post. 123 Whittle 2014, 232 124 Air Force Senior Airman Christian Clausen. 2017. “Air Force to Retire MQ-1 Predator Drone, Transition to MQ-9 Reaper.” U.S. Department of Defense. 125 New America. 2020. “Introduction: How We Became a World of Drones.” New America Project. 126 Air Force Senior Airman Christian Clausen 2017

47

complete a wider array of mission sets, which can help the Air Force stay prepared in the

fight.”127

When the focus moved from unmanned aircraft being used for “intelligence gathering and

real-time reconnaissance”128 to “air support from the attack squadrons’,”129 the aircraft’s needs

changed. The Reaper is designed to carry weapons in a way that the Predator never was and

allows for the enhanced attack capabilities and weapons proficiency130 needed in modern drone

warfare.

The program is not run without a sizable financial commitment, although comparatively, it

is a mere fraction of what conventional aircraft cost. The Predator cost four million five hundred

thousand dollars131 while the Reaper is fifteen million per aircraft.132 While these sums are

significant, it is still roughly one hundred million dollars less than the newest piloted jet133 and,

therefore, substantially more cost-effective. Beyond the logistical and strategic necessities that

drove their use there is the entirely practical consideration that war is an enormously expensive

endeavour. Afghanistan and Iraq were monopolizing large swaths of the already significantly

increased defence budget during the early to mid-2000s. They needed better options than

increasing a fleet of costly fighter jets, training more special operatives, or any of the other

expensive and unfeasible alternatives.

Beyond the more expensive Reaper still being less expensive to create and manufacture

127 Air Force Senior Airman Christian Clausen, 2017 128 Ibid 129 Ibid 130 Ibid 131 Marjorie Cohn. 2014. “Drones and Targeted Killing: Legal, Moral, and Geopolitical Issues.” Research

Paper No. 2446762, Thomas Jefferson School of Law: 7 132 Marjorie Cohn 2012, 7 133 Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens, and David J. Callen. 2012. "Drone Warfare In Yemen: Fostering

Emirates Through Counterterrorism?" Middle East Policy 19.3: 146

48

than the least expensive fighter jet, a drone can also stay airborne much longer than a piloted jet,

which reduces strain on personnel, lost time and wasted fuel. A United States Air Force report

has even said that drones promote “the wisest use of tax dollars.”134 Former Defense Secretary

Leon Panetta stated in 2013 after Afghanistan and Iraq had wound down compared to the height

of the respective wars, the government would protect and possibly increase the budget for

unmanned systems despite an overall defence budget decrease.135 It has been estimated that the

cost of training unmanned aerial vehicle pilots costs “less than a tenth what it costs to train

traditional combat aviators.”136

The practical fiscal advantages of drones over other tactical options combined with a

perceived tactical advantage and intelligence necessity due to the remote locations in the former

FATA culminated post 9/11 in the argument that drones’ use was the only legitimate choice in

Pakistan at the time. When drone purview expanded beyond its 1990s mandate of surveillance

focused on al Qaeda in Afghanistan137 -as was most intelligence, defence, and military programs

-they became armed with missiles, and their territorial boundary expanded into Yemen and

Pakistan.138 The expansion of this mission led to the formalization of a more cohesive policy in

Pakistan.

3.4 Establishment of Drone Program in Pakistan

The first confirmed strike in Pakistan is now widely acknowledged as the one directed at

Nek Muhammad Wazir in 2004. Nek was a high-profile enemy of the Pakistani army who had

134 Alan W. Dowd. 2013. "Drone wars: risks and warnings." Parameters Winter-Spring: 7. 135 Dowd 2013, 7 136 Ibid, 7 137 Bergen and Tiedemann 2011, 13 138 Ibid, 13

49

recanted on an important peace treaty earlier that same year139 and pledged his support for al

Qaeda.140 After having fought against Pakistani military forces early in 2004, he subsequently

agreed to cooperate with the Pakistani army to rid the tribal areas of al Qaeda militants and any

lingering Afghani Taliban.141 Pakistan later accused him of reneging on said deal and

consequently became one of the country’s foremost wanted. The United States stepped in when

asked and killed him with the first successful unmanned aerial vehicle missile strike142 in Wana,

in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.143 He was killed

lounging in a mud hut in his compound and talking to a reporter on his satellite phone.144 This

was a level of intelligence that previously was extremely hard to acquire and never before with

that speed; this was a massive win for affirming the new technology’s capability.

The United States agreed to the assassination as a “goodwill kill”145 gesture done to forge

a working relationship with the Pakistani government that would allow for the implementation of

a UAV program in the country. This assassination is an important milestone because it allowed

the groundwork for their agreement to be laid. The publicly unconfirmed agreement stipulated

that the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Pakistan’s army and intelligence agency,

would only allow the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to work within the

139 Christine Fair and Ali Hamza. 2016. “From elite consumption to popular opinion: framing of the US drone program in Pakistani newspapers.” Small Wars and Insurgencies. 27.4: 593 140 James Cavallaro, Stephan Sonnenberg, and Sarah Knuckey. “Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians From US Drone Practices in Pakistan.” Stanford: International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic. 11. 141 CNN Library. 2004. “Pakistan kills tribal leader.” CNN. Cable News Network. 142 CNN Library 2004 143 Meyer 2014, 229 144 Christine Fair. 2014. “Drones, spies, terrorists, and second-class citizenship in Pakistan.” Taylor & Francis. 206-7 145 Fair and Hamza 2016, 593

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FATA. This stipulation and their role in creating the technology transformed the CIA from an

espionage service to a military one.

Additionally, any targets also had to be a mutual enemy of both nations.146 The reasons

for these regulations were twofold; one, it ensured the United States did not have free access to

kill whomever they wanted; it had to be an enemy of the state of Pakistan as well. Two, it helped

reduce the likelihood the United States would gain intelligence on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.

There was a mentality in the program’s conception that so long as the ISI and Pakistani

government would not face the consequences or any potential blowback from the program, they

were content to be hands-off and allow the United States to, almost, do what they wanted. Over

time the governments’ dynamic changed due to many factors, chief among them the drone

program itself. As public perception evolved and increasingly negative views towards the United

States gained traction among the general populous relations were strained. There was a division

for the Pakistani government who also wanted the United States’ continued support, financial

backing, and power but who have an obligation to their citizenry who feel the United States has

no right to be operating in their country, killing their citizens.

While the United States’ actions make clear they supported a belief that because militant

extremists in Pakistan, and elsewhere, were formulating plans and launching attacks against

them, that it was their responsibility and their desire to eliminate them themselves. In so doing

they could foremost ensure that it was carried out, and that they were the ones in control, not at

the mercy of others. This notion, however, whether in violation of international rights to

sovereignty or not, whether within one’s rights of self-defence and national security or a

violation of jus cogens on operating in another sovereign nations’ backyard or not, indeed sent a

146 Ibid, 593

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message.

In a strong alliance, particularly a military-focused one, there should be a determined

belief that the protection of one is the protection of both, such as in NATO’s alliance where

Article 5 affirms this. While international political, diplomatic, and military partnerships do not

exist in an idyllic reality where everyone cohesively works together, priorities always align, there

are no ulterior motives, and word is bond, a strong partnership needs some measure of trust. It

was clear that the United States never felt this was true with Pakistan. As was previously

discussed, theirs was a partnership born of necessity and mutually beneficial ways to use each

other; it was not one of ideological commonality or widespread common interests.

3.5 Evolution of UAV Program in Pakistan

Militarized drone use expanded under the Obama administration to the extent that it is

now considered the country’s number one counterterrorism strategy.147 Deployment of drones

increased from approximately fifty in September 2001, to more than seven hundred fifty by April

2012,148 and by 2013, the Obama administration had already launched in five years more than

seven times the number of drone strikes as the Bush administration did during their eight years in

power.149

This expansion of United States counterterrorism efforts precipitated the proliferation of

the drone program in countries including Yemen and Pakistan when the purview moved beyond

surveillance as drones became, as scholars Hudson, Owens, and Flannes describe them,

“America’s preferred killing machines for locations where the U.S. military does not operate

147 Michael J. Boyle. 2013. "The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare." International Affairs. 89.1: 2 148 Micah Zenko. 2013. Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies. 65. The Council on Foreign Relations: 3 149 Zenko 2013, 8

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openly on the ground.”150 This summation perfectly articulates the reason for their use in

Pakistan -a country in which they are involved, albeit often clandestinely, unofficially, and

outside the parameters of the official theatres of warfare they were engaging in, in its regional

neighbours of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Within Pakistan, the focus had been centralized to the seven tribal areas that formed the

former Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Northwest Pakistan. More specifically, most

strikes have occurred in North Waziristan as it shares a border with Afghanistan that is mainly

unfettered and easily traversed and thus became a hub of terrorist activity.151 When the war in

Afghanistan began, significant swaths of al Qaeda, and Taliban militants fled to the Tribal Areas

to escape United States military retaliation but also to establish training bases, to serve as a

respite from attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and as a place to plan attacks against the

United States and Europe.152

Drone use in Pakistan can, abstractly, be divided into three main periods. There is its

infancy under President Bush’s administrations and the beginning of President Obama’s, where

strikes, while ongoing, were limited in number. During this period, the focus was intentional in

its pursuit of al Qaeda leaders and disrupting the terrorist haven that the FATA region had

become. The United States government was focused principally on the height of the wars in

Afghanistan and Iraq, and consequently, the use of drone strikes was not very widespread in

Pakistan at this point. However, several high-value targets were eliminated during this period,

including senior al Qaeda commanders, Abu Hamza Rabia, Abu Laith al-Libi,153 Tehrik-i-

150 Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens and Matt Flannes. 2011. “Middle East Policy: Blowback from the New American way of war.” Wiley Online Library. 123. 151 Amnesty International. 2013. “Will I Be Next?” US Drone Strikes in Pakistan.” Amnesty International Publications. 12 152 Amnesty International 2013, 12 153 New America. 2020. “The Drone War in Pakistan.” New America Project.

53

Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leader Baitullah Mehsud,154 and Saleh al Somali, a part of al Qaeda’s

core leadership.155

The next period, beginning in 2010 with the drastic uptick in attacks under President

Obama, lasted for several years as the United States expanded their air war in the region. This

period is when the most significant numbers of high-value targets were eliminated, along with

the most significant number of civilians, although proportionally, it was at a decline as strikes

became more exact as technology and intelligence improved. The biggest claim to fame of this

era was Osama bin Laden’s successful elimination via a special forces group on the ground

mission on May 2nd, 2011. Nevertheless this period also saw the elimination of numerous key

targets, including Mustafa Abu Yazid, aka Saeed al-Masri who was al Qaeda chief financial

expert and the top commander in Afghanistan,156 Shaikh al-Fatah, aka Abdul Razzak, the

operational commander of al Qaeda in Pakistan, 157 Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, the number two

operational leader for al Qaeda,158 Badar Mansoor, a commander of the Pakistani Taliban,159

Muhammad Mustafa, a commander in the Pakistani Taliban,160 and finally, the commander of

the Haqqani network, Abdullah Haqqani.161

The final period, during the late second terms of the Obama administration and under

President Trump has seen the waning of the drone program in Pakistan. The reason for this is

twofold. Firstly, at this point most of the al Qaeda and affiliated leadership they set out to kill

have already been successfully eliminated, and secondly, and most significantly, the jihadi threat

154 New America 2020 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid. 157 Ibid. 158 Ibid. 159 Ibid. 160 Ibid. 161 Ibid.

54

had spread elsewhere and is significantly reduced in Pakistan as compared to 2004 when the

program first began, as will be explored in due course.

3.6 Analysis of Statistical Evolution

Before examining the statistics of the patterns of strikes, it is crucial to remain aware that

though the following information is cited from multiple well-reputed sources to ensure accuracy

as much as possible, it is not feasible to know with one hundred percent certainty without the full

cooperation of the both the United States and Pakistani government and military bodies. It is

further made difficult as targets in Pakistan’s tribal areas are challenging to track and report as

they are isolated peoples. Bearing that in mind, however, the figures that will be discussed have

been taken from online databases that compiled sources globally to be as accurate as possible

given the inherent difficulties of trying to accurately draw a public picture of a classified

program and the inconsistencies of two countries with contrasting goals and at times differing

opinions on who can be classified as militants and who are civilians.162 The consequences of

these murky classifications were evident in the previously mentioned 2006 strike at a madrassa.

Looking at the statistics involved on all reported strikes in Pakistan, there is a threefold

area of concern. Firstly, the number of strikes and how those numbers have evolved through

different US Presidential administrations and changing priorities in Pakistan with the drone

program and the United States itself and the US-Pakistani partnership’s evolution. Secondly,

there is the exploration of how those targets have evolved from their formation to go after al

Qaeda and bin Laden to a much more dispersed target pool. Finally, there is the consideration of

civilian casualties caused by either ill-informed strikes, a mistake from an errant drone, a

disregard of the target to civilian ratio, or exceptional circumstances deemed worthy. The

162 Bergen and Tiedemann 2011, 13

55

threshold of acceptable innocent casualties changed over time for various reasons, as will be

explored.

3.6.1 Data Strike Compilations

The following charts were obtained from New America, a self-described nonpartisan

think-tank that focuses on public policy concerns. It is a compilation of data from major well-

reputed international and regional newspapers, wire, and television services. Strikes must be

reported from a minimum of two separate media sources to be verified, although where possible,

their standard is four or more sources.163 The classification of casualties is presented within

ranges due to inconsistencies between sources and because there is disagreement on who is

considered a militant and a civilian.164 In understanding the limitations of its absolute accuracy,

New America is well-recognized group, and the data provided is well-reputed.

Table 3.6.1 Strike Totals 2004-2020

President Total Strikes Civilian Casualties

Militant Casualties

Unknown Casualties

Total Casualties

Bush 48 116-137 218-326 65-77 399-540 Obama 353 129-162 1,659-2,683 146-249 1,934-3,094 Trump 13 0-4 33-62 0-2 33-68 All 414 245-303 1,910 211-328 2,366-3,702

As the figures provided by New America show, the total number of drone strikes in

Pakistan under the Bush administration were forty-eight,165 under President Obama, three

hundred and fifty-three,166 and under President Trump were thirteen.167 These numbers bring the

163 New America. 2020. “Methodology.” New America Project. 164 New America Methodology 2020 165 New America, Drone Wars 2020 166 New America, Drone Wars 2020 167 New America, Drone Wars 2020

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running total to four hundred and fourteen. New America also estimates President Bush’s forty-

eight strikes resulted in between three hundred and ninety-nine and five hundred and forty

casualties, of which an estimated two hundred and eighteen to three hundred and twenty-six are

confirmed militants.168 This leaves between one hundred and eighty-one to two hundred and

fourteen casualties who are either confirmed civilians or whose status is unknown.169 This is a

high percentage of somewhere between thirty-five and sixty percent who are something other

than confirmed militants.

Under President Obama, the proliferation of the program exploded both in total strikes

but also in the corresponding number of casualties. Nevertheless, the accuracy seems to have

improved as well. There were somewhere between one thousand nine hundred and thirty-four

and three thousand ninety-four total casualties from his three hundred and fifty-three strikes. Of

this, between one thousand six hundred and fifty-nine to two thousand six hundred and eighty-

three were confirmed militants.170 The percentage of militants formed somewhere between fifty-

four and eighty-six, meaning those other than confirmed militants total between fourteen and

thirty-six, a marked change. The information from another reputable source will be examined

before further analysis of the trends is conducted.

The following charts were obtained from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, a

London-based non-profit which claims to “hold power to account.”171 It is a compilation of

information sourced through their investigative reporting and reliant on information from

“research, data, whistleblowers, and contacts.”172 The quantification of casualties again is within

168 Ibid 169 Ibid 170 Ibid 171 Elaine Potter. 2010. “About Us.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 172 Ibid

57

ranges because there is conflicting data and reporting on those numbers, and this is the most

accurate way to ensure authenticity.

Their total confirmed strikes are forty hundred and thirty, more than New America

classified, which resulted in between two thousand five hundred and fifteen and four thousand

sixteen total people killed,173 a higher range than New America both on the lower and upper

parameters. Of the people killed somewhere between four hundred and twenty-four and nine

hundred and twenty-nine were civilians, one hundred and seventy-two to two hundred and seven

of which were children.174

The Bush years are summarized as follows:

Table 3.6.2 The Bush Years 175

Total CIA drone strikes: 51 Total reported killed: 410-595 Civilians reported killed: 167-332 Children reported killed: 102-129 Total reported injured: 175-277

Table 3.6.3 Obama 2009 176

Total CIA drone strikes: 52 Total reported killed: 465-744 Civilians reported killed: 100-210 Children reported killed: 36-39 Total reported injured: 262-397

173 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 2021. “Strikes in Pakistan.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 174 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 2021. 175 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 2010. “The Bush Years: Pakistan Strikes 2004-2009.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 176 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 2010. “Pakistan: Reported US Strikes 2009.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism.

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Table 3.6.4 Obama 2010177 Total CIA drone strikes: 128 Total reported killed: 755-1108 Civilians reported killed: 89-197 Children reported killed: 23 Total reported injured: 351-428

Table 3.6.5 Obama 2011178

Total CIA drone strikes: 75 Total reported killed: 363-666 Civilians reported killed: 52-152 Children reported killed: 6-11 Total reported injured: 158-236

Table 3.6.6 Obama 2012179

Total CIA drone strikes: 50 Total reported killed: 212-410 Civilians reported killed: 13-63 Children reported killed: 1-2 Total reported injured: 100-212

Table 3.6.7 Obama 2013180

Total CIA drone strikes: 27 Total reported killed: 109-195 Civilians reported killed: 0-4 Children reported killed: 0-1 Total reported injured: 43-89

Table 3.6.8 Obama 2014181

Total CIA drone strikes: 25 Total reported killed: 115-186 Civilians reported killed: 0-2 Children reported killed: 0-2 Total reported injured: 53-76

177 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 2011. “Pakistan: Reported US Strikes 2010.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 178 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 2012. “Pakistan: Reported US Strikes 2011.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 179 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 2013. “Pakistan: Reported US Strikes 2012.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 180 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 2014. “Pakistan: Reported US Strikes 2013.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 181 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 2015. “Pakistan: Reported US Strikes 2014.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism.

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Table 3.6.9 Obama 2015182

Total CIA drone strikes: 13 Total reported killed: 60-85 Civilians reported killed: 2-5 Children reported killed: 0 Total reported injured: 25-32

Table 3.6.10 Obama 2016183

Total CIA drone strikes: 3 Total reported killed: 11-12 Civilians reported killed: 1 Children reported killed: 0 Total reported injured: 3-6

Table 3.6.11 Trump 2017184

Total CIA drone strikes: 5 Total reported killed: 15-22 Civilians reported killed: 0-3 Children reported killed: 0 Total reported injured: 1-5

Table 3.6.12 Trump 2018185

Total CIA drone strikes: 5 Total reported killed: 5-11 Civilians reported killed: 0 Children reported killed: 0 Total reported injured: 1

The challenge in compiling these figures are numerous: problems with underreporting,186

conflicting media reports,187 with the FATA being hard to reach and mostly off-limits to

182 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 2016. “Pakistan: Reported US Strikes 2015.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 183 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 2017. “Pakistan: Reported US Strikes 2016.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 184 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 2018. “Pakistan: Reported US Strikes 2017.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 185 New America Drone War 2020 186 James Cavallaro, Stephan Sonnenberg, and Sarah Knuckey. 2012. “Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians From US Drone Practices in Pakistan.” Stanford: International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic. 32 187 Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey Stanford 2012, 35

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foreigners,188 problems with literacy making communication and reporting challenging,189

reluctance to report women as its culturally seen as disrespectful, and the Pashtunwali principle

that leads to a sense of obligation to provide shelter and protect non-state actors whether they

agree with their cause or not.190 All of this is to say that while these figures are only the best

guess and there is some disagreement, they are similar enough to identify several critical trends

among strike numbers. In the first years under President Bush, despite having the most specific

target group criteria of all years of the program, there is the highest proportion of comparative

civilian casualties of all years.

In the first four years of strikes in Pakistan, there were only five HVT’s killed. The initial

strike in 2004 eliminating Nek Mohammed was followed by two in 2005 and two in 2006.191

During this time there were, unfortunately, several highly publicized civilian incidents. In

particular, the 2006 strike of a madrasa in the tribal areas in northwest Pakistan resulted in the

deaths of eighty-two civilians.192 In response, both the Pakistani and American governments

publicly denied the United States’ involvement and the responsibility was placed on the

Pakistani military.193 In retaliation, a suicide bomber struck a police barracks in Islamabad less

than a week later.194 There were forty-two people killed.195 The message was clear: some were

not okay with the Pakistani government cooperating or colluding with the United States nor with

the employment of drones in their country, and they were not going to tacitly stand by and allow

188 Ibid, 26 189 Ibid, 25 190 Ibid 22-23 191 Andrew Cockburn. 2015. Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins. New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company. 221 192 Cockburn 2015, 221 193 Ibid 221 194 Ibid 221 195 Ibid 221

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it to continue without striking back. In the early stages, this opposition was limited to people

such as an al Qaeda operative or other affiliated terrorist who would be targeted directly.

However, outside of that scope, the general public was okay with or indifferent to the program.

While isolated backlash occurred after failed strikes, or rather, after successful strikes with

unintended casualties, the public was not significantly engaged in the drone narrative. As time

evolved and their use and death rate increased so markedly, opposition began to grow and

influence the United States’ conduct. While not influencing the number of strikes it did

precipitate change, including the implementation of requirements to publicly disclose civilian

casualty figures,196 a marked change from the initial total clandestine and secretive nature of all

aspects of the program operations. Intense opposition also reinforced the imperativeness of every

reasonable effort made to ensure the minimization of non-militant casualties.

This second source of data further shows that throughout their use, drone accuracy has

improved. Scholars have estimated the number of strikes in Pakistan that successfully eliminated

an important militant target as only one of every seven launched.197 The balance of these strikes

hit low-level fighters of little comparative importance and civilians.198

It is an idea reinforced by Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann in their article for

Foreign Affairs, where they attributed proportionally decreased civilian deaths to three factors.

There is one, increased coordination between the United States and Pakistan’s intelligence

agencies,199 two, smaller missiles now being employed,200 and three, drones now capable of

196 Daniel R. Brunstetter. 2019. “Trump's Executive Order on Drone Strikes Sends Civilian Casualty Data Back into the Shadows.” The Conversation. University of California. 197 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann. 2011. “Washington’s Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan.” Foreign Affairs. 90.4. 12 198 Bergen and Tiedemann 2011, 12 199 Ibid 13 200 Ibid 13

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longer hover times which facilitates more time to distinguish between civilians and militants

accurately.201 The merits of these improvements are self-evident. Better intelligence coordination

and longer hover times mean a higher probability that information will be exact, identities

verified, and affiliations confirmed. When any or all these aspects are unconfirmed or based on

supposition and not on fact, there is naturally an increased margin for error. A margin for error

quantified in human lives, potentially innocent human lives, is not a cost that anyone is interested

in paying.

Moreover, physically smaller missiles with more advanced targeting capabilities mean

that when strikes launch, they are more exact and collateral damage can reduce. Physically

smaller missiles can more narrowly hit specific targets and lessen the physical damage to

surrounding infrastructure, which at times is its own form of lethal consequence. Collateral

damage comes not only from incorrect information but at times simply from other, unintended

people, having been present in the area when the strike hits. It can be fatal though more often; it

results in injuries from shrapnel flying or buildings collapsing. Any and all unintentional

casualties, whether fatal or not, undermine the overall success of the program as it reduced

people’s faith in the ability of the drone to precisely hit their target without threat to civilians.

The final important piece of information to be gleaned from this data is that the program

peaked in 2010 when there were a record one hundred and twenty-eight strikes. This number was

thought justifiable as a response to the United States and other state authorities’ claims that they

discovered militant al Qaeda plots to bomb New York and Europe.202 This is demonstrative of

the fluid nature of the program. While the intention is to be a preventative tool in eliminating

militants and other perceived threats before they can launch successful attacks against American

201 Ibid 13 202 Amnesty International 2013, 12

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forces, civilians, or other interests, it is, a very reactionary tool. Every time it succeeds in

eliminating a high-value target, it does accomplish its peremptory goal, but it is also a fluid

program that is continually adjusting and reacting to change; change in threat levels, change in

geographic location, and change in who comprises the most significant threat.

3.6.2 Target Composition

Over the years, the program changed trajectory in other ways beyond the increase in

frequency. The second significant evolution is the affiliation of those targeted. While being still

continuously deployed as a counterterrorism measure ensured that the intended targets remained

individuals believed or proven to be terrorists, their aim changed from being near exclusively

focused on al Qaeda leadership to being against the largely Taliban and Haqqani networks, as

well as occasionally against others. In referring to the chart under President Bush, al Qaeda

members accounted for thirty-eight percent of the targets.203

Table 3.6.13

Bush Obama Trump Taliban 21% (10/48) 32% (114/353) 31% (4/13) Al Qaeda 38% (18/48) 9% (33/353) --- Unclear 33% (16/48) 43% (153/353) 8% (1/13) Haqqani Network 4% (2/48) 10% (34/353) 54% (7/13) Baitullah Mehsud Faction

4% (2/48) 4% (13/353) ---

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

--- 1% (3/353) ---

Maulvi Nazir --- 1% (2/353) ---- ISIS --- --- 8% (1/13)

As is evident at the start of the program, three principal militant groups/networks

operated in the FATA regions. There were the Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, and al

203 New America Drone War, 2020

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Qaeda.204 The former principally targeted the United States, Afghani, and allied military forces

operating in Afghanistan during the beginning of the war.205 The Pakistani Taliban sought to

overthrow the Pakistani government and consequently conducted attacks targeting state

apparatus and personnel throughout the country.206 Lastly, al Qaeda most famously are the

militants and jihadists planning and propagating attacks around the world.207 These groups were

all seen as forces that not only posed a threat to the United States directly in terms of the

potential of another attack against either their deployed forces in Afghanistan or at home but

were also a threat to Pakistan. Looking to attack Pakistani citizens or trying to overthrow the

government meant it was also in Pakistan’s best interests to try and pre-emptively eliminate said

targets. At the time, these three groups were confined to one area and were where drone strikes

were exclusively confined.

In the years since, however, the groups operating in the FATA have evolved. Al Qaeda

has become much less frequently targeted by strikes, not because they no longer present a threat

or because lethal action is thought unnecessary but because the composition of the former FATA

groups has evolved. In the last several years, a significant influx of Haqqani network and ISIS

members have taken over operating in the region. The Haqqani network has proven to be

responsible for ongoing attacks on American forces still stationed in Afghanistan, so targeting

them became increasingly prioritized.208

Moreover, al Qaeda itself has largely left the FATA region. Strikes proved successful in

decimating the al Qaeda leadership responsible for 9/11, and as the old guard was killed, the new

204 Amnesty International 2013, 13 205 Ibid, 13 206 Ibid, 13 207 Ibid, 13 208 Greg Miller. 2012. “Plan for Hunting Terrorists Signals U.S. Intends to Keep Adding Names to Kill Lists.” The Washington Post. WP Company.

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leadership became much more decentralized and is principally, for the time being at least,

operating out of other theatres. Most especially Yemen, and Syria where strikes have also seen a

significant upsurge. Simply put, the composition of targets has changed as the players involved

have too, and the theatres of militant activity have expanded. The drone program has been

required to remain fluid in that aspect of operations.

3.6.3 Civilian Casualties

The final major component in examining these figures beyond the evolution in numbers

of attacks and the composition of targets is the civilian casualty aspect. Over the years, the

comparative percentage of civilian casualties to the overall number killed has decreased, which is

to say strikes, generally speaking, became more exact. There are several reasons for this. Most

significantly, there is an entirely sound reason that the technology has improved in the eighteen

years since they first began more widespread use. Improved technology means better imagery to

ensure targets are genuinely there and better distinguish between militants and civilians. It also

means missiles are more accurate than before.

Further, there has been greater financial investment in the program, so drone operators

have a more comprehensive training, the intelligence apparatus supporting them has more

thorough information, and there is a better understanding of the militants and terrorists it is

targeting. After eighteen years of war in the same operating theatre with many of the same

players, patterns have appeared, networks have grown, and there is more familiarity with the

behaviours to look for.

Additionally, because the early years of strikes in Pakistan were successfully able to

eliminate many of the high-profile militants it set out to kill as retribution for 9/11, the evaluation

of their worth compared to the threat of civilian casualty, while never at any cost, decreased. In

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the program’s infancy the threshold for lethal action was that they were part of “personality

strikes.”209 This term meant a very narrow focus on targeted killings of high-value targets of

armed, non-state actors.210 On September 17th, 2001, then-President George W. Bush signed the

Memorandum of Notification, a document that granted carte blanche power to the Central

Intelligence Agency to locate and kill high-value targets (HVT’s) among al Qaeda leadership.211

This document also included a list of twenty-four people that the CIA were approved to execute

without needing any further permissions should the time come when/if they are located.212 The

focus at this time was very narrowly centred on seeking justice, or revenge, depending on

interpretation, of al Qaeda and affiliated members who had attacked the United States. Over the

evolution of the program that threshold changed as target lists expanded.

Over time so-called “signature strikes”213 were introduced whereby groups of men or

individuals were considered targets based on patterns of behaviour or characteristics associated

with terrorism, and the perceived likelihood of their threat, not on factual data that they were

one. Their identities did not even have to be known to meet the threshold of being targeted if

their behaviour was thought suspicious to the United States security personnel surveilling the

FATA.214

Moreover, while many military tactics that emerged post 9/11, including the Patriot Act,

Memorandum of Notification, enhanced interrogation i.e. torture, and the drone program, have

alienated the United States to many nations across the world who oppose such actions, they

originated from a place of heightened terror. Post-9/11, the United States government and

209 Cavallaro, Sonneberg, and Knuckey 2012, 12 210 Ibid, 12 211 Cockburn 2015, 115 212 Ibid,, 115 213 Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012, 12 214 Cockburn 2015,16

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President Bush’s administration were dealing with not only the consequences of an attack on

their soil and the subsequent anthrax scare but with a tremendous amount of fear amongst its

people who were terrified that it would happen again. What appeared was an administration that

wanted to do everything in its power to prevent such an incident from reoccurring. For better or

for worse, that meant that terrorists or suspected terrorists needed to be hunted; that meant people

died in the name of the greater good, and that meant American and allied lives were put at risk

by putting boots on the ground. This political climate allowed highly controversial acts of

Congress such as the Patriot Act to come into existence and how the idea of long-distance

assassination extraneous to war was welcomed.

Target lists were conceptualized initially as a finite emergency measure.215 Its morally

questionable and legally murky basis could pass in a highly emotionally fraught and deeply

wounded political climate as it was conceived during a time of war in the aftermath of a deadly

terrorist attack. What appeared as a short-term fix has proved to have longevity that far surpasses

that, as it has become a fixture of the current drone program and a hallmark of the broader

counterterrorism strategy. These lists have not merely endured but expanded with thresholds

even less discriminate.

This longevity is evident in the governments’ official Disposition Matrix, known

colloquially as the “kill list,”216 which followed. Publicly revealed by the Washington Post in a

series of three articles in 2012, it was created under the Obama administration in 2010 and was

the formalization and expansion of what had been occurring even more clandestinely for nearly a

decade. The kill list functions as a database that compiles the biographies, known associates,

215 Miller 2012 216 Amnesty International 2013, 12

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affiliated organizations, and possible locations, among other pertinent information,217 for

individuals the United States considers worthy of lethal action.

Today both the Central Intelligence Agency and Joint Special Operations Command create

their own target lists218 that are a result of their separate sources of intelligence, distinct criteria

for lethal action, priorities, and threat assessments. These lists are presented to the current

administration when they then authorize who goes onto the official kill list.219

This expansion into signature strikes and kill lists proved, understandably, to be a lot

more controversial than their predecessor from concerned citizens in both the United States and

Pakistan and from members of the international community who debate their legality, accuracy,

and the morality of their use. This was a new legal territory and granted new ownership to

intelligence and military commands over the still escalating drone program, as will be discussed

in the next chapter.

Finally, the question over the threshold of civilian casualties considered acceptable risk

was also a sensitive topic. Former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Marc Garlasco has gone

on the record explaining that the number officials deemed as being acceptable without much

further thought was thirty during the preliminary stages.220 That is, if there were a purported

estimate of twenty-nine civilians or less who would be collateral damage in a strike to eliminate

a high-value target, then it was “not a problem”221 and required no further approval. As soon as

that predicted thirtieth civilian was involved it required the further approval of either President

Bush or Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.222 However, Garlasco stated that was typically

217 Miller 2012 218 Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012, 14 219 Ibid, 14 220 Cockburn 2015, 139 221 Cockburn 2015, 139 222 Cockburn 2015, 139

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nothing more than a formality as the approximately fifty instances where permission was

requested, it was granted every time.223

While the secret nature of how the program operates means information on these sorts of

figures is unknown unless someone comes forward, it is clear from the aforementioned analysis

of strike data that the threshold of what is considered acceptable collateral damage decreased as

there were increasingly fewer as the years unfolded. This is a substantial evolution in

understanding civilian casualties, acceptance of thresholds of error, and the overall development

of the program.

3.7 Logistical Evolution

Even upon the preliminary stages of formalization of the drone program, the evolution of

the logistical and support personnel necessary has been extensive. It began by needing only

thirty-one imagery analysts on loan from the National Imagery and Mapping Agency224 working

for the CIA who relayed information to intelligence officers located at the United States Air

Force base, Ramstein, in Germany who then sent their orders from the CIA to the Predator

crews.225

Now it is an enormous program that is jointly run by the CIA and Joint Special

Operations Command.226 It has completely revolutionized the United States military and now

officially trains more Air Force pilots to man unmanned aerial vehicles than they do to fly

223 Cockburn 2015, 139 224 Whittle 2014, 157 225 Whittle 2014, 156 226 Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012

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conventional aircraft.227 Drone pilots are stationed in either Creech Air Force Base in Nevada or

Cannon Air Force Base in New Mexico,228 thousands of miles from where they operate.

In 2001 the United States military owned eighty-two unmanned aerial vehicles of three

different kinds: the Predator and two other small reconnaissance only vehicles.229 By 2010 the

military had approximately eight thousand UAVs comprised of fourteen different types.230 There

was a particular explosion of armed Predators that pre-9/11 was only planned to number forty-

eight, all of which were unarmed. Post 9/11, that number changed to one hundred and sixty-five

armed as well as seventy-three armed Reapers,231 the more advanced model that could carry even

more missiles and would eventually come to replace the Predator in 2018 fully.232

Predator drones required a support staff of one hundred and sixty-eight people per

vehicle.233 Its successor system, the Reaper, was significantly more expensive but also better.

They are larger, heavier, and capable of carrying more weapons, including five one-hundred-

pound bombs.234 However, Reapers are also over fifteen million dollars apiece to buy and have

annual maintenance costs totally five million each per year.235

The one aspect that has remained constant through these changes in how and where it is

run is the program’s clandestine nature. On the US side, only some strikes are ever confirmed

and, other than the first stated intent in 2001 to find and eliminate bin Laden, they are never pre-

emptively announced.

227 Whittle 2014, 300 228 Craig Whitlock. 2012. “Remote U.S. Base at Core of Secret Operations.” The Washington Post. WP Company. 229 Whittle 2014, 299 230 Ibid, 299 231 Ibid, 299 232 Ibid, 299 233 Cockburn 2015, 152 234 Ibid, 177 235 Ibid,, 177

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3.8 Questions of Pakistani Level of Involvement

On the Pakistani side, their involvement has always remained elusive. There have been

times when they claimed public credit for the result of a strike, such as the first when Nek

Mohammed was executed. There have been others when they have denounced the program and

expressed their disapproval of their airspace and sovereignty rights being infringed.

At the beginning of the program one of the agreements, as mentioned, was that the

Pakistani government consistently claimed responsibility for all drone strikes to support the

image that they were able to defend their own peoples without foreign involvement. The United

States was thus able to deny their involvement. This relationship reportedly existed from at least

2004 to 2007.236 When public opposition to the program began to rise, it became more

challenging for the Pakistanis to continue offering cover for the US. It also became significantly

more public after the bin Laden raid in May 2011 when the Pakistanis could not have claimed

responsibility, even though not a drone, as it was noticeably clear to everyone they had had no

idea the mission was even occurring. Whether one calls them hypocritical, survivalists, adaptive,

intelligent, or pandering to pressure, the Pakistani position has shifted which has changed a lot in

terms of the dynamic between countries.

These conflicting reports have made it exceedingly difficult for those not a part of either

the United States or Pakistani governments or intelligence agencies to really know the truth of

Pakistan’s level of involvement in the program. Were they a partner? Were they uninvolved?

Does it fall somewhere in between?

In truth, it seems to fall somewhere in between where they are made aware of, and help to

ease, many of the attacks and supply the resources to aid while at other times still being kept in

236 Cavarallo, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012, 15

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the dark. Lending credence to the first assertion is that in 2013 former Pakistani President Pervez

Musharraf publicly acknowledged it for the first time237 that his government had signed off on

United States drone strikes despite earlier repeated denial and public condemnation of the

program. While he claims having given consent, “only on a few occasions when a target was

absolutely isolated and no chance of collateral damage,"238 it is still a validation, which runs

contrary to what was repeatedly said. President Musharraf was in power in 2004 when the first

strike was launched, and therefore the acknowledgement of his having prior knowledge of strikes

and his granting of approval and support adds an interesting dimension to the understanding of

the program’s creation.

It has even been reported that General Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani, the head of the Pakistani

military, had even, at one point, requested increased drone support in South Waziristan.239 This is

further reinforced by the WikiLeaks revelations of diplomatic cables in 2008 from the former

United States Ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Patterson. The cable was a recounting of a meeting

she had with Interior Minister Rehman Malik and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani, which

included the Prime Minister’s statement where he said, “I don’t care if they do it as long as they

get the right people. We’ll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it.”240

The revelation of these public statements means that the legality of the use of drones

itself in Pakistan by the United States and what it means that Pakistan has been involved will be

examined in the following chapter. To understand what it means in the context of the creation of

237 Nic Robertson and Greg Botelho. 2013. “Ex-Pakistani Leader Admits Secret Deal with U.S. on Drone Strikes.” CNN Cable News Network. 238 Robertson and Botelho 2013 239 Shezhad Qadi. 2012. “US-Pakistan Relations: Common and Clashing Interests.” World Affairs. 175.1: 75 240 Tim Lister, 2010. “WikiLeaks: Pakistan quietly approved drone attacks, U.S. special units” CNN Cable News Network.

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the program, however, it lends critical legitimacy to the United States’ narrative that it was the

best conceivable course of action to address the threat of militants residing and harbouring within

Pakistan, especially within the hard to reach Federally Administered Tribal Areas, because

Pakistan itself supports it. They would have been neither indifferent nor supportive of a program

that did damage to their country, and thus with the tacit acceptance, it follows that that meant it

was the best option.

Moreover, the strikes have occurred with intelligence sharing between the ISI and CIA,

and the human intelligence needed to conduct the strikes coming from Pakistan. This is not

merely tacit consent to the program and certainly not the opposition said to be occurring but is

proof of its support of United States operations. It is demonstrative of the classic case of the ISI

and government showing Pakistan’s citizens what is in its left hand to distract from what its right

hand is doing. The problem inherent in this is that this disconnect between government apparatus

and citizens and between the two governments has consequences for the health, longevity, and

practicality of any partnership between the United States and Pakistan.

Additionally, there is reported to have been evidence uncovered by the United States that

the Pakistanis “would delay planned strikes in order to warn al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban,

whose fighters would then disperse.”241 This came to light in June 2008, when McConnell “had

taken human and technical intelligence to President Bush showing multiple conversations

between an ISI Colonel and Siraj Haqqani, a guerrilla commander whose network was allied

with the Afghan Taliban.”242 What follows is Bob Woodward’s retelling of President Bush’s

reaction.

“Okay,” Bush had said, “we're going to stop playing the game these sons of bitches are killing Americans. I've had enough.” He ordered stepped up predator drone strikes on al-

241 Bob Woodward. 2010. Obama's Wars. 1st ed. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks. 5-6 242 Woodward 2010, 5-6

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Qaeda leaders and specific camps, so called infrastructure targets. It was like attacking an anthill --the survivors would run away in the aftermath … Bush had directed that Pakistan receive “concurrent notification” of drone attacks, meaning they learned of a strike as it was underway or, just to be sure, a few minutes after. American drones now owned the skies above Pakistan.”243 For this to have occurred it is proof positive that there was a time they were pre-

emptively told despite claims to the contrary.

Finally, until recently, drones often flew from Pakistan's Shamsi Airfield. This is

demonstrative of Pakistani compliance with the program and major logistical support. Without

access to the airfield, the program would be much more difficult to operate as it would then have

to potentially function out of the United States forward operating bases (FOBs) in Afghanistan,

which are further and bring even more complicated questions into the argument on legality and

the conduct of war.

All these examples indicate that Pakistan has some level of involvement, and perceptions

of their outrage and censor are both exaggerated and hypocritical. On the other hand, it is also

clear that there are times when the Pakistani government is kept in the dark about the United

States’ activities in their country. The clearest example of this was the bin Laden raid in 2011

when the United States Navy launched a full-scale special forces operation within their borders

under then President Obama’s administration without saying a word to their Pakistani

counterparts with whom they were allied.

This is all to say that there have been ebbs and flows in the level of cooperation between

Pakistan and the United States as their respective priorities have evolved, tests to their

relationship have occurred, the composition of the threat they are facing has expanded, and

external pressures on their dynamic have all occurred. Due to the covert nature of much of

243 Ibid, 5-6

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intelligence, defence, and military operations, publicized information is always tempered by

national security concerns and considerations over enemy counterparts acquiring too much

knowledge. A comprehensive understanding of all the players involved is impossible, but it is

entirely accurate to say that the state of drone operations in 2021 is very different from its height

in 2010, its infancy in 2001, or any of the years in between.

3.9 Current State of Program in Pakistan and What it Means Going Forward

Currently, the state of the program in Pakistan has largely halted. After peaking in 2010

under President Obama, the program has steadily decreased though it has not stopped entirely.

The ramifications of these actions are still being felt. In many ways, the damage has already been

done, and the success already felt, as will be explored throughout the final chapters.

While a drone has not been used, at least that has been publicly disclosed, since July 4th,

2018,244 that should not be taken as a sign that the program has ceased to exist going forward.

Quite simply, presently, there are no practical alternatives to staunch militant activity in Pakistan,

especially in the tribal regions. The United States is neither considering sending ongoing special

operatives nor less discriminate airstrikes at least in present conditions and as such, the

probability they will be used again eventually still is high.

The original incarnation of al Qaeda that was the precipitating reason for the program in

Pakistan emerged on August 18th, 1988,245 as a religiously based Islamist terrorist organization

founded by Osama bin Laden in Peshawar, Pakistan. It operated simultaneously as both an

international state-less army and an extremist Sunni Muslim movement seeking global Jihad and

244 New America Project Drone War, 2020 245 Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank. 2012. "Revisiting The Early Al Qaeda: An Updated Account Of Its Formative Years." Studies In Conflict And Terrorism. International Political Science Abstracts. 35.1: 2.

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a strict interpretation of Sharia law.246 Al Qaeda today is no longer that same group. It is much

more fragmented and has splintered off into other incarnations, including al Qaeda in the

Arabian Peninsula (in Yemen), al Qaeda in Iraq, Jabhat al Nusra (in Syria), al Shabaab (in

Somalia), al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (in West Africa), and finally, the Islamic Emirate of

the Caucasus (in Chechnya and Dagestan, Russia). 247

While staying a persistent threat, these new incarnations of decentralized groups,248 have

failed to succeed in executing a large-scale attack. Therefore, the emergence of new groups,

including the Haqqani network, Taliban, and ISIL, are considered more dangerous and are more

heavily targeted. This is not to say the drone program has faded; it has merely been directed on

groups who operate beyond the confines of Pakistan and the former FATA region for the last two

plus years.

UAV strikes under President Trump’s administration decreased to near extinction in

Pakistan because his focus shifted to the theatres where these new actors are currently located.

The threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as the Islamic

State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has spread to Libya, Yemen, Egypt, Algeria,249 Saudi Arabia and

Sinai250 among others. These are regions that his predecessors targeted less as the threat was

concentrated elsewhere.251 This reprioritization is also reflective of the renewed focus in

Afghanistan and the elimination of Afghan militants “waging war against the U.S.-backed

246 Ibid, 8 247 Frank Kagan. 2013. “The Continued Expansion of Al Qaeda Affiliates and Their Capabilities.” House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Congress. 248 Thomas Joscelyn. 2013. "Global Al Qaeda: Affiliates, Objectives, and Future Challenges." The Long War Journal. 249 Mostafa Hasham. 2014. “Islamic State Leader Urges Attacks in Saudia Arabia: Speech.” Reuters. 250 Aaron Y. Zelin. 2015. “The Islamic State’s Model.” The Washington Post. 251 Dan De Luce and Sean D. Naylor. 2018. “The Drones are Back.” Foreign Policy.

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government in Kabul or Pakistani Taliban fighters who pose a threat to the government in

Islamabad.”252

While the use of drones in Pakistan has waned overall, the significance of the program

has not. Being during what may prove to be nothing more than a lull and not a cessation is

merely a reflection of the enemy it targets. Many, including this paper, argue that al Qaeda

having largely been dispersed from the Tribals is proof of the success of the program -after all, to

rid the area of jihadi militant terrorists and kill Osama bin Laden were the twofold intents of the

program initially. There are contrasting arguments to be made of this issue, both of which are

important for framing the discussion following on the diplomatic, legal, political, military

consequences on the Pakistani-American relationship. For al Qaeda to generally no longer be

operating in the former FATA and bin Laden to be dead can be construed as a success since the

realization of a goal that was initially the launching pad for all drone operations in the country is

an accomplishment.

Alternatively, in some ways, it has only created more problems. It took what was once a

geographically contained threat and dispersed them until their members span an entire region of

multiple countries and not merely one region within one country. It has also strained the

relationship between the countries. It was already a fragile partnership built on mutual

exploitation and distrust but born of necessity. The ongoing potential threat means the two will

still need to work together. In many ways, their partnership is more important than ever to ensure

the problem does not return with a renewed vengeance as militant groups tend to do historically.

The consideration to bear in mind is that the program has not waned because it was

suddenly, or even gradually, decided that it was an ill-advised or unfeasible policy decision to

252 De Luce and Naylor 2018

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continue deploying drone attacks. Rather, the attacks have merely followed the perpetrators they

target. That means more focus on Yemen, Syria, and others, and as such, they could just as easily

turn around and migrate back to the Tribals to regroup or move again, at which point strikes

could presumably return more vigorously to Pakistan.

President Trump signed an executive order on March 6th, 2019, that revoked the

requirement implemented under President Obama that drone strikes conducted outside of a war

zone must have their civilian casualty figures publicly reported by intelligence officials.253 This

will make it difficult to follow trends in the future. It returns the program to its earlier era of

lacking transparency and public accountability. The consequences of this order will be explored

more comprehensively in chapter six when the social and diplomatic effects are analyzed. In the

interim, it is important to recognize that the efforts to squash transparency threaten to undermine

any effort to facilitate a strong partnership based on honesty, accountability, and intelligibility

about who is targeted, why, and who was struck.

If anything, these facts only reinforce the idea that Pakistan is the case that needs to be

examined and that the impact on their relationship with the United States can serve as a case

study with which to analyze and predict the broader implications of drone use on inter-country

diplomacy and military partnership, and what the proliferation of this technology means on the

international system.

Being that, at present, UAV use is not comprehensively regulated under international law

the United States is beholden to no one in how they use or employ their machines. From its days

as a specifically employed tool used sparingly outside the theatre of war to arguably the United

States’ most widespread military tools, its proliferation has been the catalyst for change, both

253 Brunstetter 2019

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between Pakistan and the United States, and a lightning rod of prolific questions of legality,

morality, diplomacy, policy, politics, and questions of the conduct of war, extrajudicial killings,

assassinations, and conduct befitting the world’s foremost power.

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Chapter 4: Military Considerations of the Drone Program and Their Resulting Effect on the United States-Pakistani Partnership

and the International System of States 4.1 Military Context

As chapter two showed, since the beginning of their state-to-state interaction with a

newly independent state in the 1940s, the United States and Pakistan’s dynamic has revolved

around security. It is a partnership built largely on protection. On the one hand, the protection the

United States supplies Pakistan in terms of financial aid, military funding, and the backing of

great power to bolster their own. On the other, the power Pakistan provides to the United States

in terms of having such a geographically important ally in a vital region where they are often

unwelcome, and of the highest priority, protection in ensuring peace with one of the only two

confirmed nuclear powers in the region, the other being India.

Power-based military dynamics are complicated as there are always high stakes that can

make change slow, issues bleed into each other and encourage states to be very set in their ways

because security is such a foundational concern. Even in trying to narrow the security focus to

drones specifically, the military consequences are tested by external factors. Security concerns

often tend to intertwine with each other as risk bleeds into other areas of inter-state dynamics.

This holds between the United States and Pakistan. For Pakistan, as such a prominent power in

the Middle East, it is a lightning rod of discontent and strife. For the United States, where they

have been heavily involved in the region militarily and in trying to facilitate, spearhead, and/or

support efforts to reshape political systems in various countries, it is difficult not to let issues

bleed over. The use of drones in Pakistan for the last fifteen years is its own distinct issue

independent of all the other complicating issues in assessing the bilateral relationship between

the two countries. This is especially true militarily due to the unfortunate reality that the Middle

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East has recently been a hotbed for religious jihadi extremism that the drone programs in

Pakistan, Yemen, Syria, and elsewhere are principally focused on. It is exceedingly difficult not

to let these issues bleed into one another. The drone program does not live in a proverbial box

impervious to the effects of politics, diplomacy, militancy in other countries, expanding terrorist

reach, or the always prevalent complication India is to Pakistan on nearly any issue, with any

partner.

However, in saying this, analyzing the drone program and its impact on their partnership

is ambitious enough on its own merit. In understanding this, there are two exceptions so

inextricably intertwined that it is necessary to analyze these to tease out drones’ influence on

their relationship. These exceptions are Operation Neptune Spear, i.e. the military operation that

killed Osama bin Laden, and the war in Afghanistan. Their respective importance will be

discussed shortly.

4.2 Military Success

Before delving into tangential military operations still of relevance, we will first explore

the drone’s military consequences specifically. Overall, on military and strategic merits alone,

the program has been quite successful. The original objectives of employing drone technology in

Pakistan was: one, to gain better intelligence of the regions, actors, and to help reduce the time

delay for receiving important information that can spark action; 254 two, to find bin Laden and

other al Qaeda’s top lieutenants and kill or apprehend as many as possible, 255 and three, to be in

a position better suited to eliminate other terror threats and prevent attacks.256 On these strictly

military measures, it has proven successful.

254 Whittle 2014, 73 255 Ibid, 149 256 Ibid, 150

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4.2.1 Improved Intelligence

Addressing the first of the three measures of military success is in examining whether

intelligence has improved. The Pakistani drone program has continued to operate under the

Central Intelligence Agency and JSOC umbrella because in operating outside of a war zone, it

has chiefly been an intelligence mission. While the weaponized drones have military technology

and are used to kill, it is foremost an intelligence tool with weapon capabilities. Even the highest

profile of military special forces operations, the mission to kill bin Laden, resulted from the

CIA’s intelligence work who found, then monitored him long before the military became

involved and even when the subsequent military action planning started, the CIA remained

heavily involved. The military dynamic, in other words, has been more a military-intelligence

dynamic between the CIA and ISI than purely between both militaries. In recognizing this

reality, the aim of improving intelligence capabilities, cooperation, and ensuring they have the

knowledge to take decisive military action was a success. This is further reiterated by so many

high-value targets successfully killed by a strike or captured from intelligence first provided by a

drone. As mentioned, even before 9/11, the American military and intelligence apparatus had

been looking for bin Laden for years with nothing to show for it. Nevertheless, after the

proliferation of drones, the United States and Pakistan were able to find many targets then

because the new intelligence capabilities had so much more to offer. This was especially true in

the earlier years when more robust intelligence sharing was occurring between countries.

4.2.2 Eliminate Terror Threats

Moreover, the second military objective of eliminating terror threats has been perhaps the

most decisively successful. Beyond the globally famous death of bin Laden in Abbottabad, al

Qaeda and Taliban leaders found and subsequently killed or captured in Pakistan include: 9/11

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architect Khaled Sheikh Muhammad who was captured in Rawalpindi; number three Taliban

leader Mullah Obaidullah Akhund who was captured in Quetta and died in prison, suspected

militant Abu Zubaydah who was apprehended in Faisalabad, and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

(TTP) leader Baitullah Mehsud killed by a strike in South Waziristan.257

Apprehending or killing bin Laden was the catalyst for a lot of military activity in the

region in general; it was what spearheaded the initial creation and expansion of unmilitarized

drones in the region, was what launched the war in Afghanistan, and was the propaganda tool to

keep people invested in this pursuit even at a high cost both in American military lives and

financially for the country. Finally, successfully finding bin Laden in 2011 had negative

repercussions politically and diplomatically, as chapter six will articulate, but militarily, it was

nothing short of a decisive victory.

4.2.3 Better Prevent Future Attacks

The third and final indicator the drone program has been successful militarily is harder to

prove but vitally important. The intention of stopping and preventing future terrorist attacks or

attacks by militants was crucial to the United States’ investment in all these new technological

weapons. Not only driven by a reactionary need for revenge and justice, but the country was also

aiming to prevent more proactively something like 9/11 happening ever again. This goal’s

success or failure is harder to identify because unless an attack occurs, there was never any

certainty that it would have been successful. Furthermore, any prevented attempts are rarely, if

ever, acknowledged or publicly discussed and thus, the success in doing so is hard to quantify.

Nevertheless, every single prevented attack, be there only the handful that has been confirmed,

257 Cavarallo, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012, 131

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or potentially thousands unknown, represent lives not lost, infrastructure not decimated, and

psychological trauma not experienced, and that is a tremendous success, by any measure.

One such example was the June 2005 arrest of father and son, Hamid and Umer Hayat,

who were apprehended after lying to the FBI about their knowledge of and speculated

involvement with a jihadist camp in Pakistan.258 The son, Hamid’s, conviction has subsequently

been overturned based on an ineffective legal defence, but whether he was, in fact, guilty or

wrongly convicted has not been conclusively proven either way but the knowledge he allegedly

spent parts of two years at an al Qaeda camp in Pakistan,259 is a result of better intelligence

capabilities and the efforts made to put them in a better position to prevent attacks from

happening, not just finding perpetrators after.

While this case was not the result of drones killing their target before an attack could

happen, they reflect better intelligence and cooperation between the two governments, and better

intelligence collection practices more broadly is a win in their relationship. This is still militarily

a huge win in bolstering US security. This is not to say that militarily, mistakes were never made,

and the drone program has been perfect. Nor is it to say that the program did not have missteps

and would have been better served if certain attacks were never launched, such as those that

resulted in high civilian casualty counts. These three barometers of success prove that on military

merits alone, the drone program in Pakistan has been reasonably successful. Intelligence has

improved, high-value militants have been killed, and attacks have been prevented. While drones

have adversely affected their relationship in other ways militarily, as has been, and will continue

to be analyzed in other chapters purely understood in the deaths of enemies, the reduction of

258 Department of Justice. 2007. “Hamid Hayat Sentenced to 24 Years in Connection with Terrorism Charges.” United States Department of Justice. 07:700. 259 Department of Justice 2007

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security threats, and the improvement of intelligence sharing. Al Qaeda’s presence has been

largely eradicated from the country, as clear by the sharp decline in their targeting260 in

examining the figures in chapter two, the Taliban’s power has been mitigated. The deaths

attributable to terrorism are declining once again, with civilian death rates decreasing by a

staggering eighty percent in the last five years.261 In these regards, it has been successful in

bolstering that one aspect of their relationship.

4.3 Operation Neptune Spear Relevance

Given the complexity of issues and factors that inform inter-state relationships, there are,

naturally, other considerations to be made that affect both drones and their relationship. One

cannot seriously examine the United States’ deployment of drones in Pakistan, nor examine the

military ramifications to their partnership without discussing the most famous and important

example of excluding this norm; the special operations mission that resulted in the death of

Osama bin Laden.

Even in hiding, he was still the most wanted terrorist not only out of revenge or

vindication but because symbolically, he still stood for the pinnacle of modern jihadist militant

ideology and killing him sent a clear message. As Rohan Gunaratna succinctly summarized,

Osama bin Laden influenced the contemporary wave of global terrorism more than any other terrorist figure. While his own group al-Qaeda spearheaded the most devastating attacks, bin Laden built a global terror network by bringing together like-minded groups from conflict zones in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Both operationally and ideologically, al Qaeda influenced insurgent and terrorist groups and spawned a movement that will outlive its founder and leader. For three decades straddling two centuries, bin Laden played a significant role in globalizing terrorism … Although puritanical in his belief, bin Laden also harnessed modern communications platforms to politicize, radicalize and mobilize millions of supporters and sympathizers. Most

260 Bureau of Investigative Journalism 2021 261 Ayez Gul. 2018. “US War on Terror Kills Nearly 500,000 in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan.” Voice of America.

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importantly, he crafted an ideology of deep hatred against the West. He could communicate complex messages and simple world words speaking softly with the Quran in one hand and an AK47 in the other, he built mass social appeal across the Muslim world.262 There are three principal reasons why bin Laden is so important in the analysis of their

relationship. One, because the mission death was conducted without telling their Pakistani

counterparts when they are supposed to be allies. As discussed in the first chapter, the only real

factor unifying their interests is their common security concerns. Bin Laden, while alive, was

certainly at the forefront of actors to earn that distinction and yet they were still left unaware and

uninformed. This is very illuminating since it reveals much of their feelings on perceived

trustworthiness, reliability, and, most importantly, the fragile and potentially untenable nature of

a bilateral partnership built on only one real factor when that factor, i.e. security threats, is itself

viewed differently.

The significance of the raid is not in the finer points of mission details but in

understanding that it stands for the epitome of U.S. distrust of Pakistan. To conduct a

clandestine, unauthorized military operation within the sovereign territory of a country you claim

as a major non-NATO ally without informing them is virtually unheard of. By most measures,

such an action would be thought of as an act of war, yet it happened between allies. There can be

no greater indicator that the United States government and military brass did not trust their

Pakistani counterparts. Whether that mistrust is placed in believing that they knew bin Laden

was there and did not do anything or telling them he was there would leak back to people in his

network or even to him and threaten any opportunity to get to him depends on who is asked.

Nevertheless, in this case, actions undoubtedly speak louder than words ever could, and the

262 Rohan Gunaratna. 2011. "The Death of Osama Bin Laden: An Analysis." Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses. 3.5: 2.

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actions say that they felt it was necessary to keep Pakistan entirely in the dark until the mission

was long since completed.

In reflecting on the raid on July 22nd, 2019, during an event hosted by the Woodrow

Wilson Center in Washington, DC, former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf delivered an

address on the state of the US-Pakistan relationship. He categorically denied allegations that

Pakistani authorities were complicit in protecting bin Laden saying, “this is an absolute case of

negligence not complicity.”263 He further acknowledged that while there may be individual

members within the military who had extremist sympathies, he feels that, on the whole, the

military had a positive anti-terrorist ideology backed by a strong military code.264

This was reiterated by Prime Minister Imran Khan who spoke of the raid earlier last year

(2020). While attending the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Khan reflected on

bin Laden, the raid, and perception of al Qaeda in general in conceding that his safe harbour in

Pakistan was aided by sympathizers among the military and ISI-though not top brass because

they were too closely monitored to be complicit.265 This occurred, in his mind, because for

decades al Qaeda had been viewed by jihadists on a crusade for independence, as heroes, not as

terrorists and suddenly asking them to be viewed that way because the United States declared

them so post 9/11 was not something everyone was comfortable with.266 This dissonance

between public reproach and private support is a common narrative in the Pakistani fight against

terrorism.

263 Lahlou, Alia. 2011. "Pervez Musharraf on Bin Laden controversy, U.S.-Pakistan relations." Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. 264 Alia Lahlou. 2011. 265 Rhea Mahbubani. 2020. “Pakistani Leader Imran Khan Said Osama Bin Laden Was Able to Hide in His Country Because His Guerrilla Fighters Were Once Regarded as 'Heroes'.” Business Insider. 266 Mahbubani 2020.

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Secondly, it was a mission carried out by special operations forces and not by drones in a

country where the near entirety of their footprint has been limited to drones. Bin Laden’s

targeting was conducted this way because they needed to verify in person that he was in fact

there and because they wanted the opportunity to acquire the intelligence available at the

compound. As Former CIA director Leon Panetta said in an interview with 60 minutes,

we just did not know whether in fact he was there. I mean we had all of this intelligence that indicated that there was a good chance. The fact that there were couriers there who had a relationship with bin Laden and all of these other details that seemed to -when they came together, created a confidence level that there was a pretty good chance he was there. But it was all circumstantial we never had direct evidence that he in fact had ever been there or was located there. And that's why, in the end, it became an even more courageous decision by the president to take this option because the reality was -and we red teamed this and talked about other possibilities- but the reality was that we could have gone in there and not found bin Laden at all. The authority here was to kill bin Laden. And obviously, under the rules of engagement if he had if he in fact thrown up his hands, surrendered and didn't appear to be representing any kind of threat, then they were to capture him. But they had the full authority to kill him267

White House spokesman Jay Carney reiterated this when he said,

The team had the authority to kill Osama bin Laden unless he offered to surrender; in which case the team was required to accept his surrender if the team could do so safely. The operation was conducted in a manner fully consistent with the laws of war. The operation was planned so that the team was prepared and had the means to take bin Laden into custody. There is simply no question that this operation was lawful. Bin Laden was the head of al Qaeda, the organization that conducted the attacks of September 11, 2001. And al Qaeda and bin Laden himself had continued to plot attacks against the United States. We acted in the nation's self-defense. The operation was conducted in a way designed to minimize and avoid altogether, if possible, civilian casualties. And if I might add, that was done at great risk to Americans. Furthermore, consistent with the laws of war, bin Laden's surrender would have been accepted if feasible268 Quite simply, it took excellent intelligent work to deduce that the person living in a

compound in the middle of a major city in the heart of Pakistan was bin Laden and not to be

267 Jim Lehrer, Jim. 2011. “CIA Chief Panetta: Obama Made 'Gutsy' Decision on Bin Laden Raid.” PBS, Public Broadcasting Service. 268 John R. Crook. 2011. "U.S. special operations personnel raid compound in Pakistan, kill Osama bin Laden." American Journal of International Law.

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pigeonholed by the assumption that he was living somewhere in the hard to traverse, and even

harder to live, Tribals where he may have been protected, or anywhere else in the world for that

matter. However, the Americans had no way of guaranteeing with one hundred percent certainty

that it was him unless it was verified with human intelligence, hence the need for a raid. A drone

strike was not going to verify his identity as he never came outside, and the walls were too high

for proper electronic detection. This departure from normal practice in Pakistan, while not

unprecedented, was rare. It shows the inherent limitations of the technology whereby it is only as

good as the intelligence and technology behind it. As good as it is, as heralded it is by many as a

better twenty-first-century solution than other counterterrorism tools, there are still times nothing

can replace the human factor in intelligence collection, analysis, and military planning. The hunt

for bin Laden was one such time to the great irony that drones were initially developed to find

him, and yet when he was found and killed, it was by an HK416, a three-thousand dollar

weapon269 and not the fifteen million piece of weaponry designed for it.

Lastly, the intelligence taken from his compound offered unparalleled insight into his

thoughts, and in a way, a reflection back on the effectiveness of their counterterrorism practices.

It was the ultimate report card from the world’s most wanted terrorist, his thoughts, reflections,

and teachings of the then-current and future al Qaeda. For example, found in the compound was

a series of journals where he shared his belief that al Qaeda was getting too distracted from their

mission by emphasizing belief and ideology at the expense of operational planning.270 There has

been no attack even in the vicinity of the damage 9/11 caused, the bombing of embassies in

Kenya and Tanzania or even the USS Cole attack’s lustre. It is not that no missions were

269 Task and Purpose. 2019. “The Marines $150 Million Rifle: What Is the Heckler & Koch M27 So Expensive?” The National Interest. 270 Geoff Dyer. 2015. "Bin Laden's Papers Yield Al-Qaeda Job Description: Abbottabad Raid." Financial Times.

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attempted; in fact, there was plenty that still was still successful; see the 2003 Istanbul bombings

that killed over twenty people and injured three hundred fifty271 to four hundred fifty others,272

the 2004 Ashura bombings in Iraq that killed one hundred and seventy-eight people and injured

over five hundred,273 the 2005 London bombings that killed fifty two and injured over seven

hundred,274 or the coordinated 2007 Yazidi communities bombings where nearly eight hundred

people were killed and injured over one thousand five hundred,275 to name a few. The latter even

ranks as the third deadliest act of terrorism in history, but it did not receive attention anywhere

remotely in the same vicinity of 9/11, and so its impact outside of Iraq was largely ignored.

Plenty of death and destruction still occurred at al Qaeda’s behest, but nothing that rivalled 9/11;

an attack that was supposed to be a taste of what was to come, not the crowning jewel. Too many

missions were being prevented, and bin Laden himself was unimpressed and disappointed. That

speaks as highly of how far American and coalition forces had come in intelligence improvement

and inter-agency intelligence sharing as anything else could.

The mission also yielded enormous quantities of precious intelligence that while rarely

publicly discussed and not readily shared with Pakistan, further reiterates the mistrust. Any

intelligence bin Laden thought important enough to keep on a compound that was otherwise as

self-contained, untechnical, and isolated as possible (though not geographically isolated) was so

highly valued that they would have done nearly anything to get it. While the backlash from the

271 Ely Karmon. 2003. “The Synagogue Bombings in Istanbul.” The Washington Institute: Improving the Quality of U.S. Middle East Policy. 272 Helena Smith, Jason Burke, and Luke Harding. 2003. “Focus: Istanbul Bombings.” The Guardian News and Media. 273 Burns, John F., and Jeffrey Gettleman. 2004. “Blasts at Shiite Ceremonies in Iraq Kill More Than 140.” The New York Times. 274 CNN Library. 2019. “July 7 2005 London Bombings Fast Facts.” CNN Cable News Network. 275 Sebastian Maisel. 2008. “Social Change Amidst Terror and Discrimination: Yezidis in the New Iraq.” Middle East Institute Policy Brief.

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raid was enormous, the intelligence value within the compound was appreciated by both. The

Pakistani government even granted their consent for the CIA to search the compound where he

had been killed. Having only been in the compound for approximately forty minutes during the

original operation, they had only been able to do a preliminary sweep.

An agreement between CIA deputy director Michael J Murrell and Lieutenant General

Ahmed Shuja Pasha, head of Pakistan's ISI, granted the CIA the opportunity to send a forensics

team using sophisticated equipment to probe more thoroughly anything that may have been

hidden in walls or buried.276 Pakistan further allowed the CIA to question bin Laden's three

wives that they had taken into custody after the raid, although Pakistani officials said that none

cooperated or provided meaningful intelligence. The relationship fallout proved to be more than

worth it, but it is still a risky gamble when so reliant on their geographical location, cooperation,

and approval to work out of bases and use supply routes still so vital to their war in neighbouring

Afghanistan.

While more than eight years later, some documents remain classified, what has been

publicly released includes everything from personal, loving letters about his family, his

communication with other al-Qaeda officials, his thoughts on the Arab Spring and other major

uprisings that have occurred throughout the Muslim world, books by 9/11 conspiracy theorists

including philosopher David Ray Griffin. He also had thirty-nine English language books on

such varied topics as Islam, terrorism, US foreign policy, philosophy, and publications by the US

think tanks including, Rand Corporation, Carnegie endowment, and West Point scholars. His

letters also reveal his displeasure with people who claimed to fight under his name, fighting

276 Henry J. Reske. 2011. "Pakistan OKs CIA Search of bin Laden Compound." Newsmax.

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under al Qaeda but failing miserably in their attempts with poor mission planning and poor

follow-through.277

4.4 Operation Neptune Spear Origins

A growing contingent within JSOC believed that bin Laden might have been dead after

years of unsuccessfully hunting him. As former Seal Team Six commander Chuck Pfarrer

explained in his book entitled Seal Target Geronimo,

There was some serious speculation within JSOC that Osama was dead. No one thought anymore that Osama was hiding out and living on Pashtun hospitality. There was a $25 million bounty on his head. Hospitality or no hospitality, for $25 million most people will turn in their grandmothers. Many people in JSOC thought that a government was sheltering Osama, whether dead or alive. The “He’s Dead” theory went that Osama had been murdered by the Pakistani ISI, and that they had concealed his death to make sure that the “boogeyman” of international Jihad kept the money flowing to Pakistani armed forces. It was starting to make sense to a lot of people, especially since there was increasingly more struggle between Osama and Ayman Zawahiri.278 Officially entitled Operation Neptune Spear, the mission that killed Osama bin Laden

was the culmination of a raid conducted by the United States Navy’s Seal Team 6, in conjunction

with the Central Intelligence Agency and Joint Special Operations Command. The missions'

origins date back to 2007 when United States intelligence identified bin Laden’s most trusted

couriers, Abu Ahmed al Kuwaiti. Some believe Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s eventual al

Qaeda successor, gave up the identity and location of al Kuwaiti through back channels so the

Americans could get to bin Laden and his competition be eliminated without him needing to do

anything himself.279 True or not, over the following two years, the CIA traced al Kuwaiti’s

movement until they were able to successfully track him back to an expansive compound in

277 Dyer 2015, 8 278 Chuck Pfarrer. 2011. SEAL Target Geronimo: the inside Story of the Mission to Kill Osama Bin Laden. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press. 149-150 279 Pfarrer 2011, 159-169

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Abbottabad, fifty-six kilometers outside Islamabad.280 Several factors led to CIA officials feeling

confident in informing then-President Obama in September of 2010 that bin Laden might be

living in the compound.281 The property’s monetary value was unfeasible for only a courier; the

security level, including walls eighteen feet high in some areas, was more intensive barbed wire

and security gates than a courier would need.282 There were no internet or telephone connections

to the house, and the occupants burned all garbage, so pick up was not required, which allowed

the compound to better stay under the radar and eliminated the opportunity for garbage to be

picked through, which could have identifying DNA inside, such as that extracted from a napkin

or food scraps. There were believed to be a dozen children on the compound who were all

homeschooled. Rarely did anyone leave, and when they did, it was only ever the same couple of

people among the estimated two dozen who lived there.283 All of this “overtly defensive

behavior”284 was starting to add up to a high value target in the CIA’s estimation.

Preliminary plans for three separate courses of action were developed. The first option

was to employ a JDAM, a smart bomb usually carried by a Stealth bomber that had the range

capability of thirty to forty miles, and while low tech had better penetration ability than a cruise

missile.285 If used, it would have taken out not only the individual target but also the compound

and potentially much of the neighbourhood.

The second possibility was a joint operation with the host nation, later confirmed to be

Pakistan. Being a “nonpermissive environment,”286 it was understood that a special operations

280 CNN Library. 2019. “Death of Osama Bin Laden Fast Facts.” CNN Cable News Network. 281 CNN Library 2019 282 Bowden, Mark. 2012. The Finish: The Killing of Osama Bin Laden. Atlantic Monthly Press: New York, NY. 206 283 Bowden 2012, 200 284 Pfarrer 2011, 151 285 Pfarrer 2011, 152 286 Ibid, 152

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team entering the country if people knew they were there was a guarantee of resistance and being

targeted.287 Pakistan is generally considered a semi-permissive environment. As opposed to

permissive environments like Iraq and Afghanistan during their respective wars, or hostile states

like Syria or North Korea where no degree of cooperation ever occurs, a semi-permissive

environment means there is some measure of political cooperation and operational latitude.

However, Pakistan does not fully cooperate, nor do they allow unchecked action. In this case,

however, cooperation would have been a no-go, and they were not to be informed over concerns

that the ISI, military, government, or any combination therein were compromised by those loyal

to bin Laden and al Qaeda and who may have forewarned him. This would not only have lost

them their opportunity but could have even been an ambush, so the decision was made not to tell

anyone, in any position, within the Pakistani state infrastructure.

The third option occurred. A stealth insertion without the host nation, aka Pakistan,

knowing they were there. They were to use Ghost Hawk helicopters, the most highly classified

aircraft the United States military had in its arsenal, and only used by DEVGRU and Delta

Force.288 That further demonstrated the highly classified nature of the operation and its even

while maintaining said high value targets’ covert identity. The target’s identity was kept so

classified and held to as small a group as possible that even the DEVGRU members who were to

conduct the mission were not informed it was bin Laden during the planning stages.

By February 2011, the intelligence was thought strong enough that mission planning

began raid the compound with the intention to capture or kill bin Laden.289 There are

subsequently five National Security Council meetings over the next few months chaired by

287 Ibid, 152-153 288 Mark Owen and Kevin Maurer. 2012. No Easy Day: The First-Hand Account of the Mission That Killed Osama Bin Laden. New York, NY: Penguin. 289 CNN Library 2019

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President Obama to discuss the operation. Occurring on March 14th and 29th, April 12th, 19th, and

28th, it culminated with the order being given to raid on April 29th at 8:20 am Eastern Standard

Time.290

4.4.1 Operation Mission Details

The following is a succinct mission timeline assembled from a compilation of

declassified materials and publicly confirmed details. It, of course, is only a reflection of what is

publicly known. Any classified detail that contradicts, or any information left out, is unknown.

Operation Neptune Spear formally began at 1:25 pm on May 1st, 2011 Eastern Standard

Time, the early morning of May 2nd in local Abbottabad time, when President Obama and other

key government and military officials, including Vice Admiral Bill McRaven, the commanding

officer of JSOC,291 formally approve the execution of Operation Neptune Spear.292 Within thirty

minutes, the mission was underway as two top-secret Stealth Hawk helicopters, Razor 1 and 2,

took off from Afghanistan, scrapping the intended Ghost Hawks because of too great a security

risk.293 Between the two, twenty-five Navy SEALs294 were sent in, including assaulters, snipers,

spotters, and demolitionists.295 By 3 pm, the helicopters had landed on the compound in

Abbottabad, where one helicopter famously crashed, though incredibly no fatalities occurred,

and the mission proceeded without interruption.296 The top-secret helicopter, never even

previously confirmed to exist, housed technology important to retrieve and was later a cause for

290 Ibid 291 Pfarrer 2011, 148 292 Julie Marks. 2018. “How SEAL Team Six Took Out Osama Bin Laden.” History.com. 293 Pfarrer 2011, 179 294 Marks 2018 295 Pfarrer 2011, 181 296 No Easy Day-Mark Owen

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diplomatic negotiation to retrieve the technology,297 as will be discussed later this chapter. Upon

breaching the compound’s outer walls, the men fought their way inside, level by level,298

ultimately locating bin Laden on the third floor. At 3:39 pm, bin Laden sustained a fatal gunshot

to the head, above the left eye, after using his third wife as a human shield and attempting to

reach his weapon, the infamous AKSU rifle frequently posed with.299

Over the course of the forty-minute operation, three other men, including one of bin

Laden’s sons and two bodyguards, as well as one of bin Laden’s wives in the compound, were

also killed.300 The latter death was considered accidental.301 At 3:53 pm, President Obama is

preliminarily notified that bin Laden was positively identified and killed.302 His identity is

confirmed by one of his wives as well as American facial recognition software.303 This is later

reinforced by the result of a DNA test the following day.304 At the compound, ten computer hard

drives, five computers, more than one hundred storage devices, and bin Laden’s personal journal

were all found and extracted for further intelligence analysis.305.

The Seal Teams all left the compound by 4:10 pm after breaching, killing their target,

retrieving all intelligence, packing up bin Laden’s body, and destroying as much of the downed

helicopter as they can. All in less than one hour. By 11:35 pm, President Obama was already

addressing the nation about the raid and confirming bin Laden’s death.306

297 Pfarrer 2011, 207 298 CNN Library. 2019. “Death of Osama Bin Laden Fast Facts.” CNN Cable News Network. 299 No Easy Day-Mark Owen 300 Marks 2018 301 The Finish: The Killing of Osama bin Laden-Mark Bowden 302 Marks 2018 303 CNN Library 2019 304 Pfarrer 2011 305 Ibid 306 Ibid

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4.4.2 Operation Aftermath

Culturally for much of the American population, bin Laden’s death meant more than just

the death of a major terrorist leader; even more than retribution for the mastermind behind the

US Embassy bombings in the 1990’s and September 11th and their associated injuries and

fatalities. His death, for many, was the symbolic representation of successful vindication.

However grandiose a statement, or overwrought an emotion, after the pain, heartbreak, and

trauma suffered at his behest, after the long and drawn-out wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that

followed and which killed far too many, and with a so-called “Global War on Terror” with no

end in sight, his death served for many as confirmation that the path has been worth it. That men

and women fighting for their country did not, and were not, doing so in vain.

The validity in this interpretation is not what is important. What matters is that believing

that successfully apprehending or killing him would help fill this void in the American psyche,

the country was willing to go far to achieve it. Far enough to infringe on an allied nation’s

sovereignty and trample over the fragile foundation of quasi-trust that existed, thereby

irreparably damaging the relationship.

This notion is reinforced in President Obama’s address to the press only hours later when

he confirmed Osama’s death. Passages from his speech read as follows,

Tonight, I can report to the American people and to the world that the United States has conducted an operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, and a terrorist who’s responsible for the deaths of thousands of men, women, and children … The images of 9/11 are seared into our national memory … And yet we know that the worst images are those that were unseen to the world. The empty seat at the dinner table. Children who were forced to grow up without their mother or their father. Parents who would never know the feeling of their child’s embrace. Nearly 3,000 citizens taken from us, leaving a gaping hole in our hearts …. For over two decades, bin Laden has been al Qaeda’s leader and symbol, and has continued to plot attacks against our country and our friends and allies. The death of bin Laden marks the most significant achievement to

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date in our nation’s effort to defeat al Qaeda … After nearly 10 years of service, struggle, and sacrifice, we know well the costs of war … Americans understand the costs of war. Yet as a country, we will never tolerate our security being threatened, nor stand idly by when our people have been killed. We will be relentless in defense of our citizens and our friends and allies. We will be true to the values that make us who we are. And on nights like this one, we can say to those families who have lost loved ones to al Qaeda’s terror: Justice has been done307

These passages are illustrative of this mentality. Capturing or killing him was of the utmost

priority, even at the expense of the relationship with Pakistan, as choosing not to inform them

was a decision they knew would be met with backlash and would greatly strain the

relationship, but it was thought worth it. It was not a situation where in the aftermath, Pakistan

shrugged their proverbial shoulders and said, “Oh well, it’s not a problem they operated in our

borders without notice.” It was quite the opposite, in fact.

To understand the response from Pakistan there are three distinct groups and viewpoints:

the government, military, and civilian population. Firstly, at the government level, they were

most upset by concerns of sovereignty infringement, unilateralism, and the exclusion from an

ally.

Just days after the raid, Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani gave a speech where he said,

Pakistan alone cannot be held to account for flawed policies and blunders of others. Pakistan is not the birthplace of al Qaeda. We did not invite Osama bin Laden to Pakistan or even to Afghanistan. It is fair to ask who was Osama bin Laden and what did he personify? Osama bin Laden was the most wanted terrorist and enemy number one of the civilized world. Elimination of Osama bin Laden, who launched waves after waves of terrorists attacks against innocent Pakistanis, is indeed justice done …. When we say that in this war against terrorism, Pakistan has lost some 30,000 men, women and children and more than 5,000 armed forces personnel, billions of dollars lost as economic costs; we do not intend to put a price or seek acknowledgement or recognition from any one….. The war against terrorism is our own national priority. Our nation is united in its resolve

307 President Barack Obama. 2011. “Osama Bin Laden Dead.” National Archives and Records Administration.

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to eliminate terrorism from our sacred land. Pakistan will not relent in this national cause and is determined not to allow its soil to be used by any one for terrorism.”308

He goes on to say that,

Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence prosecuted the anti-terror strategy with a high degree of professionalism and superb determination. In fact, some 40 of the key al-Qaeda operatives including Chief Operation Officer Faraj Al Libbi and Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, the master planner of 9/11 were captured by the ISI. Pakistan’s armed forces also carried out successful operations in Swat, Malakand, South Waziristan, Mohmand and Bajour Agencies against terrorists and militants. No other country in the world and no other security agency has done so much to interdict Al-Qaeda than the ISI and our armed forces …. It is disingenuous for anyone to blame Pakistan or State institutions of Pakistan including the ISI and the armed forces for being in cahoots with the Al-Qaeda. It was Al-Qaeda and its affiliates that carried out hundreds of suicide bombings in nearly every town and city of Pakistan and also targeted political leaders, State institutions, the ISI and the General Headquarters. The obvious question that has vexed everyone is how Osama bin Laden could hide in plain sight in the scenic surroundings of Abbottabad. Let’s not rush to judgment. Allegations of complicity or incompetence are absurd. We emphatically reject such accusations. Speculative narratives in the public domain are meant to create despondency. We will not allow our detractors to succeed in offloading their own shortcomings and errors of omission and commission in a blame game that stigmatizes Pakistan. This issue of the hideout needs a rational answer. Recrimination and misplaced rhetoric are self-defeating. Yes, there has been an intelligence failure. It is not only ours but of all the intelligence agencies of the world … It was the ISI that passed key leads to CIA that enabled the US intelligence to use superior technological assets and focus on the area in which Osama bin Laden was eventually found.”309

These lengthy packages articulate all major causes of concern that for the government, their

problem really resided in their authority being usurped and their sovereign rights disrespected

and ignored.

The military, conversely, initially remained silent on the issue and referred people over to

the government for comment. It was not until later when anyone in senior military command said

anything about the mission, and that was just their acknowledgment of the intelligence failure.310

308 Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani. 2011. “The Prime Minister of Pakistan's Speech on the Abbottabad Operation and Death of Osama Bin Laden.” Global Research Centre for Research on Globalisation. 309 Gilani 2011 310 Ibid

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Although they were also quick to qualify that the failure had not only been theirs, no other

agency in the world knew where he was for over a decade.311 They also claimed that they had

raided the house in 2003 and found nothing there.312 This assertion was later proven false as US

satellite imagery proved that as late as 2004, no structure was built there.313 The one military

consequence directly felt was by the US special operations forces operating in the area under

Pakistani knowledge and support. Among Pakistan’s actions was the abortion of a “carefully

cultivated, multifaceted American presence in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa”314 and

FATA. Special forces were distributing seeds to residents while working with the Pakistani

Frontier Corps and Pakistani Special Forces to train, advise, and equip them.315All the extra

missions and military goodwill initiatives were halted until a later date.

It was really amongst the public, however, where the backlash was the most intense. The

protest was so vehement because there was rampant concern that their military had failed to live

up to the reasons for its basic existence-to protect them and their borders. While some blamed

the civilian government because the military only has the purview to act under its authority and

they cannot do something the government has not told them to, hostility was either way directed

at the protective infrastructure of the state via both the government and military, in feeling that

they failed them. Either way, the opposition was fierce. It was a situation that gave many people

a valid reason to be upset.

The public protest was so vehement because in bin Laden being found and executed

within Pakistani borders, they were left appearing one of two ways; incompetent for not knowing

311 Ibid 312 Declan Walsh. 2011. “Osama Bin Laden Killing Prompts US-Pakistan War of Words.” The Guardian. 313 Walsh 2011 314 Linda Robinson. 2012 “ The Future of Special Operations Beyond Kill and Capture.” Foreign Affairs. 315 Robinson 2012

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he was there, or complicit in terrorist harbouring at the least, and potentially terrorist collusion if

they knew and did not do anything. There was no way for the Pakistani government, military,

and ISI to really win to protect their image and integrity. They were humiliated by the

intelligence failure and then the salt in the wound of not detecting a US operation occurring on

their soil until it was already well underway. While the raid happened quickly, multiple United

States helicopters were in Pakistani airspace, in the middle of a major city and right near the

Pakistan Military Academy no less, for over an hour undetected. There was not one shot fired in

defence, and it was right in the middle of the country. This was no mission on the Tribals’

outskirts where response time would be delayed, or the US could sneak over the border very

quickly; it was a mission far into the country and yet there was still no response. It was really a

series of events that did not paint Pakistani military, intelligence, and government competency in

a very positive light to the United States and its allies and was something Pakistani citizenry had

no troubles vocalizing to their government.

A poll conducted by Gallup only days after the raid found that nearly two-thirds, or sixty-

four percent, of Pakistanis condemned the US military operation and nearly half, or forty-six

percent, said his death actually makes their country less safe from terrorism.316 There was even

disagreement on whether he should have been captured or killed. Those agreeing that he should

have been captured on the Pakistani side amounted to fifty-two percent, while on the American

side, only thirty-three percent said that he should have been captured alive.317 Overwhelmingly,

nearly ninety percent of Pakistanis disapproved that the operation occurred without their

government knowing beforehand.318 This discord has implications in that, as Julie Ray and

316 Julie Ray and Rajesh Srinivasan. 2011. "Pakistanis Criticize U.S. Action That Killed Osama Bin Laden; Many believe Pakistan will be less safe from terrorism." Gallup Poll News Service. 317 Ray and Srinivasan 2011 318 Ibid

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Rajesh Srinivasan argue in their article on the subject, “Americans’ and Pakistani's different

reactions to the operation and bin Laden's death illustrate the wide gulf that exists in their

perspective perceptions about the war on terrorism and Pakistan's participation. Although news

report suggests bin Laden’s killing has angered many Pakistanis the perceived attack on their

country sovereignty perhaps hurts them more.”319

The Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen said, he

“realized the challenges under which this relationship now labours.”320 Both he and then

United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who were the highest-ranking US

representatives in Pakistan to be in the country since the raid, “both recognized that that moment

would be a turning point that could either propel them to the cooperative agenda that both

countries publicly stated to wanting or it could tear them apart, perhaps irreparably.” 321

On the American side, the “concern” was not really a concern at all; it was euphoria.

General euphoria and a sense of triumph over successfully killing him were felt from all. Both

the American media and the public were so enthralled by the news that little attention was paid

to the breakdown in the relationship between allies. Alternatively, it is simply that no one really

cared when compared to a two-decade-long hunt for bin Laden dating back to pre-9/11 days that

finally came to an end, especially when it ended in a highly satisfying way for the country—his

death at their hands.

4.5 War in Afghanistan’s Relevance

319 Ibid 320 Associated Press in Islamabad. 2011. “US-Pakistan Relations 'at Turning Point' after Killing of Bin Laden, Warns Clinton.” The Guardian. 321 Islamabad 2011

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The second major external component that is crucially important to understanding

Pakistan and the United States is Afghanistan’s role, most especially the war in Afghanistan. It is

so important because it served as a source of contention and negatively affected their

relationship. A war lasting for eighteen years invariably affected others than those at once

involved, and this was certainly the case for the Pakistani-American relationship. There are three

principal reasons: one, practically speaking, their geographic proximity invariably meant

Pakistan would be involved if for no other reason than the ongoing border disputes and a hard to

defend border in some areas that facilitate frequent migration of militant jihadists looking to

escape into the Tribals. The second is the division caused by contrasting views on the Taliban,

i.e. Pakistan supporting them while the US was vehemently opposed and finally, the two’s

contrasting end goals. It can even be argued, as some have, that the war in Afghanistan was

impossible to win without Pakistan’s cooperation and support.

These reasons will be explored, but the long-running war’s central pertinent details will

be described first. This is not like Operation Neptune Spear, where everything is relevant as it

only involved these two countries. Comprehensive details of the entirety of the war in

Afghanistan are unnecessary as this is not about understanding the enormous complexity of the

war and the military, political, diplomatic, or humanitarian implications on its own merit. Rather

it is about understanding the factors that make it relevant to Pakistan and the United States

specifically.

4.6 Pertinent Aspects of War in Afghanistan

4.6.1 Origins

The United States launched a war in Afghanistan to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure

that fostered the 9/11 attacks. This meant targeting al Qaeda and the perpetrators of 9/11 and

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toppling the Taliban government. The Taliban government had been practicing a severe

interpretation of Islamic law and openly welcomed bin Laden after being expelled from Sudan.

Overall, it was a system the United States strongly objected to and wanted to be removed. From

the beginning, the latter is not what Pakistan wanted, but they felt compelled to support the

Americans for fear of the withdrawal of US support to Pakistan.322

No one can forget President Bush’s infamous “Either you are with us, or you are with the

terrorists” statement. That line encompasses all that needs to be said about Pakistan’s choice in

the matter. Nevertheless, to further confirm the point, former President Pervez Musharraf

publicly went on the record as saying that in a post 9/11 conversation between himself, former

head of the ISI Lt. General Mahmud Ahmed, and former US Deputy Secretary of State Richard

Armitage, the “US threatened to bomb Pakistan back to the stone age, if it did not immediately

turn against its Afghan Taliban, and allow the US to use military bases in Pakistan to invade

Afghanistan.”323 Pressuring Pakistan into joining their fight may have forced their cooperation,

and was even successful militarily in helping them achieve those two initial goals in

Afghanistan; however it was not without ramifications in other regards, not the least of which

was a renewed fragility in their political and diplomatic relationships.

The first two months of the war were straightforward in their goal; topple the Taliban

government. That was successful when Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar was chased

from office, and President Hamid Karzai was selected as interim leader of Afghanistan. This

period quickly morphed into what the next six-plus years would become: a dragged-on attempt to

defeat the Taliban and rebuild Afghanistan’s institutions militarily. Insufficient resources, a new

corrupt Afghan government who could not find their footing, a resurgence of the opium industry

322 Naeem Ahmed. 2012. "Re-defining US-Pakistan Relations." The Dialogue. 7.3 323 Ahmed 2012

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that could finance insurgents, and an insurgency that would not quit marred the war and kept the

United States centrally involved in a conflict they thought would have long since ended.

Military, financial, and political resources were by this point split between Iraq and Afghanistan,

and thus neither had the full repertoire of resources that would have been available had only one

war been conducted. Further, finding its footing against the first democratically elected but

corrupt government, the Taliban began to resurge in 2005, modelling new tactics inspired by

Iraqi insurgents. The rise in suicide bombings and IEDs resulted in a sharp increase in maiming,

injuries, and deaths. This corresponded to an uprising of anti-American and anti-Western

sentiment. The slow reconstruction coupled with widespread allegations of prisoner abuse in

American detention facilities and rising civilian casualties from NATO bombings did nothing to

inspire loyalty or support for the United States.324 Pakistan remained a somewhat unwilling

participant and maintained the status quo, at least where Afghanistan was concerned, until the

troop surge.

4.6.2 Troop Surge

On February 17th, 2009, President Obama approved sending seventeen thousand more

American troops to aid the thirty-six thousand Americans and thirty-two thousand NATO

already there. Along with this troop surge, the commanding general for Afghanistan, General

David McKiernan, was replaced by General Stanley McChrystal, who had been serving as the

JSOC Commander. Naturally, this occurred because the US shifted focus wanting the renewed

effort in Afghanistan to be modelled more like Iraq under General McChrystal with much more

focus on special operations forces and a more reconciliatory, protection-based approach rather

324 Ayez Gul. 2018. “US War on Terror Kills Nearly 500,000 in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan.” Voice of America.

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than the outright killing of as many militants as possible to squash the insurgency as that was not

working.325

The new reliance in special operations and drones brought challenges. As General

McChrystal explained,

… That's the danger of special operating forces. You get this sense that it is satisfying, it's clean, it's low risk, it's the cure for most ills. That's why many new presidents are initially enamoured with the Central Intelligence Agency, because they are offered a covert fix for a complex problem. But if you go back in history, I can't find a covert fix that solved a problem long term. There were some necessary covert actions, but there's no "easy button" for some of these problems. That's the danger of interpreting what we did in Iraq as being the panacea for future war. It's not.326

The 2009 troop surge was the most consequential moment other than the initial declaration

because it drove a wedge in the United States and Pakistan’s military partnership.327

These moments are so important because they represented many areas of difference

between Pakistan and the United States. At the beginning of the US war in Afghanistan, Pakistan

wanted no part of being involved but was forced into it. Then the troop surge and later

corresponding policy shifts, including the rampant increase in drones, further caused tension

since Pakistan felt even more dragged into the fight than ever before, and there were more deaths

of their own people.

4.7 Sources of Tension

4.7.1 “Safe Haven” Geographically

The reason the war in Afghanistan was a source of tension is threefold. The first and most

straightforward reason is that when the United States removed the Taliban government who had

supplied haven to bin Laden and al Qaeda after September 11th, those terrorists fled over the

325 Stanley McChrystal. 2013. “Generation Kill.” Foreign Affairs. 326 McCrystal 2013 327 Qazi 2012, 74

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border into Pakistan’s mountainous region, the area formally known as FATA. Their geographic

proximity has tied them together so inextricably that some have even gone as far as to say that

the FATA have become “a de facto operational theater of the Afghan war.”328

Pakistan provided the haven that Afghani insurgents needed to evade the United States’

reach and ensure the upsurge counterinsurgency of 2009 would not be successful. As long as that

border remained opened, it was only going to continue occurring.329 For that reason, Afghanistan

and Pakistan remained inextricably linked, with no end in sight in that regard.

This is significantly more adamant than just saying that Pakistan had been dragged into

the conflict. This reflects a much more dynamic level of involvement whereby fighting and

attacks are launched on both sides. Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent, Iraq is relevant in the

practical sense that the conventional US armed forces and special operators were spread quite

thin already fighting those two protracted wars. Consequently, when enemy fighters fled to

Pakistan, it was strategically important to kill them, but the US would not extend their ground

troops into another war theatre.

4.7.2 Opposing Positions on Taliban

The second reason the war in Afghanistan caused strife is that Pakistan had strong ties to

the Afghani Taliban, dating back to Afghanistan’s war against the Soviet invasion. The two had

a fairly strong military-intelligence collaboration. Any relative stability they brought to the

country was beneficial for Pakistan, and their ability to coexist peacefully meant more than any

differences they may have had. The United States was not unaware of this; however, al Qaeda

was the bigger threat in the beginning. Cooperation against al Qaeda was “regarded as too

328 Munir Ahmad. 2011. “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Balochistan.” New America Foundation. 1. 329 McChrystal 2013

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important to jeopardize by confronting Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment over lesser

evils like the Taliban.”330

Pakistan’s support did not waiver just because the United States was opposed, and they

were brought into the fold by the US and NATO. WikiLeaks documents that were leaked,

including intelligence from the “Afghan War Diary,” even suggested that the Pakistani ISI had

remained secretly cooperating with Taliban forces all along despite working with the United

States to combat militants in welcoming their aid.331 Without Pakistan’s cooperation and

corroboration, the United States will never be able to rid Afghanistan, and Northwest Pakistan of

the Taliban and yet Pakistan did not want them gone. This naturally created tension because their

interests were not only not in line but also contradictory.

4.7.3 Contrasting End Goals

The final major aspect of tension surrounding Afghanistan was the prospect of US

withdrawal and the war’s end. While they never wanted war in the first place, US withdrawal

from Afghanistan was not much better for Pakistan. One would think that in initially having

wanted the Taliban to stay in power and the United States not to try to impose their power on the

country that them leaving, after severely diminishing al Qaeda’s capacity in the country, the only

point of agreement, would be a positive even for Pakistan. To some extent, that is true since too

much American power, or too big an American footprint in the region, reduces Pakistan’s power

and reach, which is not good for them. However, the more prevalent emotion regarding the US’s

withdrawal from Afghanistan was “fear.”332 In many ways, Afghanistan was left a bit of a mess,

330 Shashank Joshi. 2012. “The Broken US-Pakistan Relationship: Shashank Joshi.” Current History. 111. 744: 141. 331 Joshi 2012, 144 332 Ibid 142

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and that has consequences that extend beyond just their borders and would trickle to them for the

same reason of geographic closeness that got them involved in the first place. A government

without solid standing, terrorist threats still rampant, foreign countries still engaged in training

and advising, and fighting still occurring are all factors that created such turmoil in the country

and the region more broadly, in the first place. There are still Taliban forces seizing and holding

new territory,333 the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K) is an ongoing major

threat to both civilians and Afghan forces,334 and there is still a significant amount of in-border

and cross border movement as more than eighty-three thousand were displaced inside

Afghanistan, and more than one hundred and thirty thousand returned from Pakistan and Iran.335

The uncertainty and instability of these factors leave uncertainty for Pakistan because there are

such connected issues.

The end goal really boils down to this: The United States wants for Afghanistan a stable,

thriving democracy that meets its vision of freedom, a strong economy, solid infrastructure, and

to be a self-reliant state they can work well with no matter how unrealistic this goal; Pakistan

wants a client state they influence who still possess power in the region but not more than

them.336

Either way, neither goal has really been met. There was a pervasive sense among

Pakistani's that the job was not finished, and every sacrifice made may have ultimately been in

vain as Afghanistan is still on shaky ground. Pakistan has indeed had to pay a high price for

actions that are not their fault. While a price being paid by civilians or non-combatants is

333 Office of Inspector General, and Department of Defence. 2019. “Operation Freedom’s Sentinel.” Department of Defense. 2 334 Office of the Inspector General 2019, 2 335 Ibid 7 336 Lieven, Anatol. 2012. Pakistan: A Hard Country. 2nd ed. London, England: Penguin Books. 405-406.

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unfortunately common in war, Pakistan has never officially been the ones who wanted to engage

against al Qaeda or the Taliban, and it was a fight they were brought into, and yet they have paid

the price in lives all the same.

Tangentially and geographically, the United States and Pakistan are connected because of

their neighbours and the linkages of people living within its borders. Over the nearly twenty

years of war in essentially their own backyard with sustained American presence, the United

States has, in some ways, become Pakistan’s “de-facto neighbour”337 despite being

geographically located on other sides of the world. Pakistan also had citizens killed and

sacrificed parts of their sovereignty, reputation, and they swallowed their pride in allowing the

drone program on their soil, and they (sometimes) worked with the United States in a conflict

they were reluctantly dragged into. While far from being an innocent bystander or martyr, there

still was a significant sacrifice made. A sacrifice many within Pakistan felt was ignored and

unappreciated.338

Over seventy thousand Pakistani security forces and civilians have been killed. There has

been an estimated one hundred billion dollars in direct economic loss for the government in

addition to an incalculable339 loss of less quantifiable economic and human development growth.

The diverting of fiscal resources, external funding, and aid that could have been earmarked for

improving infrastructure, education, health care, or grow the economy was instead used to fund

military operations, support emergency measures like an influx of refugees, and tackle emerging

security threats and impairment to progressive social initiatives. In other words, the investment

337 Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi. 2010. “Pakistan-US Policies on the “War on Terror” and the Taliban: Allies at Loggerheads.” Pakistan Horizon. 63.2: 52. 338 Joshi 2012, 142 339 Shuja Nawaz. 2018. “Trump’s Flawed Pakistan Policy: Why Islamabad is Unlikely to Change.” Foreign Affairs.

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in education or health care has been sacrificed to finance military activity.340 These sacrifices,

and the perceived lack of appreciation for it, kept the wedge very much in place even though

there was a success in the overriding mission objective that connected the two countries. These

considerations will be further expanded on in chapter six in examining the political, social, and

diplomatic consequences of the drone program. The military implications of this feeling of

immense sacrifice are that it may have been worth it as it met its goals and because it was less

destructive and, indeed, less deadly than other options that may have existed to target the same

peoples. Options such as on the ground special forces operations, or an expansion of the War in

Afghanistan’s mission into Pakistani territory, among others, may have deepened that sacrifice.

Fundamentally, this chapter seeks to argue that the program, judged on its military and

intelligence merits, benefited the relationship. While military and intelligence merits were not

perfect and were indeed not without some sources of tensions still unresolved, it was on balance,

beneficial. Understood on its pursuit to cause the death of enemies by eliminating high value al

Qaeda targets and ridding them from the former FATA, to minimize security threats by better

equipping the Pakistani ISI, military, and government to prevent future attacks, and by

improving intelligence sharing, it was successful. As previously discussed, al Qaeda’s presence

has largely been eradicated from the country, the Taliban’s power has been mitigated, which has

further minimized the security threat, and the deaths attributable to terrorism in Pakistan are

declining.341 These are, conclusively, measures of success. The program only became successful

pursuing its objectives by cooperating with a level of integration and intelligence sharing that

had not happened in decades. They shared information about whom they believe to be

340 Nawaz 2018 341 Ayez Gul. 2018. “US War on Terror Kills Nearly 500,000 in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan.” Voice of America.

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perpetrators, allies, networks of peoples, and other critical intelligence that led to the successful

identification and elimination of targets.

Additionally, having been fed critical information from human sources in the former

FATA region, peoples whose importance and value to the program cannot be overstated, a new

dynamic was created. This level of cooperation is not only what allowed them to meet the goal of

being able to eliminate these targets, but it also succeeded in creating that level of interaction that

had not been there. As a result of the military and intelligence success of the program, the United

States and Pakistan were able to successfully cultivate a more fulsome military partnership than

they had had in decades; a not insignificant accomplishment given where the relationship stood

just before the launch of the program launch when their partnership had disintegrated. The

military and intelligence necessity, or perceived necessity, of the program led to its creation and

laid the foundation for the first bridge in mending their partnership from where it stood in the

immediate years preceding 9/11 to now, as traced in chapter two. Evaluated through this lens, the

success is profound; drones resoundingly bettered the Pakistani-American military and

intelligence partnership. Evaluating the program by other means however, is significantly less

clear.

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Chapter 5: Legal and Normative Considerations of the Drone Program and Their Resulting Effect on the United States-Pakistani

Partnership and the International System of States 5.1 Context of Legality

The international system of states comprises a tangled web of contrasting interests,

governing practices, and systems, varied moral and ethical compasses, or lack thereof, and a host

of other complicating factors. There is no one authority that the entire world recognizes as being

the arbiter of acceptable behaviour and not. The closest it comes in theory and practice is the

United Nations, but that too is disregarded by many. Nevertheless, the world still tries to govern

itself and others by implementing international laws and normative regulations.

As one can imagine employing technology with weaponized, lethal capabilities raise

many questions, not the least of which concerns the legality of how they should be used, by

whom, when is appropriate, against whom, and how their use infringes on existing laws

surrounding war, sovereignty, and perhaps most concerning, humanitarian, and human rights

law. While these foundational questions are fundamental and explored in this chapter, this is not

a legal paper exploring everything as comprehensively as possible. A bigger consequence for

understanding the Pakistani-American bilateral relationship is appreciating and recognizing how

the answers to these legal questions -and in the next chapter, the political, diplomatic, and social

ones- have influenced the relationship and what that could mean moving forward.

Drone use exists at the closely interwoven and subjective intersection of legality and

morality. Questions that are both morally and legally consequential including how anyone can

objectively be categorized as a terrorist where it is a term itself which frequently encompasses

moral judgment; whether terrorist acts should be a military or policing matter, and where is the

dividing line between them; whether states have the legal prerogative to summarily execute

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people without trial, proof, nor an attack in the first place. All these questions are valid,

important, and merit full-fledged discussions. The answers to those questions, or at least the

dialogue surrounding them need to lay the necessary framework to come to resolutions most

intelligently about the drones’ legality and morality going forward internationally. However, that

discussion however falls outside this paper’s scope, where the concern lies more in the legal

aspects geared specifically to affect the bilateral relationship between the United States and

Pakistan and not the legality of drones generally. The most relevant legality questions on their

relationship include state sovereignty, self-defence, and who can be targeted for assassination

outside the context of war.

Coming into mainstream use during the same era that saw prisoner abuse, illegal

detentions, torture, Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and atrocities at Bagram created an

atmosphere that even by association has made some question the legality and the humanity of

drones.342 For some their illegality and inhumanity is absolute in their mind. For others, it is

neither, and there is no questioning that either. However, for perhaps the vast majority, their

perception has been influenced and informed more by the culture and the knowledge of the

extreme measures in the post 9/11 counterterrorism atmosphere than it is on an informed

interpretation of drone use.

Thomas Waldman and Caroline Kennedy wrote that,

This assertion of a secret, unchecked power means that even if excessive torture is now forbidden the terrorists can be terminated from a safe difference on the word of the president. Not held, not tortured, simply ‘finished.’ Whether there is a kind of moral equivalent between torture and killing with armed drones is now part of the serious chatter in Washington. This is important as President Trump has made it clear that he believes torture absolutely works and that armed drones provide useful options in the ever widening war against ISIS and global terrorism343

342 Thomas Waldman and Caroline Kennedy. 2017. “Ghost Wars: The War on Terror and those who are 'Disappeared'.” Research Gate. 343 Waldman and Kennedy 2017

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Within Pakistan, the operation of drones is fascinating given that the former FATA is a

region unlike any other in the country and is unique anywhere. Before it began integrating into

the neighbouring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province,344 the FATA was under the President of

Pakistan’s direct executive authority, not by the broader democratically elected government.345

While represented in the National Assembly and Senate, laws created in the assembly did not

apply unless the President so ordered.346 Popular belief, however, is that true power in the

country lies with the military or ISI, not the government. Regardless of who is at the head,

military or elected official, Parliament’s laws or bills do not apply to the FATA unless the

President so instructs.347 Further, the Pakistani courts do not have jurisdiction348 as it is a region

governed by Pashtunwali, an “ethical code and system of customary legal norms.”349 People in

the protected areas were allowed to approach the court if they chose to, but the Supreme Court of

Pakistan and the Peshawar High Court did not have jurisdiction otherwise.350 If you lived in the

protected areas, you were under direct government control, while the non-protect areas were

“administered indirectly through local tribes.”351

For our purposes, this means already subjective legality questions are made even more so

as the region is further made complicated by its governance principles being different from the

rest of the country and being guided by customs not well understood by outsiders. These

complications lead to interesting and important questions in terms of the legality of the program

344 UNDP. 2020. “FATA Governance.” UNDP Pakistan. 345 Government of Pakistan. 2020. “About FATA Administrative System.” Federally Administered Tribal Areas Government of Pakistan. 346 Government of Pakistan, 2020 347 Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012, 23 348 Ibid, 23 349 Ibid, 23 350 Government of Pakistan 2020 351 Ibid

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in Pakistan specifically, as well as in terms of the place for drones in the context of international

law and legal norms. The following summation of the legal questions the drone program raises is

merely a brief articulation of the main factors and should be understood that it is not a complete

examination of the many complexities of comprehensive legal and normative doctrine.

5.2 Domestic Legality

Domestically, the United States drone programs are predicated on the justification of

their use under the post 9/11 joint Congressional resolution known as the Authorization for the

Use of Military Force (AUMF). Originating as a joint resolution of both houses of Congress, it

authorizes the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,

organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist

attacks that occurred on September 11th, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.”352 In

the eighteen years since the resolution passed, it has been cited and exploited domestically as the

basis of the governments’ position that the United States is at war not only against al Qaeda, the

Taliban, but also any affiliate groups, located anywhere, at any time.353 This is a significant

departure in thinking and laws of war doctrine from the traditional mindset of the enemy being a

comparatively easily classifiable, conspicuous combatant or insurgent group and reflects the

more amorphous, at times unobtrusive, jihadi driven enemy that can be hiding and residing

among the masses.

Domestic legal considerations of drone deployment anywhere are many and raise valid

and problematic questions. The answers to some of those questions have a bearing on the ripple

352 United States Congress. 2001. “Joint Resolution: To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States.” United States Government. 353 Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012, 118-119

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effects it creates on the respective programs’ operation in any given country where it currently

operates, particularly concerns over which government agency and under whose auspices it

should be governed. A comprehensive conversation of whether it should be under the CIA or

Department of Defense is a heated and important question domestically, that while important,

further complicates attempts to understand the already sufficiently complex bilateral relationship

between Pakistan and the United States; however, this debate will be briefly discussed as it has a

bearing on the future analysis of the consequences of the drone program.

5.2.1 CIA Versus Department of Defense: Covert Versus Clandestine Action

Having been introduced to the repertoire of weapons options at the United States’

disposal under the command of the Central Intelligence Agency, as discussed in the third

chapter, it thereby constituted a covert action falling under Title 50, the legal code for War and

National Defense.354 As Christine Fair explains, “A covert action is one in which the

involvement of the sponsoring government is meant to remain secret.”355 By contrast, a

clandestine activity “is intended to remain a secret, but should it be revealed it can be publicly

acknowledged.”356 A clandestine activity it would be should it move under the assumed

command of the Department of Defense as it would then likely fall under Title 10, the code for

Armed Forces.357 This is a critical distinction to understand in Pakistan because the implied

consent, and involvement of the Pakistani government with the Americans on the drone program,

has remained highly secretive, rarely officially discussed, and never publicly confirmed on the

354 Online Editor. 2013. “CIA or DOD: Clarifying the Legal Framework Applicable to the Drone Authority Debate.” American University National Security Law Brief. 355 Christine Fair. 2014. “Drones, Spies, Terrorists, and Second-Class Citizenship in Pakistan.” Taylor & Francis. 229 356 Fair 2014, 229 357 Online Editor 2013

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American side. This shows that a program moves from the CIA to the DOD and therefore, a

transition from a covert to clandestine action may have lost Pakistanis’ support for the program

because it wishes to maintain plausible public deniability. The consequence of that would be

enormous. Militarily the previous chapter explained how the success in fulfilling the program’s

aims, killing terrorists with the fewest casualties possible, through either a strike or covert action

is, while not dependent, much more successful when there are Pakistani involvement and

support. An action, which may knowingly result in the spurning of their support, is not one to be

taken lightly.

As the program is governed today under the authority and command of the Central

Intelligence Agency and Joint Special Operations Command, any Executive Orders or legal

briefings that exist that grant approval to conduct drone strikes and are therefore evidence of

their legality are classified and thereby, unknown to the public, legal scholars, or anyone else

interested in assessing the program. For this reason, many questions of legality are so often

debated about the United States drone program. It is still largely shrouded in speculation,

existing off unconfirmed reports, and unfortunately classified under national security auspices.

Domestic legality, however, does not inherently translate to international legality. There

are three foremost branches of international law as it applies to drone use and in which it must

comply if it is to be a lawful action. These are: international humanitarian law, international

human rights, and international laws of war and force.

5.3 International Legality

5.3.1 State Sovereignty

The first of the four most prominent legal questions at the forefront of American drone

use in Pakistan is the potential infringement on laws protecting state sovereignty. Sovereignty is

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the notion that a state has the ultimate power and authority to govern itself. The legal framework

that protects and ensures states’ right to sovereignty is plentiful and nuanced. As one of the most

staunchly supported bodies of law, principally because no one wants others stepping on their

figurative toes or invading their space, most other actors, at least at the state level, hold some

measure of support for this practice. Consequently, when state sovereignty is potentially being

infringed upon, people take notice.

The issue of state sovereignty and whether the United States has violated Pakistan’s has

been a source of debate since the first strike occurred. Some argue that it has because the United

States is working within their air space and borders, a right that is not theirs as Pakistan has not

granted them the authority to do so, which would be one of two exceptions that would make it

legally permissible. Publicly Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry, a spokesperson of the Pakistan Foreign

Ministry, told Amnesty International that it is the opinion of the Pakistani government that

“drone strikes are violative of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, are violative of

international law and are counterproductive because they do not serve their purpose but create a

thirst for revenge.”358 Public statements to this effect are numerous as the state wished always to

maintain plausible domestic liability. The tricky part is that they need permission from the host

state for their action to be legal as per state sovereignty. When that permission is publicly denied,

even if privately granted, then it can create a headache whereby it ever came to be a court case or

its legality questioned by an international governing authority than Pakistan would be in the

position of either acknowledging it had granted permission and lied to its citizens about it, or

they would deny having provided it and the United States would have been conducting illegal

operations, at least under state sovereignty law. However, in that case, Pakistan is proven to have

358 Amnesty International. 2013. “Will I Be Next?” US Drone Strikes in Pakistan.” Amnesty International Publications. 53.

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aided in supplying intelligence, and when it publicly declared the initial responsibility of drone

strikes, it undermines that claim. State sovereignty laws are a very messy factor in the Pakistan-

United States relationship, particularly as a series of border disputes between them that will be

discussed in the next chapter, had Pakistan claiming its violation.

If Pakistan agreed to US strikes however, as other evidence suggests, than that is an

entirely different matter. Had the US been granted permission to conduct operations, they were

not violating Pakistan’s sovereignty. The issue is that even this is unclear as there are conflicting

public statements on whether the United States had that permission and cooperation. An official

acknowledgment saying the US had permission came from then Director-General of the ISI,

Ahmed Shuja Pasha, who testified to the Abbottabad Commission about the raid that killed bin

Laden that because US drones had their utility, there was an “understanding” between the

Pakistani and US security authorities on the continued operation of US drones over Pakistani

territory.”359 This was reiterated by former President and Army Chief Pervez Musharraf, who

said in an interview that he gave the United States “qualified permission to undertake some US

drone strikes in the Tribal Areas.”360 This is further complicated because strikes in the former

FATA were not for the Pakistani government or military to grant permission in the first place as

the Pakistani government is not the one with jurisdiction over the region. This means that even if

permission was granted, it was never lawfully theirs' to give.

Even for the sake of argument, if one says that Pakistan clearly supplied prior permission,

consent can always be revoked. The United States having been previously granted authorization,

whether tacit or explicit, for other strikes or missions does not mean that it has carte blanche to

continue going forward indefinitely, nor is it carte blanche to expand the region in which it is

359 Amnesty International 2013, 53 360 Ibid, 53

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used. Deals made behind the scenes or through Pakistan’s practice of turning a blind eye, so they

do not face the backlash, as was discussed previously, is not sufficient proof of approval were it

ever to be legitimately called in to question or brought before an international court. This proves

the difference between what is legally defensible theoretically and what would be in practice.

Having the cooperation and/or corroboration of the Pakistani government, ISI, and/or

military allowed the program to have success in intelligence gathering, finding key targets and

the like, especially in the beginning when its foothold was less secure. That cooperation was

enough for many scholars and politicians to argue the United States was not in violation of

international sovereignty law because they had the host nation’s permission to be acting there.

Conversely, others argue that that may well have been true at the beginning under former

President Musharraf but that that permission expired when he left office, so permission and/or

indifference may well no longer apply. They cite occurrences such as the mission that killed bin

Laden, done without consent, as evidence of a breach of sovereignty. So too are the series of

border skirmishes in the late 2000s to early 2010s that will be discussed. While not drone

campaigns but actual military special operations ground missions, and air force air breaches, they

occurred without the Pakistani governments’ permission, and they claimed their sovereignty was

infringed. Unless the United States is ever brought before the international court to be tried for

violating the sovereignty and a judging panel is forced to decide –and that will certainly never

happen- it does not seem there will ever be a definitive answer as to whether the program exists

in violation of that right or not.

5.3.2 Right to Self-Defence

The second major legal consideration is that of the right to self-defence. Even with

Pakistan’s lack of consent and a breach of sovereignty it could be considered lawful if they meet

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the threshold under laws of self-defence. Legal claims to self-defence extend beyond the scope

one thinks of in criminal law, where one has the right to defend themselves against a physical

attack in the process of occurring. Under international law, one also has the right to anticipatory

self-defence wherein one can mitigate the threat posed by non-state actors who plan to act

against the state or its occupants.361 The United States has used the 9/11 attacks, and the ongoing

threat of al Qaeda and others in Pakistan as the legal justification to claim there is a pervasive

imminent threat and consequently their actions would meet the threshold for self-defence.

However, self-defence law also stipulates that the host state must be proven to be

“unwilling or unable to take [the appropriate steps, itself, against the non-state group].”362 This

latter point is contested by those who argue that the evidence is insufficient to meet these legal

standards and perhaps even indicates that it does not.363 If proven correct, the United States

would not have met the legal threshold under international self-defence law.

This discussion is important for several key reasons. First and foremost, the question is

whether nearly twenty years after 9/11 and facing an al Qaeda threat that is now more

fragmented, geographically dispersed, ethnically diverse, and arguably less threatening than

newly emerged groups such as ISIL who operate in new theatres, can one still abide by the claim

that the likelihood of an imminent attack is sufficient to merit pre-emptive killing? That is a

question without a clear answer. On the one hand, twenty years is a long time to be clinging to

the same notion, especially when the key members who speared that attack have mostly been

detained or executed. The actors involved are, therefore, not the same ones who threatened them.

Further, there has not been another attack anywhere close to the same magnitude since, so can it

361 Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012, 106-108 362 Ibid, 108 363 Ibid, 108

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still be considered imminent enough to warrant proactive self-defence? On the other hand, many

of the militants they seek to eliminate or detain claim allegiance to the same group, al Qaeda,

who attacked them and whose mission still includes targeting the United States and the non-

Muslim world more broadly. By that token, they are still under threat, and their action would be

warranted.

Former United Nations Special Rapporteur reinforces this point on extrajudicial,

summary, or arbitrary executions Christof Keyns who as far back as 2012 was already

questioning whether “killings carried out in 2012 can be justified as in response to [events] in

2001,” noting that “some states seem to want to invent new laws to justify new practices.”364

Another nine years later, this question is even more poignant.

Additionally, US self-defence claims are further complicated because Pakistan has

successfully apprehended and/or killed threats within its own borders. This means that drone

action in Pakistan arguably meets the host state’s threshold of being incapable of dealing with

the threat themselves. In falling under the auspices of Langley and not the Pentagon, it casts

doubt on the idea that it is a defence practice. To some, it appears more a clandestine practice in

eliminating enemies than it does an act of defence against an imminent threat no one else can

deal with. This is perpetuated by the image, however false, that actions taken by the military are

inherently defensible, and there is legitimacy and legality in its source while clandestine

intelligence operations are inherently operating in the gray, or even in the outright illegal. Again,

however inaccurate these assumptions may be opinion matters, not to the same extent in law as

in politics, but it does, nevertheless. This is especially true in how both states view the legality of

US actions.

364 Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012, 106-108

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5.3.3 Laws of Symmetry and Proportionality

Historically, two of the principal guiding laws of war have been built on the idea of

symmetry365 and proportionality.366 The symmetry that enemy combatants are lawfully equal to

you and that the combatants have an opportunity to meet on a comparable field. This means that

dropping an atomic bomb or employing chemical weapons against an enemy population,

regardless of the moral and humanitarian implications for human rights law, is not legally lawful

under laws of war regarding symmetry. This is difficult to reconcile in drone use in Pakistan.

Firstly, because in Pakistan, enemy combatants are being killed despite it not being at war, and

secondly, the Global War on Terror is inherently asymmetric. It is asymmetric because it does

not obey the basic proponent that your enemy is your equal. As Christine Fair writes, “while it is

permissible to target members of al Qaeda, we reject their right to target us and we exempt al

Qaeda’s members from the protections that are traditionally extended to enemy combatants. This

is reflected in the term often used for al Qaeda and other such groups: ‘unlawful combatant.”367

The very idea of drones has been promoted, or at least branded publicly, as a valuable

unconventional tool touted for their ability to target new asymmetric enemy combatants. This

perception says it all; it is an asymmetrical tool used within an asymmetric “war” and therefore

operates in a legal grey area at best.

The Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) was a legal code from colonial Britain that still

existed in Pakistan’s FATA until 2018, when the FATA Interim Governance Regulation replace

it in. It was a “technical assistance project to support the Government of Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa to peacefully integrate the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas

365 Fair 2014, 218 366 Ibid, 218 367 Ibid, 218

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through the extension of civilian governance institutions and socio-economic

development.”368

Under the FCR, there was a collective responsibility, which means the entire clan, tribe,

or family could, and often would, be punished for any individual’s alleged crime(s).369 This

denied the areas’ residents its basic right to the rule of law and rendered them “lesser citizens.”370

As Christine Fair articulates,

Part of the unrecognized legitimizing discourse surrounding the use of armed drones in FATA is the unfortunate fact that residents of FATA are second-class citizens, and the legal regime under which they are governed allows the state to ignore individual innocence and guilt. The United States exploits this predicament, but Pakistan perpetuates it by sustaining a legal regime that discriminates between the citizens of the so-called ‘settled areas’, where the constitution applies, and those lesser citizens under the rule of the FCR371 This reality, or the belief of this reality, has allowed the United States to spend fifteen

years running a drone program that is illegal based on principles of symmetry. Frankly, it has

been allowed to occur because no one cared much about the rights of “second class” citizens, and

certainly neither country cared about the rights of terrorists and other militant threats. The only

opposition is as it concerns whom they kill is the objection to civilians being killed; no one has

any interest in reaffirming the rights of terrorists.

The connected but distinct principle of proportionality in international law prohibits

military action that is “expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,

damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the

368 UNDP 2020 369 Anisa Ajmal. 2019. “Future Uncertain for Pakistani Cases Dating Back to Colonial-Era Law.” Gadhara. 370 Fair 2014, 225 371 Ibid, 225

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concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”372 This means that military operations are

bound by the idea warfare must not cause damage disproportionate to the military advantage.

The methods of warfare that have been prohibited under international law include,

perfidy, terror, starvation, reprisals against non-military objectives, and indiscriminate attacks, damage to the natural environment or to works and installations containing dangerous forces; ordering that there shall be no survivors; pillage; taking hostages; taking advantage of the presence of the civilian population or population movements to promote the conduct of hostilities; improper use of distinctive emblems and signs; and attacks on persons hors de combat or parachuting from an aircraft in distress373

While this list is lengthy, what is means is that the Basic Rule, article 48 of the Geneva Protocol

must always be followed, which says, “In order to ensure respect for and protection of the

civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish

between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military

objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”374

Symmetry and proportionality are always the backbone of jus in bello, the principle of

minimizing suffering in armed conflict, especially of civilians. It is interested in protecting all

civilians always. Regardless of any potential reasons for war, regardless of race, gender, sex,

political ideology, regardless of anything, and everything. The bottom line, civilians must always

be protected, which is as true in drone warfare as it is in any other.

5.3.4 Who Can Be Targeted? Targeted Killing Versus Signature Strikes

Even when action is lawful under the aforementioned sections, all actions must also

always comply with international human rights law and/or international humanitarian law.

372 Geneva Convention. 1977. “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts.” United Nations. Protocol I. 51.5. 373 Red Cross. 2020. “Methods of Warfare.” International Committee of the Red Cross. 374 Geneva Convention. 1977. “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts.” United Nations. Protocol I. 48.1125.

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International human rights law is more relevant in armed conflict,375 while humanitarian law is

often outside the scope of armed conflict.376 International humanitarian law is therefore of more

concern in Pakistan, where formal war is not being waged. However, there is a crossover with

human rights law, particularly as the drone program in Afghanistan has some interconnectivity

measure where there is formalized armed conflict. The significant part of relevance to

humanitarian law is that drones must never knowingly target innocent civilians.

Those targeted by drones have fallen into one of two categories: casualties of targeted

killings or signature strikes. The former was more common in the earlier years of the program as

their definition is marginally more succinct than the latter. Targeted killing is a deliberate,

premeditated form of assassination by a government against its enemies. These are the people

who fall on the kill list, as described in chapter three. In the context of self-defence and against

terrorists or other actors in asymmetrical warfare, the United States military and officials say it is

lawful. Some disagree and say it is just another form of extrajudicial killing that the United

Nations outlawed in its Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal,

Arbitrary and Summary Executions.377

Conversely, as previously mentioned, signature strikes378 are those whereby either groups

of men or individuals are deemed a threat solely based on their patterns of behaviour or because

they demonstrated characteristics associated with terrorism.379 In the United States’ view, those

factors increase the perceived likelihood of their threat, and thus they may become the focus on a

drone attack, not from there being concrete intelligence on their guilt or confirmation on

375 Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012, 114 376 Ibid, 114 377 United Nations Department of Political Affairs. 1991. “United Nations Manual of the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions.” UN Peacemaker. 378 Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012, 12 379 Ibid, 12

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premeditated intent to harm the United States or her interests. At times their identities did not

even have to be known to meet the threshold of being targeted.380 So long as their behaviour is

thought suspicious to the United States security personnel who are surveilling the former FATA,

they could be susceptible to a strike.381 With a threshold for guilt that low it is a practice,

unsurprisingly, many feels are legally shaky at best and outright illegal at worse.

Moreover, even while targeted killing is more lawful than signature strikes, it too is a

practice not without legal tension, as there still exists an important distinction between lawful

and unlawful extrajudicial killing. In 2010 President Obama welcomed a law professor from

Yale Law School named Harold Koh into his administration to be the point person on clarifying

drone use criteria.382 The distinction between a lawful extrajudicial killing and an unlawful one

is, understandably, hugely important, especially as the scope of the program expanded. It is

doubtfully a coincidence that it was in the same year, 2010, the program exploded under this

same administration. For Koh, the difference between the two is that the former is “the result of a

careful study to determine that the target is an active combatant who is fighting American forces

or planning attacks.”383 This contrasts with the latter, which “takes place without the benefit of

such careful determinations.”384

Christine Fair, a scholar at Georgetown University, succinctly articulates that, “Such a

distinction is convenient because these judgments are rendered by the US government without

any hearings and without affording any opportunity to the person in the drone’s sights to defend

themselves. Not surprisingly, this approach has failed to satisfy legal scholars and policy analysts

380 Ibid, 12 381 Cockburn 2015, 16 382 Fair 2014, 217-218 383 Ibid, 217-218 384 Ibid, 217-218

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alike.”385 Under international human rights law, lethal force is only lawful when it is “necessary

and proportionate.”386 In other words, when it is necessary to protect a threat to life or where

“there are no other means, such as capture or non-lethal incapacitation, of preventing that threat

to life.”387

The contradictory legal discourse on the classification of targets and whether drone

assassination in legal is particularly relevant in Pakistan because it was the original non-war

location for their use and remains statistically the non-war country with the largest number of

strikes; and not coincidently, the largest number of casualties. Whether it is a program operating

legally or illegally is important in assessing its long-term feasibility once the War in Afghanistan

truly ends and those bases will no longer be available to use as launching pads and thus will

require even more cooperation from the Pakistani’s if the program were to remain operational.

5.4 Would More Lawful Changes Better Solidify the Relationship?

Arguably, the number one suggestion repeatedly voiced amongst scholars, both those

supportive and in opposition of the drone program, is that to improve the success of the program,

make it better align with international law, and mitigate some of its repercussions, improving the

transparency of the program will go far. It will organically facilitate better understanding and

help mitigate the negative consequences that stem from such staunch opposition.

Foremost, as chapter three showed, there are significant discrepancies in the number of

civilians who have been either inadvertently targeted or a consequence of collateral damage.

According to Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiederman, over the same reporting period, the United

385 Ibid, 217-218 386 Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012, 117 387 Ibid, 117

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States claimed thirty civilian deaths while Pakistan claimed over seven hundred.388 These sorts of

discrepancies lead to a muddying of the waters about both the program’s legality and the trust

level between allies.

Because international law outlines the imperative that when lethal force is used, every

conceivable step must be taken to avoid harm to civilian bystanders,389 the discord in figures

reported lends credence to the possibility that is raised by many that the United States is not

following this law. The argument is that if every feasible step were taken, then there would be no

reason not to disclose figures because one, the numbers would be smaller, and two, if there was

no way to avoid those deaths, then there is no need to hide or fudge the numbers because they

would present no room for questioning or undermining.

Many of the hypothesis’s media, scholars, and critics express as to why the drone

program is still as discreet and classified is because it runs contrary to law or norms and

therefore keeping it hidden is for the program’s survival. While no one other than those within

the government and military knows the truth and can speak to the credibility of that belief and

the program’s inner workings, it does seem to have legitimacy since transparency builds

confidence. People question why information is not disclosed if there is nothing to hide. In the

post-9/11 era, the United States citizens have become accustomed to some measure of

infringement into their privacy occurring in the name of national security and the “greater good.”

They have become acclimated to the many more aggressive counterterrorism measures

implemented, though they expect some measure of information in exchange.

While in practice, many of the military responses that appeared have proven to have their

own consequences and alienated the United States to many nations across the world, the

388 Bergen and Tiederman 2011, 13 389 ACLU. 2021. “Targeted Killing.” ACLU.

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decisions arose from a very organic place. When Presidents Bush’s administration was dealing

with not only the consequences of an attack on their soil and the subsequent anthrax scare but

also with a tremendous amount of fear amongst its’ populous, what emerged was an

administration who wanted to do everything in their power to prevent such an incident from

occurring again. For better or for worse, that meant that suspected terrorists needed to be hunted

down, that people died in the name of the greater good, and that American and allied lives were

put at risk by putting boots on the ground. This political climate allowed highly controversial

acts of Congress such as the Patriot Act to come into existence, what fostered the creation of the

drone program, and what brought the United States and Pakistan together in their pursuit of a

common enemy.

Now, nearing twenty years after the attack, those reactionary decisions’ ramifications are

being felt more keenly by people who are tired of suffering the consequences. Among them,

some question how legally ambiguous actions are still being conducted and how people are still

dying in wars, and as a victim of drones, in the name of a fight, many have long since lost their

appetite for.

When Amnesty International published a lengthy report in 2013 focusing on drone use in

Pakistan, naturally, it was with consideration to the humanitarian factor. It ultimately concluded

that, in their opinion, the United States has acted unlawfully and that, “Like other forces

operating in the Tribal Areas, the USA appears to be exploiting the lawless and remote nature of

the region to evade accountability for its violations.”390

While one cannot intelligently speak to the validity of their conclusion unless or until the

United States fully discloses the records of every strike, the chain of command used to authorize

390 Amnesty International. 2013. “Will I Be Next?” US Drone Strikes in Pakistan.” Amnesty International Publications. 56

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these and an accurate reporting of every casualty of every strikes ever conducted, that most

important part is not necessarily what is proved, but what is believed. Whether or not strikes are

legally, ethically, morally, judiciously, military, politically, diplomatically, or whatever other

standard one wishes to hold them to, the right thing to do, what matters is how their use provokes

reaction based on the perception of their meeting or failing to meet, that criteria. As long as there

are civilians, terrorist groups, NGOs, foreign governments, or political dissidents that object to

drone use in Pakistan, that feel it is problematic, or take umbrage of their use, then it has an

impact on the bilateral relationship between the two, and by extension, on many other states and

actors.

The report further raised concern that violations of this nature, in following the logic of

their assertion, set a “dangerous precedent that other states may seek to exploit to avoid

responsibility for their own unlawful killings.”391 When a generally well-respected organization

questions whether dangerous precedents are being set that erode the internationally recognized

and upheld international apparatus for the protection of human rights it is imperative to assess

whether the claim is legitimate. While there will always be people who choose to operate outside

the confines of the law, who seek power, are driven by ideologies that run counter to mainstream

values of humane action, or even simply who choose to act with deliberate malicious intent, the

common narrative that pervades international society is a respect for human rights, an

appreciation for humanitarian law, and an understanding that while war is something few would

ever like to see when fought, it must be just and guided by certain key humane practices.

5.5 Proliferation of the Technology Testing Relationship in the International System

391 Amnesty International 2013, 56

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Scholar Ann Florini argues three significant shifts have occurred in the international

system in the post-World War II era; democratization, multilateralism, and restrictions on the use

of force, particularly with weapons of mass destruction.392 This third shift is of particular

importance for analyzing this issue because drones may be poised to be the next iteration of the

final shift. History has proved that the advent of revolutionary weapons technology has had

substantial consequences on the international system. It can quickly shift power structures, make

states or other actors re-evaluate partnerships, and can completely transform both warfare and

everyday life. One need looks no further than the way nuclear weapons and the race to produce

them between the United States and Russia caused the Cold War and the complete realignment

of the international system as most of the world came to be split according to whom it supported.

When the two biggest examples of this, nuclear weapons, and chemical weapons, appeared, they

completely revolutionized the understanding of what military and state obligations and

expectations are when deadly technology and weaponry are owned. Florini argues that,

One effect of technological developments of the past century has been to create distinction as among categories of weapons. The use of so-called "conventional" weapons is accepted, no matter how devastating their effects. The use and increasingly even the possession of “weapons of mass destruction"-that is, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons-is not. The political and moral constraint surrounding the latter go much beyond rational deterrence. That is, states refrain from using them even when there is no reason to fear retaliation in kind …. These taboos are clearly normative, not purely "rational" calculations of costs and benefit … This norm of non-use is gradually broadening itself to include a prohibition on possession by most if not all countries393 Both forms of technology were highly debated at the time of their respective rise to

prominence, both in moralistic and legal terms. Only after a series of treaties and conventions

began to determine the regulations of their use the ultimate decision was reached by creating the

392 Ann Florini. 1996. “The Evolution of International Norms”. International Studies Quarterly. 40.3: 382. 393 Florini 1996, 383-4.

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Geneva Protocol. The Protocol, acting in accordance with a public who were opposed to said

weapons, outlawed their use on both moral and legal grounds.394 Drone use today appears to be

following along a similar path whereby the technology does not fit neatly into the pre-existing

international laws and challenges the system’s understanding of sovereignty, right to self-

defence, and how operating outside a theatre of war may change expectations of what is

appropriate and legal conduct.

Moreover, some of the very arguments used during the international law and normative

creation process for nuclear and chemical weapons are the same arguments being made now for

drones. When people were divided over the use of gas in warfare, proponents were arguing it

was no more inhumane than conventional methods and, in fact, some even went as far as to say it

was more humane because one slipped into unconsciousness or death quicker than by other

means.395 This was eventually resolved by prohibiting their use. In contemporary drone

conversations, similar arguments are being applied where balancing concerns of morality,

effectiveness and legality all converge.

The way drone use has thus far unfolded by the United States in Pakistan with its

statistical increase in use and expansion of targets, the ultimate resolution of the norm of non-use

and illegality does not currently appear to be the path for drones. Attributable to the fact that the

rhetoric and justifications exercised around their use has largely been centred around the Global

War on Terror, a conflict very much ongoing, and because it has evolved into arguably the

preeminent counterterrorism tactic of the United States, a hugely powerful player on the

394 Catherine Jefferson. 2014. "Origins of the norm against chemical weapons." International Affairs. 90.3: 659. 395 Jefferson 2014, 653.

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international stage, it has allowed drones to operate by rules the United States has been able to

make up as it goes along.

This is an issue that raises fundamental questions the international system will have to

supply an answer for at some point shortly. It is the question of the tension between fundamental

principles. From one viewpoint, the obligations to human rights and humanitarian law that actors

must adhere to during war settings must remain intact. That means unnecessary destruction must

be avoided, and there must be a clear differentiation between combatants and non-combatants.

Conversely, however, military effectiveness is a consideration, and even if drones are not proven

to be more effective at killing targeted combatants than other methods, that does not eliminate

the fact that actors will still want to employ the technology. It can also create tension within the

international community if the technology is more exact but still results in non-combatant deaths.

This is especially problematic if said deaths occur outside the confines of a legally declared war,

as in Pakistan, because international law cannot address it as robustly. The tension that arises

from this legal grey zone invariably worsen as a time comes when better regulation will prove

necessary but most importantly, for the United States and Pakistan, it has brought undue stress to

the relationship. Just as rules and regulations have their place in society to help guide people’s

decisions in a way that support the betterment and safety of everyone and same holds on an

interstate basis where clear boundaries would help delineate the bilateral relationship of these

two countries who have had a very back and forth dynamic as their interests evolved, and their

level of cooperation and agreement ebbed and flowed. Ultimately, this is to say that drone use

that operates more definitively within existing international legal precedent would better serve

the health of their partnership and improve some of the concerns that exacerbated a wedge

between them, such as target ambiguity and sovereignty.

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Chapter 6: Political, Social, and Diplomatic Considerations of the Drone Program and Their Resulting Effect on the United States-

Pakistani Partnership and the International System of States 6.1. Political and Diplomatic Context

While the deployment of drone technology is a military and intelligence resource

primarily, the decision to use it is always made more complicated by political and diplomatic

considerations. When, where, and against whom the technology targets are not only about

tactical advantage and military strategy, they are questions that the public also has opinions on,

and in turn, it matters what is politically and diplomatically viable. People both educated and not

on the issues surrounding drones or any other aspect of American military decisions have proven

to have much to say. Being a pair of states with democratically elected representatives where

constituents theoretically are supposed to guide politics, these opinions have weight.

Perception is consequential in political decision-making, and in many ways, it does not

actually matter if, for example, the majority of Pakistani citizens really oppose drones or if, as

other data suggests, there is actually support for it. What matters is the narrative of that belief. If

people believe their use has infringed on their sovereignty, or people oppose them based on

hatred or mistrust of the United States or based on the principle of another force operating in

their country, or whatever the case may be, the backlash over that can be effective in making

their respective states take notice. Perception driving politics in a democratic system will

ultimately come to drive policy.

Drone use in Pakistan has been driven by the aim of killing terrorists and other threats.

This is a tall order given that terrorism is a tactic anyone can choose to employ to inflict

maximum emotional and psychological trauma on ones' enemy; it is not a clearly identifiable or

finite group that, if killed or defeated, ceases to exist. It is a renewable tactic and therefore

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impossible to eradicate. It is further made exponentially more difficult because it is a tactic

employed predominately, at least in current global consciousness, by those fueled by radical

religious extremism, itself a belief system hard to combat. Consequently, eradicating or, more

realistically, minimizing, as much as possible the cultivators of these beliefs in Pakistan or

elsewhere is just as much, if not more so, a political problem than a military one. As the FATA

region proved, while killing al Qaeda members or other jihadi militants in the area, be it through

drones or other means, does help, it is by no means the end of the line. The region is still

harbouring those who employ terrorist tactics and espouse radical ideology aimed at inflicting

mass casualties if necessary to pursue their interests. This has huge repercussions politically.

The principal reason understanding this is important for our purposes is that politically

the relationship between both countries has been damaged due to pursuing drones as the

preeminent counterterrorism tactic in the country, to the detriment of anything else. The years of

emphasis on intelligence and military-based counterterrorism tactics, like drones, had occurred

for a variety of reasons which essentially boils down to no one wanting to bear witness to a

terrorist attack launched on their soil or against their citizens because they did not capture or kill

the perpetrator(s) when they had the chance. While even those critical of the drone program

would never advocate allowing terrorist or militant attacks to occur merely in the name of

reducing political backlash and solidifying a more wholesome partnership, there is nevertheless a

need for a more comprehensive understanding. Success in military operations alone is not

proving successful at mitigating all problems in their interstate dynamic, and its consequences

are compromising the health of the United States-Pakistan relationship.

As the previous chapters illustrated, legal, security, and military strain are already

evident. While still difficult to reconcile when juxtaposed with the endeavour’s worth, it is at

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least marginally more tangible than the even more complicated “softer” considerations of drone’s

the social, diplomatic, and political consequences in Pakistan have had on their relationship. The

reason for this is threefold; one, security and military considerations are so tantamount in US

consciousness that they will, all information shows, continue to do what they feel is necessary to

ensure their country’s and its citizens’ protection. One need only look at a nearly two-decades

long war to see proof of that. This means that, while the consequences of such actions are

important to understand and fit within any actions going forward, they are not necessarily a

deterrent.

The second principal reason the “softer” considerations are more complicated is that

unlike militarily, where the United States is so far superior in terms of resources, equipment,

personnel, and technological weaponry, the gap is narrower politically. While the United States

has more power and influence on the world stage, it is still beholden to its populace as it is a

democratically elected system. In a bilateral partnership, those external sources of power,

prestige, and influence are significantly dimmed as it becomes about a fruitful partnership, not

necessarily of equals, but at least two parties wanting or needing to work together, which means

both sides need to be heard and engaged.

The third and final reason it is even more complicated as diplomacy between two parties

that disagree on many things, including many foundational moralist principles and competing

interests that drive their actions, is nearly always a tenuous situation. Two people with distinct

backgrounds, interests, expectations, and levels of compromise they are willing to accept can

have a difficult enough time agreeing to something. This is made unquantifiably more difficult at

the level of state interaction. Understanding the reasons for the complexity of analyzing the

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political, social, and consequences of the drone program on their relationship is also

demonstrative of the reasons for its importance.

For this paper’s purposes in distinguishing how political, diplomatic, and social concerns

differ, clarification will be provided. In this context, political analysis is concerned with those

actions that are driven by the will of each country’s citizens. The issues that draw more on

rhetoric and belief that will be explored include the support and opposition for the program from

both countries’ citizens and whether drones have served as a lightning rod for radicalization.

These are political issues affected by the beliefs of constituents. They are issues that are more

intra-state based that project outward towards changing their inter-state relationship.

Diplomatic considerations alternately exist more state-to-state or state representative-to-

state representative in collaborating on any given issue. This means instances where officials

were negotiating with Pakistan, such as after Operation Neptune Spear in retrieving their

technology and the aftermath of the Salalah incident over the border reopening.

Finally, social concerns more broadly refer to the general climate that has been fostered

by these two countries for drones to operate in. This is the difference between a permissive and a

hostile atmosphere that fosters what may be guiding principles for drone use. These three

dimensions of their relationship are all intrinsically linked.

6.2. Political vs. Military Tension Guiding Action

As is often the case in democracies, when there are national security, defence, or war

concerns, there can be competing tensions between the military and political bodies. What is best

militarily in terms of strategy to win, defend, or neutralize, can be different from what is

politically workable or willed the people. Intuitively this is a logical dilemma because while

ethical militaries are still tempered by morality and integrity, their intentions are about being

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equipped, literally and metaphorically, to eliminate their adversary to save their countrymen,

defend their way of life, and/or protect and preserve their country’s identity. The military

infrastructure is often more removed from the day-to-day of politics and is less hampered by the

same considerations’ their political counterparts are. In the context of Pakistan’s interaction with

the United States, there has been a pattern of the latter going directly to the Pakistani military or

ISI when they needed things done efficiently,396 at times bypassing government officials and/or

offices entirely. This, understandably, creates a lot of mistrust and malcontent. Balancing civil-

military relations is often a delicate process in many countries and holds for both the United

States and Pakistan. The dichotomous tension in each country manifested its way up into the

bilateral relationship as well.397 This is especially true and worsened by the feeling, or fact,

depending on whom one asks, that the United States often skips their Pakistani political

counterparts in the first place. Historically, this may be because the military was the real seat of

power in the country;398 now, it seems to be because they get the answers they want more from

the military than politicians. This is particularly true for drones; there was more military support

in understanding its necessity and utility399 than political support from politicians prioritizing

keeping plausible deniability.

The concern now from some is that this behaviour pattern from the US is more because

they expect the Pakistani military to fall in line with their requests. As Shuja Nawaz, a Pakistani

national and the founding director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center phrased it, “The

Pakistani military is galled by the general sense that it has been reduced to an army for hire, and

396 Shuja Nawaz. 2012. “The Pakistan Dilemma What the Military’s Recent Behavior Says About U.S.-Pakistan Ties.” Foreign Affairs. 397 Nawaz 2012 398 Ibid 399 Ibid

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many of the generals now argue that the United States is treating the country as a client state, not

as an ally.”400

Moreover, in most regards, the United States is the more powerful, resourced,

technologically advanced, and better-financed country, and has exerted that power over Pakistan.

The United States proceeded to use drones even when unpopular. They conducted Operation

Neptune Spear without Pakistani approval, they have proceeded with their own agenda in

Afghanistan, and they have been unafraid to target even those Pakistan does not wish eliminated.

In recognizing and understanding all of that, there is an apparent gross imbalance of political

power, particularly on the international stage with major international organizations such as the

United Nation. However, the one caveat that must never be forgotten is there is always the

overriding concern of a nuclear-powered Pakistan. This reality always mitigates their ability to

step too far over the line, but in the general day-to-day political power balance, the United States

wields more power.

The final consideration in drones’ military-political tension is that practically speaking,

drones do not have never-ending staying power. This is to say that drones are not a limitless

solution whereby they can successfully operate in Pakistan forever with a maintained level of

support, an abundance of terrorist and militant targets it can kill, and the political will to do so.

Rather, they, at least at this point in their technological evolution, are a weapon inherently

limited to addressing specific needs within the two countries’ security dynamic. In turn, this

means one needs to build the infrastructure to deal with whatever problems drones are trying to

target, be it safe havens, insurgents, terrorist leaders, etcetera.

400 Ibid

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The initial mentality drones provoked is that drone strikes can be successfully used from

here without incident. While the technology of drones appears here to stay in any given scenario,

they will not, and cannot, be successful forever. The inhabitants of Pakistan who are being

targeted and even the world more broadly have significant problems watching Western forces

conduct drone strikes inside another country’s borders.

General Stanley A. McChrystal, the former commander of Joint Special Operations

Command (JSOC), expressed that using drones must be done sparingly not only in semi-

permissive or hostile environments but anywhere because “It's not a strategy in itself; it's a short-

term tactic.”401 He goes on to warn that,

Just the strike part of it can never do more than keep an enemy at bay. And although to the United States, a drone strike seems to have very little risk and very little pain, at the receiving end, it feels like war. Americans have got to understand that. If we were to use our technological capabilities carelessly -- I don't think we do, but there's always the danger that you will -- then we should not be upset when someone responds with their equivalent, which is a suicide bomb in Central Park, because that's what they can respond with.402

This statement is illuminating, especially from its source. This from one of the highest-ranking

members in the military, who is cautioning against the collateral possibilities of the use of a

military weapon and warning against the reality that war is not a peaceful endeavour and

stepping on people’s toes, even outside a theatre of war, is still an act of war. For that, political

understanding is required, and the delicate balance of civil-military relations is again brought to

the forefront.

6.3. Public Opinion in Support and Against

401 McChrystal 2013 402 McChrystal 2013

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The most consequential factor politically is the public dissonance it creates. Drone use

has sparked heated debates and backlash, in both countries, from citizens who hold opposing

positions on the merit of the drone program in Pakistan.

Understanding how Pakistani society feels about the United States UAV program in their

country is a complicated answer. Though limited understanding is not without insight, it does

lack the full picture, as the accessible literature is a perception cultivated most prominently by

mainstream media and what the Pakistani government allows to reach the air. Carlotta Gall, a

reporter who covered the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2001, details how Pakistani

intelligence agents barged into her bedroom, physically roughed her up and took her electronics,

all to ensure she did not publish information they did not want to be known.403 This is media

censorship at its most extreme, and it is all done to ensure the ISI can control the public

narrative. There are confirmed instances of journalists being killed, forcibly prevented from

entering certain areas, and threats and intimidation are commonplace.404

It is not surprising then that in their comprehensive study on how the drone program in

Pakistan is framed in national newspapers, Christine Fair and Ali Hamza found that even as late

as 2014, ten years into the program, large segments of the population remained unaware of US

drone strikes.405 However, among those that are aware, public opinions fall in line quite closely

with the prevailing media narrative406 suggesting there is little opportunity for dissonance or

perhaps no access to dissenting opinions to broaden their understanding. They write that while

the country engages in “considerable self-censorship and go to great lengths to accommodate the

403 Carlotta Gahl. 2014. The Wrong Enemy: American in Afghanistan 2001-2014. Houghton Mifflin Hartcourt Publishing: New York, NY. xiv-xv 404 Gahl 2014, xvi-xvii 405 Christine Fair & Ali Hamza. 2016. “From elite consumption to popular opinion: framing of the US drone program in Pakistani newspapers.” Small Wars & Insurgencies. 27.4: 579 406 Fair and Hamza 2016, 584

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sensitivities of Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies. Pakistan’s most fearsome

intelligence agency, the ISI, has a media management cell and its job is to monitor and police the

content of all media in Pakistan.”407

The “information elites” can control the narrative as the average citizen has

comparatively limited information access compared to the American public, particularly as only

sixteen percent have access to the internet,408 the most accessible of all media. The elites have

historically been able to control the overriding narrative, and this often suits their agenda.

Further, several issues adversely hinder the understanding of how Pakistani citizens feel.

Firstly, there is no homogeneity amongst Pakistani citizens in the first place. It is a country

comprised of approximately ten major ethnic groups and numerous other smaller ones. Assorted

opinions stem from the varied priorities that can sometimes exist, and linguistic differences can

impede accessibility to media forms in other languages. Moreover, there are vast differences

between opinions of people living in the capital and other major cities where there is a strong

military presence and, thus, more support for ISI and government decisions and those living in

rural and tribal areas.409 These considerations are important because while there is never

consensus when discussing over two hundred million people’s opinions, there are fundamental

differences that are cause for disagreement. These factors all present challenges in understanding

Pakistani public opinion’s full picture; however, in looking at many studies others have

conducted you can piece together as comprehensive an impression as is possible.

6.3.1. Opposition in Pakistan

407 Ibid 580 408 Ibid 582 409 Ibid 582

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In Pakistan, as in the United States, there are both those who support and oppose. The

overriding perception that is broadcast to the world and that data seems to reinforce is that the

majority is opposed. Their opposition tends to be based on two fundamental objectives. One, the

infringement on their state’s sovereignty and two, that a foreign state is interfering on what they

feel is a matter their own military or ISI can handle and should be left to do so.

Polls such as those conducted by the PEW research center that obtained primary research

on Pakistani opinions on American drone use in their country and their feelings towards America

are valuable resources for understanding this idea. In their 2012 edition they found only twelve

percent held favourable views of the United States.410 By 2014 is had increased marginally to

fourteen percent,411 but it is still significantly down from the twenty-three percent it had been in

2000412 pre-9/11. That figure is even more startling given that pre-9/11 the United States had

sanctions imposed against Pakistan, yet they were still more favourably viewed than amid the

drone campaign. As it pertains to drone use more narrowly, a staggering ninety-seven percent

classified drones as being an undesirable thing, with ninety-four percent thinking they kill too

many civilians and only twenty-six percent thinking they are even necessary.413

These figures offer keen insight into the growing unease, resentment, and animosity

towards the United States and the drone program’s widespread unpopularity. Rampant objection

from their populous has made it increasingly difficult for the Pakistani government to collaborate

with their American counterparts cohesively and dynamically. This tension has undermined their

410 Pew Research Center. 2012. “Chapter 1: Views of the U.S. and American Foreign Policy.” PEW Research Center. 2. 411 Pew Research Center. 2014. “A Less Gloomy Mood in Pakistan.” Pew Research Center. 412 Pew Research Center 2012, 2 413 Pew Research Center 2012, 3-4

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bilateral relationship and continues to place it at risk, not only in the military and security sense

but also in the even more difficult to navigate political and military senses.

This is reiterated by the New America Foundations study of public opinion in the FATA.

While their September 2010 study is now outdated as a tool to gauge current perceptions, the

study was able to capture the opinions of many in the then FATA during those crucial years

when strikes were at their peak, and therefore their effects felt the most keenly. It was reported

that nearly ninety percent of people polled opposed the United States military pursing al Qaeda

and Taliban in their region generally and seventy-five percent were opposed to drones

specifically.414

The most interesting and important discovery in this report is that for most, their position

reflects the specific US military policy to employ drones and that with changes in practices their

relationship is not irreversible. Nearly seventy-five percent said,

Their opinion of the United States would improve if the U.S. increased visas for FATA residents and educational scholarships to America, withdrew the American military from Afghanistan or brokered a comprehensive peace between Israelis and Palestinians … Two-thirds said that policies such as American aid for education and medical care would improve their opinions as well.415 While public disproval does not automatically mean the government will respond or that

it will have an immediate impact on anything, long term it is challenging to sustain practices that

citizens oppose unless you are speaking of a tyrannical government, which neither country is.

Consequently, strong dissatisfaction and disproval among the Pakistani public are crucial in the

government’s ability or viability in supporting or cooperating with the American program and,

therefore, risk upsetting the fragility of the always-tenuous diplomatic relationship these

countries share.

414 New America Foundation 2010, 3 415 Ibid, 4

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6.3.2. Support in Pakistan

Conversely, a growing body of research indicates that the level of opposition is lower

than commonly believed. Some outright support their use but even those who would not go that

far do not outright oppose them. Among the former in conducting interviews with residents in

the FATA, journalist Rob Crilly concluded ample support among those who live in the regions

most affected. He describes the case of a police officer who wished to remain autonomous in

Dera Ismail Khan, a small town in the former FATA who explained that there was much support

in his town, especially after the killing of Qari Hussain.416 Crilly writes how,

He (the police officer) explained patiently how Hussain, one of the Pakistan Taliban's most feared commanders, had run training camps for children. Such was his reputation he was known as Ustad-i-Fedayeen, teacher of suicide bombers …. No one is quite sure when he was killed. But the officer was convinced he had died in the months before our meeting. That is when the suicide attacks stopped417 He also details how the further into the Tribals he got, the area most targeted by strikes,

there was actually increasing support. In his words, “As the friendly policeman had explained,

these after all were people who had to live with the daily consequences of terrorism.”418 This

perception was further reinforced by Naheed Mutsafa, a reporter who found that “There is

certainly sympathy for the ordinary inhabitants of FATA who are caught up in the strikes. Over

the course of many interviews, I’ve never heard anyone doubt that civilians are killed when

Hellfire missiles come raining down. But there is a feeling that things are tough all over, and that

as the security situation has turned dire the trade-offs have naturally become starker.”419

This perception certainly contradicts the common narrative of drones being a needlessly

detrimental tool. Their support stems from the very pragmatic realization that unless, or until, the

416 Rob Crilly. 2016. “Why many people in Pakistan support American drone strikes.” Telegraph. 417 Crilly 2016 418 Ibid 419 Naheed Mustafa. 2013. “Drone Lands Dispatch: Letter from Pakistan.” Foreign Affairs

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underlying causes that spark terrorism can be better minimized or eradicated, it will always exist.

If the militant and terrorist threat does exist than there needs to be a solution to stop the

perpetrators. Drones serve that purpose. While perhaps not ideal, they are a tool in maintaining

or creating “some semblance of security in a restive region.”420 Compared to other options, such

as war, on the ground operations that put more people at risk, or leaving militants, insurgents,

and terrorists to their own devices, it is perhaps the least bad option.

Support is highest within the geographic areas most affected by strikes. While the

evidence in the former FATA is comparatively more anecdotal as people are unable, or unwilling

to talk to outsiders, and because foreigners are not allowed access, what evidence does exist has

largely been in support of their use.

Despite the popular narrative, there does seem to be a not inconsequential amount of

support for the drone program. Perhaps running counter to intuitive thought, it holds that

Pakistani citizens living in the major cities and closer to the capital, the more vocal the

opposition, whereas in the remote FATA, where the strikes are occurring, support is more

rampant. Regardless, citizens’ opinions do affect that political viability of working with the

United States either by fully cooperating with them, covertly supporting with intelligence or

logistical considerations, or outright impeding and opposing their involvement or use. Their

dynamic is further complicated by the lack of homogeneity among the American populous as

well.

6.3.3. Opposition in the United States

420 Mustafa 2013

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Contrary to Pakistan, where much of the opposition comes from civilians in the cities, in

the United States, the opposition is relatively limited among the entire general population. The

real opposition comes from scholars, journalists, and even some military personnel who express

concern or reticence over the program. The reality in the United States is that far removed from

seeing drones in use, the average citizen is only superficially aware of current events, and their

understanding of their country’s major foreign policy concerns id limited. Especially when it is

less publicized or accessible to them through mainstream media consumption than wars in

Afghanistan and Iraq. Rampant drone use in Pakistan was commonly in their shadow.

Scholars from the center for a New American Security published a report in which they

presented poll results showing over half of Americans cannot even identify a UAV. Fifty-four

percent were unable to correctly identify the MQ-1 Predator, while sixty-six percent could not

identify the MQ-9 Reaper.421 The public holds incorrect beliefs about the nature of drone

function and what their weapons capabilities are as,

60 percent believed UAVs are both more precise and more likely to launch air strikes than manned (not true); 64 percent believed UAVs can fly effectively in the same weather as manned aircraft (they cannot); and 67 percent believed that UAVs are more capable of survival in high threat environments (also not true). Finally, half (50 percent) of all respondents believed that UAVs are subject to different combat rules of engagement than manned aircraft (however, a majority did recognize correctly that use of UAVs and use of manned aircraft are both subject to the same laws governing armed conflict).422 These findings demonstrate the obvious conclusion that the majority of the average—

average meaning someone not in government or military who would automatically be more

familiar with the technology and its rule—American does not fully understand the program. It

also demonstrates, they argue, that the knowledge gaps influence misconceptions about how they

421 Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia Macdonald. 2016. “U.S. Public Support for Drone Strikes.” Center for a New American Security. 422 Schneider and Macdonald 2016.

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are used and regulated.423 This matters because the general public still showed reticence to their

use when the potential risk to civilian casualties was higher. Methodologically, Schneider and

Macdonald tested the US response to hypothetical scenarios that posited different risk levels

across five key attributes: risk to air crew, friendly ground troops, national security objective,

civilians, and risk of crisis escalation.424 They found that civilians are less willing to employ an

unmanned aircraft when a higher risk for civilians exists.425 This indicates that while there may

be a common narrative in that they are less risky for the operators, i.e. no one on the American

side is put at risk, and that is appealing, there is a prevailing belief that it is a potentially more

dangerous practice for those on the receiving end. How else does one account for a decreased

willingness to use them when the potential civilian casualty rate is higher except to say that

American support only really exists when it is targeting who they want to be targeted?

6.3.4. Support in the United States

Compared to Pakistan in the United States, there is more support for drone programs than

other options, i.e. deploying forces. Perhaps attributable to the fatigue of war post-Afghanistan

and Iraq, there is the recognition of an ongoing “Global War on Terror” that needs to be fought,

but no one has the appetite to continue sending their sons and daughters to war, and therefore

drones are a very appealing option for them. Examples of this support include a 2013 Gallup poll

where sixty-five percent of Americans agreed with the U.S. government’s decision to launch

drone strikes against terrorists overseas.426 A Fairleigh Dickinson University Public Mind poll

where seventy-five percent of respondents expressed their approval of the U.S. military’s use of

423 Ibid 424 Ibid 425 Ibid 426 Ibid

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drones to carry out attacks overseas on targets deemed a “threat to the United States”427 reiterates

this support.

Finally, in May 2015, a PEW public opinion poll reported that, “58 percent of U.S. adults

approved of the use of drones to carry out missile strikes against extremists in Pakistan, Yemen,

and Somalia.”428 Of all of the most comprehensive reports on American public opinion, the

support has been consistently more than the majority and has been pretty clear-cut in their

opinions. It is fair to say that the general population is unfamiliar with the drone program’s full

scope in Pakistan. Despite being less literate or educated than their American counterpart, the

average Pakistani citizen has a leg up in their understanding of the program because they are

living with its consequences. They see the militants and the civilians being killed and they have a

fuller picture of what is happening. The average American citizen, as the data suggests, only

knows a general idea. They cannot show them,429 do not understand the rules of engagement

(ROEs) for their use, and do not appreciate their technological capabilities and limitations.430

This means that while the majority do support them, it is a very abstract understanding. They

support them because they seem better than the alternative, not because they fully understand

what their use looks like in practice. That distinction works simply fine for a series of

governments who are keen to support their use worldwide.

427 Cohen, Grant M., "Origins of U.S. Public Opinion for Drone Strikes: The Intersection of Elite Rhetoric, Media Coverage, and American Public Opinion, 2000-2015" (2018). Open Access Dissertations. 2068. https://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/oa_dissertations/2068 PG 85 428 Cohen, Grant M., "Origins of U.S. Public Opinion for Drone Strikes: The Intersection of Elite Rhetoric, Media Coverage, and American Public Opinion, 2000-2015" (2018). Open Access Dissertations. 2068. https://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/oa_dissertations/2068 PAGE 90 429 U.S. Public Support for Drone Strikes When Do Americans Prefer Unmanned over Manned Platforms? By Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia Macdonald PAGE 2 430 Schneider and Julia Macdonald PAGE 2

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6.3.5 Why Public Opinion Matters and it Means for their Relationship

Overall, the political discord caused by their use has been detrimental to the health of

their relationship. Most significantly because the degree to which the respective governments

must appease their citizens, whose opinions have evolved, has been consequential for each

governments’ stance. Not only has change been precipitated by the evolution in military and

security needs and as the technological capability improved, but also because of political

pressure. This is evident in looking at trends in drone patterns. It is clear empirically that after

major gaffes or mistakes such as a 2006 strike in Chenegai, in the Bajaur area of Pakistan, which

killed an estimated eighty civilians at a madrasa and was promptly followed by a period of no

strikes for several months.431 Alternatively, a 2011 strike that killed nineteen people in Datta

Khel, North Waziristan, was followed by no strikes for a month, a long time period given that the

strike ended a period where it had been the ninth strike in only nine days from March 8th to 17th,

2011.432

These incidents were followed by a cessation of strikes for a period until backlash filtered

out of the news cycle which indicates the importance of perception and public support. Most

would agree that it is essential to the very foundation of democratic political systems that those

governing their respective countries heed their citizens’ demands. That includes military and

military action, as one cannot successfully engage in conflict if the public does not have the

appetite for it. This was noticeably clear in Afghanistan and Iraq when the American people

quite conclusively lost their appetite for a protracted war, and they eventually pulled out of the

countries still entangled in a mess. Consequently, needing to reflect, to varying degrees, the will

431 Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 2021. “Spreadsheet of Data.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 432 Bureau of Investigative Journalism Spreadsheet 2021

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of their people is vital to a well-functioning government. Of this, there is little doubt. It is,

however, not without consequence.

In the context of the relationship between Pakistan and the United States, it has been

negatively impacted by changing politics due to changing public support. The program has

needed to adapt and evolve, as all evolutions of war must, but in the case of drones, the program

has shifted quite significantly and in a brief period. Just recalling the trends, it went from nothing

to an explosion in only six years, stayed frequent for a few years, and then slowly started

dissipating again, all within a fifteen-year time span. This is reflective of its reactionary nature.

Since its creation in the late 1990s to fill void for better intelligence on bin Laden, it has been

used as a weapon in response to changing priorities, just as any other military weapon is. Its use

in Afghanistan within the theatre of war expanded out to Pakistan following those fleeing

militants to its even dispersal throughout the Middle East; it is reactionary.

Understanding this is important because it is clear that public opinion, particularly in the

United States, has a constraining role on public policy and political actors. as evident by the

“institutionalization of public opinion research organizations, associations, and quantitative-

minded employees specifically assigned with the responsibility to monitor public sentiment.”433

Whether or not one thinks the general public is knowledgeable and should have influence over

complicated foreign policy is one’s own decision to make, and to what extent value should be

placed on those opinions is another. However, it is clear that it does matter, and in the case of the

United States and Pakistan, it has meant public stances have changed. Support in the United

States has made it more palatable to continue using and even to expand its mandate. Opposition

433 Grant M. Cohen. 2018. "Origins of U.S. Public Opinion for Drone Strikes: The Intersection of Elite Rhetoric, Media Coverage, and American Public Opinion, 2000-2015." University of Miami.

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in the cities in Pakistan has made it a harder sell, particularly once their plausible deniability was

questioned after information began leaking regarding their behind-the-scenes consent and

support.

6.4. Drones Inspiring Radicalization?

Connected to the idea that there is a backlash among Pakistani citizens is the idea of

drone blowback. Socially much has been made of the idea that in Pakistan, and elsewhere,

drones are used, blowback is created whereby in seeking revenge or justice for a killed family

member or friend, people will radicalize and join the Taliban, al Qaeda, or someone else in order

to exact revenge. Conceptually it appears as plausible an explanation as any other. The notion

that witnessing the death of a loved one will spark the need for revenge or retribution is a

compelling narrative. It is a compelling idea that really speaks to the reality of casualties. Many

scholars, critics, and even those supporting drones speak to the importance of always remaining

cognizant that, while drones are a great tool for eliminating the danger inherent of having boots

on the ground, they are still a military weapon that causes death. While it may seem more like a

videogame at times than an act of war, it produces consequences as real as any bullet fired from

close range.

This was a concept supported by Andrew Exum and David Kilcullen, two prominent

American counterinsurgency experts, in their widely read research whereby they argue that

drones cause blowback because instead of mitigating terrorism, it instead leaves people scared,

vulnerable, and does not fix the problem. It can even inspire people to join the extremists out of a

sense of revenge for their lost friends and family members in extreme cases.434 For them “every

434 David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald Exum. 2009. “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below.” New York Times.

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one of these dead non-combatants represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and

more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have

increased.”435

Intricately linked to this theory is that in Pakistan, specifically the FATA regions ethical

code of Pashtunwali can also be a driving force after a strike. The logic is that the family

members of a victim are obligated to take revenge; however, Aqil Shah also disputes this idea.

He found “less than 15 percent of the respondents supported the revenge thesis. As many tribal

elders stressed to me, militants are motivated by a violent jihadi creed, not Pashtun customs

predating Islam.”436

While this blowback thesis was widely cited for years, there is emerging evidence that it

may be false or misguided. Most of the research into examining and testing this question of

whether drone strikes unintentionally induce people into radicalizing are based on anecdotal

evidence or from the examination of isolated case studies used to extrapolate broader data. While

there is merit in this methodological approach, and much can be gleaned from individual cases

where this hypothesis seems to have some credibility, the research does not support this

hypothesis when looking at a more comprehensive systemic analysis.

Empirically, there has been no conclusive evidence that has proven this narrative correct,

and in fact, there is more conclusive evidence disproving this notion. In particular, Aqil Shah’s

research is gaining widespread traction in contradicting Kilcullen and Exum’s conclusion and

instead argues that drone blowback is a myth, especially in Pakistan. Based on interviews he

conducted with “167 well-informed adults from North Waziristan Agency (NWA), the most

heavily targeted district in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), extensive

435 Kilcullen and McDonald Exum 2009 436 Aqil Shah. 2020. “Drone Blowback: Much Ado about Nothing?” Lawfare Brookings Institute.

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interviews with respected experts on terrorism, and an official Pakistani police survey of 500

detained terrorists from southern Sindh Province”437 he finds there is “no evidence of a direct

link between drones strikes and radicalization or the recruitment of militants, either locally or

nationally.”438

Shah also challenges the blowback thesis in finding that militancy is being provoked by

economic and religious grievances, not general anti-Americanism or anti-Americanism caused

by drone use.439 Moreover, in response to the direct question, “Why did you start thinking that

violence in the name of Islam was justified?”440 The responses were as follows: 41.4 percent

cited perceived Western opposition to Islam, 19.4 percent said lack of justice in society, 19.8

percent said personal experiences, and the final 19.4 percent was “other.”441 Even more telling is

that the responses to the question, “What ultimately drew you to join a terrorist/banned

outfit?”442 The answers were: forty-one percent from unemployment or economic concerns, forty

percent from religious concerns, and sixteen percent were psychological issues.443 Nowhere

amongst those responses were drones blamed.

Finally, Shah finds fault with the idea because “revenge cannot possibly explain suicide

attacks on shopping markets and public parks which invariably kill innocent civilians. And the

Taliban has assassinated hundreds of tribal leaders and others on the mere suspicion of spying

for the United States or the Pakistan military. If anything, the revenge motive should drive

437 Shah 2020 438 Ibid 439 Ibid 440 Ibid 441 Ibid 442 Ibid 443 Ibid

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people to target the Taliban to avenge the deaths of their loved ones rather than joining their

killers.”444

No one can conceivably or convincingly argue that drones are harmless, and no one is

claiming so. Like any other form of killing or warfare, they are traumatizing for loved ones and

mentally weigh on perpetrators. There is, however, a significant difference between drone

attacks causing negative psychological effects and being a cause of radicalization. This is one

regard where the social and political backlash has actually been overstated in the popular

narrative and where its impact on the relationship has consequently been rather limited.

6.5. Diplomatic Incidents

As has been made evident throughout the recurring theme, two central problems that

undermine a healthy US-Pakistan relationship. One, their dynamic is one-dimensional focused

exclusively on security and two, that said security interests’ clash.445 Consequently, problems of

this nature have a lower probability of being resolved diplomatically because security concerns

are always a very polarizing problem. As long as Washington and Islamabad have such

contrasting interests and objectives, and unless a complete departure occurs, which is unlikely,

there can be little hope of a meaningful change in their dynamic in this regard.

While the over seventy-year relationship between the United States and Pakistan since its

independence has had its’ share of diplomatic tension, there have been several key developments

in the last fifteen years. The previously discussed bin Laden raid was the military episode that in

many ways can be considered the defining moment where brewing tension between the allies

came to a head; it did not emerge in a vacuum. While the first few year’s post 9/11 and American

444 Ibid 445 Qazi 2012, 72

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involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan before the drone program really exploded were the

years when the partnership was its most united and interests most aligned, the cracks began to

emerge in the late 2000s when the drone program ramped up, and there were a series of incidents

that sparked tension, backlash, and protest.

A series of the six most compelling incidents of conflict or disagreement began to build

in the late 2000s to early 2010s. Several of these incidents resulted in Pakistan's decision to shut

down NATO access points into the country, but they all led to the rising tension. This growing

tension eventually came to a head in with a succession of three incidents in a narrow period: the

Raymond Davis incident in Lahore, the bin Laden raid, and the Salalah incident, all between

May and November 2011. The latter will be explored more thoroughly later in this chapter but

first, it is important to understand the place the smaller precipitating incidents have in their

dynamic devolution.

6.5.1 Gora Prai Airstrike

While there had been little skirmishes or incidents between the countries before, when the

relationship was a lot more united in those early post-9/11 years than it became, they had been

better able to withstand the pressure on their relationship. Cracks began to form, and tensions

began to rise as the drone program ramped up in the late 2000s and precipitated the first of the

so-called “border skirmishes” between the United States and Pakistan along the Pakistan-

Afghanistan border that resulted in the combined deaths of forty-two Pakistani personal and zero

American.

The first incident occurred on June 10th, 2008 when a US airstrike in Gora Prai, a border

checkpoint in the mountainous region along the Afghan-Pakistan border, resulted in eleven

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Pakistani paramilitary troops death.446 Located along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, Gora Prai

had been a hotbed of tension for decades as they warred over whose territory it is. It began with

Afghan troops allegedly trying to cross the frontier. Coalition forces then intervened, and the

United State launched an airstrike aimed at the Afghan militants. The airstrike missed its target

and hit the Pakistani troops manning the post, not the Afghani targets. Eleven soldiers were

killed, as were approximately fifteen Taliban militants located nearby.447

A senior Pakistani military official condemned the incident saying it was “completely

unprovoked and cowardly,”448 and had officially logged their protest with the Coalition. In

Afghanistan the US-led coalition referred these queries to the US embassy in Islamabad, who

then referred queries further to the Pentagon. The United States maintained they were acting in

self-defence against imminent attack from pro-Taliban militants.449

The strike was particularly opposed because it came during a time when even only half-

way through the year, there were already more than fifty Pakistanis killed by US strikes,450 and

there were rising tensions over sovereignty issues as the drone strikes prevalence steadily

increased. Rising tensions from US also exacerbated claims that Pakistan was not doing enough

to apply pressure on al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other militants in the area. So much so that Bruce

Riedel, a Brookings Institute senior analyst and former advisor to three US Presidents, said,

The timing is terrible. Just when the internal struggle in Pakistan to resolve (President Pervez) Musharraf's fate is coming to a head and our strained relations with the new rulers are very tense, we get a major incident on the border killing Pakistani soldiers. Whatever little pressure Pakistan has been putting on al-Qaeda is likely to get even smaller451

446 Associated Press. 2008. “Pakistani Soldiers Killed on Afghan Border.” ABC News. 447 Associated Press 2008 448 Associated Free Press. 2008. “Airstrike Threatens to Worsen US-Pak Ties.” The Daily Star. 449 BBC News. 2008. “US Releases Border Strike Footage.” BBC News. 450 BBC News 2008. 451 Associated Free Press 2008.

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Pakistan’s foreign secretary Salman Bashir, as per then US ambassador to Islamabad

Anne Patterson, is reputed to have said,

Pakistan strongly condemned the air attack on the Frontier Corps' border checkpoint at Gora Prai in Mohmand Agency by the Coalition Forces based in Afghanistan. The attack was unprovoked and a gross violation of the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan … The senseless use of airpower against a Pakistani border post by Coalition Forces is totally unacceptable. It constitutes a blatant and willful negation of the huge sacrifices that Pakistan has made in its endeavour to combat terrorism.452 These passages clearly articulate the forceful opposition and deep regret over the

incident. Regret over its outcome undoubtedly and regret for the consequences, albeit not

necessarily regret over the action since the coalition felt obligated to respond, the soldiers’ death

was a casualty of war, an accident, not intentional. The result, however, was the same and was

the first in the buildup of tension that had been unfolding.

6.5.2 Angoor Ada Raid

The second significant incident was the Angoor Ada raid on September 12th, 2008.

Occurring in Angoor Ada in South Waziristan, it marked the first time United States troops

fought a ground-based battle against the Taliban within Pakistani borders. This incident was

hugely controversial as many were in an uproar protesting the violation of Pakistani sovereignty.

After the hunt for bin Laden had gone (temporarily) cold intelligence led them to a minor

al-Qaeda facilitator. Carried out by DEVGRUs’ blue squadron453 in the early morning under

nightfall, Chinook helicopters provided cover and surveillance while forces attacked three

houses. While a swift operation lasting only thirty minutes, it yielded the death of some twenty

people, including women and children.454 Disputes over whether they were civilians or

452 Associated Free Press 2008. 453 Chris Martin. 2012. “The (Open) Secret History of SEAL Team Six (Part 6).” SOFREP 454 Martin 2012.

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combatants swiftly followed, and while the US never confirmed the identities or loyalties of

everyone involved, they considered it to have ultimately not yielded any high-value targets.455

The negative reaction within Pakistan was swift, with the government of Pakistan issuing a

statement saying that a strong protest by the Foreign Office has been lodged with the government

of the United States and that “such acts of aggression do not serve the common cause of fighting

terrorism and militancy in the area.”456 The next day, the Pakistani parliament passed a resolution

condemning the raid, calling for more oversight of American involvement in the country and

requiring Pakistani officials’ cooperation when all military covert operations occur.457 Two days

later, Pakistan blocked the major fuel route supplying the US and other NATO allies with access

into Afghanistan.458 In addition to fuel, most nonlethal supplies passed, including food, vehicles,

and water. More essential supplies, like weapons, ammunition, etcetera, were flown in, but the

less lethal but just as essential supplies traversed throughout Pakistan on a route from Karachi,

the major port south of the country, all the way into landlocked Afghanistan. In closing the route,

they exerted their leverage and power over the Americans, at least in this regard. 459

The detour now necessary through Central Asia was both more time-consuming and

expensive. It increased the logistical costs involved in “supplying their troops by a factor of 6, to

104 million U.S. dollars.” 460 The Lawara Mandi and Tanai incidents followed only days later on

the 21st and 25th of September 2008, respectively. Neither were major considerations as there

455 Ibid 456 Associated Press of Pakistan 2008. 457 Jane Perlez and Helene Cooper. 2010. “Signaling Tensions, Pakistan Shuts NATO Route.” The New York Times. 458 Nawaz 2009, 10 459 Perlez, and Cooper 2010 460 Karl Fischer and Ulrike Schultz. 2012. “THE USA AND PAKISTAN - A VOLATILE PARTNERSHIP.” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. 85

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were no casualties of any kind after helicopters flew into Pakistani airspace both times, but they

nonetheless occurred and were more incidents of border disputes that were ramping up.

6.5.3 Kurram Border Skirmish

On September 30th, 2010 was yet another incident where US helicopters entered Pakistani

airspace after a mortar attack by Pakistani militants was thought imminent.461 Members of

Pakistan's frontier corps who were on guard at the Mandata Kadaho border fired warning shots at

US helicopters after they crossed into their territory. When US helicopters reciprocated by

launching missiles it destroyed the post, killed three soldiers, and wounded three others.462 It was

the fourth strike by coalition forces in a week, though the first that was fatal. In response,

Pakistan again closed the NATO supply route into Afghanistan, this time for a period of eleven

days.463

This signified, even beyond the exertion of their leverage, that Pakistan had really

reached its threshold of “tolerance for intrusions on its sovereignty”464 and that receiving billions

of dollars of aid per annum was not enough to let the United States do as they pleased. 465 As

Pakistani interior minister, Rehman Malik expressed on the same day of the incident “We will

have to see whether we are allies or enemies.”466

6.5.4 Raymond Davis Killings in Lahore

461 Jane Perlez and Helene Cooper. 2010. “Signaling Tensions, Pakistan Shuts NATO Route.” The New York Times. 462 Perlez and Cooper. 2010. 463 Ibid 464 Ibid 465 Ibid 466 Ibid

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The next major contention source was a departure from military-centric events and

occurred on January 2nd, 2011, when Raymond Davis, a private CIA contractor, shot two

Pakistani citizens on their motorcycles trying to rob him in Lahore, Pakistan.467 He was initially

arrested and charged with the murders of them both and illegally possessing a firearm, but the

United States claimed diplomatic immunity and tried to get him released. Pakistan refused due to

the massive uproar from the public and their calls for his execution.468 After weeks of negotiation

he was finally released after the United States agreed to reimburse the victims’ families with

“blood money,” i.e. the Islamic Sharia law practice of repatriation after death.469 In their report

on the incident, Karl Fisher, and Ulrike Schultz wrote,

For the Pakistani intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Davis affair was an opportunity to thoroughly re-assess its cooperation with the CIA. Although there had always been a fair amount of mistrust between the two intelligence agencies, the ISI now felt that its distrust of the USA had been vindicated. Raymond Davis was clearly a member of an extensive network of agents that the CIA had built up in Pakistan on account of its growing doubts about Pakistani sincerity when it came to pursuing Taliban and al-Qaida leaders.470

For the ISI, there were fears according to one senior Pakistani intelligence official that,

“There are hundreds of CIA contracted spies operating it Pakistan without the knowledge of

either the Pakistan government or the intelligence agency.”471

In having had no idea he was there or what he was doing, “how many more Raymond

Davis are out there?”472 This event really marked the inception of an era where Pakistani

mistrust of Americans was reaching a crescendo. It consequently revealed just how rampant

American distrust of Pakistan had always been in having spies operating in their ally’s’

467 Fisher and Schultz 2012, 78 468 Fisher and Schultz 2012, 78 469 Ibid 78 470 Ibid 79 471 Associated Free Press. 2011. “Davis Row Creates Rift between ISI, CIA.” Geo News. 472 Associated Free Press 2011

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sovereign territory. That mistrust became known no more clearly in the history of their

relationship than it did just months later with the bin Laden raid.

Raymond Davis marked the first of the three most major incidents between the two that

informed the context of the most significant fractures, along with bin Laden and Salalah, which

will be outlined. They are the indicators that tensions were coming to a head.

The next event chronologically was the bin Laden raid. As discussed in chapter five,

Operation Neptune Spear was the epitome of mistrust and the deliberate withholding of

information to ensure Pakistan was kept in the dark for as long as possible. Its backlash was huge

in every way. It was an international media frenzy, an action heralded by many, vilified by the

rest, and enraging for the Pakistanis who were left humiliated by being either so untrustworthy

and corrupt that they knew he was there and did nothing, or so ignorant and naïve that they did

not know. Neither of which is a depiction they were interested in.

The first was the previously described bin Laden raid. Diplomatically it proved to be

quite a mess the United States had to clean up in the aftermath. The operation was a success

militarily as the target was eliminated and vast swaths of intelligence were collected. It was also

arguably the right decision strategically to not inform or involve the Pakistani’s as the result did

potentially prove that the end justified the means in this case. It was not, however, without

diplomatic fallout. The tension between governments ratcheted up considerably in its wake. As a

former Navy Seal commander who interviewed all those involved in the mission succinctly

described it, “within minutes after the last helicopter rumbled across the border back into

Afghanistan, the Pakistanis knew they’d been had. The government was convulsed first with

bewilderment, then embarrassment, and then rage.”473

473 Pfarrer 2011, 207

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As an outlet for this anger and to exact their own retribution, after the helicopter crash,

the Pakistani’s held an auction for countries to come to examine the remaining part of the

downed Razor 1. The winner was the Chinese, who were allowed to disassemble, photograph

and take material samples.474 Out of spite. the Pakistani’s also allowed the North Koreans and

the Iranians to look.475 Two weeks later, Senator John Kerry travelled to Islamabad “hat in

hand”476 to ask for the helicopter’s return.

6.5.5 Datta Khel Incident

The penultimate incident was only weeks after bin Laden's death and all the controversy

surrounding that. On May 17th, 2011, in Datta Khel there was another skirmish between US

helicopters and Pakistani forces. NATO claimed that an American base along the Afghanistan-

Pakistan border took a hit from Pakistan’s indirect fire coming.477 Resultantly US helicopters

flew into the area where they exchanged fire with Pakistani forces on the ground. Conversely,

Pakistan claimed that a UAV breached its airspace to launch a strike at a jirga site, a traditional

community meeting that arranges to resolve disputes.478 While there was an agreement in place

that granted the United States the rights to fly up to six kilometres into Pakistan if they were in

pursuit of Taliban fighters attacking in Afghanistan who then fled into Pakistan,479 that would

have played into the American version of events. For Pakistan, there was anger over the fact that

only ten days prior, they had granted permission for the jirga to convene ,and the US killed the

attendants, forty-three civilians in total.480 While the NATO supply routes were not closed in this

474 Pfarrer 2011, 207 475 Ibid 207 476 Ibid 207 477 “Drone Strikes on a Jirga in Datta Khel.” 2018. Forensic Architecture. University of London. 478 Drone Strikes on a Jirga in Datta Khel 2018 479 Bill Roggio. 2010. “Another US Hot Pursuit Action in Pakistan?” FDD's Long War Journal. 480 Drone Strikes on a Jirga in Datta Khel 2018

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instance, it was yet another occasion where Pakistan felt their sovereignty was infringed upon,

and tensions were at a boiling point after having another sovereignty dispute so immediately on

the heels of that very complaint from the bin Laden raid.

6.5.6 Salalah Incident

The final most significant diplomatic blunder was the Salalah incident that occurred on

November 26th, 2011. Resulting in the deaths of twenty-four Pakistani soldiers, this was an

incident wherein NATO forces opened fire at two Pakistani border checkpoints along the border

with Afghanistan. Both sides have conflicting stories about what happened. The Americans and

Afghans say they were under fire from the checkpoint ,and their actions were therefore

defensive. Pakistan, however, said it was unprovoked and that it was the NATO side that fired

first for no reason and that it was done intentionally and in a premeditated fashion.

Indisputably, two helicopter air strikes481 were launched against military posts in Salalah,

a village in the Mohmand tribal region that borders Kunar Province in Afghanistan,482 that were

said to be in response to “consistent shelling on the Pakistani check post.”483 Immediately after,

Pakistan closed major border crossings that served as access routes for NATO supplies to

Afghanistan484 and ordered the CIA to remove the UAV operations it ran out of Shamsi Air Base

in the western part of the country.485A senior Pakistani military official who spoke on the

481 Firdous Iftikhar. 2011. “24 soldiers killed in NATO attack on Pakistan check post.” The Express Tribune. 482 Salman Masood and Eric Schmidt. 2011. “Tensions Flare Between U.S. and Pakistan After Strike.” New York Times. 483 Iftikhar 2011 484 Ahmed 2012, 2 485 Masood and Schmidt 2011

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condition of anonymity said, "The latest attack by NATO forces on our post will have serious

repercussions as they without any reasons attacked on our post and killed soldiers asleep."486

There was a full investigation promised by the Obama administration into the friendly

fire incident, the deadliest up to that point. However, Jon Boone, a journalist specializing in

writing on Afghanistan and Pakistan, wrote, “Whatever the outcome of investigations, the

incident is likely to do yet more damage to the critical relationship between the US and Pakistan.

The partnership between the two countries has been repeatedly battered in the past year, first by

the jailing of a CIA contractor and then by US special forces who raided deep inside Pakistani

territory and killed Osama bin Laden.”487

The United States also ceased all drone strikes for the two months following the incident.

The closure of supply routes was a significant hindrance for the United States as having to go

through alternate routes in the Northern Distribution Network, also known as Russia,

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, was lengthy, inefficient, and significantly more

expensive. The reaction was so fervent because Pakistan felt like they could no longer rely on

their ally to respect such fundamental principles as their sovereignty, nor have active spies

killing their citizens, nor have the dignity of being forewarned of military operations. The United

States felt their ally was undermining not just their efforts in their own country but their actual

war efforts in an ongoing and dangerous war next door that saw far too many people killed and

wounded. Going as far as to block a major access point that was easing that war effort-an act

about as undermining as possible, was difficult for them to accept. Every time the supply route

closed, they relied on diplomatic intervention to get it reopened. It spurned renewed efforts to try

486 Jasmine Coleman. 2011. “Pakistan Halts NATO Supplies after Attack Leaves Soldiers Dead.” The Guardian. 487 Jon Boone. 2011. “NATO Air Attack on Pakistani Troops Was Self-Defence, Says Senior Western Official.” The Guardian.

168

and decrease logistical dependency on Pakistan. It was and is a challenging task because there is

nowhere else workable to go.488

It was not until then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton formally apologized on July 3rd,

2012, after Salalah, that Pakistan reopened the supply routes. This was a major diplomatic

powerplay, and in forcing the United States into making a public apology, it was a powerful

statement of the diplomatic pressure Pakistan can still exert despite being the comparatively less

politically powerful country. It also showed the power that diplomacy could have as American

officials credited Secretary of State Clintons' relationship with Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina

Rabbani Khar as playing a significant role in Pakistan accepting the apology. While the events in

Salalah were not of drones’ making, it was a consequential action that affected drones, as there

was a cessation of strikes in the months that followed, and it most certainly strained their

diplomatic ties. It is not a course of action the Pakistani have chosen to take often, but this

handful of incidents prove that it is not unprecedented.

These diplomatic tactics were not options taken often before this period in part because

there was little need. While there were drone strikes and military actions undertaken by the

United States within their borders that Pakistan disagreed with or did not support, they still had

plausible deniability on their side, which meant it could all be swept under the rug.

The triple combination of Lahore, Salalah, and bin Laden changed this as it brought an

overwhelming amount of ill will and for most negated any good that the United States had done

for them previously or was doing currently. While the details of these three events all differ

enormously, their commonality lies in their negative impact on the relationship. While they are

not about drones directly, it has nonetheless had an impact on drones because in causing what

488 Perlez and Cooper. 2010. “Signaling Tensions, Pakistan Shuts NATO Route.” The New York Times.

169

has so far proven to be irreparable damage to their relationship, everything circles back to their

one unitor. This is because drones, as has already been reiterated numerous times, has been one

of the few points that has brought them together over the last decade. It has not brought them

together in the sense that they have agreed on the program and been united by its purpose but

rather brought them together because it was one of the few points of overlap generally. If the

countries were not forced to work together to facilitate the ongoing war in Afghanistan that was

keeping them in Pakistan’s backyard and fighting an enemy militant force that was still operating

transnationally than it would have likely dissolved beyond repair in the wake of the weight of

those incidents and the constant border disputes. During that same period in 2011 there were

“102 "close-border" attacks against three U.S. outposts in Pakistan since May, compared to 13

such incidents during the same period last year.”489

Since then, the relationship remained strained. It was in series of meetings between July

21st and 23rd, 2019, Prime Minister Imran Khan met with President Donald Trump to discuss the

state of their country’s partnership. What came out of this meeting was an agreement to reset the

relationship. How that will unfold remain to be seen, but it demonstrates the enduring

recognition of the importance of the partnership. The effort to bolster and better a more

beneficial, peaceful bilateral partnership endures, and as long as that effort continues, there

remains hope for that dream to become a reality. Realistically there is a lot of tension, mistrust,

misinformation, displeasure, and competing interests all threatening that. How that unfolds and

the role drones may play in exacerbating those tensions or being a tool for increased unification

is still uncertain. The history of their relationship and its ebbs and flows over changes and

different iterations in the drone program’s evolution has shown that they do have a role.

489 2011. "Cross-Border Attacks from Pakistan on the Rise - US." Dow Jones Institutional News

170

Today, in 2021, the future of their diplomatic relationship, especially concerning drones,

is still uncertain. In part because on March 6th, 2019, President Donald Trump signed Executive

Order 13862, which revoked the previous requirement that drone casualty figures be publicly

disclosed.490 Under President Obama’s previous Executive Order 13732 that was signed on July

1st, 2016, it became required that the Director of National Intelligence or someone else the

President designates, disclose an “unclassified summary of the number of strikes undertaken by

the United States Government against terrorist targets outside areas of active hostilities, as well

as assessments of combatant and non-combatant deaths resulting from those strikes, among other

information.”491 The creation of this new order trumps the old one’s progress, which was

implemented because it was one of the changes many called for both in the United States and

Pakistan. Many argued that if the program became more transparent fewer would or could find

fault in its targeting capabilities.

This decision may prove to be a diplomatic nightmare as its creation was to appease a

major source of backlash and tension between the two countries. The rationale was that if figures

were disclosed, then Americans could be confident that their government was being as deliberate

and methodical in their killing as possible. As a side benefit, Pakistan’s sacrifice in the drone

campaign, the thirty thousand civilian casualties and five thousand armed forces casualties,492

would be recognized and validated. The recognition and validation of the identity of the

casualties they experienced in the name of peace, security, and the eradication of terrorists and

militants within their border went a long way diplomatically or at least could be politically spun

to go a long way to treating Pakistan as a partner in the drone campaign, not a casualty of it.

490 Executive Office of the President. 2019. “Executive Order 13862 of March 6, 2019 Revocation of Reporting Requirement.” National Archives. 491 Executive Office of the President 2019 492 Gilani 2011

171

Declassified reporting also makes it harder for militants and terrorists to mould claims of

inflated death, strikes occurrences, the US overstepping of bounds or really anything that would

suit their agenda into provoking a reaction or enacting sympathy from portraying the United

States as an infidel foreign power out to kill Muslims. When no one is publicly disputing the real

figures, any group can curate any narrative for their own purposes. Time will come to tell what,

if any, fallout comes from this decision to reverse progress, but it does set the stage for their

partnership to be tested yet again. Intention for peaceful cooperation is a long way from its actual

realization, but it is better than the alternative. The 2019 reaffirmations of the importance of this

fragile bilateral interstate by both sides is an encouraging step and the best thing for them both

and for the broader status of the international security of states. Two nuclear powers on good

terms are always for the best, for everyone, no exceptions.

One of the most exciting insights in examining the social consequences of the program is

revealing the deep divide among the level of support between those in Pakistan who reside in or

near the capital city and the more ISI and government influenced areas, and the former FATA.

This distinction in support magnifies the domestic civil state dynamic and broadens the inter-

state dynamic between the United States and Pakistan. The difference in support is consequential

because the lack of homogeneity in their support levels means there is a conflicting message

regarding cooperation on that bilateral partnership. The drone program fundamentally could not

have succeeded without that human intelligence provided by those living in the tribal areas, and

therefore, that support was crucial. Socially this meant that there needed to be a certain level of

support for the program even to occur. Without that support and intelligence provided to the

United States, they would have had to rely on their own human intelligence or other resources in

the former tribal areas. Whether that took the form of special operations missions or intelligence

172

operatives working in the region, etcetera had that been a viable option; the drone program

would need not exist in the first place. They were not, however, viable options for many of the

reasons discussed in chapter three. Therefore, the support of some in Pakistan and the ignorance

of the program's existence by others have shown how crucial it was for the program's

development and expansion. As opposition grew, the program's viability dwindled and showed

the impact that the social dynamic had on the relationship.

Politically at the inter-state level, this chapter highlights the vulnerability of the

partnership. The lack of trust that has hallmarked their relationship for so long was only

exacerbated as the drone program was introduced and further crumbled to the point of nearly

being unrecoverable after the bin Laden raid in 2011 as well as the other primary military and

political considerations of the time including the series of border incidents previously discussed.

Conversely, diplomatically these border disputes have demonstrated that there was some limited

benefit that the drone program provided. The instances of diplomacy having succeeded after

these border incidents were viable because the drone program held the relationship together long

enough for diplomacy to work. Essentially, there was enough common interest centred around

their military interaction and apparatus that the relationship did not crumble immediately. That is

because of, as mentioned earlier, efforts to boost the military and intelligence apparatus that the

drone program needed to exist and, in turn, created.

Ultimately, all of this revealed that on political, social, and diplomatic merits, while there

were periods that they contributed with limited success to the betterment of their relationship

overall, it was detrimental. Any pursuits of a more encompassing or fulsome relationship

extending beyond these security interests were negatively impacted by the program's social and

political consequences. If the drone program is to expand going forward either with a resurgence

173

within Pakistan itself or in its emergence in new operating theatres, their use needs to be

calibrated carefully in walking that fine line between military intentions and political and social

fallout. Pakistan and the United States have demonstrated this need for careful calibration as the

program has drifted off into near obscurity in 2021 and as the relationship is once again, in a

very fragile place.

174

Conclusion: Where Does This Leave the Relationship?

In responding to the question initially posed, this thesis has tried to supply an answer on

how the emergence of militarized unmanned aerial vehicles used by the United States in Pakistan

has affected their partnership and the regulation of their use. It has done so by examining the

legal, military, political, diplomatic, and social consequences in proving that the United States

drone program in Pakistan has left an indelible mark on many facets of the health and vitality of

the bilateral relationship between the two countries.

Before understanding how the drone program changed the relationship, we first needed to

understand what the relationship looked like prior. In exploring the history of their relationship,

two major trends became clear. Firstly, their relationship has been nearly exclusively security-

centric to the detriment of their economic, humanitarian, political, and technological potential,

and two, their security interests often clash. Essentially, the only factor strong enough to unify

their interests is also their biggest source of tension. This competing tension forms the basis of

everything and undercuts every aspect of their dynamic.

Militarily the program has been more successful than it has in other facets as it met its

goals of improving intelligence cooperation, eliminating high-value targets, and being better

equipped to prevent future terrorist and/or insurgent attacks. While not without its own obstacles,

as the War in Afghanistan and Operation Neptune Spear proved, it was still a unifying factor in

their relationship. In fact, the launch of the war in Afghanistan and the mission to hunt bin Laden

and his compatriots in the first place that brought the two countries together again after the 1990s

brought sanctions and cessation of cooperation. The drone program and the clandestine

cooperation during the early years of the program brought a level of military and intelligence

cooperation that was not seen in an exceedingly long time. However, it is in all other regards

175

where the drone program has been more detrimental than not on the prospects of health and

longevity of any American-Pakistani partnership.

The legal, political, diplomatic, and social consequences have been detrimental to their

bilateral relationship as it has left their relationship in a state of flux and left more questions than

answers as to the potential future trajectories of their partnership. Uncertainty about the

programs’ legality as it concerns state sovereignty, right to self-defence, laws of asymmetry in

that it is inherently an asymmetrical fight, and the most important, whether the United States can

assassinate foreign nationals. Questions surrounding the legality of the program are important for

their relationship because it has been one of the most common sources of criticism, that they do

not have the right to interfere, or are overstepping their bounds. Some with the Pakistani

government and ISI have made claims about it being illegal and wanting the program to stop.

The unresolved legal questions have been detrimental to their collaborative efforts because the

undefined parameters and grey area of operation make running the program unclear and divisive.

The wedge has been driven further by the political, diplomatic, and social considerations

analyzed next. The contrasting opinions on supporting or opposing drones that exist in both

countries, and the advent of the blowback thesis have placed stress on each country individually

and thus on the pair. This analysis gave way to two principal conclusions. The first is that despite

its military success, the drone program’s political, diplomatic and social ramifications were more

detrimental to their prospects for a better, more comprehensive relationship. The backlash from

the Pakistani government, military, and citizens over various concerns in the wake of the border

skirmishes in the late 2000s and early 2010s and isolated drone strikes went wrong including the

2006 strike that killed eighty people at a madrasa in North Waziristan. These were various

incidents that challenged their cooperative nature and caused dissension from the government

176

over repeated claims the United States violated their sovereignty. From the military who opposes

being made to feel more like a US government tool than a powerful entity in their state; and from

a populous who expressed increasing concern and outrage that their own government and

military were not properly protecting them from the threats that the United States thinks exists in

their country. This growing opposition which came to a head with the triple whammy of CIA

contractor Raymond Davis murdering two Pakistani citizens, the bin Laden raid, and the Salalah

incident, brought the relationship to a near breaking point. Despite not being drone incidents,

they were, it was argued, saved by drones.

This leads to the second major conclusion; that drones, despite doing little to improve

their relationship beyond an initial couple of years when it worked very well, were able to unite

them at a time when the damage may have otherwise been irreparable. While it may not be as

quantifiable or tangible as legally or militarily, it is nonetheless valued. The overriding theory on

whether drones have ultimately been “good” or “bad” is a tough question as it is not easily

classifiable nor quantifiable in either polarizing category, but rather it exists more in the middle.

There has been significant fallout, especially politically and legally, from drone use. For

some, that outweighs the military benefit. I argue that while the negative consequences are

crucial to understand and work needs to be done to reduce said fallout to best ensure the

program’s longevity and the bilateral relationship, ultimately, the military benefit is the most

important thing at this juncture for both the United States and Pakistan. For the United States, the

preeminent concern is that even with the Iraq war having finally ended and their role in

Afghanistan decreased into more of an advisory role with fewer troops deployed their military is

still stretched and their government tied up. Iraq, Syria, North Korea, Russia, its own political

situation with a pandemic, deep division, racial inequality, and a host of other pressing issues has

177

their resources tied up in other matters, and the ease of the burden drones have provided in a

country where it would like not to have to be, has helped. For Pakistan, the military

considerations are also still the most important because if they ever want full control of their

country back, and the United States gone, then the program needs to have succeeded in its goal,

at least as much as possible, to seriously impede militant’s opportunity to live in the country

peacefully.

Throughout the history of their relationship, it has long been a one-dimensional

partnership focused on security. While ideally, they would branch out to maximize the potential

of a full-fledge military, economic, political, technological, and diplomatic partnership, the

reality as it exists today is that they are not in that place yet. Some measure of a cooperative

relationship is better than no relationship when it concerns two powerful nuclear states.

Where one falls on assessing whether it has been a good thing or not is ultimately a

matter of opinion based on where priorities lay. If military strategy and security are the number

one priority and aim of their relationship, one would probably agree it has been a source for

good. If one prioritizes the expansion of their dynamic to include a more political, economic, or

humanitarian partnership, then it has failed spectacularly. It is fair to say that ideally, the

relationship needs to expand their points of common interest beyond militant and terrorist

eradication if there is any hope for a good, stable partnership going forward. Nevertheless,

twenty years ago before 9/11, their relationship had dissolved into nothing but antagonism, and

so where it sits today, while still flawed, is better than it was and that in large part is because of

the military success of drones and their ability to come together for the bigger fight.

The result of nearly twenty years of military operations, drones included, targeting

terrorists, insurgents, and militants in their borders have left Pakistan a much more secure

178

country than it was. Al Qaeda’s presence has been largely eradicated from the country; the

Taliban’s power has been mitigated. Deaths attributable to terrorism are declining once again,

with civilian death rates having decreased by a staggering eighty percent in the last five years.493

The Pakistani military is better trained and has better resources after two decades of increased

counterterrorism funding. What this may translate to in the future, however, is less clear.

The late 2018 reintegration of the region formerly known as the Federally Administered

Tribal Areas into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province could lay the foundation for meaningful

change looking to the future. This shift removes some of the political, diplomatic, and legal

quandaries that existed through the duration of their partnership as the region will come to follow

the same laws, regulations, and political leadership as the rest of the country. It is too soon to

know if this change will manifest into any actual change within Pakistan itself, and thereby if

there is any possibility for it to change things within their relationship with the United States.

However, being such a drastic departure from how the region has functioned historically,

it does raise the possibility that a shift may occur. The region’s reintegration into the rest of the

country does arguably have the hallmarks of having the potential to be one of the biggest

changes in dynamic since the drone program started there in 2004 since the FATA was the area

militants were near exclusively hiding in and operating out of. It could change the proverbial

game in Pakistan and between the United States and Pakistan with different rules in place.

Conversely, it could also prove to be nothing more than a footnote in national Pakistani

political history if is not used as a catalyst for change. History will come to show which path was

taken and whether things change with the US. As their dynamic exists today, drones have left an

indelible mark. With great military success came division elsewhere and leaves behind a legacy

493 Gul 2018

179

of difficult normative precedent the international community may have to grapple with as the

technology further proliferates and the number of actors who both employ it and are subject to it

expands right along with it. There is no disputing that the technology few in Langley believed in

has taken the world by storm and has brought two tense allies back into the fold, and that is a

win.

180

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