As French as Anyone Else: Islam and the North African Second Generation in France

As French as Anyone Else: Islam andthe North African Second Generationin France

Jean BeamanPurdue University

Amid growing Islamophobia throughout Europe, Muslims in Francehave been described as “ethnoracial outsiders” (Bleich 2006, 3–7)and framed as a cultural challenge to the identity of the Frenchrepublic. Based on ethnographic research of 45 middle class adultchildren of North African, or Maghr�ebin, immigrants, I focus onthe actual religious practices of this segment of the French Muslimpopulation, the symbolic boundaries around those practices, and therelationship between how middle class, North African second-generation immigrants understand their marginalization within main-stream society and how they frame their religiosity to respond tothis marginalization. How respondents frame their practices revealstheir allegiance with the tenets of French Republicanism and la€ıcit�eas well as shows how Muslim religious practices are being accommo-dated to the French context. This religiosity is not a barrier toasserting a French identity. Individuals frame their religious practicesin ways that suggest they see themselves as just as French as anyoneelse.

France has the largest concentration of Muslims in Europe today (Harg-reaves, Kelsay, and Twiss 2007). Muslims are estimated to be about 6–8 percent of France’s total population (including immigrants and thoseborn in France); the majority of them being of Maghr�ebin origin (Gray

This research was supported by funding from the European University Institute Max

Weber Programme and the Duke University Research Network on Racial and EthnicInequality. A very early version of this manuscript was presented at the Research andAnalysis in the Sociology of Religion workshop at the University of Notre Dame. I thank

participants for their feedback. For their helpful comments and suggestions, I especiallythank Japonica Brown-Saracino, Marcus Anthony Hunter, and Lyn Spillman. I also sin-cerely thank my respondents for their generosity and participation. All errors are my own.

[Minor typographical changes have been made to this article since it was first published.]

© 2015 by the Center for Migration Studies of New York. All rights reserved.DOI: 10.1111/imre.12184

IMR Volume 50 Number 1 (Spring 2016):41–69 41

2008; d’Appolonia 2009).1 Islam in France has long been a topic of bothscholarly and popular attention, particularly addressing the perceived lackof integration of French Muslims into mainstream society (Bleich 2006,2009; Fernando 2005; de Galembert 2005; Gaspard and Khosrokhavar1995; Kastoryano 2004; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). The 2004 lawbanning “conspicuous religious symbols” in public schools and the debateover the Islamic headscarf, or hijab, is just one example of the concernsabout French Muslims and how they seemingly threaten the identity ofthe republic (Bowen 2004b; Fernando 2005; Kastoryano 2004; Killian2007; Silverstein 2004a).

How Islam operates in France is situated within a larger context ofIslamophobia in France and throughout much of Western Europe (Bleich2009; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). In a society hesitant to openlyacknowledge race and ethnicity as meaningful categories, religion distin-guishes inclusion versus exclusion (Scott 2007). French and North Afri-can, or Maghr�ebin, are often placed on opposing ends of anethnonational identity continuum in larger society, and being French andMuslim are therefore seen as incongruent (Kastoryano 2002). Regardlessof the degree to which they personally identify as Muslim, Maghr�ebin-ori-gin individuals are often categorized as Muslim in media and popular cul-ture at least partially because Islam is the major religion of the Maghreb(Alba and Silberman 2002; Hargreaves, Kelsay, and Twiss 2007; Brubaker2013). That Islam is stigmatized in France (Bleich 2006) further compli-cates how North African-origin individuals negotiate their religious identi-ties (Babes 1995).

In this article, I illustrate how these processes of identity construc-tion occur in the wake of such stigma. I offer a more comprehensive con-ception of what being Muslim in France means to a segment of thesecond-generation population — middle class adults of North African ori-gin. Based on ethnographic research and interviews with 45 middle classsecond-generation North African immigrants, I focus on the actual prac-tices of French Muslims, how they frame their religion, and — perhapsmost importantly — how these framings reflect their understanding ofboth French Republican society and their social location within it. Specifi-cally, I address the following questions: How do the negotiations involved

1Due to French law prohibiting distinguishing French citizens based on faith, statistics onreligious identification and Islam are scarce and somewhat inconsistent (Bowen 2004a;

Laurence 2001; Laurence and Vaisse 2006).

42 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW

in individuals’ religious identities, and the boundary work they do as partof these negotiations, reflect how they locate themselves in French society?How are individuals adapting Islam to the French context? How do theyinterpret the stigma related to being Muslim in France? Middle class adultchildren of North African immigrants, those individuals who are upwardlymobile compared to their immigrant parents, well-educated, and holdprofessional types of employment, are perhaps the best reflection ofFrench Republicanism’s successes and limitations. By focusing on thesymbolic boundaries (Lamont and Molnar 2002) that these individualsdraw regarding their Muslim religiosity, I show how they situate them-selves as similar to other French citizens. In other words, how they asserttheir Muslim religiosity is one way they respond to and combat their mar-ginalized place in mainstream society.

Religion is one domain where immigrant groups negotiate their rela-tionship to wider society (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Connor and Koenig2013; Zolberg and Woon 1999). For Maghr�ebin immigrants, a Muslimidentity was often a crucial tool in their struggle against French colonial-ism (Cesari 2002). Less is known about how children of these immi-grants, who face their own challenges navigating between their parents’country of origin and French society, have inherited this legacy.

Previous research on second-generation immigrant religiosity (Cesari2002; Chen and Jeung 2012; Ramadan 2002; Voas and Fleischmann2012) has focused on the connection between and relative salience of eth-nic identity and religious identity. I intervene in this debate by showinghow their religiosity allows them to respond to marginalization regardingtheir Maghr�ebin ethnic origin and Muslim identification. I therefore con-sider how individual religiosity and identity are constructed, adapted, andinfluenced by the French context (Roy 1994; Bowen 2004a,b, 2009; Fer-nando 2005; Gray 2008). I argue that respondents frame their religiosityin ways that allow them to agentically respond to their marginalizationand legitimate their inclusion within mainstream French society. Themiddle class segment of the North African second generation often posi-tions their religious identities in ways that correspond to the tenets ofFrench Republicanism. Namely, they frame their religiosity as a personaland private matter. That respondents are choosing a more privatizedexpression of their religious identity reveals how Islam is being adapted oraccommodated to the French context. Examining how respondents con-ceptualize their religious practices reveals how French this populationreally sees themselves. As Europe debates multiculturalism and immigrant

AS FRENCH AS ANYONE ELSE 43

incorporation, considering how religiosity factors into the socioculturalrealities of residents in these societies is crucial (Joppke 2009).

In what follows, I provide a brief background of the North African-origin population and Islam in France. I then discuss the methodology andthe conceptual framework of this study, including how this challenges andcontributes to existing research on the second generation in Europe, religi-osity, and Islam. I then discuss the variation in religious identification andpractices among my respondents, and how this relates to their experiencesof marginalization. I then address the boundary work of my respondentsand how they negotiate their religiosity to fit within Republican society. Iconclude by discussing the implications of my findings for second-genera-tion immigrant religiosity, symbolic boundaries, and social exclusion.

BACKGROUND

Any discussion of how religion is practiced in France must include a dis-cussion of la€ıcit�e and Republicanism. La€ıcit�e is a component of FrenchRepublicanism and the French term for the separation of church and state(Gunn 2004). Established by law in 1905, it withdrew state official recog-nition and financial support from religions while also guaranteeing citizensthe right to form private religious associations (Laurence 2001; Scott2007). The French state cannot promote any particular religion and indi-viduals are encouraged to keep their religious affiliations to themselves(Bowen 2004a).2 Religious expression is supposed to be confined to thehome and places of worship. Because of France’s emphasis on la€ıcit�e , thedistinction between public versus private spheres in terms of how religionis practiced becomes more meaningful than it might be in other societies.Under the Republican model, citizens are supposed to interact with thestate as citizens and not as members of any particular group. DespiteFrance’s emphasis on la€ıcit�e and the division between church and state,Christianity has factored significantly in the development of FrenchRepublicanism and French identity more generally (Gray 2008). However,as Auslander (2000) notes: “The everyday signs of religious adherenceto Christianity or Judaism have not been understood to threaten the

2Over the years, several exceptions to this rule have been made allowing the French stateto, among other things, subsidize private religious schools and the building of mosques,recognize Christian holidays, and create Muslim state organizations (Bowen 2006; de Gal-

embert 2005; Killian 2007; Laurence 2001).


foundations of the French nation because they are not associated withimmigration (or racial difference)” (2000, 291).

The same, however, has not been true for Islam (Bleich 2009). Inother words, Islam is framed as dangerous to the French republic becauseof its association with immigration. The majority of French Muslims(franc�ais de confession musulmane) originated from France’s relationshipwith Maghreb through the colonialism of Algeria in 1830, of Tunisia in1881, and of Morocco in 1912. Algeria would remain in French controluntil 1962 and Tunisia and Morocco, until 1956 (Laurence 2001).Though emigration from the Maghreb to France began as early as theearly 1900s, World War I brought immigrants from these colonies enmasse to France for work. These immigrants, who were expected to onlybe temporary residents, often settled in the outlying banlieues, or suburbs,of major cities because of the presence of cheaper housing and factoryemployment. The number of Maghr�ebin immigrants continued toincrease with World War II, the end of France’s Fourth Republic in1958, and the Algerian War of Independence in 1962. Due to an eco-nomic recession and declining employment opportunities, France tempo-rarily suspended immigration of non-European workers in 1974. This ledto migrant workers settling permanently with their families in France asopposed to returning to their home countries (Body-Gendrot 1993).According to the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Eco-nomiques (INSEE), which conducts the French census, more than half ofthe immigrants who arrived before 1974 came for employment-relatedreasons; and another one-third came to join their husbands or family. Sec-ond-generation North African immigrants descended primarily from thispopulation (Silberman, Alba, and Fournier 2007). The growing attentionpaid to immigrants is not due to numbers, as the actual number of immi-grants has remained relatively constant since 1930, but rather due tochanging demographic composition as presently more immigrants arefrom former North African colonies than from other regions. As of 1999,about 26 percent of second-generation immigrants are of Maghr�ebin ori-gin.3 Specifically, about 14 percent are of Algerian origin, 9 percent areof Moroccan origin, and 4 percent are of Tunisian origin (Tribalat 2004).

3There is a paucity of data on second-generation North African immigrants because theFrench census does not count racial or ethnic origin of those born in France. The availabledata combines individual country of birth with parent country of birth (see Meurs, Pailhe,

and Simon 2006; Simon 2003; Tribalat 2004).


Existing research on the North African second-generation focuseslargely on inherited disadvantage from the first generation, particularly onspecific outcomes including educational attainment and employment pros-pects (Simon 2003), and disparities vis-�a-vis “whites”4 (Heath, Rothon,and Kilpi 2008; Lombardo and Pujol 2011; Penn and Lambert 2009; Sil-berman, Alba, and Fournier 2007). In addition, discrimination againstand exclusion of North African-origin individuals has been documented,most recently in the 2009 study, Trajectoires et Origines, which found amismatch between feeling French and having one’s Frenchness denied byothers (Simon 2012). Simon (2003) identified three possible social mobil-ity paths for the second generation: “a reproduction of the positions ofthe first generation; a successful social mobility through education; or amobility hindered by discrimination” (2003, 1091). As of 2003, about15 percent of second-generation North African immigrant men and about23 percent of second-generation North African immigrant women holdsalaried jobs. I focus on the segment of the North African second-genera-tion population, who have achieved upward social mobility as evidencedby their educational and employment outcomes.

A few recent studies have shed light on the religious practices ofFrench Muslims across generations, which correspond with the findingspresented here on middle class second-generation French Muslims. As of2007, 33 percent of people from Muslim-origin families are believing andpracticing Muslims and 38 percent are believing Muslims. In terms ofpractices, 61 percent of French Muslims pray every day; 23 percent attendmosque every Friday; 70 percent fast during Ramadan; and 62 percentonly consume meat that is halal. Praying daily and going to the mosqueon Fridays are the most discriminating distinctions between believing andpracticing Muslims (Institut Franc�ais d’Opinion Publique 2009). A 2001report of the High Council of Integration distinguished between being“of Muslim culture” and “of Muslim religion” based on how often Mus-lims pray in mosques; they estimate that there are about one millionMuslims “of Muslim religion” and about three million Muslims “of Mus-lim culture” (Haut Conseil �a l’int�egration 2001; Bowen 2004b). In termsof second-generation immigrants, as of 1999, about 18 percent attendmosque regularly, about 28 percent attend sometimes, and about

4Following the lead of my respondents, I use the term “white” throughout this article torefer to franc�ais de souche or those of native French-European origin, even though I recog-

nize that “white” is not a commonly used racial term in French society.


54 percent never attend (Penn and Lambert 2009). Recent research hasbegun to challenge prevailing notions of French Muslims as completelydifferent from other French citizens (Klausen 2008; Laurence and Vaisse2006). When considering the ratios of regular mosque participation toregular church participation, French Muslims are as “secularized” as otherFrench people (Hargreaves, Kelsay, and Twiss 2007; Laurence and Vaisse2006). According to a 2006 Pew Report (Pew Research Center 2006),French Muslims are equally likely to identify as French (about 42%) asthey are to identify as Muslim (about 46%). A 2007 Gallup poll similarlyfound that while Muslims in Paris are more likely to define religion as animportant part of their lives than the Parisian population as a whole, thatdoes not prevent them from identifying with being French (Nyiri 2007).

DATA AND METHODS

The research presented here is based upon ethnographic data from semi-structured interviews conducted from 2008 to 2009 with 45 middle classadult children of Maghr�ebin immigrants living in the Parisian metropoli-tan region.5 Respondents were born in France and have at least one Mag-hr�ebin immigrant parent.6 My sample includes 21 women and 24 men.Respondents range in age from 21 to 49 years old (the average age being32 years old). In terms of parents’ country of origin, 25 of them are ofAlgerian origin, 12 are of Moroccan origin, and eight are of Tunisian ori-gin. Eight respondents are parents. 35 percent of respondents live in Paris,and 65 percent live in the banlieues, mostly in the Inner Ring d�eparte-ments of Seine-Saint-Denis, Val-de-Marne, and Hauts-de-Seine. Allrespondents are French citizens and about a third of them have dual citi-zenship (with the country of their Maghr�ebin origin). Respondents’ par-ents emigrated from the Maghreb between 1950 and 1970, primarily foreconomic reasons. Often fathers came to France first for work, and moth-ers later followed them. They generally have low levels of educationalattainment, often not greater than elementary school. Some respondents’

5All names and identifying information, except those of cities, have been changed to pro-

tect anonymity, per Institutional Review Board guidelines.6I included three respondents in my sample even though they were not born in Francebecause they immigrated when they were two years of age or younger. As these individualsthemselves identified as second generation and spent the majority of their lives in France,

I felt confident including them in my sample.


parents are, in fact, illiterate in French. All respondents’ parents speakArabic. Usually, fathers worked in low-skilled jobs, such as construction,while mothers were homemakers or domestic workers.

I delineate middle class based on my respondents’ educational attain-ment levels and professional statuses. In terms of educational attainment,I focus on those who passed the Baccalaur�eat (BAC) exam, the exam allFrench students must pass upon finishing high school to pursue furtherstudies, and attended college (whether or not they actually graduated). Interms of employment, I focus on individuals with professional types ofemployment (the French socioprofessional category of cadre), whichinclude jobs such as journalist, lawyer, and banker.

I recruited respondents through contacting various organizations andassociations (in person and via mail, telephone, and email) that are gearedtoward immigrant-origin individuals, as well as advertising on relevant In-ternet forums and websites. Due to the difficulties in obtaining access to alarge respondent sample, I used snowball sampling, in which existingrespondents generate potential respondents (Small 2009). Because of myoutsider status as a non-French person, snowball sampling was crucial forgetting me “inside” this population. About half of my sample is connectedin some way because they are involved in similar professional and socialnetworks. In addition, my sample is relatively homogenous in terms ofeducational attainment and employment status. It is therefore limited inits ability to generalize to the entire second-generation population, as thissample cannot be seen as representative of the entire second-generationpopulation. My position as an outsider undoubtedly shaped how myrespondents perceived me (Horowitz 1986; Venkatesh 2002); yet Iremained cognizant throughout the research process of not imposing myown understandings over those of my respondents.

Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and three hours. Interviewquestions addressed a variety of topics including ethnic and cultural iden-tity, religiosity, social networks, employment, family history and parentalbackground, relationship to parents’ country of origin, educational experi-ences, and experiences and perceptions of racism, discrimination, andmarginalization. Interviews were conducted in French and digitallyrecorded. A native French-speaking transcriber later transcribed the inter-views. Interviews were then coded for emergent themes. These themesincluded how respondents perceive and describe their religious identitiesand affiliations, their perceptions and experiences of marginalization, their


religious practices and their beliefs about those practices; and the bound-aries around Muslim identity.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND EXISTING RESEARCH

I examine the intersections of individual religiosity, or degree of religiouscommitment (Voas and Fleischmann 2012), identity, and perception ofsocial location, or position within French society. In doing so, I extendand challenge existing research in two domains: the relationship betweensecond-generation immigrant religiosity and national belonging and therelationship between symbolic boundaries and cultural membership. I fol-low Eid’s (2008) definition of religious identity as encompassing familiar-ity with beliefs, observation of religious practices, and a sense ofbelonging to one’s religious culture.

Children of Muslim immigrants in Europe “grow up in a world inwhich Islam is a chronic object of discussion and debate, a world that isthick with self-conscious and explicit discussions about Islam” (Brubaker2013, 4). Previous research on second-generation immigrant religiosity hasunpacked different negotiations of religious identities, including religiousprimacy, racialized religion, ethnoreligious hybridization, and familistic tra-ditioning (Chen and Jeung 2012). In response to Islam being framed as aminority religion, young Muslims employ one of the following responses— becoming more privatized or individualized in expressing their religion;becoming more fundamentalist in expressing their religion; or relating theirreligious identity to an ethnic-based one (Cesari 2002; Ramadan 2002;Voas and Fleischmann 2012). However, this has not been conceptualizedin terms of socioeconomic status and middle class attainment.

Furthermore, second-generation religious participation has beenfound to depend on the relative salience of religious identity versus ethnicnational identity (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). I show how this operatesin a context where religion stands in for race and ethnicity as a marker ofdifference because race and ethnicity are not acknowledged. What is cru-cial here is not just how a second-generation immigrant group constructsand negotiates religious identity but also how they do this in the contextof a religion that is stigmatized in larger society. How does this fact shapehow they frame their religiosity, as well as elucidate their identities asminorities?

For Muslim immigrants, accommodating their religious practiceswas part of the larger processes of assimilation into French society. Killian


(2007) shows how first-generation Muslim women accommodate theirreligious practices to the French context, meaning that they keep an“Islam of the heart” and express their faith only in the private sphere. Shefurther argues this differs across generations in that second-generationFrench Muslims are more likely to express visible symbols of their reli-gious and ethnic identities. However, I challenge this by showing the rele-vance of socioeconomic status to second-generation French Muslims’expressions of faith. My middle class respondents similarly accommodatetheir religious practices to the French Republican context as the first-gen-eration French Muslims Killian studies. They are just as interested in rele-gating religious expression to the private sphere and not imposing it onothers. Though they acknowledge their racial and ethnic origin and Mus-lim-related identity as marking their difference, they see themselves as justas French as anyone else which is revealed through how they frame theirreligious practices. This is despite the stigma they face for having Mag-hr�ebin origins and being Muslim. These are individuals that engage withIslam in la€ıque terms. My findings on the middle class show how the sec-ond-generation similarly accept la€ıcit�e as they navigate two different cul-tural worlds — French and Maghr�ebin. Their social positions areexplained less by assimilation, and more by a denial of cultural citizen-ship, a claim to belonging to French society that is actually accepted byother French citizens (Beaman 2012).

I show how in the wake of their experiences of marginalization, thissegment of France’s North African second-generation adopts a more priv-atized expression of their religious faith. This can be explained both byhow these middle class individuals are successfully assimilated by tradi-tional measures and by how they are responding to their experiences ofmarginalization. They can be considered “secular Muslims” (musulmansla€ıques) — those Muslims who embrace French Republicanism and itsnotion of la€ıcit�e , while also acknowledging their allegiance to being Mus-lim and countering prevailing images of pious and fundamentalist Mus-lims (Fernando 2009).7

Secondly, this research intervenes in current debates regarding howsymbolic boundaries are created, maintained, and reinforced (Lamontand Molnar 2002). As my respondents are citizens, their exclusion isnot based upon citizenship status, but rather their race and ethnic

7While secularism is not an exact translation of la€ıcit�e , I follow the trend of other scholars

who use the terms interchangeably for simplicity’s sake (Kastoryano 2004).


origin and their Muslim affiliation. As race and ethnic origin are notacknowledged as a base for exclusion, a connection to Islam is used toreinforce their difference from other French citizens. Respondents drawboundaries around their religiosity and religious practices in response tothe stigma and marginalization related to being Muslim. In addition,respondents draw symbolic boundaries vis-�a-vis other North African-ori-gin individuals around what a real or authentic Muslim is. Individualscan adopt a “consumer” approach to Islam by adopting those practicesthat appeal to them (Cesari 2002). By focusing on how respondents aresimilar to other French citizens and also distinct from other FrenchMuslims, this approach is similar to other research on boundary work,such as by Lamont (2002) who compares the symbolic boundaries Afri-can Americans draw vis-�a-vis whites with the symbolic boundariesNorth African immigrants draw vis-�a-vis French people and also byJackson (2001) who shows how African Americans in Harlem crosssymbolic boundaries regarding race and class through code-switchingand behavior-switching. However, the French context reveals the rele-vance of national cultural repertoires for how individuals draw bound-aries. In other words, respondents access French Republicanism andla€ıcit�e in drawing these boundaries. The boundaries my respondentsdraw around being Muslim allow them to contest their external identifi-cation or assigned identities as “other” and instead assert their identitiesas French.

By focusing on middle class individuals, I also complicate existingnotions about the assimilation and integration of French Muslims ofNorth African origin into mainstream French society. This is a seg-ment of the population that could be described as successfully assimi-lated based on their educational and professional accomplishments andwho remain committed to France’s Republican ideology. Yet, theyoften feel excluded from full inclusion in mainstream society. Howthey frame their religious practices is instructive for framing the futureintegration of Muslims in France and elsewhere. For those FrenchMuslims who are middle class, Islam can hold a significant place intheir lives, yet not hinder their national belonging — seeing themselvesas French and desiring to be seen as French by others. In what fol-lows, I demonstrate how religious identity functions as an importantindicator of assimilation and integration, despite the assumed contrar-ian nature of Islam relative to its more dominant Christian counterpartin France.


RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION AND PRACTICES

First, I discuss the variation of religious identifications among my respon-dents, rather than treating their religious identifications as homogeneousand assuming that they are all Muslim and that manifests itself in identi-cal ways (Tietze 2002).8 I emphasize that these are categories based onhow respondents define themselves, not how I as the researcher categorizethem. What I highlight here is the heterogeneity of ways these individualsconfigure their religious identities. In the next section, I link their reli-gious practices and identifications with their experiences of marginaliza-tion and difference.

The majority of respondents, about 68 percent, identify as practicingMuslims (Musulman pratiquant). These practices include the following:ritual prayer, or salat; observing Ramadan; abstaining from alcohol andcigarettes; following proper food regulations (halal); attending mosque;observing Muslim holidays; and wearing the hijab. It is important to notethat these practices could potentially conflict with French Republican soci-ety (i.e., fasting during Ramadan conflicting with the French work sche-dule; Killian 2007).

Lila, a 26-year-old of Algerian origin and a law student, sees beingMuslim as an integral part of her identity. It dictates her daily behavior.Though she does not wear the hijab, she does the ritual prayers andobserves Ramadan. Eid ul-Fitr, the holiday which celebrates the end ofthe fasting period and of Ramadan (la fe te d’Aid in French or “Feast ofthe Sacrifice” in English), is very important to Lila. She will even miss herexaminations to celebrate it. She was raised in a Muslim family. However,she, her three brothers, two sisters, and parents practice to varying degrees.Her mother is a strict Muslim, and her siblings are more liberal in howthey practice.9

Baya, a 25-year-old of Algerian origin, who teaches high schoolbiology in the eastern banlieue of Bagnolet, learned about Islam throughwatching her parents practice as she was growing up. However, they did

8Here, I follow Brubaker (2013, 6) who cautions that “people who identify as Muslims(like those who identify with any other religion) do not identify only or always as Muslims,

and they may not identify primarily as Muslims, though some of course do” [Emphasis inoriginal].9Some respondents did note a difference between their religious practices and those oftheir siblings, and explained that their siblings were too young to have yet developed a

religious identity.


not force her to practice it. At age 16, she began asking questions andstudying Islam. She now even takes courses in written Arabic at a localmosque. Baya already spoke Arabic at home but wanted to deepen herproficiency as she grew in her Muslim faith. However, this has notinterfered with her educational and occupational success. Other respon-dents also articulated a connection (or reconnection) to speaking Arabic,especially at home. It is not uncommon for children of North Africanimmigrants to “turn back” to studying Arabic later in their lives, as itremains the “highest-status vehicle for religious knowledge” eventhough the language itself is gradually declining in Maghr�ebin-originMuslim households (Bowen 2004a, 48). Baya explains, “My parentswere shocked when I told them I wanted to do the daily prayers butthey never told me I had to, it was just something I decided on myown.”

Similarly, Zara, a 28-year-old of Moroccan origin, who works as asocial worker, is a devout Muslim who considers being Maghr�ebin andbeing French as constitutive elements of her identity. For her, being aMuslim means “respecting Islamic principles, the five pillars — faith, fast-ing, praying, giving donations, and the pilgrimage. I do all of these,except the pilgrimage which I haven’t done yet. Inch’Allah (God willing),I will have an opportunity to do the pilgrimage.” Although her parentsraised her Muslim, Zara did not really take the religion that seriouslyuntil she was about 15 years old. It was not until she was 20 years oldthat she started to do the daily prayers.

Semi, a 35-year-old of Algerian origin, who works in the banlieue ofLevallois where he also was born and grew up, also strongly identifies as apracticing Muslim. As an example of Semi’s strong Muslim identity, afterour interview in a caf�e just outside of Paris, he insisted on paying for cof-fee because “that is what a Muslim man is supposed to do.” He starteddoing the daily prayers when he was 25 years old, because it was, as heput it, “just a natural thing to do.” His entire family consists of practicingMuslims as well, though his brother and sister do not do the dailyprayers. Semi differentiates between Maghr�ebins who are practicing Mus-lims and Maghr�ebins who are not; those that are Muslim have a more dif-ficult time being accepted by French society than those who are “justMaghr�ebin.”

These examples reveal the heterogeneity among practicing Muslims.For Lila, Zara, Semi, and others who identify as practicing Muslims,being Muslim is a constitutive element of their identities, yet as I will


show it is not something that prevents them from feeling French anddesiring full inclusion in French Republican society.

About 13 percent of respondents self-identify as a believing or cul-tural Muslim (Musulman croyant), in that they believe but say that theyare not practicing. They often participate in only a few rituals, such asobserving Ramadan. For these individuals, being Muslim is more of a cul-tural claim than a religious one (Bowen 2004a; Venel 2004). They essen-tially see themselves as “less” Muslim than other French Muslims. Nadia,a 24-year-old of Algerian origin and graduate student studying humanresources and communications, explains this distinction:

So, I have the tendency to say that I am a cultural Muslim, which means that in terms of

culture I am Muslim, because I was raised that way, even though my father was not Mus-

lim. . . Algerian culture is anchored in the Muslim religion, so the foundation of the educa-

tion I received had a religious foundation. So I have a tendency to say that I am Muslim

in a cultural sense, because I observe Ramadan, I don’t eat pork, I only eat halal meat,

. . .but apart from that I do not do anything.

Nadia does not remember being particularly interested in Algerianor Maghr�ebin culture until she was a teenager. She increasingly felt a needfor an attachment to her Maghr�ebin culture; she sought out connectionswith other Maghr�ebin youth online and began to learn more. Eventhough Nadia practices Islam in ways somewhat similar to self-identifiedpracticing Muslims, she does not feel as attached to being Muslim as areligious identity as are practicing Muslims. Part of Nadia’s cultural Mus-lim identity relates to her creating a social network of like-minded Mus-lim friends of Maghr�ebin origin. Her Muslim friends characterizethemselves similarly in terms of their religious identity and religiosity.

Diana, a 34-year-old, who emigrated from Algeria when she wastwo years old, identifies similarly. Though her father is a devout Muslim,her parents always let her decide her religious practices. She sees herself asMuslim, but emphasizes that she does not take her faith too seriously.Similarly, Farid, a 35-year-old journalist of Moroccan origin, who lives inIvry-sur-Seine, a banlieue south of Paris with his Algerian-origin wife,five-year-old daughter, and one-month-old son, considers himself Muslim,but emphasizes that it does not dominate his identity. He only startedbelieving about five years ago and does not see it as dramatically dictatinghis everyday life.

Still some respondents, about 16 percent, are not at all religious.Nouria, a 30-year-old social worker of Algerian origin, was raised Muslim


but then she started to question Islam when she was a teenager and laterstopped believing altogether:

I used to do everything that practicing Muslims do – I prayed, I followed almost all the

pillars of Islam, I observed Ramadan. . . but as I got older I started to distance myself a bit

more from the religion and I realized that I was Muslim because my parents were Mus-

lims. If I ever adopt a religion it will be because I choose it.

As she increasingly distances herself from her Islamic faith, she andher two brothers and sister, who have all had a similar religious evolutionas Nouria, do not tell their devout mother they do not practice as theyknow it would disappoint her. Islam represents a connection to her par-ents and the values and practices they transmitted to her and her siblings,more so than an actual religious faith. Most of the respondents who arenot at all religious either “broke away” from their parents’ religion or wereraised in atheist or non-religious households.

BEING MUSLIM, BEING DIFFERENT

For many children of Maghr�ebin immigrants, a Muslim identity is onedimension along which they are marginalized. Zara’s first childhood expe-riences of feeling different were directly related to her being Muslim:

When I was young at school I remember having henna on my hands, you know the tattoos

people have, and my schoolteacher got really upset with me because. . . at the time I was

seven years old, so it was 20 years ago, and the teachers did not even know what henna was,

and I remember my schoolteacher punishing me because she thought that I colored my

hands with felt-tip pens. It really traumatized me. It was such a horrible feeling.

It was early moments like these that reminded Zara that her way oflife at home was markedly different from her way of life at school andthat this difference was something that not everyone had to navigate. Inaddition to the complications of being of Maghr�ebin origin in Frenchsociety, children of North African immigrants who identify as Muslimmust confront a religious identity that is portrayed as counter to main-stream French society (Brubaker 2013). For many respondents being con-scious of this distinction, and how being Muslim would often mark themas different, was part of how their parents socialized them.

Similarly, Sa€ıd, a 30-year-old of Algerian origin, who is both adoctoral student at Sciences Po and a freelance journalist, characterizes


himself as a practicing Muslim who observes Ramadan, abstains from eat-ing pork, but does not do the ritual prayers. He also has to navigate beingMuslim in a society that has not easily accepted such an identity:

If a Muslim wanted to become French, he had to renounce his religion; he had to say,

“Voil�a, I want to be French so I am abandoning Islam.” That is how it was before. And I

think in the minds of many French people today, you can still find this mindset, this idea

that it is difficult to be French and Muslim at the same time. Either we are French and

not Muslim, or we are Muslim and therefore cannot be French.

Sa€ıd positions his religious identification as a barrier which separateshim from being fully accepted as French by others. More generally, hefeels neither French nor Maghr�ebin, and therefore, his religious identitycan be seen as constitutive of that unsettled space. He vividly remembershis Muslim identity being used against him a few years ago when he triedto rent an apartment. He had called a landlord to schedule an appoint-ment to view an apartment. When he arrived, the landlord asked himwhether he was Muslim. Sa€ıd did not completely understand why heasked this question and responded that he was, indeed, Muslim. He laterfelt uncomfortable and did not pursue renting that apartment.10 Sa€ıdexplained that this experience was one of many in which he is treated dif-ferently because of his ethno-religious identity, one which complicates hisfeelings of belonging in French society. He asserts a French identity butdoes not find that identity to be accepted by others. Of note is how Sa€ıdwas set apart for merely identifying as Muslim, not for his actual prac-tices.

That identifying as Muslim sets them apart from their fellow citizensis something that is continually reinforced for this segment of the NorthAfrican second generation. Nasser, a 29-year-old of Moroccan origin andformer banker, regularly confronts how his being Muslim is questionablyviewed and derided by others:

I know that they always mock me in terms of halal, what you can eat. Saturday, I went to

a conference. . . and there was a buffet with different sliced meats that I could not eat. I

did not say anything, it did not bother me at all. I ate salad. And people said to me, “you

don’t eat the sliced meat?” And I said “no, it is not halal.” And one guy said, “but this

isn’t a Muslim celebration.” I didn’t understand. . . why they would say that to me, espe-

cially when I never asked them anything, I didn’t say anything, I didn’t ask why there

10Sa€ıd further explained that this apartment was actually too small to be legally used as an

apartment.


weren’t other options, no, nothing. . . I consider it my choice to eat halal, that others

should respect. There were people there who were vegetarian, who eat neither meat nor

fish, but I am not going to ask them why they do not eat meat or fish. . . No, I respect

their decision. I am not going to tell them, “well, this isn’t a vegetarian meal.” It is things

that this that we encounter more and more, that I see more and more. . . We are some-

times obligated to hide our differences as if we are ashamed of them. But I’ve arrived at an

age when I tell myself, “It’s my difference. I am not looking to put it out front, but I

don’t want people to tell me to hide it.”

Nasser is particularly bothered by others’ reactions to his only eatinghalal meat because he feels that he is keeping his religious practices privateand not forcing them on anyone else. To him, this is part of being amember of a la€ıque society. The fact that Nasser is a practicing Muslimand that this is considered in opposition to being French is one in whichhe is continually reminded. This is regardless of the fact that he does notsee being Muslim as oppositional to being French.

DRAWING BOUNDARIES: MAKING RELIGIOUS IDENTITYFIT IN FRENCH REPUBLICAN SOCIETY

In framing their religiosity, respondents who self-identify as Muslim drawsymbolic boundaries (Lamont and Molnar 2002) around the meaning of a“real Muslim” (Cesari 2002). In this section, I discuss the boundariesrespondents draw to distinguish themselves from others, including otherMuslims who might practice differently, those who are not religious, andthose who practice a different religion. Cultural resources associated withreligion help to mediate symbolic boundaries of race, ethnicity, and socio-economic status (Chong 1998; Ecklund 2005). Culture in this senseencompasses rituals, values, customs, traditions, practices, and worldviews(Swidler 1986). All of this speaks to how this segment of the French Mus-lim population makes distinctions among each other’s practices and config-ures their religious identities to fit within the confines of French society.

This group therefore draws boundaries around being authenticallyMuslim and attempt to redefine what it means to be a believer in Islam, bydistinguishing “between those who merely believe and those whose beliefleads to practice.” This redefinition “allows them to remain a bona fide partof their parents’ community. It facilitates their participation in Islamicholidays, feasts, and commemorations of life-cycle events, such as births,marriages, and deaths, without feelings of shame, guilt, or conflict” (Cesari2002, 41). Individuals draw boundaries that allow for a more liberal


definition of a Muslim identity, such as Nadia when she distinguishes beinga cultural Muslim and a religious Muslim.11 This boundary work alignswith the tenets of French Republicanism. This evidences how symbolicboundaries are shaped by the national contexts and repertoires to whichindividuals have access. Because they desire full inclusion and acceptanceinto French society, they frame their religiosity in ways that facilitate that.

For instance, while one of the pillars of Islam involves praying fivetimes a day (salat), Karim, a 32-year-old with dual Algerian and Frenchcitizenship, who lives in the southwestern banlieue of Melun with his wifeand two young children, does not do the ritual prayers because he feels healready has a connection to Algerian culture. This also illustrates the con-nection to respondents make between being Muslim and being Mag-hr�ebin. Karim had a strong Muslim upbringing and remains close to hisparents. Being Muslim has always seemed very natural to him, bothbecause of his parents’ religious attachment and because he grew up in apredominately Muslim neighborhood. For example, many of his neigh-bors took Arabic courses on the weekend too and many of his classmatesand friends also fasted during Ramadan. Ever since he was five years old,he has traveled to Algeria at least once a year. His parents instilled in hima strong link with Algeria and Algerian culture, one that he plans, withhis wife, to pass on to his young children. He distinguishes between thoseMuslims who do the ritual prayers and those who do not, explaining thatmost often it is those who lack a strong connection to the Maghreb thatpray daily to establish that. Karim does not feel he needs to “prove” anyaspect of his identity by praying five times daily:

I think that because I’ve spent a lot of time in Algeria, I’ve traveled there a lot, I go to

Algeria often, I know the country . . . I’ve met people in Algeria who are about my age

and the majority of them do not do the daily prayers, they spend their time with other

things besides doing the daily prayers. The other thing is that I speak the language [Arabic]

and I think also that my parents transmitted to me many things. . . while my friends that

do the daily prayers, and those who began to do so at an early age, for a lot of them they

do not travel to Algeria or they seldom go there, they do not speak [Arabic] well or not at

all, and they are more distant from the country [Algeria], its history, and I feel like they

do the daily prayers to try to establish a link with Algeria, because it is the religion that

binds them to it. But for me, I don’t really have that need.

11Venel (2004) identifies ritual prayer as the distinction between practicing and believingMuslims. However, while my respondents who identify as non-practicing or cultural Mus-lims do not do the ritual prayer, some respondents who identify as strongly practicing

Muslims also do not do the ritual prayers.


Karim articulates what for him is essential in being a French Muslim— possessing a genuine connection to the Maghreb while living in France.As Karim feels this connection, the actual practices or rituals associated withIslam, namely the salat, are less pertinent for him.12 Negotiating religiouspractices is part of how Karim constructs his overall identity — by makingsense of the differences (including educational achievement, professionalsuccess, and religious practice) between him and others in his community.Respondents like Karim do not just have an ethnic or religious identity, butalso an ethnoreligious identity, in which their Maghr�ebin origin and Mus-lim religion are inextricably linked.

Youssef, a 32-year-old Parisian of Algerian origin, similarly experi-ences feeling different based on his religious identification. In particular,he feels most challenged in this regard at his work at the French FootballFederation:

At my job, there about 10 Arabs,13 five of whom drink alcohol, do not observe Ramadan,

who love to go out, go to clubs, hang out, smoke, etc. . . and there are five others who,

who do not go out. Me, I do not drink, I do not smoke, I do not really go to clubs and

all that. But it is to me that they say, “you are extremist” but they love the others [the five

Arabs who go out, etc.], they love them. . . but with an Arab like me it’s different. Do you

see what I’m saying? If tomorrow, you give in to what the French do, what they are, that’s

great. Then they’ll say, “Youssef is a great guy, he drinks, he can drink two barrels of

beer.” You see what I’m saying?

Youssef asserts that it is not only the fact that he is Muslim thatleads his coworkers to see him as different, but also the way that he prac-tices his Muslim faith. To him, the Muslim identity that the French moreeasily accept — that of the Muslim who drinks alcohol and goes to night-clubs — is not an authentic one. In order for Youssef to be a Muslimwho is not made to feel different, he would have to significantly alter hisreligious identity, and not be what he sees as a “true” Muslim:

I claim a Muslim identity, but do I practice it 100 percent? No, I do not practice every-

thing in Islam, but I do identify as Muslim. . . I believe in God, I agree with the dogmas

of the religion. But after that. . . everyone has their interpretation [of Islam], our own way

to live. So I agree with some things, disagree with other things, but I think I act correctly

12Previous research has framed ritual prayer as a measure of the degree of immigrantassimilation, in that a decline in the number of times one prays signifies greater levels ofassimilation (Bowen 2004a).13Many respondents used the term Arab interchangeably with Maghr�ebin and North Afri-

can.


in accordance with Islamic values, ones that are similar to other monotheistic religions,

above everything the positive aspects, respecting others, those sorts of things.

Youssef observes Ramadan, as he has his entire life. His three oldersisters practice in the same ways that he does. He explains that his fatheris more “Republican” than religious. Youssef is not even sure if his fatherbelieves in God. The fact that Youssef does not completely follow Islamicpractices, such as doing the daily prayers and regularly attending mosque,poses no barrier to identifying as Muslim. This is one example of howrespondents adapt Islam to the French context. While religion is often alocus of difference for this population, respondents still assert a Frenchidentity through how they actually frame their religion. That manyrespondents feel they relate to their religion in similar ways as their com-patriots confirms for them that they are as French as anyone else.

Likewise, Elyamine, a 29-year-old of Algerian origin, has been Mus-lim all his life. “This religion has been in my heart ever since I was born,”he explains. His parents, with whom he is really close, are really strictwith their religious practice. Elyamine has become increasingly strict withhis religious practice in recent years. Today, he does the ritual prayers.Observing Ramadan with his family is so important to him that evenwhen he lived in London for work, he returned to France so that hecould observe with them. Elyamine cited this as proof of his religiousdevotion when explaining his religiosity. It also reveals his ties to his fam-ily and his Algerian background. Growing up he often traveled to Algeria,especially as his oldest sister and much of his extended family lives there.Elyamine sees himself as an authentic Muslim. The boundaries he drawsaround being a true Muslim are similar to how Lila places observing Eidul-Fitr above her law school exams.

Nadia, who describes herself as a cultural Muslim rather than a reli-gious Muslim, believes that religion is a personal matter, one that shouldbe kept to oneself. Therefore, she does not feel that Muslim womenshould wear the hijab, as it brings religion into the public sphere:14

I completely tolerate women who wear the hijab, it is a personal choice, but at the same

time, we live in a country where there is not an official religion, a secular country, and I

think that is something we should all respect also. . . we should not be shocked when

14Killian (2007) discusses how first-generation Muslim women not wearing the hijab is anexample of accommodating to French society as it is not actually required in Islam. What

is required is for women to dress modestly.


women [who wear the hijab] cannot find work, but it is a totally different notion of things

that could bother some people who do not know anything about Islam, who could also

have a negative image of it, to see someone who arrives with a veil covering part of their

face. That dynamic is really important. The religion that one practices is for oneself and

not for others.

Despite individuals affirming their religious identity, they locate itwithin a Republican context, in that they also acknowledge the divisionbetween church and state and the relegation of religion to the privatesphere.

Furthermore, many respondents refer to the significance of the prac-tices they adopt, while negating the importance of those which they donot. In this vein, observing Ramadan, even if one does not fast but cele-brates Eid ul-Fitr, is the minimum threshold one must cross to claim anytype of Muslim identity. Practicing ritual prayer, abstaining from alcoholand cigarettes, or wearing the hijab are framed as less relevant for everydayMuslim life. Often these respondents also distinguish themselves fromtheir parents in terms of how they practice Islam, and this boundary workfacilitates that.

Boundary work is also used to expand the definition of being aMuslim by countering prevailing stereotypes of French Muslims. Faridloves both hip-hop and Islam and denies any conflict there. He thinksothers’ definitions of Muslim are too limiting. To him, just because hedoes not attend mosque on Fridays nor has a wife who wears the hijabdoes not mean that he is any less a Muslim as those Muslims who do.

Salim, a 36-year-old of Tunisian origin, considers being Muslim tobe the most important thing in his life, before being Maghr�ebin or Tuni-sian. He converted to Islam about 10 years ago after being in a near-fatalcar accident caused him to reevaluate his life. Yet he is married to a whitechristian woman and sees no incongruity there:

It does not pose any problems for me, none at all. It is actually the opposite. Difference is

always a richness. . . So we live normally, me, I observe Ramadan, she does not. I pray

[does the daily prayers], she does not. And there are no problems. That’s part of Islam

too, accepting differences.

Since Islam is a patrilineal religion (Gray 2008), Salim’s four-year-old son is Muslim. His wife accepts this, but the entire family also cele-brates Christmas. I emphasize here how Salim assertively defends his Mus-lim identity against those who would suggest its incongruence with being


married to a non-Muslim woman. He elaborates that contrary to conven-tional wisdom, Islam is a religion of peace.

Linda, a 34-year-old, who has lived in Paris for about 10 years andhas six siblings, considers herself very knowledgeable about Algerian cul-ture and knowing about Islam is a constitutive part of this cultural flu-ency. Although she identifies as a practicing Muslim, she sees manydifferences between her and other Muslims due to how she was raised.Even though her parents are devout Muslims, they have always been moreliberal than the typical Maghr�ebin family. For example, Linda recounts astory of her 28-year-old brother who is also a practicing Muslim and hasa very traditional view regarding gender roles:

He came to see me recently in Paris and the day he arrived at my place, there were three

male friends there also. . . We were all getting ready to go out for someone’s birthday or

something. And then when he arrived, he did a double-take. He was obviously shocked,

but he wasn’t going to say anything to me then and if he had, he would have been stuck

outside! And afterwards, after he left town, he called our mother. He told her: “I was just

at your daughter’s place and did you know, she had three men at her place?” And do you

know what my mother said? She said. . . “It is a little complicated to sleep with three men

at the same time, isn’t it?” And that story just made me feel so good, she just dismissed

him. . . So, I love my parents’ state of mind, they are practicing [Muslims] but at the same

time they are very, very, very open. . .

Linda appreciates her mother’s acceptance of French gender norms.Although Linda came of age in a practicing Muslim household, she wasnot raised to be restricted by her religion. The traditional roles that areoften prescribed to Muslim women — particularly those that she seesoperating in other Muslim families — were never assigned to her. Whileshe sees her brother as fitting the stereotype of a “radical French Muslim,”Linda sees herself as having a more “assimilationist” French Muslim iden-tity. This is at least partially due to Linda’s middle class status (she worksas human resources director and owns a condo in the 15th arrondisse-ment). This French Muslim identity does not conflict with French secularsociety. Despite institutional constraints around identity options, thereexists a heterogeneity of religious identity among French Muslims.

Another example of how respondents draw boundaries around theirreligious identity is how they frame celebrating Christmas to signify theirsimilarities with other French people. Many individuals celebrated Christ-mas when they were children to “fit in” with others. This is an exampleof blurring the boundaries between themselves and others. Soria, a 21-year-old medical student of Algerian origin, remembers, “When I was


younger my parents wanted me and my sisters and brothers to do thesame things as the other children.” Her neighborhood in Rueil-Malmai-son, a western banlieue, was predominately French and hers was one ofthe few immigrant families. Growing up, she received what she character-izes as an “Islam education.” She learned the rituals from her parents anddid not question them much until she grew older. Today, she fasts duringRamadan, believes in God, and otherwise “tries to do good things in[her] life.” Soria continues to celebrate Christmas, as she and her familysee it as a French tradition and holiday, not a religious celebration.

Growing up, Nadia and her seven older siblings felt awkward whentheir classmates would talk about the Christmas gifts they received andNadia and her siblings had nothing to contribute. Her parents quicklychanged that and the family continues to celebrate Christmas today.

Safia, a 32-year-old journalist of Tunisian origin, who grew up in anupper-middle-class Parisian neighborhood, also celebrated Christmas withher family as a child, to not be different from the other students atschool. However, she has not continued the tradition with her own chil-dren because her husband, who is also of Maghr�ebin origin, is afraid theirchildren will forget “where they come from.”

Youssef also stopped celebrating Christmas once he grew up. He seesthis as a generational difference — between Maghr�ebins of his parents’generation and Maghr�ebins today:

Before, we did not want to do anything to appear different, but today it is not as neces-

sary. We wanted to be like everyone else [before] and today we are not as ashamed to be

different. . . So our parents tried really hard to copy what everyone was doing, but I think

that also, it is complicated to explain to your five-year-old child that he is different, it is

much easier to just buy a Christmas tree and celebrate Christmas, especially if Christmas is

largely a commercial thing.

Religious practices — even of religions in which they themselves donot believe — are one site to locate acceptance of and adherence to FrenchRepublicanism. By exhibiting the multiple ways one can be a Muslim, mid-dle class children of North African immigrants are constantly negotiatingtheir religiosity, which becomes particularly sensitive in a la€ıque society.

DISCUSSION: BEING MUSLIM AND BEING FRENCH

Like some recent research (including Foner and Alba 2008; Klausen2008; Laurence and Vaisse 2006; Nyiri 2007), this article challenges


prevailing notions of French Muslims as completely different from otherFrench citizens, particularly in terms of religiosity. However, I have espe-cially focused on the middle class segment of the French Muslim ofNorth African origin population to reveal the complications of negotiatingmarginalized identities even for those individuals who could be describedas successfully assimilated. These data suggest that middle class FrenchMuslims are increasingly choosing more privatized and individualizedexpressions of their religious identity, which reflects how Islam is beingadapted to the French context. Like French Christians, young Muslimsoften relate to their religion as consumers, “choosing which rules andtenets of their religion to embrace and which ones to dismiss” (Cesari2002, 41). Muslims who defend French la€ıcit�e are often seen as productsof assimilation (Laurence and Vaisse 2006). Yet this assimilation is lim-ited, as they remain excluded and marginalized because of their ethnora-cial identifications.

Even respondents like Lila and Elyamine who are deeply religiousengage with their faith on la€ıque terms. This is not an issue of second-generation immigrants not taking their religious identity seriously. Whenmany respondents assert a religious identity, they do so in way that canbe characterized as very French. Often, the ways individuals practice theirreligion are more aligned with French Republicanism, and its emphasison secularism, than in opposition to it. They frame their religion as a pri-vate and personal affair. Respondents’ privatized expressions of their reli-gious identity reflect how Islam is still being adapted to the Frenchcontext in the second generation. How they frame their religiosity is inresponse to the marginalization and exclusion they face.

The role religion plays in the lives of middle class children of NorthAfrican immigrants does not negate conforming to la€ıcit�e . Rather, this pop-ulation uses their religious practices to legitimate their membership in theFrench imagined community (Anderson 1991). Their religiosity does nothinder them from feeling French or locate them outside a French secularism(see also Fernando 2005; Maxwell and Bleich 2014). They are not inter-ested in asserting an oppositional identity based on their religious attach-ments. They draw boundaries in terms of their religious identities andpractices, which include them with other French people. Often, individuals’religious identifications are shaped by their childhood experiences and thevalues that their parents and other family members transmitted to them.Their religiosity allows this generation to make two seemingly disparate


connections — one with French Republican society and the other withMaghr�ebin culture.

Because of how Islam is widely perceived in French society and theprevalence of anti-Muslim sentiment, any degree of association with Islambecomes problematic for children of Maghr�ebin immigrants. That myrespondents were not more fundamentalist in their religious expressions isat least partially due to their middle class status, particularly in terms ofemployment and educational attainment. While they often experiencemarginalization and discrimination comparable to children of Maghr�ebinimmigrants who are less successful, they also deeply support France’sRepublican ideology and all that that constitutes. That respondents wouldexpress their religiosity in la€ıque ways is due to the influence of havingbeen raised in French Republican society, as well as reflective of their feel-ings of belonging to France. This is regardless of the stigma and marginal-ization they have faced due to their Maghr�ebin origins. Being Muslimmatters for this segment of the North African second generation but doesnot represent the totality of their identities. This suggests that futureincorporation and integration of Muslims in Western European societieswill not be especially problematic as individuals are adept at adaptingtheir religious practices to national contexts.

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As French as Anyone Else: Islam and the North African Second Generation in France

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