1

All Animals Are Equal, or Are They?

The Ikhwān's Ṣafāʾ Animal Epistle and its Unhappy End

The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ’s animal epistle has achieved vast popularity from the time of its

composition about a millennium ago, as evidenced, for example, by the number of its

translations and manuscripts.1 Several factors have contributed to this success. Besides the

entertaining fable format and the subtle sense of humour that runs through the narrative, the

authors’ dissection of deep-seated and prevalent anthropocentric biases is remarkably thought-

provoking. The basic premise is a fictional scenario wherein nonhuman animals bring humans to

court on the counts of abuse and claims of superiority. Through the animal characters, the

Ikhwān demonstrate the futility of humanity's claims to a special status founded solely on

species-contingent attributes, a proposition that must have led readers across the ages to rethink

their anthropocentric assumptions. This favourable reception notwithstanding, students of the

epistle are typically also surprised by the narrative’s final outcome. Not only do nonhuman

animals fail to win the case, in a sudden turn of events, they unreservedly acquiesce to humans'

claims of superiority.

Although several cursory explanations have been proposed for this unexpected

conclusion, they fail to account fully for it. The aim of this paper is to offer a more text-based

explanation to this discrepancy by situating the epistle in its intellectual and religious contexts.

What needs to be evinced from the outset is that, when considered against the backdrop of the

Ikhwān's entire work, the real puzzle turns out to be the body, rather than the outcome, of the

narrative. Relegating nonhuman animals to an inferior status is quite consistent with the Ikhwān's

worldview; what needs to be accounted for is how a group of authors whose interest in

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classification and hierarchy has been described as something that amounts at times to 'a positive

passion and mania,' was able to entertain such egalitarian ideas.2

In this paper, I will propose that the egalitarian message stems primarily from the Qur'an,

the main text the authors engage in the fable. To this end, I will first introduce the authors and

describe their intellectual background; second, I will look into the questions of hierarchy and

anthropocentrism in the traditions that form the intellectual and religious backdrop of the epistle;

third, I will illustrate how steeped the authors are in hierarchical reasoning; and finally, I will

analyze some of the key themes in the epistle to highlight the Qur'anic origin of its egalitarian

message and to demonstrate how divergent this message is from the rest of the Ikhwān's work.

The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ

The group of authors who adopted the collective penname of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ wa-

Khillān al-Wafāʾ (The Brethren of Purity/Sincerity and Friends of Loyalty) took much care to

conceal their identity, with a great measure of success. From their work it is possible to glean

that they were Muslim thinkers who lived in Iraq sometime between the end of the ninth and the

beginning of the eleventh centuries; beyond this, hardly anything is known in full certainty about

their personal identities.3 Opinions are even divided on whether the epistles were composed by

one or more writers. Although more often the authorial voice refers to itself in the plural, Ian

Netton does not exclude the possibility that 'the Rasāʾil [epistles] could be the work of one

author only, for there are significant lapses from the usual plural mode of address into the first

person singular.'4 There is also some agreement that this work was composed in the 970s and

published in the 980s of the Common Era;5 however, some scholars prefer earlier dates.

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Disagreement extends also to the Ikhwān's sectarian affiliation. It is often maintained that they

3

were Ismāʿīlī; however, Godefroid de Callataÿ argues that this is 'more problematic than their

general affiliation to Shiʿism' due to the difficulty of linking them 'with any historical faction of

Ismailism that we know about.'7 In the absence of further evidence it is unlikely that any of these

or related questions will be conclusively resolved. Fortunately, this uncertainty does not extend

to the author's intellectual legacy. Thanks to the availability of the Ikhwān's work, students of the

epistles stand on firmer ground in this area.

Persuaded of the universality of truth and possibly motivated by a desire to reduce

sectarian and religious discord,8 the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ erected a complex theology whereby they

strived to coalesce beliefs and ideas from different religious traditions and philosophical schools,

including Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, the three Abrahamic monotheisms, and

Greek philosophy. Signs of this admixture are clear in the animal epistle, where, for example, the

Bible is seemingly assigned the same status as the Qur'an and where scriptural and rational

arguments are cited in tandem. The very fable format is the result of such cultural encounter. The

Ikhwān were mainly inspired by the Fables of Bidpai, an Indian work translated into Arabic via

Persian by the renowned ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (d. 142/759).

Although the Ikhwān drew from many traditions, their greatest debt was to Greek

philosophy, particularly to Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism. Like many Muslims who

sought to quench their thirst for knowledge from Hellenistic sources, these authors found in

Pythagoreanism a blend of mysticism and science which, according to Majid Fakhry, 'satisfied

the bipolarity in Muslim thought, torn between Greece and the Orient',9 whereas Neo-Platonism

presented them with 'a brilliant attempt to bring together the major currents in classical Greek

thought, Platonic, Aristotelian, Pythagorean and Stoic, interpreted or recast in oriental religious

or mystical idiom.'10

The Ikhwān sought to combine this already complex syncretism with

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Abrahamic monotheisms, particularly Islamic doctrines. To them, philosophical sciences (al-

ʿulūm al-ḥikmiyya) and prophetic or revealed law (al-sharīʿa al-nabawiyya) are from the same

divine origin and share common goals; therefore, even if their methods differ, in essence they

remain the same.11

The Ikhwān's system has been characterized both as a 'remarkable overall synthesis',12

and as 'a syncretism of syncretisms.'13

Many critics maintain that paradox and ambiguity prevail

in the epistles,14

but this assessment can be interpreted as a failure to engage properly with the

authors' propositions. They definitely, however, demonstrate difficulty conforming their ideas to

mainstream Islamic tenets. For example, both Netton and Fakhry note with surprise the Ikhwān's

acceptance of Christ's crucifixion and resurrection, two notions that the Qur'an explicitly

rejects.15

In some instances the Ikhwān's diction goes so far as to imply that they accept the

divinity of Jesus, only to assert the opposite elsewhere.

Aside from such occasional deviations from the mainstream tradition, what advocates of

orthodox Islam find most objectionable in the Ikhwān's work is the fact that, in an effort to

synthesize philosophy and revelation, these authors twisted many tenets of the orthodox tradition

to force them to align with various philosophical doctrines. For example, in their attempt to

integrate the Neo-Platonic and the Islamic conceptions of the deity, the Ikhwān sacrificed several

attributes that are foundational to the mainstream Islamic conception of God. For them, the

Supreme Being generated the world through emanation rather than ex nihilo creation. This

conception not only compromises the divine attributes of omnipotence and free will, which are

foundational to the orthodox Islamic understanding of God, but also gives rise to a cosmology

that differs distinctly from the mainstream Islamic one, particularly due to the notions of

hierarchy and anthropocentrism, two important corollaries of the emanation theory.16

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Hierarchy and anthropocentrism

Neo-Platonism holds that the world emanates from the divine being in the form of a

chain, known as the Great Chain of Being, whereby status decreases in accordance with the

decreasing perfection of existents as the distance between them and the divine origin increases.17

The criteria that illustrate a creature's perfection vary; however, they have in common a

pronounced anthropocentric character. Thus, in the sub-lunar sphere, animals that are closer to

humans in terms of anatomy and/or behaviour or that are more useful to humans rank higher than

others. Nonhuman animals in their turn are superior to plants because they share with humans the

irascible and nutritive souls, whereas plants rank higher than inanimate matter because of their

nutritive soul, which they have in common with the two upper classes (humans and other

animals).

The special role that Neo-Platonism assigns to reason is another indication of this

tradition's anthropocentric character. Rational faculties not only impart to humans a special status

by drawing a distinction between them and the rest of the sub-lunar world, they also connect

humans to the superior heavenly sphere, populated, as it is, by intelligent beings. The rationality

of the heavenly realm is a crucial motif in the Neo-Platonic cosmology. One notes, for example,

that the first being that emanates from the deity is the Intellect, 'a principle embodying divine

reason or intelligence', as de Callataÿ explains.18

This fact underlies the importance of reason in

two ways: first, it suggests that reason is the primary engine of creation, since the rest of the

world is produced through its medium; second, it implies that the chief attribute, or perhaps even

the essence, of the deity consists of rationality, considering that this is what overflows from him

first. Plato, from whose thought several components of the Great Chain were drawn, ascribed the

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world's goodness to the fact that it is reigned by a 'rational divine power.'19

Indeed, the god of

Neo-Platonism is conceived of as the 'Supreme God Mind,'20

and 'reason itself', as Lovejoy and

Karen Armstrong respectively point out.21

The anthropocentric aspect of this theme lays in the fact that the criterion taken as a sign

of humans' distinction acquires such universal magnitude. In a first move, reason is presumed to

be the faculty that raises humankind above other sub-lunar beings; in a second, it is equated with

goodness itself and becomes the factor that accounts for the world's perfection. God's goodness is

ascribed primarily to the element of rationality, as opposed, for example, to the attributes of

mercy, generosity, forgiveness, and justice typically emphasized in mainstream Islamic tradition,

whereas the world's goodness is explained by the fact that it is ordered according to a rational

design and governed by rational powers, which contrasts with the attribute of spirituality that the

Qur'an ascribes to the entire creation, whether animate or inanimate.

Neo-Platonism's anthropocentrism can also be discerned from the tremendous trust

placed in the abilities of humans' rational faculties. The human mind, as Lovejoy explains, is

believed to have the ability to seek and find 'some stable, definitive, coherent, self-contained, and

self-explanatory object or objects of contemplation.'22

Since the world is considered the artefact

of a rational divine being who, in the end, seems to think like humans, it is to be expected that it

is accessible to human minds. The elements of awe and mystery are not absent from the Neo-

Platonic worldview: the sheer size of the Chain and the infinite meticulous attention given even

to its tiniest details do make it a source of wonder, yet the overall scheme is fundamentally

understandable to humans. Describing the Neo-Platonist trend in 18th century Europe, Lovejoy

notes that although

[O]stentatious modesty in the recognition of the disproportion between man's intellect

and the universe was one of the most prevalent intellectual fashions ... it was

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frequently accompanied by an extreme presumption of the simplicity of the truths that

are needful for man and within his reach.23

Neo-Platonism, however, is far from being the only tradition reflecting strong

anthropocentric tendencies and hierarchical preoccupations. In fact, according to Lewis Vaughn

and Austin Dacey, psychological research shows that 'highly elaborate status hierarchies have

characterized life within human groups', an observation that is borne out by a cursory survey of

human cultures.24

To cite some examples, Sangharakshita Bhikshu explains that hierarchical

principles are deeply embedded in Buddhism, and enumerates various types of hierarchies,

including the hierarchy of the different levels of the cosmos and the hierarchy of persons.

Bhikshu concludes that it 'would seem that the concept of hierarchy is absolutely fundamental to

Buddhism; without it, Buddhism as we know it can hardly exist.'25

Lance Nelson observes that in

Hinduism the universe 'is not a community, but a hierarchy, in which gods enjoy great happiness,

human beings experience moderate happiness and pain, and animals suffer "extreme misery"'26

In Confucianism, the notion of hierarchy is central to the important principle of Li,27

as without it

'there would be no arrangement of society' and chaos would prevail.28

Hierarchy in

Confucianism is also believed to be 'the way of nature, as exemplified by the different natural

positioning between Heaven and Earth, high and low respective', whereas equality is assumed to

be against nature, as 'it gives rise to confusion leading to chaos.'29

Within the Abrahamic context,

Roberta Kalechofsky admits that 'Judaism accepts a hierarchical scheme of creation'.30

Lynn

White goes so far as to accuse Christianity, particularly in its Western form, of being 'the most

anthropocentric religion the world has seen',31

and some argue that the anthropocentric

orientation of the Christian tradition 'fostered ugly hierarchies and tragic dualisms that in practice

have crushed much of nature.'32

In Islam, the Ikhwān al-Ṣāfāʾ are far from being an exception in

their subscription to hierarchical ethos and holding of anthropocentric views.

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Prevalence of hierarchical tendencies notwithstanding, Abrahamic monotheisms still

have an egalitarian dimension that is at least as discernible as the hierarchical one. Many authors,

while acknowledging the de facto social stratifications that characterized different historical

periods among monotheistic societies, still emphasize the relative nature of this hierarchy and,

more importantly, highlight these societies' subscription to the ideal of egalitarianism at a formal

level. Marshall Hodgson, for example, highlights the egalitarian character of Semitic societies

versus the aristocratic taste and the hierarchical character of Iranian societies.33

In Judaism and

related traditions, Hodgson explains, social justice tended to be 'egalitarian justice ... with every

person equal before the law.' Hodgson does not fail to note that, given the initial inequalities in

human nature, demand for radical egalitarian justice was not always pressed very far, yet he

adds,

Still, several of the Abrahamic traditions ... reflected initially an active sense of the

equal dignity and ultimate rights of the less privileged classes in society. Over the

centuries, within each Irano-Semitic religion, tradition tended to develop again and

again reformed versions in which such egalitarian justice was commonly stressed and

some degree of practical implications drawn from it.34

Therefore, whereas Neo-Platonism and many eastern religions seem more concerned with order

and social propriety, which can be more conducive to social stratification, Abrahamic traditions

are more concerned with justice, which is more conducive to egalitarianism. Unlike the rational

deity described earlier, the God of Abrahamic monotheisms is more often imagined in ethical

terms. 'God in the Qur'an,' writes Asma Barlas, 'is an ethical construct associated with truth and

justice.'35

There appears to be a deep correlation between the egalitarian dimension of Abrahamic

monotheisms and their theocentric character. Louise Marlow suggests that

there may be a logical connexion of sorts between an affirmation of the oneness of

God and the upholding of the principle of equality among the human beings created

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by him; in principle, at least, the monotheistic religions treat their adherents as

brothers, regardless of the difference in their origins.36

David Clough derives a more encompassing egalitarian message from God's mode of creation,

omnipotence, and providence. He writes,

If we confess God as creator ex nihilo we must recognize that our basic relationship

to creation is to recognize that we are part of it. Like all other creatures, we owe our

existence, our sustaining from moment to moment and our future life to God. Like

other creatures we are frail and finite, in contrast to the power and eternity of God.

Like other creatures we are made of the dust of the earth and will return to it.37

The image obtainable from this statement is thus of a deity that is utterly transcendent and a

creation that belongs together because of its common origin, shared frailty, need, and finitude.

Beyond such possible logical connections, the theocentric character of Abrahamic

religions helps counter hierarchical tendencies through some concrete measures, most

importantly through emphasis on the divine attribute of justice on one hand and the theme of

accountability on the other. God, monotheistic doctrines tend to emphasize, does not differentiate

between creatures on the basis of external attributes, such as race or wealth,38

but rather on the

basis of faith and virtue. Monotheistic teachings thus seek to divest social privilege of meaning.

Through their insistence that wealth and other signs of social privilege that humans tend to prize

are meaningless in the sight of God, they seek to reorient humans from treasuring worldly

privileges, which are at the root of social stratification, to developing ethical virtues that will

keep selfish desires under check. These traditions often emphasize also that God prohibits

injustice and promises the unjust severe chastisement. The fact that humans are given only one

earthly life followed by reward or punishment in the hereafter is meant to heighten the sense of

ethical accountability.

In line with the predominant discourse on this topic, the previous discussion has focused

mainly on the theme of egalitarianism in a human context. The fact that traditional monotheistic

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societies were mostly concerned with human dignity, particularly of males, is, of course, a sign

of anthropocentrism and androcentrism. However, more and more voices in the fields of animal

and women studies argue that the association of such attitudes with these traditions are more

representative of the mindsets of particular historical periods and cultural contexts. More

egalitarian readings are not only consistent with these religions' worldviews, but they may even

be more tenable than hierarchical ones. Richard Bauckham, who argues that the biblical creation

narratives 'make quite clear our kinship with other creatures', proceeds to explain that

Genesis 1 makes the point by placing the creation of humans not on a separate day,

but on the day devoted to the creation of land animals. Being land animals

themselves, humans do not get a day to themselves.

The fact that God created Adam from the dust of the earth, 'just as he then also formed every

animal and bird from the earth', bespeaks the same kinship, Bauckham maintains.39

These

themes appear to tip the scales in favour of egalitarianism even in a tradition such as Christianity,

which has been accused of extreme forms of anthropocentrism.

Out of the three Abrahamic religions, Islam is considered the most insistent on the

principle of God's oneness on one hand and the most committed to the equality ideal on the

other. Richard Martin maintains that 'among the monotheistic Western religious traditions, Islam

has most insistently asserted the unity and oneness of God.'40

On the other hand, Marlow states

that 'Islam is probably the most uncompromising of the world's religions in its insistence on the

equality of all believers before God',41

and Leila Ahmed characterizes the ethical vision of this

religion as 'stubbornly egalitarian.'42

Considering the perceived connection between the

principles of theocentrism and egalitarianism, it is plausible to posit that Islam's strong insistence

on egalitarian ethos stems from its more rigorous theocentric character.

Historically, although Muslim societies had their fair share of social and cosmic

stratifications, they still seem to have come closer than others to achieving the egalitarian ideal.

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Marlow mentions that in certain respects, 'the Islamic tradition of classical times may be said to

be strikingly egalitarian.'43

Similarly, Bernard Lewis writes,

If we look at the changes made by Islam at the time of its advent in seventh century

Arabia; still more, if we compare the Muslim world in medieval times with caste in

India to the east or with the entrenched aristocratic privilege of Christian Europe to

the west, then Islam does indeed appear as an egalitarian religion in an egalitarian

society. In principle and in law, it recognizes neither caste nor aristocracy. Human

nature being what it is, both tend to obtrude themselves on occasion; but when this

happens, it is in spite of Islam and not as part of it, and such departures from equality

have repeatedly been condemned by both traditionalists and radicals as non-Islamic

or anti-Islamic innovations.44

Of course, Islam's egalitarianism still had its limitations, since several groups were excluded

from it. Several Muslim feminists have convincingly argued, though, that a thoroughly

egalitarian message is retrievable from Islam's doctrines and, more importantly, from the Qur'an.

Indeed, as I hope to demonstrate in this paper, using the Qur'an to justify hierarchical attitudes

other than faith-based ones often proved to be a challenging task and resulted in clear

inconsistencies, akin to the discrepant conclusion of the Ikhwān's animal epistle.

Hierarchy in the Ikhwān's work

The theme of hierarchy permeates the Ikhwān's work. In the fable's prologue, the authors

start by pointing out that they have placed the animal epistle after the one on plants, a sequence

that is consistent with the order of the Chain of Being. They also state that they have already

shown 'that the lowest plants verge into the highest mineral gems, and the highest plants into the

lowest animals' and promise to demonstrate that 'the highest animals verge with the lowest rank

of human beings and the highest rank of humans, with the lowest of the angels' in the present

(animal) epistle.45

They reiterate that mineral substances are the 'lowest things that come to be',

plants come next because of their ability to grow, animals follow on this scale because they add

locomotion and sensitivity to the previous function, and humans stand on the top because they

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have discernment and reason.46

Besides the Neo-Platonic system, the Ikhwān rank animals

according to the Jain system of senses, albeit with modifications. At the bottom of this scale one

finds animals that 'are almost on a par with plants' because they 'have but one sense, that of

touch.'47

These consist for example of 'worms that breed in clay, water ... or the gut of larger

animals.'48

Status in this system rises with each additional sense. Five-sensed animals, which

include human beings and many other species, are obviously placed at the top, yet these 'too

divide into the higher and the lower.'49

The Ikhwān also perceive a hierarchical scheme in the constitution of the body. 'The

brain', they explain, 'is king of the human body,' due to its function as the 'hub of the senses,

quarry of our thoughts, home of our ideas, storehouse of memory, abode of the soul, and seat of

reason.' Next comes the heart, which 'is the brain's servant, charged with carrying out its orders

in governing the body and controlling its functions.' The liver, lungs, and arteries come next

because they serve the heart in different ways. At the bottom one finds the bowels, relegated to

this lowly position because of their function of taking up the wastes and expelling them from the

body.50

In the forty-second epistle the Ikhwān explain that human society consists of innumerable

classes which, nonetheless, can be divided into three major categories, with women, children,

and the ignorant at the bottom, the wise and those who are deeply grounded in knowledge at the

top and everyone else in between.51

They also arrange professions hierarchically according to a

set of criteria, including the primary matter (hayūlā) which they involve, added value, and the

degree of people's need for them.52

Humans' superiority to other sub-lunar beings is firmly established in the animal epistle's

prologue. Reason and discernment are the primary foundations and/or manifestations of this

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special status, but the authors remind also that in earlier essays they highlighted 'human virtue,

man's admirable attainments and praiseworthy traits, his true insights, ingenious arts, and

uplifting modes of governance, training, discipline and rule.'53

The very shape of the human body

bespeaks humans' distinction, they maintain, for whereas plants 'live upside down', their heads

pointing toward the centre of the earth, man 'is just the opposite'. Other animals remain in

between, 'their heads fac[ing] one way, horizontally, and their tails the other.'54

Man's upright

position is taken to mean that he has completed the cycle of what Goodman calls the

'Neoplatonic drama of the cosmic fall of the Universal Soul into embodiment and particularity.'55

Man's soul, the Ikhwān explain, has 'reached the core and begun its return, rescued now and risen

beyond the plane of minerals, plants, or animals. Now it stands erect, in the straight way.'56

Besides, the authors consider the human form to be 'God's vice-gerent on earth'.57

Thus, in their

worldview, rational faculties, cultural achievements, moral virtue, physical constitution, and

divine partiality concur to lift man's status.

Nonhuman animals' inferior status has concrete repercussions. The reason why 'all other

animals arose before man', the Ikhwān explain, is that 'they all exist for his sake'. It is a 'self-

evident' principle, they elaborate, that 'whatever exists for the sake of something else antedates

it.'58

The same theme is reiterated elsewhere. In the eighteenth epistle they write,

God created corruptible beings (al-kāʾināt al-fāsidāt), i.e. animals, plants, and

minerals; put them at the service of the human being and allowed him to rule over

them and to use them as he wishes (mallakahu ʿalayhā yataṣarrafu fīhā kayfa

yashāʾ).59

Drawing an analogy between nonhuman animals and grains, the Ikhwān write in yet another

essay that animals' lives are fulfilled only upon their deaths, the time when they can be

'harvested' (ḥaṣād) so that humans can finally benefit from them.60

From this, nonhuman animals

appear to have no intrinsic value: the whole point of their existence is to serve their human

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masters. It is also remarkable that, even when the Ikhwān take into consideration the interests of

nonhuman animals, they do so through anthropocentric lenses. In their view,

The aim of the permission to kill animals for food is not only the consumption of

their flesh, but also the liberation of their souls from the pit of the Gehenna of the

world of generation and degeneration (gharaḍuhum takhlīṣ nufūsihā min darakāt

jahannam ʿālam al-kawn wa-al-fasād), and to move them (animal souls) from a state

of deficiency to a state of fullness and perfection in the human form, which is the

fullest and most perfect form in the sub-lunar sphere.61

Although it is not clear how animals can reach perfection once humans consume their flesh (By

becoming part of the human body? Do their souls merge with human souls?), this argument

shows that a nonhuman animal's only chance to rise on the Chain of Beings is through the human

medium.

In the ninth epistle the authors go so far as to deduce man's right to rule over other

animals from his physical appearance. They maintain that God created man in a fairer image than

other animals so that he (man) can rule over them, using them any way he wishes (li-yakūna bihā

mufaḍḍalan ʿalayhā, mālikan la-hā, mutaṣarrifan fīhā kayfa yashāʾ).62

These statements not only

confirm humans' superiority in distinct terms (humans do not belong with earthly beings,

whether animate or inanimate, for unlike humans these beings are corruptible), but also that their

superiority entails concrete privileges: because of their fair image humans are entitled to use

nonhuman animals any way they wish!

In a statement that evokes the biblical theme of dominion and lessons derived thereof, the

Ikhwān also affirm that ruling over other animals and other sub-lunar beings is a virtuous deed

because it enables man to resemble God (yatahayyaʾu lahu al-tashabbuh bi-ilāhihi wa-barīhi).63

These statements show that no matter how 'pro-animal' the authors may appear in the main

narrative, in reality they side unconditionally with their own race. Goodman's observation that

for Neo-Platonists, animals 'are made not for human exploitation but, in the first instance, for

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their own sakes', if at all valid, hardly applies to the Ikhwān.64

If man is entitled to use other

animals 'anyway he wishes,' as they repeatedly affirm, it is difficult to see how exploitation can

be avoided.

This, of course, is not to detract from the Ikhwān's work; quite the opposite, in fact. For

thinkers who are so steeped in hierarchal reasoning, being able to entertain the egalitarian

outlook that is reflected in the fable is a remarkable feat. However, interpreting the fable's final

verdict as an attempt to turn the reader's frustration against God 'for having established the

hierarchy of creation on the basis of such unfair and arbitrary principles', as Richard Foltz

suggests, finds no justification in the Ikhwān's work.65

Regardless of whether or not hierarchy

can be attributed to the Qur'anic God, the Ikhwān would neither consider it unfair nor arbitrary;

on the contrary, it is the very element that allows for the best and fullest world possible.

Similarly, Carol Bakhos's attempt to tone down the Ikhwān's hierarchical tendencies

while magnifying the hierarchical nature of the overall Islamic scriptural and exegetical tradition

(along with other monotheistic ones) is based on selective readings of both the Ikhwān's work

and the tradition at large.66

Reiterating de Callataÿ's views, Bakhos writes that in the Ikhwān's

scheme humans 'occupy the same rank as minerals, plants, and animals' and that they [humans]

do not have a status of their own since, like all other animals, they are sentient.67

The Ikhwān's placement of humans among other sub-lunar beings, however, can hardly

be taken as a sign of any egalitarian tendency. Rather, the authors have to grapple with humans'

sub-lunar status, an empirical reality that can neither be ignored nor explained away. It is notable

that even if the authors situate humans with other earthly beings, they strive to draw a distinction

between them and the rest of the sub-lunar world. The human soul is the only non-corruptible

sub-lunar being, and it is only a matter of time before it will move to the heavenly sphere, its true

16

home. The Ikhwān, in fact, consider humans' sub-lunar existence an imprisonment that needs to

be endured, before death will finally liberate them and enable them to join the heavenly sphere.

Remarkably also, in one instance they categorize animals into five classes, namely (1) humans,

(2) birds, (3) sea-animals, (4) two- and four-legged animals, and (5) reptiles.68

Whereas the four

last classes are classified according to their mode of locomotion, humans - who clearly fit with

the fourth category - are singled out as a separate class for no obvious reason other than

anthropocentric considerations.

The authors' effort to draw a distinction between human beings and other animals can be

detected even in the fable, the part of their work where they create the impression of espousing

an egalitarian outlook. In this narrative, the human characters invoke the unity of their form

versus the 'varied forms and contrarious shapes' of other animals to illustrate their own

distinction, a statement that nonhuman animals fail to question.69

This shows that, for the

Ikhwān, human beings are not one among other animal species. Rather, humans stand alone as a

separate class with its own sub-categories, whereas all other animals are lumped together in one

group that is assumed to be more or less uniform, even though empirical observation attests to

the contrary.70

Bakhos also disagrees with Zayn Kassam's view that the Hellenization of the Ikhwān

'brought with it an ontological scheme in which humans were perceived as positioned on the

periphery between the angelic orders and the three natural kingdoms comprising the nonhuman

animal, the vegetal, and the mineral,' maintaining that the hierarchy Kassam 'attributed to

Hellenistic ideas is ... one that the Bible and Qur’ān maintain.'71

Bakhos, however, appears here

to conflate the Qur'an and the Bible with readings thereof. Considering how often these

scriptures have been read through anthropocentric lenses, the possibility that hierarchical ideas

17

have been read into them should not be excluded. In any case, as any careful reader would

immediately notice and as several authors have already pointed out, the Ikhwān's obsessive

preoccupation with hierarchy is probably unmatched in Islamic tradition.72

It is also important to point out that, regardless of how immersed many pre-modern

Muslim thinkers were in hierarchical reasoning, only a few embraced the view that humans'

supposed superior status entitled them to use other creatures for their own benefit, among whom

were the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ.73

Muslims, almost across the board, did assign a higher status to

humankind on one hand and also used many species as sources of food and labour, but only a

minority of scholars (notably, Hanafī jurists) drew a correlation between these two themes. The

legitimacy of using other animals was more often derived from divine authorization, not status

considerations. Since animals were considered sinless, to many Muslims the scriptural sanction

of killing them for food and using them for labour appeared to conflict with the notion of divine

justice, leading many theologians to invoke principles such as afterlife compensation to reconcile

these seemingly incompatible themes. In contrast, the Ikhwān were so convinced that nonhuman

animals' inferiority entailed their servitude that they fail to question this premise even in the

fable, where they appear to align with egalitarianism. This shows that even when the authors try

to espouse egalitarian ethos, their saturation with hierarchical reasoning prevents them from

noticing the oddity of such a claim. Bakhos's attempt to present the Ikhwān as animal champions

and to tone down their hierarchical tendencies seems thus hardly tenable.

This said, it is important to reiterate that even though these authors are an extreme case,

they are not the only Muslim thinkers captivated by order and classification. After all, desire to

dominate and propensity toward hierarchical stratification, whether at the social or the cosmic

levels, may be innate drives in human nature.

18

The fable: Qur’anic subtext and selected themes

The Case of the Animals is a fictional legal suit whereby nonhuman animals take human

beings to the court of the King of the Jinn on account of their abuse of other creatures. A group

of travellers are shipwrecked on a remote fertile island thriving with plants and trees, governed

by a righteous Muslim Jinni king, and inhabited by beasts, cattle, birds, and carnivores who,

prior to the humans’ arrival, lived together in peace and harmony. Seeing the verdant landscape,

the travellers decide to settle and avail themselves of the abundant 'resources' of the island,

including its animal inhabitants. Other animals, who have opted to live in this secluded area

precisely to avoid human tyranny, first resort to flight, and then, when their efforts end in failure,

they take their case to the king's court.

Although animal abuse is the primary trigger of and a recurrent theme in the litigation,

the controversy revolves primarily around the status, rather than the treatment, of animals.

Echoing the authors' views, the human characters contend that their superior status entitles them

to use other creatures. Strangely, both nonhuman animals and the King of the Jinn appear to

accept this premise. Although they challenge the human characters to provide corroboration for

their claims of superiority, they fail to ask why superior status should justify exploitation in the

first place. This lack of questioning is a further indication that the Ikhwān perceive a logical

connection between low status and permissibility of exploitation. This connection, however, is

not as logical or as universal as they seem to assume. Several traditions, most notably Indic ones,

assign to humans a superior status without deducing rights of exploitation thereof. Acceptance of

this premise presupposes also that if in this court case the question of status is settled in humans'

19

favour - which in the end it does - humans would automatically be guaranteed the right to exploit

other creatures.

When challenged to provide evidence for their superiority claims, humans invoke both

scripture and empirical reality. Although they cite only the Qur'an, they maintain that the Torah

and Gospel also affirm that humans are other animals' masters. They also consider humans’

physical constitution, mental faculties, eloquence, and cultural achievements clear manifestations

of natural superiority. The nonhuman animal characters, however, prove these assumptions to be

the result of misconstrued readings of both scripture and nature. A closer look at both reveals

that neither source endorse humans' pretentious claims.

Qur'anic subtext

There is substantial evidence to corroborate the proposition that in this work the Ikhwān

engage primarily with the Qur'an. This scripture is not only the most cited text, as Goodman

points out,74

but it also constitutes this fable’s main subtext both in subtle and manifest ways. In

certain respects this epistle belongs with other works of adab, such as al-Jāḥiẓ’s (d. 255 /869)

Kitāb al-ḥayawān, which were largely a response to the Qur'an's invitation for humankind to

contemplate God’s signs in animals and other creatures with the hope of deducing theological

conclusions. Furthermore, to challenge the notion of humans' uniqueness, nonhuman characters

invoke Qur'anic themes highlighting God's compassion to other creatures. The authors engage

also with the Qur'anic notion of 'taskhīr' (typically translated as subjugation), to contest its

prevalent definition and its impact on nonhuman animals' status. The idealized image of

humankind that one encounters in other parts of the Ikhwān's work is replaced in this epistle with

a more realistic one that is more in tune with the Qur'an's depiction of the human being. The

20

presentation of worldly pleasures and material goods as transient and truly worthless is also

profoundly scriptural. The proposition that size and comparable criteria are irrelevant to the

question of status similarly resonates with the Qur'an. To defend the idea that rationality and

spirituality are not the monopoly of humankind the nonhuman characters also take recourse to

the Qur'an. The proposition that meaningful status has ultimately to translate in tangible results,

precisely: reward or punishment in the hereafter - the penultimate conclusion of the fable - also

stems from the Qur’an.

In short, in spite of the fictional format, this fable can be regarded as an exegetical piece

that is dedicated to the subject of animals in the Qur’an, albeit through Neo-Platonic lenses. The

authors juxtapose two readings of Islam's sacred book: the one anthropocentric, the other less so

(and to some extent it may be described both as theocentric and eco/animal-centric). Proponents

of both positions are able to find substantiation for their views in the Qur'an, however, thanks to

a holistic, intra-textual approach, nonhuman animals' interpretation is consistently more

convincing.

In the next section I will elaborate on these themes to highlight the Qur'anic subtext of

the epistle. As I do, my primary aim is to underline the divergence between the non-

anthropocentric views encountered in the fable and the Ikhwān's thought as we learn about it

from other parts of their work, and the correspondence between these views and the Qur'an along

with adjacent exegetical literature. Before I proceed, it is important to reiterate that the

contestation of hierarchical views notwithstanding, several factors indicate that at a deeper level

the authors' anthropocentric presuppositions continue to shape the views even of their fable’s

nonhuman characters , and once detected, the story’s final outcome becomes less surprising.

Since the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ do not always make the utmost use of the Qur'anic arguments that they

21

cite in defence of the egalitarian position, it is occasionally necessary to elaborate on some of

their propositions to illustrate further how justified their non-anthropocentric reading of the

Qur'an is. Finally, it is important to point out that, although the authors engage primarily with

scriptural themes, their discussion is almost never free of Neo-Platonic overtones. However,

since the main focus of this paper is to highlight the Qur'anic subtext of the epistle, I will refer to

such other themes only in as much as they pertain to the main thesis.

Animals as signs

The authors state in the prologue that one of their goals in writing the animal epistle is

their wish to ‘consider the merits and distinctions of the animals, their admirable traits, pleasing

natures, and wholesome qualities’.75

This type of interest in the animal world is not unique to the

Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ. Among the prominent works that reflect the same fascination with animals one

may cite, for example, al-Jāḥiẓ’s encyclopaedic Kitāb al-ḥayawān (The Book of Animals), al-

Damīrī’s (d. 808/1405) Ḥayāt al-ḥayawān al-kubrā (The Comprehensive Source on the Lives of

Animals),76

and the Shīʿī scholar al-Majlisī’s (d.1111/1699) Tawḥīd al-Mufaḍḍal (Al-Mufaḍḍal’s

Contemplations on God’s Oneness).77

The authors of these works investigate the anatomies and

habits of a large number of animal species, deriving their knowledge from personal observation,

Greek sources (particularly Aristotle’s History of Animals), anecdotal information, and popular

myth. The underlying assumption is that one can learn about the Creator through the signs He

has placed in the created world.

This enterprise is largely motivated by the Qur’an’s invitation to contemplate God’s

creation. God in the Qur'an asks, ‘What, do they not consider how the camel was created? (Q.

88:17)’ and ‘Have they not regarded the birds, that are subjected in the air of heaven? Nothing

22

holds them but God; surely in that are signs for a people who believe' (Q. 16:79).78

In the

creation of cattle there is also a lesson for humankind: 'We give you to drink of what is in their

bellies, between filth and blood, pure milk, sweet to drinkers' (Q. 16: 66). In fact, the Qur'an

appears to present the entire animal world as a locus of signs. Due to its concentric position

between two verses that bring up the ‘sign’ motif, verse 38 in surat al-Anʿām (6) appears to be,

among other things, an invitation for humans to reflect on the animal world. The passage states,

They also say: ‘Why has no sign (āya) been sent down to him from his Lord?’ Say:

‘'Surely God is able to send down a sign, but most of them know not.

No creature is there moving on the earth, no bird flying with its wings, but

they are nations like unto yourselves. We have neglected nothing in the

Book; then to their Lord they shall be mustered.

And those who cry lies to Our signs (āyātinā) are deaf and dumb, dwelling in the

shadows. (Q. 6:37-9).

From this passage it is possible to infer that part of the Qur'an's audience challenged Muhammad

to produce a miraculous sign which would authenticate his message. God's answer appears to be

that there is already a wealth of signs in the animal world for those who truly seek to understand.

Animals as signs of creation is a salient theme in the fable. Like other exponents of the

genre both before and after them, the Ikhwān do not tire of pointing out what they perceive as

wonders in the animal world. One of their characters, the bee, says,

Among our special gifts and blessings from our Lord are the form and frame He gave

us, our fair mores, and the admirable conduct of our lives, truly a lesson for those

with hearts to understand, a portent (āya) for all with eyes to see. For God, in his

wisdom, gave us an intricate and ingenious body and a wondrous form.79

The bee's discourse evokes the Qur'anic sign motif both lexically and thematically. The phrases

'a lesson for those with hearts (ʿibra li-ulī al-albāb)' and a sign 'for those who have eyes (ulī al-

abṣār)' are both Qur'anic and they both present this animal as a sign of creation. The insect

proceeds to give an elaborate description of her anatomy, highlighting how carefully God fitted

23

her body to her needs, enumerates the skills that God taught her, and so forth. In conclusion she

says, 'God has so lavished his gifts and blessings on me that I can hardly list them and adequately

thank Him.'80

Thus, as a sign of creation this insect points to the divine attributes of wisdom,

meticulousness, and compassion. The same applies to the camel, whose long neck is intended 'to

match his long legs ... so he can reach the grass on the ground - and to help him rise with a load,

and so that he can reach all parts of his body with his lip to scratch and rub them.'81

Indeed, each

individual animal the Ikhwān describe in this passage proves to be a recipient of ample divine

attention and each species to be perfectly created. Such features in the animal world point to

God's infinite generosity and perfection.

Besides details of individual species, the Ikhwān present the very diversity of the animal

world as an awe-inspiring phenomenon. As if under the effect of the afore mentioned Qur'anic

passage (Q. 6:37-9), when all animal representatives gathered in the court of the King of the

Jinn, the latter gazed left and right 'Beholding the immense diversity of shapes and forms,

colours, sounds, and songs before him, for some time he was overcome with wonder.' The King

of the Jinn sees in these 'marvellous creatures' the 'handiwork of the All-Merciful,' thus clearly

thinking of animals in their capacity as signs of creation.82

A Jinni philosopher comments on the

King’s wonder saying,

Your majesty is amazed at them, and I am amazed at the wisdom of the Creator who

formed and fashioned them, raised and reared them, who gave them being and

preserves and provides for them still, who knows their every lair and refuge. All this,

writ plain in His Book, with nothing left out or forgotten, but each detail clear and

precise.83

The lexical and thematic connection to the Qur'an is also clear in this passage. The verbs

'khalaqa' (to create/to form), 'ṣawwara' (to fashion), 'razaqa' (to provide for), 'ḥafiḍa' (to

protect/to preserve), and 'dabbara' (to manage)84

may not be distinctly Qur'anic when taken

individually, but when used together they evoke the Qur'an. The sentence '[He] knows their

24

every lair and refuge (yaʿlamu mustaqarrahā wa-mustawdaʿahā)' is quoted from the Qur'an. This

jinni also reiterates the theological conclusion expressed in the same verse (Q.6:38), denoting

God's omniscience (the fact that everything is written in the divine Book), and highlights God's

infinite mercy, wisdom, care and compassion toward all species. The Qur'anic invitation to

ponder the animal world is thus clearly answered in the Ikhwān's fable.

Providence

The human characters cite many Qur'anic verses which, on the surface, appear to bear out

their claim that they are God's favourites, such as verses allowing them to consume the flesh of

cattle and to use camels and equine for transportation.85

The mule, who undertakes the refutation

of this claim, does not contest the fact that the Qur'an often highlights God's favours toward

humankind, but questions the conclusions that the human delegate construes from this theme. To

counter this argument, the mule invokes a verse to the effect that God laid down the earth to all

creatures (al-anām, Q.55:10), proposing that the word 'anām' means 'animals and plants.' The

mule appears to imply that humans have no right to lay exclusive claim to God's care and

compassion.

The mule's interpretation is somewhat problematic, since Arabic sources typically do not

include plants in the definition of the word 'anām,' but the non-anthropocentric undertone of his

argument is pertinent and perhaps corroborated in early lexical material. Arabic lexicons and

Qur'anic commentaries define the word 'anām' either as 'humans and jinn (only)' or as 'all

creatures (al-khalq)/every creature that has a soul (kullu shayʾ fīhi al-rūḥ).'86

The first definition

does not make humans the only recipients of God's compassion, yet by making them one of only

two species for whom the earth is laid down, it is closer to the anthropocentric end of the

25

spectrum than the second definition. The second extends to all animals and is thus non-

anthropocentric. The fact that several early exegetes understand the word 'anām' as 'all living

creatures' shows that the mule's interpretation is indeed anchored in the exegetical tradition. The

more inclusive and therefore less anthropocentric definition (all creatures) is also more

consonant with the one encountered in the early dictionary Kitāb al-ʿayn, attributed to al-Khalīl

ibn Aḥmad (d. 170/786). Unlike later dictionaries, in this work the word 'anām' is defined as 'all

creatures on earth' (mā ʿalā ẓahr al-arḍ min jamīʿ al-khalq), with no mention of the less

encompassing meaning (humans and jinn).87

From this, it is perhaps justified to infer that closer

to the time of revelation the word 'anām' referred to all living beings, which tilts the scales in

favour of the mule's interpretation.

The mule's view gains more weight from related Qur'anic themes. From its very

beginning this scripture describes God as the 'Lord of all Being (Rabb al-ʿālamīn)' (Q1:2).

Although as with the word 'anām,' 'ʿālamīn' is occasionally interpreted as 'humans and jinn

(only),' many exegetes prefer a more encompassing definition. Al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) comments

on the word 'Rabb' saying that God in this capacity is in charge of His creation's affairs through

the blessings He bestows on them (al-muṣliḥ amra khalqihi bi-mā asbagha ʿalayhim min

niʿamihi)' and cites the early exegete ibn ʿAbbās (d. 68/687), who defines the word 'ʿālamīn' as

'all creation, including all heavens and every being in them and all earths and every being on

them and everything in between, whether known or unknown (to humans).'88

Al-Zajjāj (d.

311/923) also defines the word 'ʿālamīn' as 'everything that God has created (kullu mā khalaqa

Allāh).'89

The mule's implied point (the fact that God's care is not limited to humankind) is thus

discernible from the Qur'an and distinctly reflected in its exegetical tradition.

26

The mule makes another insightful observation: the verses that humans cite in

corroboration of their privileged status, he maintains, 'point only to the kindness and blessings

God bestowed on mankind'.90

Consistent with this comment, the Qur'anic passages that highlight

God's favours toward humankind often stress God's attributes of mercy and compassion, never

humans' merit. For example, in the middle of one of the passages discussing the uses of cattle,

one finds the assertion, 'Surely your Lord is clement, compassionate' (Q.16:7). Remarkably also,

through the enumeration of God's favours the Qur'an seeks to encourage humans to show

gratitude and to give thanks to God. The clause 'laʿallakum tashkurūn' (that you [people] may

give thanks) occurs fourteen times in the Qur'an as a comment on God's favours to all people or

to specific groups thereof. Humans, however, mostly fail to give thanks, as indicated by the oft

repeated formulae: 'qalīlan mā tashkurūn' (rarely do you [humans] give thanks), and 'akthar al-

nās lā yashkurūn' (most people do not give thanks). This further supports the proposition that the

enumeration of God's favours toward humankind does not serve to illustrate their distinction. If

anything, it serves to illustrate their shortcomings, particularly their ingratitude and failure to

reflect. The mule's objection to humans' interpretation is thus warranted.

Taskhīr (presumably, subjugation)

From the humans' mention of the permissibility to use animals as a source of food and

service, the mule appears to have inferred that they allude to the notion of 'taskhīr,' typically

translated as 'subjugation' and often taken as a clear indication of humans' privileged status in the

Qur'an. Although this scripture does not say that nonhuman animals in particular are

'musakhkhar' (presumably subjugated) to human beings,91

the Ikhwān are still justified to assume

that this is the case, as this scripture says that 'God "sakhkhara" to you (i.e. humans) whatsoever

27

is in the heavens and earth' (Q. 31:20). This comprehensive nature of 'taskhīr,' however, creates a

thorny problem within the Neo-Platonic worldview, as it connotes the superiority of humans

even to heavenly bodies. In other parts of their work, the Ikhwān solve this problem by treating

the 'taskhīr' of heavenly bodies and that of other beings differently. The 'taskhīr' of stars and

constellations, they explain, pertains to their various motions and positions (for example setting

or rising).92

Although life itself is sustained thanks to these movements (should the sun cease to

set or rise, for example, the weather would become either too hot or too cold for plants and

animals to survive), the Ikhwān construe no hierarchy from this type of 'service.'93

In this case,

'taskhīr' simply means that through their movement heavenly bodies benefit humans and other

sub-lunar beings.

In contrast, outside the animal epistle the 'taskhīr' of earthly creatures to humans is

explained in terms of authority and dominion. The authors maintain that

God subjected (sakhkhara) to man everything in the earth, including animals, plants,

and minerals, thus enabling him (man) to rule over them as a lord (ghadā

mutaḥakkiman fīhā taḥakkum al-arbāb), and to manage them as a king (mutaṣarrifan

fīhā taṣarruf al-mulūk).94

Since 'taskhīr' here entails domination, it is clear that the authors understand it as 'subjugation.'

The Ikhwān explain also that 'because of its deficient and inferior status, the animal soul is made

to serve and to be subjugated to the rational human soul (lammā kānat rutbat al-nafs al-

ḥayawāniyya anqaṣ wa-adwan min al-nafs al-insāniyya juʿilat khādimatan wa-musakhkharatan

li-al-nafs al-insāniyya al-nāṭiqa).'95

In this case 'taskhīr' entails inferior and servile status. The

Ikhwān are thus able to safeguard the superior status of heavenly beings while inferring the

inferiority of nonhuman animals from the notion of 'taskhīr' through a dual approach of this

principle. The animal delegate's strategy consists merely of contesting this double standard. If the

28

'taskhīr' of the sun and the moon does not imply that these heavenly bodies are men's slaves and

chattels, then neither should the 'taskhīr' of animals, he contends.

The mule's observation is pertinent regardless of whether or not one takes into account

the afore-mentioned Neo-Platonic concerns. The Qur'an speaks not only of the 'taskhīr' of

physical beings, but also of natural phenomena, such as the day and the night, to human beings.

In view of this, to interpret 'taskhīr' as subjugation and to construe from it a hierarchical

relationship would be unconventional, to say the least. Indeed, study of this concept in its various

Qur'anic contexts shows that rather than 'subjugation,' it means 'adaptation.' 'Taskhīr 'connotes

that God designed the world in ways that humans (and probably other creatures) find convenient

and fitting to their needs. For Qur'anic exegetes the 'taskhīr' of stars means, among other things,

that they help travellers find their destinations. The 'taskhīr' of the sea and ships means that they

have traits that allow humans to travel. The 'taskhīr' of the day and the night means that humans

can make a living during the one and rest during the other, and so forth. Humans can thus benefit

from things that are 'musakhkhar' (adapted rather than subjugated) to them, but they neither

control them nor is it typical to consider humans superior to these beings and phenomena.96

Even

in the case of ships, humans have only the outward appearance of controlling them. In reality,

Qur'anic commentators maintain, they are under the control of God, who can at will either drown

or save them.

Consistent with the mule's remarks, then, this same line of reasoning suggests that

'taskhīr' of nonhuman animals to humans entails service without necessarily denoting authority

or bearing on animals' status. Indeed, in several commentaries, the 'taskhīr' of camels is

interpreted as a reference to their (innate) amenability to humans, with no mention of relative

29

hierarchical status. This shows that the mule's interpretation is convincing, a more holistic

approach to the Qur'an, and grounded in the exegetical tradition.97

Humans' origin

The mule raises another important point when, in refuting humans' claims, he cites a

verse to the effect that God created humans out of humble water.98

In the Islamic scripture the

creation of the human race is traced to 'black fetid slime (ḥamaʾ masnūn),' a foul substance by

humans' own standards, whereas the 'water' from which individual humans are created (i.e.

sperm-drop) is described as 'mahīn' (insignificant, humble). The use of the adjectives 'masnūn'

(fetid, foul) and 'mahīn' (humble) signals an intention to emphasize the modesty of humans'

origin, both at the species and individual levels. Moreover, on multiple occasions, the Islamic

scripture underlines the paradox of unbelief and haughty behaviour of the human being who, at

some point was no more than a drop of fluid. It says, for example, ' Has not the human being

regarded how that We created him of a sperm-drop? Then, he is a manifest adversary.' (Q.

36:77); it also says, 'Perish the human being! How unthankful he is! Of what did He create him?

Of a sperm-drop He created him' (Q. 80:17-9). Among other things, these verses serve to curb,

rather than promote, humans' feelings of self-importance, and thus the fable’s theme of humans'

lowly origin is, once again, more in tune with the Qur'an than it is with the rest of the Ikhwān's

work.

In contrast, the Ikhwān's eagerness to glamorize the human race is clearly discernible

from their rendering of the creation narrative outside the fable. 'When God wanted to place on

earth someone to rule it on His behalf (khalīfa lahu),' they write,

He first moulded from dirt a wonderfully designed and beautifully refined frame

(haykal ʿajīb al-binya, ẓarīf al-khilqa) with many organs and numerous powers. From

30

that frame He fashioned an image that surpassed in beauty the images of all other

animals ... He then blew into it of His spirit, thus joining the earthly body with the

best (aḥsan) and the noblest (ashraf) spiritual soul (nafs rūḥāniyya).99

Although the Ikhwān do not suppress the 'dirt' part (or are they unable to, considering its explicit

mention in the Qur'an and the Bible?), the added details transform a narrative that seemingly

seeks to downplay humans' humbleness in order to highlight their distinction. The human frame

is 'beautifully refined' and 'wonderfully designed' and humans surpass all other animals in

beauty, they write. This, again, shows that the non-anthropocentric undertone of the mule's

interpretation stems from the Qur'an rather than from the Ikhwān's worldview.

Human character

The mule describes aspects of humans' behaviour which point to their wickedness and

corruption. 'Your Majesty,' he complains to the King,

[I]f you consider how dense, vulgar, uncouth, and foul-mouthed humans are, you'll be

amazed at how little they discern their own odious ways, vicious traits, depraved

characters, and vile actions, their manifold barbarities, corrupt notions, and

conflicting dogmas.100

The divergence between this image and the Ikhwān's overall depiction of humankind has

probably become too obvious to require any further reiteration; in contrast, the correspondence

between the mule's report and the Qur'an's presentation of humans requires elucidation.

Someone who ponders the Qur'an's description of humankind would find much to

warrant the bleak image that emerges from the mule's complaints. Ingratitude, arrogance, hot-

bloodedness, injustice, niggardliness, and fretfulness are among the chief attributes that are

associated with the word 'insān' (human being) in the Qur'an. The human being 'is most sinful

(ẓalūm), most unthankful (kaffār)', one finds in surat Ibrāhīm (Q. 14:34); 'when evil visits him,

then he is cast down and desperate' (Q. 41:49); 'When some affliction visits the human being, he

31

calls upon his Lord, turning to him; then when He confers on him a blessing from Him he forgets

that he was calling to before and sets up compeers to God” ' (Q. 39:8). This portrayal is a far cry

from the flattering image one repeatedly encounters in the Ikhwān's work, obviously, excepting

the fable.

The relative correspondence between the depiction of humankind in the Qur'an and the

animal epistle is due to the change in the Ikhwān's outlook. In other sections of their opus the

authors are occasionally critical of certain human behaviours or social classes but discuss the

human race at large in terms of idealized images which hardly correspond to humans' lived

reality. In contrast, in this epistle the authors allow their animal characters to describe human

behaviours as they are often experienced in reality. The resulting parallel with the Qur'an is

remarkable.

It is also important to point out that, in spite of its generally critical view of humankind,

the Qur'an presents believers who do good deeds in a positive light, even while asserting that

these are a minority ('few indeed are those that are thankful among My servants' Q.34:13; 'Yet,

be you [Muhammad] ever so eager, the most part of humanity believe not.' Q.12:103). The

Ikhwān's animal characters also point to the fact that piety and kindness are rare among

humankind, thus agreeing with the Qur'an. The most pious among humans, they maintain, would

prefer the company of wild beasts to the company of their fellow species members.101

This image

is not exactly Qur'anic, but it constitutes a departure from the anthropocentric views which

permeate the rest of the Ikhwān's work, and a move towards theocentric ones, which are more in

tune with the Qur'an. In both the fable and the Islamic scripture humans are mostly depicted in a

negative light, and those who are excluded from this depiction owe this exclusion to their piety

and obedience to God.

32

Human shape

There is, however, one Qur'anic instance in which the word 'insān' appears to evoke a

positive connotation, when God says that He created humankind in the ‘best stature’ (aḥsan

taqwīm) (Q. 95:4). When the human characters assert that their 'fair form, erect stature, upright

carriage, and keen senses' entitle them to be other animals' masters, the King of the Jinn initially

finds this a fair claim, first because sitting erect, in his view, is a royal trait, whereas bent backs

and bowed heads are the marks of slaves; and second because the Qur'an, he maintains, bears

this claim out, as it says that God created humans in the best shape.102

Obviously, the mule

disagrees. He argues that various body postures have nothing to do with status; rather, they are

assigned according to the specific needs of each group of beings. Both humans' erect form and

animals' bent form are meant to allow them to reach their sustenance, consisting, respectively, of

tree fruits and grass.103

Fair form, on the other hand, is not the monopoly of humans. The point of

the Qur'anic phrase 'best stature,' the mule contends, is not to compare humans to other creatures;

rather, it is to compare the different shapes in which God could have created humans. Out of

innumerable possibilities, God chose for them the most appropriate height that best fits their

needs. But this is a privilege that God extended to all creatures, as He 'adapted the parts of every

species to its needs in seeking the beneficial and avoiding the harmful.' To claim otherwise, the

mule continues, is to ascribe imperfection to God, for 'a slight to the work is an affront to its

Maker.'104

This interpretation is inconsistent with the views that one encounters elsewhere in the

Ikhwān's work. As pointed out earlier, these authors explicitly state in the prologue that humans'

erect stature is a sign of their natural superiority and go so far as to infer humans' right to rule

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over other animals, plants, and minerals from the fact that they are created in the 'fairest

image.'105

In the ninth epistle they write that God created humans in a better shape (aḥsan ṣūra)

than all other animals.106

The proposition that the phrase 'aḥsan taqwīm' is intended as a comparison between the

various shapes in which God could have created the human being, on the other hand, is

encountered in works of Qur'anic exegesis predating the Ikhwān's work. Al-Ṭabarī reports that

the early exegetes ʿIkrima (d.105/723) and ibn ʿAbbās proposed it and he himself (al-Ṭabarī)

prefers it.107

The Qur'an says also that God 'gave to every creature its nature than guided it'

(Q.20:50) as the mule reminds. Consistent with the interpretation that the mule appears to imply,

another early exegete, Mujāhid (d. 104/722), comments on verse Q. 20:50 saying that God

'perfected the creation of every animal then taught and guided it to what benefits it (sawwā

khalqa kulli dābba thumma hadāhā li-mā yuṣliḥuhā wa-ʿallamahā iyyāh).108

The mule could also

have cited Q. 32:7, stating that God 'has created all things well,' which further corroborates the

proposition that humans are not favoured over other creatures with respect to their shape.

More importantly, however, this animal could have exposed humans' selective approach

by citing the entire passage where the phrase 'aḥsan taqwīm' occurs, for the two subsequent

verses state, 'Then We restored him [the human being] to the lowest of the low, save those who

believe, and do righteous deeds' (Q. 95:5-6). Irrespective of how one interprets the phrase 'aḥsan

taqwīm,' then, any status that stems from it is transient. In the end these verses re-affirm the

theocentric message, since they proclaim that ultimate and meaningful status must be earned

through faith in God and obedience to Him.

Material privileges

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Humans further invoke 'luxurious gifts,' including fancy foods, clothing, cushions, mats,

and other sources of worldly pleasures, to illustrate their superiority.109

The nightingale and the

jackal, who take up the refutation of this argument, first point to the subjective and misinformed

nature of humans' claims. Other animals enjoy their foods as much as humans do, they say, and

are neither wanting nor any less pleased with the comparable items that God gave them, for God

caused their clothing, cushions, and carpets to grow on their own bodies.110

Besides, animals are

spared the toil and health problems that humans endure for the sake of obtaining and as a

consequence of relishing in these items.111

More importantly, since humans often obtain material

gains in improper ways and use them in ungodly ways, their extravagances may result in serious

woes and retributions in the hereafter.112

These points resonate strongly with the Qur'an, in which many verses recommend

detachment from material privileges and moderation in enjoying them. Time and again this

scripture asserts that God provides for all living beings, human or nonhuman, thus indicating that

when it comes to meeting creatures' needs human beings are not singled out. Moreover, this

scripture warns that wealth is but a trial (Q. 8:28; Q. 64:15) and asserts that luxury is at best

irrelevant to God and at worst a peril to afterlife happiness: 'It is not your wealth nor your

children that shall bring you nearer to Us, except for him who believes, and does righteousness'

(Q. 34:37). The Qur'an also states, 'those who treasure up gold and silver, and do not expend

them in the way of God—inform them of a painful chastisement' (Q. 9:34). Historically, the

Qur'an also reminds, those who resisted God's message were mostly the well-to-do: 'We never

sent before you any warner into any city, except that its affluent ones (mutrafūn) said, "We

indeed found our fathers on a course, and we are following upon their traces"' (Q. 43:23).

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Worldly privileges are thus fraught with temptations that may lead one away from the

path of God, so humans’ access to them does not signify extra closeness to God (and can rather

induce the opposite state). The Qur'an does not denounce enjoyment of food, clothing, and other

divine gifts, ('Say: “Who has forbidden the ornament of God which He brought forth for His

servants and the good things of His providing?” ' Q. 7:32), however, it warns against

excessiveness and extravagance ('eat and drink, but be you not prodigal. He [God] loves not the

prodigal' Q. 7:31). The nightingale and the jackal's view that the virtue of moderation is rather

alien to the human species is more consistent with the Qur'an, as is their point about the

irrelevance of luxury in matters of status.

Size

In the fable's prologue the Ikhwān maintain that 'larger-bodied' animals are 'more

perfectly formed' than smaller ones.113

When nonhuman animals are given a chance to speak up,

however, a more egalitarian outlook emerges. The cricket notes that despite the great diversity of

creation, all animals, regardless of how small or large, 'were treated equably in the giving of

generous gifts.' Contrary to the idea presented in the prologue, the equitable treatment extends to

all animals' physical constitutions and capabilities. Comparing the elephant to the gnat, the

cricket says,

God gave the elephant his great bulk and mighty frame, the long, strong tusks he uses

to defend himself from harm, and the long trunk he uses to grasp what is useful to

him. But he also gave the tiny, frail gnat two delicate wings matched to his size, the

power to fly swiftly and escape harm, and his own tiny proboscis, to take in

nourishment. So the great and small are put on equal footing by the gifts they use to

obtain what is good for them and avoid what is harmful …[God] gave each ample

means to secure its interests—to pursue the beneficial and guard against harm.114

The choice of the gnat in this comparison is probably triggered by the Qur'an, which says,

'God does not hesitate to strike a similitude even of a gnat, or aught above it (Q. 2:26).' This

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verse inspired generations of exegetes and theologians to consider how worthy of mention this

and other insects are. Al-Jāḥiẓ, for example, warns against taking insects and other seemingly

insignificant creatures lightly, for 'How many a nation did ants force to leave their lands, did

mice destroy, did gnats torture, and did flies cause to suffer. These are God's soldiers. He uses

them to destroy the tyrants, oppressors, and transgressors.'115

The gnat is often singled out as

particularly worthy of reflection. In al-Jāḥiẓ's opinion even the wing of this insect is so full of

wonders that a clear-minded and focused person who ponders its creation could fill volumes

describing it.116

In the Ikhwān's fable as well, the gnat proves, upon scrutiny, to be not only as

perfect as the elephant, it is even 'more marvellously built and more elegantly designed'; for

whereas the latter has only four legs, the gnat has six. 'Despite her size, she's deadlier and more

baneful than an elephant, and he cannot get the better of her.'117

There is clear contradiction between the views expressed here and those stated elsewhere

in the Ikhwān's work. The elephant is indeed one of three animals that stand at the top of the

nonhuman animal world in the Ikhwān's version of the Chain of Being, along with the ape and

the horse. The authors account for this classification by the fact that the ape is the closest to

humans in shape, so much so that even his soul became a replica of the human soul. The horse is

admired for his nobility and good manners, which are so exemplary that some horses would

abstain from answering the call of nature in the presence of their riders and kings; horses'

intelligence, bravery, and endurance of stabs and wounds in wars also illustrate their merit.

Finally, the elephant owes his special status to his great intelligence, thanks to which he can

understand human speech and respond to commands and prohibitions.118

In recapitulation, the

Ikhwān write that these three animals owe their distinction to 'the human virtues that are manifest

in them' (limā yaẓhar fīhā min al-faḍāʾil al-insāniyya). This anthropocentric outlook is disrupted

37

in the fable. Anatomically and behaviourally the gnat has much less in common with humans

than the elephant, and, being an insect whose bites can cause swelling and irritation, humans

typically find it disagreeable. This insect thus owes its distinguished status to its Qur'anic

mention. This, again, shows how the Qur'an's theocentrism keeps disrupting the Ikhwān's

anthropocentric worldview.

Reason and knowledge

The invocation of the rationality argument elicits a unique reaction: upon hearing it, the

assembly 'fell silent for a time, considering the virtues and gifts that the human said (dhakara)

God had lavished on the Adamites, distinguishing them from all other animals.'119

Although the

nonhuman characters soon rise to the challenge, this mere pause illustrates the special weight

that the Ikhwān assign to the rationality criterion in establishing humans' distinction. This

reaction is, indeed, one further indication of the author's underlying biases and foretelling the

final outcome. Their seeming willingness to give their nonhuman characters a chance

notwithstanding, deep down they believe that the superiority of the human race is too obvious for

anyone to fail to notice it. Even their nonhuman characters have to pay tribute, albeit subtly, to

this human feature before re-launching their attacks.

While they have a chance, the nonhuman characters have no shortage of counterpoints.

First, they point out that knowledge and discernment are not the monopoly of humankind. The

bee states, 'Had [humans] considered our natures and studied our lives, they would have seen

clearly from how we manage our affairs and co-operate to secure our interest that we, too, have

knowledge and understanding, awareness, discernment, thought, judgement, and governance,

subtler, wiser, and finer than theirs.'120

Consistent with the views of many modern ethologists,

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the mere fact that nonhuman animals manage their lives well and take care of their own needs is

taken here as an indication of underlying complex mental processes. The reason why humans are

unaware of other animals' intelligence, the bee explains, is that they (humans) have not

considered the natures or studied the lives of other species.

Although the bee draws her supporting evidence from empirical (rather than scriptural)

data, her argument may still have some basis in the Qur'an. Whether or not this scripture ascribes

rationality to nonhuman animals cannot be firmly established, however, many exegetes inferred

this theme from the Qur'an's ascription of spirituality to them (nonhuman animals). A more

subtle link can also be discerned in the 'signs' theme. Since the bee blames humans' lack of

awareness of other animals' skills on lack of study, it may be argued that, had humans responded

to the Qur'an's invitation to ponder God's creation, they would have become aware of such skills.

Failure to have an adequate appreciation of nonhuman animals' skills can thus be blamed on the

failure to respond properly to this Qur'anic invitation.

The second counterpoint consists of the exposure of the flaws inherent in human

knowledge. The parrot maintains that the sciences and disciplines in which humans take much

pride are often pointless or even harmful. Geometers and surveyors, for example, 'busy

themselves with proofs too subtle to follow and theorems too remote to conceive – that only

distract one from the sciences one really needs.'121

Philosophers and logicians lead people astray

with their many disputes, conflicting opinions, doctrines, and schools.122

Physicians are needed

only because of humans' unhealthy lifestyles, and so forth.123

Readers who are familiar with the rest of the Ikhwān's work will know better than to take

this refutation seriously. In one of their epistles the authors write,

Know, our dear brother ... that sciences are numerous, and that all of them are noble

(anna al-ʿulūma kullahā sharīfa). He who studies them will find glory and he who

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seeks them will be saved. In their acquisition there is life for the soul and comfort for

the heart. In their study there is guidance, salvation from the darkness of ignorance,

and happiness in this life and the next.124

Due to their obsession with hierarchical classification, the Ikhwān proceed to rank sciences

according to their respective merits, but this is only a matter of degree. In the end all sciences are

meritorious and the acquisition of any of them is praiseworthy. It should be remembered also that

the Ikhwān are not mere advocates of geometry and philosophy, they are practitioners of these

disciplines. If anything, then, the parrot's criticism illustrates the authors' sense of humour and

ability to laugh at themselves.

Although at first glance it may be difficult to perceive the Qur'anic basis of the parrot's

criticism, deeper scrutiny reveals that even if this point is not derived directly from this scripture,

it is at least consonant with it. The Qur'an, of course, does not discuss philosophers, geometers,

or any of the practitioners of the disciplines that became known to Arabs and Muslims post-

revelation, but it discusses an equivalent group: poets. It says, 'And the poets – the perverse

follow them; have you not seen how they wander in every valley and how they say which they

do not? Save those that believe, and do righteous deeds, and remember God oft (Q. 26:224-7).

From this criticism, it is possible to see that poetry, the wellspring of Arabs' knowledge and the

one discipline in which this nation continues to take pride to the present day, is depicted in the

Qur'an in a negative light. The Qur'an, however, does not issue a sweeping judgment: poets who

remember God abundantly are excluded from this criticism, which reaffirms this scripture's

theocentric worldview. Poetry is thus neither inherently negative nor – contrary to what Arabs

tend to think – is it inherently positive. Rather, its merit depends on whether or not it subscribes

to the Qur'anic theocentric system. The parallel between the Qur'an's criticism of poets and the

parrot's criticism of philosophers is quite discernible. Both groups are generally commended for

40

their assumed grasp of knowledge and wisdom, yet in these criticisms both are depicted as a

source of confusion and misguidance.

The same theocentric outlook may be sensed in the Qur'an's evaluation of humans'

capacity for contemplation. From God's repeated invitations to humankind to ponder (tafakkar)

the signs (āyāt) placed in the Qur'an and in the natural world, one is justified to conclude that

reason is presented as a valuable tool. However, God in the Qur'an asserts that most humans, or

at least most of the specific groups discussed in the sacred text, particularly Muhammad's

Meccan opponents and the people of the Book who continued to reject his message, failed to

ponder God's signs, as evidenced by this very rejection. This failure is not a slight matter. The

dwellers of the hellfire, the Qur'an tells us, will regret their misuse, or lack of use, of their

rational faculties. 'If we had only heard, or had understood,' they will bewail, 'we would not have

been of the inhabitants of the Blaze!' (Q. 67:10). Thus, what appears to count from a Qur'anic

standpoint is not the mere possession of rational faculties, but rather the use of these faculties to

engage with God's message. As such, reason may be compared to wealth and other divine gifts,

the merit of which is contingent on whether or not they are used in ways pleasing to God.

Language

Related to the rationality argument, nonhuman animals maintain also that they have

sophisticated linguistic faculties and find ample corroboration in the Qur'an for their claim.

Addressing his human opponents, the parrot says,

[I]f you could follow the discourse of the birds, the anthems of the swarming

creatures, the hymns of the crawling creatures, the hosannas of the beasts, the

meditative murmur of the cricket, entreaty of the frog, admonitions of the bulbul,

homilies of the larks, the sandgrouse's lauds and the cranes' celebration, the cock's

call to worship, the poetry doves utter in their cooing and the soothsaying ravens in

their croaking, what the swallows describe and the hoopoe reports, what the ant tells

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and the bee relates, what the flies portend and the owl cautions, and all the other

animals with a buzz or roar, you would know, O human race, you would realize that

among these throngs are orators and eloquent speakers, theologians, preachers,

admonishers, and diviners, just as there are among the sons of Adam.125

The parrot finds substantiation for this claim in the Qur'anic verse, 'nothing is, that does not

proclaim His praise, but you do not understand their extolling' (Q. 17:44). The bird comments on

this verse saying: 'God calls you dim and benighted when He says you understand not. He

connects us with insight, good sense, and awareness when He says, Each knows his worship and

praise.' The parrot seems to read too much into this Qur'anic theme. The statement 'you

understand not' in this verse applies to humans' inability to understand the praising hymns of

nonhuman creatures, and can hardly be taken to imply that God calls (all) humans dim and

benighted. Still, the suggestion that nonhuman animals have languages seems to be defendable

on Qur'anic grounds.

The idea that nonhuman animals have communication systems (regardless of whether or

not one calls them languages) finds further corroboration in a passage in surat al-Naml (The

Ants, Q. 27:18-28), reporting the speeches of an ant and a hoopoe that were miraculously

accessible to the Prophet Solomon. The Ikhwān refer to this passage,126

but hardly construe from

it any conclusions pertaining to nonhuman animals' rational and linguistic faculties. This is

perhaps hardly surprising, considering, again, how threatening a deeper engagement with the

rationality theme is to anthropocentric presumptions. Rationality and language, after all, are

prevalently taken as the primary foundation of humans' uniqueness. Even the translators of the

epistle, who note some overlap between this Qur'anic passage and a somewhat related Biblical

one, appear to dismiss the Qur'anic version as a mere fantasy. They write, 'It is reported at 1

Kings 5:13 (MT) that Solomon discoursed of the trees, of the beasts, of the creeping creatures,

and of the fish, but the makers of legends took it that he spoke not of the birds and beasts but

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with them.'127

Similarly, many Muslim exegetes insist that the two animals who exchanged

speeches with Solomon were taught language miraculously, even though this interpretation is

inconsistent with the Qur'anic rendering of this narrative, in which the miracle consists of

Solomon's ability to understand other species' languages. The insistence to reduce this theme to

mere fantasy or miracle shows that the Ikhwān are hardly an exception in clinging to human's

exceptionalism.

Religion versus spirituality

The human characters also take recourse to religion to prove their superiority. God, they

argue, has favoured them with prophecy and inspiration, graced them with miracles and revealed

books, and blessed them with a number of religious obligations, including purifications, fasts,

charity and alms.128

Animals do not see things in the same light. The fact that humans have

prophets among them is an indication of their wickedness rather than virtue. After all, ‘No one

but the sick needs a doctor,’ and prophets are physicians of the soul.129

The nightingale, who

takes up the refutation of this argument, substantiates this view with the Qur'anic statements,

'Prayer forbids indecency and dishonor' (Q. 29:45) and 'the good deeds will drive away the evil

deeds' (Q. 11:114).130

This refutation presumes that humans have a natural inclination toward

what is shameful and foul and toward bad deeds (al-sayyiʾāt), for which prayer and good deeds

are prescribed as remedies. The bird maintains also that animals have no need for messengers

because they are 'inspired innately, directly by God, with all [they] need know.'131

The Qur'anic

evidence for this opinion is found in the verses 'And thy Lord revealed unto the bees, saying:

'Take unto yourselves, of the mountains, houses, and of the trees, and of what they are building.'

(Q. 16:68) and 'Each [bird] knows His worship and praise' (Q. 24:41). Thus, whereas animals

43

appear to be indifferent to or even critical of institutional religion, they are careful to emphasize

their own spirituality.

Had the Ikhwān's engagement with the anthropocentrism/theocentrism question been

more genuine, nonhuman animals could have won the case using the spirituality argument, for

not only does the Qur'an affirm the spirituality of the nonhuman world in no vague terms, it also

adopts spirituality, rather than rationality, as the decisive criterion in matters of status. The

spirituality of the nonhuman world is discernible, for example, in the themes of tasbīḥ

(glorification of God) and sujūd (prostration to God), which the Qur'an ascribes to nonhuman

beings, both animate and inanimate. This scripture repeatedly asserts that 'All that is in the

heavens and the earth magnifies God' (Q. 57:1; Q. 59:1, 24; Q. 61:1; Q. 62:1; Q. 64:1). It also

says 'To God bows everything in the heavens, and every creature crawling on the earth, and the

angels. They have not waxed proud' (Q. 16:49). Although through anthropocentric lenses

nonhuman beings' spirituality has often been reduced to mere mechanical behaviour, stripped of

meaning, it still remains a fact that the Qur'anic language used to describe this behaviour denotes

spirituality. This description, moreover, stands in clear contrast with the Qur'anic assertion that

most humans fail to believe in and submit themselves to God. Whatever the nature of nonhuman

beings' spirituality, the mere fact that the Qur'an ascribes it to the nonhuman world and considers

it scarce among humankind sheds doubt on the assumption that the entire human race is God's

most valuable creation.

The Qur'an also says,

The unbelievers of the people of the Book and the idolaters shall be in the Fire of

Gehenna, therein dwelling forever; those are the worst of creatures. But those who

believe, and do righteous deeds, those are the best of creatures; their recompense is

with their Lord – Gardens of Eden, underneath which rivers flow, therein dwelling

for ever and ever. God is well-pleased with them, and they are well-pleased with

Him; that is for him who fears his Lord (Q. 98:6-8).

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This passage confirms the proposition that, from a Qur'anic standpoint, status is contingent on

faith and deeds, not species membership: disbelievers are the worst of creation whereas believers

who do good deeds are the best of creation. Status is also translatable into reward or punishment

in the hereafter and God's pleasure or lack thereof. Thus, even though humans can be said to

have a chance at becoming superior, they still have to earn this rank through faith in God and

good deeds.

Resurrection

The turning point in the court case starts when a human delegate from the Ḥijāz claims

that, of all living beings, humans only will be resurrected, then proceeds to enumerate the

delights awaiting his race in the hereafter.132

This is a strange point. Commenting on it, Kassam

says,

[A]s Muslims, one would have expected the Ikhwān to be intimately familiar with the

Qur’ānic text that relates in 6:38: ‘‘There is not an animal in the earth, nor a flying

creature flying on two wings, but they are peoples like unto you. We have neglected

nothing in the Book [of our decrees]. Then unto their Lord they will be gathered’’

which suggests that animals will be taken up into their Lord just as humans will be.133

Indeed, the notion of nonhuman animals' resurrection can be inferred from several Qur'anic

verses, is explicitly stated in the Hadith, and is too widely accepted in Islamic texts predating the

Ikhwān's work for them to be unfamiliar with it. This theme thus appears to be deliberately

suppressed due to its total incompatibility with the Ikhwān's worldview. As pointed out on

numerous occasions, the authors place animals, along with plants, minerals, and the four

elements in what they call 'the world of generation and degeneration (ʿālam al-kawn wa-al-

fasād).'134

Humans' rational soul is the only sub-lunar being that is able to attain salvation from

the ocean of matter (baḥr al-hayūlā) and the prison of nature (asr al-ṭabīʿa), once it is separated

from the body. Then it will rise to the heavenly sphere (malakūt al-samāʾ) and join the angelic

45

world135

to relish in blissful existence eternally thereafter.136

This idea is too foundational to the

Ikhwān's system for them to entertain giving nonhuman animals an afterlife.

Nonhuman animals do not give up yet. Even though they do not challenge the proposition

that they have no share in the afterlife, they astutely manage to turn this argument to their

benefit. Lack of resurrection is not all loss, they argue, for in the same way that it deprives them

of heavenly rewards, it also protects them from the tortures of hell, which awaits the wicked

members of the human race. The nonhuman animals thus resort to the Qur'anic theme of afterlife

accountability to counter humans' claims. Astonishingly, rather than engaging with this theme,

the human characters strike their winning point simply by re-invoking a number of arguments

that have already been refuted. The Ḥijāzī delegate exclaims in what appears like an exasperated

tone:

How are we equal? ... How do we stand on a par, when we have among us prophets

and their devisees, imams, sages, poets, and paragons of goodness and virtue, saints

and their seconds, ascetics, pure and righteous figures, persons of piety, insight,

understanding, awareness and vision, who are like the angels of high! They quest

after the highest goods, yearn after their Lord, turn to Him in all things and ever

hearken to Him. They look to Him, contemplate His greatness and splendour, trust

Him in all things, beseech Him alone, seek Him alone, and hope in Him alone, since

their care is His dread.

The reader will readily note that every point made here has already been refuted: the presence of

prophets has been taken as a sign of humans' immorality rather than virtue, saints were said to

prefer the company of other animals to the company of their own species' members, insight and

discernment proved to be common to all nonhuman animals and scarce among humans as are

adoration of God and abstention from assigning partners to Him. Moreover, the logic underlying

this claim is unclear. If most members of the human species are immoral, confused, and ignorant,

as one understands from the body of the fable, why should the entire race still be considered

superior to other animals simply because it counts among its members some eminent people?

46

What we see is a reversion to the idealized conception of the human being. Although in

the rest of their work the Ikhwān occasionally express unfavourable opinions of humankind,

overall their idea of the human being is quite flattering. This view is for example clear in their

description of the different stages of human life. They say:

[The human being] starts as a humble drop of fluid (nuṭfa); then he becomes a clot

(ʿalaqa), firmly established in a well-protected place; then a lump of flesh

(muḍgha); then a well-designed, fully-shaped fetus; then a moving, sentient child;

then a bright and gifted teen (ṣabiyyan dhakiyyan fahīman); then a strong, able, and

energetic youth; then an experienced, knowledgeable middle-aged adult, then a

wise, learned, and pious old philosopher (faylasūf); after he dies his soul becomes a

heavenly, spiritual eternal angel (malakan samāwiyyan rūḥāniyyan) happy and

savouring the delights of eternity.137

One is of course justified to ask, how many people fit in the itinerary of the bright and gifted

child through the wise, learned, and pious old philosopher? For the Ikhwān, however, even if this

description does not apply to every single human being, it still captures the essence of being

human.

Intercession

Another noteworthy detail appears in one of the epistle's manuscripts.138

After

enumerating the various virtuous people whom they count among their kind, the human

representative adds, 'If this does not work, then we will reach salvation through the intercession

of our Prophet, Muhammad, peace be upon him, and we will live forever in the bliss of paradise.'

Before discussing this argument, it is important to note that its mere absence from other

manuscripts raises a question about its authenticity. Is this detail added to or omitted from the

original text? Either way, this discrepancy, in my opinion, is an indication of the implausibility

of the Ikhwān’s court verdict. If this detail is a later addition, it suggests that an editor of the

epistles noticed the Ikhwān's failure to engage with the afterlife accountability argument, thus

47

deciding to fill the gap; if it was omitted from the original text, it suggests that an editor noticed

the groundlessness of the intercession argument, thus deciding to leave it out.

The theme of shafāʿa, or intercession, is the subject of significant debate. As several

authors have noted, the Qur'an appears to reject, or at least to deemphasize it, emphasizing in its

stead the notion of personal accountability. Fazlur Rahman, for example, notes that 'The whole

temper of the Qur'ān is against intercession.'139

Indeed, this scripture repeatedly warns its

audience of the Day when intercessions will be to no avail (Q. 2:48, 123, 254) and when people

will have 'no protector and no intercessor' aside from God (Q. 6:51). From these assertions, Jane

Smith and Yvonne Haddad conclude that

The basic argument of the Qur'ān is that God is sovereign in arranging the

relationship between Himself and His creatures and that no human efforts at

mediation can be valid and effective. Every individual is responsible for his or her

own deeds and acts of faith, and will be called to full account for them.140

Smith and Haddad, however, note that 'certain passages of the Qur'an have been

interpreted as leaving room for the possibility of some kind of intercession.'141

The Qur'an states

that God, angels, 'true witnesses,' and those 'who have made a covenant with God' may intercede

on behalf of others, but this favour is not unconditional. Eva Riad observes that

Quand l'intercession est quand même admise il faut la regarder plutôt comme un acte

de bonté, de grâce de la part d'Allāh. Au lieu d'être une démarche de l'homme vers

Dieu elle est devenue un don de Dieu qu'il confère à celui qu'il considère digne ou

qu'il rend digne de l'accepter.142

From these analyses it is possible to conclude that although the Qur'an does not rule out the

possibility of intercession, it far from presents it as a guaranteed favour to be extended to the

entire human race. Indeed, considering this scripture's emphasis on the principle of personal

accountability, intercession is often understood as an additional favour that can benefit only

those who have satisfied at least the minimum requirement of not ascribing partners to God.

48

The Qur'an does not explicitly include Muhammad among those who may intercede on

behalf of others either, but Muslims were able to find a Qur'anic basis for this function by

including the Prophet in the categories of 'true witnesses'143

and 'those who have obtained a

covenant from God.'144

Muhammad's function as intercessor is also clearly reflected in the

Hadith and enjoys much popularity among Muslims.145

In the view of some, this is a later

development in the tradition. Smith and Haddad maintain that this development symbolizes 'the

transition from the earlier Qur'anic stress on individual accountability to a recognition of the

growing importance of communal affiliation and identity.'146

These authors conclude that 'the

general Qur'ānic denial of the possibility of intercession, shafāʿa, was modified in the ensuing

understanding of the community, and the Prophet Muhammad was invested with the function of

intervening on behalf of the Muslims on the day of judgment.'147

Regardless of how rooted the notion of shafāʿa is in the Qur'an and Islam and how

invested Muhammad is with this function, the mainstream tradition tends to reserve this privilege

for Muslims only. For example, Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) explains that intercession on behalf of

disbelievers will be in vain and that they will dwell in the hellfire forever.148

Smith and Haddad

note that 'intercession is not generally understood to be for those classed as mushrikūn [i.e. those

who assign partners to God] and kāfirūn [disbelievers], but for those who are in a condition of

īmān [belief] even though they have committed transgressions.'149

This is not to suggest that the tradition has been callous to the destiny of non-Muslims.

As Mohammad Hassan Khalil has demonstrated, prominent Muslim thinkers from different

schools of thought and historical periods strived to find room in their theology for the 'righteous

other' and 'willed that felicity could be attained through paths other than their own',150

however,

this felicity is the fruit of the divine attributes of justice and mercy, not Muhammad's

49

intercession. God, many Muslim theologians argue, would not condemn to the Fire someone who

never heard of Muhammad or Islam or who was exposed only to a distorted version of the

message. Moreover, thanks to God's mercy, even grave sinners may eventually have a chance,

these theologians maintain, either by eventually being admitted to the Garden or at least by being

spared the agonies of the Fire. This, however, will not happen until they pay at least in part for

their earthly sins. Accountability in their view thus remains a crucial aspect of the Islamic

afterlife scene, applying to Muslims and non-Muslims. Indeed, the Qur'an presents the

suggestion that the wicked and the righteous will receive the same treatment in the afterlife a

sign of bad judgment. It says, 'Or do those who commit evil deeds think that We shall make them

as those who believe and do righteous deeds, equal their living and their dying? How ill they

judge!' (Q. 45:21).

In contrast, the Ikhwān allow not only for the intercession of Muhammad and other

prophets, but also of saints and other people. For them, children and insane people will reach

salvation thanks to the intercession of their fathers and mothers, as well as prophets.151

On more

than one occasion they enjoin their reader to seek the company of loyal brethren (ikhwān

aṣdiqāʾ)152

and God's friends (awliyāʾ Allāh al-kirām)153

to reach salvation through their

intercession. To corroborate the view that humans' souls survive bodies, the Ikhwān point to the

fact that members of all religions invoke God at the graves of saints, hoping for the latter's

intercession on their behalf. This, the Ikhwān maintain, proves that souls do not perish, for had

this been the case this practice would not have been adopted by members of all religions.154

The

Ikhwān thus clearly endorse the notion of shafāʿa.

This endorsement notwithstanding, there seems to be little need for shafāʿa in their

eschatology, as it seems to involve hardly any judgment or accountability. In the Ikhwān's

50

worldview, upon death the human soul will simply be born into an angelic form in the heavenly

sphere and will finally be rescued from the ocean of matter and the prison of nature (baḥr al-

hayūlā wa-asr al-ṭabīʿa). Indeed, to be human seems already to be a moral achievement, for

humans are assumed to have already been rescued from the mineral, plant, and animal stages and

are now in the last stage of Gehenna, waiting to be rescued from it once they are born in their

next form, the angelic one.155

For the Ikhwān, the fires of the pit (nīrān al-hāwiya) are nothing

other than 'the world of generation and degeneration' (ʿālam al-kawn wa-al-fasād), i.e. the very

world we currently live in.156

Thus, the only punishment that may await those who fail to 'live up'

to their human nature consists of the possibility of being sent back to the sub-lunar sphere. This

is a far cry from the eschatological scenes described in the Qur'an. Moreover, regardless of how

mild this punishment is, it is barely presented as a looming possibility. The reader is encouraged

'to take provisions of good deeds, sound opinions, beautiful morals, and true sciences' so that he

can meet the high expectations that the authors have of him and so that he can enjoy the eternal

bliss and joy awaiting him.157

Rather than fear of punishment, it is then hope for reward that is

presented as the main motivation to live a good life. In any case, birth into an angelic form is

often presented as an automatic process and a guaranteed promotion. In the same way that a

foetus leaves the womb of its mother to be born into this world, death allows humans to leave the

womb of this world to be born into the next. From this, it is justified to conclude that, rather than

sparing humans punishment or earning them additional reward, the notion of shafāʿa is needed in

the Ikhwān's theology primarily to integrate it with the mainstream Islamic worldview.

The Ikhwān appeal also to the attributes of divine mercy and forgiveness, maintaining

that God will forgive all sins, seemingly including even the sin of ascribing partners to Him,

although the Qur'an asserts on two occasions that this is a sin God will not forgive (Q. 4:48;

51

4:116). Such forgiveness would not imply that God will break His promise, they maintain, since

for Arabs, to not fulfil a threat is considered a virtue rather than a vice. They write,

God's threats to His subjects are like the threats of a compassionate father, who tells

his sick and ignorant child to do certain things and to abstain from certain foods and

drinks, threatening that he will punish the child if the latter does not comply. If the

child disobeys his father he will remain sick and continue to suffer. Being

compassionate, the father will not inflict further pain on his child by implementing

his threats. This is the truth about God's torture and threats (hādhā ḥukmu ʿadhābi

Allāhi wa-waʿīdihi). This is more befitting to Him, His mercy, generosity,

beneficence, and kindness.158

The Ikhwān are far from being an exception in invoking the theme of God's mercy, and

indeed, unlike that of shafāʿa, this theme has a solid Qur'anic basis. One would still wonder,

however, why this mercy should stop at the human threshold. After all, God in the Qur'an says,

'My mercy embraces all things (wa-raḥmatī wasʿiat kulla shayʾ)' (Q. 7: 156). God's mercy is thus

not limited to humans only, nor even to animals; it extends to everything.

Conclusion

In this paper I have proposed that the discrepancy between the body and outcome of the

Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ's animal epistle is due to the tension between the anthropocentric worldview to

which the authors subscribe and the theocentric Qur'anic worldview with which they engage in

the fable. This discrepancy, in my opinion, illustrates the impossibility of integrating these two

worldviews. Another question remains: why did the authors make such a strong case for

nonhuman animals if they did not truly believe in it, as Foltz legitimately asks? Does this

discrepancy have anything to do with their taqiyya (roughly, anonymity)? Did the authors simply

try to indulge in an intellectual exercise in which they tried to test certain views? Did they fail to

see this end coming at the outset of their project? In view of the Ikhwān’s clearly inclusive

attitude vis-à-vis different faiths, races, and cultures, could it be suggested that they wanted to

52

test their boundaries by investigating the possibility of extending their inclusiveness to other

living beings as well?

Bearing in mind that any attempt to account for the authors' intention is destined to be no

more than a speculative effort, an explanation can perhaps still be attempted. Considering that

the Ikhwān did not seem to perceive major discrepancies between the discipline of falsafa (what

they refer to as ʿulūm ḥikmiyya) and orthodox Islamic doctrines, I am personally inclined toward

the third scenario. It is perhaps justified to hypothesize that the Ikhwān's initial intention was

simply to teach their readers about the wonders of the animal world, as they declare in their

prologue, and to call for better treatment of other animals – a theme they knew would resonate

with their readers. As they proceeded, however, their argument took them in a different direction.

Once they gave voices to their nonhuman characters, abandoned the prevalent practice of

comparing an ideal notion of humans to a distorted and misinformed notion of other animals, and

allowed their animals to draw from the Qur'an, the fable took a turn the authors perhaps did not

foresee. In other words, just by becoming open and willing to entertain the ideas that (1)

empirically there is more to animals than they (the Ikhwān) are typically willing to grant and that

(2) the Qur'an presents nonhuman creatures in a radically different light from their own, they

discovered that these ideas were not as unthinkable as they initially assumed. The conclusion

they were about to reach, however, would cast doubt on their entire theology and thus they could

hardly afford it. On the other hand, when the final outcome became visible they possibly felt that

they had invested too much in this project to abandon it altogether. The nonhuman animals'

arguments and refutations were too clever and too provocative to deserve abortion. Thus, instead

of rewriting or abandoning this work, they opted for a manipulation of its final outcome, which,

they could have presumed, would hardly shock their readers anyway, for, on a serious note, who

53

would want animals to be the equals of humans? Admittedly, however, this hypothesis is no

more than a conjecture. A definitive answer is probably unattainable.

Notwithstanding this intricate point, one should not be detracted from two more

important conclusions. First, in spite of their violation of the reader's sense of justice, the

Ikhwān’s accomplishment is still admirable. Their careful critique of anthropocentric attitudes is

indeed unmatched in Islamic civilization and perhaps even beyond in pre-modern times. To have

this critique developed at the hands of such subscribers to hierarchical ethos makes their

achievement even more remarkable. Moreover, if indeed their intention in building the case for

other animals was an attempt to generously extend their inclusive attitude to embrace all

animated beings, then, despite its failure, this attempt is worthy of esteem, for it shows that even

if the Ikhwān caged themselves in their intellectually rigid hierarchical schemes, they were still

capable of thinking beyond their own limitations.

The second conclusion concerns the Qur'an. As I hope I have illustrated, this scripture

lends itself remarkably well to a non-anthropocentric reading, yet this Qur'anic outlook has

hardly been captured in Islamic tradition, most notably in the genre of tafsīr (Qur’anic exegesis),

where one would have expected such a stance to be noticed and expounded. This is largely

(though not exclusively) due to the linear approach to the Qur'an most exegetes take. The

Ikhwān’s animal epistle is in fact the only thematic medieval treatment of Qur'anic animal

themes of which we know. It is remarkable how the mere departure from the linear approach to

the Qur'an could result in such an egalitarian reading. Once a number of Qur'anic animal themes

were brought together and read in light of one another, a distinctly non-anthropocentric and

egalitarian worldview emerged, despite the fact that this reading was undertaken by no less than

some of the most resolute subscribers to the principle of hierarchy. In view of this, one is left to

54

wonder, had this endeavour been undertaken by someone less steeped in hierarchical reasoning,

what conclusions would have been reached, and what impact could such conclusions have had

on the status and perceptions of nonhuman animals in Islamic tradition?

1 For more on the reception of this epistle see Lenn Goodman, 'Reading The Case of the Animals versus Man: Fable

and Philosophy in the Essays of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ', in Nader El-Bizri (ed.), The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ and their Rasāʾil:

An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 248-74, at pp. 249-50. 2 Ian Richard Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists: An Introduction to the Thought of the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwān al-

Ṣafāʾ) (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 37. 3 Godefroid de Callataÿ, Ikhwan al-Safa': A Brotherhood of Idealists on the Fringe of Orthodox Islam (Oxford:

Oneworld, 2005), p. 3. 4 Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists, p. 3. See also Majid Fakhry, Islamic Philosophy, Theology, and Mysticism: A Short

Introduction (Oxford: Oneworld, 2000), p. 57. In this paper it is assumed that the epistles are the work of more than

one author. 5 De Callataÿ, Ikhwan al-Safa', p. 10.

6 See for example Abbas Hamdani, 'The Arrangement of the Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ and the Problem of

Interpolations (with Postscript)' in Nader El-Bizri (ed.), The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ and their Rasāʾil: An Introduction

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 83-100, at p. 85. 7 De Callataÿ, Ikhwan al-Safa', xi. See also Seyyed Hossein Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological

Doctrines, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978, revised edition), pp. 26-30; Patricia Crone, God's Rule:

Government and Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 205. 8 Nader al-Bizri, 'Prologue' in Nader El-Bizri (ed.), The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ and their Rasāʾil: An Introduction (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 1-32, at p. 10. 9 Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 167.

10 Fakhry, Islamic Philosophy, pp. 6-7.

11 Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ wa-Khillān al-Wafāʾ (4 vols. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1957), vol. 3, p. 30.

12 Islamail Poonawala, 'Why We Need an Arabic critical Edition with an Annotated English Translation of the

Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ' in Nader El-Bizri (ed.), The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ and their Rasāʾil: An Introduction (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 33-57, at p. 43. 13

De Callataÿ, Ikhwan al-Safa', p. 75. 14

For example, see Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī, al-Imtāʿ wa-al-muʾānasa, (3vols. Beirut: Dār Maktabat al-Ḥayāt,

1970), vol. 2, pp. 5-6. 15

Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists, pp. 60-1; Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, 3rd

edn (New York:

Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 184; Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, Rasāʾil, vol. 4, p. 31. 16

Note that Seyyed Hossein Nasr perceives no contradiction between these two modes of creation. He writes,

'creationism and the idea of manifestation or emanationism, if correctly understood, represent the same metaphysical

truth.' Nasr offers a symbolic interpretation, whereby he likens the cosmos to God's 'garment' which 'at once veils

and reveals His Reality.' Many Muslims, however, would find this interpretation too anthropomorphic. In any case it

is doubtful that this is how the Ikhwān conceived of emanationism. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Religion and the Order of

Nature, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 63. 17

Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge, Massachusetts:

Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 59. 18

De Callataÿ, Ikhwan al-Safa', p. 18. 19

Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, p. 40. 20

Ibid., p. 63. 21

Karen Armstrong, A History of God: The 4,000-Year of Quest of Judaism, Christianity and Islam (New York:

Ballantine Books, 1993), p. 171. 22

Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, p. 26. 23

Ibid., p. 9 (emphasis in the original).

55

24

Lewis Vaughn and Austin Dacey, The Case for Humanism: An Introduction (New York: Rowman and Littlefiled

Publishes, 2003), p. 59. 25

Sangharakshita Bhikshu, The Bodhisattva Ideal: Wisdom and Compassion in Buddhism (Birmingham: Windhorse

Publcations, 1999), p. 172. 26

Lance E. Nelson, Purifying the Earthly Body of God: Religion and Ecology in Hindu India (Albany: SUNY Press,

1998), p. 67. 27

Li, as Tao Jiang explains, is a core Confucian notion which is 'usually translated as ritual, ceremony, propriety,

ritual propriety, etiquette, and politeness'. It is also described as 'the cement of the entire normative sociopolitical

order'. Tao Jiang, 'Intimate Authority: The Rule of Ritual in Classical Confucian Political Discourse' in Peter D.

Hershock and Roger T. Ames(eds.), Confucian Cultures of Authority, Series in Asian Studies Development (Albany:

SUNY Press, 2006), pp. 23-4. 28

Ibid., p. 27. 29

Ibid., p. 28. 30

Roberta Kalechofsky, 'Hierarchy, Kinship, and Responsibility: The Jewish Relationship to The Animal World' in

Paul Waldau and Kimberley Patton (eds.) A Communion of Subjects: Animals in Religion, Science, and Ethics

(New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 92. 31

Lynn White, 'The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis' Science, New Series, 155; 3767 (1967), pp. 1203-1207,

at p. 1205. 32

Robert Booth Fowler, The Greening of Protestant Thought (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,

1995), p. 60. 33

Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization (3 vols. Chicago:

The University of Chicago Press, 1974), vol. 1, p.131. 34

Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol.1, p. 133. See also pp. 128-137. 35

Asma Barlas, 'Believing Women' in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur'ān (Austin:

University of Texas Press, 2002), p. 96. 36

Louise Marlow, Hierarchy and Egalitarianism in Islamic Thought, Series: Cambridge Studies in Islamic

Civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1997), p. 3. 37

David Clough, On Animals, Volume One: Systematic Theology (London: T&T Clark International, 2012), p. 27. 38

In the case of Islam, this point has often been inferred from Q.49:13, stating 'O humankind, We have created you

male and female, and appointed you races and tribes, that you may know one another. Surely the noblest among you

in the sight of God is the most godfearing of you. God is knowing, aware.' Although medieval Islamic society was

not entirely race blind, it seems that it did not assign much importance to racial differences. Christian Lange writes,

'It should be pointed out...that egalitarian views of race had strong supporters in Islam, including such prominent

thinkers as Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/869) and others who argued that the black skin of Africans was the result exclusively of

natural causes. 'Christian Lange, Justice, Punishment, and the Medieval Muslim Imagination, Series: Cambridge

Studies in Islamic Civilization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 229. 39

Richard Bauckham, Living with Other Creatures: Green Exegesis And Theology (Waco, Texas: Baylor University

Press, 2011), p. 223. 40

Richard Martin, Islamic Studies: A History of Religions Approach (Upper Saddle River, N. J. : Prentice Hall,

1996), p. 100. 41

Marlow, Hierarchy and Egalitarianism , p. xi. 42

Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven: Yale University

Press, 1992), p. 63. 43

Marlow, Hierarchy and Egalitarianism, p. 1. 44

Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 8. 45

The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, The Case of the Animals versus Man Before the King of the Jinn, ed. and tr. Lenn Goodman

and Richard McGregor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 63. Citations from the animal fable are from

Goodman's and McGregor's translation. 46

Ibid., p. 65. 47

Ibid., p. 74. One-sensed beings in Jainism consist of inanimate beings, including the four elements. What the

Ikhwān consider to be one-sensed beings, such as worms that breed in clay, are considered two-sensed beings in

Jainism. See Kristi Wiley 'Five-Sensed Animals in Jainism' in Paul Waldau and Kimberly Patton, eds. A

Communion of Subjects: Animals in Religion, Science, and Ethics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006),

pp. 250-55, at p. 251. Note also that in another essay the Ikhwān state that plants have the sense of touch. The

Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, Rasāʾil, vol. 3, p. 227.

56

48

The Ikhwān, The case of the Animals, pp. 74-5. 49

Ibid., p. 76. 50

Ibid., pp. 84-85. 51

The Ikhwān, Rasāʾil, vol. 3, p. 511. 52

Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 287-90. 53

The Ikhwān, The case of the Animals, p. 64. 54

Ibid., pp. 69-70. 55

Ibid., pp. 71, ft. 56

Ibid., p. 72. 57

Ibid., p. 84. 58

Ibid., p. 68. 59

The Ikhwān, Rasāʾil, vol. 2, p. 114. 60

Ibid., vol. 3, p. 32. 61

Ibid., vol. 1,p. 212. 62

Ibid., vol. 1, p. 297. 63

Ibid., vol. 1, p. 298. 64

The Ikhwān, The Case of the Animals, p. 13. 65

Richard Foltz, Animals in Islamic Tradition and Muslim Cultures (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), p. 52. 66

Carol Bakhos, 'Jewish, Christian, and Muslim attitudes toward Animals', Comparative Islamic Studies.5; 2 (2009),

pp. 177-219, at pp.210-1, p. 177. 67

Ibid., p. 211. 68

The Ikhwān, Rasāʾil, vol. 3, P. 207. 69

The Ikhwān, The case of the animals, P. 301. 70

For more on this point see Sarra Tlili, 'The Meaning of the Qur'anic Word 'dābba': Animals or Nonhuman

Animals?' Journal of Qur'anic Studies, 12 (2010), pp. 167-187; at pp.182-4. 71

Bakhos, ' Jewish, Christian, and Muslim attitudes', p. 211. 72

See for example, Adil Awa, L’ésprit critique des frères de la pureté: encyclopédistes arabes du IVe/Xe siècle

(Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1948), p. 289; Yves Marquet, 'Imamat, Résurrection et Hiérarchie selon les Ikhwan

as-Safa,' Revue des Études Islamiques 30 (1962), pp. 49-142, at p. 104; Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists, p. 36. 73

Islamic literature indeed exhibits much more sensitivity to nonhuman animals than Bakhos appears to grant.

Bakhos notes for example that 'The contingent existence of animals is taken for granted such that the question of the

destruction of animals along with humans in the flood narrative does not preoccupy ancient and medieval exegetes.'

(p. 206). This is inconsistent with the apologetic tone one finds in some Muslim sources. For example, al-Qurṭubī

explains that for children, beasts, and birds that lost their lives in the flood death was not a punishment. Rather, these

animals died because they reached their appointed time (ājāl). Abū ʿabd Allāh al- Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-

Qur'an, ed. ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, 3 (24 vols. Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 2006), vol. 11, p.

127. 74

The Ikhwān, The Case of the Animals, p. 10. 75

Ibid., p. 65. 76

Kamāl al-Dīn al-Damīrī, Ḥayāt al-ḥayawān al-Kubrā (2 vols. Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1978). 77

Al-ʿAllāma Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī, Biḥar al-Anwār al-Jāmiʿa li-Durar Akhbār al-Aʾimma al-Aṭhār, 3 (110

vols. Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1983), vol. 3, pp. 57-151 (Tawḥīd al-Mufaḍḍal). 78

Unless otherwise stated, all translations of the Qur’an are from Arthur John Arberry's , The Koran Interpreted: A

Translation, with slight modifications. 79

The Ikhwān, The Case of the Animals, pp. 233-4. 80

Ibid., p. 235. 81

Ibid., p. 112. 82

Ibid., p. 199. 83

Ibid. 84

According to the editors two manuscripts give the verb 'dabbara' instead of 'rattaba' (to sort). 85

The Ikhwān, The case of the Animals, p. 104. 86

Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī , Jāmiʿ al-bayān fī taʾwīl al-Qur'an, (13 vols. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1999), vol. 11,

p. 577. 87

Al-Khalīl ibn Aḥmad, Kitāb al-ʿayn murattab ʿalā ḥurūf al-muʿjam, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Hindāwī (4 vols. Beirut:

Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2003), vol. 1, p. 94.

57

88

Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-bayān, vol. 1, p. 92. 89

Al-Zajjāj, Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm ibn al-Sarī, Maʿānī al-Qur'an wa-iʿrābuh, ed. ʿAbd al-Jalīl ʿAbduh Shalabī (5 vols.

Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1988), vol. 1, p. 46. 90

The Ikhwān, The Case of the Animals, p. 106. (emphasis added). 91

Among nonhuman animals, the Qur'an states that God 'sakhkhar' to humans sacrificial cows and camels (Q.22:36-

7) and camels in their transportation capacity (Q.43:13). 92

The Ikhwān, Rasāʾil, vol. 2, p. 84. 93

Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 83-4. 94

Ibid., vol. 1, p. 340. 95

Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 368-9. 96

For more on the theme of "taskhīr", see Sarra Tlili, Animals in the Qur'an, (New York: Cambridge University

Press, 2012), pp. 74-115. 97

Ibid., p. 78. 98

The Ikhwān, The Case of the Animals, pp. 105, 119. 99

The Ikhwān, Rasāʾil, vol. 1, p. 297. 100

The Ikhwān, The Case of the Animals, p. 119. 101

Ibid., pp. 265-6. 102

Ibid., p. 109. 103

Ibid., pp. 109-10. 104

Ibid., pp. 111-2. 105

In addition to previous references, see also the Ikhwān, the Rasāʾil, vol. 4, p. 101. 106

The Ikhwān, The Rasāʾil, vol. 1, p. 297. 107

Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-bayān, vol. 12, pp. 636-7. 108

Ibid., vol. 8, p. 422. 109

The Ikhwān, The Case of the Animals, pp. 247-8, 259. 110

Ibid., pp. 249, 261. 111

Ibid.. 112

Ibid., p. 249. 113

Ibid., pp. 77-8. 114

Ibid., pp. 191-2. 115

Abū ʿUthmān ʿAmr ibn Baḥr al-Jāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-Ḥayawān, ed. ʿAbd al-Salām Hārūn, 2 (8 vols. Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-

Bābī wa-Awlāduh, 1965), vol. 3, pp. 303-4. 116

Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 208-9. 117

The Ikhwān, The Case of the Animals, p. 79 (emphases added). 118

The Ikhwān, Rasāʾil, vol. 2, p. 170. 119

The Ikhwān, The Case of the Animals, p. 242. Goodman and McGregor render the word 'dhakara' as 'claimed.' 120

Ibid., p. 243. 121

Ibid., p. 288. 122

Ibid., p. 287. 123

Ibid., p. 289. 124

The Ikhwān, Rasāʾil, vol. 3, pp. 301-2 (emphasis added). For more on the same point see also vol. 3, pp. 532,

538. 125

The Ikhwān, The Case of the Animals, pp. 278-9. 126

Ibid., pp. 140-1, 192. 127

Ibid., p. 140, ff. 123 (emphasis in the original). 128

Ibid., p. 255. 129

Ibid., p. 256-7. 130

Ibid., p. 255. 131

Ibid., p. 258 132

Ibid., p. 311. 133

Zayn Kassam, 'The Case of the Animals Versus Man: Toward an Ecology of Being' in Paul Waldau and

Kimberly Patton (eds.) A Communion of Subjects: Animals in Religion, Science, and Ethics (New York: Columbia

University Press, 2006), 160-9, at p. 167. 134

The Ikhwān, Rasāʾil, vol. 2, pp. 52-3; 59. 135

Ibid., vol. 4, p. 87.

58

136

Ibid., vol. 1, p. 286; see also de Callataÿ, Ikhwan al-Safa', pp. 24-6. 137

The Ikhwān. Rasāʾil, vol. 1, pp. 448-9. 138

MS Feyzullah effendi 2130 (AH 704), Istanbul. Manuscript 'fāᵓ', See The Case of the Animals, pp. 58 and 277 in

Arabic text. 139

Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur'ān, 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 31. 140

Jane Smith and Yvonne Haddad, The Islamic Understanding of Death and Resurrection (New York: Oxford

University Press, 2002), p. 26. See also Eva Riad, 'Šafāʿa dans le Coran' Orientaia Suecana, 30 (1981), pp. 37-62, at

pp. 49-50. Riad says, 'La šafāʿa n'a pas de place dans la nouvelle relation entre Dieu et l'homme que prêche le

prophète'. 141

Smith and Haddad, The Islamic Understanding of Death, p. 26. 142

Riad, 'Šafāʿa dans le Coran', p. 50. 143

Smith and Haddad, The Islamic Understanding of Death, p. 26. 144

Ibn Ḥazm al-Andalusī, al-Faṣl fī al-milal wa-al-ahwāᵓ wa-al-niḥal, eds. Muhammad Ibrāhīm Naṣr and ʿAbd al-

Raḥmān ʿUmayra (5 vols. Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1996), vol. 4, p. 112. 145

Among Muslims, however, the Muʿtazila and the Khawārij are believed to reject the notion of intercession. See

Ibn Ḥazm, al-Faṣl fī al-milal, vol. 4, p. 111 and Jār Allāh al-Zamakharī (d. 538/1143), al-Kashshāf ʿan ḥaqāᵓiq

ghawāmiḍ al-tanzīl wa-ʿuyūn al-aqāwīl fī wujūh al-taʾwīl, eds. ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd and ʿAlī Muhammad

Muʿawwad (5 vols. Riyadh: Maktabat al-ʿAbīkān, 1998), vol. 1, p. 266. 146

Smith and Haddad, The Islamic Understanding of Death, p. 26; see also Riad, 'Šafāʿa dans le Coran', p. 54. Riad

writes, 'Si donc le Coran a en gros une attitude vis-à-vis de la šafāʿa, au sense intercession-méditation et

intercesseurs-médiateurs, il est d'autant plus remarquable que cette notion eut un développement si riche plus tard

dans l'Islam'. 147

Smith and Haddad, The Islamic Understanding of Death, p. 80. 148

Ibn Ḥazm, al-Faṣl fī al-milal, vol. 4, p. 112. 149

Smith and Haddad, The Islamic Understanding of Death, p. 27. 150

Mohammad Hassan Khalil, Islam and the Fate of Others: The Salvation Question (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2012), 145. 151

The Ikhwān, Rasāʾil, vol. 2, p. 455. 152

Ibid., vol. 2, p. 140. 153

Ibid., vol. 3, p. 486. 154

Ibid., vol. 4, p. 37. 155

Ibid., vol. 3, p. 47. 156

Ibid., vol. 3, p. 48. 157

Ibid. 158

Ibid., vol. 3, p. 503.