İSTANBUL ŞEHİR UNIVERSITY

ALEVISM ANDDİYANET

THE NARRATIVES AND DRAMAS EFFECTOmer Sipal1/15/2013

SUBMITTED TO: DR. TALHA KÖSE

INTRODUCTION

Alevi Opening initiated in 2007 by the AKP government

brought the complexity of Alevi question in Turkey to the fore.

The Opening process revealed that Alevi Question is much more

complicated than it seems, and unfortunately on the face of

this complexity misunderstandings are huge on the part of both

the state and the Sunni community. In this connection, Köse’

(2010) emphasis on the lack of mutual understanding is

illuminating: “Conflicts, resentments, grievances, and

perpetual fears about the Alevis have existed for centuries and

have been publicly voiced through different mechanisms; yet,

the message had never been understood thoroughly by the

interlocutors of the Alevis” (p.144). On the face of these

complexity and misunderstandings, the Opening process revealed

the difficulty of closing the gaps between Alevi community and

the state on the one hand, and Alevi community and Sunni

community on the other hand. Having the narratives emphasizing

the marginalization, victimization and discrimination for

centuries, Alevi community attitudes/stances towards this kind

of initiatives –Alevi Opening- have been not that positive.

Alevis’ narratives of Ottoman period that “Alevis have been

persecuted, oppressed, discriminated against, and marginalized

by the central governments” and “the Alevi identity, culture,

and institutions were either denied recognition or assimilated

into the majority Sunni identity during this era” ( Köse 2010,

p.145) are so strong that any initiative launched by the state

confronts ambivalent feelings, reactions. It is possible to

observe this ambivalence among Alevis through opinion polls

conducted during the Opening process. One opinion conducted in

2009 (SDE, Alevi Raporu) shows the high levels of distrust

about “Alevi Opening” among Alevis: 49.2% of Alevis stated

their dissatisfaction with the Opening and only 14.9% stated

they were happy about the process (p.50).

Even if Alevis did not have positive feelings towards the

Opening process, they, thanks to the Opening, could articulate

their demands more strongly. Their demands revolve around the

recognition of two things: “First and foremost, the

acknowledgment of the past crimes, assaults, and unjust

practices against the Alevis by the Turkish state and the

Sunnis (especially the extreme right and Islamist groups)”

(Köse 2010, p.145); and second is the introduction of legal and

political mechanisms that will make the actualization of Alevi

communities’ rights possible. According to Alevis, the legal

and institutional barriers dating back to Ottoman period have

not been removed by the state. Besides the legal and

institutional barriers that have prevented the actualization of

Alevi-ness, there have been also prevalent and strıng societal

biases against Alevis among Sunni community.

Three legal obstacles are central to the identity politics

of Alevis: a) the legal status of Cemevis as the places of

worship b) the issue of compulsory religious in public schools

c) the restructuring of Diyanet in terms of its status and

services. Among these three legal obstacles, the restructuring

of Diyanet – or Diyanet on its own- is of utmost importance for

Alevis mainly because of the memories about marginalization,

victimization and discrimination. Diyanet was perceived as a

continuation of the Ottoman’s Sunnification project. This

perception of Diyanet invokes the dark Ottoman episode, and

consequently initiates the whole memories of marginalization,

victimization, and discrimination. For this reason, Alevis’

stance towards Diyanet was a reaction of the past to the

present, which necessitates searching the past for the origins

of this reaction.

This study will embark on searching the past – Ottoman

Sunni past- in order to detect the origins of the stances of

Alevis to the Diyanet. In this connection, the study will adopt

psychocultural narratives and interpretations to explain the

stances of Alevi towards the Diyanet. To be able to understand

the current stances of Alevis towards the Diyanet- how have

they developed their current stances? - a background knowledge

that will cover the period from the time of the wars between

Safevid and Ottoman –the beginning of Alevis’ marginalization

in Sunni Ottoman empire- to the establishment of the Republic

will be introduced. Based on this background history and

theoretical framework, an analysis of the stances/positions of

Alevis towards the Diyanet will be presented.

THE ROAD TO MARGINALIZATION, VICTIMIZATION AND DISCRIMINATION

Understanding the history of the conflict1 between Alevis

and Sunnis will cast light upon Alevis’ current stances towards

Sunni in general and their current stances towards the Diyanet

in particular. Before presenting the history of conflict

between Alevis and Sunnis, it is necessary to talk briefly

1 In fact, it is not possible to talk about a full-fledged history ofconflict but that of frictions between Alevi and Sunni communities. As Kösepoints out “There had never been a history of inter-communal confrontationand violence between Alevi and Sunni communities” (Köse 2010, p.148).

about the Islamization process of Turcoman –later called

Alevis- so that it will be possible to grasp this process

influences on the following periods.

The nomadic Turcoman tribes, beginning in the early 10th

century in Central Asia, converted to Islam through dervishes.

The early periods of their Islamization saw an eclectic belief

system. That is to say, Turcoman tribes could not get rid of

their previous beliefs, and consequently the new religion

coexisted with the previous beliefs, which consisted of

“Buddhism, Manicheism, Iranian religions such as

Zoroastrianism, Mazdaism, Christianity, Gök Tanrı (Celestial

God), the cult of ancestors, and the cult of nature” (Köse

2009, p.49). Because of this syncretic and heterodox

understanding of religion, the rituals and culture of these

Turcoman tribes differed from those of the Sunnis.

In the early centuries of the Ottoman Empire, non-Sunni

and non-orthodoxy elements were not exposed to any kind of

pressure by the Empire (Köse 2009, p.53). It was the foundation

of the Safavid state in 1501 that initiated the reasons of

distrust on the part of Ottoman Empire towards Turcoman tribes

–later Alevis. Born as a Sunni Sufi order in the early 14th

century in Ardabil-Iran, the Safavid order expanded its

influence to Iraq, Syria and Anatolia (Üzüm, 1997). The

following centuries saw the transition of the Safavids from

order to a full-fledged state. The transition from order to

state accompanied sending emissaries to Anatolia to recruit

supporters for the Safavid order. The activities of the Safavid

order attracted the attention of Ottomans and they were not

happy about their activities.

Perceiving the threat of Shiism - which received wide

acceptance among (Kızılbaş)2 Turcomans- coming from Safavids,

Ottoman Empire launched a comprehensive suppression campaign

against Turcomans living in the Ottoman lands especially in

Anatolia. The head of Safavid state, Shah Ismail who came from

a Turkish origin, was a murshid-i kāmil (“supreme spiritual

director) for Kızılbaş Turcoman, and they pursued their murshid-

i kamil’s da’wa (cause). The fact that “Almost the entire Safavid

army was composed of Turcoman warriors from Anatolia” (Sümer,

1992) proves how ambitiously Turcoman adopted their murshid-i

kamil’s da’wa. Being adept at using Turkish and writing Turkish

2 The term “Kızılbaş” got into circulation with Turcoman support for Safavidstate against Ottoman Empire. The term’s origin goes to the red hats thatTurcoman in Safavid army wore. With Turcoman support for Safavids the termhas been being used pejoratively.

poems, Shah Ismail -through his poems- “created a strong

cultural symbolism among Turcoman” (İrat 2006, p. 39). The

Ottoman Empire’s reaction to the unfolding events was harsh

enough to suppress Turcoman living in Anatolia. Adoption of

Twelver Shiism by the Safavid state and consequently initiation

of a comprehensive forced Shiification campaign in Iran made

the life unbearable for Kızılbaş Turcoman in Ottoman land

because of the Ottoman’s similar policies. Selim I (Grim) were

determined to pacify all Kızılbaş groups in Ottoman land before

initiating his campaign against Shah Ismail. Labelled as

heretics, Alevis were persecuted as a result of official fatwas

ordering their murder. Thousands of Alevis were killed in the

16th century during the harsh campaign launched against

Turcoman. As far as official records are concerned, 40000

Kızılbaş died in the campaigns launched by Selim I, but Alevi-

Bektaşi groups claim that the casualties are much higher (Köse

2009, p.60). Pir Sultan Abdal, one of the most important

figures of Kızılbaş Turcoman was executed. After the defeat of

Shah Ismail, Kızılbaş revolts broke out in Anatolia and they

were suppressed.

In the following periods, Ottoman Empire benefited from

Bektaşi order in order to tame and integrate into the Ottoman

system. They adopted the Bektaşi order. They had two options:

integration into Sunni understanding or the adoption of

taqiyya/dissimulation to preserve their beliefs. Some were

integrated, some choose taqiyya. Their resistance did not stop

but continued passively; they practiced their rituals; went to

dedes for their disputes instead of going to Kadıs (Köse 2009,

p.67).

The impacts of the harsh reaction of Ottoman Empire on

Turcoman elements in Anatolia were huge for both the 16th

century and following centuries. As a result of the persecution

and suppression they experienced during this period – 16th

century- Alevis had no choice but retreat into the mountainous

regions of Anatolia in order to be able to survive. “There they

developed not only independent theological reasoning but also a

specific system of politico-religious institutions. These

enabled Alevism to survive in small, self-sufficient and

outwardly isolated local communities” (Vorhoff 1998, p. 229).

The dissimulation or secrecy was a common occurrence among

Kızılbaş in different parts of Anatolia. The banishment of some

of the rebellious Kızılbaş groups to newly conquered places in

the Balkans was another hard experience for Kızılbaş Turcoman.

In the nineteenth century, a consistent policy of

avoidance rather than a consistent policy of discrimination and

marginalization was under way (Köse 2009, p.68). The underlying

reason of that avoidance policy, according to Ortaylı, was to

prevent any possible Alevi3-Sunni conflict (Ortaylı, 1999, p.

37). The reign of Mahmud II was an exception to this avoidance

policy because of his abolishment of Janissary troops. Because

of the close relationship between Bektaşi orders and

Janissaries, the Bektaşi orders shared the same fate. Mahmud II

closed all Bektaşi orders and confiscated their properties.

Therefore, Mahmud II did/does not have a positive reputation

among Alevis. “Memory of Mahmut II was naturally something at

which Bektaşis shuddered. It is said that it became their

custom to spit and utter a curse whenever they passed the tomb

of Mahmut on Divan Yolu in Istanbul” (Birge, 1965, p. 79). The

following periods did not see the end of Bektaşi orders, they

survived by engaging in secret activities. And also the

following periods did not see comprehensive campaigns against

Alevis. Now I will elaborate on psychocultural interpretations,3 The name Alevi got into circulation after 19th century.

dramas and narratives so that it may be possible to evaluate

the impacts of these historical events on Alevi community.

PSYCHOCULTURAL INTERPRETATIONS, DRAMAS AND NARRATIVES

Significant historical episodes, shared traumas and

especially painful collective experiences that initiate

emotions such as “fear, humiliation and victimhood” are central

to the emergence and construction of identities. The discourses

that are based on significant historical episodes, shared

traumas and painful collective experiences have the capacity of

mobilizing people around the/their identities that are exposed

to the external threats, and consequently influential in the

construction of ethno-sectarian identities. Shared narratives

on the dark episodes of the groups’ pasts – massacres, wars,

cleansing, mass killings etc. - function as a glue binding

members of groups firmly.

The claim of one group that emphasizes its subjective

historical experiences may clash with another group’s claims

related to historical experiences. The conflicts of the claims

over historical experiences are what psychocultural dramas are

about. “Psychocultural dramas are intergroup conflicts over

competing and apparently irresolvable claims that come to

engage the central elements of each group’s historical

experience, contemporary identity, and suspicions and fears

about an opponent” (Ross 2001, p.167). Psychocultural dramas

are the mechanisms through which the justifications of the

different claims clash with each other. The dramas of two

groups may be diametrically opposed to each other, which causes

the introduction of any possible solutions. The irreconcilable

nature of the dramas is “polarizing” according to Ross(2001):

“Psychocultural dramas are polarizing events whose manifest

content involves non-negotiable cultural claims, threats,

and/or rights that become important because of their

connections to core metaphors and group narratives that embody

a group’s identity” (p.167).

Narratives provide insights about how the darks episodes

of the past are perceived by the groups that have been exposed

to massacres, wars, mass killings etc. “Each group expresses

collective memories and perceptions through narratives that

seek to make sense of its experiences and to explain events in

terms of their interpretations of past and future actions.

Shared narratives recount and reinforce emotionally significant

events and experiences within a group, sometimes through

dramatic rituals but also as they frame daily interactions and

behaviors” (Ross 2007, p.31). Psychocultural narratives, in

this way, function as a tool through which identification and

perception of the “self” and “the others” are reproduced

continuously. Through the reproduction of the narratives

related to “the self” and “the others” based on past

victimizations, ethno-sectarian identity groups can make use of

different political and social environments for different aims.

The preservation and continuation of a distinct Alevi identity

has been through the narratives of victimization,

discrimination and marginalization. The emphasis on the

victimization becomes an effective tool in the hands of

“victimized” groups. Köse (2011) points out this fact: “The

perpetual feeling of victimhood has historically been

maintained and the language and the discourses of victimhood

have been adapted to the conditions of changing social and

political environments” (p.6).

Psychocultural narratives open the ways that enable

examining the nature of conflicts. According to Ross (2007),

narratives are important. The first reason is that “a

narrative’s metaphors and images” reveal much about how social

and political worlds in which individual and groups live are

perceived and consequently cast light upon the conflicts in

which they are embedded (Roy 1994, cited by Ross 2007, p.30).

The narratives show, in the minds or the worlds of people, how

central the “dynamics” of the conflicts are and how effective

these dynamics are in interpretation of the external world.

Second reason why psychocultural narratives are important is

that “they can reveal deep fears, perceived threats, and past

grievances that drive a conflict” (Ross 2007, p.30). The

continuous fear of “victimization” is the underlying reason

that reproduces these “deep fears, perceived threats, and past

grievances”. That there are possible situations in which the

victims get hurt after the disappearance of the direct cause(s)

of victimization is the situation that Luc Huyse (2003) calls

“revictimization”. The sources of “revictimization” are

several: emotional, legal, political or social. The sources of

“revictimization” are: i. Denial of the status of victim; ii.

Unfulfilled expectations in dealing with official agencies;

iii. Unwanted effects of victim-centered initiatives; and iv.

Social stigmatization and exclusion. (cited in Köse 2011, Huyse

2003, p. 61). According to most of Alevis these sources of

revictimization have not disappeared but continue to live.

“Sunni citizens and the Turkish officials have never

acknowledged their pains. Their expectations in terms of

official recognition have not been satisfied; and the

discrimination and marginalization against them are still going

on in many areas (Köse 2011, p.7). The third reason why

narratives are important is the issue of selectivity, which

means prioritization of some actions over others (Ross 2007,

p.30). Narratives related to the Kızılbaş Killings and the

suppressive and oppressive practices during the reign of Selim

I play a central role in the construction of contemporary Alevi

identity. The prioritization of the different sides of the

conflicts may result in totally different stories as Ross(2007)

emphasizes: “Opponents draw on distinct metaphors, emphasize

different actions, cite clashing motivations, and communicate

different affects to such an extent that it is sometimes hard

for a naive observer to recognize that the narratives

protagonists offer are describing the same conflict” (p.31).

The fourth reason is about “recounting

narratives/storytelling”; “storytelling” is the mechanism

through which the construction and strengthening of victimized

communities takes place (Ross 2007, p.30).

ALEVISM AND DIYANET

The Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (the Administration of

Religious Affairs) was founded on 3 March 1924 by the

Republican regime in order to control religious affairs of the

country. The objective of the Republican regime was to “redraw

the boundaries Islam and create a sterilized Turkish Islam with

its own institutions and vision”, rather than completely

ignoring the religion (Köse 2012, p.12). With the abolishment

of tekke and zaviyes and consequently adoption of Sunni- Hanefi

School of law as the de facto –even if not de jure-

denomination of the state under the banner of Diyanet

disappointed Alevi communities who perceived the coming of the

Kemalist regime as the savoir. Perceiving the Kemalist regime

“as the barrier against the return to the Ottoman legacy, which

is represented in the Alevi public memory as a period of

marginalization, oppression and violence” (Köse 2012, p.25),

Alevis were backstabbed, at least through the adoption of

Sunnism, by the Kemalist regime. In this point, it is necessary

to state that Atatürk, in spite of founding the Diyanet, is the

third important pillar of the modern Alevi identity with Hz.

Ali and Hacı Bektaş. Atatürk, being a pragmatist politician,

were aware of the potential of “the Sunni Islam” as the common

denominator of the majority and launched a mechanism that would

control the religious affairs of the country. Diyanet would

enable the Kemalist regime to centralize religious life of the

country as the sole authority by excluding other non-state

networks from the operation of the religion. Köse(2012) points

out this pragmatism: “The Republican establishment tried to

create a ‘local’ Turkish Islam that was completely ‘apolitical’

at the popular level. In addition, this vision of Islam was

meant to exclude the ‘low Islam’ or ‘Sufi Islam’ and to

accommodate the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı as the institution of

Turkish ‘high Islam” (p.13). Having such an important function,

Diyanet could not be given up just for the sake of pleasing

communities like Alevis. It is possible to reconcile the

Kemalist project of Diyanet with the concerns of Alevis, but

the scope of this study is enough for the discussion of it4.

Alevi society has not had a positive stance/position

towards Diyanet because they believe that Diyanet is the4 For the relationship between Alevism and Kemalizm look at T. Köse, ‘Between Nationalism, Modernism and Secularism: The Ambivalent Place of ‘Alevi Identities’, Middle Eastern Studies

continuation of the Sunnification project dating back to

Ottoman Empire. The narratives of the Kızılbaş killings,

suppression of Kızılbaş Turcoman, banishment of Turcoman during

the rivalry and conflict between Ottomans and Safevids are

central to the identity politics of Alevis. These narratives of

dark episode of Alevis are the keys to understanding the

stances/positions Alevis have taken up against Diyanet. The

centrality of the past for Alevi-positioning is aptly stated by

Massicard(2013): “Alevist historiography presents history as an

endless repetition of the same pattern, with a recurrent theme

of being massacre, associated with the figure of the victim or

martyr. (…) Alevists have a large repertory of such tragedies

to draw upon, including that at Kerbela(680) and Gazi(1995), as

well as the massacres carried out by Selim I during the sixteenth

century and the Kahramanmaraş massacre(1978)” (emphasis added

p.58). The image of Diyanet in the minds of Alevis is attached

the narratives of massacres, killings of Sunni Ottoman. Without

the psychocultural dramas and narratives related to the

recurrent victimization of Alevis at backdrop, the

stances/positions taken up against the Diyanet cannot be

understood.

Diyanet understanding that Alevism is within the Islamic

orthodoxy and Alevis are “Muslims who have strayed from the

straight and narrow path and adopted certain ‘bad’ habits

(drinking alcohol, not praying, not going to the mosque)”

(Massicard 2013, p.104) is perceived as the Sunni understanding

of Alevism, and consequently backlashes all the attempts

initiated by the Diyanet adopting these views. The constant

fear of assimilation among the Sunni majority is strengthened

by Diyanet’s pro-Sunni stance. The concept of revictimization

tells much about the mood most Alevis are in especially

emotional side of revictimization. Diyanet, being the pulpit of

Sunni Islam according to Alevis, overlooks the demands of Alevi

society, and by being a pro-Sunni institution and by

overlooking Alevis’ status of victim it reproduces the

victimization of Alevis. The mindset that constantly emphasizes

“we are surrounded by enemies who are either trying to

exterminate us or to assimilate us” (cited by Köse 2011, p.13)

is so hegemonic that anything connoting Sunnism or Ottoman

Empire or both stirs the narratives about Selim I’s Kızılbaş

killings, Ebussuud’s fatwas about Kızılbaş Turcoman, Mahmud

II’s abolishment of Bektaşi lodges etc., and consequently

alienates Alevis from developing positive feelings.

It is needless to say that antipathy towards the Diyanet

is shared by almost all Alevis no matter how diverse their

worldviews are. What differentiate them are the disagreements

over what should be done. Alevi associations do not have a

consensus on what should be done with the Diyanet. The Alevi

Bektaşi Federation, (the ABF) claims that an institution like

Diyanet does not have a place in a secular regime (Köse 2010,

p.155). Some Alevis are against finance of the Diyanet from the

public budget while some others claims that Alevis should be

exempted from taxes because the Diyanet does not provide

service to Alevis (Köse 2010, p.155). According to Köse (2012),

there are two contending positions on Alevi identity. The

religious position argues that Diyanet consolidates the Sunni

understanding of Islam in Turkey, and this in turn leads to

marginalization of Alevis, their cultural practices, rituals,

and lifestyle (Köse 2012, p.8). The religious position does not

totally oppose the existence of the Diyanet; instead, they

emphasize the unwillingness of giving the rights of Alevis. On

the other hand, ideological positions argues what is important

for Alevis are “the social, political and economic orientations

of the Alevis, who are seen as being fundamentally different

from the Sunnis, or other identity groups in Turkey” (Köse

2012, p.12). The difference between Alevi community and others

and Sunnis is central to the politics of the ideological

position. They argue that Alevism has a different worldview and

it is a different religion. Because “the ideological position

is also critical with regard to the common myth that assumes

that Alevis have always had a good relationship with the

Kemalist regime, and that the Alevi community is the

guarantor/insurance of the regime’s secularist principles”

(Köse 2010, p.16), it does not adopt the Diyanet which is an

institution of the Kemalist regime.

CONCLUSION

The origins of the current Alevi issue should searched in

the remote past in the sixteenth century. The rivalry and

consequently conflict between Ottomans and Safavids planted the

seeds of hate between Kızılbaş Turcoman – later Alevis- and

Sunnis. Born as a political issue, the rivalry and conflict

between Ottomans and Safavids turned that political issue into

a religious issue. The conflicts between Ottomans and Safavids

led to the marginalization of Kızılbaş Turcoman in the Ottoman

lands and that of Sunnis in the Safavid lands. In order to

consolidate centralization in the Anatolia, Selim I initiated

comprehensive suppression campaigns against Kızılbaş Turcoman,

which causes thousand casualties of Kızılbaş. The harsh

measures initiated against Kızılbaş forced Kızılbaş to retreat

mountainous regions so that they could preserve their

identities. The psychocultural narratives and dramas

constructed about these “dark episodes” have been central to

the identity politics of Alevi communities since then. The

narratives and dramas constructed about these episodes are the

key to understanding how Alevi communities make sense of the

world. Without understanding these psychocultural dynamics, it

is not possible to understand the nature of Alevi issue.

Alevis’ stance towards the Diyanet is a case in point. I argue

that psychocultural narratives and dramas are central to

Alevis’ stances of the Diyanet. That is to say, Alevis

perceives the Diyanet as the continuation of the Sunnification

of Ottoman period. The stance/position taken up by Alevis

towards the Diyanet is determined by the psychocultural

narratives and dramas about Ottoman past.

Köse’s(2010) point about the “Alevi Opening” that “the

most challenging set of obstacles for dealing with the root

causes of Alevi-state and Alevi-Sunni oppositions along with

the ongoing ‘Alevi opening’ are the psychocultural and

emotional obstacles” ( Köse 2010, p.152) is a pertinent point.

Trying to solve the issue without taking the psychocultural

narratives and dramas into consideration will be doomed to

fail. Therefore, solutions suggested by the state should take

these narratives into consideration. Given that integrating the

cemevis into the Diyanet system will not be acceptable for

Alevis “Establishing a new “Alevi Directorate” under the Prime

Minister’s office and funding and regulating cemevis through

this new institution may be an ideal solution” ” (Köse 2010,

p.154).

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