Addressing Europe's Urban Challenges: Lessons from the EU URBAN Community Initiative

Addressing Europe’s Urban Challenges: Lessonsfrom the EU URBAN Community Initiative

Juliet Carpenter

[Paper first received, January 2005; in final form, December 2005]

Summary. Urban issues have moved up the European Union’s policy agenda over the past10 years. Since the launch of the URBAN I Community Initiative (CI) in 1994, urban issueswithin regional policy have increasingly featured in EU policy documents. This paper presentsthe findings of the ex-post evaluation of the URBAN CI that was implemented from 1994 to1999, funded by the European Commission. It shows that while URBAN-style area-basedinitiatives were already taking place in some member-states, in the majority of countries theURBAN CI presented an innovative way of addressing area-based urban challenges, effectivelyleading the way for a sea-change in thinking on urban regeneration in many member-states,both in terms of content and process. The paper concludes with some reflections on theimplications of the findings for addressing urban deprivation through area-based initiatives.

1. Introduction

It has increasingly been recognised over thepast decade that cities are the engines ofregional growth, the motors of competitive-

ness that can contribute significantly to aregion’s fortunes (Boddy and Parkinson,2004). Cities play an important role in their

respective local, regional and national econ-omies, acting as the power-house for theirwider economic systems (Buck et al., 2005).

But even the most ‘successful’ cities interms of competitiveness are afflicted byurban poverty and social exclusion, often

spatially focused pockets of deprivation thatare home to low-income-groups, few econ-omic opportunities and run-down urban

environments (Madanipour et al., 1998; Abra-hamson and Hansen, 1996).

Governments across Europe have devel-oped their own responses to socio-spatialpolarisation within cities, initiated at the

national, regional or local levels, accordingto the particular context. In the context ofthe UK in particular, the approach has beenthrough area-based initiatives (ABIs),spatially targeted programmes focused onspecific neighbourhoods which aim toaddress the multifaceted challenges of dis-advantage. In the UK, these initiatives beganin the 1960s with the Urban Programme andhave evolved over the decades as the natureof the challenges has become clearer(Dabinett et al., 2001), into the current incar-nation as New Deal for Communities.However, the fact that successive govern-ments continue to need to plough resourcesinto often the same deprived areas, with onlymixed success, raises the question ofwhether ABIs actually make a difference.

This paper looks at the example of an ABIinstigated at the EU level, the URBAN Com-munity Initiative, which was a neighbourhood-focused urban regeneration programme

Urban Studies, Vol. 43, No. 12, 2145–2162, November 2006

Juliet Carpenter is in the Department of Planning, Oxford Brookes University, Gipsy Lane, Oxford, OX3 0BP, UK. Fax: 01865 483559. E-mail: [email protected].

0042-0980 Print=1360-063X Online=06=122145–18 # 2006 The Editors of Urban Studies

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aiming to address the economic, social andenvironmental disadvantage faced by neigh-bourhoods across the EU. The programmewas implemented between 1994 and 1999, inwhat were then 15 member-states of the EU,taking an approach that particularly focusedon issues of process, partnership and capacitybuilding through regeneration. The articledraws on research undertaken for the ex-postevaluation of the programme and shows that,while the impact of the programme wasnecessarily limited due to the resourcesavailable, the programme nevertheless didhave an influence at a local, regional andeven national level in some cases, bringingchanges in the policy responses to urban depri-vation within some individual member-states.However, mirroring debates that have takenplace in the UK context, the research alsoraises questions over whether ABIs canaddress deep-seated challenges of polarisationand inequality within cities, or whether theyneed to be implemented in parallel with morefundamental policies to tackle urban depri-vation at a more structural level.

The article begins by reviewing thedifferent perspectives on area-based initia-tives, looking at the arguments for andagainst ABIs, as well as the pros and cons ofpeople- versus place-based policies withinABIs. It then explores the achievements ofthe URBAN Community Initiative and thefactors which influenced this. The paper con-cludes with some implications of the findingsfor our understanding of area-based regener-ation initiatives and a discussion of how theURBAN experience can further our know-ledge of deprived urban areas and ways totackle them.

2. Interpretations of Deprivation andArea-based Initiatives

There is much debate on the causes of urbandeprivation and the potential effects andbenefits of area-based initiatives (for asummary, see Parkinson, 1998; Stewart,2001; Skifter Andersen, 2002). Some see theexistence of spatial concentrations of povertyas a symptom of globalisation, economic

restructuring and the uneven distribution ofwealth under a market economy that generatessocial and economic exclusion (Oatley, 2000;Byrne, 1999).

Poor areas exist because the poor exist(Lupton, 2003, p. 7).

This would suggest that macro approaches toaddressing poverty are needed. Economicgrowth brings uneven gains, benefiting therich rather than the poor and therefore concen-trating wealth away from disadvantagedpeople and places. As Lupton notes

The only way to transform the fortunes ofpoor areas is to transform the fortunes ofthe poor, by redistributing economic gainsand not just by creating them (Lupton,2003, p. 8).

However, there are also arguments based onmicro explanations for addressing the spatialconcentration of poverty. It is argued thatbeing resident in these neighbourhoods itselfcompounds the disadvantage faced by thoseliving there. These so-called neighbourhoodeffects it is argued, can work in a number ofways. They reinforce disadvantage throughthe physical characteristics of the area—forexample, through isolated location, poorquality housing and poor services (Buck,2001). Others suggest that neighbourhoodeffects are also apparent in the discriminationthat people face due to their residentialaddress, in accessing the labour market forexample, or credit services (Atkinson andKintrea, 2001). Neighbourhoods become stig-matised in the eyes of institutions, investorsand other citizens, a process which works toperpetuate the disadvantage that those areasand their residents face.

However, some researchers have suggestedthat the area effects of deprivation are not sosimple, that some individuals from deprivedneighbourhoods manage to escape dis-advantage. In a wider non-UK context, someresearchers have argued that neighbourhoodeffects are relatively small in Europe and there-fore do not justify a specific area-basedapproach to urban deprivation (Friedrichs,1997; Musterd and Ostendorf, 1998).

2146 JULIET CARPENTER

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However, there does appear to be empiricalevidence that, with certain caveats, living inneighbourhoods where there is a concentrationof poverty works to the disadvantage of thoseresidents (Atkinson and Kintrea, 2001).

Thus, as Lupton suggests

Area problems cannot be solved simply by‘macro’ policies, but need to be tackled bytargeted programmes to address the com-pounding effects of neighbourhood(Lupton, 2003, p. 9).

ABIs also play a useful role for governments,as they reinforce the perception that depri-vation only exists in a few well-definedareas. Limited resources can be channelledinto delimited neighbourhoods and thereforethe impact is greater—to the credit of thegovernment.

However, within the area-based approachto tackling deprivation, there are differentways of addressing disadvantage, character-ised as place-based or people-based, eachwith their proponents as well as their critics.On the one hand, place-based policies helpby investing in run-down urban environments,which then become attractive to externalinvestment. However, this then risks trigger-ing increased property prices, population dis-placement and potential gentrification. On theother hand, by investing in people rather thanplaces, individuals benefit from support, butthose fortunate enough to access opportunitiesthrough support are likely to move out of theneighbourhood when they have the chance todo so, leaving behind those at increased riskof exclusion (Taylor, 1998). There appears tobe support for a combination of place- andpeople-based schemes within ABIs, as well assupport for a combination of macro and micropolicies to address spatial concentrations ofdeprivation. National-level policies are neededto address structural causes of poverty and thewider forces of decline, combined with neigh-bourhood-level policies to tackle the local-level manifestations of social and economicexclusion (Kleinman, 2000).

In the EU context, given the limited powersof the European Commission, its ability to

influence macro policies of member-states isarguably limited. But through regionalpolicy, it has the opportunity to implementmicro policies, albeit in a small way, toaddress the issue of urban deprivation at theneighbourhood level, both people- andplace-based. It is this micro-level policyaimed at urban areas, the URBANCommunity Initiative, that will be examinedin this paper, looking at the achievementsthat were made and the implications of thefindings for addressing urban disadvantage.

3. The URBAN Community Initiative

3.1 Background

The URBAN Community Initiative (CI) waslaunched in 1994, at a time when citiesacross the EU were facing significant econo-mic, social and environmental challenges.Although urban deprivation was not a newphenomenon, with major slum clearance pro-grammes having been implemented after thewar, it became increasingly apparent duringthe 1980s that many EU urban areas wereexperiencing severe economic decline andpopulation loss, with shifts from central tomore suburban neighbourhoods. At the sametime, areas dominated by social housingmainly on the outskirts of cities, that hadbeen built to absorb city-centre slum clearanceand out-migration, were themselves experien-cing economic, social and environmentalstress. As a consequence of these trends,neighbourhoods in crisis (quartiers en crise)were emerging, both in inner-city districts,as well as in suburban housing estates (seevan den Berg et al. (1998) for an overviewof the different member-state contexts).

Up until 1994, the European Union’sinvolvement in specifically urban interven-tions was relatively limited. The StructuralFund programming period 1989–93 hadseen major investment in infrastructure andhuman resource development, some ofwhich was focused on urban areas, but expliciturban interventions had not been a feature ofregional policy during that period. TheURBAN Community Initiative was launched

ADDRESSING EUROPE’S URBAN CHALLENGES 2147



in 1994 (CEC, 1994), financed through theStructural Funds from 1994 to 1999, inresponse to the growing awareness at the EUpolicy level of the challenges facingEurope’s towns and cities.1

Pockets of high unemployment and socio-economic deprivation existed in many urbanareas, with certain social groups at risk ofexclusion, particularly ethnic minority com-munities and migrants (Martin, 1998).Certain neighbourhoods were also facingsevere environmental degradation and werein need of physical regeneration. Althoughthese challenges were not experienced by allurban neighbourhoods, in most towns andcities, even the most prosperous, there werecertain areas which were affected. The aimof the URBAN CI was to address theseissues through the Structural Funds, toimprove the living conditions of citizens inthese areas and to promote sustainable urbandevelopment. The strategy adopted was acombination of place-based and people-based initiatives, depending on the particularlocal, regional or national context, recognis-ing the need for individual strategies to meetlocally specific challenges.

3.2 URBAN Strategies

Modelled on the UK’s experience of theSingle Regeneration Budget, URBAN wasan ABI promoting a spatial concentration ofresources in specific urban neighbourhoods.URBAN targeted four different types ofneighbourhood depending on the local andnational context (Table 1): peripheral urbanareas (37 per cent of all programmes), innercities (32 per cent), historical city centres(19 per cent) and mixed areas that combineda variety of these three characteristics (12per cent). When compared with van denBerg et al.’s (1998) definition of ‘urbanproblem areas’ in each member-state, thereis a close correlation between the types ofneighbourhood being targeted by URBAN ineach national context and the areas high-lighted by van den Berg as quartiers en crisein each national context.

URBAN was targeted at the most disadvan-taged districts of the city. The average level ofunemployment in the programme areas wasover 20 per cent, and, in some neighbourhoods,as high as 40 per cent. The programme areasalso housed high concentrations of immigrantsand ethnic minority groups, representing up to70 per cent of the target population in someareas.

The programme was designed to addressurban deprivation through an integratedapproach to the problems faced by run-downneighbourhoods, using a partnership approachthat involved local authorities and target com-munities to design and implement the pro-gramme. The programme supported a rangeof initiatives, both place- and people-based,including the launch of new economic activi-ties, social and health provision, vocationaltraining and the renovation of infrastructureand environmental improvements.

Each of the 118 URBAN programmes wasresponding to two drivers when devisingtheir approach to regeneration, one being theEuropean Commission’s original guidelines/call for programmes and the other being thenational and local contexts and challenges tobe addressed. Although each programmewas unique, it can be argued that there werefour broad categories into which the pro-grammes fell: a broad integrated approach(adopted by 45 per cent of programmes); anintegrated approach with a specific focus,either economic, social or environmental(adopted by 26 per cent); a ‘flagship’ approach(10 per cent); and, a ‘community-focused’approach (18 per cent).

All the UK programmes adopted a‘community-focused’ approach, reflectingthe strong partnership and inclusive approachto urban regeneration that was being rolled outat the time through the Single RegenerationBudget from 1994 (Oatley, 1998). Othercountries, such as Germany, France andSpain, took an integrated approach, eitherbalanced or focused. Evidence from theURBAN CI in certain countries suggests thata strong integrated approach may be mostsuitable in the ‘worst’ areas of deprivation,where a holistic approach is most effective




in tackling the multidimensional issues facedby disadvantaged areas. In areas of potential,where there are ‘lost opportunities’, evidencesuggests that a strategy based on ‘flagship’projects has a good chance of securing sus-tainable regeneration. These projects can actas a catalyst for further regeneration, whileother smaller, lower-profile projects withinthe same programme can help to build com-munity involvement and encourage owner-ship. Although a central location is the mostobvious place for a strategy based on ‘flag-ships’, in order to maximise visibility, thereis also a role for these strategies in peripherallocations, where they can act as a focusfor local actors and community-basedorganisations.

3.3 URBAN Finance

The URBAN Community Initiative supporteda total of 118 URBAN programmes through-out the 15 member-states. The key factsabout URBAN are detailed in Table 2.A total of 900 million euros of EU investmentwas allocated to the programme, althoughonly 720 million euros had been spent by theEuropean Commission by June 2003. Thisbrings the average actual EU funding per pro-gramme to 6.1 million euros. Contrast thiswith the current UK government spendingon New Deal for Communities, of anaverage £50 million per programme oraround 74 million euros (Lawless, 2004) andthe relative scale of URBAN in the UK isput in clear perspective.

In terms of expenditure, 38 per cent ofactual expenditure went to physical andenvironmental regeneration, 32 per cent sup-ported activities in entrepreneurship andemployment, 23 per cent financed initiativesrelating to social inclusion, 4 per cent wasspent on technical assistance and 2 per centwent into activities in ICT and transport.A further 2 per cent supported ‘other typesof initiative’. However, there were significantvariations in the type of expenditure bymember-states. Physical/environmentalregeneration accounted for 62 per cent ofactual expenditure in Italy, as opposed tojust 10 per cent in Denmark. Expenditure onemployment and entrepreneurship rangedfrom 52 per cent in the Netherlands, to just18 per cent in Italy. Social inclusion measures

Table 2. Key facts about the URBAN CommunityInitiative 1994–99

Over the period1994–99

Total number of URBANprogrammes

118

Total EU funding committed(million euros)

900

Total EU funding paid out upto June 2003 (million euros)

720

Average actual EU fundingper URBAN programme(million euros)

6.1

Average total direct investmentper URBAN programme: EUfunding plus direct domesticco-financing (million euros)

11.8

Table 1. Type of neighbourhood targeted by URBAN

Type of neighbourhood Number Percentage

Peripheral urban area: Those districts on the edge of urban areas,typically including social housing estates that date from the1960s and 1970s

44 37

Inner city: The core of the city, typically characterised byabandoned industrial buildings, dilapidated housing and aneglected environment

37 32

Historic city centre: A city centre characterised by historicarchitecture and the potential to develop cultural heritage

23 19

Mixed: Areas that combine a variety of the above characteristics 14 12Total 118 100




accounted for 46 per cent of actual expendi-ture in Portugal, as opposed to just 12 percent in the Netherlands, Austria and Greece.This in part reflects the national policyagendas that were being pursued at the time,with EU funds providing support to thenationally held priorities. But URBAN alsoset the agenda in some cases, pilotingapproaches that had not been tested before insome urban area-based contexts and, in somecases this proved influential in shiftingnational policy priorities.

Table 3 shows the actual expenditure forthe 103 programmes that had provided databy June 2003, broken down by source offunding. These figures relate to direct invest-ment. However, indirect leverage, which isnot accounted for in these figures, was alsosignificant in some cases. Private-sector lever-age has been greater than expected, initiallyanticipated at 5.4 per cent of total expenditure,but actually representing 6.6 per cent of totalfunding. Examples included the arrival ofnew SMEs into the area, improvements tothe housing stock by private home-ownersand shop-keepers investing in their business.Indirect private-sector leverage was evidentin some programme areas, particularlythrough the volume of construction and restor-ation work that is being undertaken in someareas by private developers.

There were also some examples of very sig-nificant leverage as a result of the programme.In Rostock (Germany), there was significantindirect leverage, from both public andprivate sources. Further public investmenttook place in and around the programmearea, including the renovation of a large build-ing for reuse by the university. A study onindirect private leverage in the area has esti-mated that, for every euro invested in

housing renovation in the URBAN area, afurther 3.9 euros has been generated. In Graz(Austria), a survey on the indirect leverageeffects of the programme has shown thatinvestment in the area during implementationis estimated at 242.66 million euros, of whichonly 29.39 million euros were directly relatedto the URBAN budget as originally planned.In these cases, URBAN acted as a catalystfor regeneration, with leverage bringing infurther funds to the programme area.However, the leverage of private finance insome cases signalled the process of gentrifica-tion, bringing increased house prices andpopulation displacement. We will return tothis issue later in the paper.

4. Evaluation Methodology

An evaluation of the URBAN CI wascommissioned in 2002 by the European Com-mission,2 and was carried out by a team ofindependent urban experts across the EUbetween November 2002 and July 2003.3

The evaluation was based on an assessmentof 118 URBAN programmes and 5 urbanpilot projects (UPPs) and looked at variousaspects of the programme: the selection ofprogramme areas and the strategies adopted,their effectiveness, the management andimplementation systems, their impact andCommunity value added (including the influ-ence on existing urban policies, the promotionof transnational learning and raising aware-ness of other EU policies).

The methodology involved literaturereviews, desk research, case studies, struc-tured interviews with stakeholders (primarilythe URBAN programme co-ordinators) andstreet surveys. This combination ofapproaches was essential to address the

Table 3. Actual expenditure on the URBAN CI as of June 2003, broken down by source of funding

ERDF ESF Total EU Other public Private Total

Amount (million euros) 615.6 95.9 711.5 671.9 97.8 1481.1Percentage 41.5 6.5 48.0 45.4 6.6 100

Source: URBAN CI programme managers, June 2003.




issues both at the individual programme-arealevel, as well as those at the EU level, inorder to draw conclusions that would havepertinence for the programme as a wholeand beyond.

The methodology did not rely on quantifyingoutputs and outcomes, as these data were una-vailable for many programmes. Indeed, thismethod of evaluation would not have beenappropriate for a programme that placedemphasis on issues of process, partnership andcapacity building, where interpretative evalu-ation approaches are more appropriate toassess the impact of interventions on residents’lives. However, with such a large number ofprogrammes, following an initial review of allinterventions, it was then necessary to take asample of the total 118 programmes, in orderto look in more depth at the impact of the pro-gramme and the processes involved in itsimplementation.

The evaluation highlighted a number ofmethodological challenges that are pertinentin this type of major evaluation, covering asit did a variety of national contexts. A keymethodological issue in the assessment ofeffectiveness was the definition of ‘success’in each national context. Success is a relativeconcept and, in assessing how successful theURBAN programme has been, it was necess-ary to consider three different levels: bottom–up, top–down and nationally specific criteria.

From the ‘bottom–up’, success wasmeasured against individual programme-level target outputs and outcomes wherethey were available, that were definedlocally for each programme. From the ‘top–down’, programmes were assessed againstthe original objectives set out by the EuropeanCommission, which were

(a) To address the levels of social exclusionin inner city and peripheral areas.

(b) To address issues faced by deprived urbanareas through support to business crea-tion, improvement of infrastructure andthe physical environment, provision ofcustomised training and actions for equal-ity of opportunities and social amenities.

(c) To act as a catalyst for lasting urbanchange through a broad-based approach.

(d) To fund innovative projects that, wherepossible, form part of a long-term urbanintegration strategy being implementedby the cities concerned.

Thus, they focused on what Hall (1997) hastermed both ‘inward-looking’ and ‘outward-looking’ approaches to area-based regener-ation, addressing internal problems related toissues such as infrastructure and the environ-ment, as well as external problems related toisolation from the rest of the city and theneed to link with wider regeneration strategiesin the city as a whole.

In between these two levels of analysis,each national evaluator also identified otherconditions or factors that were used asnational success criteria for each of the pro-grammes (Table 4). It was important to recog-nise that because each member-state beganfrom a different starting-point in terms oftheir urban regeneration agenda and pro-cesses, the expectations nationally from theprogramme were also very different. Forexample, Sweden and Denmark highlightedissues of sustainable development withintheir aims for URBAN, while in the case ofGreece, the concern was more to establish acoherent urban policy which was lacking atthe time.

At each level (local, national, EU),‘success’ was measured on three counts: interms of outcomes that benefited the targetarea and population; in terms of managementand delivery processes; and in terms of thesustainability of the initiatives and outcomes,given the time-limited nature of theprogramme.

The complexities of carrying out inter-national comparative research have been recog-nised by many (for example, Masser andWilliams, 1988; Allen, 1996; Murie andMusterd, 2004) and the difficulties in devisinga methodology that takes into account diversenational contexts are considerable. While ithad limitations, the three-point evaluationmethod used for this study has addressedsome of these difficulties, by applying a




common methodological framework, while atthe same time taking account of nationalcontexts. This does not, however, negate thedifficulties of carrying out such transnationalstudies and further work on developing cross-national methodologies, particularly in thelight of EU enlargement and the added com-plexity that this brings, is called for.

5. How Successful was URBAN?

In the context of other local and nationalfunding streams, financial support toURBAN was relatively limited. Coupledwith this was a focus on neighbourhoodswith weak local economies, and so it comesas little surprise that URBAN had limitedpotential to instigate fundamental shifts in

economic circumstances. In addition, at thetime of URBAN’s introduction, the cultureof monitoring and evaluation was not strongin most member-states, and data collectionboth for baseline positions and for trackingprogress was patchy. However, even giventhese limitations, there have been successfuloutputs from many programmes, with anenhanced physical environment and improvedsocioeconomic conditions, evidenced if notby hard data, through programme visits andinterviews with programme managers.

5.1 Achievements of URBAN

The evaluation showed that on a number oflevels, the URBAN programme was success-ful in addressing urban deprivation and

Table 4. The definition of success as applied to the URBAN programmes in each national context

Austria To promote institutional co-operation and stimulate strategic integratedapproaches, in the planning as well as implementation phases

Belgium To promote an integrated approach to urban regenerationDenmark To promote new urban development based on the principles of

sustainabilityFinland To encourage positive development of social networks and long-lasting

improvements in the built and natural environment in programme areasFrance To enhance the theme of ‘economic development and employment’ in the

contrat de ville and the ‘urban revival’ plan, and to mobilise theprivate sector

Germany To promote a truly comprehensive and integrated approach, especiallythrough including economic objectives and activities in existing strategies

Greece To fill the gap existing in the sphere of urban policy in GreeceIreland To promote community involvement and consultation, and strengthen the

role and capacity of municipalities in running regeneration programmesItaly To increase deliverability, to promote horizontal integration within

municipalities by overcoming a sectoral approach to urban problemsand to add value through participation and partnership

Luxembourg To promote the ‘regeneration zones’ programme that the governmentwas launching

Netherlands To focus on tourism and cultural development, to increase the visibilityof the programme

Portugal To promote more integrated policies by supporting a broad approach tourban issues in Lisbon and Porto

Spain To increase community involvement in the management andimplementation of URBAN, to promote co-operation betweendifferent levels of government and between different departmentswithin the municipality, to involve the private sector in urban regeneration

Sweden To establish active partnerships around environmental issues in alocal and regional context

United Kingdom To increase community involvement in the management andimplementation of urban regeneration projects

Source: National evaluators’ feedback from fieldwork, June 2003.




disadvantage. Figure 1 shows the effects of theURBAN programmes across the EU, the mostcommonly cited being improvements to thephysical environment, occurring in over 90per cent of programme areas. This took avariety of forms, from historical restorationwork in city centres (for example inMalaga), to the renovation of disusedrailway arches as artists’ studios and culturalspaces (Vienna), and the creation of newworkspace facilities for community enter-prises (Bremen). New facilities and com-munity centres that were constructed throughthe programme often then served to housesocial projects also funded by the programme.This was the case in Rotterdam, where theSchiecentrale project saw the conversion ofan old power plant into a media and ICTcentre. The centre provided space for businessstart-ups in the ICT and audio-visual sectors,indirectly stimulating the local economy ofthe Delfshaven area. Other examples of phy-sical improvements included a sports centrein Duisburg, business space and a trainingcentre in Roubaix-Tourcoing, and a commu-nity centre and recreational space in Graz.

However, as others have argued (Parkinson,1998, Social Exclusion Unit, 1998), physicalimprovements are not sufficient to turnaround the fortunes of a deprived neighbour-hood. Taking an integrated approach,

URBAN also aimed to address social exclu-sion through measures such as job creation,provision of training, supporting newbusinesses and increasing provision of socialservices to address the needs of local com-munities. For example, in Barakaldo (Spain),the programme provided new social facilitiesthrough the Centro de Servicios Sociales andthe Centro de Dia, to target the needs of thelocal population at risk of social exclusion,including the elderly, mentally disabledpeople, women and young people. Supportincluded advisory services and facilities fornew and existing businesses, and by the endof the programme, there had been a significantdrop in levels of unemployment in the targetarea.

However, caution should be exercised attri-buting this directly to the programme ratherthan wider structural economic trends, and thewider impact of such support would have to bemeasured over a longer time frame than wasavailable for the evaluation. Other examples ofsocioeconomic achievements included theHague, where over 600 jobs were createdthrough the programme, and 240 people weretrained, while in Sheffield 58 jobs were attribu-ted to the programme, along with 118 temporaryposts. However, again, it’s important to considerthe nature of these jobs, whether they have beentaken up by local people or those from outside

Figure 1. The effects of URBAN (percentage of programmes with impacts).




the area, and their long term sustainability.While temporary jobs provide valuable experi-ence, they do not offer security to those whoface exclusion, and this is an aspect that the pro-gramme did not address in sufficient detail.Deep-rooted economic exclusion cannot beaddressed by part-time temporary employmentopportunities.

5.2 Outcomes of URBAN

Community engagement and socialcapital. Much has been written about theimportance of community involvement inurban regeneration programmes and how thenotion of social capital (Putnam, 1993) canhelp in understanding community partici-pation and regeneration (Taylor, 2000).While many agree that community networksand social capital play a key role in successfulurban development, there are debates overhow networks of trust and understanding arebuilt, how to empower local communitiesand the role of community cohesion in urbanregeneration (Forrest and Kearns, 2001).

In the context of the Structural Funds onMerseyside, Hibbert et al. (2001) haveargued that it is important to show howsocial capital is formed through the ‘scalingup’ of local associational relations, networksand institutions, to wider power structuresand relations. The evidence from theirresearch suggests that trust amongst partici-pants is central to this process.

Findings from the URBAN evaluationreinforce the importance of community involve-ment in regeneration programmes and alsopoint to the importance of trust in thisprocess. Communities were variouslyinvolved in all stages of the programme,from contributing to its design, throughhelping to select projects that best matchedthe needs of the neighbourhood, to sitting onsteering groups and monitoring committees,closely involved in the management of theprogramme. This ‘bottom–up’ approach tothe design and delivery of programmes wasinnovative both in southern member-states,where there was little history of communityparticipation (Chorianopoulos, 2002), and

also in northern member-states where, backin 1994 when the programme was launched,such community involvement beyond token-ism was rare.

In the URBAN programme in Derry/Londonderry, for example, an extensive Com-munity Audit was undertaken at the start ofthe design process, which helped to establishthe local community’s needs and aspirationsfor their area. The programme in NorthernIreland is widely seen to have had a significantimpact in terms of building bridges between thetwo religious communities in the city andhelping to build trust between partnershipmembers (Murtagh and McKay, 2003). Thisapplication of the European Commission’s sub-sidiarity principle, where decisions are taken atthe lowest appropriate level, has been taken as amodel for other policy areas. In all, there wasevidence of social capital being built in 85 percent of programmes.

In Sheffield, an evaluation sub-group of thepartnership responsible for implementationwas set up to appraise project proposals,using a community-devised scoring system

relating to need, demand, justification and fitwith the Action Plan. Recommendationswere then made to the partnership for projectselection. All projects were endorsed by thelocal community before they went for apprai-sal. This was a key part of the community’s

involvement, helping to build a sense ofownership with the programme.

However, while in the main communityengagement in URBAN was a significantachievement, there appear to be contradictionsinherent in the programme, which workedagainst the involvement of communities inthe programme. For the small level ofresources available, URBAN was a ‘top-

heavy’ administratively complex programme.The jargon associated with EU StructuralFunds and the bureaucracy and paperworkinvolved tended to isolate communities andmade it difficult to sustain community invol-vement, as there was a risk of feeling over-

whelmed by the jargon and disengaging fromthe process. This also supports Hibbert et al.’sfindings that




Not only is jargon alienating, it can increaselevels of mistrust between communities andoutside agencies (Hibbert et al., 2001, p. 156).

Although the emphasis was on local engage-ment, some found that the programme wasnot at all ‘community-friendly’. In somecases, programme managers felt that theywere encouraged to take risks in funding pro-jects, such as those run by small communitygroups without a track record of delivery,and yet there was not the necessary flexibilityin time-scales, reporting requirements andoutcomes that involvement of such groupscan necessitate. In another example, a lackof clarity about the issue of eligible expendi-ture resulted in claw-back from some projects.Again, it was the community groups that wereparticularly hard hit, for whom the availabilityof funds is often a significant issue.

The tension between programme complexityand community involvement was also playedout towards the end of the programme period.Engaging the community in regeneration pro-grammes always takes much longer than antici-pated. However, time to build capacity amongthe local community was not integrated into thetime-scale and so, towards the end of the pro-gramme, due to earlier delays in getting thecommunity involved, a number of programmesfaced pressure to spend their budgets in a shortspace of time. In some cases, this led to theapproval of larger projects with less of a com-munity focus, as they were seen as ‘easier’ toimplement, although they risked compromisingthe strategic and integrated nature of the pro-gramme. This conflict between communityinvolvement and complexity highlights the dif-ficulties inherent in engaging local groups inmanaging and implementing programmes andprojects, a finding that has echoes in the experi-ence of New Deal for Communities, wherethere have been tensions between communityinvolvement and programme delivery. It alsosuggests that time must be built into the time-table for capacity building and engagement.

A number of programme managers felt thatthere was a lack of clear guidance on the aims,objectives and action planning details of theURBAN programme. In some member-

states, it transpired that even the nationalmanaging authority, which were the pro-gramme managers’ direct contact with theEuropean Commission, were not entirelyclear about the intricacies of the programme,leading to delays in getting responses toquestions and, on occasion, conflicting mess-ages. Instances such as these served to under-mine the trust that was being built up betweenthe different partners and thus to erode thesocial capital that was being formed.

To alleviate some of the problems associatedwith the complexity of EU programmes, severalprogrammes such as Sheffield and Vienna set uplocal project offices within the designatedURBAN area which helped to break down bar-riers, offering the local community a drop-inpoint, to answer their queries and concerns. Thiswas useful for local community groups withoutprevious experience of involvement, as it pro-vided the support and facilities they needed bothto submit an application for funding and tomanage their projects once funding had beengranted. Other programmes, such as London’sHackney Tower Hamlets, produced a ‘jargon-busting’ “Guide to successful project develop-ment and management” which set out the regu-lations, requirements and systems related torunning an EU project in plain English. Theseinitiatives all aimed to build trust between com-munity groups and the programme managementteam, central, as Hibbert et al. (2001) argue, tothe process of urban regeneration and a criticalcomponent of social capital.

Nevertheless, there can be questions raisedabout the depth of social capital in a numberof cases, with the added layer of bureaucracyand management processes imposed by theEU, increasing the risk of mistrust or break-down in trust.

Urban governance. Together with the empha-sis on community involvement, the URBANprogramme was also characterised by theimportance it placed on new forms of urbangovernance and the process of ‘doing’ urbanregeneration, through the application of theCommission’s ‘partnership principle’ (CEC,1999). The challenges of urban deprivation inmost national contexts had traditionally been




addressed by single agencies, most commonlythrough physical renewal, or environmentalimprovements, managed at the national level.URBAN helped to raise awareness amongpolicy-makers that urban deprivation was achallenge with many facets and demanded amultiagency, multilevel approach to deviseintegrated solutions to address those challenges(at the economic, social and environmentallevels). URBAN programmes aimed topromote joined-up working both acrosssectors and between levels of government(national, regional and local).

Evidence suggests that one of the mostimportant legacies of the URBAN programmehas been this partnership working, which haspaved the way for the formation of lastingrelationships and the creation of networks ofpublic- and private-sector organisations,brought round the table in many cases forthe first time to focus on area-based initiatives.While it has been argued that there are limitsto local partnership working (Geddes, 2000),and clear tensions that arise within regene-ration partnerships (Lawless, 2004), many ofthe URBAN case studies showed that therewas real ‘added value’ in managing regene-ration using a partnership approach, despitethe challenges involved and delays that wereoften incurred. Over half the programmeshad ‘institutional effects’ in terms of new part-nerships and ways of ‘doing’ regeneration.

In Magdeburg, for example, the inclusionof the Chamber of Crafts and the Chamberof Trade and Industry in the partnership wasseen as ground-breaking at the time and hasset a precedent for the inclusion of a widerange of non-traditional actors in other partner-ships. The partnership has been maintained andnow operates at a regional level. Owners ofSMEs in the area also formed an associationduring the implementation of URBAN, whichcontinued running after the programme had fin-ished, to promote the economic development oftheir area. In the same area, a group of com-mitted and vocal residents formed a Citizens’Advisory Council, providing support and infor-mation to local people, which again was activein community-based work well beyond the life-time of the URBAN programme.

It is worth noting the role of the privatesector here for, while there were examples ofsuccessful programmes that did not engagethe private sector to a significant degree,there were also those that failed to achievetheir ambitions, partly because the privatesector pulled out of the partnership. Forexample, in Thessaloniki, one major projectfailed to materialise because the initial commit-ment of support from a private company waswithdrawn. The programme in Magdeburganticipated supporting the development of thelocal economy through encouraging SMEs,but this aspect of the programme proved diffi-cult, as banks were less than willing to sharein the risks of micro enterprises and businessstart-ups. However, the role of the privatesector in regeneration is a double-edgedsword, as will be seen later in this paper.

The sustainability of these partnerships hasbeen positive in many cases, in taking forwardnot only the urban regeneration agenda, butalso being applied to other specific urban gover-nance arenas, such as community and youthwork, environmental issues and housing. Incities such as Helsinki, Genova and Bristol,the experience of URBAN fed directly intothe planning and delivery of the subsequentURBAN II programme (2000–06). In thecase of Bristol, this influence also extendedto the delivery of Objective 2 funding as well.

This is not to say that the URBAN pro-gramme did not come up against the familiarproblems that multiagency regeneration part-nerships face, such as reaching consensus indecision-making when so many voices andopinions are to be taken into account,uneven balance of power and lack of trust(Raco, 1999; Rhodes et al., 2003). A numberof the URBAN case studies confirmed thatbroad partnerships bring a complexity thatcan slow down the implementation process.‘Joining up’ across sectors and departmentsbrought difficulties and delays, particularlyin countries such as Denmark, which hadtraditionally adopted a rigid sector-orientedapproach to urban redevelopment.

It has been argued that managing andimplementing a successful regeneration pro-gramme requires the solid foundation of




data-driven needs analyses, as well as thepreparation and implementation of monitoringand evaluation systems, to assess progressand achievements (Dabinett et al., 2001). Atthe time of URBAN’s introduction, theculture of monitoring and evaluation was notstrong and, in some member-states, almostnon-existent. However, URBAN was in partresponsible for encouraging a culture of moni-toring and assessment of programmes incertain member-states, for example in Bari(Italy), where the practice has been strength-ened and applied to other programmes in the city.

However, there was still the feeling in someareas that the programme had not beendesigned at the outset with the local contextin mind. For example, in Sheffield, the initialtargets set for training beneficiaries of theEuropean Social Fund (ESF) were unrealistic,given the postcode restrictions and the smallnumber of potential beneficiaries in thedefined area. Similarly, for London’s ParkRoyal, the programme outputs were agreedbetween the European Commission and theGovernment Office for London without inputor consultation with local stakeholders.Targets for the ‘number of new businessstart-ups’ were unachievable in one area, asit was predominantly residential, with littlespace designated for commercial use. Localgroups felt excluded and alienated from theprogramme, which made it more difficult tobuild ownership and engage local people.

In the case of the individual URBAN pro-grammes, the challenge of decision-makingacross departments and interests was notresponsible for blocking definitively the pro-gress of the programme, although there wereinevitable cases of disparate views, disagree-ment and necessary consensus building.However, despite the challenges theypresent, the URBAN experience confirmsthat multisector partnerships are critical forthe management of integrated urban regene-ration schemes, as long as a balance can bestruck between inclusivity and complexity.

Influence on urban strategies and nationalurban policy. It has already been noted thatthe URBAN CI was launched in 1994 in

very different national policy contexts.Although member-states were facing somecommon challenges in their towns and cities(such as high unemployment, social exclu-sion, physical decay), there were also nation-specific concerns which were being addressedthrough individual national policies. In 1994,a number of member-states had alreadyintroduced ABIs to address urban deprivation(for example, the Netherlands, France, theUK, and to a lesser extent, Denmark andIreland) (Atkinson, 2000). In the main,however, these initiatives had a specific sec-toral focus, rather than taking an integratedapproach and, in other countries, there wasno provision for a specific national policyrelating to urban areas, other than physicalplanning policies (see van den Berg et al.(1998) for further details of the nationalurban policy contexts).

From this low baseline position, the poten-tial influence of URBAN was therefore strong.The evaluation showed that in some member-states such as Italy, URBAN had a significantinfluence on policy, with the government sub-sequently funding several national pro-grammes in deprived urban areas, such asthe Contratti di quartiere (‘Neighbourhoodcontracts’) which were urban social renewalprogrammes based on the participation oflocal residents and which were largely seenas the result of the experience of URBAN.The Italian government has continued tofund programmes in the urban policy field,taking its lead from the integrated approachthat was first introduced through URBAN.The influence of URBAN was also strong atthe municipal level, particularly in Spain andGermany, where it was adopted as a modelfor further regeneration activity.

However, in other countries, the advent ofURBAN on the policy scene did not introducea radically new approach to tackling urbanissues. Both the UK and the Netherlandsalready had well-established area-based neigh-bourhood renewal policies, such as the com-munity-focused Single Regeneration Budget(SRB) in the UK and the nationally led BigCities Policy in the Netherlands (van Kempen,2000), which both mirrored URBAN by taking




an integrated area-based approach toregeneration. In France, the contrat de villeaddressed urban deprivation (Le Gales andMawson, 1994), whilst in Ireland, there wasalso already a strong tradition of partnershipworking in small-area interventions.

Although the UK government claimed thatURBAN had not added anything new to theurban policy scene, given the long history ofABIs and an integrated approach to regeneration(interview by author with ODPM official, 2003),evidence from case study work in the UKsuggests that the emphasis on partnershipworking went above and beyond what hadbeen achieved previously. This finding also sup-ports other work in the UK, which has shownparticularly in the context of Northern Ireland,that URBAN’s emphasis on community partici-pation and social regeneration went beyond theprevious regeneration practices in terms of itsparticipatory style and delivery systems, andalso had significant benefits in terms of bringingthe two communities in Northern Irelandtogether (Murtagh, 2001).

Overall, the evaluation found that URBANwas original and influential in 11 member-states, introducing for the first time an inte-grated approach to urban renewal (forexample, in Austria), new policy instruments(in the case of Denmark) and stimulating dis-cussion about urban needs, targets for urbanpolicy and the means of achieving a betterbalance between polarised neighbourhoods(for example, in Finland). It would be interest-ing to track this influence further to see howfar this has filtered up the policy-makingchain and whether there have been transverseimpacts in other policy areas.

5.3 Adverse (Negative) Effects

A programme such as URBAN aimed toaddress the growing spatial inequalities thatare evident in towns and cities acrossEurope. However, there were a smallnumber of cases (under 10 per cent) wherethe outcome was just the opposite. It can beargued that ABIs just displace problemsbetween different neighbourhoods, ratherthan add to the overall economic and social

well-being of the city as a whole (see Parkinson,1998). While the evaluation does not showthat this was generally the case, there wereexamples of negative spill-over effects fromthe assisted areas into other neighbourhoodswhich go some way towards supporting thisargument.

In the case of Graz, there was some evi-dence that the improvements made withinthe area led to the displacement of the activi-ties of the ‘red light district’ to adjacent neigh-bourhoods. In Rostock, unregulated changesto the area brought about by the URBAN pro-gramme, particularly in terms of housing andproperty, have led to a process of gentrifica-tion, driving sections of the socially disadvan-taged population into other areas. Thephysical appearance of the neighbourhood inRostock has also changed dramatically, withthe arrival of new economic activities suchas pubs, cafes, restaurants and shops,forming a gentrified consumption urbanscapein what was previously a predominantlylow-key residential area. Similarly, the targetarea in Marseille has seen an increase inrental prices and increases in the level oflocal taxes in the area.

Although these effects were by no meansuniversal, they raise important questionsabout the overall aims of ABIs and forwhom the intervention takes place. Atkinsonargues that area-based initiatives need to be

supported by wider policies (on theeconomy, employment, social protec-tion)—in other words, place-based policiesneed to be integrated with people-basedpolicies (Atkinson, 2000, p. 1046).

In the cases highlighted above, this balancebetween the focus on people and place wasnot achieved, with consequences of displace-ment for the local people involved. Althoughinitial policy statements purport to supportlocal community groups, build capacity andpromote local well-being, the risk is thatcapital interests will spot an opportunity and,without mechanisms to prevent this, investin the area and eventually displace the originalresidents and local economic structures.A programme that has explicit social inclusion




objectives also necessarily needs mechanismsto protect local residents from the risk of dis-placement. Regeneration partnerships need tobe aware of the potential issues and to identifyactions to minimise the risks.

6. Implications of Findings

In the URBAN programme, the level ofresources involved, and hence the physicaloutputs achieved, were modest. In themajority of cases (80 per cent), nationalresources were already being targeted in theselected areas, given the high levels of depri-vation in each neighbourhood. In addition, thetime-scales for the programmes were shortand the impacts were only most significantin those areas where the particular localcontext enabled relatively small interventionsto generate disproportionate knock-on effects.However, at the end of the programme period,many of the URBAN programme areas werestill absolutely and relatively disadvantaged,with spatial concentrations of sociallyexcluded groups. So how far did URBANmake a difference (at the local, regional ornational levels) and what did it bring to theregeneration agenda?

URBAN set itself high ambitions. The levelof resources and limited time-scale were notcommensurate with the scale of the problem.As a result, its impact in terms of fundamentalreductions of deprivation and exclusion wasalways going to be limited. However, thereare broader questions over whether suchsmall regeneration programmes can everachieve fundamental changes in terms ofaddressing inequality, given the continuedpolarisation that exists in cities. As an alterna-tive, extensive and large-financed regenerationprojects (such as the Guggenheim in Bilbao)might appear to be the solution. However,research suggests that these too lead to conti-nued social exclusion, as well as to the for-mation of new urban elites and lessdemocratic forms of urban governance (Mou-laert et al., 2003). So, although limited interms of its fundamental impact, the URBANprogramme did add value through its impacton urban governance, by creating the

conditions for change in the future, in termsof building partnerships and trust betweenmembers, developing local capacity and intro-ducing innovative approaches to doing andmanaging urban regeneration, both at thelocal and in some cases, national level.

There are a number of implications fromthe findings that are important to bring outfor other ABI programmes. First, in terms ofpartnership working, while partnerships needto be inclusive, there are issues to addressaround inclusivity versus simplicity, as com-plexity can risk compromising the very objec-tives of the programme. The additional layerof bureaucracy that came from being anEU-funded programme brought added com-plexity that arguably risked compromisingthe objectives of the programme. Delivery ofregeneration is emerging as a key issue forsuccessful outcomes and, as regenerationmanagement tends towards complexity, thechallenges of this need to be understood.Linked to this is the importance of socialcapital in partnership working and buildingup trust to bring different groups and stake-holders together in working relationships.

Secondly, it is clear that despite the fundingfrom URBAN and many other nationally tar-geted policies, pockets of urban deprivationstill exist throughout the EU. Evidence fromthe URBAN experience suggests that ABIsdo provide a useful approach to addressspatially concentrated urban disadvantage,but that they need support from other quartersto be the most effective. Locally driven place-based initiatives need to be complemented bylocally responsive people-based initiatives,with the whole needing to be set within apolicy context sympathetic to ABIs. Thispolicy context is important at two levels. Atthe city level, ABIs should be part of widersub-city and city ‘nested’ strategies toaddress deprivation in an integrated way(Atkinson, 2000, p. 1050). At the nationallevel, it is becoming increasingly importantto bend the activities of national mainstreamservice providers (such as in education,health and crime prevention), to targetdeprived neighbourhoods. In addition, thestructural causes of poverty and deprivation




need to be addressed at the national level,through macro policies to address the funda-mentals of economic restructuring, workless-ness, national skills and training policies,and social exclusion. The key is to build upcoherence between different levels of gover-nance and their strategies.

Globalisation is bringing increased socialand spatial inequalities, particularly in anurban context. The URBAN experience con-firms that ABIs are a useful policy tool inhelping to address urban deprivation, in parti-cular when applied in city and national policycontexts that work in the same direction.Nevertheless, as Carley and Kirk (1998) alsofound they do not solve the problem. Thereare still many unsolved challenges inEurope’s most deprived neighbourhoods andunanswered questions about the most effectiveway to tackle spatially concentrated disadvan-tage. In particular, breaking the ‘vicious ordownward cycle’ (Hall, 1997) in run-downneighbourhoods is an issue that will continueto tax urban policy-makers in the future.URBAN has contributed to demonstratinghow ABIs can contribute to turning thevicious cycle into a virtuous cycle, particularlythrough creating the conditions for change inthe future. But it appears that the key to tack-ling deep-rooted disadvantage in urban neigh-bourhoods lies in complementary macropolicies that address the structural causes ofpoverty and disadvantage. It is through a com-bination of macro and micro policies that thosefacing deprivation in Europe’s most disadvan-taged neighbourhoods have the greatestchance of moving out of poverty.

Notes

1. The Structural Funds are the European Com-mission’s financial instruments to implementits regional policy. The majority of theFunds (around 90 per cent in the period1994–99) are channelled through mainstreamregional policy tools (Objectives 1, 2, 3 andthe Cohesion Fund programmes). The remain-ing budget supports the so-called CommunityInitiatives (around 9 per cent of the total) andinnovative actions (around 1 per cent). Thelogic of this hierarchy of interventions isthat innovative actions pilot new approaches

to specific challenges, whereas the Commu-nity Initiatives provide resources for testingapproaches to problems shared by differentmember-states (CEC, 1994b). Examples ofCommunity Initiatives in the current pro-gramming period 2000–06 are URBAN II,EQUAL, INTERREG and Leaderþ . (Foran overview of EU Structural Funds, seeWilliams, 1996; Bachtler and Turok, 1997.)

2. The evaluation was undertaken on behalf ofthe Evaluation Unit of DG Regio of the Euro-pean Commission, under the guidance of aSteering Group of European Commission offi-cials and with the advice of three independentexperts on EU urban issues. The presentarticle is published with the kind agreementof the European Commission, although allviews expressed are the author’s own. Thefull text of the report (CEC, 2004) can befound on DG Regio’s website (http://euro-pa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/rado_en.htm).

3. The team of national evaluators that under-took the fieldwork in each member-state waslead by GHK Consulting and included the fol-lowing: Athens Economics (Greece), Eau2Es-tudios (Spain), ECORYS (the Netherlands),GHK Consulting (Belgium, Ireland and theUK), IRS (Italy), Kaupunkitutkimus(Finland), Quaternaire (Portugal), Statisticsand Research Aland (Sweden and Denmark),Urbanis (France and Luxembourg) andURBANO (Germany and Austria). Theauthor would like to acknowledge the workof all those involved in undertaking thenational fieldwork and contributing to discus-sions in the research meetings, providingmaterial on which this paper is based.

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Addressing Europe's Urban Challenges: Lessons from the EU URBAN Community Initiative

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