A Framework for Critical Materialists

c© 2014 Imprint Academic Mind & Matter Vol. 12(1), pp. 93–118

A Framework for Critical Materialists

Robert PrentnerChair of Philosophy

ETH Zurich, Switzerland

Abstract

This contribution discusses a materialist framework for address-ing conscious experience. In the first part of the paper the structureof this framework is laid out. Several explananda of consciousnessare identified that materialists should try to relate to an under-lying substrate by identity statements, reductions, or functionaldescriptions. Most important for giving a satisfactory explanationof consciousness are accounts of why these relations hold (e.g., bynomological necessity) or how they can be embedded in a part-whole ontology (mereology). A way to achieve this is discussed inthe second part of the paper. Drawing from the philosophy of sci-ence, the importance of model building is stressed. Analogies playa crucial role here.

A position in the philosophy of mind for which analogies seemparticularly important is panpsychism. The relation between analo-gies and arguments for panpsychism is studied systematically andwith respect to historical examples. It will be argued that a partic-ular class of analogies is important, not only for panpsychism, butfor a science of consciousness as such. The two-step argument pre-sented in favor of such analogies roughly reads: (i) some analogiesare important for any kind of model in science, and (ii) such analo-gies must therefore not be neglected. In the philosophy of mind,those are identified to be structural ones. The article concludeswith a formulation of research questions for the future. Emphasisis placed on the necessity to formalize the explananda of conscious-ness, as well as mereological and analogical arguments to arrive ata coherent concept of mind-matter relations.

1. Introduction

1.1 Explananda of Consciousness

A currently much debated question in the philosophy of mind is thefollowing: How is the existence of conscious experience (i) compatible withor (ii) explicable by the laws governing the physical world?1

1In the remainder of this article I shall speak of an “explanation of consciousness”.It may, however, be the case that something like an explanation of consciousness isillusory. Still, it would be desirable to have a theory where consciousness is at leastcompatible with science.

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But what is it that makes consciousness problematic? One surprisingobservation is that the more intricate the faculty of mind the easier itseems to be explicable by science, e.g., by brain physiology. Cognition,as a functional property of evolved organisms, is thought by many to bereducible to biology in terms of functionality and adaptation. The sameis true for behavior, understood as output following some (sensory) input.The more basic the faculty, the harder it is to reconcile it with currentphysical theories. Examples are experiences or feelings. What has to beexplained then are the facts that make up or structure our consciousness.

Here is a list of features which may, in a preliminary way, serve asexplananda of consciousness:

• TemporalityThis pertains to anything related to the temporal structure of ex-perience: duration, tensed time, presence, nowness,2 attention andmemory.

• ImmediacyThe way how an experience appears to its subject seems to be iden-tical with the way it really is. Regarding experience, there seems tobe no difference between the phenomenon and the “thing-in-itself”.Hence there is a difference between describing, remembering, dream-ing and wakefully experiencing, and also between objective and sub-jective knowledge.3 This relates to the thesis that consciousness isa special form of representation (Dretske 1995, Tye 2009), and tothe supposed identity of primary and secondary intensions of qualiastatements (Chalmers 2009).

• QualiaThe “way-it-is-like” or the “way-it-feels” to have an experience isknown as the quale of an experience.4 An explanation of qualia iswhat Chalmers (1995) called the “hard problem of consciousness”.Many examples of qualia are drawn from perception: the redness ofthe morning sun or the taste of a ripe mango. In fact, any experi-ential state is related to the unique way it feels to be in that state.Perception and pain are related to certain qualia, but so is fatigueand vigilance, desire or dislike.

• EmbodimentHow are experience and body related? Although it is the body wefeel with, the feeling itself is conceivably incorporeal. This is truefor features like cognition, memory, and perception, but also for

2Compare the notion of the “specious present” introduced by James (1890).3Compare the famous “Gedankenexperiment” with Mary due to Jackson (1982).4Other notions include “raw feelings”, “what-it-is-likeness”, the “subjective con-

tent” or the “phenomenal content” of an experience.

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emotions and moods. How can the body, in particular the brain, beunderstood as a medium or bearer of subjectivity?

• IntentionalityConscious states are intentional if they include a reference to somecontent or are directed toward an object. Are there unintentionalconscious states? Is intentionality constitutive for consciousness orthe other way around?5

• Phenomenal StructureThere are particular structural features of consciousness, such asits “phenomenal transparency” (Metzinger 2003): We attribute theblueness of the sky to the sky, not to our senses. There is also trans-parency regarding meaning – e.g. “semantic transparency” (vanGulick 1995).Another central feature of the phenomenal structure of conscious-ness is the “unity of consciousness”. We are not separately awareof different features of our experience (say a smell and, separately,a pain) but experience them as a whole (as “smell-pain”). This issurprising insofar as the corresponding brain processes are often lo-calized with different centers for processing different kinds of input.6

The unity of consciousness is particularly interesting because it af-fects scientific approaches to consciousness as well as philosophicalones.

These items might not form a comprehensive list but they should makeclear that there are plenty of features of conscious experience which arevery different from properties of ordinary physical matter. Many inter-esting issues in consciousness research are not restricted to only one suchfeature.7 But then, how are these features related? Which are whollydependent or supervenient on matter? Which are irreducible, and whichones are really fundamental for our experience?

1.1 A Materialist Framework

In the following, I shall sketch a framework for addressing the prob-lems of explaining the origin, purpose and reality of conscious experience.

5Martin (1986) argues for an experiencing subject as a precondition for intentional-ity. This is, after all, what distinguishes the intentionality of a conscious being from the“intentionality” of a thermostat. The argument is turned around by Strawson (2008),who actually grants intentionality to physical states and views them as “experience-involving-phenomena”. Compare also the “minimally conscious” photodiode of Oizumiet al. (2014).

6A related problem in neuroscience is called the binding problem (Revonsuo 1999).7Is there anything like a distinct self forming the subject of every experience and

what is its relation to personhood? Why does consciousness seem to “pop up” whena certain intensity or threshold is met, without the subject being in control of thisprocess? How is action possible?

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One expects different types of explanations such as evolutionary, material,functional or structural ones. An explanation of the origin of conscious-ness will probably be addressed by an evolutionary account. Identifyinga particular feature and tracking down the corresponding neural correlateis what I call a material explanation. Functional explanations can be un-derstood as relating sensory input and behavioral output relying on some(material) structure. Figure 1 gives an overview.

Materialism(Monism)

Physicalism

Explananda of Consciousness

iden

tity

redu

ctio

n function

LogicsLawsMereology

AnalogiesModels

Panpsychism?

Figure 1: In a materialist framework for an explanation of consciousness,a basic substrate (“matter”) is related to various explananda of conscious-ness via the relations of identity, reduction, or function. Physicalism andpanpsychism are philosophical notions that further classify the substrate,often accompanied by a discussion of the most promising candidate for anexplanation of consciousness (e.g., “functionalism-physicalism”). By con-trast, this article focuses on the logical, law-like and mereological struc-ture of such explanations. In particular, the role of models and analogieswill be investigated. Based on this, the question arises whether some ad-vanced forms of panpsychism and physicalism are really fundamentallydifferent approaches to a science of consciousness.

The substrate of an explanation of consciousness forms the reservoir ofpossible entities and states endowed with qualities or properties to whichany mind-matter relation ultimately refers. Opposed to Cartesian dual-ism, assume that there is one single kind of (material) substrate whichserves as such a basis (“monism”). In its most common version, materi-alism is equated with physicalism, with primary properties such as mass,charge, flavor or spin of elementary particles. Saying the mind is physicalmeans that it is derivable from physics. Just how we could understandmind as being a derived (or “higher order”) property is the question.Historically important answers include mind-brain identity theory8 andeliminative materialism9.

8For instance, Place (1956) and Smart (1959) state that mental properties (sensa-tions, consciousness) are identical to brain states.

9This means that (some of) the explananda of consciousness are not real: Addressing


The mainstream view in contemporary philosophy of mind, however,is functionalism. The strength of functionalism is the reconciliation of aseemingly purposeful process with non-teleological science (Nagel 1961).Functionalism can be regarded as an alternative to directly reducing prop-erties of consciousness to basic properties of matter by introducing ab-stract entities. In functionalism, one has to differentiate between theactual function and the substrate on which the function is realized. Usu-ally the substrate is thought to be physical (the brain). While identitytheory states that certain features of consciousness are identical to certainbrain states (pain is identical to C-neurons firing), functionalism says thata mental state is identical with a functional state realized by the brain(pain is identical to a causal relation between a “pain-stimulus” and anoutput behavior). Qualia, though, still seem to be a problem for func-tionalism. How should the way “it is like to realize a certain function” beaccounted for by a function?

Instead of focusing on the strengths and weaknesses of particular typesof explanations, I am mainly concerned with the structure of mental fea-tures, the way they are integrated in experience and, finally, the structureof explanation as such.10 With this in mind, I shall discuss possible pat-terns of mind-matter relations in Sect. 2, which pertain to logic, (natural)laws and mereology. In Sect. 3 I emphasize the relevance of analogiesand models for an explanation of consciousness. While models are heav-ily used in science, analogies are ubiquitous in our everyday thinking, inparticular when dealing with consciousness. I argue that analogies shouldnot be relegated to some kind of pre-scientific description. Instead of be-ing opposed modes of thinking, analogies and models are closely related.This might not be particularly new to some philosophers of science butgets rarely mentioned in the philosophy of mind.

In Sect. 4 I discuss a possible replacement of physicalism: panpsy-chism. In particular, I shall look at some examples of analogies encoun-tered in panpsychism. Is this type of reasoning typical for panpsychistsand does it allow us to discard such theories altogether? Or are theredifferent kinds of analogies, some of which are useful or even necessaryfor physicalists too? This would be contrary to the widely held beliefthat there is a dichotomy between metaphysical musings and empiricalresearch which is reflected by a difference of analogical thinking and sci-entific (causal) explanation. Such criticism is discussed in Sect. 5.

In Sect. 6 I shall give a brief outlook for future research on mind-matterrelations. This outlook is programmatic, emphasizing the framework inwhich such relations can be formulated, the role of analogies and the sim-ilarity of advanced physicalist and panpsychist approaches to conscious-

the mental is just a way of talking, it is what Churchland (1981) calls “folk psychology”or a mere “stance” according to Dennett (1987).

10This last point was already stressed by van Gulick (1995).

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ness. If a science of consciousness which is roughly panpsychist could bebuilt, what would it look like?

2. Some Properties of Relations

2.1. Laws and Logic

If the activation pattern of a certain arrangement of neurons neces-sarily leads to a particular experience, one might say that the experiencelogically follows the activation pattern.11 One can cast this example intothe form of a syllogism:

(1) We record a firing pattern F in brain B.

(2) Brain B belongs to person P .

(3) The firing pattern F necessarily leads to some experience E.

⇒ P experiences E.

Given the three premises, the conclusion that P experiences E seems tofollow logically. But this kind of syllogism is highly oversimplified:

• What does it actually mean that B “belongs” to a person? After all,the brain is a physical object, a person probably is not. The problemdoes not cease to exist if we use other notions instead of “person”like human, self, experiencer etc. Logic does not tell us about thecorrect relation between (material) objects and subjects.12

• How do we know that the firing pattern F leads to the experience E?Even if we always found the co-occurrence of F and E, that would behardly satisfactory. It does not guarantee that the relation betweenF and E is one of necessity.

It follows that, while logical considerations do give rigid criteria forreduction or identification, the real explanatory work lies in the premises!The flip side is that, even if we agree with Chalmers (2009) that con-ceivability arguments – or, more generally, modal logic as proposed byKripke (1980) – do lead to ontological conclusions, one does not see howthis actually helps to bridge the “psycho-physical gap”. One possibility isto look for law-like relations. Such would be more satisfactory than merestatistical correlations. However, statistical analyses might be practicallyuseful like in the case of Bayesian inference. What are the preconditionsfor deriving laws or at least statistically motivated inferences? Apartfrom being able to formulate the explananda in a mathematical way, theyshould enter the search for mind-matter relations independently of the

11This leaves open whether the metaphysical relation between a conscious experienceand the corresponding firing pattern is of (necessary or contingent) identity; otherpossibilities are supervenience, emergence, necessity-without-sufficiency etc.

12Compare also the discussion in Sect. 1.1 concerning “embodiment”.


way they present themselves to the experiencing subject. In other words:To create a simple law-like (or statistical) relation between two sets ofproperties F and E, it is crucial to be able to describe and formalize theproperties of F independently of those of E and vice versa.

2.2 Mereology

So far we have looked for the possibility to give a causal relation be-tween the explananda of consciousness and the properties of an underly-ing theory. Sometimes, however, the relations between physical facts andmental events are relations between the whole of an individual and itsparts, like in premise (2) where a person is related to its brain. It mighteven be an ill-formed question whether matter can cause consciousness,just like the sentence “our stomach enjoys chocolate” is ill-formed.13

Mereology tries to elucidate how parts and wholes are related. Fromour everyday experience we know that changes in our physiology can in-fluence mental activity and vice versa. Taking drugs may lead to halluci-nations or influence our mood. We usually speak of this interaction as ifit were causal: Certain events lead to a change of the mental or physicalstate, like a stone changes its course when an external force influences it.

We can distinguish between two types of mereological explanations:“Mereological upward explanations” state that an individual is in a cer-tain mental state simply because physiological activity is part of a largerphenomenon whose occurrence brings with it the occurrence of this men-tal phenomenon (Ros 2008, p. 199). In our example, taking drugs “leads”to the experience of euphoria. Conversely, “mereological downward expla-nations” state how certain physiological features are embedded in mentalactivity or the mental state, respectively (Ros 2008, p. 199). Our beingnervous “leads” to an increased heart rate. In both examples the relationbetween the mental and the physical state is not understood as a relationof cause and effect, but as a relation between parts and wholes.

Mereological explanations do not violate the principle of causal closure:Physical events are only explained by other physical events, mental eventsonly by other mental events.14 One is tempted, though, to see here a kindof dualist requirement, if it is not spelled out what the notions “part of”or “embedded in” actually mean.

A mereological analysis might also be favorable in other cases: Whatare the relations between different explananda of consciousness and the(experiencing) self, or how can we relate successive temporal parts to asingle entity (“persons”)? Mereology might thus pertain to spatial as wellas temporal relations. However, it is still a big desideratum to devise a

13For the discussion of typical “mereological fallacies” of this kind see Bennett andHacker (2003).

14Sometimes this is also referred to as the domain-specificity of explanations.

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rigorously formalized notion of mereology. Whether this is at all possible,for example in terms of a mathematical formalism, is an open question.

3. Models and Analogies

3.1 Models in Science

In the previous chapter I argued for the importance of (i) stating re-lations of necessity between matter and consciousness, and (ii) employinga mereological treatment where necessary. Both approaches face seriousproblems in terms of formalization and coherence. How should we get agrip on these issues?

In practice, scientists design models to describe idealized empiricalproblems. Models are used for very different reasons: to make predictions,to help us understand theories, or to explain empirical data. This leadsto varying ideas of what makes a model. A climate physicist’s model willdiffer from an engineer’s model used in a wind channel or from statisticalmodels used in the social sciences.

To disregard the role of models in science is a tendency that wasparadigmatically spelled out by Duhem (1954): A complete formal re-construction of any successful model might be given once the detailedtheory is known. Therefore scientists should focus on constructing theo-ries instead of building models which will ultimately be derived anyway.This view, however, fails to see how the use of models embraces theorybuilding and scientific progress (Hesse 1966).

It is therefore instructive to look at models more closely. How couldthey be classified? A model that serves an “inductive” purpose, i.e. todevelop theories from empirical data, could be called a “pre-theoreticmodel”. Often, this kind of models will be used when a detailed theoryis not yet available. “Deductive” models, on the other hand, serve tosimplify a given theory and to make it applicable to a particular problemin which the “basic theory” seems to be too general to be applied di-rectly (an example would be quantum chemistry). Those kind of modelsmay be called “post-theoretic”. The majority of current models in theexact sciences are post-theoretic because the basic laws are thought to beknown (quantum theory, statistical mechanics, the theory of relativity).The development of such models is of importance when empirical dataare not available (high-energy physics), difficult to obtain experimentally(molecular modeling in pharmaceutical chemistry), or just too expensive(catalysis and synthesis).

Another criterion is whether models are used to explain particularphenomena or whether they make predictions for the future. Combin-ing the distinctions between explanative/predictive models and induc-tive/deductive models leads to the following classification (illustrated inFig. 2).


deductive

inductive

predictiveexplanative

Figure 2: Graphical scheme of a classification of models. A model can beconsidered as “deductive” or “inductive”, “explanative” or “predictive”.Examples are given in the text.

• Inductive-explanativeExamples are mechanical models used by Maxwell and Faraday toexplain electromagnetic phenomena or Dalton’s atomic hypothesis(a formal model), the mathematical modeling of social phenomena,or finding a theory of gravitation using data from astronomy.

• Deductive-explanativeExamples are the models of quantum chemistry or the Ising modelof ferromagnetism.

• Inductive-predictiveExamples are time-series analyses of financial markets.

• Deductive-predictiveExamples are climate models or computer-aided drug development.

These categories overlap. Most often, deductive models need empiricalparameters as input (initial conditions or boundary conditions). Climatemodels, for example, need recorded temperature data. Explanative mod-els can also be used as predictive models, e.g. quantum chemistry can beused to explain the spectrum of a molecule and to predict the stabilityof a (hypothetical) compound. Reflecting on models in science invites usto cross the border between inductive and deductive science in favor of amore pragmatic approach to scientific problem solving.

To return to an explanation of conscious experience: What use canbe made of models? We do not have something akin to a “theory of

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consciousness” yet, but, as we have seen, models can be of value evenbefore we have a well-formulated theory. The history of science teaches usthat most often the formal reconstruction of a theory follows initial stagesof model building. If we think that properties of conscious experienceare analogous to properties of physical objects in the sense that they arerepeatable events, a predictive model may be of help to find an explanationof consciousness. If we take first person data to be valid empirical input, asChalmers (2004) suggests, models similar to those used in ordinary sciencemay be useful. This will not be the case, however, if we regard consciousexperience to be an irreducible and unique phenomenon not to be analyzedany further. Whether there can be something like “mereological models”depends on a possible formalization of mereology.

Interestingly, in some approaches to consciousness models are com-bined with a panpsychist conception of nature, such as in the works ofFechner, where analogies between animals and plants were based on mod-els of nervous and vascular systems. The French Jesuit Chardin (1959)tried to develop a kind of “teleological model” which is based upon evo-lutionary theory, physics and theology.

Hesse (1966) pointed out that modeling empirical facts means draw-ing analogies between a well-known model system and the system understudy. On this view the complex living organism is idealized by a modelsystem that accounts for several structural features like metabolization,reproduction, movement, perception etc. Just how experience can be ac-counted for in such a model is the question.

3.2 Analogies in Science

Analogies were long thought to be representative of a “metaphysi-cal way of thinking” and therefore not part of any scientific explanation(cf. Emmet 1945). In particular, animist views were often illustrated bythe use of analogies. To think that a magnet is animated rests on theanalogy between a human’s (self) movement and the magnet’s dispositionto move iron.

But ridiculing analogy as such misses the point. Hesse (1966) providesa useful analysis of analogies featuring a “tabular representation” includ-ing two kinds of relations. “Vertical relations” account for relations withinthe model or the explanandum itself. “Horizontal relations” account forthe relation between models. By analyzing these two kinds of relations wemay infer whether the analogy is useful or not. Poor analogies are usuallymarked by one (or more) of the following criteria:

• The analogy is just a matter of a (superficial) similarity of facts.The horizontal relation is too weak, and the conclusions drawnfrom the analogy cannot be justified. Many analogies between mind


and quantum systems fall under this category (e.g., just stating the“mind-like” nature of quantum systems).

• The analogy should be replaced by a causal analysis. This is alwaysthe case when the horizontal relation is too strong, like in the case ofidentity. For instance, the nature of the mind should be studied bythe properties of the physical brain rather than by analogy, assumingthat mind-brain identity were true.

• The vertical relation is not the same for explanandum and model.This is usually the case when we speak of bad comparisons or mis-leading analogies. In the example of the magnet, iron is moved be-cause of a natural law expressed by classical electrodynamics. Thereis a clear causal relation. This is not the case for the movement ofhumans.

Analogies are not restricted to the domain of (folk) psychology ormetaphysical speculation. In her “analogical conception of theories”,Hesse (2001) claims that any useful scientific model is not a representa-tion of the “real world” but instead only analogous to empirical findings.Typical examples are the kinetic model of an ideal gas or the wave modelof light, but also mutually exclusive models like “particle” and “wave”, asemployed in quantum physics.15

Models can furthermore highlight a method of theory proliferationthrough analogy. Every positive analogy is accompanied by a negativeone: Colliding billiard balls might serve as good model for the kinetics ofan ideal gas, but clearly their color has nothing to do with the “color”of molecules. But there are also neutral analogies whose status is notyet decided, like the relation between the shape of billiard balls and the“shape” of gas particles. Exactly such neutral analogies are the crystal-lization points of a developing theory (“we have an analogy but how goodis it really?”).

Apart from being highly productive, good analogies also have eco-nomic value. They may hint at a reasonable hypothesis. If we have tochoose between two hypotheses, analogies might indicate which one ismore parsimonious in its assumptions. Another benefit of analogies istheir broad applicability. Where causal explanation seems to be impos-sible or intractable, just as in the case of mind-brain relations, analogiesmight be important tools of inference.

15Hesse’s claim emphasizes that finding a good model it is not about finding thesingle correct representation. This quickly leads to discussions concerning scientificrealism and related topics in the philosophy of science, which will not be addressedin this paper. The main point is that analogies are not negligible “ancient” ways ofinference but are still widely used, even in the formal sciences.

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4. Panpsychism?

4.1 Panpsychist Matter and Analogical Arguments

Panpsychists believe that mentality is a fundamental feature of nature.The currently most fashionable way to account for this is to “add” mentalqualities to the physical, leading to modern versions of panpsychism fea-turing a “panpsychist matter”. Strawson (2003, 2006), accordingly, callsthis kind of monism “real materialism” or “real physicalism”.16

A look at the history of Western thought reveals that many differentviews on the mind-body problem were to some extent panpsychist.17 Still,they differ in key points such as the role of consciousness, the objectivityof the given reality or causality, and must not be conflated. It is doubtfulwhether particular proponents of panpsychism would identify their ownmetaphysical views with those of the others. But insofar as all these theo-ries assume a single substance, they can be considered as types of monism.Related notions include (derivative) “neutral monism” and “dual-aspectmonism”, the exact difference being open to scholarly debate.18

Analogies occur frequently in arguments for panpsychism. Most ofthese arguments belong to one or more of the following four groups:

• Argument from force or powerSpeculations about the nature of physical forces often lead to theassumption that there is a mental or vital principle behind them.19

Thales famously ascribed a soul to the magnet, as did WilliamGilbert in the 15th century, because it was able to move iron. AsMcGuire (1968) noted, Newton was inclined to grant the electri-cal force an intrinsic power which united life and nature under oneprinciple. Whitehead identified the directedness of a vector withits qualitative aspect and related it to the intentionality of mentalphenomena (Whitehead 1929, Hampe 1990).Nowadays, even though the brain is often considered to be too“wet and warm” to show any non-classical effects (Koch and Hepp2006),20 some believe in the relevance of quantum mechanics formind-matter relations. Like the nature of classical forces, quantum

16The way how such an “addition” should be conceived will be discussed in Sect. 4.2and is related to the so called “intrinsic nature” argument for panpsychism.

17Besides the contemporary views of Strawson (2006) and Nagel (1979), systematicexamples were given in James’ mind-dust theory, Schopenhauer’s World as Will andRepresentation or Whitehead’s cosmology put forth in Process and Reality.

18An example for such a dual-aspect monism was developed by physicist Pauli andpsychologist Jung (Seager 2011, Atmanspacher 2012). It can be viewed as an attemptto bridge the gap between physics and psychology.

19Skrbina (2005) calls this the “argument by indwelling powers”.20This is still a somewhat controversial issue. There are findings which show that

entanglement might be observed or maintained in biological systems at room temper-ature; see, e.g., Sarovar et al. (2010) or Cai et al. (2010).


mechanics leads to speculations whether certain features of con-sciousness are related to fundamental physical processes (for a re-view see Atmanspacher 2011).

• Argument from continuityWe are conscious beings and we believe that other humans are con-scious too. Generally we grant many beings the potential of havingsome form of consciousness. Most are confident that very youngchildren have experiences, as do babies. What about the unborn,animals or plants? Many panpsychists seem to believe in a continu-ity of consciousness that goes “all the way down”. This is accompa-nied by rejecting the criteria that supposedly tell us if and why anorganism becomes conscious.

• Argument from non-emergenceThis might be the leading argument in the contemporary panpsy-chist movement (see Nagel 1979 or Strawson 2006). Either con-sciousness is a continuous property or it has to emerge at some pointout of the ever increasing complexity of (unconscious) matter. Forthe majority of contemporary panpsychists the latter is impossible.It is a brute kind of emergence that is fundamentally different fromthe emergence of properties in physics, e.g. when liquidity is said tobe an emergent property of water molecules.21 In other words, theemergence of the conscious from the unconscious is not (cannot be!)analogous to the emergence of liquidity from molecules. But if themental cannot emerge from the physical, it must be a fundamentalproperty.

• Argument from evolution or functionThis is often encountered together with some form of the continuityargument but could also be viewed as an argument for panpsychism(or at least some sort of vitalo-psychism) on its own: Certain struc-tures in plants, animals and humans are the same or serve similarfunctional purposes.22 From this similarity of physiological struc-ture we infer a similarity in experiential structure. Furthermore,this similarity hints at a common evolutionary basis, which speaksin favor of mentality as a widespread phenomenon. Paradigmaticexamples for such arguments can be found in the work of Fechner.

I do not regard all these analogies to be valid; over the years betteralternative explanations might have developed. A historically interesting

21Bruntrup (2011) illustrates this by distinguishing “intra-attributive” emergencefrom “inter-attributive” emergence. In the first case emergence produces novel featuresbelonging to the same ontological category (example: liquidity from an assembly ofmolecules), whereas in the latter case a novel feature of a different ontological categoryis said to emerge in an in-principle-unknowable way (example: consciousness fromunconscious matter).

22Regarding, e.g., “plant nerves” see Stahlberg (2006).

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argument was given by Schopenhauer (1958, §19, vol. I) for the embodi-ment of will in nature. Looking at its structure, using Hesse’s (1966) tab-ular representation, illustrates the role analogies play in Schopenhauer’sreasoning.

Schopenhauer describes the world under two aspects: It is always arepresentation presented to a subject, and at the same time it is expe-rienced. In particular, the way we recognize ourselves is understood inthis two-fold way. We can imagine, perceive or describe our body like anyother physical object. We can study it scientifically; we record its reac-tions to external stimuli and try to causally explain its behavior. Thisis, however, only part of the truth. We also experience our body; we feelits (our) pain. The experienced body is given to us without mediation,we are directly aware of the body. Not only do we sense our body butwe sense as bodies. With the body we desire or dislike. Our will is em-bodied (or “objectificated” as Schopenhauer put it). Here, some form ofcontinuity comes into play. If will is objectificated in ourselves it must beobjectificated in the whole world. This conclusion is reached by use of ananalogy. The way we experience ourselves serves as a model for the wholeof reality (“the world”).

ourselves (model) ←→ world(explanandum)

representation the body the worldgiven as object given as object

will experienced body the world as will?

embodied will

Table 1: Schopenhauer’s analogy for the World as Will and Rep-resentation. Our own two-fold nature forms the “model” which isthought to be analogous to the world as a whole.

Table 1 illustrates Schopenhauer’s argument. We note that the “model”which serves as the analogy is the way we are presented to ourselves, i.e. asobject (as “representation”) and as experiencing subject (as “will”). Theworld, the totality of reality, is given to us as object too. The question is,whether the world also has some “internal aspect”, just as we do when weconsider our body as embodied will. If we look at the vertical relation wefind that it is mereological: Our whole being is expressed by two comple-mentary parts, called “representation” and “will”. Over and above thesetwo aspects, there cannot, according to Schopenhauer, be any other modeof existence.

Causality is only relevant within the domain of representation. Ac-cordingly, there can be no causal relation between representation and will.Whether the “world is an objectification of will” cannot be answered by


means of a causal analysis. The only remaining possibility is to draw aconclusion based on analogy. There are two possible outcomes:

• The world is analogous to ourselves and therefore of double nature.The world is a “world as will and representation”.

• The world is not; only I am of this double nature. This solution,however, leads to solipsism – which Schopenhauer rejects.23

This shows how Schopenhauer used analogy to arrive at a panpsy-chist worldview. Of course, many of Schopenhauer’s assumptions seemimplausible today, for example, his strong reading of Berkeley’s empiricalidealism. But the core of his argument is this: Drawing on our own bod-ily experience, we infer a well balanced structural analogy between theobject and the subject of experience as such (or between “will and repre-sentation”). This example shows how one might use analogies to clarifyconceptual or metaphysical issues encountered in mind-matter research.

4.2 Structural Analogies

A somewhat different classification of arguments in favor of panpsy-chism was given by Seager and Allen-Hermanson (2013). The authorsidentified three complexes of such arguments: arguments from analogies,continuity, and intrinsic nature. I now wish to argue for the fact thatanalogies are important for all of them. The main difference is the kindof analogies employed.

The argument from non-emergence, and thus the core of the continu-ity argument in Seager and Allen-Hermanson (2013), was already listedabove and subsumed under the category of analogical arguments. Thiswas done to emphasize the crucial step in the argument contra brute emer-gence. It is the missing analogy between any known instance of brute or“inter-attributive” (Bruntrup 2011) emergence and emergent propertiesin physical science. If such an analogy were known (or at least consideredpossible), the appeal to continuity would lose serious ground.

A similar case can be made for the argument from intrinsic nature: Ifphysical entities are defined by the functional role they play, the questionarises which of their properties (if any) can be regarded to be intrinsic to

23There seems to be another option: Parts of reality are granted this two-fold nature(and we may call them bearer of subjects.). There are some problems associated withthis solution, though it seems natural for us. First, Schopenhauer considers the firstaspect (representation) as somehow “less real” than the second (embodiment of will),and he wants to grant the world as much reality as possible. Second, concepts like“numbers”, “parts”, or “finiteness” are bound to the domain of objects (i.e. to mererepresentations). Third, our natural inclination to grant subjectivity to, say, humansbut not rocks is again based mainly on analogy (for example on similarity to ourselves).However, this type of analogy is drawn on contingency, whereas Schopenhauer’s double-aspect principle follows necessarily from his metaphysics. It is only by analogy thatwe are aware of it.

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them, i.e. such that they exist apart from their relations to other phys-ical entities. After all, any functional description needs a substrate onwhich the functional properties are realized. Following the intrinsic na-ture argument, experience or consciousness is a prime candidate for suchan intrinsic property.

An old example: The magnet’s (functional) disposition to move iron isbased on an intrinsic mental property. The updated version: The intrinsicnature of the electromagnetic interaction (or of its carrier, the photon) isexperiential. Whereas the historic arguments (first group in Sect. 4.1)try to state a direct (psychological) evidence for panpsychism, the intrin-sic nature argument addresses a more fundamental issue of physical (orpanpsychist) theory as such. Note, however, that the intrinsic nature ar-gument still relies on an analogy: functional relations need a substrate onwhich they can be realized. One could object that this is nothing but thedefinition of functionality, but then, why draw the analogy between phys-ical theory and functional realization? Why, after all, is such an argumentmore fashionable in the computer age than it was at the time when putforward by Russell and Eddington?

But there is an important difference between the types of analogiesused in the classical arguments of Thales or Gilbert and the continuityand intrinsic nature arguments. While the former support a materialanalogy between consciousness and a physical process (like movement),the latter highlight structural features of physical theory as such. Theanalogies are structural.

Thus the argument in favor of analogies comes in two steps: (i) analo-gies are always employed, even in the most empirical type of research,and (ii) some analogies are particularly useful for mind-matter relations,and those are structural. Schopenhauer’s panpsychism historically illus-trates point (ii) by giving a precursor version of such a structural analogy.Its merit lies not in the content of his metaphysical theory but in thestructure of his arguments.24

5. Two Types of Critique

Much criticism has been directed toward philosophical theories of con-sciousness in general and panpsychism in particular. Some of these criticalvoices are concerned with those theories’ vicinity to metaphysics. In ad-dition, there are also arguments directed toward certain propositions ofthe theory or its relations to empirical findings. I wish to mention someobjections to panpsychism to argue that criticism of the second kind is

24It is important to note that analogies can be negative, just like theories can bewrong. If the analogy between functional realization and the (dispositional) structureof physics is negative, the intrinsic nature argument will eventually fail.


in fact useful for the development of theory and that criticism of the firstkind really need not bother anyone.

5.1 Metaphysics

Literally speaking, metaphysics refers to theories that go “beyond”physical theories. When the foundations of modern physics were laidby Galilei, Descartes and Newton, their metaphysics went beyond whatwas considered to be physical theory of the time, namely Aristotelianphysics.25 However, science is not reflective about its metaphysical foun-dations. In the 17th century, many assumptions in Galilei’s new physicsmust have been considered “revisionary” metaphysics.26 However, whatcounts as revisionary or not is exposed to historical contingency. Whatwas revisionary in the 17th century is the common metaphysics of today(which we often are not even aware of).

Metaphysics is often considered “anti-empirical” or speculative. Arefacts about consciousness non-empirical? This surely has to be rejected.Consciousness is given before anything else is, even before the objectivefacts established by science. One can doubt, as did Descartes, every factabout the external reality, but one cannot doubt the existence of one’sown conscious experience.

On the other hand, dealing with consciousness and its ontological sta-tus is a prima facie case of metaphysics. After all, we are interested inquestions pertaining to the nature of consciousness, existence, and funda-mental aspects of reality. Physicalism, understood as a statement aboutthe true nature of consciousness, and generally about the nature of being,is a metaphysical claim. Eliminative materialism is at least as revisionaryas any other theory of the mind. This all implies that consciousness-related research can be empirical and metaphysical at the same time, andthis also means that the notion of “metaphysics” should not be taken asa synonym for anti-empirical inquiry.

It is one of the key tasks of philosophy and science to criticize andunveil the fallacies of human thinking. How should this be done withoutconsidering deviating (metaphysical) ideas? One could try to rely onpurely “internal” critique (Willaschek 1998) and criticize a theory withinthe scope of its definitions and basic assumptions. Often, however, critiqueis “external”. As long as one is looking for contradictions in contemporarymetaphysics, one is operating in an “internal” mode of critique. But asone tries to propose an alternative, the critique becomes external. It istempting to assume that science only deals with internal critique. This

25For a classical study of the metaphysical foundations of science see Burtt (1924).26This draws on Strawson’s (1959) distinction between “revisionary” and “descrip-

tive” metaphysics. The former is usually understood as being problematic, while thelatter is not.

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is true as long as science stays within its physicalist boundaries, i.e. aslong as science is criticizing science; or, to borrow a phrase from Kuhn,as long as it stays within the materialist paradigm. Any scientific critiqueof our everyday notion of free will is external from the everyday pointof view where we see ourselves as the cause of our actions. Conversely,how could a critique of the scientist’s critique be phrased without (partly)abandoning the physicalist stance? To criticize a theory often makes itnecessary to abandon a particular point of view shared by the adherentsof the theory. Thus it becomes necessary to state an external critique.

Related to this is a methodological claim which is often directed to-wards panpsychism: The way panpsychism is reasoning does not conformto the standard ways of scientific (or analytic philosophy’s) inference –panpsychist thinking is of analogical nature. While often true, this doesnot imply that such reasoning should be dismissed. There are many situ-ations in which we rely on analogies, at least to give us hints or direct usto a certain hypothesis. The claim that analogical thinking is per se anti-empirical has to be rejected. A historic proponent of panpsychism againserves as a paradigmatic case: Fechner. As Woodward (1972, p. 376)notes, the “genius of Fechner lay finally in his ability to construct an em-pirical meta-theory through analogy”. As discussed in Sect. 3.1, analogieseven play an important role when developing models within science.

To give a physical explanation of consciousness can either mean that(i) the explananda can be cast into a physical description, derivable byknown physical theory, or (ii) that physics as such must be modified toaccount for them. Physicalists seem to favor the first route, whereaspanpsychists seem to vow for the second option. In both cases the use ofanalogies will be crucial, and we must adopt an external type of critique:either external to our everyday understanding of experience (“it is reallyonly a material process”) or external to the assumed picture of science(cf. “real physicalism”).

Do analogies fare better than the usual arguments for (or against)panpsychism? This is the wrong question to ask. It is important to ap-preciate that analogies play a crucial role within these arguments. Theystand and fall together with the analogies they rest on. To generally rejectthe use of analogies would lead too far. Abandoning analogies (and thusmodel building) from reasoning would also limit science to the practice offormally deducing facts from underlying theories. But this would amountto closing neuroscientific laboratories (among others) until neurosciencewas deduced from basic physics. It is crucial to think about what kindof analogies are important. I argued that structural analogies are theargumentative tools to keep. This can be inferred from their entangle-ment with scientific practice (model building) and their abundance in thephilosophy of mind.

In addition, analogies can be useful heuristic devices. They are eco-


nomic in the sense of referring to the best explanation with the mostparsimonious assumptions, although there is always a danger of anthropo-morphism and oversimplification. Furthermore, analogies are not opposedto mathematical treatment. There is no good a priori reason why thisshould be the case when limiting oneself to structural analogies, insteadof relying wholly on primitive (material) analogies. Yet, a formal notionof structural analogy is still missing. But it does not seem impossible todevise one.

5.2 Specific Critique

Next to the general considerations raised above, one can start to thinkof more specific types of critique directed towards the project of givingan explanation of consciousness. This kind of critique pertains to theformulation of the problem, to empirical adequacy, and to intra-theoreticchallenges.

First I want to defend the initial idea to give a list of explanandaof consciousness. One might argue that a distinction of several featuresof consciousness is itself not acceptable because consciousness has to beunderstood as an “experiential whole”, and the notion of “features ofconsciousness” already implies an inadequate picture (“quasi-atomistictheory”). This might be true. However, a “holistic theory” of conscious-ness that accounts for the postulated “wholeness” of consciousness shouldbe able to explain the features of consciousness as derived or approximateproperties.

One could also criticize that the list of explananda implies a picturewhich treats consciousness as a collection of distinct features (a “bundleof sensations and intentions”): Instead, there are no such “features ofconsciousness”, just outcomes of some yet-to-be-specified activity of somesubject. But then one could interpret the explananda of consciousness asdifferent “modes of activity”. In any case, a list of explananda turns outto be a useful starting point for a deeper analysis.

One could also claim that, by selecting certain features over others, onealready makes a (crude) abstraction favoring a certain kind of explanationover another.27 That certain aspects of consciousness are primary should,however, follow from the theory itself and not be its starting assumption.The same is true for inter-dependencies between the explananda. That,e.g., intentionality is constitutive of all other features of consciousnessshould be an outcome of the theory. Of course, this can be anticipatedby a good phenomenological or ontological analysis, but one would like tohave a theory to finally decide matters.

27Any explanation of consciousness which is, e.g., not too concerned with qualia willlikely be a reductive physicalist theory.

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An important type of critique is concerned with empirical findings.More than metaphysical considerations, empirical findings determine theplausibility or adequacy of a theory. Eliminative materialism, though it isa coherent position, is not plausible for many since the reality of consciousexperience is regarded to be a (quasi-axiomatic) fact of life. Findingsfrom science and psychology are highly relevant because they shape theempirical basis for our understanding of consciousness. If a theory isincompatible with many of these, it is simply common sense to discard it,except when it delivers a testable hypothesis concerning possible errors inthe acquisition or interpretation of experiential or scientific data.

In addition, there are intra-theoretic challenges for certain theories.Contemporary versions of panpsychism like Strawson (2006) face the so-called combination problem, a notion which goes back to James (1890).In an updated version it reads as follows:

If the fundamental entities that make up matter are themselvesconsidered to be in some way conscious (or “proto-conscious”),how could a multitude of these “micro-subjects” combine toone single subject giving rise to a unified conscious experience?

This problem, indeed, presents quite a task for panpsychist theories.28

Nevertheless, it is the kind of problem which a refined theory should beable to overcome (cf. Coleman 2012). The combination problem is some-times considered to be a fundamental obstacle to panpsychism. However,one needs to recognize that it is exactly the question of how micro-subjectscombine which (i) develops a panpsychist theory further, (ii) makes it pos-sibly fruitful for a scientific understanding of mind, and (iii) may lead to arethinking of panpsychist theories29 or to the formulation of a rival theorythat shares the benefits of a panpsychist theory and avoids its fallacies.Progress, after all, is not achieved when everything works out as planned,but rather when there are serious problems to be solved.

Regarding the combination problem one can distinguish a problemconcerning qualia (how can qualia be combined to form a unified whole?)and a problem concerning subjectivity (how can different points of view becombined to a unified one?). Similar problems also concern neuroscienceunder the label of the binding problem of consciousness. Scientists usuallylook for neural mechanisms that “bind” the various spatially separatedprocesses in the brain to form a unified phenomenal field. But bindingmight refer to a mereological problem, rather than to a problem of mecha-nistic (causal) nature. And, importantly, this hints at a structural analogy

28As Seager and Allen-Hermanson (2013) note this is not a problem for all panpsy-chist theories. They explicitly mention Leibniz’ monadology, but also Schopenhauer’sor Whitehead’s philosophy are not troubled by the combination problem.

29The question could, e.g., also be reversed: How do individual subjects arise fromone single “will”, as Schopenhauer suggests?


between completely different approaches (neuroscience and panpsychism)to the same phenomenon (the unity of consciousness). Speculative as itmay sound, advanced forms of panpsychism and materialism might turnout to be different (complementary?) representations linked by structuralanalogies.

6. Conclusions and Outlook

Whenever even the most elaborate explanations fail to account forbasic features of reality, this should make us wonder whether our besttheories can be considered complete. The completeness of physical theoryis exactly what is at stake when dealing with mind-matter relations. Anycomplete theory should tell us about the relation of our experience to theunderlying physical world. Exactly this question of how to fit consciousexperience into the natural world seems to be the most puzzling issuematerialists are confronted with today. Part of the appeal of the “hardproblem of consciousness” is that it might hint at a deeper level of realitywhich physical theory so far failed to account for.

I proposed a framework in which the problem of conscious experiencecould be formulated clearly and unconflated with assumptions from oureveryday experience. I gave a list of features of consciousness which mayroughly serve as explananda for any theory of consciousness. The keyquestion is how these features can be related to an underlying theory.I argued that (onto-)logical considerations are only of secondary impor-tance. They do not enable us to bridge the psycho-physical gap. Instead,we may rely on the formulation of suitable models which take into accountlaw-like, mereological and analogical relations.

The underestimation of analogical arguments leads to the dismissal ofalternatives such as panpsychism. This is unfortunate, because the de-velopment of and the competition between rival theories often leads toprogress. So, even physicalists have reasons to take panpsychism seri-ously. Persuasive arguments based on a superficial metaphysical critiquedo not give sufficient reason to abandon one theory. Nor do specula-tive arguments in favor of some theory give sufficient reason to believe init. Instead, more specific questions have to be taken into account. The(sometimes artificially defended) demarcation between panpsychism andphysicalism might be even renounced if the difference between a phys-icalist and a panpsychist account of consciousness is a mere differencein approaching or describing the reality of experience. For the future, Ipropose to take a closer look at the following issues:

• In the light of a model, the phenomenology of some of the ex-plananda of consciousness should be worked out in more detail. Theempirical adequacy of analogical arguments in favor of panpsychism

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may be re-assessed on scientific grounds where possible. An exampleis Fechner’s argument for panpsychism based on plant physiology.

• The formalization needed to asses the explananda in light of a scien-tific theory needs to be advanced and will possibly reflect back on ourphenomenal model of consciousness. The processes of (phenomeno-logical) modeling and formalization are mutually interdependent.30

• A conflation of physical and mental facts should be avoided if possi-ble. If the underlying framework is “ontologically neutral” it shouldbe shown (i) how exactly the physical and the mental form a whole,31

or (ii) how mental and physical facts are derivable from a neutralkind of matter. 32

• A formal account of emergence should be given. The argument fromnon-emergence seems to be one of the strongest arguments favoringpanpsychism to date. However, an exact notion of emergence thatis closely linked to the physical sciences with an inference to theexplananda of consciousness is still missing in large parts.33 (Thesame is true for mereology, whose importance is slowly rediscovered.)

• A proposal of how the combination problem can be addressed co-herently should be given. This point is closely related to the pointsabove. A better understanding of the phenomenal unity of con-sciousness would be of interest for physicalists and panpsychistsalike.

Such an investigation might turn out to be useful, even if one comesto a negative conclusion concerning the explanative power of physicalistor panpsychist approaches. Instead of guessing new “fundamental theo-ries” of consciousness, it might be more productive – and more humble –to devise and compare models of experience or of mind-matter interrela-tions. This recommendation does not only pertain to panpsychists, it alsopertains to biologists, information theorists, and physicalist philosophers.

Analogies might play a big role in such models, but not every anal-ogy is a good one. I have tried to show what makes a good analogy,concluding that it should be a structural (or formalized) analogy in thefirst place. The need for analogies to address the mind-matter problem

30Compare the discussion of a time observable that relates to what I call the “tem-poral presence” of conscious experience in Franck (2008).

31Sieroka (forthcoming) showed how, in a Leibnizian-Husserlian framework, one cansystematically relate neurophysological (third person) with phenomenological (first per-son) aspects of (auditory) perception, consciousness, and time.

32See for example the work by Primas (2009).33A possible candidate for such a framework of emergence may be emergence from

“contextual topologies”, cf. Bishop and Atmanspacher (2006) and references therein.Regarding mereology compare Harre and Llored’s (2011) concept of mereologies asgrammars of scientific discourse.


was already expressed in the works of Schopenhauer or Fechner. Regard-ing their use of analogies, their metaphysical work is still relevant for thecurrent discussion, even though its content might be outdated or wrong.

One aspect of model building is the determination of the point upto which a model is adequate, and beyond which its explanative validitybreaks down. We should not be afraid of a panpsychist conception ofreality. And neither should we be of physicalism. However, evidenceshould be our guideline.

Acknowledgments

Many ideas of this work originated from a Master’s thesis written atETH Zurich in 2011/12. I want to thank Michael Hampe for many stim-ulating discussions. Furthermore, I want to thank Harald Atmanspacherfor encouragement and his helpful comments on earlier versions. I alsowant to thank Karen Kepler Albert for reading a manuscript version ofthis work and an anonymous referee for highly useful suggestions. Thiswork was financially supported by an ETH Research Grant, ETH-16 13-1.

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Received: 27 September 2013Revised: 01 April 2014Accepted: 04 April 2014

Reviewed by Michael Silberstein and another, anonymous referee.

A Framework for Critical Materialists

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