A Comparative Analysis of President Clinton and Bush's Handling of the North Korean Nuclear Weapons...

A Comparative Analysis of President Clinton and Bush’s Handling of the North

Korean Nuclear Weapons Program: Power and Strategy*

Ilsu Kim

The purposes of this paper are: 1) to examine and analyze how the two presidents’ policy goals in dealing with North Korea actually materialized; 2) to illustrate how these two Presidents implement their policy goals toward North Korea; 3) to discuss the Congressional responses to the president’s policy goals toward North Korea; and 4) to provide comparative analysis of the two presidents’ handling of North Korea. This study shows that different Presidents have dealt with North Korean issues in different ways, Two such presidents, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, tried at the beginning of their terms as president to ignore the brewing problems in North Korea. However, both were forced to solve the North’s nuclear issues early on in their respective administrations. Their decisions in dealing with North Korean nuclear capabilities help to define their early reputations as foreign policy makers. Yet, the domestic as well as international contexts that President Clinton and Bush faced were somewhat different. President Clinton maintains that the

* This study was supported by the 2003 Grant fYom Research Center for Social Science, Chungbuk National, University.

P U C Z ~ ~ ~ O C U S , Vol. XIX, NO. 1 (Spring 2004), 69-106. 0 2004 by the Center for International Studies, Inha University.

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North 's nuclear crisis arose from North Korea 's security fears: Abandoned by its two Cold War patrons, economically bankrupt, and internationally isolated, the North Korean government saw the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as the only path to survival and security for their regime. In this regard, Clinton's actual efforts to resolve the issues surrounding the North 's nuclear program appeared ambiguous and inconsistent. This led to the temporary suspension of the NorthS nuclear am bitions through an Agreed Framework. However, President Bush stuck to more of a hardnosed approach. He continues to demand a complete, veriJiable and irreversible dismantling of the nuclear program first, before any provision of economic or humanitarian assistance is extended toward North Korea. Bush favors multilateral negotiations, which leads the DPRK to feel more isolated than before. Although the second six-party talks ended without a major breakthrough, it seems that all parties except the North think the meeting was successful in terms of lowering tensions in Korea. This case study demonstrates several observable features that characterize the president's role in shaping North Korean policy. A president who wants to take a new approach to some element of US. policy can be caught between the diplomat's desire for flexibility and the power of domestic political forces. The president can achieve success, but only if the new direction in policy finds acceptance on Capitol Hill.

Key words: North Korea, Agreed Framework, Bill Clinton, George FT Bush, Six-Party Talks, Dismantling North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program, Highly Enriched Uranium

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Introduction

Ever since the United States entered World War 11, the American president has worn the mantle of “Leader of the Free World.” During the Cold War, Washington served as the defacto capital of the non-communist world, with the president regarded as the guardian of security against totalitarianism. A president such as Lyndon Johnson wore this mantle uncomfortably, fighting a war in Vietnam while Ronald Reagan relished this role and employed both symbolic and substantive actions to demonstrate commitment to defending America and its allies from possible Soviet aggression. One important place where American presidents made their stands was on the Korean Peninsula, where the United States has committed itself to defending the Republic of Korea since 1950.

In this age of the president as a world leader, it became commonplace for American politics to describe the chief executive as the architect of U.S. foreign policy.’ Conventional wisdom echoes that the president makes foreign policy, Congress wants to protect domestic interests in shaping policy at home, and presidential leadership is the engine of good government in all areas. Even in the years since the Vietnam War and Watergate came to tarnish the image of the presidential government, this conventional view remains, presidents have been able to direct the course of American foreign policy over Congressional objections. Despite this conventional wisdom, however, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush encountered difficulty in shaping American policy toward the North Korean government.

This paper is an analysis on the U.S. policy toward North Korea with the emphasis on the role of the U.S. president. Needless to say,

1. For a detailed discussion about the concept of “world leader,” see Ryan J. Barilleaux and Barbara Kellerman, The President As World Leader (St. Martin’s Press, 199 1).

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there is a dearth of studies on U.S.-ROK security relations and American foreign policy toward North Korea.* Despite their contributions to our better understanding of US.-North Korea relations, we must acknowledge some limitations of the research. Owing to the employment of the model of the unitary and rational actor, the research more often results in mere description or in policy recommendations to the US. or to North Korea. This sort of research cannot explain the impact of the individual policy maker (the president), who plays a central role in shaping American foreign policy.

The specific research questions of this paper are: 1) to examine and analyze how the two presidents’ policy goals in dealing with North Korea actually materialized; 2) to illustrate how these two presidents implement their policy goals toward North Korea; 3) to discuss the Congressional responses to the president’s policy goals toward North Korea; 4) to elucidate the responses from North Korea to the president’s policy goals and strategies; and 5) to provide comparative analysis on the two presidents’ handling of the North Korean nuclear weapons program.

In order to better answer the research questions above, this

2. Tae-hwan Kwak, “The Korean Peninsula Peace Regime Building Through the Four-Party Peace Talks,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, 17, 1 (SpringlSummer 2003), pp. 1-32; Hun Kyung Lee, “The U.S. Policy and Strategy toward DPRK: Comparison and Evaluation of the Clinton and Bush Administrations,” Pacific Focus, 17, 2 (Fall 2002), pp. 61-87; Edward A. Olsen, “A Korean Solution to the United States’ Korean Problems,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, 17, 2 (FalWinter 2003), pp. 215-240; Ralph C. Hassig & Kongdan Oh, “The Great Swichover Debate,” The Journal of East Asian Afairs, 17, 2 (Faminter 2003), pp. 241-257; Chung-in Moon and Jong-Yun Bae, “The Bush Doctrine and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis” Asian Perspective, 27, 4 (2003), pp. 215-240; Dennis Florig, ‘Two Visions of Convergence in Northeast Asia: The Bush Administration and the Regional Powers on North Korean Nuclear Weapons,” Journal of American Studies, 35, 3 (Winter 2003), pp. 58-87; Joel S. Wit, “North Korea: The Leader of the Pack,” The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2001), pp. 79-102; Daniel A. Pinkston and Phillip C. Saunders, “Seeing North Korea Clearly,” Survival, 45,3 (Autumn 2003), pp. 79-102; Victor D. Cha, “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,” International Security, 27, 1 (2002), pp. 41-42.

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paper consists of four sections. First, I briefly discuss the context with which each president (Clinton and Bush) attempts to cope with reality. Any impending issues or problems they experienced receive a brief discussion. Second, I examine each president’s policy goal toward North Korea. “Goal,” as I employ the term, refers to the president’s foreign policy emphasis in a given time to deal with North Korea and to maintain peace on the Korean ~eninsula.~

Next, I discuss how each president implements his policy goals toward Pyongyang. Whatever challenges or constraints arise, the president must make the right choice for the resolution of North Korean problems. Finally, I analyze the reaction of Congress to the president’s policy goals. I examine both domestic as well as international reactions to these president’s policy goals and strategies. In this paper, I refer by the term “domestic response” to Congressional reaction.

Theoretical Discussion: The Role of President in Making U.S. Foreign Policy

The wide array of American military and political commitments abroad invites the president to play a large role in world affairs. There are two schools of thought in consideration of the president’s role as an international actor. The first is the “Presidency school,” which tends to put more emphasis on the president’s role rather than that of other actors, such as the bureaucracy or Congress!

3. The definition of “goal” has been slightly modified from John Kingdon’s conceptualization of “agenda.” Because “agenda” appears in both foreign and domestic policy, and as agencies and bureaucracies can make own their agenb , I use “goal” in this article. John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston, Little: Brown and Company, 1984). 4. Ryan Barilleaux, The President and Foreign Afairs (Westport: Praeger, 1985); Ryan Barilleaux and Barbara Kellerman, The President as World Leader (New York:

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The second view is that of the “Foreign policy process school.” This perspective tends to see the role of president as but one of many factors in formulating p01icy.~ Both schools of thought, however, hold two views in common. First, they agree that individuals play an important role in history. Second, they both think that behavior is the product of the interaction between the individual and the situation in which he finds himself.6 My position here is that American foreign policy is based on executive decision-making where the president leads and the bureaucracy plays a minor role.

As the Korean Peninsula has been one of the most important

St. Martins Press, 1991); John P. Burke and Fred I. Greenstein, How Presidents Test Relation (New York Russell Sage Foundation, 1989); John P. Burke and Fred I. Greenstein, “ President Personality and National Security Leadership: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam Decision-Making,” International Political Science Review, 10 (1989); Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Eflective use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1980); George C. Edwards and Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadership, Rev, ed. (New York St. Martin’s Press, 1990). 5. L. Gordon Crovitz and Jeremy A. Rabkin, eds., The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989); Cecil V. Crabb Jr. and Pat M. Holt,Znvitation to Struggles: Congress, The President, and Foreign Policy, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992); Edward S. Crowin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1984, 5th ed. (New York: NYU Press, 1984), I.M. Destler, President, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974); Louis Henkin, Foreign Afairs and the Constitution (New York: Norton, 1975); Robert E. Hunter, Presidential Control of Foreign Policy: Management or Mishap (New York Praeger, 1982); Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution: Shaping Power After the Iran-Contra Afair (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1990); Lawrence Margolis, Executive Power in Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1986); James M. Lindsay, “Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters,” Political Science Quarterly, 107 (1992-1993), pp. 607-628; James M. Lindsay and Randall B. Ripley, ‘‘ Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress: A Research Agenda for the 1990s,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, 17 (1992), pp. 417-449; Patrick J. Haney, Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises: Presidents, Advisors, and the Management of Decision Making (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1997); Thomas E. Mann, ed., A Question of Balance: The President and Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution, 1990); Barbara Hinckley, Less Than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1994). 6. Robert Jervis, “Political Decision-Making: Recent Contribution,” Political Psychology (Summer 1980), p. 98.

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security issues for American presidents since the end of WWII, the role of the president remains the key to American foreign policy toward the Korean Peninsula. The influence of other policymakers, such as Congress, and the bureaucracy has remained low; the president to a large extent affects the course of action towards the Korean Peninsula. It remained so during the Cold War era and remains so today. Within these considerations, the policies and decisions that the president enforces and guides are far more important than the structure through which they are developed and carried out.

There are several advantages to using this approach. It enables us to better understand the “big picture” of how American foreign policy is being made, applied, and implemented. It clearly shows the extent to which the president bears the burden of making and enforcing policy abroad. Not only as the chief executive in American politics but also as a world leader, have the U.S. presidents trying to meet the challenges that they face.7

This study attempts to bridge the gap in the current theoretical literature. This case study is one of the few attempts to search American foreign policy from the presidential perspective. In so doing, I hope to contribute to the theoretical basis for foreign policy making in general, and to expand the knowledge of the role of the president in foreign affairs in particular. Additionally, as long as the U.S. assumes the task of maintaining stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula, this sort of study will continue to attract scholarly interest, making it worthwhile to pursue hture research.

Figure 1 shows that the President’s policy-making toward North Korea goes through several stages before it reaches the final phase of policy formation. The president formulates policy toward North Korea that matches the contemporary historical situation as he

7. Ryan Barilleaux, op. cit., ch. 1; also, George C . Edwards III and Stephen Wayne, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making, 4th ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), ch. 14.

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responds to domestic and international settings. With different leadership styles, each president faces the same confrontation between the two Koreas, but in a different historical context. The president must define both the domestic as well as international situation correctly and clearly, but each president’s definition of the North Korean situation varies.

Figure I . Sources and Logic of the US. President5 Policy Making toward North Korea

International Response NORTH KOREA

President’s President’s

Sihlahon lmplementatron

Domestic Response CONGRESS

Feedback

Then, the president sets up his policy goal toward Pyongyang. “Goal” refers to the president’s foreign policy emphasis in a given time, to contain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula. Also, I refer by use of the term “domestic response” to mean Congressional reaction to the president’s policy goal. Congress does challenge the president by appropriating money that is needed to contain North Korea. Also, “international response” is referred to as the reactions of the North Korean government. The president of the U.S. must consider any

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reactions from Pyongyang throughout his policy making process toward North Korea. Once the president publicly announces the goals that he/she wants to achieve with regard to North Korea, he then seeks to implement them. Whatever constraints or challenges arise, the president must make the right choice for the peaceful resolution of North Korean problems. The president then employs various strategies and devices to accomplish his policy goals.

President Clinton’s North Korean Policy: Engagement

Policy Background

When Bill Clinton became the president of the United States in 1993, the U.S.-Soviet conflict that had dominated the half-century after World War I1 was over. The nation was the only superpower, and it had led an international coalition to roll back Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait. The United States seemed to have not only the resources to resolve international problems, but also the will to do so.

The American public as well as the new president had other things in mind, however; Bill Clinton was not very interested in active involvement in foreign policy, and he championed domestic matters during his presidential campaign. Clinton saw himself as a domestic president because he thought “the end of the Cold War would release both financial resources and human resources within the policy community that could now be mobilized for the daunting task of restructuring the American economy.”*

Despite President Clinton’s preoccupation with domestic policy,

8. Seyon Brown, The Faces of Power: United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton, 2”* ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 584; Sidney M. Millcis and Michael Nelson, The American Presidency; Origins and Development, 1776-1993 (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1994), pp. 392-397.

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he faced the reality that there are always issues of international politics that require the attention of the American chief executive. Although the Cold War ended, conflicts and tensions between the two Koreas remained. North Korea was still a closed society, isolated from the outside world and possessed massive, fonvard- deployed conventional military forces and an array of chemical and biological weapons. Worst of all, the recalcitrant North Korean regime continued its program to develop or obtain nuclear weapons.

President Clinton’s approach to these matters was distinct in the sense that it was the first time American officials engaged in direct talks with North Korean policymakers. As Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons capabilities topped the list of American foreign policy issues to address, it remained Clinton’s job not only to maintain a security alliance with South Korea, but also to prevent North Korea from becoming a “nuclear-have.” Then, Clinton had to acknowledge the North as another negotiation partner. This was clearly a difficult balance for the president who espoused devotion to domestic politics.

Policy Goals

Clinton’s policy goal was geared to promote a nuclear nonproliferation regime. Clinton saw that North Korea’s nuclear ambitions not only undermined the existing security system of the Korean Peninsula, but also endangered the security arrangement in Northeast Asia.” Unless that ambition could not be thwarted,

9. The term nonproliferation regime means a sort of network of treaties, transparency measures, and related diplomatic initiatives. Leonard S. Spector and Virginia Foran, eds., Preventing Weupons Proliferation: Should the Regime Be Combined? A Report of the 331d Strategy for Peace, U.S. Foreign Policy Conference, The Stanley Foundation, October 22-24, 1992, p. 3. 10. Fact Sheet: U S . Department of State, “Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy,” Dispatch, 4 (October 1993), pp. 676-677; Brookings Review, 13 (Fall 1995), pp. 8-13.

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Clinton feared South Korea and Japan might be tempted to take a nuclear option for the sake of their national security. This would have been inimical to Clinton’s overall goal for nonproliferation, and it was against his wish to institute nonproliferation regimes around the world.

Faced with the North’s nuclear threat, what Clinton could take as a policy was one of three options; ignorance, forceful coercion, and diplomacy. The first option, the absence of strategy was unthinkable, not only did it contradict his public commitment to nonproliferation, but also it presented grave risk to Northeast Asian Security. Clinton disowned this logic; he wanted to establish nonproliferation regimes globally.

The second device for Clinton was to coerce Pyongyang forcefully to follow America’s terms. The appreciation of economic sanctions or military pressure clearly entailed some dangers, but it had merits, as well. Clinton could show to the world that he was a determined leader who not only had set a clearer policy goal and had the resolve to cany it out to its end. Clearly, this course of action was the last resort Clinton could take.

Clinton’s third option with North Korea was to pursue a diplomatic negotiation. This approach had a merit of safety; it was not likely to instigate any conflicts. However, it required patience and took more time than other approaches. From Clinton’s point of view, if other options including sanctions and military attack held potential danger for war, negotiation and agreement were desirable. By the same token, if the arrangement could prompt North Korea to move away from defiant isolationism to greater openness and to the free world, there would be lasting gains. Clinton preferred this option to others and continued his efforts to find a resolution of North Korea’s nuclear development program.

Policy Implementation

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Prospects for progress through diplomacy did not look good, because North Korea resisted the nuclear facility inspections that a non-proliferation regime would entail. In February 1993, Pyongyang refbsed to allow an international inspection by the IAEA. Pyongyang then announced its decision to withdraw from the NPT. It also declared that it had decided to suspend its threatened withdrawal from the NPT. In the two rounds of negotiations in June and July of 1993, the U.S. agreed to replace Pyongyang’s graphite-moderated reactors with light water reactors (LWRs). North Korea’s action precipitated an international response and an American initiative.

Clinton did not want to precipitate a hotter crisis than was immediately apparent. Clinton had two difficult leadership roles; preserving security in Northeast Asia, and enforcing nuclear nonproliferation. He was having an increasingly difficult time presenting himself as any kind of international leader. Clinton had to convey a convincing portrait of world leadership and a willingness to do what was necessary to avoid nuclear chaos.

After many twists and turns, both Washington and Pyongyang reached a broad agreement in October 1994 to freeze Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. l2 To Clinton’s credit, global agreements to stop nuclear proliferation and institute a comprehensive nuclear test ban, of which Northeast Asia states are parties, has been pursued in an attempt to reinforce the denuclearization of the

11. U.S. Department of State, Dispatch, 4, 30 (July 26, 1993), p. 535; KeesingS Record of World Events, 40 (1993), p. 39509. 12. The points of agreements of the Agreed Framework were: (1) The U.S. would oversee the construction in North Korea of 2 l O O M W light-water reactors; (2) the cost of building them would be borne by South Korea, Japan, and the U.S.; (3) North Korea will freeze all activity at its 5 M W and 5OMW reactors; (4) the U.S. would provide crude oil to North Korea for energy needs; (5 ) North Korea would allow full access to all of its nuclear facilities by International Atomic Energy Agency ( M A ) inspectors once the LWRs were operational; and (6) North Korea would resume high level talks with South Korea. See Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 30, 42, p. 2067.


region. The positive aspect of this nuclear deal was that it gave the U.S.

buying time and helped to keep a lid on tensions. However, there are two problems with this Agreed Framework. One is, notwithstanding its potential threat to Seoul and Tokyo, North Korean missile issues were not covered. Second, North Korea is not required to take IAEA safeguards until significant portions of the light water reactor project are completed. Clinton’s failure to truncate the North’s nuclear projects passed to his successor, George W. Bush.

To be sure, persuading North Korea was no easy task, owing to its isolation from the outside world. In this situation, Clinton realized that he had little leverage with which to work. Illustrative as it was of the difficulties inherent in the use of sanctions or preemptive strikes, the agreement seemed to surprise members of Congress and the allies of South Korea and Japan. In the interest of regional stability, and to forestall North Korea’s collapse, Clinton lent support for engaging North Korea with a belief that for the tottering North Korean economy, engagement was much more preferable to a hard-line policy. He conducted U.S. strategy toward North Korea under this rubric.

In response to North Korea’s launch of the Taepodong missile and growing Congressional criticism against Clinton’s handling of North Korea, President Clinton named William Perry as the North Korea Policy Coordinator. He delivered what is called the Perry Process to North Korea, with a comprehensive package for improving inter-Korean and Washington-Pyongyang relations.

13. The Perry review had three goals: solidifying Congressional support on engagement policies, strengthening its policy coordination with the South, and inducing Pyongyang to take reciprocal steps to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula. An excellent analysis of the Perry Report can be found in James E. Goodby, “North Korea: The Problem That Won’t Go Away,” Axexx Magazine (May 2003) at ~http:l/~.brookings.edu/views/~icleslfellows/goodby2OO3O5Ol.h~ (searched date: Nov. 12, 2003); Jongchul Park, “US.-ROK-Japan Trilateral

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In the concluding weeks of the Clinton administration, North Korean vice Marshall Cho Myong Rok visited Washington and the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made a return visit to Pyongyang to sign an agreement on missile programs. It is believed that Clinton came close to signing an agreement with Pyongyang to curb its missile development and missile export in exchange for economic aid to the poor Pyongyang regime. President Clinton held the possibility of a trip to Pyongyang, but dropped the idea when he concluded that an agreement on missile issues is unlikely to be reached.

Congressional Reaction

The task of selling Clinton’s North Korean policy to Congress and the American public was not an easy one, for several reasons. First, Clinton had not given sustained attention to foreign policy. Second, Congress viewed foreign policy issues differently from the Clinton administration. Legislators on Capitol Hill tended to give priority to the domestic dimensions of foreign policy questions. Legislators then were reluctant to accept the president’s placement of non-proliferation as the highest goal for his policy toward the region. l4

Clinton sought bipartisan support for his North Korean policy. The task was to convince Congress and the American people that the gravest threat on the Peninsula was the North’s nuclear arms program. CIA Director James Woolsey told the Senate Government Affairs Committee on February 24, 1993 that North Korea was gaining the ability to assemble nuclear weapons. He said, “We have every indication that the North Koreans are hiding

Coordination in the Implementation of the Perry Report,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 11, 2 (Winter 1999), pp. 97-119; Scott Snyder, “Perry process and progress in inter-Korean relations,” Korea Herald, December 7, 1999. 14. Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1994), p. 424.


some evidence of some nuclear weapons-related activitie~.”’~ Members of Congress agreed with the broadest outline of

Clinton’s policy of defending against a nuclear-armed North Korea, yet achieving support for a more specific plan was a different story. Legislators were interested in more than nuclear non-proliferation. On one hand, Congressional attention in the post-Cold War era was focused on cutting the defense budget and diverting resources into domestic areas. Yet, at the same time, legislators demanded that the president continue to play the role of world leader and defender of freedom.

On June 5, 1994, President Clinton argued that North Korea has resisted his diplomatic entreaties: “We have created many, such opportunities, and North Korea rejected them all.. . We have to go forward with sanctions resolution.”’6 But Congress wanted to take a tougher stance against rogue states such as North Korea. For example, Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) recommended preemptive air strikes against North Korea’s nuclear facilities. l7

Not only was the McCain proposal adopted by the Senate on a voice vote (a sure sign of broad consensus), but Charles Robb (D- Va.) called on the Clinton administration to consider reintroducing tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea as a means to pressure Pyongyang’s compliance with the NPT, this also passed in Senate on a voice vote.”

The Senate overwhelmingly endorsed a nonbinding resolution on June 16, 1994 that called for the president to “take all necessary and prudent action” to deter a potential North Korean attack and to enhance the safety of the American troops stationed in South Korea. Action in the House of Representatives reflected a mixture of consensus and disagreement. The House approved a resolution

15. Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1993), p. 526. 16. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 30, p. 1218. 17. Ibid. 18. Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1994), p. 455.

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calling for international sanctions against North Korea, but it did not require an international inspection of its nuclear facilities. One amendment called on South Korea to upgrade its military readiness. l9 The relatively tame language of the resolution underscored Congress’ reluctance to force action in the Korean crisis and thus inherit responsibilities for the result. Most people in Congress grudgingly accepted the nuclear agreement.

North Korea j . Reaction

Having allowed six inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities since the beginning of 1992, North Korea then refused to allow further international inspection fiom the IAEA. Pyongyang argued that alleged facilities are non-military installations and that they should be of no concern to IAEA. Refusing to allow inspection, North Korea declared that it had decided to suspend its threatened withdrawal from the NPT. It justified its withdrawal by pointing to the continuing military threat it saw fiom the South and the U.S., noting that joint U.S.-ROK military exercises had been resumed.

The North’s actions precipitated an international response and an American initiative. Tensions between the U.S. and North Korea over the latter’s nuclear activities nearly erupted into war in the spring of 1994. Pyongyang up to this point had been surreptitiously siphoning bomb-making plutonium from fuel rods at the Youngbyon nuclear facility. They had consistently threatened to expel international atomic energy inspectors and warned that American threats of sanction would be interpreted as an act of war.

From Pyongyang’s perspective, the stationing of U.S. troops in Korea poses a threat to the security of North Korea. It demanded the U.S. must delete North Korea fiom the terrorism sponsor list

19. Zbid., p. 424.

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and must lift economic sanctions that essentially prohibit trade with other countries. The crisis, stemming from North Korea’s refusal to allow complete inspections of its nuclear sites, somewhat defused following former President Carter’s visit on June 1994. In the end, after many twist and turns, both the U.S. and North Korea finally reached a broad agreement in October 1994 to freeze Pyongyang’s nuclear arms program.

The agreement remains controversial because the U.S. failed to extinguish Pyongyang’s nuclear arms program. North Korea’s credibility in abiding by its Geneva Agreement has remained low. North Korea may have felt that if it gave up its nuclear program in return for a promise of economic aid, it might never receive it. The North Korean regime’s dilemma was that the economic situation might improve by opening its economy to the world, but in exposing itself to the outside world it might invite comparison with the South, resulting in the growth of dissident ideas among North Korea’s people. With a weak economy and no allies, North Korea had few bargaining chips; nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology, could be integral to the regime’s survival.

President Bush and North Korea

Policy Background

President George W. Bush has little foreign policy experience, although he has veteran policy staff. Once looking at the names of the policy staff surrounding Bush, we can easily come to the conclusion that the policy direction and/or goals that Bush would take are more likely to be hawkish ones. During the campaign, presidential candidate Bush called for a distinctly American internationalism that would stand firm against dictatorships including that of Kim Jong 11.

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Bush’s foreign policy is in line with the internationalism that most of his predecessors pursued in the aftermath of WWII. Since the end of the cold war, the focal point of U.S. foreign policy toward Northeast Asia rested in maintaining American hegemony throughout the world and preventing and containing rogue states including North Korea. For, without maintaining it, the U.S. may be denied economic, political, and military access to Northeast Asia.

Two important documents impacted upon the materialization of Bush’s foreign policy goals. These are: the Rumsfeld Report and the Armitage Report. The Rumsfeld Report stated that it would be fifteen years before any rogue state such as North Korea had the ability to launch a ballistic missile attack on the It also warned that North Korea would be a major threat to U.S. interests because it has a major proliferation of ballistic missile capabilities.

The second important document for the Bush administration in formulating its foreign policy is, the Armitage Report.21 A group of the Defense University’s Strategic Forum chaired by Armitage prepared A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea. The report stated: 1) North Korean missiles have become far more dangerous, so that the U.S. must end, in the near future, Pyongyang’s missile testing and exporting; 2) The U.S. needs to propose a 6-party meeting to deal with the security of the Korean Peninsula. 3) If diplomacy fails with North Korea, policy options that the US. can take are either the strengthening of deterrence/containment, or preemption. In the end, President Bush adopted Missile Defense, to bolster its deterrent military posture.22

20. Theater Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region, Report, 34 (June 2000), The Henry Stimson Center, pp. 15-20 at <http://www.stirson.org/policy/excbmd.hhn, (searched date: Nov. 11,2003). 21. Richard L. Armitage, A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea, Strategic Forum, National Defense University, 159 (March 1999) at <http://www.nyu.eduJ globalbeat /asia/Armitage0399.htm> (searched date: Oct. 24,2001). 22. Anthony H. Coregman, Defining America: Redefining the Conceptual Borders of


Policy Goals

President Bush opened his presidency by negating Clinton’s North Korean policy. He said: 1) Clinton was in too great a rush for a missile deal with North Korea; 2) the inter-Korean summit has not produced any changes in the internal structure of the North Korean political and economic system.23 Based on this strategic thinking, President Bush saw the need of changes to North Korean policy in the direction of a more hard-nosed internationalism. Indeed Bush’s hard-line approach has precipitated in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attack. In his State of the Union address in January 2002, President Bush called North Korea, Iran, and Iraq part of an axis of evil, and promised that the US. would not permit these countries to threaten the world with weapons of mass de~truction.~~

Complicating matters further, Bush confirmed the existence of a classified Pentagon review (Nuclear Posture Review: NPR), in which tactical nuclear weapons could be used against Libya, Syria, China, Russia, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea in certain situation^.^' This NPR also included a plan to build smaller nuclear weapons for use in certain war situations. This clearly shows President Bush wants to change his North Korean policy to be different from that of President Clinton.

President Bush set up three policy guidelines in dealing with North Korean nuclear weapons and missile issues: transparency,

Homeland Defense, A Report on Homeland Defense, A Report on Homeland Defense and National Missile Defense, CSIS at <http://www.washingtonpost.com> (searched date: Feb. 12, 2004). 23. James J. Przystup and Ronald N. Montaperto, “East Asia and the Pacific,” p. 5 in Strategic Challenges for the Bush Administration, National Defense University at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/pressBUSH.HTML (searched date: Dec. 1,2003). 24. George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” Washington, DC, January 29, 2002, see the webpage of the State Department. 25. “Nuclear Posture Review,” excerpts fiom the classified report to Congress March 14, 2002 at <www.globalsecurity.org>.

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verification, and reciprocity. First, transparency means North Korea must allow internationally acceptable and adequate inspection of all its nuclear activities and fully cooperate with the inspection process. Second, Bush emphasized that he will deal with North Korea’s missile issues only when the country can nail down the verification procedures guaranteeing that Pyongyang’s nuclear program has ended. Third, Bush criticized that flexible reciprocity only exacerbates the North’s brinkmanship. Therefore, Bush will replace this with strict reciprocity in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear as well as missile development programs.

Pyongyang maintained that it’s nuclear and missile threat was exaggerated in order to justify increases in American military spending and to deploy the MD system. North Korea interpreted the suspension of dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea as a clear sign that U.S. policy had changed from engagement to a strategy of “crime-and-punishment.” 26 Bristling over President Bush’s skepticism of them and his hard-line approach to missile issues, Pyongyang warned that they might scrap a moratorium on long-range missile tests and revive a nuclear program.

Bush stipulated any agreement would have to address a broad range of issues, including North Korea’s nuclear program, its ballistic and conventional weapons threats.27 At issue now is whether the North really has a plutonium-based nuclear program or has a uranium-based nuclear program. Bush has demanded that North Korea dismantle all nuclear projects in a complete, verifiable and irreversible way.

26. Peter Hayes, “Seven Step Policy to Solve the North Korean Nuclear Problem,” The DPRK Briefing Book at <http://www.nautilus.org> (searched date: Nov. 18,

27. Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, ‘‘Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge,” Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.

2003), pp. 1-7.


Policy Implementation

The blame for the U.S.-North Korea diplomatic impasse goes to both Washington and Pyongyang. More often than not, confusing signals emanated from Washington officials concerning policy goals, strategies, and tactics in U.S.-North Korea relations. For example, the US. Secretary of State Powell confirmed that the US. plans to engage with the North to pick up where the Clinton administration left off. On the other hand, the U.S. proposed the MD program and has been pressing the North for prompt inspection of nuclear sites. While doves like Powell in the Bush administration believe in the benefits of an engagement policy, hawks like Condoleezza Rice, national security advisor, said truly evil regimes (including North Korea) will never be reformed and such regimes must be confronted, not coddled.

Against this backdrop, the US. unveiled that North Korea admitted its secret nuclear weapons program based on the process of uranium enrichment in 2002. President Bush publicly insisted that the North must take visible measures to dismantle its nuclear program before negotiations could take place. He rejected any negotiation of any agreement with North Korea over the secret nuclear agreements with Pyongyang.

North Korea has its own grievance against the U.S. government. Pyongyang’s frustrations with regard to Bush’s North Korea policy include: 1) The US. was unwilling to lift economic sanctions as well as move forward to normalize relations with North Korea; 2) The U.S. violated the Agreed Framework by not delivering heavy oil according to schedule and failed to construct light water reactors on schedule; 3) The US. unilaterally set the agenda and simply advocated the containment policy to the North; and,,4) The U.S. is even trying to disarm the North Korean military through

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negotiation.28 The majority of South Koreans do not support President Bush’s

hard-line approach against the North. South Korea worries Bush’s tougher stance might upset the progress that was made under Kim Dae Jung’s “sunshine policy” of reconciliation and engagement towards North Korea. Indeed, Bush’s approach to North Korea seems distinctly out of step with the Roh administrations “Policy for Peace and Prosperity,” a successor to Kim’s “Sunshine ~ o l i c y . ” ~ ~

On January 10, 2003, North Korea announced their withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and on April 18, 2003, it issued a statement claiming to have almost completed reprocessing their stored nuclear fuel rods. 30 Despite North Korea’s consistent demand for direct negotiations with the U.S. on the nuclear issue, President Bush declined acceptance of this proposal. Bush insisted that the North Korean nuclear problem was the concern of all powers in the region and that the issue had to be resolved on a multilateral basis. His logic is simple: South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia all have a vested interest in the stability of the Korean Peninsula and therefore they all should have a stake in measures dealing with the crisis.

Faced with a deadlock on U.S.-North Korea relations, President Bush let China play the role of broker in bringing the DPRK to multilateral talks. The first six-party meeting was held in Beijing. However, no meaningful progress has materialized largely because neither side provided meaningful concessions to the other

28. John Feffer, “US. North Korea Relations,” In Focus, 4, 15 (May 1999), at <http:/lm.foreignpolicy-infocus.org> (searched date: Jan. 28, 20041, see also “DPRK Ready to Scrap Nuke Program If US. Drops Hostile Policy,” The Peopleb Korea at <http://www.korea-np.co.jp/main/main.aspx> (searched date: Feb. 18,2004). 29. Edward A. Olsen, “A Korean Solution to the United States’ Kuean Problems,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, 17,2 (Falwinter 2003), pp. 222-223. 30. Ralph C. Hassig and Kongdan Oh, “The Great Switchover Debate,” The Journal ofEast Asian Affairs, 17,2 (Falwinter 2003), p. 241.

President Clinton and Bush h Policy toward North Korea /91

negotiating partner. In the second six-nation talks, the North offered to freeze its nuclear weapons program in exchange for security guarantees and economic aid. Yet, Bush’s negotiating team continued to demand that the North must dismantle its program before it receives security guarantees and economic aid.31


As the pending war with Iraq consumed the attention of Congress, a number of lawmakers in both parties started to challenge Bush’s policy toward North Korea, including its refusal to portray the situation as a crisis and to negotiate with the North Korea regime. A handful of Democrats and Republicans then urged President Bush to seek a diplomatic solution by talking directly with North Korea.32

Democrats in Congress have voiced their criticism that they were not told of North Korea’s admission to its nuclear weapons program while they were considering the resolution authorizing the administration to use force against Iraq.33 The Washington Post quoted “Senators are concerned and troubled by it . . . This cloud of secrecy raises questions about whether there are other pieces to this puzzle they don’t know about.”34

As Bush prepared for the military action against Iraq, Congress urged that the diplomatic standoff over North Korea’s efforts to

31. Phillip P. Pan, “South Korea Tries to Broker Deal Between U.S., North Korea,” The Washington Post, February 25,2004. 32. Twenty seven House Democrats led by Rep. Alcee Hastings (F1.) wrote the president asking him to clarify the administration’s policy on North Korea. Several foreign policy aides to former Presidents Senior Bush and Clinton, including National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Harvard professor and Pentagon official Ashton Carter, have also called for direct talks. 33. Devon Chaffe, “North Korea and the Bush Administration’s Proliferation Folly: Nuclear Admission Demonstrates Militarism is not a solution,” October 21, 2002 at <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.10/1023chaffe~korea.htm, (searched date: February 19,2004). 34. The Washington Post, October 19,2002.

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develop nuclear weapons must not be relegated to a back-burner issue. Congress demanded the following points to call the attention of the White House to the urgent need for diplomacy with North Korea: 1) the situation on the Korean Peninsula is at least as urgent-if not more a threat than that posed by Iraq; 2) Bush must resume dialogue with North Korea; 3) Humanitarian assistance to the people of North Korea must be continued; and, 4) North Korea’s nuclear issues must be resolved through dialogue.35

However, many foreign policy experts agree that Congress has not done its job in dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat. “They have a responsibility to air questions in public and come up with suggestions,” said Stephen Costello, a Korean specialist at the Atlantic Council. Chris Nelson, author of the Nelson Report, also said, “Congress was slow to recognize that the Bush policy of aggressive non-engagement risked producing the crisis that we now face.”36

A leading Senate Democrat accused Bush by saying “The administration’s inattention and ideological rigidity has left America less secure today than we were three years Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.), the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said “It’s time to get serious about negotiations . . . North Korea must dismantle its nuclear programs and stop selling missile te~hnology.”~~

With the Missile Threat Reduction Act of 2003, Congress now threatens sanctions against North Korea. This is intended to provide a legal fkamework for preventing incidents such as

35. “U.S. Policy Towards North Korea: Priorities for Congress,” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, January 8, 2003 at <http://64.177.207.201/pages/ 16-12O.html> (searched date: August 29,2003). 36. Zbid. 37. “Senate Bipartisan Group Urges New Strategy Toward North Korea,” January 14, 2003 at <http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=Newscenter.ViewPressRel ease & Content_id=729> (searched date: Jan. 23, 2004). 38. James Gordon Meek, “Biden pushes U.S.-N. Korea talks,” Daily News, July 21, 2003.


Yemen’s purchase of North Korean Scud missiles in 2002. One member in the House International Relations Committee said the act would force the administration to be tougher on Py~ngyang.~’

North Korea ’s Reaction

North Korea repelled strongly against President Bush’s policy. Pyongyang was frustrated with the U.S. violation of the Agreed Framework, the U.S. unwillingness to lift economic sanctions, the U.S. unilateral trial to set the agenda and its advocacy of the containment policy toward North Korea, and the U.S. disarmament intention of the North Korean military through negotiation. Criticizing Bush’s hard-nosed approach, North Korea stressed that it should no longer be regarded as a rogue state and the U.S. must abandon its hostile policy toward them.40 North Korea responded “now that the U.S. tries to disarm the DPRK, while persistently pursuing the hostile policy toward the DPRK, the DPRK is not interested in any dialogue and improvement of relations with the u. s

The nuclear crisis once again erupted in October 2002 when the U S . said North Korea admitted to having a covert program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. Pyongyang has demanded of the U S . the following package as a solution to resolve the current nuclear stalemate. This includes: the U.S. should 1) conclude a non-aggression treaty with the DPRK; 2) establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK; 3) guarantee economic cooperation

39. Jonathan M. Katz, “Congress Divided on North Korea, Confusing by Bush Policy,” Arms Control Toduy (June 2003) at <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003 06/congressjune03.usp> (searched date: Jan. 12,2004). 40. See the homepage of Josun Shinbo at <http://www.Koredsinbol-2001/> (searched date: Feb. 23,2004), <http://www.kcna.co.JP /contents2/23.htm> (searched date: Feb. 23,2004). 41. Christopher Torchia, “North Korea: Not Interested in U.S. Talks,” Oct 26, 2001 at <http://www.nautilus, org/napsnet/dr/Oll O/oct26.html#iteml> (searched date: Feb. 24,2004).

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between the DPRK and Japan, and between the North and the South of Korea; 4) compensate for the loss of electricity caused by the delayed provision of light water reactors; and, 5) complete their con~truction.~~ In return for these actions by the U.S. the North proposed that 1) Pyongyang would not make nuclear weapons; 2) allow nuclear inspections; 3) dismantle its nuclear facility; 4) freeze its missile test firing; and, 5) stop its missile export.

However, the U.S. rejected the North’s demands by holding a position that seeks complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s nuclear programs, both plutonium and uranium. The nuclear standoff between the U.S. and North Korea was prolonged until the first six-way talks. Recently countries including the U.S., North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia met in Beijing to lay the groundwork for a second round of six-way talks. In this meeting, Pyongyang says it first wants economic aid, humanitarian assistance, and a security assurance that the U.S. will not attack. Though no word of agreement came out of this meeting, all parties agree to the idea of a nuclear free Korea and commitment to peaceful resolution of the North’s nuclear activities in the future.43

Comparative Analysis on Clinton and Bush’s North Korean Policy: Power and Strategy

Despite their disparate styles, both Clinton and Bush all met the same challenges in the sense that the president has a responsibility to deter the North Korean threat. The challenges differ, however, in that the time and context that the president encountered and in

42. North Korea’s official response to U.S. policy can be seen at <http:l/ 210.145.168.243/pk/199th~issue/2003121306.htm> (searched date: Feb. 25,2004). 43. Lee, Joe McDonald, “As Talks End, Pyongyang Slams Hostile U.S. Policy,” The Washington Times, Feb. 29,2004. See the webpage of the Washington Times.

President Clinton and Bush S Policy toward North Korea / 95

which they tested those realities varies.44 The next paragraph discusses the similarities and differences between Clinton and Bush in their handling of the North Korean nuclear arms program.

The Two President’s Definition of Situation

Both presidents have faced the Cold War that persists on the Korean Peninsula. Clinton was the first post-Cold War president who faced no threat to national security from the Soviet Union. Yet, conflicts and tensions between the two Koreas remained. Congress also pressured Clinton to cut the defense budget. Clinton used carrots rather than sticks in his approach to North Korea. On the other hand, Bush outlined a war on terrorism and pursued a hard- line approach. He changed his policy toward North Korea from Clinton’s engagement to his own hardnosed approach. More Congressmen showed their discomfort with Bush’s handling of North Korea. They demand that Bush must take diplomatic solutions for the reduction of the danger from the North’s nuclear capabilities.

The Two Presidents ’Policy Goals toward North Korea

Both Clinton and Bush’s policy goals toward North Korea are similar in terms of establishing a non-proliferation regime and a nuclear-free Korea. Yet there are some differences: while Clinton’s rhetoric indicated a determination to stop Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons project, his actual efforts appeared ambiguous and inconsistent. This led Clinton to end up with a temporary suspension of the nuclear weapons program in the Agreed Framework. On the other hand, Bush set up three policy guidelines including transparency, verification, and reciprocity to deal with

44. Burke and Greenstein, op. cit., p. 3.

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Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear capabilities. He demanded that the North must consistently and convincingly agree to a verifiable and irreversible dismantling of its nuclear programs, including that of high enriched uranium. This means Pyongyang must fulfill its NPT and IAEA safeguards as well as inter-Korean denucleariza- t i ~ n . ~ ~

The Two Presidents ’ Policy toward the North and Congressional Reactions

The two presidents Clinton and Bush have things in common in the sense that both were faced with strong criticism of their policy on North Korea from Congress. Yet, differences exist: Clinton’s vacillations in his North Korea policy alarmed many members of Congress. However, their failure to provide alternatives allowed him to continue his unfocused engagement in Korean matters. When members of Congress urged him to use tougher measures, such as pre-emptive strikes or sanctions, Clinton disregarded those options as too dangerous. On the other hand, most Democratic Congressmen regarded Bush’s policy of aggressive non- engagement with the North as only exacerbating the crisis. Democratic lawmakers in Capitol Hill urged Bush to take a diplomatic solution by talking directly with North Korea. Needless to say, the current nuclear standoff between the U.S and North Korea is related to Bush’s rigid stance and hard-nosed approach to North Korea. Congress cannot escape blame because it also failed to provide concrete policy options that both presidents could take.

The Two Presidents’ Policy Implementation and North Korean Reactions

45. Peter Hayes, “The Multilateral Mantra and North Korea” at <www.nautilus.org> (searched date: Feb. 2 1, 2004).


Clinton’s early stance of toughness toward North Korea only exacerbated conflicts in Korea. When he pushed for IAEA inspections and sought sanctions from the UN, along with military solutions, Pyongyang’s response was hostile and it took brinkmanship as a policy option. Conciliatory gestures were effective to dissuade Pyongyang from the threats of withdrawal from the NPT, and led them to sign the Agreed Framework with the US. On the other hand, Bush attempted to bully Pyongyang into complying with economic threats when the North admitted it had an active nuclear program. Frustrated with Bush’s North Korea policy, Pyongyang urged the U.S. to lift economic sanctions. The North also criticizes the U.S. for unilaterally trying to set the agenda and simply advocating a containment policy toward them. In the second six-nation talks, North Korea demanded the U.S. guarantee security concerns, resume heavy oil shipments, and provide economic and humanitarian assistance in exchange for the freezing of the North’s nuclear programs.46 Following, in Table 1, is the summary of the comparative analysis of President Clinton and Bush’s Policy towards North Korea.

The contrast between Clinton’s engagement policy and Bush’s hard-line approach shows that there is significant divergence between conservatives and progressives in the U.S. over how to deal with Pyongyang.47 It is important to keep in mind that Bush is still not finished with his presidency, and as such he is still making new policy decisions, and other decisions he has made are still playing out. We will not know the full effect of his presidency towards North Korea until well after he has left the White House.

46. See the following articles. “Pyongyang Proposes First-Phase Actions for Settlement of Nuke Issues,” December 13,2003; “DPRK Blames U.S. and KEDO for Stop LWR Construction,” November 15, 2003; “Pyongyang Proposes Package Solution Plan to Solve Nuke Dispute,” August 30,2003. 47. Dennis Florig, “Two Visions of Convergence in North Asia,” Journal of American Studies, 35, 3 (Winter 2003), p. 71.

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Table 1. Comparative Analysis of President Clinton and Bush's Policv toward North Korea

President Clinton President Bush

Definition of Situation

Policy Goals


North Korea's Reaction

Collapse of the Soviet Union Domestic Policy First

Non-proliferation Nuclear Free Korea Soft Landing of the DPRK Engagement (Diplomatic Negotiation)

Modest Support: Democrats Approve Republicans Disapprove

Hostile Reaction and Brinkmanship Pursued Demands Bilateral Talks (Rejects Multilateral Talks) Demand a Security Guarantee, Economic Assistance, Deletion of their Listing on the Terrorism Sponsor List

War on Terrorism Internationalism Applied to Foreign Policy

Non-proliferation Nuclear Free Korea Missile Defense American Internationalism (Verification, Transparency, Reciprocation)

Congress Voiced Criticism: Democrats Disapprove Republicans Reluctantly Approve

Hostile Reaction and Brinkmanship Pursued Demands Bilateral Talks (Accept Multilateral T a b ) Demand a Security Guarantee, Economic Assistance, Deletion of their Listing on the Terrorism Sponsor List

Concluding Remarks

The presidency offers to its occupant the opportunity to shape American foreign policy, not only in the short term but for a considerable length of time. When Harry Truman adopted the policy of containment, won support for NATO, gave aid to Greece and Turkey, and sent American forces to defend South Korea, he set the pattern for American policy for the next half-century. At the same time, however, the president does not possess absolute power in the shaping of foreign policy.

On the one hand, each president can initiate new strategies for


foreign policy. Nevertheless, domestic politics and the institutions of American government constrain the president’s freedom to adopt a new strategy or take a new direction in foreign policy. Congress possesses considerable power to limit the president’s ability to bargain, to consider policy options, and to build a consensus in support of policy change. If a new direction in foreign policy requires action or acquiescence by Congress, such as providing funds for aid or approving a treaty, then it can be said the potential power of Congress is particularly strong.

Traditionally, observers distinguish between those issues that are domestic in nature, to which legislators pay considerable attention, and international ones, in which members of Congress are more likely to defer to presidential leadership. However, a third class of issues, - called “intermestic (intemational+domestic)” by some observers, involves the intertwining of domestic and international issues. The White House and Congress interpret intermestic issues, such as foreign trade policy, differently. From the perspective of the president, these are issues of foreign policy. Members of Congress, however, focus on the domestic political and economic implications of these issues.

American policy towards the Korean peninsula is a type of intermestic issue. It is an international issue, but there is a strong domestic interest based on the history of the Korean War and a long-standing American commitment to the ROK. The conviction of many representatives and senators that North Korean aggression had to be contained was not only an ideological reflex but also a position based on the continuing character of the regime in Pyongyang.

Clinton initially adopted a stance of toughness in a push for IAEA inspections. He sought sanctions from the U.N. along with military solutions; however, these efforts served less as a viable strategy than as a face-saving device. Arguing that the engagement was the right choice because it was the only way to realize an end

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to the North’s nuclear bomb project, Clinton eventually persuaded Seoul to follow his lead in adopting the Agreed Framework.

Bush expressed his hope to deal with North Korea’s missile issues only when the nation can nail down the verification procedures that guarantee Pyongyang’s nuclear program has ended. Bush also criticized that flexible reciprocity only exacerbates the North’s brinkmanship, thus his administration would replace this with strict reciprocity in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear and missile development programs. However, Bush’s hard-line approach only exacerbated existing U. S.-North Korea, South-North Korea, and U.S.-South Korea relations.

No doubt, true confidence building is feasible when the North responds to the outside world with its deeds, not words. Unsurprisingly, critics remarked skeptically about the North’s true intention on its willingness to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. North Korea needs to get out of its economic and diplomatic predicament. North Korea’s experiment in market socialism requires security guarantees and financial assistance from the U.S., Japan and South Korea. North Korea’s latest diplomatic overture clearly departs from its past gestures because it simultaneously has approached South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. Dealing with North Korea requires patience and prudence by all parties involved.

Until uncertainty disappears and the diplomatic halt is lifted in Korea, the prognoses for U.S.-North Korea relations remain remote. What Bush realizes is that continuing U.S.-North Korean tensions would only prompt Pyongyang to suspend its contact with Seoul, which in turn, jeopardizes rapprochement towards peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. It is fortunate to see that international efforts such as the six-party talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear tension have gained some positive momentum. Though it is too early to predict how the North’s nuclear activities will be contained, one rule remains unchanged: we must seek a


peaceful resolution of Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions through dialogue.

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A Comparative Analysis of President Clinton and Bush's Handling of the North Korean Nuclear Weapons...

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