ARAM, 25 (2013) 67-77. doi: 10.2143/ARAM.25.0.XXXXXXX

A Defensive “Mission”: The GReek “CoMMiTTee foR The suppoRT of The GReek

ChuRCh AnD eDuCATion” (1882-1912)

soTiRis Roussos (university of peloponnese)

Abstract

This paper presents the activity and influence of the Greek “Committee for the support of the Greek Church and education” at the turn of the 19th century. The Com-mittee was set up by the Greek Government in 1882, working until the Balkan Wars in 1912, with the primary purpose of financially assisting the Greek Church, and com-munities in the still “unredeemed” lands of Macedonia, epirus and Thrace, as well as of Constantinople. The Committee was not restricted to the Balkans and Constantinople, but also spread its activity to the Greek orthodox Church and communities in syria and palestine. it was a semi-autonomous body operated within and financed by the Greek foreign Ministry. The Committee had, from 1880s, considerable control of the decision-making related to the Greek orthodox patriarchates and Church in the orient (patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem) and financed the Greek orthodox Churches and their ecclesiastic network. in the orient, this financial support was mainly channelled to the patriarchate of Jerusalem in order primarily to thwart Russian influence in the holy Land. The struggle against ‘slavonic [i.e. Russian] domination and their suspicions about the Catholic Church’s interests in the Levant were the bonds that knit together the Committee with influential Greek orthodox ecclesiastics in syria and palestine. in 1911, one year before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, this Committee changed its title to Benevolent Committee, and transformed itself into an intelligence agency with military officers among its members.

The paper presents the activity and influence of the Greek “Committee for the support of the Greek Church and education” at the turn of the 19th century. The Committee was set up by the Greek Government in 1882 and worked until the Balkan Wars in 1912, with the primary purpose of financially assisting the Greek Church and communities in the still “unredeemed” lands of Macedonia, epirus and Thrace as well as Constantinople. however, the Committee was not restricted to the Balkans and Constantinople, but it also spread its activity to the Greek orthodox Church and communities in syria and palestine. The Com-mittee was a semi-autonomous body operated within and financed by the Greek foreign Ministry.

The Committee had, from 1880s, considerable control over the decision-making related to the Greek orthodox patriarchates and Church in the orient

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(patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem). Most importantly, it financed the Greek orthodox Churches and their ecclesiastic network. in the orient the financial support was mainly channelled to the patriarchate of Jerusalem to thwart Russian influence in the holy Land.

The Committee was set up as a semi-official body in the foreign Ministry in August 1882 by a confidential decree of the Greek Minister of foreign Affairs in order to take over all the missions previously undertaken by the Association for the propagation of Greek Letters, that is1: promoting and fos-tering Greek national and religious identity in all the Greek speaking people of the ottoman empire, propagating Greek language, facilitating Greek educa-tion in the ottoman lands, safeguarding the Greek character of the Greek orthodox patriarchates and Churches in the ottoman empire through diplo-matic and economic assistance and, last but not least, collecting geographic and ethnographic data and cartographic information in order to “[spearhead] the campaign to promote ethnographic maps of the Balkans which were propi-tious to the Greeks”.2

since 1869, this Association was closely connected with the foreign Ministry which provided its resources and approved its budget. A representative of the foreign Ministry could also attend the society’s councils.3 The Association suc-ceeded in a twofold effort, first in building up a wide network of correspond-ents and agents in virtually every small town with significant Greek population in the ottoman empire, and second, in collecting a vast amount of ethnographic information. however, its close connection with the Greek Ministry and the Greek diplomats in the ottoman lands offered it a status which could go beyond its mission defining more than assisting official Greek policy line regarding the ottoman empire.4

The Committee for the support of the Greek Church and education officially took over the mission of the Association for the propagation of Greek Letters by a Royal Decree in January 24, 1887, inheriting all the Association’s archives

1 The Association [Etaireia pros Diadosin twn Ellinikon Grammaton] was established in 1869 by prominent members of the Greek society. its leading personality was Constantinos paparrigo-poulos, a history professor of the university of Athens and author of the ideological foundation of the Modern Greek national identity, “history of hellenic nation”.

2 R.s. peckham, “Map Mania: nationalism and the politics of place in Greece”, Political Geography, 19 (2000), 80.

3 “Draft Regulation of the Relations between the Council of Association for the Propagation of Greek Letters and the foreign Ministry” [in Greek], 1869, stefanos Dragoumis private papers (sD), 30.3 (74), American school of Classical studies, Athens (AsCs).

4 M. kotzabassi, [in Greek], “ethniki tautotita kai ekpaideusi stin Anatoliki Macedonia sta teli tou 19ou aiona: i drasi tou syllogou pros Diadosi ton ellinikon Gramaton”, paper delivered in the iv european Congress of the european society of Modern Greek studies “identities in the Greek world (from 1204 to the present day)”, Granada, 9-12 september 2010, www.eens.org/eens_congresses/2010/kotzabassi_Maria.pdf (accessed 6 July 2011).

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and ethnographic data.5 The same Decree provided for the Committee to operate within the foreign Ministry and to be financed through secret funds without any preliminary clearance.6 The Committee could also accept private grants and endowments, though the Committee’s budget was to be approved by the for-eign Minister himself. Another Royal Decree of 1892 emboldened its role within the Ministry. The Committee was now to be chaired by the foreign Minister himself, while all the Greek diplomats, Ambassadors, Consuls and agents in the ottoman lands were required to implement any request or directive coming from the Committee and to send a report on the Committee’s interests every three months. its members were not only in full knowledge of all the diplomatic correspondence in the Greek foreign Ministry related to the Greek orthodox Church in the Balkans and the near east, but also had considerable control on the decision-making related to the Greek orthodox patriarchates and Church in the orient and the Balkans. Most importantly, it financed the Greek orthodox Churches and a wide ecclesiastic network of prelates and priests in ottoman lands.7

The Committee recruited its members from prominent academics and members of the Greek parliament, such as stefanos Dragoumis, Athanassios kyriakos, Dionysios stefanou and spyridon Lambros.8 They were all leading members of the national society (Ethniki Etaireia), while also being involved in the semi-clandestine banner organisation of the ultra-nationalist, and the irreden-tist movement in Greece, which led to the Greek-Turkish War in 1897.9 The phenomenon of national associations and societies dedicated to the awareness of the Greek state and the support of the unredeemed Greek populations in the ottoman lands was widespread, in Athens, during that period.10 Another group formed the society Ellenismos (hellenism). prominent members of this society, such as pavlos karolides11 and neokles kazazes, both professors of

5 January 24, 1887, “Draft Royal Decree for the organisation of the committee for the sup-port of the Greek Church and education”, sD, 30.1 (2), AsCs.

6 The budget of the Committee for the year 1896 was set by the secret enactment no.8 of the Cabinet in June 5, 1896 and it allowed for a total amount of 449,270 drachmas

7 June 10 1900, Athens to Jerusalem, 1314/epitrope pros enischysi ellenikes ekklesias kai paideias (eeeep)/k/66.2/1/1900, november 19 1900, Jerusalem to Athens, 3099/k/66.2/2/1900, Archives of the Greek foreign Ministry (AYe).

8 in July 1896 the president of the Committee was Athanassios kyriakos and in november of the same year Dionysios stefanou was appointed president with spyridon Lambros as member. July 6, 1896, eeeep/236/sT/1896

9 november 29, 1896, Letter of the president of the national society to Dionysios stephanou, private papers of Dionysios stephanou (Ds), 4.6, Greek Literature and historical Archives, Athens (eLiA).

10 n. Maroniti, Poltiki exousia kai ethniko zitima stin Ellada, (Athens: Alexandria, 2009), 104-120.

11 karolides maintained that the Arab orthodox were originally Greeks, who had been ara-bised and forgotten their Greek language. in 1908 he published a book supporting these views. The book was translated in Arabic and was taught in the patriarchate’s schools in palestine. see

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the university of Athens, had strong views on the Greek character of the Greek orthodox Church in the near east. They visited the orthodox orient frequently and had contacts with the patriarchates particularly in Jerusalem.12

The Committee’s budgets of the period 1882-1886 remained roughly the same at 580,000 Greek drachmas (approximately 522,000 golden francs).13 The budgets appear to have increased from 1887, to 720,000 drachmas14 but in reality there is a serious decrease due to the drachma’s devaluation compared to the golden franc from 1886 to 1906. in 1895, for instance, this budget is not more than 430,000 golden francs.15 The budget plunged into 292,000 golden francs in 1896 due to the country’s economic failure combined with an increase in military expenditure.16 The bulk of this money went towards the educational needs of the Greeks in Macedonia and Thrace, in the ottoman Balkans and istanbul. from the 150,000 drachmas earmarked for the annual needs of the Greek ortho-dox Churches, more than 80,000 went to the ecumenical patriarchate and another 25,000 to 30,000 to the patriarchate of Jerusalem. The patriarchates of Antioch and Alexandria received no more than 18,000 drachmas each.17

it should be noted that this money came as grants to the patriarchs and the clergy, Metropolitans and even Archimandrites and there is no evidence that the Committee directly funded the establishment of schools or welfare institutions in the syria and palestine, in the manner in which the imperial orthodox society did. furthermore, there is no evidence that any money from those earmarked for the advancement of Greek education was channelled to syria and palestine.18 it seems, however, that the Committee and the Greek prelates used some of these funds to meet the educational or welfare needs of the faithful.19 one of the main objectives of the funds remained to stir mem-bers of the synods and influential priests away from the Russian influence.20 “fight with silver spears and they shall prevail in all things” as the Greek Consul in Jerusalem wrote to the Committee in order to secure financial sup-port against Russian influence.21

p. karolides, Peri tis ethnikis katagogis ton Orthodokson Christianon tis Syrias kai tis Palaistinis, (Athens-Jerusalem 1908).

12 April 13, 1900, Jerusalem to Athens, 1052/eeeep/k/66.2/1/1900, AYe13 Tables of the Committee’s budget 1882-1886, sD, 30.2 (42), AsCs.14 Table of the Committee’s budget, 1886-1887, sD 30.2 (31). AsCs.15 G. B. Dertlis, Istoria tou elllinikou kratous, 1830-1920, vol. ii, 3rd edition, (Athens: estia,

2005), 540-543. 16 The budget of the Committee for the year 1896 was set by the secret enactment no.8 of the

Cabinet in June 5, 1896 and it allowed for a total amount of 449,270 drachmas, eeeep/sT/AYe.17 Budgets of the Committee, 1891-1892, 1892-1893, sD, 30.2 (12), (22), AsCs. 18 Table of the Committee’s expenditures 1890-1891, sD, 30.2 (18), AsCs. 19 february 21, 1900, Beirut to eeeep, 2683/eeeep/k/66.2/2/1900, AYe. 20 february 6, 1900, eeeep to Jerusalem, 2394/eeeep/k/66.2/2/1900, AYe.21 november 19 1900, Jerusalem to Athens, 3099/k/66.2/2/1900, AYe. The phrase is a reply

of the pythian oracle to philip of Macedon.

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The 19th century was a period of intense globalisation and regional trans-formation in the Middle east. A wave of european investment and trade overwhelmed the declining ottoman empire and integrated the eastern Med-iterranean into the wider nexus of european political, economic and cultural expansion. non-Muslim communities, i.e. the Christians and the Jews, became the indispensable agents of this integration with their fluency in foreign lan-guages, their cultural and religious proximity to europe and their status as protected subjects of the Western powers. According to Adrian e. Tschoegl, “a listing of bankers and bank managers in Constantinople in 1912 shows that 30% were Greeks, 30% Armenians, 20% Jews and 20% other and unidentified; none were Turks.”.22

further integration of the region into the european political and economic systems led to serious fragmentation regarding religious and social loyalties and communities. in the Balkans, nationalism was at its height; breaking up the european part of the ottoman empire, creating nation-states and severing old trade, social and spiritual connections and allegiances. nation-states tended to subordinate Church institutions under their strict political control and, even more importantly, to transform the orthodoxy into a constitutive part of their nationalism, be it Greek, serbian or Bulgarian. As a result, the Greek orthodox Churches in the Balkans distanced themselves from the ecumenical patriar-chate not only through the separate institutional framework, but also through a new national ideology. in the case of the Church in Greece, the ideological notion of helleno-christianity (that is, an amalgam of Ancient Greece and Geek orthodoxy), could not be accommodated by the ecumenical patriarchate.23

The ottoman reforms and the Balkan nationalism of the nineteenth century eroded the authority of the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople as head of the Greek orthodox millet, and destabilised his leading position among the Greek orthodox patriarchates in the near east. Moreover, the changes in the ottoman state apparatus deprived the phanariotes, the Greek bureaucrats in the ottoman porte, who constituted the mainstay of the ecumenical patriar-chate in the central ottoman government, from their influence on the porte’s decisions.24

increasing British influence at the porte in the beginning of the nineteenth century, led to the growth of British presence in palestine. The protestant and

22 Adrian e. Tschoeg, “financial integration, Dis-integration and emerging Re-integration in the eastern Mediterranean, c.1850 to the present”, Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 13:5, December 2004, 252.

23 n. Chrysoloras, “orthodoxy and Greek national identity An analysis of Greek nationalism in light of A. D. smith’s Theoretical framework”, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GsW7/GsW%206/nikos%20Chrysoloras%20paper.pdf. (accessed 26.4.2011).

24 s. Roussos, “Τhe emergence of Arab nationalism and Greek orthodox Church networks in the near east 1899-1947”, in M. Rozen, (ed.), Homelands and Diasporas: Greeks, Jews and their Migrations, (London: i. B. Tauris, 2008), 291.

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Anglican missions initially focused their interest on the Jewish inhabitants of palestine. The establishment of an Anglican Bishopric in palestine aimed at building close relations with the orthodox Churches strengthening them against Catholic encroachment.

however, when the protestant mission shifted target from the Jews to members of the Arab orthodox community, the patriarchate responded with hostility. The missionary work posed a threat to the patriarchate, and thus led to the growth of Greek orthodox militancy and to the revival of the orthodox Church supported by the Russians. pressure by the heads of the Anglican Church stopped missionary work at the expense of the orthodox Church and in 1887, an agreement was achieved between the two Churches. The patriarch of Jerusalem welcomed an Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem in return for permis-sion for a Greek Bishop to reside in London, unspecified political advantages and an alliance against the Catholics.25 The Jerusalem patriarchate’s envoy (exarchos) in Athens sent a lengthy report to the Greek prime Minister in 1897, Charilaos Trikoupis, through the channels of the Committee, exposing the patriarchate’s grave concern over the foreign, Catholic, french, encroachment. however, the gravest danger for Jerusalem was Russian influence.26

The fear of the Greek orthodox Churches before Rome’s power strength-ened their national Greek consciousness. in the nineteenth century, the Catholic Church’s presence became increasingly felt through the growing Western influ-ence and modernisation of the ottoman state. The Latin patriarchate was rein-stated in palestine in 1847 and Catholic activity also included philanthropic and social projects, providing the Arab Catholics with a variety of social services. The re-emergence of the Roman Catholic Church also led to the re-organisation and strengthening of the Greek Catholic Church, which was considered a great pain for the orthodox patriarchate.27

Moreover, in 1847, a Russian ecclesiastical mission was established in pales-tine in the context of the antagonism between the Great powers for the protec-tion of the holy places and the pilgrims. Russian influence continued to affect the patriarchate and reached its peak with the establishment of the imperial orthodox palestine society in 1882.28 The founding members of the society included Russian scholars who supported the society as a purely educational

25 J. hajjar, L’Europe et les destinées du Proche-Orient (1815-1848), (Brussels: Bloud & Gay, 1970), 33-62.

26 December 1879, “Report on the holy sepulchre affairs by the exarchos of the patriarchate of Jerusalem in Athens”, sD, 39.1, 1879, AsCs.

27 A. o’Mahony, “Church, state and the Christian Communities and the holy places in palestine”, in M. prior and W. Taylor (eds.), Christians in the Holy Land, (London: World of islam festival Trust, 1994), pp 16-19.

28 k. Anderson, “pilgrims, property and politics: The Russian orthodox Church in Jerusalem”, in A. o’Mahony (ed.), Eastern Christianity: Studies in Modern History, Religion and Politics, (London: Melisende 2004), 390-401.

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institution, others who considered it a means to improve the life of the fellow orthodox in the Levant, and a small group of panslavists who saw it as an instrument of panslavist aims in the near east.

The Greeks in both Greece and palestine believed that Russian involve-ment and in particular the society, aimed to do what the slavonic Benevolent society in Levant had been doing in the Balkans since 1858. That is, to assist native orthodox Christians to develop their own religious, educational and other national institutions at the expense of the influence of the ecumenical patriarchate.

in 1883, Jerusalem’s exarchos in Athens wrote to the Greek premier Charilaos Trikoupis, that the Russian panslavist encroachment failed to expand its influence on the Mount Athos monastic community and, most importantly, to subordinate the ecumenical patriarchate through the Bulgarian schism. hence the Russians focused their efforts on the patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem. he pointed out the economic resources employed by the Russian missions in order to recruit orthodox priests and laymen and also the policy of depriving the patriarchate of Jerusalem of its revenues from property in Russia and Bessarabia. The exarchos argued that the only way to thwart Russian intrusion was financial assistance to the patriarchates by the Committee.29 The same view is reflected, in 1899, in a memorandum of Metropolitan of Agchialos, vasilios, an ex-member of the ecu-menical patriarchate’s synod, who reiterated the argument of a concerted effort by the Russians to expand their influence on Macedonia, Mount Athos and all four Greek orthodox patriarchates of the east.30

Both the Committee and these prelates had developed a certain theory about the affairs of the patriarchates and the Greek orthodox communities. As revealed in the reports and memoranda they exchanged with the Committee, their main argument was a “theory of dominoes”. Any development in any single ortho-dox patriarchate would influence the position of the rest of the patriarchates in the Middle east. The interconnection of the ecclesiastics group with the Com-mittee influenced the ideological basis of both groups. They formed a certain network to monitor and intervene in the affairs of the patriarchate. Their com-mon ground was found in their unquestioning irredentist ideology, the struggle against “slavonic domination”, be it Russian or Bulgarian, and their suspicion about the Catholic Church interests in the Levant. The unity and co-ordination among the four patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jeru-salem was indispensable for them in preserving the Greek character of the Churches in the near east and particularly in the holy shrines in palestine. They all agreed that unity and close co-operation between the four patriarchates was the only way for preserving Greek influence over them.

29 March 28, 1883, exarchos to Trikoupis, sD, 39.1 (2), AsCs.30 March 8, 1899, Metropolitan vasilios to Dragoumis, sD, 39.2 (83), AsCs.

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These shared views led to certain policy recommendations: financial assis-tance for the patriarchs in order to preserve the loyalty of the members of their synod and of influential Arab priests. if a patriarch or a prelate was suspected of pro-Russian stance, he was cut off from any Committee’s assistance. At first, the Committee supported those members of the synod who were against him. A second bolder step was the co-ordination between the rest of the patriar-chates to force him into abdication. This was the case of patriarch of Jerusalem, nikodemos. A superior of the Jerusalem metochion in Moscow, he was elected patriarch in 1882. Although he was Greek, he co-operated with the Russians and thus he gained their support. The Confraternity accused him of assisting Russian influence and its vehicle in palestine, the imperial orthodox palestine society, at the expense of the Greek nation. he eventually abdicated in 1890.31

however, it seems that the methods of the Committee and its network were not entirely effective. The Greek Ambassador in st. petersburg, n. Maurok-ordatos32, doubted that it was the steps taken by the Committee and the patri-archates that led to nikodemos’ abdication. he made the point that it was the disaffection of the ottoman authorities who, on the one hand, had not received the expected bribe “bacshis” and, on the other, ottoman suspicion against Rus-sian influence in the Levant.33 The Geek government was always careful not to strain their relations with Russia for the sake of the patriarchates. The Greek foreign Ministry had made clear to its Russian interlocutors that Greece had no national aspiration or political objectives in the Levant and that its interest had solely to do with the spiritual connection between the Greek nation and the Greek orthodox tradition.

however, after its initial strong reaction, the Committee and its ecclesiastic network developed a rather flexible approach in order to court the Arab hier-archy in Damascus. According to a “strategy-paper” from the patriarchate of Alexandria, dogmatic unity and church co-ordination between the four ortho-dox patriarchates should be the primary aim of this new approach. The use of other languages, i.e. Arabic, in the Church should be allowed along with the use of the Greek language.34 it is evident that they considered the most danger-ous enemy to be not the Arab demands and the emerging Arab nationalism but first and foremost the Russian, or “slavonic”, as they called it, political and ecclesiastic influence.35

31 January 27, 1885, Dragoumis to Cairo, sD 39.1 (14), AsCs. Also Tables of the Commit-tee’s budget 1882-1886, sD, 30.2 (42), AsCs and (no date) Maurokordatos (st. petersburg) to Trikoupis, sD, 39.1 (49), AsCs.

32 nikolaos Maurokordatos was also a member of the ultra-nationalist, irredentist national society (Ethniki Etaireia).

33 August 20, 1890, Maurokordatos to Dragounis, sD, 39.1 (60), AsCs.34 July 8 1908, Jerusalem to Athens, Draft proposal of the patriarchate of Alexandria on the

affairs of the patriarchate of Antioch, 3338/15.1/eeeep/A29/3/1908, AYe35 november 24 1908, Beirut to Athens, 7748/eeeep/15.1/1908, AYe

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There is no evidence of any doubts or self-criticism as to the pursued policy of preserving the Greek character of the patriarchate. There were no alternative lines of thought about reforming Church management, developing relations with the Arab orthodox faithful or meeting its educational and welfare needs. The Committee and its network resembled what has been described as group-think.36 Groupthink occurs when “decision makers began to believe that the group could not fail...Group members discounted warnings concerning the pre-ferred solution and refused to question either the inherent righteousness of the group or the inherent immorality of the enemy. Group members self-censored personal doubts, fostering an illusion of unanimity. On those rare occasions when someone did express a deviant opinion, the group quickly silenced the critic and re-solidified the consensus. Finally, self-appointed mind guards shielded the group from external sources of dissonant information.”37

it is more than certain that the Committee and its network met most of these criteria. The mission of the Committee to promote and foster Greek national and religious identity in all the Greek speaking people of the ottoman empire, propagate Greek language, facilitate Greek education and safeguard the Greek character of the Greek orthodox patriarchates and Churches in the ottoman empire, no doubt cemented its inherent righteousness. furthermore, the connec-tion of this mission with the noblest of causes of redeeming Greeks still under ottoman rule, encouraged optimism. The total control of the Committee over Greek diplomatic missions in the Balkans and the near east discouraged the expression of any different opinion.38 Last but not least, the challenge posed by the panslavists, Bulgarians or Russian, to the Greek character of the orthodox Church was, in their views, founded on unjust and hence, immoral grounds.

What made its inherent morality even stronger was the group’s identifica-tion with the dominant national ideology of helleno-christianity. According to p. kondylis, the movement of the Greek enlightenment of the early 19th century, which politically and ideologically dominated the Greek War of independence, was centred around images of ancient Greek heroes, institutions, and heritage. for this movement, ancient Greece signified the triumph of reason and democ-racy and new-born Greece should emulate modern european patterns of state-building. however, the main groups and social strata of the new Greek state, were rather unfamiliar to that heritage, on the one hand, and unwilling to abandon

36 first introduced by i. L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascos, (Boston: houghton Mifflin, 1982)

37 ph. e. Tetlock, R. s. peterson, Ch. McGuire, shi-jie Chang, and p. feld, “Assessing polit-ical Group Dynamics: A Test of the Groupthink Model”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1992, 63:3, 403.

38 The Consul General in Jerusalem was replaced after the complains of the patriarchate of Jerusalem to the Committee of difficulties to co-operate with him. March 30, 1894, Archiman-drite Germanos (patriarchal Commissioner in istanbul) to stephanou, (Ds), 4.3, 168, eLiA.

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pre-modern, paternalistic patterns of social and political power and organisa-tion, on the other. Thus, the Greek national ideology incorporated pre-modern patterns, the Greek orthodox Church in particular, into a larger narrative that connected the ancient Greek heritage to the history of Byzantium and the cap-tivity of the nation under the ottomans.39

Another pattern of groupthink suggested that “...an illusion of invulnerabil-ity and an illusion of morality are consistent with and indeed should be expected given high collective efficacy. A group high in collective efficacy will naturally believe in the reasonableness and righteousness of its decisions. Further, rationalization in the face of negative feedback and the stereotyping of opposing groups, if any, would come naturally to groups suffering from a surfeit of col-lective efficacy. Such behaviours would also serve to protect and maintain collective efficacy in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary”.40

Collective efficacy was very high as the members of the Committee and its network represented the most influential elements of the Greek political and intellectual life. personalities such as stephanos Dragoumis, spyridon Lampros, Dionysios stephanou, n. Maurokordatos were not only prominent members of consecutive Greek governments, but also leading members of societies, asso-ciations and clandestine organisations that shaped the identity of the Greek state in the second half of the nineteenth century. Their failure to safeguard the Greek character of the patriarchate in syria was a minor event compared to the crush-ing military defeat of Greece in the Greco-Turkish war of 1897, which was provoked to a certain extent by more or less the same group.

The “loss” of Antioch was seen as merely a defeat of the Greek-ottoman elite of the patriarchate of Constantinople, which unveiled its weakness and thus prompted the Committee to undertake the co-ordination of the “battle” to bring the Church of Antioch back under Greek influence. This was done through financial support of those Bishops who were in favour of the Greek prevalence in the patriarchate of Antioch and Jerusalem.41 Any alternative policies of build-ing spiritual and intellectual bonds with the Arab prelates or promoting Arab orthodox community’s welfare were never considered seriously.

in 1910, stephanos Dragoumis, now the prime Minister, proposed the trans-formation of the Committee for the support of the Greek Church and education into a Benevolent Committee (Epitropi Evagon Skopon). in his new proposal, the Committee took another character, that of an intelligence service. his draft regulation provided that the Benevolent Committee was to undertake all mis-sions of the Committee for the support of the Greek Church and education.

39 p. kondylis, Oi aities tis parakmis tis sygxronis Elladas, (Athens: Themelio, 2011), 46-47.40 G. Whyte, “Recasting Janis’s Groupthink Model: The key Role of Collective efficacy in

Decision fiascoes”, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, february/March 1998, 73:2/3, 197.

41 october 14 1900, Beirut to Athens, 2683/eeeep/k/66.2/2/1900, AYe.

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it was, however, to include, for the first time, military officers. indeed, ten members of the new Committee were to be military officers, nine foreign Min-istry civil servants and one priest. The struggle in Macedonia and Thrace has been transformed into intense guerrilla warfare, and the protection of the Greek population ought to be militarised.42 king George i was very reluctant to sign the Royal Decree for the transformation into a militarised Benevolent Commit-tee. he maintained that such a move could have been the spark for a war in the near east as the matter could not be kept secret. he insisted that the Great powers would react negatively to this move, and that Greece was by no means militarily ready for such a war.43 he, thus, asked for the exclusion of military officers from the Benevolent Committee. The king’s reservations seemed to have been overcome as the new Committee, with military officers in its mem-bers, was active in 1911.44

in conclusion, the Committee for the support of the Greek Church and edu-cation had, in the near east, a single defensive mission: to defend the Greek character of the orthodox patriarchates from what they saw as foreign, particu-larly, Russian encroachment. The Committee’s membership and its network were a powerful group of people that shared the common belief that the destiny of the Greek nation-state was to redeem the Greeks from the ottoman yoke. in the case of the patriarchates, their common ground was found in their unquestioning irredentist ideology, the struggle against “slavonic domination”, be it Russian or Bulgarian, and their suspicion of the Catholic Church’s inter-ests in the Levant. The unity and co-ordination among the four patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem was indispensable for them in preserving the Greek character of the Churches in the near east and particu-larly in the holy shrines in palestine.

The Committee’s influential network replaced the old basis of Greek hegemony over the Greek orthodox Churches in the Levant, i.e. the ecumeni-cal patriarch and the old class of ottoman Greek officials, the Phanariotes. The Committee was dissolved in 1910 to be transformed, as we have seen, into purely an intelligence agency. But its ecclesiastic network continued to function as an informal decision making group after the Committee’s dissolu-tion, influencing the Greek policy concerning the Greek orthodox patriarchates in the near east for another thirty years, almost until the outbreak of the second World War.

42 June 21 1910, Dragoumis to king George, sD 30.1 (5), AsCs.43 June 21 1910, king George to Dragoumis, sD 30.1 (4), AsCs44 August 23, 1911, Gryparis to Cabinet, private papers of eleutherios venizelos (1891-1935).

0173/0005/0045, Benaki Museum.

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