10 COUNTRIES THAT WERE NEVER BEENCOLONIZED

1. LiberiaLiberia officially became a countryin 1847, but before that, severalcountries had set up trading poststhroughout the region, includingEngland, Portugal, and theNetherlands. Some claim the U.S.had set up colonial rule in Liberiafor a period. The Cape MesuradoColony on the Grain Coast wasestablished in 1821 as a place tosend former slaves from the U.S.,but the short time-frame and lackof over-reaching American influenceallows Liberia to qualify for thislist2: JapanJapan was one of the only Asiancountries to escape Westerncolonization, becoming a colonizingpower itself in the region. As thecountry fought against foreigninfluence and intrusion, only theDutch and Chinese managed to set uptrading ports in Japan, despite theefforts of other nations. Japan,for its part, set up spheres ofinfluence in the surroundingislands, as well as in Korea,Taiwan, and South Sakhalin.3: ThailandThailand is well aware of itsunique heritage that does not

include a colonial legacy, andoften uses the phrase “land of thefreedom” to express pride in thefact that it has remained Thai-dominated since the first millenniaB.C. Despite immense pressure fromEuropean powers, Thailand escapedcolonial rule by maintaining strongrulers and exploiting the tensionbetween colonizing powers – namelyFrance and Great Britain – whichhad spheres of influence acrossneighboring countries in Asia4: BhutanBhutan is one of the few countriesthat has indisputably maintainedcomplete sovereignty throughouthistory, even before its officialconsolidation as a nation state in1616. Though it did have to fightseveral wars against the Britishduring the 18th and 19th centuries,subsequently losing bits of itsterritory and political influenceoutside of its borders, Bhutanremained entirely autonomousthroughout the colonial period5: IranIran suffered during the 1800s asthe Russians and British fought tobuild their empires in the MiddleEast, but was never subjugated tocolonization in any official sense.The country did lose some of itsterritory during the Russo-Persianand Anglo-Persian Wars, and was

briefly occupied by the Russians in1911 and the British during WorldWar I, but was still considered anautonomous state throughout history6:NepalSince Nepal was united by KingPrithvi Narayan Shah in 1744 C.E.,it has existed as a sovereignnation. While it was briefly aprotectorate of Great Britain, itwas never a British colony, evenfighting a war and ceding a thirdof its territory to ensure itscontinued autonomy from the empire.It is thought that Nepal’s isolatedgeographical position high in theHimalayas helped it withstandcolonial rule, though it is agreedthat both India and China exertedsome influence in the region.7: TongaIn 1900, Tonga became a protectedstate under the Treaty ofFriendship with Britain, setting upa British Consul in the state until1970, but no higher permanentrepresentative was permitted. Theindigenous monarchy of Tonga hasbeen maintained until the presentday, and has enjoyed anuninterrupted succession ofhereditary rulers from the samefamily since its inception.8: ChinaChina, not including Hong Kong and

Macao, has never been an officialcolony of any other power. However,during the 19th and early 20thcenturies, China did enter intotrade agreements with most Westernpowers, including Great Britain,France, Germany, Russia, Japan, andthe U.S., that were largelyconsidered disadvantageous toChina, as it was forced to makesome territorial concessions. Thisperiod of unequal treaties issometimes considered semi-colonialist, though no one powerever exerted complete controlacross the coutry.9: EthiopiaApart from a five-year period whenEthiopia fell to Mussolini’s NewRoman Empire, Ethiopia hasmaintained its autonomy throughouthistory. The Italians were ejectedby the British in 1941, andEthiopia regained its fullindependent status in 1944, but hadexisted independently way beforethen. Even during the Italianoccupation from 1936 to 1941,Mussolini’s troops were underconstant attack from Ethiopianguerrilla troops and Italy nevermaintained full order in thecountry.10: KoreaBack when Korea existed as onenation state, it resisted colonial

rule from Western powers. It issomewhat difficult to considerKorea wholly independent throughouthistory, however, as it was underJapanese rule for more than 30years until independence in 1945during World War II. But in thelens of resisting Westerncolonization, Korea is said to havemaintained its independence fromEuropean rule throughout history

sourceafkinsider.com/62750/countries-that-were-never-colonized/#

COLONIALISM: STRUCTURES,ADMINISTRATION AND LEGACIES IN

NIGERIA

                                          Forceful subjugation

TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF COLONIALISMColonialism as a concept hasenjoyed wide patronage fromscholars, commentators and thoughtleaders in old and recent times. Infact, in the delineation of whatmany designate as the “NigerianProblem”, many writers believe

colonialism to be the root cause.Therefore it is hard to distancethe discourse of the concept fromany meaningful quest to finding thetruth about Nigeria.

In defining colonialism, it must benoted that there are no particulargenerally accepted definition.Authors of diversified philsophicaland political allegiance havemanaged to furnish wide-rangingsketch of their understanding ofthe subject. Some distortions borneout of loyalty to racial biaseshave also contributed to theobfuscation of the basic principlesof colonialism.

Colonialism can be defined as asituation where a particularcountry by means of superiormilitary strength or manipulationconquers and establishes political,social and economic authority overanother country for the benefit ofthe former. It may involve themovement of people to the newly‘acquired’ territory where they mayreside as permanent settlers butstill maintain allegiance to themother country. It involves thewanton exploitation andprofiteering by the invadingcountry on subjected territories.

One challenge one may encounter isthe interchangeable use of

colonialism and imperialism whichoften – erroneously, suggest bothpossess the same meaning. However,no matter the similarities thatexist between both, there is aclear demarcation. Imperialismrefers to political or economiccontrol, either formally orinformally and colonialism is whereone nation assumes control over theother. In simple words, imperialismis the idea driving the practice ofcolonialism.

PATH TO COLONIAL NIGERIAColonialism in Nigeria did notbegin on 1 January 1914 when theamalgamation took place. The roadto colonialism has been traced bysome scholars to the period whenGreat Britain abolished slavetrade, in 1807. Through the use ofbogus Treaties that the nativerulers often did not comprehend andmanipulative forceful arrangements,the British increased theirpolitical encroachment in Nigeria.It was not until 1885, under thethreat of competition from Franceand Germany did the Britishaccelerate efforts to fully occupythe Niger area. Already it had madeinroads with the accreditation ofJohn Beecroft as the consul to theBights of Benin and Biafra in 1849and the formal declaration of Lagosas a Crown Colony in 1861.

The colonial wheel was greatlyaided by the trade activities andpolitical meddling of the RoyalNiger Company led by Goldie andwith its Headquarters at Lokoja. Itis on record that the companyincorporated by British nationalswith huge tax returns to London,entered into treaty agreements withstates in the north such as thefamous Sokoto Caliphate, Nupe andGwandu.

European missionaries also playedmajor roles in the entrenchment ofcolonialism in Nigeria. Some of themissionaries, who found their wayinto the hinterland areas such asthe delta and coastal towns, helpedthe British authorities toestablish missions and trade postswhich they later annexed. Themissionaries also initiated theprocess of acculturation bypromoting education, health andwelfare systems among the localcommunities. Thus it was relativelyeasy to convince some of thenatives to abandon their ‘inferior’cultures and value systems andadopt the ‘superior’ westernvalues.

The last decades of the 19thcentury witnessed theintensification of Colonial effortsin Nigeria. With the conclusion of

the Berlin Conference in 1884 wherethe last vestiges of independentAfrican states were unyoked by avoltron of empire-mongeringEuropean powers, the Britishdeclared the formation of OilRivers Protectorate. The Oil RiversProtectorate consisted of the NigerDelta region and Calabar where theConsulate General resided. Theterritory was renamed Niger CoastProtectorate in 1894 with theinclusion of the region “fromCalabar to Lagos Colony andProtectorate, including thehinterland, and northward up theNiger River as far as Lokoja, theheadquarters of the Royal NigerCompany” according to Wikipediasource.

Diplomacy and military might werethe ultimate tools used insubjecting the states undercolonial authority. Military forcewas employed anytime diplomacyfailed. The destruction and lootingof the towns of Nembe (1895) andBenin (1897) and others attested tothe military superiority of theinvaders- the British. By 1900 theinvaders had annexed majority ofthe territories in the southernregion of Nigeria. The Northernregion which was held by the RoyalNiger Company was brought under theBritish authority in 1900 as theNorthern Protectorate after the

termination of the Charter of thecompany.

THE COLONIAL STRUCTURE: INDIRECTRULE

Sir Fredrick Lugard is accreditedto have set in motion the Britishcolonial administrative structure.This was achieved with theintroduction of Indirect Rulesystem first in the north. Lugardwas appointed High Commissioner ofthe Dutch Geria with the mandate toconquer the remaining territoriesin the north that were not yetunder the colonial officeparticularly the emirs of theSokoto Caliphate. With the help ofthe Royal West Africa FrontierForce (RWAFF) formed in 1897,Lugard was able to launchsuccessful military expeditions onKano and Sokoto. In the resultantbattle in 1903, the Emir of SokotoAlhaji Attahiru fled while thecentury-long empire was brought toa close.

In subduing the states in thenorth, Lugard introduced theIndirect Rule system. Indirect ruleespoused the utility of alreadyexisting traditional nativeauthority in the administration ofthe local people for the benefit ofthe colonial masters. Lord MalcolmHailey who wrote NativeAdministration and Political

Development in British TropicalAfrica (1943) explained:

It is of great importance thatadministrative officers should intheir personal contact with nativeauthorities have regard to thetraditional position occupied bythe council or elders. It is nodoubt a temptation, especially inmatters involving some urgency, tofollow the easy course of dealingwith the chief alone. But apartfrom the offense which this maycause to native custom, it is notpossible to secure a true view ofnative opinion on any proposedmeasure unless the council or theelders are brought freely intoconsultation. There is moreover therisk that the native (authority)may seek to avoid taking its propershare of responsibility on theground that it is "working undergovernment orders."

The colonial machinery alsoconsidered the structure of thenative authority councils whichaccording Lord Malcolm was repletewith chiefs unable to maintaindialogue in English language. Thusit was seen as wise to allow thenative rulers to continueoverseeing the affairs of thesubjects. However authorities alsoensured that the traditional rulerswere very loyal with the use of

blackmail and veiled threats. Thefact that a greater number of theyoung people in the communitieswere acquiring were not entertainedas ground enough to delegateauthority of the colonialterritories to them. During thisperiod, age and family lineage wereimportant measurements to choosingnative leaders, hence it wasconsidered disrespect and counter-productive to by-pass the elders inthe communities and conferleadership on the younger people.Thus, despite their education andability to communicate with theBritish authorities, maintainingthe cohesion that already existedin most of the territories wasconsidered paramount. On anotherconsideration, the British officerssuspected the allegiance of theeducated elite. In the long runhowever, the resolution notintegrate the emerging educatedelite who were much younger proveda costly decision for the British.

Indirect rule was also seen as aneffective cost-reduction strategy.To manage directly a territory asthe British had amassed within theNiger area, required huge humanresources the likes of which wasnot readily available for theauthorities. The option toencourage British nationals fromthe mother country to migrate to

the colonial territories was notpaying desired dividends due torumours of deadly diseases likemalaria and sleeping sicknesscaused by Mosquitoes and Tsetseflies respectively which waskilling white people. Africa wasdesignated as “the grave of thewhite man”. Besides the cost ofshipping and relocating the needednumber of personnel would have alsoposed a huge challenge to acolonial establishment that waspoorly funded by the ColonialOffice in London. Indirect ruletherefore was the cheaperalternative.

Indirect rule in a way aided theannexation of more territories inthe hinterland that were not yetunder the foreign authorities. Thetraditional rulers felt encouragedby the colonial support theyenjoyed to embark on missions toexpand their authorities tounconquered regions. Theimplication of these wars ofconquests was additional economicbenefits for the British overlords.

The acclaimed success of theindirect rule in the NorthernProtectorate led to itsintroduction in the entire region.In 1906 the Southern Protectoratewas merged with the Lagos Colonyand Protectorate into the Southern

Protectorate. By 1914 the processof amalgamation was completed whenthe Northern Protectorate andSouthern Protectorate, becameNigeria. Indirect rule became thecardinal principle to governing thecountry British officers wereadvised to meddle as little aspossible while the traditionalrulers exercised almost autonomouspowers.

Sir Fredrick Lugard appointed in1912 became the first Governor-General and presided over the newterritory. At unification, a looseregional administration, thenorthern, western and southernregions existed. Each was under theLieutenant Governor and providedindependent government services. Inthe northern region the colonialadministration chose not tointerfere- almost completely, inthe affairs and cultural valuesthat was heavily influenced ofIslam. Christian missionaries werebarred from travelling to thenorth.

The missionaries however continuedtheir religious and culturalacculturation in the southern andwestern regions. In some places inthe south the missionaries evenfacilitated the removal of atraditional ruler that was provingdifficult to imbibe the western

values they were proselytizingthrough religion and education. Insome states in the Yorubaland, theyaccommodated the side-by-sideexistence of Christianity andtraditional values for the sake ofharmony in the society. Forinstance the Oni of Ife was seen asa progressive chief for sponsoringYoruba political movement.

In the eastern region the Britishencountered a challenge with thesystem of administration. Therewere no traditional stools in theilk of what the northern andsouthern regions already had. Tosolve the problem, the Britishunilaterally appointed WarrantChiefs to function in the place oftraditional rulers. It was adecision they later regretted andrescinded but not until wideprotest had erupted in the region.One of the protests is now known asAba Women riot of 1929. Ultimatelythe application of the indirectrule system in this region wasperceived as a colossal failure.

COLONIAL LEGACIES

The subjugation of the local peopleby a foreign power was the firstlegacy. By subjugating theterritories by force of militarystrength and state engineeredmanipulation, many Nigeriansocieties were uprooted. Itaffected the psychology of theconquered people, in that theybegan to view themselves asinferior to the invaders.Colonialism completed the processof master-slave mentality alreadystarted and interrupted by theTrans-Atlantic Slave trade.

Second, colonialism witnessed theconscious effort to demean thevalues of the local communities byclassifying it as antiquated,primitive and pagan. The Westernvalues and cultures brought andspread by the Christianmissionaries were touted as thebest alternative. Thus, manyNigerian societies were compelledto abandon their traditionalpractices and embrace the Western

culture and religion. Thissituation persists till today.

The isolationist policies pursuedin the administration of thenorthern territories has beenwidely blamed for the disunity andmilitated against efforts atattaining nationhood in Nigeria. Itwill be recalled that the Britishauthorities preferred to maintainthe status quo in the north withthe erroneous belief that itbenefited the indirect rule system.The result was that the northernregion lagged behind in terms ofdevelopment and education. From1951 to 1958 the British sought tomitigate the damage by allocatinghalf of the federal legislativeseat to the region. The move onlyexacerbated the hatred andsuspicion among the ethnic groups.

Perhaps the greatest legacy ofcolonialism was the fusion andbirth of the entity designatedNigeria in 1914. Many scholars havecategorically denounced thearrangement as a “huge mistake”.Others decried it for the wayNigerians were treated in decidingwhether they wanted to be togetheror separate. Nigerians, it isbelieved were not consulted beforethe final decision was made.Nevertheless, others say that aunion of the regions was inevitable

or that the British only confirmedwhat was already in existence.

Finally, colonialism wasinstrumental to the laying of thefoundation of federalism whichNigeria practices today. It alsofurnished the country with itsfirst written constitution whichhas been re-written and modified asmany times as was possible.Colonialism also provided someinfrastructures such as the firstrailway line in Abeokuta and seaport in Port Harcourt. There wereroads that linked the hinterland tothe coastal areas that were builtby the system. Schools, hospitalsand churches were also started. Italso gave Lagos and towns likeCalabar and Port Harcourt the looksof modern global cities withvarious architectural master-pieces, although these at firstwere exclusive for the colonialauthorities, but the people tookpossession of them at independence.

In summary, the deepest legacy ofcolonialism is found in the psycheof Nigerian people who has failedto see beyond the tainted side ofour chequered history and embracethe possibilities that lies withinus as a people. Any solution thatwe must embrace must come fromknowing that as inglorious as thepast may appear, the present and

future still possess empty scriptsthat only Nigerians must scribbleupon and direct. If we write ourpast story on the new scripts weare to be held responsible.Pre-colonial Government in IgboLand Unlike othe ethnic groups such asOyo Wђεrε there were proffessionalhistorians in the palaces, none ofsuch people existed in Igbo land asthere were no equivalents of Obaand Alaafin over most parts ofIgboland. To this end the realhistorical origin of the Igbos isclouded by the different accountsof people who have written it inline with what they think and seenas the origin. Although, there is apopular version which links theIgbo origin to Israel, because ofthe similarities between the Igboculture and the ancientHebrew.

Also according to oral traditionlike that of Nri, the ancestor ofthe Igbo, that Nri descended fromthe sky and sailed down the riverAnambra and arrived at Ageleu, meta group which had Йȍ living memoryof their own and settled with them,as their population grew, somegroups migrated to form settlementsall around Igbo land. There areother accounts as well, likeOnitsha who clings their origin tothe Bini kingdom.

Pre-colonial GovernanceThe Igbos are a segmentary andfragmentary people, because unlikeother ethnic groups in Nigeria,they did not build any strongcentralized state. They were simplyregarded as a Chiefless people. Thevillage was the centre ofgovernment were final decisionswere taken by Elders from everyfamily in a form of Gerontocracy.All lineage including Males andFemales adults in the village alsoparticipated in its politicalprocesss. The age grade and titledsocieties where themajor instrument of government.

Amala Oha is an institution ofgovernment as it is a form ofgeneral assembly. In this assembly,

all adult male memebers meet toperform legislative functions. Inancient times, Amala Oha meetingswere held in the village square.The decisions of the assembly inmatters affecting the village orindividual were final. The life ofevery individual in Igboland ishighly respected, and recognitionof an individual was not based onfamily background but on personalcapabilities and age. The eldersform the core of the villageadministration. The male populationis divided into age gradescorresponding with the youth,middle age or able bodied men andelders. Each age group has its ownspecial rights, duties,obligationand responsibilities within thevillage.

Colonial RuleNot until the imposition ofcolonial rule on Nigeria, when theBritish could not find a single Manof authority who they would use intheir indirect rule system. Theydecided to create "a man ofauthority" by appointing certainindividuals in the society askings. These appointees who weregiven government paper of authority"warrant" and made to preside overthe affairs of the community wereknown as "warrant chiefs". Thesewarrant chief are believed to have

metamorphosed some of the Eze's andObi's in present day Igboland.The next evidence for the continuedsearch for unity andrationalisation in theadministration of these territorieswas also the most important, thatis, the appointment of SirFrederick Lugard, the first HighCommissioner of the Protectorate ofNorthern Nigeria (1900-1906), asthe man to implement theamalgamation of the twoprotectorates. He, thus, became thefirst head of a unified Nigerianadministration.

This development impacted on thefuture Nigerian state in many ways.Firstly, the move was informed notby a desire or a quest on the partof the British to create a Nigeriannation-state. The concern was stillwith the old quest for efficiencyand rationality in colonialadministration. It was meant totackle the problem of the inabilityof the Northern Protectorate tobalance its budget at a time itssouthern neighbours had acomfortable sur- plus. It was alsomeant to settle/or side-track cer-tain areas of annovino conflictbetween the two administrations.

Secondly, the amalgamation was acolossal administrative hoodwink asit existed mainly on paper and in

Lugard's person, rather than in aninterlocking bureaucracy andpolitical system. Lugard refused tocreate a central secretariat, forthat would eat into his personalpower and bring the twoprotectorates together to an extenthe did not consider healthy for theNorthern Protectorate, which in hisview, needed protection from thebliz- zard of Westernisation whichwas sweeping through the South. Theresult was that, under him, acentral bureaucracy did not emerge.Also, he made sure there wasminimal contact between thetechnical departments in the northand the south, as well as betweenthem and the local administrationso close to his heart. The centralco-ordination of the work of thesedepartments rested with him.

Thirdly, Lugard wanted theamalgamation to take place at thelevel of the local government wherehis favourite Indirect Rule wasapplied. And by amalgamation at thelocal level, he meant anarrangement by which the practiceof local govern- ment and IndirectRule in the southern protectoratewas assimilated into what obtainedin the northern protectorate which,in his view, and in the view of hisdoting admirers, was the mostglorious achieve- ment of theSecond British Empire in the

manage- ment of the aflairs ofdependent and colonial peoples.

Fourthly, Lugard had no programmeof political amalgamation, that is,a system seeking to bring togetherthe forces of the future, the newclass of men produced by the impactof Western influence on Nigeriansociety and population.

Fifthly, this Lugardian approach toamalgama- tion converted Nigeriainto a battle field for two Britishtribal cohorts, the Southern andthe Northern cohorts, for theremaining period of Britishcolonial rule in Nigeria. While theNorth wanted to incorpo- rate theSouth on the basis of indirectrule, the South wanted toincorporate the North through theexpansion and extension of thepower of the mod- ern bureaucracy,Western education, Western com-merce and Western legal system andpractice. Thus, amalgamated Nigeriaremained a ram- shackle affairuntil 1960, the year ofindependence. Hitherto, it wasmerely an arrangement in whichfierce unwilling rams looking indifferent directions were shackledtogether. Howbeit, after Lugard'ssecond coming, Nigeria became, forgood or ill, and in law, anadministrative unit.

The Nigerian Civil War, Causes,Strategies, And Lessons LearntBy Major Abubakar A. Atofarati: CSC1992  Student: US Marine Command & StaffCollege (Academic Year 1991/92)

   

1. Outline.2. Introduction.3. Executive Summary.4. Background History ofNigeria.5. History of the Nigerian Armybefore 1966.6. The War - PlanningStrategies.7. The Clash of Arms.8. Lessons Learnt.9. Conclusion.10. Bibliography. OUTLINE

The Nigerian Civil War wasfought to reintegrate and reunifythe country. This paper will focuson the causes of the war,strategies employed by thebelligerents in the conflict, andthe lessons learnt.INTRODUCTION  The Federation of Nigeria, asit is known today, has never reallybeen one homogeneous country, forit's widely differing peoples andtribes. This obvious factnotwithstanding, the formercolonial master decided to keep the

country one in order to effectivelycontrol her vital resources fortheir economic interests. Thus,for administrative convenience theNorthern and Southern Nigeria wereamalgamated in 1914.   Thereafterthe only thing this people had incommon was the name of theircountry since each side haddifferent administrative set -up.This alone was an insufficientbasis for true unity. Under normalcircumstances the amagalmationought to have brought the variouspeoples together and provided afirm basis for the arduous task ofestablishing closer cultural,social, religious, and linguisticties vital for true unity among thepeople. There was division,hatred, unhealthy rivalry, andpronounced disparity indevelopment. The growth of nationalism inthe society and the subsequentemergence of political parties werebased on ethnic/tribal rather thannational interests, and thereforehad no unifying effect on thepeoples against the colonialmaster. Rather, it was the peoplethemselves who were the victims ofthe political struggles which weresupposed to be aimed at removingforeign domination. Atindependence Nigeria became aFederation and remained onecountry. Soon afterwards the

battle to consolidate the legacy ofpolitical and military dominance ofa section of Nigeria over the restof the Federation began withincreased intensity. It is thisstruggle that eventuallydegenerated into coup, counter coupand a bloody civil war.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  The Nigerian Civil War brokeout on 6 July 1967. The war wasthe culmination of an uneasy peaceand stability that had plagued theNation from independence in 1960.This situation had its genesis inthe geography, history, culture anddemography of Nigeria.   The immediate cause of thecivil war itself may be identifiedas the coup and the counter coup of1966 which altered the politicalequation and destroyed the fragiletrust existing among the majorethnic groups. As a means ofholding the country together in thelast result, the country wasdivided into twelve states from theoriginal four regions in May 1967.The former Eastern Region under Lt.Col. Ojukwu saw the act of thecreation of states by decree"without consultation" as the laststraw, and declared the Region anindependent state of "Biafra". TheFederal Government in Lagos sawthis as an act of secession andillegal. Several meetings were

held to resolve the issuepeacefully without success. Toavoid disintegration of thecountry, the central government wasleft with only one choice ofbringing back the Region to themain fold by force. The Federal side expected aquick victory while the Biafranssaw the war as that of survival andwere ready to fight to the lastman. By August 1967, the war hadbeen extended to the Mid - WesternRegion by the Biafrans with the aimto relief pressure on the northernfront and to threaten the FederalCapital, Lagos. Both sidesemployed Political, Diplomatic,Psychological and Militarystrategies to prosecute the war. By the end of April 1969,after almost two years of bloodyand destructive war, the envisionedquick victory had eluded theFederal side, the rebel enclave hadbeen drastically reduced in sizebut the Biafrans were still holdingon. More peace conferences wereheld but none achieved a cease -fire and an end to the war. TheFederals embarked on a strategicenvelopment of the remainingBiafran enclave. By the Christmasof 1969, it was obvious that theend of the civil war was near. The self - acclaimed Head ofState of Biafra, Lt. Col. Ojukwu,realizing the hopelessness of the

situation fled the enclave with hisimmediate family members on the10th of January 1970. TheCommander of the Biafran Army whotook over the administration of theremaining enclave surrendered tothe Federal Government on 14thJanuary 1970 bringing an end to thewar, secessionist attempt andbloodshed. Several lessons were learntfrom the war and these have helpedin the unification, political,military and economical progress ofthe country.

THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR CAUSES,STRATEGIES AND LESSONS LEARNT The Nigerian civil war,

popularly known all over the worldas the "Biafran War" was foughtfrom 2 July 1967 to 15 January1970. The war was between the thenEastern Region of Nigeria and therest of the country. The EasternRegion declared itself anindependent state which wasregarded as an act of secession bythe Federal Military Government ofNigeria. The war was fought toreunify the country. In order tounderstand what led to the civilwar, it is necessary to give abrief background history ofNigeria.  

BACKGROUND HISTORY OF NIGERIA The land mass known today asNigeria existed as a number of

independent and sometimes hostilenational states with linguistic andcultural differences until 1900.The Governor General of Nigeriabetween 1920 – 31, Sir HughClifford, described Nigeria as "acollection of independent NativeStates, separated from one anotherby great distances, by differencesof history and traditions and byethnological, racial, tribal,political, social and religiousbarriers." (Nigeria CouncilDebate. Lagos, 1920). Thebuilding of Nigeria as a multi -national state began in 1900 withthe creation of Northern andSouthern Protectorates along withthe colony of Lagos by the Britishgovernment. Further effort atunification and integration wasmade in May 1906 when the colony ofLagos and the Protectorate ofSouthern Nigeria, which had existedseparately, were amalgamated tobecome the Colony and Protectorateof Southern Nigeria. Even then the Northern andthe Southern Administration wereseparate and distinct. Both wereindependent of one another and eachwas directly responsible to theColonial Office. The firstmomentous act of the British in thepolitical evolution of Nigeria as amodern state was the amalgamationof the administration of the twosections of Nigeria on 1 January

1914 by Lord Lugard. For ease ofgoverning and in the economicinterest of the British, indirectrule and separate developmentpolicy were maintained in the twosections of the country, with theamalgamated administration based inLagos. This, in effect producedtwo Nigerias, each with differentsocial, political, economic, andcultural backgrounds anddevelopment within the country.   No further constitutionaldevelopment took place until 1922.The 1922 constitution madeprovision, for the first time, forelected members to sit on aNigerian legislative council, butdid not empower them to make lawsfor the North. Nigeria wasdivided into four administrativeunits in 1940; the colony ofLagos, the Northern, Eastern andWestern provinces. Thisadministrative divisions, withincreased power for the colony andthe provinces, was not onlymaintained but separateness wasalso strengthened and deepened bySir Arthur Richardson'sconstitution of 1946 whichinaugurated Nigeria's regionalism.It however achieved a half -hearted political breakthrough byintegrating the North with theSouth at the legislative level forthe first time.

The post second World Warpolitical awareness and upsurge ofnationalism in Africa brought aboutthe Richardson's constitution of1950. Political parties wereformed on regional and ethnicbasis.    The outcome of this wasobvious: full scale regionalism.With the Macpherson's constitutionof 1951, a greater measure ofautonomy was  granted the regionswith stronger regionallegislatures. With only residualpower left to the centralgovernment, Nigeria politicallytook a turn for the worse, andthere was a possibility of threecountries emerging out of Nigeria. In 1953, the central cabinetwas split over the acceptance of atarget date for securing self -government with the end result ofthe Kano riot. The gap between theregions widened. For the firsttime the North talked openly of thepossibility of secession ratherthan endure what they saw ashumiliation and ill - treatment.The West also threatened to secedeover the non - inclusion of Lagosin the West in the newconstitution. The 1954constitution confirmed andformalized the wishes of Nigerianleaders to move and remain as farapart as they possibly could. Thechoice between Unitary and Federaloptions in the form of government

had been irrevocably made. Theleaders settled for Federal option.Thereafter things happened fast inthe political arena. There wereconstitutional conferences in 1957,1958, 1959 and in 1960 culminatingin the granting of independence toNigeria on October 1, 1960. It should be noted that from1954 onwards, the politicaldirection  was constantly away froma strong center towards aformidable, almost insulation ofthe regional base of each majorpolitical party. The failure ofthe Willink commission to recommendthe creation of more states in 1958for the Nigerian type of federalismplanted the most potent seed ofinstability into the evolution ofNigeria as a nation in the 1950s.All the political leaders who hadstrong and firm political bases inthe regions fought hard for maximumpowers for the regions whichweakened the center. At the sametime, the ugly embers of tribalismand sectionalism had been fannedinto a deadly flame by all thepolitical leaders. These leadersrode on the crest of this canceroustribalism and ignorance of thepeople to power, at the expense ofnational unity and the nation. Instead of regionalismensuring and preserving nationalunity, it  became its bane. Therewere diffusion instead of fusion of

the three units. According to Gen.Obasanjo: "The only point on whichNigerian political leaders spokewith one voice was the granting bythe British of politicalindependence - and even then theydid not agree on the timing."(5:3) With granting ofindependence in 1960, all the dirt,swept under the carpet, surfaced.Nigeria was now beset by strings ofpolitical problems which stemmedfrom the lop-sided nature of thepolitical divisions of the countryand the type of the existingfederal constitution, and thespirit in which it operated. The first post independencedisturbance was over the defenseagreement between Great Britain andNigeria, which was seen as "anattempt (by Britain) to swindleNigeria out of her sovereignty", bycontracting with Nigeria to affordeach other such assistance as maybe necessary for mutual defense andto consult together on measures tobe taken jointly or separately toensure the fullest cooperationbetween them for this purpose. Itwas viewed an unequal treaty.Through student demonstrations andvehement opposition by the generalpublic and members of the FederalHouse of Representatives, theagreement was abrogated in December1962.

This episode was nothingcompared with later developments inthe country's turbulent politicalhistory. The general censusconducted in 1962 was alleged to beriddled with malpractices andinflation of figures of suchastronomical proportions that theEastern Region refused to acceptthe result. A second census wascarried out in 1963, and even thenthe figures were accepted with somereservations. Meanwhile the peopleof the Middle Belt area of theNorth had grown increasinglyintolerant of the NPC rule of theNorth. The Tiv, one of the majortribes in the Middle Belt, openlyrioted for almost three years (1962- 1965). Then came the biggestcrisis of them all - the generalelection of 1964. The electionwas alleged to be neither free norfair. All devices imaginable weresaid to have been used by theruling parties in the regions toeliminate opponents. The Chairman of theElectoral Commission himselfadmitted there were provenirregularities. The President, DrNnamdi Azikiwe refused to appoint aPrime Minister in the light ofthese allegations. The Presidentand the incumbent Prime Minister,Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, wereeach seeking the support of theArmed Forces. This marked the

first involvement of the ArmedForces in partisan politics. Forfour anxious days, the nationwaited until the Presidentannounced that he had appointed theincumbent Prime Minister, SirAbubakar Tafawa Balewa, to form abroad based government. The samecould not be said of the WesternRegion election of 1965. Therigging and irregularities in theelection were alleged to be morebrazen and more shameful. Law andorder broke down completely leadingto an almost complete state ofanarchy. Arson and indiscriminatekillings were committed by aprivate army of thugs of politicalparties. Law abiding citizenslived in constant fear of theirlives and properties.   This was the state ofaffairs when the coup of 15 January1966 took  place. "As animmediate cause, it might beclaimed that the explosion of thatday could be traced back along thepowder trail to the fuse lit at thetime of the Western Region electionof October 1965." (5:6) The aimof the coup was to establish astrong, unified and prosperousnation, free from corruption andinternal strife. The outcome ofthe half-hearted and ill-fated coupwas a change of political balancein the country. Major Nzeogwu's(the leader of the coup) aims for

the coup was not borne out of itsmethod, style and results. All thepoliticians and senior militaryofficers killed were from the Northand Western Region except apolitical leader and a senior Armyofficer from the Mid - West and theEast respectively. The coup hastened thecollapse of Nigeria. "TheFederation was sick at birth and byJanuary 1966, the sick, bedriddenbabe collapsed." (1:210) Fromindependence to January 1966, thecountry had been in a seriousturmoil; but the coup put her inan even greater situation. Most ofthe coup planners were of Easternorigin, thus the Northerners inparticular saw it as a deliberateplan to eliminate the politicalheavy weights in the North in orderto pave way for the Easterners totake over the leadership role fromthem. The sky high praises of thecoup and apparent relief given byit in the south came to a suddenend when the succeeding MilitaryGovernment of Maj Gen. J.T.U.Aguiyi Ironsi, an Easterner,unfolded its plans. If Ironsi haddisplayed a greater sensitivity tothe thinking of the Northerners, hecould have capitalized on therelief that immediately followedthe coup.

But in addition to his failureto take advantage of the initial

favorable reaction to the coup, hedid not know what to do with thering leaders who had beenarrested. He did not know whetherto treat them as heroes of therevolution or send them before acourt martial as mutineers andmurderers. Military Governors wereappointed to oversee theadministration of the regions. Inthe North the numbed favorablereaction in certain quarters turnedto studied silence and a "wait andsee" attitude. This graduallychanged to resentment, culminatingin the May 1966 riots throughoutthe North during which mostEasterners residing in the Northwere attacked and killed. A counter coup was staged bythe Northern military officers on29 July 1966 with two aims:revenge on the East, and a break upof the country. But the wisecounsel of dedicated Nigerians,interested and well-disposedforeigners prevailed. The Head ofState, Maj. Gen Aguiyi Ironsi andmany other senior officers ofEastern origin were killed. Afterthree anxious days of fear, doubtsand non-government, Lt. Col. YakubuGowon, at the time the most seniorofficer of Northern origin and thenthe Chief of Staff, Nigerian Army,emerged as the new Nigerianpolitical leader. The lack ofplanning and the revengeful

intentions of the second coupmanifested itself in the chaos,confusion and the scale ofunnecessary killings of theEasterners throughout the country.Even the authors of the coup couldnot stem the general lawlessnessand disorder, the senseless lootingand killing which spread throughthe North like wild fire on 29September 1966. Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, thethen Head of State, in a broadcastto the people of the North inSeptember said; "I receivecomplaints daily that up till nowEasterners living in the North arebeing killed and molested and theirproperty looted. It appears thatit is going beyond reason and isnow at a point of recklessness andirresponsibility." (3:9) Beforethen, in an effort to stop thekillings and to preserve the nationin one form or the other, an ad hocconference of the representativesof the regions was called on 9August 1966 in Lagos. The meetingmade the following recommendations:1. Immediate steps should betaken to post military personnel tobarracks within their respectiveregions of origin.2. A meeting of this committeeor an enlarged body should takeplace to recommend in a broadoutline the form of political

association which the countryshould adopt in the future  3. Immediate steps should betaken to nullify or modify anyprovisions of any decree whichassumes extreme centralization. 4. The Supreme Commander shouldmake conditions suitable for ameeting of the Supreme MilitaryCouncil urgently as a further meansof lowering tension. The first recommendation wasimplemented on 13 August 1966.Troops  of Eastern Nigeria originserving elsewhere in the countrywere officially and formallyreleased and posted to Enugu, thecapital of Eastern Region, whiletroops of non-Eastern origin inEnugu moved to Kaduna and Lagos.This marked the beginning ofdivision and disunity within therank and file of the Nigerian ArmedForces. "This simple and seeminglyinnocuous action broke the lastthread and split the lastinstitution symbolizing Nigeria'snationhood and cohesion which hadbeen regularly tampered with by thepoliticians since 1962. The riftbetween the Eastern Region and therest of the country was total."(5:8) Most of the civilian ofEastern Region origin who had neverlived in the East and would havecontinued to live elsewhere in thecountry lost confidence and movedto the East. Some of them when

they arrived at their destinationbecame refugees in their owncountry None of the otherrecommendations was fullyimplemented except nullification ofthe unification decree. Theimplementation of therecommendation with regards to theposting of troops to barrackswithin their region of origin wasrelentlessly pursued by thepolitical leaders of Western Regionafter the exercise had beencompleted in the Eastern Region.They were afraid of the so - alledNorthern troops domination andprobably of the safety of thetroops of Western Region origin. With the troops of EasternRegion back in Enugu and the non-Eastern troops withdrawn fromthere, with Nigerians of non-Eastern origin driven out of theEast in their own interest, andwith Easterners at home and abroadreturning home with news ofNigerian's brutality against them,and with the oil flowing in theEastern Region, the way was nowopen for the implementation of thesecession. The East and the Northbegan a virulent of words throughtheir radios and newspapers. Earlyin 1967, a peace negotiatingmeeting of the Supreme MilitaryCouncil of the Federal Republic ofNigeria and the Eastern Region

Military Governor, Lt. Col. Ojukwuwas called under the auspices ofGen. Ankrah of Ghana in Aburi,Ghana. As it turned out, all theother members of the council exceptOjukwu were either too thrusting,too naive or too ill - prepared forthe meeting. Therefore Ojukwuscored a vital goal in hisambition. Walter Schwarz remarked :"Ojukwu got his way with littleeffort, by being the cleverest. Hewas the only one who understood theissue. Step by step the others cameto acquiesce in the logic ofOjukwu's basic thesis - that tostay together at all, the regionshad first to draw apart. OnlyOjukwu understood that this meant,in effect, a sovereign Biafra(Eastern Region) and the end of theFederation." (6:18)Different versions of what happenedin Aburi were released by Ojukwu inthe East and by the FederalMilitary Government in Lagos.Ojukwu accused the FederalGovernment of bad faith and goingback on promises. The FederalGovernment accused Ojukwu ofdistortion and half truths. Afterseveral meetings amongst theFederal and Regional officials,what amounted to the demise of theFederation was promulgated indecree No. 8 of 17 March 1967 in adesperate effort to implement the

Aburi decisions and to avoidfurther stalemate and possiblecivil war. Not surprisingly, Ojukwucompletely rejected Decree No. 8 asfalling short of fullimplementation of Aburi decisions.The die was cast. All efforts tointervene by eminent Nigerians andwell - wishers to Nigeria like Gen.Ankrah, late Emperor HallieSelassie of Ethiopia and the lateDr Martin Luther King provedabortive.  The flurry of conciliatorymeetings achieved nothing. Gen.Obasanjo remarked: "Ojukwu wasadamant, obstinate and obdurate.He refused to attend the SupremeMilitary Government meeting calledin March in Benin city, Nigeria todiscuss outstanding issues anddeliberate on the budget for thecoming fiscal year. If he couldnot achieve his long cherishedambition of ruling an independentNigeria, he could break it up andrule an independent and sovereign"Biafra." Nothing could stophim." (5:10) As early as 7 June1966, after the May incident in theNorth, Ojukwu was quoted as saying:We are finished with theFederation. It is all a questionof time." (5:11) Ojukwu seized the FederalGovernment property and funds inthe East. He planned the hijackingof a National commercial aircraft

Fokker 27 on a schedule flight fromBenin to Lagos. All these andother signs and reports convincedthe Federal Military Government ofOjukwu's intention to secede. LtCol. Yakubu Gowon, the Head ofFederal Government, imposed a totalblockade of the East. It wasrealized that more stringent actionhad to be taken to weaken supportfor Ojukwu and to forestall hissecession bid. Short of militaryaction at that time, creation ofStates by decree was the onlyweapon ready to hand. The initialplan was to create States in theEastern Region only. Such actionwas considered impolitic andfraught with danger. Eventually 12States were created throughout thecountry on 27 May 1967. The Eastern Region wasdivided into three states. Thereaction from Enugu was sharp andquick: the declaration of EasternNigeria as the independentsovereign state of "Biafra" on 30May 1967. The month of June wasused by both sides to prepare forwar. Each side increased itsmilitary arsenal and moved troopsto the border watching and waitinguntil the crack of the first bulletat the dawn of 6 July 1967 from theFederal side. The war had startedand the dawn of a new history ofNigeria.

HISTORY OF THE NIGERIAN ARMY BEFORE1966

What is known today as theNigerian Army was, before 1966, apart of the British West AfricanArmy called the Royal West AfricaFrontier Force ( RWAFF ). Thisforce included the armies of GoldCoast (Ghana) Nigeria, Sierra Leoneand Gambia. At this time, therewere eight indigenous Nigerianofficers in the entire force, therest being British officers. Therole of an army in a developingcountry was not fully realized bythe nationalist leaders strugglingfor independence, hence, there wasno effective pressure on theBritish Government to trainNigerian officers in preparationfor independence. Even at thisstage, it was clear that the futurestability of a nation such asNigeria depended to a large scaleon the existence of a reliablearmy. One result of this short -sightedness was that the firstNigerian to command the NigerianArmy - Maj Gen. J.T.U. AguiyiIronsi, was not appointed until1965, nearly five years afterindependence.  At independence, it was alsoobvious that only the group thatcontrolled the Army could aspire torun a stable Nigerian government.Either by coincidence or by design,almost all the military

installations were concentrated inone area of the country - TheNorth. To illustrate this fact,below is a list of major militaryinstallations in Nigeria and theirlocations before the January 1966coup: Northern Nigeria: 1. 3rd Bn

Kaduna  2. 5th Bn

Kano 3. 1 Field Battery (Arty)

Kaduna 4. 1 Field Squadron(Engrs) Kaduna 5. 88 Transport Regt

Kaduna 6. Nigerian Defense Academy" 7. Ordinance Depot" 8. 44 Military Hospital" 9. Nigeria MilitaryTraining College " 10. Recon Squadron & Regt" 11. Nigerian Air Force" 12. Ammunition Factory" 13. Recruit Training DepotZaria 14. Nigerian Military School"  Western Nigeria:

1. 4th BnIbadan 2. Field Battery (Arty) Abeokuta  3. Recon Squaron"  Eastern Nigeria:  1st BnEnugu  There were no military unitsin the Mid - Western Nigeria andthose in Lagos were eitheradministrative or ceremonial.Recruitment of soldiers into theNigerian Army was based on ethnicquota system. Under this systemNorthern Nigeria provided 60%,Eastern and Western Nigeria 15%each and Mid - Western Nigeria 10%.This was done to encourage theNortherners who had not beeninterested in joining the Armyinitially. The standard of entryinto the Army was as well loweredto favor the Northerners. As aresult the North in 1966 had theabsolute majority within the rankand file of the Army. Thestandards fell within the Army andthe soldiers became morepolitically conscious. Madiebopointed out "In order to ensure theloyalty of the military thusestablished, the criterion forpromotion and advancement was basedmore on political considerationsthan efficiency or competence.(2:10)

The involvement of theMilitary in politics took a turnfor the worse during the WesternNigerian elections in October 1965.The politicians openly courted thefriendship of top militaryofficers. Due to the chaos thatcharacterized the general electionof 1964 and the Western Regionelection of 1965, it had becomeclear that Nigeria was overdue fora change. By October 1965, rumorsof an impending coup were alreadycirculating in the country. It wastherefore not much of a surprisewhen the coup was finally staged.

THE WAR PLANNING STRATEGIES NIGERIA

MOBILIZATION The declaration of secessionmade war not inevitable butimminent. At the dawn of 6 July1967, the first bullet was firedsignalling the beginning of thegruesome 30 month civil war andcarnage, brothers killing brothers.Preparations for war had alreadybeen set in motion on the Nigerianside by May 1967. All the soldiersof Northern, Western, and Mid -Western origin had been withdrawnfrom the East and redeployed. Fourof the regular infantry battalionsof the Army were placed under thecommand of 1 Brigade andredesignated 1 Area Command.Mobilization of ex - service menwas ordered by the Commander - in

- Chief. Out of those called up,about seven thousand in number,four other battalions were formed.Increased recruitment from thepersonnel of the Nigerian PoliceForce was embarked upon. The civilians were trainedin civil defense duties. Inmobilizing the people of Nigeria,the Federal Government had to makethe war look a just cause to stopthe disintegration of the countryand in doing this a slogan wasinvented "To keep Nigeria one isa task that must be done." Even theletters of the Head of the FederalGovernment, GOWON was coined toread "Go On With One Nigeria" andbecame a very strong propaganda. MILITARY Delivery of arms andequipment for the Nigerian Armywere hastened. Nigerian ArmyHeadquarters (NAHQ) Operationsplan envisaged a war that will bewaged in four phases and that willbe over within a month with  Thefour phases were (1) Capture of Nsukka, (2)Capture of Ogoja, (3)  Capture ofAbakaliki, (4) Capture of Enugu.1 Area Command was to be thefighting force, 2 Area Command inIbadan, Western Region, wasearmarked for the defense of Mid -West and border protection whilethe Lagos Garrison Organization was

earmarked for the defense of Lagos,the Federal capital. The NAHQ assessment of therebels in terms of men under armsand equipment did not give the NAHQmuch concern. The totalmobilization and the will of thepeople of the Eastern Nigeria tofight against severe odds was underestimated. Nigeria knew that thesurvival of Biafra depended onimportation of material from abroadto sustain her war efforts and theonly route was through the AtlanticOcean. As part of strategicplanning, the Nigerian Navy (NN)was to blockade the region from thesea thereby preventing shipment ofarms, equipment, food and other warmateriel and services into theEast. At the same time all flightsto the region were cancelled andthe international community wereinformed that no flight to theregion would be accepted withoutclearance from Lagos. The NAHQ didnot pay any particular attention tostrategic intelligence of theEastern Region. In planning andconcept the war was intended to befought by the troops located in theNorth and to be supplied mainlyfrom Kaduna. Immediately secession wasdeclared, Nigeria sent her warships to blockade and secure allsea routes into the region. TheNigerian Air Force was tasked to

ensure the control of the air spaceover the entire country. Theoffensive was to be a two prongattack, a combined arms mechanizedinfantry divisional attack from thenorth and an amphibious operationby another division from the southwith the aim of crushing theBiafran army in between. Theoffence was to be supported by theAir Force and the Navy. A thirdand fourth fronts were introducedlater in the war. DIPLOMATIC  At the Diplomatic level, theFederal Government mounted aserious campaign to dissuade othercountries, particularly the superpowers, the USA, USSR, and theUnited Kingdom from recognizing thesecessionist. The war was paintedas an adventure by an individual.The government in Lagos continuedto represent the entire country inthe international organizationswhere a very strong propaganda wasmounted to continue to portray thewar as one to re-unite the country.This made it possible to win thesupport of the super powers and tocontinue to discredit Biafra.Through this support, Nigeria wasable to import more arms andequipment from all over the worldto prosecute the war. In order toshow that she was prepared for apeaceful solution to the conflict,Nigeria continued to participate in

peace talks organized by theinternational community.  PSYCHOLOGICAL  Realizing the importance ofthe support of the civil populace,Nigeria embarked on an elaboratepsychological warfare. "To keepNigeria one is a task that must bedone" became a very popularslogan. Leaflets discrediting theBiafran Head of State, encouragingthe Biafrans to lay down their armswith a promise of non-persecution,were regularly dropped in the East. BIAFRA MILITARY On the Biafran side,preparation for war was put intohigh gear as soon as the troops ofnon - Eastern origin withdrew fromEnugu in August of 1966. Thousandsof people poured in forrecruitment. Training was embarkedupon both for officers and soldierswho were mainly lecturers anduniversity students. Before theoutbreak of hostility, the EasternRegion had no sufficient arms sinceall the soldiers who returned tothe region did so without theirarms while the soldiers who werewithdrawn from the East departedwith their weapons. What was leftof the Nigerian Army at Enugubarracks amounted to about 240soldiers, the majority of themtechnicians and tradesmen and notall the soldiers had weapons.However at the outbreak of the war,

the Eastern Region had succeeded insecuring arms and ammunition fromFrance, Spain and Portugal.Madiebo remarked, "When moreweapons were received in May 1967,a decision was taken to form twonew battalions to be called the 9thand 14th Battalions." (2:100)  Many pilots and techniciansformerly of the Nigerian Air Forceof Eastern origin returned to theregion to form the Biafran AirForce (BAF). Two old planes, a B26and a B25 were acquired with newhelicopters. T he two bombers werefitted with machine guns andlocally made rockets and bombs.The BAF also acquired Miniconaircrafts. A small Navy wasestablished in Calabar with somepatrol boat formerly used by theNigerian Navy. More boats werelater manufactured locally andthese were armored plated andfitted with light guns and machineguns. A  peoples army called, theBiafra Militia, was formed. Localleaders and ex - servicemen trainedyoung men and women in the use ofwhatever weapon the indivIdualshad. These weapons were mainlyimported and locally made shortguns. The militia were to providea ready source of manpower re-enforcement for the regular army,to assist with militaryadministration immediately behindthe frontline, to garrison all the

areas captured or regained from theenemy, and to help educate thepopulation on the reason why Biafrawas fighting. An establishment known asthe Administration Support wasformed. Before the declaration ofhostility, the small Biafran Armywas almost completely administeredand maintained by donations fromthe civil populace. Thisestablishment was to musternecessary support particularlylogistic requirements for the armyand to run the administration sinceall the young and able bodied menand women were to be engaged in thefight. A Food Directorate,responsible for the purchase anddistribution of all food, drink andcigarettes to the armed forces andthe nation was formed. ATransport Directorate withestablished. A Petroleum ManagementBoard was established forprocurement, management anddistribution of POL. The boarddesigned and built a sizeable andefficient fuel refinery whichproduced petrol, diesel, and engineoil at considerably fast rate.  Several other directorates suchas Clothing, Housing, Propaganda,Requisition and Supply, and Medicalwere established. Clothing inparticular was very essential asuniform was unavailable in Biafra.The textile mills in the Eastern

Region were reactivated to producebails of uniform for the armedforces and the civilians. AResearch and Production Board wasestablished. This organizationresearched and manufacturedrockets, mines, tanks, grenades,launchers, bombs, flame throwers,vaccines, biological and alcoholicbeverages and so forth. Women were not left out inthe scheme of things. Women weretrained in intelligence gatheringand how to infiltrate into theNigerian side. Women VoluntaryService was formed to assist ineducating the women of Biafra onthe cause of the crisis, keep womeninformed of developments,rehabilitation of war casualties,setting up of nurseries,orphanages,civil defense corps, andprovision of cooks for the troops.An Advisory Committee was set up toplan and execute the war and toadvise the Head of State onpolitical and military matters. POLITICAL / DIPLOMATIC The Biafrans knew that theodds against them was immense andthat their survival depended on theamount of external support theywere able to muster. The Biafrans,through many of their peopleabroad, mounted a very strongcampaign and propaganda for therecognition of Biafra by theinternational community and for the

purchase of arms and equipment.This powerful propaganda paid offby her recognition by countrieslike, Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon,Ivory Coast, Haiti, covert supportby France and double dealing bycountries like West Germany, Spain,Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden,Republic of Dahomey, Sierra Leoneand secret importation of arms andammunition into the region.  

THE CLASH OF ARMS STRATEGIESEMPLOYED

Nigeria's potential inmanpower, wealth, naturalresources, land mass,infrastructure, international linksand diplomacy could hardly besurpassed in Africa. Whenever waris declared, people are generallyconcerned with the relativestrengths of the opposing forcescoupled with their war potential.Armed forces are the towingequipment that pulls a nation outif she runs aground in her policy.It is madness for a nation tocommit herself more than her armedforces can do. There was nocomparison between the strengths ofthe opposing forces in the Nigeriancivil war. Nigerian Army (NA) wastoo formidable for Biafra, a ratioof 4:1. However each side knew thetactics the other side would employsince they all belonged to the sameArmed Forces before the war.

The Biafran Army, realizingthe odds against them decidedcorrectly to go into defense.Taking the advantage of fighting ontheir own ground, they constructedfortified pill boxes on the enemymost likely avenues of approach,the major highways connecting theEastern Region with the rest of thecountry. The Biafran army hadgathered a lot of information onthe disposition of the Nigerianarmy and made contingency plans tomeet any incursion into theirterritory. They conducted trainingexercise code named "ExerciseCheckmate" which was on the lineBiafra Army hoped to fight. Thisexœrcise was so realistic that whenthe Nigerian Army started theiroffensive, they reacted exactly theway Biafra expected them to. Biafradeployed her troops as follows:1. Northern Sector - 51st Brigademade up of three infantryBattalions2. Central Zone and GarrisonCommand - 11th Infantry Battalion3. Southern Zone - 52nd Brigademade up of three battalions. The Biafran Air Force carried outstrategic bombings of major towns,military installations and theDefense Industry. This had adiverstating effect on civilianpopulation and further helped theNigerian propaganda which resultedin making more people to join the

NA to crush the rebellion. TheBiafran Navy also carried out someattack on the Nigerian ships withlittle effect. Mercenaries werehired to train the troops and tookpart in the fighting.   

THE NIGERIAN ARMY OFFENSIVE. Nigeria opened her offensiveoperations from the northernsector. 1 Area Command NA,supported by an Artillery Brigade,Armored units equipped with BritishScorpion tanks, Saladin armoredcars and ferrets, and Engineerunits, issued its operationalorders for OPUNICORD, the code namefor the "police" action against therebels on the 2 July 1967.Theoffence was launched on two fronts.The command was divided into twobrigades with three battalionseach. 1 Brigade advanced on theaxis Ogugu - Ogunga - Nsukka roadwhile 2nd Brigade advanced on axisGakem - Obudu - Ogoja road. Therebels successfully repulsed theattack. However, with the manyfriends the command had made sincethey concentrated on the borderwaiting for the order to attack,they began to recruit guides,informants and with this came theintelligence on the disposition ofthe Biafran troops, their strengthand plans and a breakthrough. By the 10th of July 1967,1st Bde had captured all its firstobjectives and if they had had the

detail intelligence of the Biafranarmy on this day they would havepressed on to take Enugu, theBiafran capital. H.M. Njokuremarked, "At Ukehe I could notbelieve my eyes. All along the waywere refugees streaming towardsEnugu on Nsukka road. Many of theretreating troops carried selfinflicted wounds. Some senioroffices complained of malaria,headache, and all sorts ofailments. If the NA knew thesituation on the Biafran side onthis eventful day and pressed onthey would have taken Enugu thesame day without resistance."(4:128) By the 12th of July the 2ndBde had captured Obudu, Gakem, andOgoja. A second front, thesouthern sector was opened on the26 July, 1967 by a sea landing onBonny by a division formed from theLagos Garrison Organization (LGO).With the support of the Navy, thedivision established a beach headand exploited north after a fiercesea and land battle. On 8th August1967, Biafra invaded the former Mid- Western Region with the aim torelieve the pressure on thenorthern sector and to threatenLagos, the Federal Capital. Whilethe LGO was making preparations forsubsequent operations beyond Bonny,the news of the rebel infiltrationinto the Mid - West was passed to

the commander who was theninstructed to leave a battalion inBonny, suspend all operations thereand move to Escravos with twobattalions with a view todislodging the rebels and clearingthe riverine area of the Mid -West. These moves were carried outwith the support of the NigerianNavy and   the merchant of theNational Shipping Line. Anotherdivision was formed to support theLGO in the clearing of the Mid -West of the rebels. At thispoint, the formations wereredesignated 1 Area Command became1 Infantry Division, the newlydivision was designated 2 InfantryDivision, and the LGO became the 3Infantry Division. And with thisthe "police action" turned into afull scale military operation. By the end of September1969, a substantial part of the Mid- West had been cleared of therebels. The commander of the 3Infantry Division securedpermission to change thedesignation of his formation to 3Marine Commando because of thepeculiarly riverine and creekoperations already carried out bythe division. This was the firsttime something in the resemblanceof a Marine organization was triedin the history of the NigerianArmy. The division was not trainedIn amphibious operations. Infact

the troops were made up of thesoldiers of the Lagos GarrisonOrganization (LGO), theadministrative establishment forthe Federal capital. However, withsome crash training, the divisionbecame the most feared andsuccessful throughout the war.   Enugu became the bastion ofsecession and rebellion and theFederal Government of Nigeriaexpected that its capture wouldmean the end of secession. Theadvance from Nsukka to Enugu beganin earnest on 12 September 1967.The rebels counterattacked and forthe first time launched their "RedDevil" tanks. These were modifiedpre - second World War armoredpersonnel carriers made in France.They were dangerous, slow, blind,cumbersome and not easilymaneuverable. T hey were easy preyto anti - tank recoilless riflesand bold infantry attack. By the4th October 1967, Enugu wascaptured and with this capture 1Infantry  Division took time torefit and reorganize. The divisionhad the erroneous belief that thefall of Enugu would automaticallymean the collapse of the rebellIon.1 Infantry Division decided to givethe rebels time to give upsecession not knowing that the fireof rebellion was still burning highin the hearts of most Easterners.Ojukwu was callously fanning the

fire and riding high on theemotions of his apparently woundedand high spirited people who feltslighted and wanted to revenge forall the events of 1966. It tookthe division another six months toresume the offence thereby givingthe rebels the necessary respite toalso reorganize and acquire moreammunition, weapons and equipmentto continue the resistance. The 3 Marine Commando openedanother front on the south / southeastern border. With the supportof the Navy, Calabar was capturedon the 13th October 1967. Thecapture of Calabar, Warri, Escravosand Bonny established the supremacyof the Federal Government inNigerian waters and internationalwaters bordering Nigerian coast.Biafra was sealed off leavingPortharcourt Airport as the onlymeans of internationalcommunication and transportationwith the outside world. It was atthis point that Biafran leadershipdecided to find alternative routesfor importation of war materiel andmedical aids into the enclave.Three stretches of straight roadswere developed into airstrips;Awgu, Uga and Ulli. On 19th May1968 Portharcourt was captured.With the capture of Enugu, Bonny,Calabar and Portharcourt, theoutside world was left in no doubtof the Federal supremacy in the

war. The mercenaries fighting forBiafra started deserting. Biafrastarted to smuggle abroadphotographs of starving childrenand to blackmail Nigeria ofgenocide. This secured

military, economic andpolitical relief from internationalorganizations for Biafra andfurther lengthened the war and thesuffering of the people of Biafra. By the early 1969, 2ndInfantry Division crossed the NigerRiver at Idah, after severalunsuccessful attempts to cross theriver at Asaba, advanced throughthe already liberated areas ofNsukka and Enugu to captureOnitsha. The division continuedits advance towards Owerri. At thesame time 1 Infantry Divisionadvanced on Umuahia. The 3 MarineCommando was by now advancing onthree fronts: Oguta - Owerinta -Ulli airstrip - Umuahia axis;Portharcourt - Aba - Owerri -Umuahia axis; and Calabar - Uyo -Umuahia axis. The plan was a linkup with 1 Infantry Division atUmuahia in order to envelop therebels and either force them tosurrender or to destroy theirfighting spirit. his plan, thefinal offensive, was successfullyimplemented. Biafra triedunsuccessfully to hold the NAonslaught using guerrilla tactics.

On the 10th January 1970,Lt. Col. Ojukwu, the selfproclaimed Head of State of Biafra,on realizing the total chaotic andhopelessness of the situation,handed over to the CommanderBiafran Army Maj. Gen. PhillipEffiong, the administration ofBiafra and flew out of the enclavewith his immediate family membersin search of peace. Maj. Gen.Effiong consulted with the BiafraStrategic Committee on thesituation and they decided thatenough was enough and that the onlyhonorable way out was to surrender.In his surrender announcement tothe people of Biafra on RadioBiafra, part of Maj. Gen. Effiongaddress said:

Fellow Countrymen, As you know I was asked to

be the officer administering thegovernment of this republIc on the10th of January, 1970. Since thenI know some of you have beenwaiting to hear a statement fromme. Throughout history, injuredpeople have had to result to armsin their self defense wherepeaceful negotiation have failed.We are no exception. We took uparms because of the sense ofinsecurity generated in our peopleby the events of 1966. We havefought in defense of that cause. Iam now convinced that a stop mustbe put to the bloodshed which is

going on as a result of the war.I am also convinced that thesuffering of our people must bebrought to an end. Our people arenow disillusioned and thoseelements of the old regime who havemade negotiations andreconciliation impossible havevoluntarily removed themselves fromour midst. I have, therefore,instructed an orderly disengagementof troops.

I urge on Gen. Gowon, inthe name of humanity, to order histroops to pause while an armisticeis negotiated in order to avoid themass suffering caused by themovement of population. We havealways believed that ourdifferences with Nigeria should besettled by peaceful negotiation. Adelegation of our people istherefore ready to meetrepresentatives of NigerianGovernment anywhere to negotiate apeace settlement on the basis ofOAU resolution. Part of Maj. Gen. YakubuGowon, the Head of the FederalGovernment's speech to acceptformally the declared surrender andthe end of the civil war read: Citizens of Nigeria, It is with a heart full ofgratitude to God that I announce toyou that today marks the formal endof the civil war. This afternoonat the Doddan Barracks, Lt. Col.

Phillip Effiong, Lt. Col. DavidOgunewe, Lt. Col. Patrick Anwunah,Lt. Col. Patrick Amadi andcommissioner Police, Chief PatrickOkeke formally proclaimed the endof the attempt at secession andaccepted the authority of theFederal Military Government ofNigeria. They also formallyaccepted the present political andadministrative structure of thecountry. This ends thirty monthsof a grim struggle. Thirty monthsof sacrifice and  national agony. The world knows how hard westrove to avoid the civil war. Ourobjectives in fighting the war tocrush Ojukwu's rebellion werealways clear. We desired topreserve the territorial integrityand unity of Nigeria. For, as onecountry, we would be able tomaintain lasting peace amongst ourvarious communities; achieve rapideconomic development to improve thelot of our people; guarantee adignified future and respect in theworld for our posterity andcontribute to African unity andmodernization. On the other hand,the small successor states in adisintegrated Nigeria would bevictims of perpetual war and miseryand neo - colonialism. Our dutywas clear. And we are today,vindicated. The so - called "Rising Sun ofBiafra" is set for ever. It will

be a great disservice for anyone tocontinue to use the word "Biafra"to refer to any part of the EastCentral State of Nigeria. Thetragic chapter of violence is justended. We are at the dawn ofnational reconciliation. Onceagain we have the opportunity tobuild a new nation. On our side,we fought the war with greatcaution, not in anger or hatred,but always in the hope that commonsense would prevail. Many times wesought a negotiated settlement, notout of wickedness, but in order tominimize the problems ofreintegration, reconciliation andreconstruction. We knew thathowever the war ended, in thebattlefield or in the conferenceroom, our brothers fighting underother colors must rejoin us andthat we must together rebuild thenation anew. All Nigerians sharethe victory today. The victory fornational unity, victory for hopesof Africans and black peopleeverywhere. We mourn the deadheroes. We thank God for sparingus to see this glorious dawn ofnational reconciliation. We mustseek His guidance to do our duty tocontribute our quota to thebuilding of a great nation, oundedon the concerted efforts of all itspeople and on justice and equality.A nation never to return to thefractious, sterile and selfish

debates that led to the tragicconflict just ending. The Federal Government has mounteda massive relief operations toalleviate the suffering of thepeople in the newly liberatedareas. We are mobilizing adequateresources to provide food, shelter,and medicines for the affectedpopulation. My government hasdirected that former civil servantsand public corporation officialsshould be promptly reinstated asthey come out of hiding. Detailsof this exercise have beenpublished. Plans for therehabilitation of self - employedpeople will also be announcedpromptly. We have overcome a lotover the past four years. I havetherefore every confidence thatours will become a great nation. The surrender paper wassigned on 14th January 1970 inLagos and thus came the end of thecivil war and renunciation ofsecession.  

LESSONS LEARNT The Nigerian civil war,unlike other wars acrossinternational boundaries, was a warof unification, a war ofreintegration. It was therefore amuch more difficult war for theFederal field commanders toprosecute with the objectives ofunification in mind than warsfought against aggressors on

foreign land. The human aspect wasparamount. It was a contradictionand complication not easy toresolve - how to fight causing onlylimited destruction, how to inflictwounds and heal at the same time,how to subdue without fatal andpermanent injuries, how to feed andhouse civilian population withoutexposing our troops to danger andrisk of saboteurs and infiltrators,how to achieve surrender withoutinflicting permanent or longlasting psychological humiliation.

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC The Nigerian politicaltensions, conflicts andconfrontations, like other humaninteractions, had never conformedwith the law of physics that actionand reaction are opposite andequal. Reactions had always beenmore intense and graver thanaction, real or imagined. Thosewho are the sowers of wind areusually the reapers of thewhirlwind. The Kano riots of 1953was a reaction to the humiliationof the Northern legislators inLagos most of whom are still aliveand politicking while the riotersare dead, unsung and longforgotten. In the Nigerianhistorical context, each politicalaction, tension or conflict hadevoked more violence in reactionand the elites who initiated theaction are normally not the ones

who reap the more violent reactionor destruction. They are mastersin the art of survival and theyhave always emerged almostunscratched. It is the common manwho knows little or nothing of theon-goings and who certainly gainsnothing from the appointments orthe prerequisites of office ofthese elites that is used as cannonfodder and expendable material forthe attainment and sustenance ofpower, wealth and prosperity. Our leaders aid those ofother developing nations musteschew bitterness and violence,learn that no individual or sectionhas a monopoly of violence and thatone action of violence evokesgreater and more destructiveviolent reaction, the magnitudewhich can never be imagined inadvance. In the end the law ofretributive justice catches withthe perpetrators of bitterness,violence and destruction. Thisdifficult lesson must be learnt. The great publicity given tothe war by Mark press on behalf ofBiafra, especially the photographsof starving children and ruined ordeserted towns, evoked deepfeelings of sympathy all over theWestern world. By and large, thesepitiful sights touched theconscience of those who mountedlarge scale humanitarian campaignson behalf of Biafra. The issues in

the war were relegated to thebackground and the human andhumanitarian aspects came to thefore. Most of them were genuine intheir humanitarian efforts butlittle did they know that most oftheir contributions were used topurchase arms and ammunition whichprolonged the war and therebyincreased and heightened thesufferings of those they weretrying to help. There were involvement ofsome notable world leaders onsupposedly humanitarian grounds,but they had, as we have seen,ulterior motives which were mainlyto satisfy their political,economic or diplomatic interests.Some foreign governments covertlyencouraged and sustained rebellionunder the guise of humanitarianismby secretly giving weapons andother war material to Biafra. Theyseceded in fuelling the war andprolonged it and consequentlyprolonging the suffering of thepeople in the war affected areas. The importance of winningthe support and mobilizing thecivilian populace became veryobvious. Biafra, despite herinferiority in manpower and warmachineries held on for so longbecause her people believed infighting the war which theyconsidered a war of survival. Onthe same token, Nigeria won the war

primarily because she was able towin the support of the populace whoenlisted in thousands to reunifythe country.  

MILITARY Moral and discipline are twoof the most important factors thatgreatly contribute to success inwar. Obasanjo commented on theeffects of these factors thus, "Iobserved amongst Nigerian troopsduring the war different aspects ofhuman behavior under the stress andstrains of battle, and interactionbetween ordinary Nigerians, war orno war. What I found amazing wasthe length to which soldiers wouldgo when morale and discipline brokedown, in order to avoid going tobattle or, so to speak, facingdeath. In effect, while runningaway from death they inflicteddeath on themselves as some of themdied from their self - inflictedinjuries. But towards the end ofthe war when everything was goingright - the rebels were on the run,advance was fast and co-ordinated,moral was high - even our ownwounded soldiers did not want to beevacuated to the rear for treatmentand medical attention. Severaltimes I heard such wounded soldierssaying to me, "Oga, na you and mego end this war and capture Ojukwu." (5:169) Motivation is another veryimportant factor that made troops

fight. The Nigerian soldiersenjoyed rapid promotion andincrease in pay throughout the war.This encouraged them to fight on.It is also important to allowtroops time to worship in theirvarious religious faith. Chaplainsshould be provided to pray for thetroops whenever time warrants. Waris a situation that requires faith- faith in your equipment, faith inyour comrades and colleagues, faithin God or the supreme being orwhatever one believes in, faith inoneself and in the cause for whichone is fighting. I believe thatsuccess in a profession thatembraces the twin problem of humanrelationships and personal dangerin a degree not to be found in anyother profession demands more thanthe attributes of man, it requiresdivine guidance as well. The carefor the wounded and the dead mustbe taken seriously.

High standard of trainingcan never be over emphasized. Mostof the soldiers recruited duringthe war did not undergo enoughdepot training before beinglaunched into battle. Thisresulted in many casualties on bothsides. Most of them who survivedthe war had to be retrained.Members of the military mustrecognize that they depend more onthe professional and technicalcompetence and proficiency of their

team members than on the formalauthority structure. Themaintenance of the highlysophisticated weapons and equipmentprocured during the war became verydifficult. Most of them lasted fora few months in combat. Weaponswere imported from all over theworld and this led to non -standardization after the war.Most of them had to be phased outdue to lack of spare parts.The quality of initiative in theindividual must be allowed todevelop. It is the most valued ofall leadership qualities andvirtues in the military. In thisperiod of tremedious technologicalchange, military leaders areconfronted with almost perpetualchange or crisis of organizationespecially in a fairly fluid combatsituation. Whatever may be thetechnological achievement of ourage and it's impact on militaryscience, improvisation is still thekeynote of the individual fighterand combat group. This aspect ofmilitary training must beemphasized in peacetime. This isparticularly important in thedeveloping nation like ours. Failures arising from lackof adequate joint training becamevery obvious as a result offratricide that occurred during thewar. On many occasions firesupport request made to the Air

Force never came, and when it didcome, it was sometimes on ownfriendly positions. Supply fromthe air that became necessaryatimes and were tried often fell onthe enemy side. It is commonly said that anarmy fights on its stomach.Logistics won the war for Nigeria.If the Biafrans had half of theresources Nigeria had, the storymight be different. The Biafranswere better organized and managedthe meager resources available tothem more effectively. TheNigerian Army learnt a big lessonfrom this. The Army school ofLogistics was upgraded and wellfunded to train and produce highquality logisticians for the Armyafter the war. Communication in the fieldwas a big problem to both sides inthe conflict. Radios were lackingand when they were procured,trained manpower was not available.The importance of good and reliablecommunication and gathering ofadequate and up to dateintelligence of the enemy was a biglesson. The silencing of gunsallowed the milk of brotherhood,love, understanding and sympathy toflow from both the civilians andthe soldiers on the Federal side totheir fellow citizens on the rebelside. As time went by, everybody

came to appreciate the futility ofthe war which some had regarded asinevitable.  

CONCLUSION The war had come and gone.The story of the war and what ledto it has been told, is being toldand will continue to be told. Whatseems to me a human tragedy allthrough ages is the inability ofman to learn a good lesson from thepast so as to avoid the pitfall ofthose who had gone before. Thereis also the innate and unconsciousdesire of man to remain obliviousof the lessons of the past. Hehopes and believes that the pastcan be ignored, that the present iswhat matters, that no mistakes ofthe present can be as serious andgrievous as the mistakes of thepast. As a result history tends torepeat itself. However, there areexceptions of nations and men whohad learnt from history to avoidcollective and individual disastersor a repetition of such disasters.I feel confident that Nigeria mustjoin the group of these happyexceptions if we are to havepolitical stability, economicprogress, integrated development,social justice, contentment and bethe epicenter of Africansolidarity. Since the end of thecivil war, Nigeria has madeconsiderable progress in all theseareas.  

Show IPA nationalism,  political or socialphilosophy in which the welfare ofthe nation-state as an entity isconsidered paramount. Nationalismis basically a collective state ofmind or consciousness in whichpeople believe their primary dutyand loyalty is to the nation-state.Often nationalism implies nationalsuperiority and glorifies variousnational virtues. Thus love ofnation may be overemphasized;concern with national self-interestto the exclusion of the rights ofother nations may lead tointernational conflict. Nationalism is a comparativelyrecent phenomenon, probably bornwith the French Revolution, butdespite its short history, it hasbeen extremely important in formingthe bonds that hold modern nationstogether. Today it operatesalongside the legal structure andsupplements the formal institutionsof society in providing much of thecohesiveness and order necessaryfor the existence of the modernnation-state. Necessary Conditions for ItsDevelopment For people to express nationalismit is first necessary for them toidentify themselves as belonging toa nation, that is, a large group ofpeople who have something incommon. The rise of centralized

monarchies, which placed peopleunder one rule and eliminatedfeudalism, made this possible. Therealization that they might possessa common history, religion,language, or race also aided peoplein forming a national identity.When both a common identity and aformal authority structure over alarge territory (i.e., the state)exist, then nationalism becomespossible. In its first powerful manifestationin the French Revolution,nationalism carried with it thenotion of popular sovereignty, fromwhich some have inferred thatnationalism can occur only indemocratic nations. However, thisthesis is belied by the intensenationalism that characterized theGerman Empire and later NaziGermany. Where nationalism arises,its specific form is the product ofeach particular nation's history.

HistoryEarly Developments Although nationalism is unique tothe modern world, some of itselements can be traced throughouthistory. The first roots ofnationalism are probably to befound in the ancient Hebrews, whoconceived of themselves as both achosen people, that is, a people asa whole superior to all otherpeoples, and a people with a commoncultural history. The ancient

Greeks also felt superior to allother peoples and moreover felt asense of great loyalty to thepolitical community. These feelingsof cultural superiority(ethnocentrism), which are similarto nationalism, gave way to muchmore universal identificationsunder the Roman Empire and with theChristian Church through itsteaching of the oneness ofhumanity. As strong centralized monarchieswere built from petty feudalstates, as regional languages andart forms were evolved, and aslocal economies widened, popularidentification with thesedevelopments became increasinglystrong. In areas such as Italy,which were not yet single nations,recurring invasions led suchthinkers as Niccolò Machiavelli toadvocate national politicalfederation. The religious wars ofthe Reformation set nation againstnation, though the strongestloyalty continued to adhere to thesovereign. In the 16th and 17thcent. the nationalistic economicdoctrine of mercantilism appeared. The growth of the middle classes,their desire for political power,and the consequent development ofdemocratic political theory wereclosely connected with theemergence of modern nationalism.The theorists of the French

Revolution held that people shouldestablish governments of equalityand liberty for everyone. To themthe nation was inseparable from thepeople, and for the first time inhistory a people could create agovernment in accordance with thenation's general will. Althoughtheir aims were universal, theyglorified the nation that wouldestablish their aims, andnationalism found its firstpolitical expression. The Nineteenth Century It was in the 19th cent. thatnationalism became a widespread andpowerful force. During this timenationalism expressed itself inmany areas as a drive for nationalunification or independence. Thespirit of nationalism took anespecially strong hold in Germany,where thinkers such as JohannGottfried von Herder and JohannGottlieb Fichte had developed theidea of Volk. However, thenationalism that inspired theGerman people to rise against theempire of Napoleon I wasconservative, tradition-bound, andnarrow rather than liberal,progressive, and universal. Andwhen the fragmented Germany wasfinally unified as the GermanEmpire in 1871, it was a highlyauthoritarian and militarist state.After many years of fighting, Italyalso achieved national unification

and freedom from foreigndomination, but certain areasinhabited by Italians (e.g.,Trieste) were not included in thenew state, and this gave rise tothe problem of irredentism. In theUnited States, where nationalismhad evinced itself in the doctrineof Manifest Destiny, national unitywas maintained at the cost of theCivil War. In the latter half of the 19thcent., there were strongnationalist movements among thepeoples subject to thesupranational Austrian and Ottomanempires, as there were in Irelandunder British rule, and in Polandunder Russian rule. At the sametime, however, with the emergencein Europe of strong, integratednation-states, nationalism becameincreasingly a sentiment ofconservatives. It was turnedagainst such internationalmovements as socialism, and itfound outlet in pursuit of gloryand empire (see imperialism).Nationalist conflicts had much todo with bringing on World War I. The Twentieth Century The early 20th cent., with thebreakup of Austria-Hungary and ofthe Ottoman Empire, saw theestablishment of many independentnations, especially through thepeace treaties ending World War I.The Paris Peace Conference

established the principle ofnational self-determination, upheldby the League of Nations and laterby the United Nations. While self-determination is a nationalistprinciple, it also recognizes thebasic equality of all nations,large or small, and thereforetranscends a narrow nationalismthat claims superiority for itself.It was exactly this latter type ofnationalism, however, that arose inNazi Germany, preaching thesuperiority of the so-called Aryanrace and the need for theextermination of the Jews and theenslavement of Slavic peoples intheir "living space" (see NationalSocialism). Italian fascism was ina similar manner based on extremenationalist sentiments. At the sametime, Asian and African colonialterritories, seeking to cast offimperial bonds, were developingnationalist movements. Perhaps themost famous of these was the IndianNational Congress, which struggledfor Indian independence for over 60years. After World War IInationalism in Asia and Africaspread at such a fast pace thatdozens of new "nations" werecreated from former colonialterritorial holdings. Although interdependence and globalcommunications interconnected allnations by the 1990s, nationalismappears to have grown more extreme

with the breakup of the Sovietempire, the growth of Muslimfundamentalism, and the collapse ofYugoslavia. Xenophobic, separatistmovements are not necessarilyconfined to newly independentstates; they appear in manyEuropean nations and Canada, aswell as India, Iran, Iraq, Turkey,Lebanon, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, andmany others. Internationalorganizations, such as the UnitedNations, the European Union, theOrganization of American States,and the Organization for AfricanUnity, represent attempts to curbextreme nationalism, stressingcooperation among nations. Bibliography See H. Kohn, The Idea ofNationalism  (1944, repr. 1967) andNationalism: Its Meaning andHistory  (rev. ed. 1965); E. H.Carr, Nationalism and After(1945); L. L. Snyder, The Meaningof Nationalism  (1954, repr. 1968);A. Smith, Theories of Nationalism(1971); A. D. Smith, Nationalism inthe Twentieth Century  (1979); B.Anderson, Imagined Communities:Reflections on the Origins andSpread of Nationalism  (1983); E.A. Tiryakian and R. Rogowski, ed.,New Nationalisms of the DevelopedWest  (1985); J. Breuilly,Nationalism and the State  (1985);L. L. Snyder, Encyclopedia ofNationalism  (1990).

The Columbia ElectronicEncyclopedia Copyright © 2004.Licensed from Columbia UniversityPress nationalismLoyalty and devotion to one'snation or country, especially asabove loyalty to other groups or toindividual interests. Before theera of the nation-state, theprimary allegiance of most peoplewas to their immediate locality orreligious group. The rise of large,centralized states weakened localauthority, and society's increasingsecularization weakened loyalty toreligious groups, though sharedreligion—along with commonethnicity, political heritage, andhistory—is one of the factors thatdraws people together innationalist movements. Earlynationalist movements in 18th- andearly 19th-century Europe wereliberal and internationalist, butthey gradually became moreconservative and parochial.Nationalism is considered a majorcontributing cause of World War I,World War II, and many other warsof the modern era. In Africa andAsia in the 20th century,nationalist movements often arosein opposition to colonialism. Afterthe fall of the Soviet Union,powerful nationalist sentiments ineastern Europe and the formerSoviet republics contributed to

ethnic conflicts, such as those inthe territories of the formerYugoslavia. Learn more about nationalism with afree trial on Britannica.com. Encyclopedia Britannica, 2008.Encyclopedia Britannica Online. black nationalismU.S. political and social movementaimed at developing economic powerand community and ethnic prideamong African Americans. It wasproclaimed by Marcus Garvey in theearly 20th century, when many U.S.black nationalists hoped for theeventual creation of a separateblack nation in Africa. In the1960s and '70s, Elijah Muhammad andMalcolm X preached the ideal ofblack nationalism as an alternativeto assimilation into thepredominantly white culture of theU.S. Learn more about BlackNationalism with a free trial onBritannica.com. Encyclopedia Britannica, 2008.Encyclopedia Britannica Online. NationalismThe term nationalism  can refer toan ideology, a sentiment, a form ofculture, or a social movement thatfocuses on the nation. While thereis significant debate over thehistorical origins of nations,nearly all specialists accept thatnational ism , at least as anideology and social movement, is a

modern phenomenon originating inEurope. Precisely where and when itemerged is difficult to determine,but its development is closelyrelated to that of the modernstate and the push for popularsovereignty that came to a headwith the French Revolution in thelate eighteenth century. Since thattime, nationalism has become one ofthe most significant political andsocial forces in history, perhapsmost notably as a cause of both theFirst and Second World Wars. As an ideology, nationalism holdsthat 'the people' in thedoctrine of popular sovereignty isthe nation, and that as a resultonly nation-states founded on theprinciple of national self-determination are legitimate. Sincemost states are multinational, orat least home to more than onegroup claiming national status, thepursuit of this principle has oftenled to conflict, and nationalism iscommonly associated with war (bothexternal and domestic), secession,and even genocide in contextsranging from imperial conquest tostruggles for national liberation. Nationalism does not always lead toviolence, however, and it plays anintegral role in the daily lives ofmost people around the world.Flags on buildings, the singing ofnational anthems in schools and atpublic events, and cheering for

national sports teams are allexamples of everyday, ' banal'nationalism that is oftenunselfconscious. Moreover, somescholars argue that nationalism asa sentiment or form of culture,sometimes described as 'nationality' to avoid theideology's tarnished reputation, isthe social foundation of modernsociety. Industrialization,democratization, and support foreconomic redistribution have allbeen at least partly attributed tothe shared social context andsolidarity that nationalismprovides. Nevertheless, nationalism remains ahotly contested subject on whichthere is little general consensus.The clearest example of oppositionto nationalism is cosmopolitanism,with adherents as diverse asliberals, Marxists, and anarchists,but even nationalism's defendersoften disagree on its virtues, andit is common for nationalists ofone persuasion to disparage theaspirations of others for bothprincipled and strategic reasons.Indeed, the only fact aboutnationalism that is not in disputemay be that few other socialphenomena have had a more enduringimpact on the modern world. Ideology This section sets out thecomponents of nationalist ideology

as seen by nationalists themselves.(Academic theories of nationalismare skeptical of some of theseprinciples, see below). Nationalism is a form ofuniversalism when it makesuniversal claims about how theworld should be organized, but itis particularistic with regard toindividual nations. The combinationof both is characteristic for theideology, for instance in theseassertions:  "in a nation-state, the languageof the nation should be theofficial language, and all citizensshould speak it, and not a foreignlanguage" "the official language ofDenmark should be Danish, and allDanish citizens should speak it." The universalistic principles bringnationalism into conflict withcompeting forms of universalism,the particularistic principlesbring specific nationalistmovements into conflict with rivalnationalisms - for instance, theDanish-German tensions over theirreciprocal linguistic minorities. The starting point of nationalismis the existence of nations, whichit takes as a given. Nations aretypically seen as entities with along history: most nationalists donot believe a nation can be createdartificially. Nationalist movementssee themselves as the

representative of an existing,centuries-old nation. However, sometheories of nationalism imply thereverse order - that thenationalist movements created thesense of national identity, andthen a political unit correspondingto it, or that an existingstate promoted a 'national'identity for itself. Nationalists see nations as aninclusive categorization of humanbeings - assigning every individualto one specific nation. In fact,nationalism sees most humanactivity as national in character.Nations have national symbols, anational culture, a nationalmusic and national literature;national folklore, a nationalmythology and - in some cases - anational religion. Individualsshare national values and anational identity, admire thenational hero, eat the nationaldish and play the national sport. Nationalists define individualnations on the basis of certaincriteria, which distinguish onenation from another; and determinewho is a member of each nation.These criteria typically include ashared language, culture, and/orshared values which arepredominantly represented within aspecific ethnic group. Nationalidentity refers both to thesedefining criteria, and to the

shared heritage of each group.Membership in a nation is usuallyinvoluntary and determined bybirth. Individual nationalisms varyin their degree of internaluniformity: some are monolithic,and tolerate little variance fromthe national norms. Academicnationalism theory emphasizes thatnational identity is contested,reflecting differences in region,class, gender, and language ordialect. A recent development isthe idea of a national coreculture, in Germany the Leitkultur,which emphasizes a minimal set ofnon-negotiable values: this isprimarily a strategy of culturalassimilation in response toimmigration. Nationalism has the strongterritorial component, with aninclusive categorization ofterritory corresponding to thecategorization of individuals. Foreach nation, there is a territorywhich is uniquely associated withit, the national homeland, andtogether they account for mosthabitable land. This is reflectedin the geopolitical claims ofnationalism, which seeks to orderthe world as a series of nation-states, each based on the nationalhomeland of its respective nation.Territorial claims characterize thepolitics of nationalist movements.Established nation-states also make

an implicit territorial claim, tosecure their own continuedexistence: sometimes it isspecified in the nationalconstitution. In the nationalistview, each nation has a moralentitlement to a sovereign state:this is usually taken as a given. The nation-state is intended toguarantee the existence of anation, to preserve its distinctidentity, and to provide aterritory where the nationalculture and ethos are dominant -nationalism is also a philosophy ofthe state. It sees a nation-stateas a necessity  for each nation:secessionist national movementsoften complain about their second-class status as a minority withinanother nation. This specific viewof the duties of the stateinfluenced the introduction ofnational education systems, oftenteaching a standard curriculum,national cultural policy, andnational language policy. In turn,nation-states appeal to a nationalcultural-historical mythos tojustify their existence, and toconfer political legitimacy -acquiescence of the population inthe authority of the government. Nationalists recognize that 'non-national' states exist and existed,but do not see them as a legitimateform of state. The struggles ofearly nationalist movements were

often directed against such non-national states, specificallymulti-ethnic empires such asAustria-Hungary and the OttomanEmpire. Most multi-ethnic empireshave disappeared, but somesecessionist movements seeRussia and China as comparable non-national, imperial states. At leastone modern state is clearly not anation-state: the VaticanCity exists solely to provide asovereign territorial unit for theRoman Catholic Church. Some critics have maintained that(unlike modern nationalism, whichis a creation of the 19th centurynation state) authentic nationalism(as the Latin 'nation' wouldsuggest) must be based in some formof genophilia and the sharing ofancestors. Nationalism as ideology includesethical principles: that the moralduties of individuals to fellowmembers of the nation overridethose to non-members. Nationalismclaims that national loyalty, incase of conflict, overrides localloyalties, and all other loyaltiesto family, friends, profession,religion, or class.

THEORYBACKGROUND AND PROBLEMS

Specific examples of nationalismare extremely diverse since manytypes, forms, and origins exist.The theory of nationalism has

always been complicated by thisbackground, and by the intrusion ofnationalist ideology into thetheory. There are also nationaldifferences in the theory ofnationalism, since people definenationalism on the basis of theirlocal experience. Theory (and mediacoverage) may overemphasizeconflicting nationalist movements,and war - diverting attention frommany general theoretical issues;for instance, the characteristicsof nation-states. Issues The first studies of nationalismwere generally historical accountsof nationalist movements. At theend of the 19th century,Marxists and other socialists (suchas Rosa Luxemburg) producedpolitical analyses that werecritical of the nationalistmovements then active in centraland eastern Europe (though avariety of other contemporarysocialists and communists, fromLenin to Józef Piłsudski, were moresympathetic to national self-determination). Mostsociological theories ofnationalism date from after theSecond World War. Some nationalismtheory is about issues whichconcern nationalists themselves,such as who belongs to the nationand who does not, as well as theprecise meaning of 'belonging'.

Origins Recent general theory has looked atunderlying issues, and above allthe question of which came first,nations or nationalism. Nationalistactivists see themselves asrepresenting a pre-existing nation,and the primordialist theory ofnationalism agrees. It seesnations, or at least ethnic groups,as a social reality dating backtwenty thousand years. The modernist theories imply thatuntil around 1800, almost no-onehad more than local loyalties.National identity and unity wereoriginally imposed from above, byEuropean states, because they werenecessary to modernize economy andsociety. In this theory,nationalist conflicts are anunintended side-effect. Forexample, Ernest Gellner argued thatnations are a by-product ofindustrialization. Modernizationtheorists see such things as theprinting press and capitalism asnecessary conditions fornationalism. Unfortunately, thistheory falls short of addressingall nationalist efforts, includingthe Flemings repulsion of theFrench in the 14th century, or anynationalist efforts against empiresbefore 1800. Anthony D. Smith proposed asynthesis of primordialist andmodernist views now commonly

referred to as an ethno-symbolistapproach. According to Smith, thepreconditions for the formation ofa nation are as follows:  A fixed homeland (current orhistorical)  High autonomy  Hostile surroundings  Memories of battles  Sacred centers  Languages and scripts  Special customs  Historical records and thinking Those preconditions may createpowerful common mythology.Therefore, the mythic homeland isin reality more important for thenational identity than the actualterritory occupied by the nation.Smith also posits that nations areformed through the inclusion of thewhole populace (not just elites),constitution of legal and politicalinstitutions, nationalist ideology,international recognition anddrawing up of borders. Types of nationalism Nationalism may manifest itself aspart of official state ideology oras a popular (non-state) movementand may be expressed along civic,ethnic, cultural, religious orideological lines. These self-definitions of the nation are usedto classify types of nationalism.However, such categories are notmutually exclusive and manynationalist movements combine some

or all of these elements to varyingdegrees. Nationalist movements canalso be classified by othercriteria, such as scale andlocation. Some political theorists make thecase that any distinction betweenforms of nationalism is false. Inall forms of nationalism, thepopulations believe that they sharesome kind of common culture. A mainreason why such typology can beconsidered false is that itattempts to bend the fairly simpleconcept of nationalism to explainits many manifestations orinterpretations. Arguably, all"types" of nationalism merely referto different ways academicsthroughout the years have tried todefine nationalism. This school ofthought accepts that nationalism issimply the desire of a nation toself-determine.  Stateless Nationalism With the establishment of a nation-state, the primary goal of anynationalist movement has beenachieved. However, nationalism doesnot disappear but remains apolitical force within the nation,and inspires political parties andmovements. The development of statenationalism leads to thedevelopment of statelessnationalism movements that feeloppressed by the mainstreamnationalistic conception of the

nation - such as the "eternalSpain", "La Grande France" - andaspire at setting up their ownstate either within the nationstate or a state of its own. Stateless Nationalists in thissense typically campaign for:  Defending from strengtheningnational unity, including campaignsfor national salvation in times ofcrisis  Confronting nation state policiesthat attempt to impose a model ofpolitical behaviour from the top  Unlike state nationalism is moreopened to foreign influences,influenced by civic liberalism theyreject the extreme xenophobia ofstate nationalist parties.  Attempting to make bordersflexible so as to collaborate withneighbouring territories sharingcommon interests.  Redefining the national territorywhich is considered part of thenational homeland. This is calledirredentism, from the Italianmovement Italia irredenta.  Small nations cannot surviveunless they are opened to foreigntrade so that they reject economicnationalism of nation states. Nationalist parties and nationalistpoliticians, in this sense, usuallyplace great emphasis on nationalsymbols, such as the national flag.The term 'nationalism' is also usedby extension, or as a metaphor, to

describe movements which promote agroup identity of some kind. Thisuse is especially common in theUnited States, and includes BlackNationalism and whitenationalism in a cultural sense.They may overlap with nationalismin the classic sense, includingblack secessionist movements andpan-Africanism. Nationalists obviously have apositive attitude toward their ownnation, although this is not adefinition of nationalism. Theemotional appeal of nationalism isvisible even in established andstable nation-states. The socialpsychology of nations includesnational identity (the individual’ssense of belonging to a group), andnational pride (self-associationwith the success of the group).National pride is related to thecultural influence of the nation,and its economic and politicalstrength - although they may beexaggerated. However, the mostimportant factor is that theemotions are shared: nationalism insport includes the shareddisappointment if the national teamloses. The emotions can be purelynegative: a shared sense of threatcan unify the nation. However,dramatic events, such as defeat inwar, can qualitatively affectnational identity and attitudes to

non-national groups. The defeat ofGermany in World War I, and theperceived humiliation by the Treatyof Versailles, economic crisis andhyperinflation, created a climatefor xenophobia, revanchism, and therise of Nazism. The solid bourgeoispatriotism of the pre-1914 years,with the Kaiser as national father-figure, was no longer relevant. Extremism Although nationalism influencesmany aspects of life in stablenation-states, its presence isoften invisible, since the nation-state is taken for granted. MichaelBillig speaks of banal nationalism,the everyday, less visible forms ofnationalism, which shape the mindsof a nation's inhabitants on a day-to-day basis. Attentionconcentrates on extreme aspects,and on nationalism in unstableregions. Nationalism may be used asa derogatory label for politicalparties, or they may use itthemselves as a euphemism forxenophobia, even if their policiesare no more specificallynationalist, than other politicalparties in the same country. InEurope, some 'nationalist' anti-immigrant parties have a largeelectorate, and are represented inparliament. Smaller but highlyvisible groups also self-identifyas 'nationalist', although it maybe a euphemism for neo-Nazis or

white supremacists. Activists inother  countries are often referredto as ultra-nationalists, with aclearly pejorative meaning. Seealso chauvinism and jingoism. Nationalism is a component of otherpolitical ideologies, and in itsextreme form, Fascism. However, itis not accurate to simply describeFascism as a more extreme form ofnationalism. Nor is it generallycorrect to describe non-extremenationalism as a lesser form offascism. Fascism in the generalsense, and the Italian original,were marked by a strong sense ofstate nationalism whereas politicalparties today like the BritishNational Party tend to have aconcept of ethnic nationalism,often combined with a form ofeconomic and ethical socialism.That was certainly evident inNazism. However, the geopoliticalaspirations of Adolf Hitler areprobably better described asimperialist and, to a lesserdegree, colonialist because NaziGermany ultimately ruled over vastareas where there was no historicGerman presence (imperialism) withintentions to eventually populatemany of the conquered territorieswith ethnic Germans (colonialism).The Nazi state was so differentfrom the typical European nation-state, that it was sui

generis (requires a category of itsown). Racism Nationalism does not necessarilyimply a belief in the superiorityof one race over others, but inpractice, many nationalists supportracial protectionism or racialsupremacy. Such racism is typicallybased upon preference orsuperiority of the indigenous raceof the nation, but not always. In United States for example, non-indigenous racial nationalistmovements exist for both black andwhite races. These forms ofnationalism often promote orglorify foreign nations that theybelieve can serve as an example fortheir own nation, seeAnglophilia or Afrocentrism. Explicit biological race theory wasinfluential from the end of the19th century. Nationalist andfascist movements in the first halfof the 20th century often appealedto these theories. TheNazi ideology was probably the mostcomprehensively racial ideology inhistory, and race influenced allaspects of policy in Nazi Germany. Ethnic cleansing is often seen asboth a nationalist and racistphenomenon. It is part ofnationalist logic that the state isreserved for one nation, but notall nationalist nation-states expeltheir minorities.

Opposition and critique Nationalism is sometimes anextremely assertive ideology,making far-reaching, despite oftenjustified, demands, including thedisappearance of entire states. Ithas attracted vehement opposition.Much of the early opposition tonationalism was related to itsgeopolitical ideal of a separatestate for every nation. The classicnationalist movements of the 19thcentury rejected the very existenceof the multi-ethnic empires inEurope. This resulted in severerepression by the (generallyautocratic) governments of thoseempires. That tradition ofsecessionism, repression, andviolence continues, although by nowa large nation typically confrontsa smaller nation. Even in thatearly stage, however, there was anideological critique ofnationalism. That has developedinto several forms of anti-nationalism in the western world.The Islamic revival of the 20thcentury also produced an Islamiccritique of the nation-state. In the liberal politicaltradition there is widespreadcriticism of ‘nationalism’ as adangerous force and a cause ofconflict and war between nation-states. Liberals do not generallydispute the existence of thenation-states. The liberal critique

also emphasizes individual freedomas opposed to national identity,which is by definition collective(see collectivism). The pacifist critique ofnationalism also concentrates onthe violence of nationalistmovements, the associatedmilitarism, and on conflictsbetween nations inspired byjingoism or chauvinism. Nationalsymbols and patriotic assertivenessare in some countries discreditedby their historical link with pastwars, especially in Germany. Famouspacifist BertrandRussell criticizes nationalism ofdiminishing individual's capacityto judge his or hers fatherland'sforeign policy. Likewise GeorgeOrwell, though not a pacifisthimself, has stated that "Thenationalist not only does notdisapprove of atrocities committedby his own side, but he has aremarkable capacity for not evenhearing about them. WilliamBlum has said this in other words:"If love is blind, patriotism haslost all five senses The anti-racist critique ofnationalism concentrates on theattitudes to other nations, andespecially on the doctrine that thenation-state exists for onenational group, to the exclusion ofothers. It emphasizes the

chauvinism and xenophobia of muchnationalism. Political movements of the lefthave often been suspicious ofnationalism, again withoutnecessarily seeking thedisappearance of the existingnation-states. Marxism has beenambiguous towards the nation-state,and in the late 19th century someMarxist theorists rejected itcompletely. For some Marxists theworld revolution implied a globalstate (or global absence of state);for others it meant that eachnation-state had its ownrevolution. A significant event inthis context was the failure of thesocial-democratic andsocialist movements in Europe tomobilize a cross-border workers'opposition to World War I. Atpresent most, but certainly notall, left-wing groups accept thenation-state, and see it as thepolitical arena for theiractivities. In the Western world the mostcomprehensive current ideologicalalternative to nationalism iscosmopolitanism. Ethicalcosmopolitanism rejects one of thebasic ethical principles ofnationalism: that humans owe moreduties to a fellow member of thenation, than to a non-member. Itrejects such important nationalistvalues as national identity and

national loyalty. However, there isalso a political cosmopolitanism,which has a geopolitical program tomatch that of nationalism: it seekssome form of world state, with aworld government. Very few peopleopenly and explicitly support theestablishment of a global state,but political cosmopolitanism hasinfluenced the development ofinternational criminal law, and theerosion of the status of nationalsovereignty. In turn, nationalistsare deeply suspicious ofcosmopolitan attitudes, which theyequate with eradication of diversenational cultures. While internationalism in thecosmopolitism context by definitionimplies cooperation among nationsand states, and therefore theexistence of nations, proletarianinternationalism is different, inthat it calls for the internationalworking class to follow itsbrethren in other countriesirrespective of the activities orpressures of the nationalgovernment of a particular sectorof that class. Meanwhile, most (but not all) anarchists rejectnation-states on the basis of self-determination of the majoritysocial class, and thus rejectnationalism. Instead of nations,anarchists usually advocate thecreation of cooperative societiesbased on free association and

mutual aid without regard toethnicity or race.