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ZENJOURNALISTAndrew MacGregor Marshall

กลียุค — Thailand’s Era of InsanityOctober 31, 2013 Uncategorized

A journalist who took a stroll around Lumphini Park in the heart of Bangkok in mid-October wasconfronted by an extraordinary spectacle — royalist ultra-nationalist anti-government protesters inblackface, wearing skirts made of leaves and bizarre hats, waving banners rejecting a ruling by theInternational Court of Justice on the status of territory around Preah Vihear temple on the Cambodianborder.

The ICJ hasn’t even made its ruling yet. It is due on November 11.

The motley crew of malcontents encamped at Lumphini are mostly supporters of the so-called “PeopleDemocratic Force to Overthrow Thaksinism”, who prefer to use the acronym “Pefot”. They also includemembers of the related “white mask” movement who have staged multiple poorly attended rallieswearing Guy Fawkes masks popularized in Alan Moore’s graphic novel V For Vendetta, apparentlyoblivious to the fact that the real Guy Fawkes was executed for treason in London in 1606 for plotting tokill the king.

An equally peculiar crowd of their allies set up a camp at Sanam Luang for several months this year. In afurther disorienting twist, they included dozens of elderly members of the Communist Party of Thailandwho liked to strut around in fading uniforms proclaiming their undying support for the Thai monarchy.

The madness is not confined to the ultra-royalist side. Some hardcore Red Shirt commentators — mostnotably the ludicrous “Banpodj” — have recently been peddling a theory that claims (as far as I canmake out) that King Bhumibol and Queen Sirikit are already dead, and that Princess Sirindhorn hasbecome an evil behind-the-scenes mastermind, employing a variety of special effects to give the

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impression her parents are still alive so that she can keep Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn off the throne.Despite his hatred of the rest of the royals, Banpodj is a huge fan of the prince, regularly lavishingeffusive praise upon him.

The deeper one digs into contemporary Thailand, the more of a puzzlement it seems. Why is theestablishment so infused with an extraordinary primal hatred of Thaksin Shinawatra, a fairly ordinaryman little different from many other corrupt Thai political leaders before him, although admittedlymore effective than most? What has turned the traditionally pragmatic and unprincipled elderstatesmen of the aristocracy into rabid zealots obsessed with wild notions of impending nationalcatastrophe and existential doom? How can conflict over the looming royal succession be so crucial forunderstanding 21st century Thailand — as Paul Handley and Thongchai Winichakul, among others, havecorrectly argued — if everybody agrees that Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn will almost inevitably becomeKing Rama X? Most journalism and academic research on Thailand struggles to answer these questions.

In his remarkable, game-changing 1978 article Studies of the Thai State: The State of Thai Studies,Benedict Anderson coolly overturned decades of accepted wisdom on Thailand and showed that manyof the most cherished assumptions of scholars were entirely wrong. He proposed four “scandaloushypotheses” that profoundly redefined our understanding of Thai history. Although lacking similarbrilliance and depth of knowledge, I am at least able to draw on the work of a large number of scholarswho have gone before me and led the way, and because I have already violated the lèse majesté law andelected not to return to Thailand, I am able to speak frankly. In this article, I will set out some scandaloushypotheses of my own that I believe are essential to making sense of Thailand’s era of insanity.

1. At the elite level, Thailand’s intractable political conflict does not revolve around ThaskinShinawatra, although he is a central character in the drama. The conflict among Thailand’s eliteis essentially a succession struggle over who will become monarch when King BhumibolAdulyadej dies. In particular, most of Thailand’s elite are implacably opposed to the prospect ofVajiralongkorn succeeding his father, and are prepared to go to extreme lengths to sabotage thesuccession.

2. Both broad factions in the elite succession struggle have failed to understand that Thai societyhas fundamentally changed, with the rural and urban poor becoming increasingly assertive andinformed. As a result, Thailand’s unacknowledged succession struggle has become entangledwith a social conflict that encompasses the whole country, leading to a crisis of legitimacy for themonarchy and the deep state.

3. Thaksin Shinawatra is a fairly traditional Thai royalist, albeit one who — unusually — has fewqualms about the crown prince. Otherwise, his views are very similar to the large number of eliteThais who — although they may appear to be fanatically ultra-royalist — in fact have limitedintrinsic loyalty or love for the monarchy, beyond the extent to which they can harnessroyal barami to serve their own interests. Moreover, elite Thais opposed to the crown prince havea particular incentive to pretend to be staunchly ultra-royalist while the current king remains onthe throne, to help shield them against accusations of treachery or anti-monarchism when thesuccession takes place.

4. It’s somewhat misleading to regard the network monarchy model as demonstrating that themonarchy controls or guides the network. In modern Thai history, the network has mostlycontrolled the monarchy.

To support these assertions, it’s necessary to take a revisionist look at modern Thai history. This article isa first tentative draft of my attempt at doing so. The themes discussed will be analysed in more detail,and in broader historical context, in my upcoming book A Kingdom in Crisis: Royal Succession and theStruggle for Democracy in 21st Century Thailand. It will be published by Zed Books in 2014.

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Once upon a time, Thailand’s royal family seemed happy. Glorified by the military dictators who ruledthe country from the late 1950s until 1973, boosted by an American-funded propaganda campaign asanti-communist figureheads, and fêted abroad as a fairytale royal couple, Bhumibol and Sirikit werewidely revered in Thailand. But behind the walls of Chitralada Palace, tensions were building over theirtroublesome son Vajiralongkorn. Taciturn, lazy and prone to violent rages, he seemed ill-suited to be afuture King Rama X. Bhumibol’s relationship with his son seems to have been dysfunctional from thestart and only worsened as the prince got older. But Sirikit doted on her boy. Disagreements between theking and queen, mostly over Vajiralongkorn, began to rip the royal family apart.

In 1972, when Vajiralongkorn was 20 years old, Bhumibol performed a ceremony elevating his status tocrown prince, designated heir to the Chakri throne. But Vajiralongkorn was already remarkablyunpopular among Thais, who mocked and scorned him in private conversations. Far more popular washis younger sister Sirindhorn, an unpretentious and apparently amiable girl who many Thais came toadore. The family tensions over royal succession were exacerbated by a mounting sense of paranoia inthe palace during the mid-1970s over the threat from communism, culminating in the appallingmassacre of students at Thammasat University on October 6, 1976, by extreme-right elements inThailand that had long been fostered and encouraged by the palace. The pretext for the savagery was amock-hanging staged by students two days earlier — rightists alleged it was intended to depict theexecution of Vajiralongkorn, a claim those involved in the play have always denied. Whatever the truth, itwas exploited by the far-right to unleash an orgy of murder and rape that shocked the world, tore Thai

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society asunder and destroyed the monarchy’s carefully crafted image as a unifying institution abovepartisan politics.

In the months and years that followed, an immense effort was launched by Thailand’s establishment torehabilitate the reputation of King Bhumibol. This was the start of the absurd hyper-royalism whichremains rampant in Thailand today. Although it was underpinned by ubiquitous state propaganda, ittook on a life of its own. Thais — particularly among the elite — competed to be as ostentatiously royalistas they possibly could, leading to a phenomenon that political scientist Xavier Marquez (writing aboutancient Rome during the rule of Emperor Caligula) has dubbed “flattery inflation“.

One of the most striking aspects of hyper-royalism is not only that Vajiralongkorn was left out of theelite’s veneration of Bhumibol and Sirikit, but that the crown prince’s unpopularity wasactually exploited by the Thai establishment in order to feed the personality cult of Rama IX. From the1970s onwards, there was an overwhelming preference among Thais at all levels of society forSirindhorn to be their next monarch, and far from trying to crush this sentiment as heretical, the eliteencouraged it. Bhumibol himself appeared to agree, and in 1977, the king elevated Sirindhorn to thestatus of potential heir to the throne too. Official sources usually explain this move by characterizing itas a precaution in case anything happened to Vajiralongkorn, and claim it did not cast the prince’sstatus as heir into doubt. But in fact, the elevation of Sirindhorn to crown princess generated significantambiguity that remains to this day. It was interpreted by many Thais as a signal that the king was aware

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of their concerns and would take them into account.

Soul of a Nation, a BBC documentary filmed during 1979, made with the secretive cooperation of theBritish embassy and with Bhumibol and Sirikit allowed to view it before it was broadcast in 1980 toensure they approved, devoted considerably more time to Sirindhorn than Vajiralongkorn. One veryshort segment discussed the prince and included brief comments from him.

Most of Thailand’s elite are royalist only to the extent that it serves their purposes and preserves apolitical status quo in which they are atop the hierarchical pyramid. Bhumibol was an ideal monarch forthem — beloved by most ordinary Thais, seemingly immensely virtuous and saintly, but weak andpliable. By glorifying Rama IX, the Thai elite was sanctifying a social order in which they were firmly incharge.

Vajiralongkorn was another story. Deeply unpopular and totally unable to fit the image of avirtuous dhammaraja Buddhist monarch, he appalled most of the elite, who believed that if he everbecame king it would spell the end of the monarchy — and by extension, the end of their hegemony inThailand.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the elite’s hatred of Vajiralongkorn was further fuelled by his habit ofpreying on their daughters. In a throwback to the days of Old Siam in which kings and princes hadscores of wives and concubines, Vajiralongkorn became notorious for summoning attractive high-bornyoung women to his palace. The extent to which it happened remains unclear, but it was a source ofprofound anger and anxiety among the Thai elite, many of whom sent their daughters overseas to beeducated specifically to escape the prince’s attentions.

The flipside of the widespread loathing for the prince was exaggerated reverence for Bhumibol, andintense fear about what would befall Thailand when he died. For the elite, this terror was largely dueto their sense of self-preservation, but in wider Thai society it chimed with widely held traditionalbeliefs that an immoral king would cause the decline and fall of the nation, and that the world was on

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the verge of a dark age, or กลียุค. An alleged prophecy dating from the beginning of the Chakri era,which suggested that the monarchy would collapse after the ninth reign, also fed the anti-Vajiralongkorn hysteria.

Instead of preparing the ground for an orderly succession, the elite used popular hatred ofVajiralongkorn to foster desperate hopes among ordinary Thais that Bhumibol would reign for as longas possible. The prince himself was not unaware of what was happening — asked by Dichan magazine in1987 about his black-sheep status, he acidly replied:

Sometimes black sheep serve a purpose, one of helping others. Black

sheep help those not-too-white ones seem whiter.

Meanwhile, chastened by the disasters of the late 1970s, Bhumibol gravitated towards a less obviouslyinterventionist role for the palace in the 1980s with General Prem Tinsulanonda as prime ministerheading what Duncan McCargo famously characterised as a “network monarchy“:

The main features of Thailand’s network monarchy … were as follows:

the monarch was the ultimate arbiter of political decisions in times

of crisis; the monarchy was the primary source of national

legitimacy; the King acted as a didactic commentator on national

issues, helping to set the national agenda, especially through his

annual birthday speeches; the monarch intervened actively in

political developments, largely by working through proxies such as

privy councillors and trusted military figures; and the lead proxy,

former army commander and prime minister Prem Tinsulanond, helped

determine the nature of coalition governments, and monitored the

process of military and other promotions. At heart, network

governance of this kind relied on placing the right people (mainly,

the right men) in the right jobs.

The network monarchy model assumes that Prem was Bhumibol’s proxy, and that the king was inindirect control of the Thai elite. But this has never been quite true — in fact, it has often tended to be theelite pulling the strings. Socially isolated, and often seemingly adrift from reality, the king has been apuppet for much of his reign, although until recently he appears to have been largely unaware of thisfact. In his recent article ‘Working towards the Monarchy’ and its Discontents: Anti-Royal Graffiti inDowntown Bangkok in the Journal of Contemporary Asia, Serhat Ünaldi proposes an alternative toMcCargo’s model — a concept he calls “working towards the monarchy”:

The strength of the monarchy is not merely the result of manipulation

from above but of a symbiotic relationship which, for a long time,

has served the interests of many who all seek economic capital and

social distinction.In contrast to McCargo’s ‘network monarchy,’ which

helps to explain concrete political actions of elite groups in

support of the monarchy, ‘working towards the monarchy’ brings

broader structures into focus. It moves beyond clear-cut networks and

the immediate royal circle as units of analysis to recognise the

dominance of the monarchy in Thailand’s cultural and political life

as a widespread, cross-class phenomenon serving the social, political

and economic aims of people living in the monarchy’s physical

proximity – from entrepreneurs to slum dwellers. Where the ‘network

monarchy’ works from an active centre which manipulates politics in

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the interest of royalists, ‘working towards the monarchy’ reverses

the perspective by putting the focus on the monarchy’s followers, its

charismatic group, who are legitimising their actions with reference

to that centre which, in turn, depends on the active and continued

reaffirmation of its charisma by the charismatic group.

The elite needed the king’s sacred aura to legitimise their supremacy, and the leading members of theestablishment had to make a constant effort to make Bhumibol believe they worshipped him, and toconvince their inferiors in the network that their instructions were imbued with royal authority. But once“king’s men” like Prem (and more recently, Anand Panyarachun and Prawit Wongsuwan) managed tocloak themselves in royal barami, they have had considerable latitude to use the establishment networkto advance their own interests, whether or not these corresponded with Bhumibol’s. Usually theirinterests were aligned, but sometimes they were not, particularly with respect to the succession. Nobodyknows whether instructions genuinely come from the king. This issue was discussed in one of the mostilluminating of all the secret U.S. cables obtained by WikiLeaks, 09BANGKOK2967:

Many figures in the various circles attempt to appropriate the

charisma of the King and prestige of the royal institution for their

own purposes without any official remit, a process known in Thai as

“ang barami.” … Even Thai relatively close to royal principals treat

purported wishes conveyed by other royal associates with caution,

given the tradition of self-serving “ang barami.”

Prem and Vajiralongkorn have been sworn enemies since the 1980s. The precise origins of their hatredremain murky, but it probably stems from an unacknowledged family crisis in the royal household in themid-1980s. Bhumibol and Sirikit had grown apart, and the queen’s open infatuation with her militaryaide Colonel Narongdej Nanda-photidej became profoundly embarrassing for the king. Narongdej wassent away from Bangkok to the United States as a military attaché, and died suddenly in New York inMay 1985 after a game of tennis, at the age of just 38. The official explanation was that he suffered aheart attack but many Thais — including Sirikit herself — suspected something more sinister. Her verypublic grief over the colonel’s death spiralled into a breakdown, and at the end of 1985 Bhumibolordered her to undergo hospital treatment for what was officially called a “diagnostic curettage”. Sirikitvanished from view for months, and with public disquiet growing, Princess Chulabhorn was enlisted tocalm anxiety in a televised interview in 1986 in which she declared:

We all work for his majesty because of our loyalty towards him.

Nobody in our family wants popularity for themselves. Everybody is

sharing the work and we work as a team… But again, there are people

who say that our family is divided into two sides, which is not true

at all.

The opposite was true. The whole sad episode spelled the end of Bhumibol and Sirikit’s marriage, andthey lived separate lives for the next two decades. A rival royal court developed around Sirikit —characterised by ultra-right wing politics and all-night dinner dances. Thailand’s establishment wasnever a monolithic united bloc, and the estrangement of Bhumibol and Sirikit further widened thedivisions. This gave even greater scope for other leading agents in the network monarchy — above all,Prem — to pursue their own agenda.

As his marriage collapsed, Bhumibol appears to have begun seriously considering abdication. Heshocked the nation on his 59th birthday in December 1986 by hinting that he would soon step aside to

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make way for Vajiralongkorn to rule Thailand:

The water of the Chao Phraya must flow on, and the water that flows

on will be replaced. In our lifetime, we just perform our duties.

When we retire, somebody else will replace us…

One cannot stick to a single task forever. One day we will grow old

and die.

Palace officials confirmed Bhumibol might retire to a monastery some time after national celebrationsplanned for July 1988 when he would become the longest reigning monarch in Thai history. TongnoiTongyai, a semi-official spokesman for Bhumibol, set out the likely scenario in comments to the FarEastern Economic Review:

The king will never abdicate, if by abdication you mean leaving his

duties behind and retiring… Once his majesty sees the crown prince

reaching a more mature age and ready to take over all the royal

functions, he may enter a monastery… It does not mean that he will

remain a monk. The important thing is that he will continue to be

there, behind the throne, and help his son solve any problems.

The plan made some sense, in terms of the long-term preservation of the Chakri monarchy, but therewas panic among much of the Thai establishment. Given the dangers of openly questioning the king’sintentions, Sukhumband Paribatra took the lead in opposing the plan. As a royal himself, from a rivalChakri bloodline, he had some degree of protection. In an article for the Far Eastern Economic Review,Sukhumband wrote that: “everyone regards rumours about abdication with great apprehension”.

Meanwhile, a palace image management campaign was under way to rehabilitate the crown prince’sreputation — the glossy Dichan magazine owned by palace public relations guru Piya Malakul publishedtwo lengthy and sympathetic interviews with Vajiralongkorn, in August 1986 and July 1987, and theprince also spoke to international journalists representing the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailandat a special audience in June 1987. He used these media appearances to present himself as a man whoseyouthful indiscretions were behind him but who remained misunderstood and a victim of maliciousgossip. Meanwhile, Prem’s government and the Thai military and bureaucracy were busy planning morethan a year of organized nationwide adulation of Rama IX. Events in honour of Bhumibol’s 60thbirthday were slated to start many months in advance, and then the country would switch immediatelyto the build up to July 1988 when Bhumibol would overtake Chulalongkorn as Thailand’s longestreigning monarch. Prem announced that the king would be granted the title of maharaja, officiallymaking him Bhumibol the Great. Only three previous kings in Thailand’s history had received such anhonour. The stage was set for Rama IX to bow out in a blaze of glory in the second half of 1988 after aprolonged and massive national celebration of his rule.

In September 1987, Vajiralongkjorn was sent on a state visit to Japan. It was a chance to demonstrate hepossessed the necessary maturity and gravitas to stride out onto the world stage with confidence. Giventhe stakes, things could hardly have turned out any worse. Ahead of the trip, he demanded that hismistress Yuvathida Polpraserth accompany him in an official capacity instead of his wife; the Japaneserefused for reasons of protocol. Once he arrived, things went from bad to worse, as Barbara Crosettereported in the New York Times:

A diplomatic storm blew up between Tokyo and Bangkok over what Thai-

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language newspapers reported as “slights” to the Crown Prince, a

pilot and army major general who commands his own regiment, during an

official visit to Japan.

A Japanese chauffeur driving the Thai Prince’s car apparently stopped

at a motorway tollbooth to relieve himself — Japanese officials say

the man felt ill and had to be replaced. On other occasions, the

Prince was said to have been given an inappropriate chair to sit on

and to have been forced to reach down to the floor to pick up a cord

to unveil a memorial. The prince came home three days earlier than

scheduled, leaving a diplomatic crisis in his wake.

Worsening the diplomatic damage, members of the right-wing nationalist Village Scouts militia rallied atthe Japanese embassy in Bangkok demanding an apology, and Prem dutifully felt compelled to make aformal protest to Tokyo for insulting the prince and the monarchy, despite being well aware thatVajiralongkorn’s claims were totally bogus. Bhumibol finally persuaded his son to make a publicstatement a few days later calling on Thais to end their criticism of Japan. In the weeks that followed,diplomats and politicians in both countries quietly cleaned up the mess. If this was a taste of how thingswould be under King Vajiralongkorn, then the people of Thailand clearly had ample reason to bealarmed about Bhumibol’s abdication. By the end of 1987, the notion that Bhumibol could hand over thethrone but still steer events from behind the scenes and keep his wayward son under some semblance ofcontrol seemed like wishful thinking, doomed to failure.

In January 1988, Sukhumband wrote another article in the Far Eastern Economic Review, sounding thealarm. He used elaborately polite language, but the fact that a leading member of the Thai establismentwas publicly airing doubts about the prince — in an international English-language magazine — wasextraordinary:

In post-1932 Thailand, the monarch performs various functions as head

of state, but his primary duties are considered apolitical — his role

is above politics. But popular acceptance of the monarchy as an

institution and of the king as a person, combined with the latter’s

role as the catalyst of development, makes royal involvement in

politics more or less inevitable.

At the present juncture, the monarchy directly or indirectly,

intentionally or otherwise, plays a number of roles which have become

integral to the Thai political system.

One is that of the symbol of national unity, essential for a society

which, though relatively homogeneous, has its share of cleavages. In

this connection, the monarchy also acts as the factor of continuity,

when conflicts occur in other political institutions. Since 1932, the

kingdom has gone through 13 constitutions, 16 coups and 46 cabinet

changes. The monarchy has also become a force of national

reconciliation, when extreme political polarisation takes place, as

evident from the royally initiated development projects at former

communist strongholds.

The second major role is that of the last-resort conflict manager

when the stresses and strains of the system reach a point of crisis.

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On several occasions since 1973, the palace has intervened to

restrain military groups which would have toppled the government,

caused bloodshed or precipitated unpredictable crises. In turn, this

role creates a balance — precarious at times to be sure — among the

power groups: military, bureaucracy, political parties and business

interests…

Given the monarchy’s role in Thailand’s political and economic

development, as well as its place in the hearts and minds of the

populace, any uncertainty regarding the future of the monarch

inevitably causes a great deal of apprehension. Doubts continue to be

expressed, mostly in private but now increasingly in the open, about

the crown prince’s capacity to evoke the kind of intense political

loyalty from the people and the major domestic political groupings

that his father is able to do. Doubts also persist as to whether the

crown prince can match his father’s subtle and mediatory role in

politics.

All men and institutions go through processes of change and

transformation. Bhumibol has achieved a great deal for his country

and for the institution he inherited without forewarning, but by

doing so, he has set perhaps an impossibly high standard of

attainment for his successors. Should the leadership provided by the

monarchy become less effective for one reason or another in the

future, there will be grave political consequences.

The precarious balance among the major political groups and factions

would certainly be destroyed… This vacuum is one which only the

military would be capable of filling, given its monopoly of coercive

power, organizational cohesion and control of the media and

grassroots politics. For many Thais this ultimately is the root of

their apprehension.

Sukhumband’s intervention was by far the most public, but behind the scenes other leading figures in theestablishment, including Prem, were actively trying to sabotage the plan. Soon afterwards, palaceofficials spread word that Rama IX would not be stepping down. No reason was ever given to explainwhy the situation had suddenly changed. By first raising and then dashing his son’s hopes of soonbecoming Rama X of Thailand, Bhumibol can only have worsened the conflicts and rivalries within theincreasingly dysfunctional royal family.

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Prem stepped down as prime minister in 1988, but retained his role as the chief consigliere of the networkmonarchy through his control of the privy council and the annual military reshuffle, and his status as theleading “king’s man”. Members of the establishment with a more modern outlook, in particular thoseclose to the increasingly influential Anand Panyarachun, found Prem’s inflexible conservatism andmilitarism outdated and distasteful, and the key political dynamic in Thailand during the 1990s was astruggle between the conservative and liberal wings of the establishment. Among the biggest bones ofcontention were the appropriate role of the military in Thai politics, and what to do aboutVajiralongkorn. Establishment conservatives and liberals were united in their hostility towards the crownprince, but divided over how best to handle him. In two key episodes during the decade, theconservatives were blindsided by social and economic developments they failed to understand, tippingthe balance in favour of the “royal liberals“.

The increasing political assertiveness of the urban middle class, who generally adopted a highlymoralistic attitude towards politics and corruption and (at least in the 1990s) took a dim view of militarymeddling in politics, completely wrongfooted Prem and Bhumibol. In the political crisis of 1992 thatfollowed a coup the previous year, both men backed the authoritarian military elements of the elite, andwere shocked by the strength and tenacity of middle class opposition. The events of Black May in 1992appeared to have ended the cycle of regular coups that had blighted Thailand throughout Bhumibol’sreign, forcing the humbled and humiliated army back into the barracks and out of government.

Incredibly, Bhumibol managed to emerge from the episode with his reputation enhanced, thanks to hisfamous televised scolding of Suchinda Kraprayoon and Chamlong Srimuang at Chitralada Palace onthe evening of May 20, 1992, which ended several days of shocking violence in Bangkok and was widelymisinterpreted as a decisive royal intervention in favour of the democracy. In fact, Bhumibol’s anger hadbeen largely directed at Chamlong and the protesters demanding what the king derisively referred to as“so-called democracy”. Thailand’s middle classes chose to overlook this. As Chris Baker — an insightfulanalyst of Thai politics when he is not penning half-baked hagiographies of the king or extolling

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Bhumibol’s sophomoric “sufficiency economy” philosophy — has observed:

Since the 1976 drama, an important section of the Thai elite and

middle class has needed to imagine the king as a symbol of democracy,

particularly in opposition to the soldiers who wanted to suppress it

with guns, and the businessmen who wanted to subvert it with money.

These people want to make use of the great moral authority of the

monarchy, without paying attention to the politics. They have been

complicit in rewriting history to cast the king as a peace-maker in

1973 and 1992, glossing over 1976 altogether, and ignoring the 1932

revolution to make democracy seem to be a gift from the throne.

More progressive members of the elite, led by Anand Panyarachun and Prawase Wasi, recognised after1992 that the “network monarchy” needed to be reformed to prepare for a post-Bhumibol future, anidea that conservatives like Prem regarded as heretical. Bhumibol seems to initially have been againstthe idea also, as McCargo notes:

Despite the general view that the violence of May 1992 signalled it

was time to stop relying on the military and the monarchy, and

highlighted the need for a process of thoroughgoing constitutional

and political reform, all the evidence suggests that the King himself

failed to understand this… The violence of May 1992 had left the King

in an apparently strong position. He emerged as the supreme political

referee, following a superficially successful intervention to solve

the crisis. Yet the intervention also marked the high watermark of

his authority. His consistent support for the military reflected an

obsolete understanding of the Thai political and social order.

This was the backdrop to the struggle over the “People’s Constitution” of 1997. The conservativesclaimed the proposed constitution was an attack on the monarchy, and their opposition to the draftcharter would probably have blocked it, had the elite not been sent reeling by the economic crisis thatfollowed the collapse of the baht in 1997. In the fraught atmosphere that followed, the conservativesgave up the fight to veto the constitution, and Bhumibol gave it his assent.

Anand and Prawase were surprisingly explicit about the fact that a key motivation behind the newcharter was the need to create a constitutional framework that could keep Vajiralongkorn in check if hebecame king. The constitution institutionalised the network monarchy: Bhumibol’s “good men” wouldstaff agencies that acted as checks and balances on a strengthened executive government, reducing theneed for informal royal intervention. If the crown prince did indeed become Rama X, he would be just afigurehead. Thailand would at last become a genuine constitutional monarchy.

But although plans were now in place for coping with a future King Vajiralongkorn, most of the Thaielite convinced themselves it would never happen. They believed the crown prince was so crazy and out-of-control that sooner or later he would so something so egregiously unacceptable and impossible toconceal that it would rule him out of the running for good.

This was a plausible assumption. The prince was connected with all sorts of shady characters, earninghim the nickname contemptuous nickname “Sia-O”. On February 28, 1996, when Japanese PrimeMinister Ryutaro Hashimoto arrived at Don Muang airport for a summit meeting, his 747 was blocked for20 minutes as it taxied towards the red carpet by three F-5 fighter jets, one of them piloted by the prince.

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This was Vajiralongkorn’s public revenge for the disrespect he believed he had been shown during hisinfamous state visit to Japan nine years previously.

Then in May 1996, as Thailand prepared for Bhumibol’s golden jubilee celebrations, the crown princecaused a scandal that transfixed the nation — and foreign media — by publicly banishing his second wifeYuvathida from his palace and from Thailand, ostensibly because of an affair with the prince’s aide-de-camp. Besides the terrible publicity it attracted, Vajiralongkorn’s melodramatic break-up with Mom Benzdealt a severe blow to his succession prospects, because he also disowned and expelled from Thailandthe four sons she had borne him. The crown prince was left with no legitimate male heir.

There was also every reason to believe that Bhumibol shared the widespread contempt for his waywardson and would make Sirindhorn his heir instead at the opportune moment. The clearest signal of thiswas the extraordinary book The Revolutionary King by Canadian author William Stevenson, who spentseveral years in Bangkok in the 1990s after being personally enlisted by Bhumibol to write a semi-officialbiography. Stevenson was granted unprecedented access to King Bhumibol and his inner circle,obtaining hundreds of hours of interviews. No other writer, Thai or foreign, from outside the royal familyhas ever matched this level of access. The book was published in 1999 to near-universal derision fromacademics. It was riddled with basic factual errors as well as broader and more astonishingmisunderstandings throughout, and no effort seemed to have been made to remedy them for its secondprinting in 2001. For this reason, scholars have tended to overlook the book’s significance. It should not

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be read as a work of serious history – on that level it is a risible failure. But as an insight into Bhumibol’sview of himself, and how the palace inner circle perceives reality, and how they want to be seen, it isabsolutely invaluable. As Roger Kershaw wrote in a review of the book in Asian Affairs in 2001:

Stevenson’s privileged position as an informal mouthpiece of the King

has guaranteed, for us, the privilege of access to the royal family’s

construction of its own past and present role.

One of the many astonishing aspects of the book is how it depicts Vajiralongkorn, and Bhumibol’s viewson the succession. It quotes Lieutenant General Eugene Tighe, director of the U.S. Defense IntelligenceAgency 1977 to 1981, as saying Sirkit’s friend Clare Luce Booth had provided him with inside informationfrom the royal household:

Clare reported that the queen wore the pants and wanted her son to

become the next king, but the king favours one of his daughters.

It shared a bizarre anecdote about Bhumibol’s attempts to teach the young Vajiralongkorn somemanners:

Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn, a handsome boy, showed an imperious

sense of destiny. He defied a reprimand from a courtier by saying,

‘Don’t talk like that to your future king!’ King Bhumibol tanned his

son’s backside with the reminder: ‘You’re not the Tenth Rama yet.’

The boy pulled faces behind the backs of teachers or in solemn

ceremonies, until the king begged a favour from a palace attendant

who had the peculiarity that he could seem to stand still as stone

during long rituals while, with his hands behind his back, he

modelled clay heads in the likeness of those around him. The courtier

made six sculptures of the Crown Prince. The king lined them up along

the foot of his sleeping son’s bed one night and the boy woke up to

see his own grotesquely ugly faces.

The prince’s notoriety as a sexual predator is hinted at:

‘Why is he giving you the Evil Eye?’ a lovely young member of the

Royal Household Bureau asked me, when [Vajiralongkorn] presided over

the casting of Buddha images. I suggested he was looking at her, not

me. She shivered: ‘I hope not – it’s fatal for a woman.’ …

‘Perfection was too much to ask from a boy who was Heir Apparent,’

lamented an American-educated noblewoman. ‘Look at these pictures of

him in court dress-up! If he had to submit to old customs, then he

might as well go all the way, have all the women he wanted, and

behave like the earlier kings.’

Stevenson says Bhumibol’s mother Sangwan supported Sirindhorn being elevated to the status of crownprincess in 1977 because: “She not the Crown Prince had the makings of the next monarch.” He repeats arumour that Vajiralongkorn once fired a gun at Bhumibol. And in a surreal and totally inaccurate re-imagining of the 1991 coup and political unrest of 1992, Stevenson depicts the crown prince as one of themain villains, in cahoots with venal generals, while Bhumibol fights for democracy:

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It was three hours after midnight on 29th April, 1992 that the Ninth

Rama was playing the saxophone at a private Chitralada dinner. The

queen danced with General Suchinda Krapayoon. Later, Suchinda went to

talk to the Crown Prince who sat at his own table. ‘It‘s strange the

Crown Prince is here,’ said one of the king’s close aides. ‘He

doesn’t usually come to these things. And look at the men at his

table. They’re all crooks.’ Then Suchinda left the room without

bothering to bow to the monarch who sat with his jacket slung over

the back of his chair, as usual. He had put an old cartoon from MAD

magazine on a rostrum: in the centre of the cartoon was the single

word, THINK! …

If [Bhumibol] said anything that a dictatorial regime decided was a

criticism of the Crown Prince and his supporters, the king himself

could be charged under the law of lese majesté; but this was

increasingly unlikely. In this new crisis, he stayed in his study,

reading a sampling of the wildly flying faxes. They attacked Suchinda

and the Crown Prince and supported the king. Then counterattacking

faxes smeared Suchinda’s opponents, but still left the king

unscathed. He bided his time…

Towards the end of the book, Stevenson evokes an atmosphere of impending doom as Bhumibol’s reignapproaches its end, and suggests the king had decided Sirindhorn would succeed him. He again raisesthe prince’s promiscuity and suggests Sirikit was pressing for the prince to take a role in annexing Laos:

‘I cannot afford to die,’ he joked. All he had worked toward would be

in jeopardy the very moment it might seem that his life was running

out. The Crown Prince would never allow Crown Princess Sirindhorn to

inherit the throne. She had upset her mother long ago when she

decided she would never marry. The question of how much longer the

king had to live was endlessly debated. Those who planned to

monopolise political power could not afford to ignore the future of

the Crown Princess. Even if she remained a virgin and even if there

was no chance of her bearing an heir to the throne, provision had

been made by the king for her to succeed him. And a majority of the

people were so devoted to her that they would readily welcome her as

the next monarch, however startling an innovation this might be…

The Ninth Rama was now by far the world’s longest reigning monarch,

but he had to undergo two major heart operations. After making a

swift recovery, he appeared on television and armed with charts and a

pointer, described the surgical procedure in detail, and then sounded

a warning note. He fully expected, he said, to live for a long time

yet.

The warning was meant for those who were already clustering around

the likely Tenth Rama, the Crown Prince. [Bhumibol], like any father,

was reluctant to believe the stories he heard… It was impossible to

trace the authors of reports that alleged the Crown Prince took

elaboratc precautions before sleeping with any woman who caught his

fancy because of the rapid spread of AIDS. The users of fax machines

and modems claimed his selected companion had to go into quarantine

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long enough for doctors to be sure she was free from infection. He

was now forty-four and lived in his own heavily guarded palace in

Bangkok. Queen Sirikit proposed that he should use his military

skills in Laos… Laos, went the argument, had always been part of Old

Siam. The Crown Prince would impose order

Stevenson also shared the tale of Vajiralongjorn’s banishment of Yuvathida:

When it seemed the scandal would die down, the Crown Prince plastered

the capital’s walls with photographs of his actress-wife and the air

marshal together: ‘These two people have been declared persona non

grata and expelled from the palace. If anyone sees them, they must be

shunned . . . Anand Rotsamkhan has been expelled from his position.

If he does anything else, he will be given serious punishment . . .

The Thai Government does not want him to return to Thailand. Rest in

Peace in Foreign Lands.’

Those backing the Crown Prince as the future king withdrew into a

discreet silence. He had no authprity to speak for the government but

already he sounded like an absolute monarch.

This was truly sensational, incendiary material. The Revolutionary King was not simply a hagiography ofBhumibol, it was an explicit attack on Vajiralongkorn. The book was never formally banned in Thailand(partly because the king himself had commissioned it) but booksellers generally decided not to stock it.The royalist establishment, privately delighted about the book and its trashing of the crown prince,although unhappy that it referred to the king by his nickname “Lek”, never sought to repudiateStevenson’s assertions. Many thousands of copies were bought overseas and brought into Thailand, andthe Bangkok middle class loved the book. Its depiction of a saintly pro-democracy Bhumibol valiantlytrying to prevent the corrupt militaristic Vajiralongkorn dragging the country to its ruin resonated withtheir own prejudices and assumptions. Anyone reading the book — and taking it at face value — couldonly conclude that Bhumibol was aware his people hated the prince, and would somehow save the dayahead of the succession.

By the start of the 21st century, the Thai elite had another reason to believe that Vajiralongkorn wouldnever be king. They became aware that the crown prince had contracted HIV, and was also sufferingfrom a rare acute form of leukaemia. Perhaps he would die before his father, or so they hoped. Despised,ill and without any legitimate male heirs, Vajiralongkorn appeared to have ruined his chances of everreigning as Rama X.

Then everything changed.

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Thailand’s elite never realized the ground was shifting beneath their feet. During the long economicboom that transformed the country from the late 1950s, economic inequality savagely widened, andThailand was transformed into a mafia state. Gangsters, tycoons, police chiefs, criminal godfathers,generals and charlatans made fortunes and bought their way into the establishment, using feignedfervent reverence for the monarchy as a bogus badge of honour. The old aristocracy had always beencontemptuous of ordinary Thais, and the upstart additions to the establishment were embarrassed bytheir lowly origins and did their best to hide them. Thailand’s wealthiest families increasingly lived in abubble, a fairytale fantasy world. The key to getting ahead in the elite world of patronage and nepotismwas knowing the right people and not asking too many questions. The rich sent their children to foreignschools and universities, but never taught them to think, and as the personality cult of Bhumibol grew

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stronger, critical thinking became a disability for the elite. Face was all-important in the fin-de-siècle world of the establishment: decadence was ubiquitous but hidden behind a mask of respectability.As the years passed, most of Thailand’s elite grew increasingly corrupt and incompetent. Lying anddishonesty became so routine that they lost their ability to recognize truth. Taught to revere their socialsuperiors and the “father of the nation”, King Bhumibol, they became infantilized and ignorant.

Although the poor were mostly left behind by Thailand’s economic progress, and handicapped by thecountry’s notoriously atrocious education system, by the start of the 21st century they were not thesubmissive morons the elite assumed them to be. As longtime Thai resident James Stent wrote in hissuperb 2010 analysis Thoughts on Thailand’s turmoil:

The confined world of rural Thai villages… in the 1950s, where

spirits and officials were to be appeased and a traditional

subsistence way of life was passed on from generation to generation

with little change, has radically changed. Now villagers are plugged

into the rest of the world via television, mobile phones, pick-up

trucks, and family members spending time working at wage earning jobs

in Bangkok. As many taxi drivers, all hailing from countryside

villages in the Northeast of Thailand, have told me, “We really

aren’t as stupid as the city people think we are. We used to be

stupid, but no longer.”

Thaksin Shinawatra set this combustible sociopolitical atmosphere ablaze. Although he was a fabulouslywealthy recent addition to Thailand’s elite, and seems never to have fully understood the profoundchanges in Thai society, Thaksin did not talk down to ordinary people, and he made the effort toformulate policies that were of practical benefit to them. Thailand’s poor were not blind to Thaksin’scorruption but they were smart enough to know the rest of the elite were equally crooked. To quote Stentagain:

When I asked the villagers if it were not true that Thaksin was very

corrupt, the amused response invariably was “Of course, he is corrupt

—all politicians are corrupt, but this is the first corrupt

politician who has done something for us.” To this day, the

corruption, abuses, and personal wealth of Thaksin are glossed over

by his rural supporters—not denied, just treated as irrelevant.

Like the rest of the elite, Thaksin was a royalist in the sense that he recognized the advantages ofharnessing royal barami to advance his own agenda. But unlike most of the establishment, he had noqualms about Vajiralongkorn becoming Rama X. On the contrary, he considered it almost inevitable,and in the 1990s he began preparing for it with typical pragmatism, spending considerable amountsfrom his large fortune to win the crown prince’s favour. As the (very pro-establishment) U.S. ambassadorRalph Boyce wrote in a confidential diplomatic cable in March 2005: “the King will not be aroundforever, and Thaksin long ago invested in Crown Prince futures.”

Bhumibol was furious about Thaksin’s largesse to Vajiralongkorn. The king had been trying to disciplinehis son by restricting his financial allowance, as if the crown prince was still a schoolboy who could bebrought into line by having his pocket money cut. Thaksin’s generosity to Vajiralongkorn sabotaged thisstrategy, and Bhumibol was livid. In his birthday speech in December 2001 he mocked the prime ministerin a monologue dripping with derision.

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Thailand’s traditional elite was equally appalled by Thaksin’s apparent alliance with Vajiralongkorn.Prasong Soonsiri, a right-wing former air force officer linked to Bhumibol’s circle, leaked informationabout the king’s disquiet to Far Eastern Economic Review journalists Shawn Crispin and Rodney Tasker.This was published in the magazine’s January 10, 2002, issue in a brief gossipy item headlined “A RightRoyal Headache”:

It promises to be a messy new year for Thailand politically, if the

messages from some senior officials are to be believed. Thai Prime

Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is becoming an increasing source of

irritation to King Bhumibol Adulyadej because of Thaksin’s perceived

arrogance and his alleged attempts to meddle in royal family affairs.

Thailand’s constitutional monarch has no formal role in day-to-day

politics, but in a speech in early December marking his birthday he

lambasted the premier in public. Thaksin is known to have business

links with the king’s son, Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn. According to

a senior official close to the palace, all this is frowned upon by

the king, prompting speculation of a possible confrontation between

the Prime Minister’s Office and the palace. The same source worries

that Thaksin, who gained a massive majority in last year’s January 6

general election, may use his status as Thailand’s wealthiest

businessman, with solid backing in parliament, to fend off the royal

palace. That would have serious and worrying implications for the

future stability of Thailand.

Thaksin’s government reacted furiously, threatening to expel Crispin and Tasker, which gave furthercredence to the report. But the incident did little to damage Thaksin’s soaring popularity. It is widelyassumed that the elite was concerned that popular support for Thaksin was undermining reverence forBhumibol, but this is not quite correct. Their real worry was that Thaksin’s popularity made it lessimplausible that Vajiralongkorn could become king. The prime minister’s unprecedented approvalratings and electoral legitimacy could compensate for the crown prince’s unpopularity. Together, PrimeMinister Thaksin Shinawatra and King Maha Vajiralongkorn could make a formidable team, perhapsable to dominate Thailand for decades to come. Heightening these concerns, the crown prince appearedto be maturing and settling down, after a secret ceremony at Nonthaburi Palace in February 2001 inwhich he married one of his ladies-in-waiting, Srirasmi Akharapongpreecha.

The man with most to lose from these developments was the elderly Prem Tinsulanonda. With nodescendants to take care of, Prem had little interest in amassing wealth, but his life revolved aroundpreserving the barami he had accumulated and he was addicted to power. He had been a mortal enemyof Vajiralongkorn for two decades, and knew that if the crown prince became Rama X he would be flungout of the privy council and his personal safety could be at risk. Thaksin showed little deference to Premand saw no reason why the old general should still be such a powerful figure. After becoming primeminister, he began systematically circumventing Prem’s network and putting his own allies in influentialpositions.

In 2005, two bombshells detonated in the comfortable world of Thailand’s elite. In February, Thaksin’sThai Rak Thai party won a landslide general election victory that was unprecedented in severalrespects: Thaksin was the first prime minister ever re-elected for a second consecutive term, and the firstto win an overall parliamentary majority at the polls. It was a stunning riposte to his critics and itdemonstrated that he would be a dominant force in Thai politics for the foreseeable future. Then onApril 29, Srirasmi gave birth to a son, Prince Dipangkorn Rasmijoti. He was HIV free — Thai newspapershad reported the previous year that doctors had perfected a technique known as “sperm washing” to

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allow men with HIV to father children who were not infected. Vajiralongkorn had a legitimate male heironce again.

There was panic among the elite, and a coalition of forces assembled to oppose Thaksin Shinawatra. Itincluded almost the entire Thai establishment, the military top brass (loyal to Sirikit and/or Prem), theDemocrat Party, the bureaucracy and judiciary, and much of the Bangkok middle class who were ralliedby Sondhi Limthongkul and Chamlong Srimuang under the banner of the “Yellow Shirt” movement. Itwas a curious alliance that encompassed groups that had been at odds during the 1990s — the innercircles of Bhumibol and Sirikit, the establishment conservatives linked to Prem Tinsulanonda and the“royal liberals” in Anand Panyarachun’s network, right-wing business tycoons and leftist NGO andlabour leaders. What united them was not simply dislike of Thaksin Shinawatra, it was fear ofVajiralongkorn and the possible consequences of his alliance with Thaksin. From the start, the royalsuccession was central to the motivations of the Yellow bloc.

Because of the dangers of openly challenging Vajiralongkorn, which include but go well beyond therisk of violating the draconian lèse majesté law, the Yellow coalition never made explicit its oppositionto the crown prince becoming Rama X. But the clues were everywhere. In apocalyptic speeches, YellowShirt leaders and Thai elder statesmen invoked fears of a looming กลียุค in which corruption andimmorality would destroy Thailand. The demonization of Thaksin Shinawatra as a uniquely dangeroussupervillain — when in fact he was just an unusually effective and typically corrupt political godfather— channelled decades of fear and loathing for Vajiralongkorn. The elite recognized that an alliance ofThaksin and the crown prince posed an existential threat to their political dominance, and this was thereason for their bloodurdling millenarian rhetoric warning that the world was coming to an end. Theirworld was coming to an end, and this terrified them. When a mentally ill 27-year-old Thai man destroyedthe statue of Brahma at the Erawan shrine at Ratchaprasong in the early hours of March 21, 2006,hysterical ultraroyalists like eccentric Nation Group journalist Thanong Khanthong compared thesituation to the last days of Ayutthaya before it was sacked and burned by a Burmese army in 1767, andinvoked an ancient prophecy attributed to King Narai. Sondhi’s speeches at Yellow Shirt rallies routinelysuggested an existential battle was under way in Thailand to prevent an age of darkness engulfing thecountry. Anand Panyarachun warned that Thailand was becoming a failed state:

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Thai society is now polarized by strong hatred. If this condition is

allowed to continue, we will be living in horrifying times.

Despite his support for the Yellow movement, U.S. ambassador Ralph Boyce accurately analyzed thisend-of-the-world angst in a confidential cable at the start of September 2006:

So why all the angst? Part of it is just that people tend to forget

how bad the bad times were. But part of it may stem from the way

politics and Thai society have changed in just a few years. Politics

tended to be a game mostly for the elite to play. In the wake of the

1992 demonstrations that toppled the dictatorship, the “People’s

Constitution” of 1997, the broader access to media brought by rising

prosperity, and the populist policies of PM Thaksin — who staked his

electoral success on maintaining the support of the long-disregarded

rural population — politics has been, well, democratized. Within Thai

society, being “krengjai” (modest, self-effacing) is no longer such a

highly prized virtue; citizens more often see the importance of

demanding their rights. A much broader segment of the population

feels that they have a real stake in the outcome of the political

battles in Bangkok, and they are prepared to assert themselves. This

does raise the overall political temperature and make spontaneous

violence between the rival camps more possible. This may be an

unavoidable by-product of a shift from a political system marked by

back-room deal-making among the elites to one more genuinely

democratic. Old style pols and patricians may be spooked, but we

believe that the Thai can, in the end, manage the transition.

Despite all the efforts of the Yellow coalition to create an atmosphere of looming catastrophe and todemonize Thaksin, most Thais continued to support Thai Rak Thai. But the elite and middle class inBangkok didn’t give a damn about what the rest of the country thought. Helped by an increasingly anti-Thaksin media, they conjured up the illusion that the whole nation was rising up against a dictatorialprime minister. Thaksin himself made some terrible tactical mistakes, most notably with his failure topay tax on the sale of Shin Corp to Singapore’s Temasek in early 2006, fuelling moralistic middle classrage just when the Yellow movement appeared to be running out of steam.

In an interview by Shawn Crispin the following year, Sondhi Limthongkul confirmed that leadingmembers of the old royalist elite, including Prem, his close ally Surayud Chulanont, and senior generals,had supported the aims of the Yellow Shirts and pressured him to seek confrontation. In the lethalpantomime of Thai street politics, popular support and objective truth are irrelevant, the importantthing for anti-government protest leaders is to get some of their own people killed or maimed incircumstances that can plausibly be blamed on the authorities. Sondhi told Crispin:

The request for military intervention or for the king to come out has

always had one prerequisite: there must be bloodshed.

That old political theory, that there must be bloodshed for the king

to intervene, did not work when its purpose was to get rid of

Thaksin. So that more or less upset their planned solution. I

remember vividly that when there was [street protest] against

Thaksin, I always had people calling me: “Khun Sondhi, could you move

things a little bit forward, have a little confrontation, let us see

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a little blood?” …

I fought Thaksin and I was able to pull up the mass, and they were

excited because [the elites] never thought in their minds — and later

on they admitted it — that so many people would come out. So they

were both shocked and ecstatic. So, all the elites were pulling all

their forces behind me.

Sondhi’s Yellow Shirt rallies never came close to bringing down Thaksin by themselves, but they helpedcreate a political climate that enabled a military coup. On September 19, 2006, after months of planningby the Yellow bloc, with Prem Tinsulanonda at the centre of the web, royalist generals deposed Thaksin.Bhumibol immediately gave the new regime his blessing. It was Prem’s coup, but Bhumibol assented toit.

The 2006 coup was a terrible strategic miscalculation by the Thai establishment. They assumed ordinaryThais would passively accept the removal of the most popular prime minister in the country’s history,failing to understand how much society had changed. Millions of Thais who supported Thaksin wereinitially bewildered that the king, who they had believed to be their protector and guardian, had allowedtheir democratically expressed wishes to be overturned. As time went by, their shock and confusionbegan to turn to disgust and anger. Widespread popular reverence for Bhumibol, the sacred glue thatheld Thailand’s unequal hierarchical society together, began to corrode and decay. The establishmentalso assumed that Thaksin would follow the unwritten gentleman’s rules of the Thai elite, and meeklyaccept being turfed out of power. But that was not Thaksin’s style. He fought, and the elderly royalistsinstalled by the coup were utterly befuddled about how to respond. Worse, it quickly became clear thatthey were incompetent at running a 21st century government.

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The establishment had assumed that Prem’s coup was just the first stage of a plan he had worked outwith Bhumibol for preventing Vajiralongkorn becoming king. With Thaksin’s political influenceneutralized, they thought, the royal succession could be managed to keep the crown prince off thethrone. Not only did the coup fail to crush Thaksin’s political power, however, but it quickly became clearthat Prem had not made any arrangements with Bhumibol to handle the succession. Although he hadnever been enthusiastic about his son becoming Rama X, by early 2007 the king appeared to regard it asinevitable, and sent several signals that he had no intention of changing his designated heir. Meanwhile,Bhumibol’s health was worsening and it was clear the succession could come suddenly at any time.

Panic in the royalist ranks reached feverish levels. They had just overthrown a hugely popular primeminister in an exceptionally provocative gambit to sabotage the succession prospects of the heir to thethrone. Belatedly it dawned on them that Vajiralongkorn was still highly likely to become king whenBhumibol died. And when this happened, it seemed probable that he would bring Thaksin back fromexile and allow him to be prime minister once again. An era of political dominance by Thaksin andVajiralongkorn seemed inevitable, during which the royalists would face vengeance for what they haddone. Both Thaksin and the crown prince are noted for their hot tempers and their appetite for revenge.

In a confidential U.S. cable in January 2007 entitled “Coupmakers’ Haunted Dreams“, Ralph Boycereported that the royalist generals who toppled Thaksin were so fraught with worry that they wereunable to sleep at night. The atmosphere of late-reign panic in 2007 was also insightfully evoked inDuncan McCargo’s article Thailand: State of Anxiety. The Thai establishment had backed a coup theythought would save them from an existential threat. Instead, it seemed, they had only succeeded inmaking their demise more inevitable.

Desperate times breed desperate measures. In mid-2007, conservative royalists linked to Prem leaked anotorious video showing Srirasmi’s birthday party in Nonthaburi Palace in 2001, at which she had beenvirtually naked in the presence of numerous courtiers as the crown prince looked on, contentedly puffingon his pipe. A confidential U.S. cable noted that “the Crown Prince’s reputation continues to suffer andmay have declined further, in part due to the dissemination online and by DVD of material harmful tothe image of the Crown Prince and his Royal Consort”, and added: “some in palace circles are workingactively to undercut whatever support exists for the Royal Consort, and we assume that thisundercurrent also has implications for the Crown Prince”. In July, while Vajiralongkorn and Srirasmiwere in Europe, very high-level sources spread misinformation that Vajiralongkorn had died of AIDS.This sinister episode was recounted on the Wikipedia page for Vajiralongkorn before being removed byroyalist sympathizers:

It was an extraordinarily risky strategy for the royalist establishment to adopt — they were activelydamaging the image of the monarchy, even though they needed to maintain popular reverence for thepalace to ensure the continued survival of the existing social order. To make sense of it, one needs tounderstand their desperation. The prince already knew they had been actively seeking to undermine himand sabotage his succession prospects. It had become an all-or-nothing struggle — if the coup leadersand elite backers of the Yellow movement failed to prevent Vajiralongkorn becoming Rama X, they weredoomed. They were prepared to do anything to prevent this, whatever the cost.

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Remarkably, their kamikaze tactics had some success. Vajiralongkorn appears to have realized that hisHIV could be used against him to prevent him becoming king. The reason had nothing to do with healthor longevity — the crown prince has not developed full-blown AIDS, and HIV can now be managedeffectively using anti-retroviral drugs for those with the means to afford them. But the theology of Thaikingship derives from two intertwined religious ideologies, Buddhist and Hindu. In the Buddhist traditionthe king is a dhammaraja whose legitimacy derives from his great spiritual merit. On these terms,Vajiralongkorn’s claim to the throne was exceptionally weak. In the Hindu tradition, the legitimacy ofa devaraja king derives directly from the purity of his bloodline. Previously, Vajiralongkorn’s dynasticclaim was impeccable — he was a celestial prince, the only son of the king and queen. The fact his bloodwas diseased — with leukaemia, and more importanly with HIV due to the moral stigma that tends to beattached to it — made him vulnerable.

During 2007 an experimental project was initiated in Thailand on behalf of the prince in which doctorsinvestigated using plasma filtration and magnetic activated cell sorting (MACS) technology to removeinfected cells from the bloodstream. The equipment was assembled but in the end it was never used —Vajiralongkorn instead began spending long spells at a clinic in Munich. Intriguingly, this came at a timewhen German doctors successfully managed to cure a man of HIV — Timothy Brown, the so-called“Berlin patient”. He was cured with a bone marrow transplant that gave him HIV-resistant bone marrowtreated with stem cells, a highly complex procedure that only made medical sense because Brownsuffered from acute myeloid leukaemia as well as HIV. His leukaemia necessitated the bone marrowtransplant, and his German doctors used the transplant to also cure his HIV. Vajiralongkorn also hasboth HIV and leukaemia, but while he may have explored the possibility of a bone marrow transplant, itnever happened, for unknown reasons. In the end, he began an alternative unorthodox treatmentregime in Germany that involved regular transfusions of HIV-free blood. A curious aspect of both theexperimental treatment explored in Thailand and the transfusions in Germany is that they could nevercure HIV, only greatly reduce the prevalence of HIV infected cells in a patient’s blood. Yet Vajiralongkornappears to believe it is important for him to purify his blood as much as possible.

Another extraordinary development followed the smear campaign by leading royalists. After decades ofbeing Vajiralongkorn’s staunchest supporter and insisting he remain first in line for the throne despiteBhumibol’s doubts, Sirikit began to waver. She believed she was destined to save Thailand fromcalamity, and that in a former life she had been the 16th century Ayutthayan queen Sri Suriyothai, whosupposedly disguised herself as a man and rode into battle on an elephant to defend her husband KingMaha Chakkraphat during the Burmese-Siamese War of 1548. Suriyothai was killed in the battle but herhusband was saved and the Burmese were vanquished, or so the story goes. Egged on by her cabal ofambitious ladies-in-waiting, who hated Vajiralongkorn, Sirikit began to think she would be the bestperson to lead Thailand, as regent for Vajiralongkorn’s young son Dipangkorn. She also grew close toSondhi Limthongkul, whom she met at the residence of her sister Busba. Sirikit liked to go secretly toBusba’s place to relax, drink and play cards away from the constantly watchful eyes of palace courtiers.Sondhi was often there too because he was having an affair with Busba’s daughter Suthawan Ladawan,the wife of Suriakart Sathirathai. Sirikit became increasingly influenced by her discussions with Sondhi.

As the elite obsessively and secretively plotted over the royal succession behind the high walls of theirmansions and palaces, outside in the real world Thai faith in the monarchy was collapsing. On August19, 2007, the coup-installed government held a referendum on a new draft constitution to replace the1997 charter which had failed to function as the elite had hoped it would. There were many things wrongwith the latest version, but voting against it was futile as this would allow the government to pick anypast constitution it wanted from Thailand’s history, according to the rules the elite had written to ensurean outcome that suited them. A huge military-backed propaganda campaign told Thais that voting toreject the charter was tantamount to voting against King Bhumibol, using the slogan “Love the King.

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Care about the King. Vote in the referendum. Accept the 2007 draft charter.” Copies of the draftconstitution were distributed with a yellow cover — the king’s colour. In spite of all this, more than 42percent of those who cast their ballots voted “No”.

This was a remarkable result. Given the fact that an opinion poll would be unthinkable, it is very difficultto estimate what percentage of Thais genuinely revere the monarchy. The 2007 constitutionalreferendum is probably the best gauge, and it suggests that the number of Thai royalists is far lowerthan the establishment likes to claim.

Another major propaganda campaign preceded the general election held on December 23, and themilitary and royalist establishment used several underhand (and illegal) tactics to stack the odds againstThaksin’s new proxy party, the PPP. Nevertheless, the PPP easily won the elections, with the perenniallyuseless Democrat Party far behind in second place. On February 28, Thaksin Shinawatra returned fromexile abroad, prostrating himself on the ground outside Suvarnabhumi Airport as thousands ofsupporters cheered and wept.

These were crushing blows to the royalist establishment. Despite suspending democracy for more than ayear and attempting all kinds of dirty tricks, they had been totally unable to deflate Thaksin’s popularityin Thailand. And yet, within a few months, the gloom and anxiety that had pervaded the Yellow bloc theprevious year evaporated, replaced by a giddy mood of exuberant combativeness. The reason wasSirikit. By April 2008 she had pledged her full support to Sondhi’s PAD and made up her mind to freezeher wayward son out of the royal succession and reign as regent when Bhumibol died — provoking afurious row with Vajiralongkorn in Chulalongkorn Hospital in March 2008 that was mentioned in a secretU.S. cable. It was a crazy plan, not least because Sirikit was approaching the age of 76 and her healthwas not much better than her husband’s. But the desperate royalist establishment and Yellow movementrejoiced at this remarkable development. Just when it seemed that everything was lost, and that thelooming ascendancy of Thaksin and Vajiralongkorn was unstoppable, Sirikit had switched sides andgiven them hope. They began to dare to believe they might prevail after all.

Besides all its more obvious flaws, there was another huge problem with the establishment’s plan to

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bypass Vajiralongkorn and instal Sirikit as regent — Bhumibol was implacably against the idea. He hadbeen estranged from his wife for two decades, and although he had grave misgivings about his son, hewas even more appalled by the idea of Sirikit effectively succeeding him. Had royalist veneration ofBhumibol been genuine, his opposition to their succession machinations would have put an end to theplan. But for the Thai elite, self-preservation was far more important than principle, and whateveraffection they may have felt for their dear old monarch, it was trumped by their existential fear of thecrown prince. And so Bhumibol’s objections were blithely ignored. The elite could afford to do sobecause they had Sirikit on their side. At the age of 80, only two years after his diamond jubilee had beencelebrated with an outpouring of adulation across Thailand and around the world, King Rama IXdiscovered just how little real power he really had. To add insult to injury, the Yellow Shirt leaders whowere knowingly flouting Bhumibol’s wishes ceaselessly proclaimed their bogus love for the king andinsisted they were motivated by their determination to protect him from the evil schemes of Thaksin.Making things even worse for the hapless monarch, Sirikit moved in with him in Hua Hun’s Klai Kangwon(“Far From Worries”) palace in mid-2008, ostensibly to look after the increasingly infirm Bhumibol butactually to keep an eye on him and prevent him circumventing her schemes.

To have any hope of success, the plan to prevent Vajiralongkorn becoming Rama X required threeinstitutions in particular to be on board. First of all, the privy council was crucial: if Bhumibol diedwithout removing the crown prince’s status as designated heir, the privy council could still propose analternative candidate as monarch by invoking Article 10 of the 1924 Palace Law on Succession, whichstates:

The Heir who is to succeed to the Throne should be fully respected by

the people and the people should be able to rely on him happily. If

he is considered by the majority of the people as objectionable, he

should be out of the line to the Throne.

Secondly, the army leadership had to agree with the plan. If the military disagreed with efforts to meddlewith the royal succession they would swiftly crack down and crush the plot. Given the possibility thecrown prince might attempt to launch an armed challenge to the privy council’s decision, the armywould also have to be on standby to lock down the capital and enforce the alternative succession plan. Thirdly, under Thailand’s constitution, parliament had to formally ratify the privy council’s decision andproclaim the new monarch. There would be no time to circumvent this requirement by staging a militaryor judicial coup and appointing a new parliament because another crucial element of the plan was thatit would have to be executed with decisive speed. As soon news of Bhumibol’s death became public,Vajiralongkorn would begin acquiring the status of monarch by default unless an alternative candidatewas proposed and ratified immediately. Every hour that passed without an alternative monarchformally in place would gravely lessen the plan’s likelihood of success and increase the probability ofserious civil conflict. Moreover, for those in charge of carrying out the plan, the consequences of openlytrying and failing to sabotage Vajiralongkorn’s succession were too grim to contemplate. Once the planwas set in motion, failure to achieve success would be suicidal.

The privy council was fully on board — Prem was a prime mover in the plan to sabotage the succession,and his elderly cronies all passionately loathed Vajiralongkorn. The army leadership also supported theplan — all of the top brass were acolytes of Sirikit and most were fanatically loyal to her. The problemwas parliament. Ever since the start of the 21st century, Thaksin Shinawatra had won control ofparliament every time an election was held, even when the odds were heavily stacked against him. Giventhe fecklessness of the Democrat Party, there was no prospect of this changing any time soon. Some wayhad to be found to prise parliament from Thaksin’s grip — and more importantly, prevent him winning itback at the first opportunity he got.

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And so, apparently oblivious to the damage this would do to the reputation of the monarchy and thestability of a country still roiled by the royalist coup of September 2006, the establishment and the YellowShirts launched an aggressive campaign to topple the newly elected government, with the explicitbacking of the queen. For Thaksin, the royalist assault on the PPP presented both a serious threat and abeguiling opportunity. If he could successfully resist, and ensure Vajiralongkorn became Rama X, hecould expect to be richly rewarded for his role as kingmaker.

The new U.S. ambassador Eric John, a far shrewder observer of Thai politics than his bumptious andbiased predecessor Ralph Boyce, analyzed the conflict in a confidential cable during 2008:

The battle lines in Thailand’s political environment are clearly

drawn, even if there are multiple actors in play. However,

reductionist arguments that the crisis is about “the King vs.

Thaksin” are overly simplified; neither camp controls all who claim

allegiance to each, and key secondary figures in both camps have

differing agendas. While all countries have their unique dynamics —

Thailand’s revolves around the institution of monarchy — Thailand

nevertheless is experiencing a version of a scenario that has played

out in other East Asian countries: economic growth outstripping the

pace of democratic institutional maturation, and new groups

challenging the prerogatives of old elites.

Although both sides in this polarized society have independent-minded

and middle-class participants, former Prime Minister Thaksin

Shinawatra provides direction and, we assume with confidence,

financing for his allies, relying on a loyal electorate in the

northeast and north of Thailand which benefited from his populist

policies from 2001-06. The Thaksin machine faces off against a mix of

royalists, Bangkok middle class, and southerners, with Queen Sirikit

having emerged as their champion, as King Bhumibol largely fades from

an active role. The two sides are competing for influence and appear

to believe, or fear, that the other will use the political power it

has to marginalize (if not eliminate) the opposing side. They are

positioning themselves for what key actors on both sides freely admit

to us in private will be Thailand’s moment of truth — royal

succession after the King passes away.

On March 28, Sondhi Limthongkul resumed regular Yellow Shirt rallies. On May 19, Visakha Bucha day,the most important Buddhist holiday, Sirikit visited Wat Channa Songkram, Bangkok’s “War VictoryTemple”, with army commander Anupong Paochinda. As a leaked cable from U.S. chargé d’affairesJames Entwistle noted:

That temple is not the traditional venue for the royal family on this

holiday, but is normally a place where people pray before going into

a battle of one sort or another.

It was a declaration of war. The events that followed in 2008 were truly extraordinary — a guerrillainsurgency openly fought by Thailand’s establishment against the country’s elected government. Therewas a remarkable degree of coordination among different elements of the Yellow alliance — the PAD,elite elder statesmen, the biased judiciary, the Democrat Party, newspapers and the militaryleadership. This was the “network monarchy” flexing its muscles, but it was Sirikit and her cronies

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pulling the strings, not Bhumibol.

The shrill and paranoid climate of rabid hyper-royalism was ratcheted up ever higher, with the lèsemajesté law used to undermine the government and intimidate the foreign media. Jakrapob Penkhair, aminister attached to the prime minister’s office who was the main government spokesman, andJonathan Head, a highly respected BBC journalist, were accused of violating Article 112 during an August2007 panel discussion at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand at which Jakrapob had criticizedThailand’s culture of patronage and directed some snide remarks at Prem. Abandoning any pretence ofbeing a progressive party that believed in freedom of speech, the Democrat Party began preparations toimpeach Jakrapob, who eventually resigned on May 30. Meanwhile, Anand Panyarachun, who had longcultivated a cosy relationship with prominent foreign journalists and remains the only significant elitesource most of them have, privately assured Head he would not be charged, but on May 27 policeshowed up at the FCCT and questioned club president Nirmal Ghosh for three hours, also threatening toconfiscate the club’s computers. The intimidation worked. Foreign journalists in Bangkok remainterrified of writing anything that could be construed as lèse majesté, and have done an atrocious job ofexplaining to the world what is really going in Thailand.

On May 25, the Yellow Shirts held a rally at Democracy Monument attended by around 10,000 people. ThePAD supporters attempted to march on parliament and Government House, and after being stopped atthe nearby Makkawan Bridge, they set up a permanent protest site there. It was the beginning of 193days of continuous and increasingly disruptive protest by the Yellow Shirts, explicitly intended tosabotage the government’s ability to govern.

On June 18, Thailand and Cambodia signed a Joint Communiqué in Paris endorsing the registration ofthe 9th century Khmer temple of Preah Vihear as a UNESCO World Heritage site. The clifftop temple wason disputed territory, claimed by Thailand, and although the International Court of Justice had ruled in1962 that it belonged to Cambodia, Thailand continued to contest 4.6 square kilometres of territoryaround Preah Vihear. The UNESCO agreement followed years of diplomacy, during the Thaksin andSurayud administrations, to agree a position on the UNESCO listing that was acceptable to bothcountries and did not impact Thailand’s territorial claim. The Joint Communiqué explicitly stated thatThailand’s support of UNESCO status for Preah Vihear would not prejudice ongoing border negotiationswith Cambodia. But the Yellow movement saw an opportunity to attack the government by claiming —entirely inaccurately — that the PPP administration was “selling Thai territory” to Cambodia. Theystoked dangerous tensions at the border to try to inflame nationalist anger and rally opposition to thegovernment.

On June 20, thousands of PAD supporters broke through police barricades and marched on GovernmentHouse. The Democrat Party demanded a no-confidence debate in parliament on June 24-25, also joiningthe attack over Preah Vihear. The government easily defeated the no-confidence motions, but most Thaimedia coverage favoured the opposition. Meanwhile, the courts once again began delivering judgmentsdamaging to the Thaksin camp. On July 8 the Supreme Court upheld electoral fraud charges againstYongyuth Tiyapairat, a senior ally of Thaksin’s. The decision meant that the PPP could face dissolutionaccording to the rules of the 2007 constitution. The Constitutional Court also ruled that Foreign MinisterNoppadon Pattama should have received formal parliamentary approval before signing the JointCommuniqué with Cambodia. As a result, Noppadon resigned on July 10. The U.S. embassy commented“we find the Court’s analysis questionable”, adding:

This ruling will likely reinforce the impression of Thaksin

supporters that the Court is ill-disposed toward Thaksin and his

allies.

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Thaksin’s opponents also stepped up their efforts to convict him and his wife Pojaman on corruptioncharges over a 2003 deal. Pojaman also faced separate tax evasion charges. U.S. ambassador Eric Johnwarned in a confidential cable that the politicization of the judiciary would have highly damaging long-term consequences for Thailand:

The courts may prove capable of marginalizing Thaksin, either by

incarcerating him or by tarnishing his reputation beyond repair. It

is possible that Thaksin’s conviction in one or more cases would

represent a straightforward dispensation of justice, as we believe he

likely used his authority as Prime Minister to benefit himself and

his cronies. However, we also note that there is an increasing

perception among Thais that the judiciary has become politicized;

this perception has grown ever since a watershed speech in April

2006, in which King Bhumibol called on the judiciary to take action

to resolve the ongoing political crisis. While the courts currently

have the requisite level of prestige and credibility to marginalize

Thaksin — a goal that the Army proved incapable of achieving in the

2006-07 period — the judiciary may also suffer in the long term, as

it moves beyond its traditional role and increasingly serves as a

decisive instrument for shaping political life.

On July 22, activist Darunee Charnchoensilpakul, known as “Da Torpedo”, was arrested on charges oflèse majesté over speeches she had made at anti-PAD rallies on July 18 and 19. As the U.S. embassynoted, some of her comments breached the most sensitive taboos:

She implied that King Bhumibol was involved in the unusual death of

his brother, King Ananda Mahidol; urged Thailand to follow the

example of Nepal in abolishing the monarchy; and suggested that the

aging King relied on Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda to

make his decisions.

Inevitably, the antics of the royalist establishment, the Yellow Shirts and the judiciary further damagedthe reputation of the palace. A U.S. cable at the start of August quoted Thaksin ally Jaran Ditapichai andPAD leader Somkiat Pongpaiboon as saying anti-monarchism was surging:

UDD activist Charan, a former communist who has expressed his

distaste for monarchies in a controversial book on the French

revolution, told us he was surprised by what he perceived as an

increasingly open expression of anti-monarchy sentiment, such as

Daranee’s. He said “many Thais are like her now… online, in coffee

shops, and on community radio.” The King, he said, is being heavily

criticized in public, by the public, for the first time in modern

history. He claimed to have heard many community radio programs in

which people phoned in to complain that the monarchy had supported

past coups, and many callers viewed the monarchy as an obstacle to

democracy in Thailand. PAD co-leader Somkiat also told us he had

noticed a proliferation of anti-monarchy websites, starting in 2005,

and he also referred to the widespread availability of video discs

that show the Crown Prince’s Royal Consort, Srirasmi, semi-nude.

During August, Thaksin and Pojaman travelled to China for the opening ceremony of the Olympic

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Games. Instead of returning to Thailand at the end of their visit, they flew to London and on August 11Thaksin faxed a handwritten statement to the Thai media declaring he would not return to face legalproceedings he denounced as unfair. The Yellows scented blood. Thaksin Shinawatra was officially onthe run.

On August 31, a 41-year-old Australian working as a university lecturer, English teacher and freelancewriter in Chiang Mai became the latest Westerner to fall foul of the lèse majesté law. Harry Nicolaides hadself-published a novel in 2005, entitled Verisimilitude: Is the truth, the truth? He printed just 50 copies, ofwhich only seven were ever sold. In one passage, the novel related the sexual shenanigans of a Thaiprince, unnamed but clearly based on Vajiralongjorn:

From King Rama to the Crown Prince, the nobility was renowned for

their romantic entanglements and intrigues. The Crown Prince had many

wives major and minor with a coterie of concubines for entertainment.

One of his recent wives was exiled with her entire family, including

a son they conceived together, for an undisclosed indiscretion. He

subsequently remarried with another woman and fathered another child.

It was rumoured that if the prince fell in love with one of his minor

wives and she betrayed him, she and her family would disappear with

their name, familial lineage and all vestiges of their existence

expunged forever.

Nicolaides was arrested at Bangkok airport while trying to leave the country to return to his nativeAustralia. He was denied bail, and held in Bangkok Remand Centre awaiting trial.

Border hostilities with Cambodia continued to simmer, with efforts to defuse the confrontation overPreah Vihear damaged by some aggressive Thai troop movements. The pro-Sirikit military leadershipwas doing its part to keep tensions on the boil.

At the end of August, Eric John sent a cable to Washington entitled “THAILAND PROTESTS: A PADPRIMER”. He billed it as “a guide to PAD, its leaders, and motives”. The cable discussed the alarming

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extremism of the Yellow Shirts, and their intimate links with Queen Sirikit:

The People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) behind the ongoing street

protests against PM Samak’s government first surfaced in 2005 in

reaction to growing discontent over the alleged corruption of then-PM

Thaksin. It largely disappeared following the September 2006 coup

that ended the Thaksin administration, only to reemerge in Thai

politics on March 28 with the same leadership but fewer supporters

and a more radical agenda. Since then, it has been an active,

occasionally aggressive, daily force on the Thai political stage. The

last 90 days of protests have halted Bangkok’s infamous traffic on

numerous occasions, temporarily seized a media outlet, and even

displaced the Prime Minister on several occasions from his office…

Before the aggressive actions launched August 26 which led to arrest

warrants for its leadership and left its future uncertain, PAD

appeared to be transforming itself from a movement whose purpose was

to combat Thaksin and his allies whenever they were perceived to be

untouchable, to a political party with a simultaneous populist and

royalist-nationalist bent, with megalomaniac Sondhi Limthongkul using

it as his personal vehicle, much as Thaksin did with Thai Rak Thai.

PAD’s 2008 reincarnation largely abandoned its origins as a wide,

loose coalition of the working class, royalists, and middle class

Bangkokians seeking justice and increased transparency in government

in a shift to anti-democratic principles and increasing association

with the Queen’s circle rather than the King alone…

In the latest round of protests, PAD supporters have also started

wearing armbands and other items in light blue, a color associated

with the Queen, seen by many in Thailand to support a more

nationalistic approach on issues like the south and a more

aggressive opposition to the Thaksin camp, including if necessary

with military involvement.

Sondhi Limthongkul’s anti-democratic beliefs were made clear when he began openly proposing aphilosophy of “New Politics” in which 70 percent of parliament would be appointed by the networkmonarchy and only 30 percent directly elected. The bizarre scheme was motivated by a determination toput parliament forever beyond Thaksin’s control and ensure Vajiralongkorn could be prevented frombecoming king.

On August 26, the PAD escalated the political crisis once again, storming and occupying GovernmentHouse during a day of coordinated provocations aimed at forcing Samak’s administration into a violentresponse. As the U.S. embassy reported:

In the latest twist in Thailand’s on-going political drama, the

Peoples Alliance for Democracy (PAD) staged a mass demonstration in

Bangkok and strategic points around the country in a what some press

sources are reporting as a last bid show-down with the Peoples Power

Party (PPP) led government of Samak Sundaravej. Kraisak Choonhaven,

Democrat party MP and deputy party leader, told us that the PAD

leaders had laid out their intentions to him late August 25; the PAD

hoped to provoke clashes with the police, leading to enough violence

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and government overreaction to spark military intervention/another

coup…

The day’s activities got off to an unexpected start early on August

26 when some 80 to 100 PAD supporters attempted to take control of

the government-run NTB television station between 0430 and 0530.

Although Royal Thai Police units responded and arrested a large

number of the demonstrators (press reports indicate between 60 and

80), control of the NTB compound and the quality of the transmission

varied throughout the day. In the end, it appeared the NTB showdown

was only the first incident in a series of determined PAD attempts to

provoke PM Samak and security forces into a direct confrontation.

With surprising efficiency, the PAD executed simultaneous marches on

the Ministries of Education, Finance, Agriculture and Transportation,

as well as the Government House compound which is the formal seat of

the PM and the government. By 1500 they had occupied these ministries

and the Government House compound.

On August 29 the Yellow Shirts raised the stakes once more, forcing the shutdown of several provincialairports including Phuket, Krabi and Hat Yai, and blocking key railway services. Thousands of Thais andforeign tourists were left stranded.

Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej did not take the bait, although this was partly because he knew hecould not count on the support of army chief Anupong Paochinda. Anupong was a man with splitloyalties: he was part of the Queen’s Guard army clique and had joined the 2006 coup plotters, but hewas also in Thaksin’s Class 10 military network. During 2008, he insisted he was remaining neutral in theworsening political conflict, but this meant that he failed to offer Samak the military support that theprime minister would have needed for a robust response against the Yellow Shirts. Aware of this, Samakrefrained from pushing for a serious crackdown, although the police did issue arrest warrants for thePAD leadership. As the U.S embassy commented:

While there is little doubt that PAD had hoped to provoke conflict,

the Thai government and police have so far pursued a passive posture

with the apparent intent to avoid confrontation.

In their excellent 2009 book Thaksin, Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker note that the military’s refusalto back the government was far from being a “neutral” position:

General Anupong Paochinda, who had succeeded as army chief in October

2007, persistently claimed that he and the army would not make

another coup but would remain “neutral”. He said the dispute was

“political” and thus had to be solved by political means. But in a

situation in which PAD had begun to break laws as a deliberate

strategy to undermine the authority of the government, “neutrality”

took on a special meaning…

Anupong’s “neutrality” was effectively a withdrawal of services from

the PPP government — the horse bucking off its jockey. This move both

symbolized the army’s growing independence of action and undermined

the PPP’s legitimacy to govern.

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Meanwhile, leading network monarchists were plotting Samak’s downfall. Privy councillor SiddhiSavetsila told Eric John on September 3 about a secret scheme he was planning to present to KingBhumibol to remove Samak (and Thaksin) from politics:

Privy Councilor ACM Siddhi Savetsila made clear to Ambassador Sept. 3

that he viewed Thaksin and, by extension, PM Samak as an existential

threat to the Thailand he supported, centered on the monarchy…

Stressing that Ambassador was the only foreigner he would share the

information with, Siddhi laid out a scenario which he said he would

present to King Bhumiphol later in the day in an audience for the

Privy Councilors in Hua Hin. The solution was not by using force but

to rehabilitate Thai democracy. The same Constitution would remain,

amended to allow outsiders (non-MPs) to serve in the Cabinet. The

House and Senate would stay. Universally respected former PM Anand

should serve as the leader of the “project,” which would involve

respected, “honest” ex-military and Ministry of Interior officials,

academics, one or two PAD members, and perhaps some Democrat Party

figures. The mandate would be to initiate a wide array of reforms in

the economic, social, and political sphere. That in turn would “weed

out” the bane effects of Thaksinism from the system. Army Commander

Anuphong would have to deliver the message to Samak; no one else

could.

Siddhi said that a group of prominent figures had approached him with

the plan, more than could fit in his modest living room. The only one

he named was Pramote Nakorntab, a retired respected professor and

political scientist from Chulalongkorn University; others included a

high ranking Air Force officer and a Constitutional Court Judge.

Since, as a Privy Councilor, he was not supposed to be involved in

politics, only in advising the King, Siddhi agreed to meet “as a

former military leader” ready to do his best for the country. He was

willing to push forward and present the project to the King in part

to shield Privy Council Chair Prem Titsulanonda, who had been heavily

and unjustly criticized for backing the PAD and trying to promote a

Democrat Party-led government. The stakes were high; it was essential

to rehabilitate the democratic system in Thailand. “If we lose,

Thaksin will come back, and if Thaksin comes back, the monarchy will

be lost,” Siddhi explained.

It was a remarkable insight into the working of the network monarchy, with elite figures scheming andconspiring in private and then seeking a signal of support from the king. The plan was yet anothervariant of “Thai-style democracy” — suspending genuine democracy and replacing it with the rule ofappointed royalist “good men”. Siddhi was an 89-year-old political dinosaur who had been close to PhaoSriyanond’s clique in the 1940s and 1950s and served as a foreign minister under Prem. The very fact hebelieved he had a right to meddle in politics and advocate the overthrow of an elected governmentdemonstrated how out of touch and deluded senior royalists had become.

Anand Panyarachun told U.S. diplomats that Samak was likely to be forced from power: “I cannot ruleout regime change, but it would not be a traditional coup d’etat.” He confirmed he had been in contactwith the plotters:

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Anand acknowledged he had been listening to the group for the past

week, but refused to get involved directly in anything before the

plan was put into action. If the plan went forward, he was prepared

to meet with them at that point. It was imperative to ensure the

least impact on the contents of Thai democracy; even in the case of

non-elected persons of supposed quality, care needed to be taken.

Anand claimed that “I’m always my own man,” and that he had turned

down many positions offered when he thought others sought to control

him.

Ambassador underscored the critical importance of developments in

Thailand staying within the framework of the constitution and rule of

law; if that did not occur, the U.S. would respond accordingly. Anand

replied that he had disagreed with the U.S. reaction to the 2006 coup

and frequently disagreed with western views of what constituted

democracy in various countries.

The bureaucracy and judiciary were playing their part to help. On September 2 the ElectionCommission voted to seek the dissolution of the PPP due to vote buying by Yongyuth Tiyapairat. OnSeptember 3, Tej Bunnag resigned as foreign minister. Samak hung on, though he wasincreasingly isolated. Meanwhile, at Government House, the number of PAD protesters began dwindling,as the U.S. embassy reported:

The PAD siege of Government House continued despite deteriorating

living conditions at the site; the weekend rains turned the trampled

grounds of Government House compound into a sea of mud. In an effort

to ward off the increasingly unsanitary conditions, and diminish what

the Thai press called the prevailing stench of urine, protest

organizers began sprinkling white “disinfectant” powder over the

stinking muddy ground. Protesters jokingly said they could bear the

stench better than they could stand the government.

Fearing that they were losing momentum, the Yellow bloc struck back on September 9. TheConstitutional Court ruled that the prime minister had violated conflict-of-interest rules by continuing toappear on a TV cookery programme, Tasting and Grumbling, even though he received at most onlynominal payments. It was a bizarre and clearly partisan decision (expertly dissected by VerapatPariyawong in his Harvard thesis Three Course Recipe for the Court’s Cookery) that made it clearer thanever that the judiciary had become a tool of the royalist elite to thwart the democratic will of themajority.

Samak had to resign as a result of the decision, but parliament could have opted to renominate him asprime minister. Instead, however, Thaksin and his allies decided it was time to drop Samak. As Eric Johnnoted, they had “realized that Samak is now a far greater liability than asset”. Instead, Thaksin’sbrother-in-law Somchai Wongsuwat was nominated as the next prime minister. In a meeting with EricJohn after resigning from the PPP, Samak was scathing about Sirikit:

Samak described to Ambassador the political pressure against him

during his seven months in office. He showed disdain for Queen

Sirikit, claiming that she had been responsible for the 2006 coup

d’etat as well as the ongoing turmoil generated by PAD protests. He

alleged the Queen operated through Privy Council President Prem

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Tinsulanonda who, along with others presenting themselves as

royalists, worked with the PAD and other agitators. Citing his own

regular meetings with King Bhumibol, Samak claimed he — rather than

his opponents — was sincerely loyal to the King and enjoyed the

King’s support. In his discussion of the monarchy, Samak made no

mention of the Crown Prince.

On October 3, fighting erupted between Thai and Cambodian troops around Preah Vihear. The sameday, police detained one of the PAD leaders, Chaiwat Sinsuwong, and two days later, arrested key YellowShirt figurehead Chamlong Srimuang. The arrest of Chamlong appears to have been a carefully laidtrap, possibly involving Prem Tinsulanonda. The government was led to believe that the palace approvedthe arrests. Chamlong was aware he was about to be detained: as in 1992, he was using his treatment bythe authorities as a way of stirring up his supporters. As the U.S. embassy reported:

Chamlong appeared to have anticipated his arrest; he had left a

letter to be read to protestors at Government House at 9:00 a.m.,

describing the anti-government demonstrations as a patriotic duty,

and instructing the remaining PAD leaders to break off negotiations

with the government after his arrest…

Protests at Government House had become less energetic and poorly

attended in recent weeks; on one mid-day, mid-week visit in late

September, we counted no more than 250 protesters. Many supporters

stopped coming to Government House in person, opting to watch the

speeches via the pro-PAD Asia Satellite Television (ASTV). Chamlong’s

arrest in particularly appeared to energize PAD sympathizers. On

October 4, visiting INR analyst estimated roughly 1,000 supporters

were inside the Government House compound. According to media

reports, the crowd at Government House grew substantially after

Chamlong’s arrest, and PAD supporters from other provinces are moving

into Bangkok. A senior police official told us on October 6 that more

than 10,000 PAD supporters were at Government House on the night of

October 5. This official anticipated approximately 5,000 additional

people to join October 6 rallies at the site.

As Eric John commented in a later cable:

In retrospect, it appears that PAD leader Chamlong Srimuang sprung a

perfect trap by consenting to be arrested October 5. Chamlong’s

arrest gave renewed vigor to an increasingly dispirited PAD protest,

at a time when a possible government-opposition agreement to form a

commission to review possible constitutional changes threatened to

take the winds completely out of the PAD sails.

It was all part of the Yellow plan. The arrests were a prelude to an attempt to provoke violentconfrontations with police on October 7, when new Prime Minister Somchai was required to deliver hispolicy statement to parliament. Royalist tycoon Chutinant Bhirombhakdi of the Singha beer dynasty haddinner with a senior Yellow Shirt leader on October 6 who explicitly admitted the PAD was hoping at leasttwo dozen of its own supporters would be killed in the confrontation, to give the military justification fora coup. As Eric John reported in a November cable:

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Chutinant believed PAD continued to aim for a violent clash that

would spark a coup. He asserted that he had dined on October 6 with a

leading PAD figure (NFI), who explained that PAD would provoke

violence during its October 7 protest at the parliament. The unnamed

PAD figure predicted (wrongly) that the Army would intervene against

the government by the evening of October 7. Chutinant asserted to us

that PAD remained intent on a conflict that would generate at least

two dozen deaths and make military intervention appear necessary and

justified.

On the night of October 6, the Yellow Shirts marched from Government House to the parliamentbuilding, erecting barricades with razor wire and booby traps. PAD guards with slingshots, metal bars,golf clubs, ping pong bombs and clubs patrolled the perimeter. The stage was set for the deadlyconfrontation of “Black Tuesday”.

At around six in the morning on October 7, police began their effort to disperse the Yellow Shirts. NickNostitz, probably the best foreign journalist in Thailand, witnessed the events of the day as they unfoldedand wrote a detailed account on the New Mandala website. Nostitz says police warned the protestersmultiple times via loudspeakers that unless they peacefully ended their blockade, tear gas would be used.The police said conflict would not help anyone, that they were all Thais, and they should not fight eachother. When the Yellow Shirts failed to move, the police fired tear gas canisters and advanced towardsthe barricades. Yellow Shirts threw ping pong bombs and firecrackers. There were some unusuallypowerful explosions. Nostitz describes what happened as the skirmish ended:

In all the rush and the smoke it was very difficult to see exactly

what was going on; biting teargas blinded nearly everyone… Also very

few police officers had proper masks, and were just as affected.

During all the time the loudspeaker from the police asked protesters

to stop fighting. Soon after the protesters stopped, and sat down on

the road, and police achieved their goal of opening the gate.

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That was when I was made aware of the badly injured protesters. One

man was sitting, with his left leg blown away at the knee, folded

beside him just held by a few strings of skin. He was surrounded by

shocked police officers; some tried to comfort him. There were two or

three other badly injured protesters around… Things then calmed down.

I spoke with several police officers over the injuries. They were all

shocked.

The police action allowed the parliament session to begin and the prime minister began his speech. Butduring the morning the Yellow Shirts counterattacked, taking police by surprise. As a U.S. cablerecounted:

The RTP morning operation resulted in over 70 protesters being

admitted to hospital, mainly with tear gas symptoms, but media

reported a handful of more serious injuries, including one protester

who lost a leg and a second who allegedly suffered shrapnel wounds.

By mid-afternoon, after the mid-day clashes, hospital personnel

confirmed to us that the number of admitted had risen to 101, that

most but not all of the injuries were consistent with tear gas and

trampling injuries, and that one protester had lost a leg. Several

police were reported injured in the mid-day clashes.

Police COL Suwat, deputy Commander of the Metropolitan Police for

Demonstrations/Intelligence, told us the police had only used tear

gas and flash bangs in the morning operation. The RTP believed a

crude homemade pipebomb with black powder, similar to fireworks and

likely in a metal container, had exploded, perhaps accounting for the

more seriously wounded. One woman had lost a leg when the bomb

exploded; the RTP believed the bomb belonged to the PAD…

Police… inexplicably let down their guard while PM Somchai was

speaking, and a secondary PAD effort reestablished the blockade.

Media reported that PAD protesters used sticks to drive off the

police from the main entrance into the parliamentary compound, then

commandeered police vehicles to barricade the entrances, trapping

MPs, Senators, and for a time PM Somchai inside. House Speaker Chai

Chidchod then suspended the policy debate and canceled the session

planned for October 8.

Street battles raged throughout the afternoon and into the evening. PAD protesters attacked police withsticks, ping pong bombs, and slingshots firing iron ball bearings and marbles. Some Yellow Shirts evenhad firearms. Protesters tried to ram several vehicles, including a lorry, into police barricades. Onepoliceman was deliberately run over by a Yellow Shirt in a pickup truck, who then reversed back overhim.

During the afternoon, an explosion destroyed a stationary Cherokee jeep some distance from thefighting, killing Methee Chartmontri, a former police lieutenant colonel who was head of the PAD guardsin Buri Ram and brother-in-law of PAD leader Karoon Sai-ngarm. Methee’s body was blown apart by theblast: one leg was still inside the vehicle, most of his corpse was blasted out of the wrecked jeep, and hishands were never found. The second fatality on Black Tuesday was Angkhana Radappanyawut,nicknamed “Nong Bow”, a 28-year-old business administration graduate from Bangkok’s Assumption

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University and the eldest of three sisters. She had joined the protests that day with her family, allsupporters of the Yellow Shirts. Angkhana died near the corner of Royal Plaza, in the thick the battle, theleft side of her chest torn open by a blast that lacerated her heart, stomach, spleen, left kidney, and liver,and broke her left arm and all her ribs on the left side. She was dressed in a yellow PAD T-shirt and jeans,with a wristband in the red, white and blue of the Thai flag.

Nostitz described the scene in the first volume of his planned trilogy Red vs. Yellow:

Another injured woman was lying in the midst of a heap of debris on

the street. At first I did not even realize there was a person there;

it was only when army medics attended to her that I realized it was a

woman. Not until one month later was I able to confirm that this was…

Angkhana Radappanyawut… one of the two people that died that day.

Great controversy hangs over the events of October 7. The Yellow Shirts accused the police of brutality,pointing to the deaths of two PAD supporters and the shocking injuries suffered by some protesters. Theylauded the two Yellow Shirts who died as martyrs. Based on investigations by forensic pathologistPorntip Rojanasunan, they alleged that the deaths and injuries were caused by Chinese-made tear gascanisters fired by the police. But this story does not stand up to scrutiny. Porntip has since been exposedas a corrupt and incompetent fraud, ignorant of basic scientific principles, as a result of the GT200debacle. There is no credible doubt that Methee Chartmontri was killed by explosives he was transportingdetonating prematurely, probably while he was handling them — the reason for his missing hands. As forAngkhana, her family angrily denied accusations that, either knowingly or unwittingly, she had beencarrying a PAD bomb. Nostitz discusses the controversy in Red vs. Yellow, Volume 1:

The death of Angkhana Radappanyawut became a huge issue over the

following days and weeks. She was portrayed by the PAD as an innocent

protester who was simply walking back to Government House when the

police attacked and killed her. A cult of martyrdom and hero worship

was created around her death. The UDD called her a naïve person who

was being used to carry explosives that went off and killed her.

From the location where she died, there are doubts about her non-

involvement in the fighting. She died at the front line of the

fighting, and not at the back of Royal Plaza where there were no

hostilities and which would have been the closer and more logical

route for a protester to follow when walking back to Government House

from Parliament… The debate about Angkhana continues, and will

probably never come to a satisfying conclusion.

Although the circumstances of Angkhana’s death are murky, it is not implausible that she wasaccidentally killed by explosives she was carrying, as part of the Yellow Shirt leadership’s strategy oftrying to get some of its supporters killed that day. As the U.S. embassy noted in confidential cable08BANGKOK3042, the confrontation at parliament was the latest effort by the PAD to provoke anaggressive response:

For most of the day, it was the PAD attacking police formations, not

the other way around. The police reported that PAD demonstrators

utilized pistols, knives, and metal pipes during the clashes and also

had gasoline-filled pingpong balls, essentially mini-Molotov

cocktails.

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In line with the Yellow strategy, opposition politicians and the royalist media exploited the deaths andmayhem to attack the legitimacy of the elected government. In comments that would later haunt him,Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva declared at a news conference:

For all that has happened, the PM cannot deny his responsibility,

either by negligence or intention. What is even worse than laying the

blame on the authorities is vilifying the people. I have never

thought that we would have a state which has the people killed and

seriously injured, and then accuses the people of the crimes. This is

unacceptable. I have heard those in the government always asking

people whether they are Thai or not. Considering what you are doing

now, it is not the question of being Thai or not, but whether you are

human at all… There is nowhere else on earth, in democratic systems,

where the people are abused by the state, but the government which

comes from the people does not take responsibility.

Doctors at Chulalongkorn Hospital said they would not treat wounded police. “The medical team ofChulalongkorn Hospital will not give assistance to police officers injured from the clashes with PADsupporters. This is a social measure to show that doctors and nurses condemn the violent actions,” saidDr Suthep Koncharnwit. Meanwhile, newspapers actively sought to sensationalize the riot and smear thepolice and the government. Here is the front page of The Nation on October 8:

On October 9, the Appeals Court threw out the most serious treason charges against the nine coreleaders of the PAD. Chamlong was freed on bail. The same day, the Administrative Court ordered policeto use less forceful crowd control methods. The government looked weaker than ever.

On October 13, six days after Angkhana Radappanyawut died, Queen Sirikit personally presided overher cremation ceremony. Thousands of Yellow Shirts at the funeral chanted “Long Live Her Majesty”.Afterwards, Angkhana’s father Jinda wept as he told reporters: “Her Majesty said my daughter was agood woman since she had helped the nation and preserved the monarchy.” The Yellow Shirts seized onSirikit’s gesture as proof of explicit royal backing for their cause. But it was a deeply divisive and highlydangerous move for the monarchy. Many Thais were shocked by Sirikit’s overt support for an extremist

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anti-democratic movement which had deliberately provoked confrontation with the police in an effort totopple an elected government. As the U.S. ambassador noted in leaked cable 08BANGKOK3289:

Queen Sirikit … made a bold political statement practically without

precedent in presiding over the funeral of a PAD supporter from

humble roots who died during the October 7 clash between PAD and the

police. Even some figures close to the Queen have expressed their

private unease at the overtly political act, since it seems to erode

the concept, which the King has long sought to promote, of an

apolitical monarchy. After the Queen’s funeral appearance, there was

a notable increase in public complaints about acts of lese majeste,

with many seemingly targeting the Queen; PPP-affiliated politicians

have expressed a combination of fear and loathing for the Queen in

private conversations with us in recent months. Such politicization

of the monarchy at this time appears to create extra uncertainty

around the eventual royal succession, and it could well boomerang on

royalists when the time comes to redefine the role of the monarchy

after the King’s passing.

Besides Sirikit, the funeral was attended by Princess Chulabhorn, army commander Anupong,Democrat Party leader Abhisit and PAD leader Sondhi. The October 14 funeral rites of MetheeChartmontri, the PAD guard leader blown up in his jeep by his own bomb, were presided over byAnand Panyarachun, who the royalists were hoping to instal as an unelected prime minister, withAbhisit also in attendance. The stellar royalist presence at the funerals was a remarkably open displayof contempt for the electoral choices made by Thailand’s people and for the rule of law. The queen ofThailand, the head of the army, the leader of the parliamentary opposition and the man angling tobecome an installed “national unity” premier were all publicly aligning themselves with a movementready to use any means necessary to undermine the legitimate government of the country. The date ofAngkhana’s funeral — October 13, 2008 — has acquired near-mythical status among Thais who haveturned against the monarchy. It was the day it became impossible for them to keep believing thepalace was above politics, a neutral arbiter in the conflict. They call it วันตาสว.าง — the day ofenlightenment.

Siddhi Savetsila claimed the king was fully in favour of Sirikit’s attendance at the funeral, in aconversation with Eric John:

Siddhi viewed PAD as providing essential support to the monarchy. “If

we lose PAD, we lose the battle,” he said. He related that he and

Prem had advised the King to show support for the PAD after the

October 7 clash, and he claimed the King had supported the Queen’s

appearance at the funeral of one of the PAD supporters killed in the

incident. The King subsequently thanked Siddhi for his advice

(according to Siddhi). Siddhi said he and Prem were the only Privy

Councilors advising the King and Queen on the political standoff.

He was lying. Bhumibol had never supported the plan, as Chutinant Bhirombakdi told the ambassador:

Chutinant agreed that the Queen’s appearance at the October 13

funeral had highly negative ramifications, saying that even

politically neutral Thais felt she had inappropriately brought the

monarchy into politics. He also acknowledged increasing semi-public

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criticism of the monarchy, focused on the Queen. Chutinant stated

with confidence that the King had sought to deter the Queen from

attending the funeral by questioning the wisdom of that plan, but had

stopped short of forbidding her to do so.

Moreover, Bhumibol was deeply unhappy about his wife’s overweening ambitions, and the mayhemcaused by the Yellow Shirts.

An eruption of hostilities on the disputed border with Cambodia on October 15, with Thai andCambodian forces fighting an artillery duel around Preah Vihear, heightened the ominous atmosphereof impending conflict. The same sense of looming menace permeated Thai politics. While the armyappeared reluctant to launch another coup, the royalists were exploring other methods to topple thegovernment, as Anand Panyarachun told U.S. charge d’affaires James Entwistle on October 16:

Anand offered assurances that there “would not be a coup in the

traditional sense of the word,” but said the next three weeks were

perilous for Thailand, which “never in history had been so deeply

divided.” …

Anand professed not to know a clear path which could resolve the

crisis, but he clarified remarks he made publicly October 14 after

the funeral of a PAD supporter killed on October 7: ex-PM Thakin held

the key to dissolving the crisis. Thaksin could gracefully accept

fate/legal judgment for his transgressions, stop directing and

funding political activities, and allow the country to move forward.

The problem, stated Anand, that Thaksin did not want to give up

either money or (indirect) power.

Meanwhile, key members of the network monarchy were suddenly unreachable as U.S. diplomats tried tocontact them to caution against a coup, suggesting that feverish plotting was afoot:

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Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda and Privy Councilor Siddhi

Savetsila, both seen as connected to efforts to bring down the

Somchai government, declined to meet/talk to us October 16. Prem’s

assistant, a Vice Admiral, told us that Prem did not feel comfortable

meeting with foreign diplomats at the current “delicate” time, adding

that Prem had declined a similar request from the British Ambassador.

Siddhi’s secretary simply told us Siddhi was not available this week.

Privy Councilor (and former Prime Minister) Surayud Chulanont,

upcountry in Khorat, deferred receiving a phone call from the Charge

until the evening of October 17, after he returns to Bangkok.

(Comment: We believe that the Privy Councilors could guess the

purpose of the requested meetings and that they most likely made a

deliberate decision not to engage. End Comment.)

Army commander Anupong explicitly called on the prime minister to resign in a speech on October 16,declaring: “No one can stay in a pool of blood.” And on October 17, Anuporn “Joe” Kashemsant, apalace official on Sirikit’s staff, echoed Anand’s hints that the royalists were exploring various strategiesfor bringing down the government, in comments to U.S. diplomats:

Anuporn Kashemsant, a foreign liaison officer for the Queen in the

Principal Private Secretary’s office, remarked to us October 17 that

various political maneuvers were ongoing. He said “a coup like what

happened September 19, 2006 is not one of the options” for resolving

Thailand’s political crisis, because the military had proven it was

incapable of running the country. His qualification evoked the remark

of former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun on October 16 to Charge

that there would not be “a coup in the traditional sense of the

word.” Anuporn hinted that significant developments likely would take

place in the coming days, but refused to predict what might occur,

beyond saying there were two possible paths forward.

The royalist offensive against Thaksin’s influence would indeed follow a two-pronged attack strategy —judicial intervention and escalating disruption by the Yellow Shirts.

Supreme Court judges made Thaksin a convicted criminal on October 21, sentencing him to two years injail for corruption over his wife’s purchase of land from a government agency in 2003. His prospects ofreturning to Thailand seemed more distant than ever. Thaksin himself was incandescent, and vowedrevenge, as he told U.S. ambassador John by telephone:

After the verdict, Thaksin phoned the Ambassador. He denounced the

verdict against him as “the fruit of a poisoned tree,” emphasizing

that the court had relied on material prepared by the Asset

Examination Committee, which was composed solely of ardent foes of

Thaksin. With slight sarcasm, Thaksin said he was happy to have been

convicted, as his opponents in the political class would only face

larger problems as a result of treating him unfairly.

Another cable gives more details of the telephone call from Thaksin, including talk that Sirikit wasagitating for another coup while Bhumibol was adamant the military should not intervene this time:

In a rambling but spirited exposition of his views, Thaksin recalled

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how his Thai Rak Thai party had won the 2005 election in a landslide,

only to be evicted by the 2006 coup d’etat. Thaksin affirmed that he

remained popular and said “my party” (now the People’s Power Party,

but presumably he also referred to any subsequent incarnation) would

continue to win elections by a significant margin.

Thaksin said he had sent a message to Army Commander Anupong Paojinda

that the Army should not seize power. Thaksin said he could guarantee

that a coup in current circumstances would not resemble General

Sonthi Boonyaratglin’s 2006 coup — it would not be peaceful, and

Anupong would regret it, Thaksin said.

Thaksin told the Ambassador that Anupong did not want to launch a

coup, but Queen Sirikit was pressing him to do so. Thaksin also

asserted that Anupong knew that King Bhumibol did not favor a coup.

Thaksin highlighted that, at the same time when the Queen presided

over the funeral of a PAD protestor, the King granted an audience to

PM Somchai, sending a more positive public message than the Queen’s.

Thaksin added that he had been on the verge of releasing a letter in

response to his conviction, but his staff had discouraged him from

doing so, saying his tone would have been too angry and negative

toward the monarchy. Thaksin said one item on his agenda (and

presumably in his draft letter) was the need to remove lese majeste

provisions from the criminal code; Thailand could not rightfully

claim to be democratic so long as there remained a threat of

prosecution for lese majeste

One of Thaksin’s top allies, former parliament speaker Yongyuth Tiyapairat, told Eric John on October28 that King Bhumibol was out of touch and exploited by belligerent ultra-royalists to further an agendathat would end up damaging the palace:

Yongyuth said with dismay that Thailand claimed to have a

constitutional monarchy, but in reality it often seemed Thailand had

an absolute monarchy, with the Palace vetting appointments to high-

ranking military and civil service positions, and the King was

treated “like a god.” The King was generally inaccessible, and those

around him often provided him with inaccurate information. Many

people (e.g., PAD) tried to harness the influence of the Palace and

to direct popular anger at their opponents by claiming they were not

loyal to the monarchy. These circumstances were unhealthy for

Thailand, and also detrimental to the long-term interests of the

royal family, Yongyuth said.

An extraordinary episode during October, never properly reported by Thai or international media, woulddemonstrate just how isolated and weak Bhumibol had become. The king sent a clear signal that hewanted the ultra-royalists to cease their strategy of confrontation and violent disruption. It was time forthe long Yellow Shirt occupation of Government House to end. As usual, he did not say so directly, butinstructed three of the most trusted members of his inner circle to convey the message.

The first messenger was Bhumibol’s favourite among his four children, and the only one of them whoremained close to him: Princess Sirindhorn. During a visit to the United States, Sirindhorn gave a news

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conference on October 9. This was very unusual: foreign press access to the princess is usually strictlystage-managed, and she generally prefers to keep a low profile on her international visits. Shestrenuously avoids being drawn into discussion of politics. But, as the Associated Press reported, this timeSirindhorn made some unexpected remarks about the Yellow Shirts:

The princess of Thailand said Thursday that she does not believe

protests in her home country are being staged to benefit the

monarchy.

Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn talked about the importance of public

service Thursday at the Choate Rosemary Hall prep school in

Wallingford. She later headed to the University of Pennsylvania for a

U.S.-Thailand education discussion.

Her visit came amid the worst political violence in Thailand in more

than a decade. Thousands of protesters have camped at the main

government office complex to demand electoral changes and an end to

corruption in Thai politics.

In violent clashes on Tuesday, 423 protesters and 20 police were

injured, Thai medical authorities said. One woman was killed, and a

man died in what appeared to be a related incident.

It was the worst political violence since 1992, when the army killed

dozens of pro-democracy demonstrators seeking the ouster of a

military-backed government.

The princess was asked at a press conference following her talk

whether she agreed with protesters who say they are acting on behalf

of the monarchy.

“I don’t think so,” she replied. “They do things for themselves.”

Asked why the king has not spoken out, she said, “I don’t know

because I haven’t asked him.”

The story was ignored by most of the Thai media, with Khao Sod the only mainstream newspaper toreport Sirindhorn’s comments. Sondhi Limthongkul made a ranting rebuttal, saying the U.S. journalistswho had asked the question and written the article had been bribed by Thaksin, and claiming wronglythat Sirindhorn’s comments had been mistranslated.

Later in the month, Bhumibol again signalled his opposition to continued Yellow Shirt disruption, viapublic comments by two more of his closest confidantes: Sumet Tantivejkul, secretary general of theChaipattana Foundation which has administered Bhumibol’s royal projects since 1988, and DisathornWathcharothai, chair of the Rajaprajanugroh Foundation, a palace-sponsored disaster-relieforganization. Both men are named as key members of the king’s inner circle in Eric John’s 2009 analysisof palace power politics, “CIRCLES OF INFLUENCE INSIDE THE INSTITUTION OF THE MONARCHY IN KINGBHUMIBOL’S TWILIGHT“:

Those few whose counsel the King has sought in recent years,

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according to various sources, are neither household names nor

political players, but associated with his charitable development

foundations or his closest staff. These include the sharp-tongued

Thanphuying Butrie Viravaidya, his deputy Principal Private Secretary

(DPPS) and wife of NGO activist Meechai “the Condom King” (Butrie is

currently ensconced at Siriraj Hospital); Wud Sumitra, another DPPS;

Sumete Tantivejkul, head of the Chai Patana Foundation; Disathorn

Watcharothai, Chair of the Rajanukhrao Foundation and son of the Lord

Chamberlain; and Pramote Maiklap, former director of the Royal

Irrigation Department. The Privy Councilor closest to the King is

likely Air Chief Marshal Kamthon Sidhvananda, former long-time head

of State Electricity Giant EGAT, whom the King credits for

electrifying much of rural Thailand. His most regular social

interaction in recent years came in weekly late-Saturday night jam

sessions with his pick-up jazz band, whose geriatric members have

played with the King for decades.

Another U.S. cable recounts the interventions of Sumet and Disathorn in October 2008:

In late October 2008, the King directed two of his proxies to carry

his water for him, Sumet Tantivejakul, the Secretary-General of the

King’s Chai Pattana Foundation, and Disathorn Wathcharothai, Chair of

the Rajanukhrao Foundation. Speaking October 26 before a group of

academics closely associated with the yellow shirt movement laying

siege to Thailand at the time, supposedly in defense of the monarchy,

Sumet called on protesters to “stop violence and secure peace via

dialogue.”

Disathorn was even more direct three days later, on October 29 at a

seminar in Chumphol. “No matter whether the PAD or UDD, I wish to say

that if we love the King, please don’t go farming at Government

House. Don’t go to show forces anywhere…. If you love the King, go

back home. Showing your power over there makes no benefit at all.

Worse, it just creates disunity. I dare to say it here because I am a

real man and a real voice. I carry the King’s message.”

Their message was unmistakeable, and Disathorn even went as far as explicitly stating that he spoke withthe king’s authority. Bhumibol was making clear that he did not support the Yellow Shirt occupation ofGovernment House, and indeed that the PAD did not have his backing despite its constant claims to beacting in his name. Piya Malakul confirmed to Eric John on November 4 that Bhumibol wanted theYellow Shirts to end their protest and go home:

King Bhumibol explicitly told Army Commander Anupong Paojinda not to

launch a coup, Piya Malakul, an advisor to Queen Sirikit, told

Ambassador November 4…

Piya’s claim that the King instructed Anupong not to conduct a coup

is the strongest account we have heard to date about the King’s

opposition to a coup and his communicating this to Anupong; it would

explain why Privy Counselors Prem and Siddhi, both seen as opponents

of the current government, gave recent assurances to the Ambassador

that there would not be a coup. While Piya did not specify how he

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heard of this exchange, the purported instruction does appear

consistent with Anupong’s actions, other high-level military

assurances to the Ambassador, and reporting in other channels…

Piya remarked that King Bhumibol was highly irritated by PAD’s

occupation of Government House and other disruptions caused by the

anti-government group, but the King was unsure how best to ensure PAD

would vacate the compound. Piya said the King had instructed two of

his loyalists to convey his desire that PAD leave Government House….

Piya considered PAD co-leader Sondhi Limthongkul to be obstinate,

however, saying Sondhi had become obsessed with his own sense of

mission.

The Yellow Shirt leadership and their ultra-royalist establishment allies failed to follow Bhumibol’s clearlyexpressed wishes. Adding insult to injury, Sondhi Limthongkul denounced both Sumet and Disathornfrom the PAD stage at the Makkawan bridge near Government House, where he gave regular vitriolicspeeches to inspire his increasingly fanatical followers. A U.S. cable from 2009 describes Sondhi’sresponse:

In the late 2008 political crisis caused by the occupation of

Government House, and ultimately Bangkok’s airports, by the yellow-

shirt PAD activists claiming to be defending the monarchy, both

Sumete and Disathorn joined Princess Sirindhorn in October 2008 in

publicly stating that the King did not consider the yellow-shirts to

be acting on his behalf. Disathorn went so far as to tell a seminar:

“if you love the King, go home.” Instead, PAD leader Sondhi Lim

denounced both men from the PAD stage with curses; Sondhi repeated

his criticism of Disathorn at the November 15 PAD rally.

Sondhi Limthongkul was knowingly and explicitly defying messages from three of King Bhumibol’s mosttrusted allies. He must have been well aware that in doing so he was publicly defying the king. And yet hedidn’t stop there: he cursed and insulted them. In one speech, using his usual apocalyptic and messianiclanguage, he said Thailand was divided into two: the righteous, and the unrighteous. Sondhi saidcontemptuously of Sumet that: “Instead of siding with the righteous, he preached unity.” It isinconceivable that Sondhi could have behaved with such swaggering insolence towards King BhumibolAdulyadej, the monarch he claimed to revere, unless he was very confident that he had the backing ofQueen Sirikit and her allies in the establishment and military.

The marital power struggle was won with ease by Queen Sirikit. Bhumibol was not only ignored: he washumiliated. When Sondhi Limthongkul denounced Rama IX’s messengers from the PAD stage, he wasalso sending a signal to Bhumibol and the king’s inner circle: their time was over. Sirikit and her cronieswere calling the shots, and she would not be swayed by the entreaties of her husband, even if he was theking. The ultra-royalists were unwilling to call a halt to their crusade against the government eventhough that was clearly what Bhumibol wanted. Within a month, the PAD was to launch a dramaticescalation of its campaign of disruption, proclaiming a “Final War” involving operations codenamedHiroshima and Nagasaki, and storming Bangkok’s airports. As Eric John observed:

Instead of responding positively to the King’s message… PAD leader

Sondhi Limthongkul denounced Sumet and Disathorn’s “meddling.” Three

weeks later, the yellow shirts escalated their activities by seizing

the airports.

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Like Shakespeare’s King Lear, who gives away his crown and his kingdom in the hope of a peaceful andcontented retirement but instead becomes a helpless and tormented old man raging impotently atforces he no longer has the power to master, Bhumibol had found himself marginalized and irrelevant,ignored by royalists who claimed to revere him, and mocked and insulted by a clown like SondhiLimthongkul. Millions of Thais claimed to love the king so much they would die for him, and yetBhumibol was unable even to persuade the protesters occupying Government House to disperse and gohome. Their T-shirts and headscarfs and wristbands were festooned with slogans proclaiming theirloyalty to the king, but they were unwilling to do the one thing he asked of them. Bhumibol was a fadingold man, and he could offer the royalist establishment no protection after his passing. Sirikit was nowthe undisputed power in the palace, and an establishment fearful of the future ahead of the loomingtrauma of royal succession saw the queen as their best (and only) hope. Bhumibol could not protectthem from Vajiralongkorn and Thaksin’s vengeance, but perhaps Sirikit could. Elite royalists consumedby apocalyptic end-reign anxiety regarded her as their guardian angel.

On November 1, some 90,000 Thaksin supporters rallied at Bangkok’s Rajamangala Stadium. They wereoverwhelmingly dressed in red, which was to become the colour signifying support for Thaksin inThailand, just as yellow had been adopted by the rival royalist PAD mass movement. Addressing the hugecrowd by telephone from an undisclosed location abroad, Thaksin denounced the coup and hiscorruption conviction, and very deliberately raised the stakes once again in his battle with the royalistsby making a calculatedly incendiary comment:

The only things that can bring me home are royal mercy or the

people’s power.

Thaksin’s comments were intended to be ambiguous but potentially menacing, containing an implicitthreat that unless he received a royal pardon and the monarchist establishment ceased its hounding ofhim, he could only return by mobilizing the people against the palace. A U.S. cable dated November 3discussed the remark:

Thaksin’s statement is controversial, and rightly so. He appears to

be urging the King to act on his behalf, although convicts generally

request a royal pardon after they begin serving their sentences, not

when they are ensconced abroad to avoid incarceration. Also, raising

“the people’s power” as an alternative to “royal mercy” could make it

seem as though Thaksin is disputing the Palace’s supremacy, or trying

to drive a wedge between the Palace and “the people.”

A later cable carried further analysis of the comment, including remarks by wealthy royalist ChutinantBhirombhakdi and evidence that Thaksin had crafted the phrase with great care:

Chutinant discussed former Prime Minister Thaksin’s statement in his

November 1 address to supporters that either “royal mercy or the

people’s power” could allow his return to Thailand. Chutinant said

this juxtaposition, which he viewed as highly strategic, had the

predictable effect of energizing Thaksin’s opponents in the royalist

camp. This reaction allowed Thaksin to demonstrate publicly that many

palace figures were aligned against him, thereby eroding the prestige

that the palace derived from its status as an institution above

politics. (Separately, after Thaksin’s remarks, a member of Thaksin’s

legal team told us that the sentence in question was part of a “very

refined product” and that she had heard this sentence “four or five

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times” in Thaksin’s rehearsal of the speech.)

What made Thaksin’s comment so subversive was that it suggested that the palace and the people werenot united in Thailand — contrary to the official fairy tale of a harmonious kingdom where the monarchwas selflessly devoted to his adoring people — and that it was Thaksin, not the monarchy, who had thesupport of the masses. Like all of his most provocative remarks, it contained a great deal of truth. For thefirst time in Thai history, ordinary people were turning against the monarchy in significant numbers. In acable entitled “QUESTIONING THE UNQUESTIONABLE” the U.S. embassy discussed the consequences ofthe queen’s conduct:

After Queen Sirikit presided over the October 13 funeral of a

People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protestor killed during an

October 7 clash with police, public criticism of the Queen increased

notably. Thanapol Eawsakul, editor of left-wing Same Sky Magazine,

told us that critical online comments posted to his website spiked,

and overall traffic to his site increased from 10,000 hits per day to

30,000 hits.

Thanapol, who has been charged with lese majeste for material

previously published in Same Sky, told us he spent much of his time

cleansing his website of content that could lead to further lese

majeste accusations, such as: nude photos of the Crown Prince’s

consort, including video clips of an infamous birthday party;

multiple postings ranting about the Crown Prince’s lewd sexual

behavior; photos (that Thanapol suspected to be digitally edited) of

the Queen wearing what appears to be a famous stolen Saudi blue

diamond; and multiple links to other sites with purported evidence

linking the royal family to the stolen Saudi jewelry. To his

surprise, people even posted comments speculating about King

Bhumibol’s involvement in his brother’s death, some going as far as

to suggest that Bhumibol shot then-King Ananda. Posters also drew

upon Forbes magazine’s recent report claiming the King’s assets

topped $35 billion, decrying the monarchy’s wealth as a result of

generations of extortion, and calling the upcoming royal funeral of

the King’s elder sister as a waste of taxpayer money.

Prachatai, one of the few news organizations in Thailand that makes an effort to do serious journalismon issues related to the monarchy, reported a similar leap in interest, the U.S. embassy said:

Prachatai.com Executive Director Chiranuch Premchaiporn told us that

after the 2006 coup d’etat, daily online visitors to Prachatai

increased from 1,000 to 10,000, and that the October 7 clash between

PAD protestors and Thai police drove an increase from 15,000 to

30,000 visitors. The surge in posted comments, similar to what

SameSky experienced, required significant additional hours of “eye-

ball” scans to purge their sites of potentially offensive comments.

Criticism of Sirikit was not just confined to the internet. In private, growing numbers of Thais wereswapping gossip and complaints about her behaviour. In pro-Thaksin neighbourhoods, villages anddistricts, particularly in the northeastern province of Isaan with its long history of resentment towardsBangkok rule, distaste for the queen was surprisingly open, according to BBC correspondent Jonathan

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Head, quoted by the U.S. embassy:

BBC reporter Jonathan Head, subject of an ongoing lese majeste, spoke

with us on November 3 from the northeastern province of Udon Thani,

where he said people raged publicly against the Queen in a manner he

had never witnessed before. “The Queen ripped up the rule book when

she attended the (PAD) funeral,” he said, adding that he remained

uncertain how to incorporate recent interviews into future BBC

reporting without becoming the subject of additional lese majeste

investigations.

Shocked and alarmed by the surge in online attacks on Sirikit and the rest of the royals, the military tookan increasingly hard line against lèse majesté, despite lacking a constitutional mandate to do so. As theU.S. embassy noted, top generals in the Queen’s Guard clique took the lead in the battle:

Army Commander General Anupong Paojinda warned Thai citizens of the

dangers associated with criticizing the monarchy in a televised press

conference on October 27. According to an English-language daily,

Anupong said, “There must be no cases of contempt or disrespectful

acts toward the monarchy. The Army will take action using every means

against any person or group acting in contempt of or being

disrespectful toward the monarchy.” Anupong’s remarks appeared to be

a direct response to the recent increased criticism of the monarchy.

Note: The Thai criminal code outlaws lese majeste, but there is no

legal basis for the Army to take action against those committing that

crime. The Constitution specifies, however, that the King

concurrently holds the position of head of the Thai Armed Forces. The

Internal Security Act does provide that the Internal Security

Operations Command (ISOC), an interagency body headed by the Prime

Minister with the Army Commander as his deputy, is supposed to, among

other tasks, “encourage people to be aware of their duty in upholding

nation, religion, and King.”

UDD co-leader Charan Ditthaphichai claimed to us that most lese

majeste investigations involving UDD supporters resulted from the

Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) Task Force 6080, which

focuses on offenses against the monarchy, reporting cases to Anupong,

who then forwarded them to the police. Charan stated that Army Chief

of Staff General Prayut Chan-Ocha, a close associate of the Queen,

manages Task Force 6080 by virtue of his role as Secretary of ISOC.

Government ministries also began making greater efforts to keep criticism of the royal family contained.The U.S. embassy detailed some of the steps being taken:

The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Ministry and the

Ministry of Interior (MOI) joined recent Army and Police efforts

against lese majeste in late October. The ICT Ministry sought the

cooperation of website editors in self-censoring content and

announced an effort to create an expensive gateway to filter anti-

monarchy postings. The MOI directed provincial governors to monitor

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leaflets and community radio stations for anti-monarchy material…

Comment: The recent move by the ICT Ministry to further scrutinize

anti-monarchy Internet chatter reflects a government response to

perceived more widespread criticism of the royal family, particularly

of the Queen. Operators of websites and other online media are

increasingly concerned about measures the RTG might take against them

and are self-censoring site content to pre-empt future lese majeste

charges. As a result, critics of the monarchy are finding less open

space to voice their opinions, even anonymously — precisely what

defenders of the monarchy intend through more aggressive

implementation of lese majeste. End Summary and Comment.

But heavy handed repression of open debate about the monarchy and the succession could provecounterproductive and provoke more questioning of the appropriate role of the palace in Thai society,the embassy warned:

The Army Commander’s statement indicates that lese majeste offenses

are not viewed simply as criminal acts but as a threat to Thailand’s

supreme institution. The rise in high-profile lese majeste cases, the

frequency of online remarks bordering on lese majeste, and the

seriousness of the authorities’ response indicates that some segments

of society are highly dissatisfied with the behavior of some members

of the royal family, if not the institution itself. If the

authorities were to harshly repress critics of the monarchy, this

could prove counterproductive, as quiet discourse in many circles

could shift from mere gossip about some royals’ distasteful behavior

to a more weighty questioning of the monarchy’s role after the death

of widely-beloved King Bhumibol.

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On November 23, Sondhi Limthongkul rallied Yellow Shirts at Government House for a “final battle”against the government. Initially it appeared to be a failure, as Nostitz recounts in volume 1 of Red vs.Yellow:

The “Final War” began with a clear defeat for the PAD, or so it

seemed at first. The PAD had failed to gather its claimed 100,000

supporters, instead bringing only perhaps 24,000 people on to the

streets, many from Chonburi and the southern provinces. They had

failed to provoke the police into violence.

On November 24, the PAD besieged the cabinet’s temporary offices at Don Muang airport, whereministers had relocated following the occupation of Government House. And then on November 25,thousands of Yellow Shirts occupied Bangkok’s Suvarnabhumi International Airport. The military didnothing to prevent the occupation of Suvarnabhumi or to end the blockade (which later extended to DonMuang airport too). Instead, army chief Anupong gave a news conference on November 26 in which heruled out a coup but once again publicly demanded the resignation of the prime minister.

PM Somchai had been out of Thailand at an APEC summit in Peru, and returned on November 26.Unable to land in Bangkok, he instead arrived in Chiang Mai, in the pro-Thaksin north of Thailand. As

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Nick Nostitz says:

The state was still unable to deal with the increasingly messy

situation. Several members of the pro-government forces fled

overseas, possibly to prepare a government in exile in case of a

military coup. Others planned to go underground, and organize

resistance from their strongholds in Isarn and the north. The

government was already a government in exile in its own country,

functioning from Chiangmai in the north, where Prime Minister Somchai

was based, protected by pro-government forces.

It seemed that the security forces were not following government

orders, the military were refusing to work with the police. Twice

orders to disperse the protests at the airports were given,

preparations were made, but the time passed without any action by the

police. On November 28th national police chief Patcharawat Wongsuwan

was sacked for failing to execute the order to disperse the PAD at

the airports…

Civil war seemed entirely possible, and likely to be coming within

days.

At such a precarious, frightening, pivotal moment for Thailand, with the legitimate government unableto function and extremist mobs shutting down Bangkok’s airports and doing immense damage to thenation’s economy and international reputation, many Thais looked to Bhumibol to do something. Thiswas just the kind of national crisis that most Thais believed their king would step up to solve. That waswhat they had always been taught. They were to be profoundly disappointed. Bhumibol had tried tointervene in October and had been humiliated, his prestige badly damaged. He had neither theinclination nor the influence to intervene again.

By November 28, Eric John was explicitly pressing for the king to resolve the situation — anextraordinary stance for a U.S. ambassador to take — but leading monarchists insisted it would nothappen:

PAD leader Chamlong told supporters at an airport stage November 28

that an important person (phu jai in Thai) had asked him to stop the

protest, but that he had replied it was too late to do so, for the

nation’s sake. Chamlong vowed that the PAD occupation of the

airports would continue until Somchai stepped down and warned of a

massive uprising by PAD supporters if core leaders were arrested. A

fellow leader acknowledged additional “lightly armed” guards were

reinforcing PAD presence at the two airports in anticipation of

police action. Several trucks bearing a medical logo/red cross were

caught on video unloading weapons at Suwannaphum airport late

November 28.

At this point, perhaps the best option for a non-violent, peaceful

resolution of the current crises, both airport occupation and

political stalemate, would be for the Thai King to intervene. Such

extraordinary intervention, technically outside the constitution, has

happened twice before in the King’s 62 year reign: in 1973 and 1992.

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With this in mind, Ambassador separately engaged the two most

politically active Privy Councilors November 28, Privy Council Chair

Prem Titsulanonda and ACM Siddhi Savetsila, suggesting that the

King’s intervention now could prevent bloodshed and resolve the

crisis in the national interest.

Both Prem and Siddhi said such intervention would not happen, and

that they would act to protect the King from being dragged into the

political crisis. Prem stated that the King could intervene after

bloodshed occurred, but not prior. Prem lamented the stalemates —

between the PAD and government, and the government and military — but

did not offer any solutions. Both circled back time and time again

to Thaksin; the real problem in this crisis was not the PAD and the

airport occupation, but Thaksin, who would not admit/accept his

guilt, and would use every resource at his disposal to fight to the

end. Prem said that for the King’s intervention to be effective, as

it was in 1992, Thaksin and Chamlong needed to be in the room;

Somchai and Chamlong would not solve the matter.

Prem in particular seemed crestfallen by Ambassador’s depiction of

the international mood vis-a-vis the PAD and the airport occupation,

and the explanation of how actions by the PAD, which claims to act in

defense of the monarchy, were actually actively undermining the

monarchy’s standing at a critical moment. Prem countered that it was

Thaksin who was damaging the monarchy.

Siddhi echoed the same themes, while acknowledging that a Privy

Council meeting November 26 concluded that the situation would

worsen; they feared bloodshed, particularly if the pro-Thaksin

redshirts swung into action. Time worked against the PAD, said

Siddhi. The best option would be for the PAD to abandon the airports

and return to Government House, but he was not optimistic that they

would do so. Siddhi thought it possible that the Constitutional Court

might rule to dissolve Somchai’s ruling People’s Power Party (PPP)

December 2-3, which would offer a way out. Prem, however, suggested

the Court wished to call several more witnesses, and that a decision

was not imminent.

With the king’s birthday approaching on December 5, it seemed inconceivable that Bhumibol couldavoid commenting on the mayhem engulfing Thailand. In particular, his traditional annual speech onDecember 4 was keenly awaited. Meanwhile, speculation was growing that the politicized and partialjudiciary would once again intervene to break the deadlock: not by insisting on the imposition of basiclaw and order but by disbanding the PPP for electoral fraud.

On December 2, as a mute Bhumibol joined the annual Trooping the Colour ceremony with Sirikit andVajiralongkorn, Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva and his colleague Korn Chatikavanij visited EricJohn at his Wireless Road residence. Abhisit claimed he had no intention of seeking political gain fromthe actions of the Yellow Shirts, and made excuses for Bhumibol’s silence:

Abhisit appeared frustrated, despairing that he saw no easy way out

of the current stalemate. Abhisit said he had long favored Army

Commander Anupong Paojinda’s recent suggestion that Prime Minister

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Somchai should dissolve the House of Representatives, although

Anupong ought to have suggested this privately rather than publicly.

Abhisit acknowledged that some PPP figures expressed concern that

royalists would take advantage of House dissolution to impede new

elections and impose rule by an ad hoc council (a contingency not

provided for by the Constitution), but he dismissed this scenario as

“crazy,” “rubbish,” and “ridiculous.” (Comment: We are not as quick

to dismiss this prospect; a leading Privy Councilor told the

Ambassador that he and other senior royalists hoped to bring about

rule by such a council. End Comment.)

Appearing genuinely pessimistic, Abhisit denied that he would seek to

build majority support in the House for his own potential candidacy

as Prime Minister. (Note: Abhisit formally became a candidate for PM

after then-Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej was forced out of office

in September. End Note.) Abhisit said he might be open to talks with

other parties’ faction leaders if they were to approach him, but it

would be inappropriate for him to go courting their support. He said

he would watch carefully for signs of disunity among PPP figures,

noting the pace at which they would move to the Puea Thai party,

which pro-Thaksin figures formed as a backup vehicle in the event of

PPP dissolution…

Abhisit noted pessimistically that PAD’s seizure of the airports had

set a very negative precedent that would now be included in both

sides’ playbooks for years to come. He said that he was not willing

to rule out the vague, dire predictions from some quarters that

Thailand would fall into a state of civil war…

Abhisit remarked that King Bhumibol was in a very difficult position.

In years past, the King had remained above the fray and was respected

by both sides in a social conflict. Now, however, the pro-Thaksin

side was trying actively to make the monarchy appear as though it was

a biased participant in the current crisis. When asked whether the

King might be able to bring about a peaceful resolution of the

current standoff, Abhisit said the King might be able to make a

general appeal to the nation, but any specific proposal would entail

a “huge risk” to the monarchy, which would lose prestige if the

King’s advice were to be ignored. When asked whether the absence of

the King’s intervention at a time of crisis would also undermine the

institution, by raising questions about its continued utility, Korn

scoffed at the notion; Abhisit replied simply: “You can already read

comments raising that question posted on the BBC website.”

A few hours later, the Constitutional Court dissolved the PPP, banning Prime Minister Somchai and otherparty executive board members from politics. The PPP’s coalition partners Chart Thai and MatchimaThipathai were dissolved too. Once again, the judges had done their best to undermine Thaksin and hisallies. But it remained unclear who would form the next government or whether the Yellow Shirts wouldnow cease their blockade of the airports. As Eric John commented:

The Constitutional Court’s ruling was widely expected, but it is

unclear whether it will end anti-government demonstrations or provoke

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a violent response from government sympathizers. PAD leaders, whom

we sense are divided, may realize that their seizure of Bangkok’s

airports is fast eroding the support they enjoyed from Bangkok’s

middle and upper class; the ruling offers them a chance to declare

victory, end the airport occupations, and allow public focus to

return to the King’s birthday celebrations. If, as Abhisit predicted,

the PAD does not choose this option and the King does not use his

December 4 annual birthday message to send a clear signal to end the

protest, the stalemate could drag on, with no fixed end in sight.

The ruling further eroded the legitimacy and credibility of the courts in the eyes of the millions ofordinary Thais who supported Thaksin Shinawatra. Leading royalists had made it clear for months thatthey regarded the PPP’s dissolution as a foregone conclusion. As Marc Askew wrote in his articleConfrontation and Crisis in Thailand, 2008-2010:

By the end of 2008, a lethal combination of organized street

agitation, civil disobedience, paranoid nationalism, hyper-royalist

hysteria, calculated military inaction and punitive court decisions

finally succeeded in destroying the PPP-led administration.

Bhumibol failed to appear to give his birthday speech on December 4. He decided to hide behind feignedill health. While there is little doubt Bhumibol was unwell, there was no real reason he could not give thespeech. As the U.S. embassy commented:

On December 4, Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn and his sister, Princess

Sirindhorn, appeared jointly before assembled dignitaries to announce

that King Bhumibol was ill and unable to deliver his customary annual

address to the nation. After the Crown Prince made brief remarks on

the King’s behalf, Princess Sirindhorn explained that her father had

bronchitis, was exhausted, on an IV, and unable to eat. Subsequent

official reports from the Palace indicated that the King suffered

from a fever and had an infection, but by December 8 his condition

was improving and he was able to eat soft food…

Comment: The rivalry between the Crown Prince and Princess Sirindhorn

is well known to Thailand’s political class, and we believe this

joint appearance sent a deliberate signal of Palace solidarity. While

the Princess’ briefing on the King’s health was justified by her

recent meeting with the King, we note that the Crown Prince served as

the King’s formal representative at the event. End Comment.

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The military put enormous pressure on wavering Thaksin allies to jump ship and support Abhisit as thenext prime minister. The generals wielded both carrot and stick — legislators were offered large financialinducements to switch their allegiance (40 million baht each, according to Thai media), and the militarytold them that if they stayed in the Thaksin camp there would be a coup. The deeply corrupt DemocratParty secretary general, Suthep Thaugsuban, was heavily involved in the negotiations, which focused inparticular on the faction controlled by the (also deeply corrupt) Buri Ram godfather Newin Chidchob,previously a staunch ally of Thaksin. As Paul Chambers explains in In the Shadow of the Soldier’s Boot:

The military, now dominated by the virulently pro-Prem Queen’s Guard

faction, saw it in their best interests to keep pro-Thaksin MPs out

of power and help negotiate into office a government opposed to

Thaksin… Two familiar and connected pro-Prem soldiers were

instrumental in this oblique intervention: army chief Anuphong

Phaochinda and retired Gen. Prawit Wongsuwan. Joining them was then

army chief of staff … General Prayuth Chan-ocha. Like Prawit and

Anuphong, Prayuth had served in the 21st Infantry Regiment of the

Second Division — the Queen’s Guard. Indeed, shared past service in

the Queen’s Guard had now become the central bond of loyalty

connecting most senior soldiers.. In early December, on the heels of

the court verdict, talks began between these soldiers and members of

several political parties … as well as several members of the pro-

Thaksin Phuea Thai Party to set up an anti-Thaksin ruling coalition.

The three soldiers also contacted the now wavering Thaksin henchman

and long-time politico Newin Chidchob — who proved to be less than

loyal to his erstwhile patron.

Anupong met several key politicians whose loyalty was up for sale, including Newin, at his officialresidence in the First Infantry Regiment compound off the Vibhavadi Rangsit road on December 6.Prayuth was also present, and Prem’s influence on the proceedings was obvious. A report in The Nationdescribed the negotiations:

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A key leader of one of the former coalition parties said most parties

had moved to the Democrat camp due to a request by a senior military

figure, who was conveying a message from a man who could not be

refuted.

Besides, he said, all parties knew that if the Pheu Thai were to take

over, anti-government protesters would take to the streets again.

Another source said that if Pheu Thai did form the next government,

the military would definitely have to stage a coup…

On the evening of December 5, Democrat Party secretary-general Suthep

Thaugsuban and MP Niphon Promphan met with key leaders of former

coalition parties. The leaders included Sanan Kachornprasart and

Somsak Prissanananthakul from the disbanded Chart Thai party, Pradit

Pattaraprasit and Suwat Liptapanlop from the Ruam Jai Thai Chart

Pattana Party, Pinij Jarusombat and Preecha Laohapongchana from the

Puea Pandin Party, Newin Chidchob and the now defunct People Power

Party’s Sora-at Klinprathum.

In the initial stages of this meeting, the Democrats promised that

the three parties and Newin’s faction would be given the same

ministerial quota they had under the previous government.

However, the decision-making had to be hastened when the ex-wife of

fugitive former PM Thaksin Shinawatra, Pojaman Damapong, suddenly

jetted in to Bangkok later that night.

The Democrats called for a press conference at 5pm the very next day.

But before they met the press, key Democrat leaders namely Suthep and

Niphon, along with their supporters namely Pradit, Somsak, Suchat

Tanchareon from Puea Pandin, Somsak Thepsuthin from the disbanded

Matchima Thipataya, and some MPs from Newin’s group met Army Chief

Gen Anupong Paochinda at his residence. The only parties not invited

were Pheu Thai and Pracharaj.

This meeting would have been secret if the politicians hadn’t got

lost. So a soldier was sent to meet them at a PTT petrol station,

then escort them on a motorbike to the Army chief’s house.

Former army chief Gen Pravit Wongsuwan and army chief-of-staff

Prayuth Chanocha were also at the meeting.

A source said the politicians met Anupong to ask his advice about

forming a Democrat-led coalition. The Army chief told them all

parties should put the country first, because if the next coalition

was the same as the previous one, Thailand would plunge even deeper

into turmoil.

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The meeting lasted three hours. After that leaders of the Democrats

and the four minor parties met the press — two hours late — at the

Sukhothai Hotel, and declared their agreement to form the next

government.

Newin Chidchob had long been a notorious figure in Thai politics. Born in 1958, he was named in honourof the Burmese dictator Ne Win by his father Chai, a former village headman who had established ahighly profitable quarrying business. Chai Chidchob established himself as a godfather in the Buri Ramarea and Newin followed in his father’s footsteps. He became a close confidante of Thaksin Shinawatra,due to some particular skills that the prime minister considered invaluable. He was an expert in the darkpolitical arts: vote-buying, intimidation, blackmail, bribery, and rabble-rousing — the U.S. embassydescribes him as an “infamous dirty-trickster”. And the half-Khmer Newin was also considered highlyadept at black magic. As Pasuk and Baker explain in The spirits, the stars, and Thai politics, theirpresentation to the Siam Society in 2008:

Newin seems to have brought two skills which attracted Thaksin. The

first was vote-buying. Newin was tried for vote- buying and escaped

only on a narrow technicality. At the 2005 polls, he was sent to the

south to organize wholesale vote-buying with money distributed

through the government machinery. (It failed after local Democrats

taped the proceedings).

Newin’s second talent is that he is Khmer. In the Thai imagination,

Cambodia is a source of great spiritual power, and Khmers have access

to powerful techniques. Newin has never claimed any special

expertise, but the image clings to him because he is Khmer…

Now, at the end of 2008, Newin Chidchob was betraying his former political master. In a phone call hetold Thaksin: “It’s over, Boss.” This meant the aloof and ineffectual Abhisit Vejjajiva could beceme primeminister. As Andrew Walker commented in a post on New Mandala:

With the assistance of a military coup, two party dissolutions, a new

constitution, an activist judiciary, royal backing, an ultra-

nationalist crisis, six months of escalating street provocation,

military insubordination, and an economically disastrous airport

shutdown, the Democrat Party now seems to be within striking distance

of forming Thailand’s next government…

Their path to government has been anything but honourable, but the

ultimate decision will be made by parliament. If the Democrat Party

can muster the numbers in parliament, they have a right to form

government.

Sure enough, on December 15, parliament elected Abhisit as Thai prime minister. The “silent coup” of2008 was complete. Parliament was back under the control of the elite and Queen Sirikit.

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From the start, the administration of Abhisit Vejjajiva faced an insurmountable legitimacy deficit. Thehypocrisy of the new prime minister and his allies was plainly evident. Right up until army-backedhorsetrading that propelled him to the premiership, Abhisit was insisting that new elections were the onlysolution to Thailand’s political deadlock. Once he became prime minister through a parliamentary votethat by no means reflected the wishes of Thailand’s electorate, Abhisit suddenly abandoned hiseagerness for elections. He was to hang on to power for almost 30 months without going to the polls toseek a democratic mandate. Abhisit also professed distaste for the criminal actions of the PAD and theinterventionism of the army, yet he allowed them to engineer his political ascent. He repeatedly gavepedantic legalistic justifications for his right to rule, utterly failing to acknowledge the understandableoutrage of the millions of Thais who had seen their democratically expressed wishes trampled by the so-called Democrat Party. As Michael Montesano wrote in his article Contextualizing the Pattaya SummitDebacle: Four April Days, Four Thai Pathologies:

Abhisit was serious about staying in power. He appeared to view his

path to the premiership as entirely legitimate, notwithstanding the

roles played by airport occupiers, helpful Constitutional Court

justices and the Army commander in preparing that path for him.

Realizing the need to focus on being able to win the general

elections that would inevitably come, he hunkered down to pursue what

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he viewed as normal politics…

This vision of normalcy represented a willful public denial that the

political crisis that had engulfed Thailand since late 2005 and early

2006 continued, and that it had pushed Thailand into far from normal,

into even “revolutionary”, times.

Even the U.S. embassy noted Abhisit’s sanctimoniousness:

One can find irony in Abhisit’s pledge to end “failed politics,” as

he owes his election as Prime Minister to the recent disorder,

culminating in the closure of Bangkok’s airports in late November.

That disorder appeared to hasten the Constitutional Court’s

dissolution of the previous ruling People’s Power Party and convince

many in the Bangkok elite, including its usually apolitical big

businessmen, that it was necessary to establish a new government

unaligned with former Prime Minister Thaksin.

Abhisit’s foreign minister exemplified the hypocrisy of the new administration. Kasit Piromya was acareer diplomat who had fallen out with Thaksin and joined the PAD, giving several ranting speechesfrom the Yellow Shirt stage. He was involved in the blockade of Suvarnabhumi, and foolishly tolddiplomats and foreign journalists that the illegal airport occupation had been “a lot of fun“. Kasit’spresence at the heart of government demonstrated the dishonesty of Abhisit’s promises to enforce therule of law. The new administration’s double standards were illustrated when police swiftly issued arrestwarrants for supporters of Thaksin who had protested outside parliament on December 15. As the U.S.embassy commented:

There is reason to believe that the security forces and the courts

may be significantly less tolerant of disorderly acts by Thaksin

supporters than they were of the PAD’s. (To date, no court has issued

any arrest warrant for PAD leaders based on the recent airport

takeovers.)

But the most significant and dangerous of Abhisit’s compromises was Democrat Party’s new alliancewith Newin Chidchob and the Bhumjai Thai party. Abhisit proclaimed a policy of “zero tolerance” forcorruption upon taking office, but he was utterly dependent on the backing of Newin and his cronies.They were determined to extract as much loot as possible in return for propping up the ramshacklecoalition of the supposedly honest and clean prime minister. The new cabinet received royal assent onDecember 20. Newin’s Bhumjai Thai Party was given control of three of the most lucrative ministeries forcorruptly siphoning cash: Transport and Communications, Commerce, and Interior. The Interior Ministryis also immensely powerful, with tentacles reaching deep into Thai society in all regions of the countryand extensive ability to manipulate local officials and disseminate propaganda.

Prem Tinsulanonda, who incessantly fulminated against “bad people” in politics but had clung to powerthroughout the 1980s by striking one deal after another with one of parliament’s shadiest godfathers,Banharn Silpa-archa, oddly failed to mention the new government’s odious underbelly when Abhisitwent to seek his blessing on December 27. As The Nation reported:

Chief royal adviser General Prem Tinsulanonda voiced optimism on

Sunday in the leadership of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, saying

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it was fortunate for Thailand to pull out of the political trouble.

“In the past years, people are not happy and it is fortunate for the

country to have installed the new prime minister who I am confident

can overcome the turmoil,” he said in his New Year greetings.

Abhisit led his Cabinet members to call on Prem to wish him a Happy

New Year. Prem said he had no doubts that Abhisit would succeed in

putting politics back on course even though he had to overcome so

many political hurdles.

He urged the government to administer the country under five

principles — endurance, tolerance, sacrifice, lead by example and

winning the people’s trust. He said he knew that Abhisit and Cabinet

members would have no easy job in facing tough challenges ahead. He

wished them every success in striving to serve the country, the King

and the people.

After receiving Prem’s blessing, Abhisit said he felt heartened for

the moral support.

The privy council president and his Yellow Shirt allies did not appear to understand that theconsequences of their “silent coup” would come back to haunt them. Many Thais were utterly incensedat the manner in which a legitimate government had been removed. The reputation of the monarchyhad been further damaged. And the mob tactics of the royalists could — and would — be copied byThaksin too. As James Stent wrote in Thoughts on Thailand’s Turmoil:

The precedent of civil disobedience by illegally occupying public

space was set in 2008 by the yellow shirts when they dispossessed the

Prime Minister of his offices at Government House for several months,

and subsequently closed down for a few days Suvarnaphum and Don Muang

airports, damaging both Thailand’s international reputation and the

Thai economy. They did not consider that the other side could copy

their tactics.

In an assessment of the state of Thai democracy at end-2008, the U.S. embassy correctly predicted thatthe Yellow Shirt disruptions that paralysed the PPP’s ability to govern would now be followed by RedShirt sabotage of Abhisit:

Looking forward, the new Democrat-led coalition will face the same

harassing street tactics from the pro-Thaksin red-shirts that the

PPP-led coalitions faced from the PAD yellow-shirts… While the

tension is currently less than during the height of PAD protests, and

coup talk has receded, there is no end in sight for the polarization

characterizing Thai politics.

On January 19, Harry Nicolaides pleaded guilty to defaming the monarchy, the only hope for thoseaccused of lèse majesté if they want a royal pardon. He was sentenced to six years in prison, cut in half tothree years because of his guilty plea as is standard practice in Thailand. Photographs of a gaunt andweeping Nicolaides clinging to the bars of his detention cell at the court, his feet shackled, were carried in

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newspapers and television reports around the world. It was another disaster for Thailand’s internationalimage. A handwritten account by Nicolaides of his treatment in jail was published in the Sydney MorningHerald in February with the headline “The medieval price an author pays for insulting Thailand’smonarchy”:

My book, Verisimilitude, was a rather clumsy first attempt at fiction

— only 50 copies were printed and seven sold. I love Thailand and

respect the royal family. It was never my intention to offend anyone…

I can’t afford to fall sick — the mental strain is enough — so my

family send me some chicken and a salad every day…

On the king’s 81st birthday I saw fireworks in the distance. Some

prisoners had tears in their eyes, praising a man they regard not

just as their king but their father. I may not be Thai, but I am a

son, and I know what it means to love a father. I am applying for a

royal pardon. I pray the king learns of my plight so I might enjoy

his grace.

When I’ve finished my chicken, Thais beg for my scraps.

Nicolaides received a royal pardon on February 21, 2009, and was deported to Australia. “I have beencrying for eight hours,” he told reporters on arrival in Melbourne. Shortly before boarding the flight inBangkok he had belatedly learned his mother had suffered a stroke during his imprisonment.

Strict enforcement of the lèse majesté law was central to the agenda of the Abhisit administration, whichowed its very existence to the scheming of the royalist establishment. In his inaugural policy speech atthe end of 2008, the prime minister proclaimed that “protecting the monarchy” was the top priority ofhis government. In the warped worldview of the Democrats and their allies in the Yellow coalition,protecting the monarchy apparently involved enthusiastically backing the queen, ignoring the king’swishes, and plotting against Vajiralongkorn.

Information and Communications Minister Ranongruk Suwanchawee (a nonentity who had a cabinetseat purely as a proxy for her faction-leader husband Pairoj who was officially banned from politics)quickly declared very publicly that her top priority would be cracking down on the communication ofinformation. She set up a so-called “war room” of officials scouring the internet for websites supposedlyinsulting the monarchy, and announced that 2,300 had been blocked. Month after month, with priderather than embarrassment, the government would give a new and ever higher tally of blocked sites: thenumber was soon in the tens of thousands. In 2010, a billboard even appeared around Bangkok showinga smiling Abhisit on the phone. “If you find an inappropriate website,” read the caption, “call 1212.” Itwas not clear from the billboard whether the photograph of Abhisit was supposed to depict him doinghis civic duty by phoning the hotline to report an internet infraction he had inadvertently stumbled upon,or whether lucky citizens who dialed in with tip-offs about unacceptable online content might find thecall answered by their prime minister himself, eagerly jotting down the offending URL before swinginginto action.

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A secret U.S. cable in February 2009 noted the increasingly repressive climate, and the risk that theadministration’s hardline approach would prove counterproductive:

While the political crisis that gripped Thailand the second half of

2008 has disappeared from the streets for now, the deep gulf in Thai

society and the body politic remains, and the eventual fate of the

monarchy is one of the key cleavage lines. The struggle by many

parties for position and advantage in shaping public perceptions in

anticipation of the passing of the revered King, a potential messy

succession involving the far less respected Crown Prince, and the

almost certain redefinition of the role of the institution of

monarchy continues unabated.

Many of the Democrat Party leaders who have moved into top government

positions are cosmopolitan, well-educated people who nevertheless

appear to be facilitating growing efforts to clamp down on forms of

speech critical of the monarchy. Whether that is primarily out of

personal conviction or political advantage, or both, remains unclear.

Thailand has a reasonably strong and active civil society, however,

that promotes changing societal attitudes towards traditional

institutions and behavioral norms; this issue will not be easily

swept under the carpet. Broad-brushed efforts against all

unflattering mention of the institution, King, Queen, and Crown

Prince through crude application of the blunt instrument of lese

majeste laws, without distinction between those who actually intend

ill towards the monarchy and those expressing opinions which

otherwise would not find an audience, may end up undermining the

institution the law is meant to protect — an unintended consequence

akin to the People’s Alliance for Democracy’s (PAD) extreme actions

in 2008 and the Queen’s ill-advised patronage of the October 13

funeral of a PAD demonstrator. End Summary and Comment.

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In a January 22 lunch with U.S. diplomats, Prem and Siddhi gave Abhisit lukewarm praise, andfulminated about Thaksin:

Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda described PM Abhisit as

“clean” and “one of the best we have.” Prem hoped the government

would get off to a good start. Prem and Privy Councilor Siddhi

Savetsila were considerably more animated about ex-PM Thaksin and his

supporters. Prem stated that Thaksin would not stop his political

efforts; he would keep trying to protect and promote himself. Siddhi

claimed that anti-government protestors were losing credibility as a

result of their actions, such as throwing eggs at their opponents

(such as former PM Chuan). He suggested the tactics were designed

simply to keep the protestors, and by extension Thaksin, in the news.

Prem added that this type of motive was also behind Thaksin’s talking

up an alleged assassination plot…

The Ambassador said he could easily imagine two scenarios for Thaksin

going forward: stay abroad and fight, while slowly losing influence

here in Thailand; or come back, go to jail, and hope for a pardon as

part of a deal. Prem replied that he considered it “almost

impossible” for Thaksin to come back, because he did not think

Thaksin would ever agree to go to jail. Prem added that Thaksin was a

very dangerous man and should be jailed…

On February 9, Anglo-Thai academic Giles “Ji” Ungpakorn fled Thailand to Britain to avoid prosecutionafter being charged with lèse majesté in January for using a quote from Paul Handley’s banned The KingNever Smiles in his 2007 book A Coup for the Rich. On arrival in the UK, Giles published The Red SiamManifesto, an article in English and Thai that openly challenged monarchist fairytales:

This king:

grew in stature under the corrupt military dictators: Sarit,

Tanom and Prapass.

allowed innocent people to be executed after they were falsely

accused of killing his older brother.

supported the blood bath at Thammasart University on 6th

October 1976 because he felt that Thailand had ‘too much

democracy’. He was also the patron of the violent gang that

were called the ‘village scouts’.

allowed the army to stage a coup in September 2006. Furthermore

he allowed his name to be used by the army, the PAD protestors

and the Democrat Party, in the destruction of democracy.

has been an advocate of economic views which reveal his

opposition to state social welfare for the poor. But what is

worse, as one of the richest men in the world, the king has the

arrogance to lecture the poor to be sufficient in their poverty

(through the notion of the Sufficiency Economy).

Finally, this king allows his supporters to proclaim that he is ‘the

father of the nation’, and yet his own son is not respected by anyone

in Thai society!

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The elites in Thailand, who claim legitimacy from the king, are

exploiters and blood-suckers. They are not the real owners of

society. They should remember that their wealth and status is as a

result of the hard work of those ordinary citizens whom they despise.

For the millions of Thais who know all this to be true, it is only

fear and intimidation that stops us all from speaking this truth out

loud.

On March 6, police raided the offices of the Prachatai news agency, one of the few independent andreliable voices in Thai journalism, and arrested its widely respected director, Chiranuch Premchaiporn,on the very same day that Abhisit had pledged to uphold media freedom in a speech at the Asia NewsNetwork’s 10th anniversary celebration in Bangkok

Meanwhile, Thaksin and the Red Shirts further escalated their campaign to bring down the government.With the king’s health extremely fragile, Thaksin was desperate to retake control of parliament so that hecould block any attempt by his enemies to sabotage Vajiralongkorn’s succession and instal analternative monarch. As Askew writes in Confrontation and Crisis in Thailand, 2008-2010:

The evolving events from March 26 showed how the red-shirt movement

was modelling its tactics on the PAD’s successful pattern of

declaring demands, provoking reactions and claiming pretexts for the

escalation of crowd action. The government was also embroiled in this

delicate game, which hinged on claiming the moral high ground of

legality, order and non-violence. Symbol and action, innuendo and

accusation were intimately entwined in the play of events, and the

first player to be demonstrated as the initiator of violence would

lose the moral advantage.

On March 26, the Red Shirts rallied again: tens of thousands marched on Government House and set upcamp there once more, planning a prolonged siege. Red Shirt protesters were routinely denounced byAbhisit’s government as paid stooges of Thaksin Shinawatra but a U.S. embassy cable noted that thiswas inaccurate — many of them clearly believed in their cause. The Red Shirts began calling themselvesphrai — an old term roughly meaning “serf” — and contrasting themselves with the amart, theestablishment. They mocked the pretensions and double standards and deceitfulness of the elite, and thefairy tales of Thailand as a united, free and harmonious nation. On the evenings of March 27 and March28, Thaksin addressed Red Shirt protesters at Government House via video link. For the first time, heexplicitly accused Prem Tinsulanonda of plotting the 2006 coup, and also named Surayud Chulanont andPiya Malakul as key conspirators. All three responded with appalled denials

A partial translation of Thaksin’s March 27 comments was provided by Chris Baker on New Mandala. Theexiled former prime minister told the crowd that his famous 2006 comments about a “charismatic”person trying to overthrow him had, of course, referred to Prem Tinsulanonda:

The phrase “person with extra-constitutional charismatic power”

created a big fuss. Sondhi [Limthongul] claimed I meant the King. I

was not so bold. I’m loyal. I was not so bold as to say that. In

truth, the person with extra-constitutional charismatic power is

General Prem Tinsulanond [Big cheer]. I didn’t dare say it then. And

one of General Prem’s people phoned to ask me to say clearly that it

was not General Prem. But it was, so I wouldn’t. [Big cheer]

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Because General Prem was involved in politics, and the military was

involved, we had the coup, the constitution of 2007, and the country

has gone backwards by at least 15 years…

That Pa [Prem] descends to play politics, to order this and that, in

his role as a person with extra-constitutional charismatic power, is

something that destroys the procedures of the country, gives rise to

a system of double-standards, gives rise to social injustice.

Pa has no children but children are growing up. They must have a

future, must live in a country with a proper system, a democracy that

commands international acceptance, and social justice, not a system

in which Pa can press this button and that button.

On March 30, Thaksin told the crowd that Prem had routinely interfered in military promotions fordecades. As the reaction of the U.S. embassy shows, this was also absolutely true:

Addressing the crowd by video link from abroad, Thaksin on March 30

continued to attack Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda,

claiming that Prem, as Privy Council President, had frequently sought

to influence the promotions of military officers. (Note: We have

reported that for years. End note.)

What panicked the elite was that Thaksin’s accusations were extremely accurate. He was breaking one ofthe unwritten rules of the Thai establishment, airing their dirty laundry in public, and challenging thefables that elite networks created to mask their political meddling.

By early April, Thaksin appears to have decided to launch a significant escalation, and seek to toppleAbhisit’s government through mass unrest. The protesters announced that their “D-Day” would be April8, when they would march on the residence of Prem Tinsulanonda. It was a deliberately provocativetactic. On the evening of April 6, his ex-wife Pojaman and their children and other close relatives leftThailand on various flights ahead of the showdown. The same evening, Abhisit appeared on nationaltelevision to say he would tolerate peaceful protest but would not allow “civil war or a people’srevolution”. He also told protester’s to leave Prem’s house alone. On April 7, a group of “supporters” ofPrem gathered at his residence. It was quite clear that they were not who they claimed to be, as Nostitzreported:

On April 7 there was news that a new group of Prem supporters had

gathered in front of Prem’s residence at Thewet. They wore light blue

neckerchiefs, and called themselves a spontaneously founded citizens’

group – the “Glum Rak Pandin Goed” (The Group that Loves their Land

of Birth). Most of the few dozen people had difficulties remembering

the group’s name, and garbled it when I asked them. They walked in

and out of the army installation next to Prem’s residence, mingled

with the soldiers there. I met many PAD guards who I knew from the

government house occupation of last year, and who remembered me as

well.

The same day, Red Shirt protesters in Pattaya, where Abhisit was holding a cabinet meeting, attackedthe prime minister’s car. Abhisit escaped but his driver and some police officers were beaten up.

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Also on April 7, Buri Ram gangster and parliamentary faction leader Newin Chidchob held a theatricaltelevised news conference in which he tearfully proclaimed his loyalty to the king and pleaded withThaksin to stop “hurting the monarchy”. It was a shamelessly cynical performance. The Nation reportedhis remarks:

A tearful Newin Chidchob on Tuesday launched a stinging attack on

former boss Thaksin Shinawatra and asked him to put a brake on the

red shirted movement’s activities that may have upset His Majesty the

King.

His voice choked with emotion, Newin said if he could ask for two

things from Thaksin after “risking my life” for him, he would want

the former prime minister to “tell his men” to stop “hurting” the

monarch and ending activities that could damage Thailand as a whole.

The political drama unfolded on TV as Newin and his colleagues

appeared at a press conference to rebut claims by the redshirted

movement that they had “betrayed” Thaksin…

Newin asked red shirted protesters who planned to join in a mass

rally on Wednesday to reconsider their decision, saying their leaders

had ulterior motive beyond toppling Abhisit government…

“Please think twice, the red shirt protesters. You all are being

used. Your leaders have hidden agenda beyond what they told you,

beyond ousting this government,” he said.

Newin’s voice was choked with emotion when he said he was ready to

die for the monarchy and would do anything to fight those who wanted

to destroy the monarchy.

Besides Newin’s high-profile news conference, the Interior Ministry which he controlled sent an order onApril 7 marked “most urgent” to all provincial governors, ordering billboards to be erected all overThailand with the slogan “PROTECT THE INSTITUTION — CALM PEACE UNITY”.

On the morning of April 8, the Red Shirt “D-Day” protest began. More than 100,000 people packed SriAyutthaya Road, Royal Plaza, and the roads surrounding Government House. On April 9, many Bangkoktaxi drivers — who overwhelmingly support Thaksin — blocked roads in the capital in sympathy with theprotest. But numbers at the Bangkok rally began to wane as the focus switched to seaside sex resort ofPattaya, where world leaders were arriving for the ASEAN summit at the Royal Cliff Hotel. Besides thepolice and soldiers deployed to Pattaya to maintain order during the summit, a militia group alsoappeared wearing navy blue T-shirts with the slogan “PROTECT THE INSTITUTION — CALM PEACEUNITY”. During the years he was allied with Thaksin, Newin had played a key role in arranging streetmobs. Now he was doing the same for his new allies in the Democract Party, in particular SuthepThaugsuban. The two men — both supremely corrupt — had been bitter enemies in the 1990s but nowwere comrades. Suthep was in overall charge of the security response to the Red Shirt protests, and hedrew on Newin’s shady expertise.

On April 10, a brief clash between the Blue Shirts and Red Shirts erupted after Arisman Pongruangrong,a popular singer who had become a UDD leader, delivered a letter of protest to ASEAN delegates. In

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Bangkok, Red Shirt leaders on the stage outside Government House announced that transport wasavailable for those willing to travel to Pattaya to reinforce their comrades there. Taxis, vans and busescrammed with Red Shirts began streaming down the highway to Pattaya.

By the morning of April 11, the police securing the Royal Cliff Hotel, where the summit was to be held andmost foreign delegations were staying, had been replaced by soldiers, members of the Border PatrolPolice militia, and Blue Shirts. Confrontations between the Blue Shirts and Red Shirts erupted in severalparts of Pattaya. Newin was videoed and photographed personally directing the Blue Shirts. As theatmosphere grew increasingly confrontational, hundreds of Red Shirts forced their way into the hotel.Nick Nostitz describes what happened:

Red Shirts stood at the front doors, and suddenly began pushing. One

large glass window suddenly broke, and Red Shirts stood inside the

Hotel. I was completely astounded, and let myself be carried with the

flow of protesters who streamed into the hotel like an overflowing

river. There were bewildered journalists, delegates and observers

from many Asian countries watching on. In between were tourists in

swimming trunks. Some Red Shirts stood next to them and snapped

pictures with their mobile phones, and the tourists took their

images. There was no violence, it was just plain bizarre and surreal.

Soldiers ran to protect the entry of the main hotel building; Red

Shirts ignored them, walked around and entered through a side

entrance, searching for Abhisit. In general, the protesters were

noisy, but very well behaved.

In Red vs. Yellow volume two, Nick Nostitz discusses the reasons for the government’s creation of the BlueShirt militia, and the incompetence of the security operation defending the Pattaya summit:

The idea behind the setting up of the Blue Shirts was to avoid the

security forces appearing to use violence against protesters. This

concern stems from the fear of the state, after many occasions in

past decades when crackdowns have gone terribly wrong… Therefore a

militia, the existence of which could plausibly be denied, was set

up. I spoke afterwards with one of the PAD guards I met in Pattaya.

When I asked him if he felt used, given that PAD relations with both

Newin and Suthep are not exactly cordial, he said of his involvement:

“That thought often occurs to me. These people always tend to use us

for their own advantage, and we don’t know until after the events. I

just went there with my friends to protect ASEAN, and didn’t know

anything. Only there I found out that most of the people with me

there were soldiers, including many conscripts that did not want to

be there.”

The intelligence screw-up is a notorious factor throughout this

conflict. Ground-level intelligence officers are under extreme

pressure. Government ideology says that Red Shirts are bought and

paid for by Thaksin Shinawatra, do not truly believe in their cause

and are less numerous than they claim. Therefore, when ground-level

officers report numbers that seem too high, they will not be

believed, and are reprimanded and suspected of being pro-Red. In

order to avoid these accusations, many intelligence officers report

the numbers that their superiors want to hear. In the case of Pattaya

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the number given was 1,000 to 1,500 Red Shirt protesters, while the

real number was in the range of 4,000 to 5,000. Enough Blue Shirts

were in place to deal with the lower number but they were completely

overwhelmed by the true numbers. The orders to the security forces in

uniform not to use violence were the final straw and ensured the day

ended in a true mess…

If the government had authorized regular forces to use regular crowd

dispersal methods, namely teargas and water cannons, in order to

prevent the Red Shirts from coming close to the conference venue,

this would have been within what is permitted by international rules,

and would hardly have raised an eyebrow among the international media

or the delegates, both being used to regular violent protests at

similar international conferences. It is also open to question

whether the hotel invasion would have occurred, if the Blue Shirts

had not attacked the Red Shirts in Pattaya in the first place.

The summit was cancelled. Nine foreign heads of state — including the Japanese and Chinese primeministers — fled from the roof of the Royal Cliff Hotel by helicopter. It was a humiliation for Abhisit andhis government.

The focus of confrontation switched back to Bangkok. On April 12, police arrested UDD leader Arisman,provoking immense anger among the Red Shirts over double standards — no Yellow Shirt leader hadbeen arrested over the airport occupation four months earlier. Later in the day, speaking at the(Bhumjai Thai Party-controlled) interior ministry, Abhisit declared a state of emergency in Bangkok andsurrounding provinces too. Around 50 people wearing red shirts forced their way into the ministrycompound and attacked Abhisit’s car. The prime minister managed to escape the crowd, with securityofficers firing warning shots in the air. But later a car carrying Niphon Prompan, secretary of the primeminister’s office and a longtime friend of Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn, was set upon by protesters afterit crashed while trying to break through the crowd. In a phone-in to supporters on April 12, Thaksincalled for a “people’s revolution”:

I would like to invite all sides: Let join hands. Take this

opportunity to make a People’s Revolution in order to bring about the

true democracy to the people.

Abhisit’s three-month-old administration was looking increasingly vulnerable. The prime minister washaemorrhaging credibility. In response, the government and military leadership launched a crackdownin Bangkok. On the night of April 12, the troops stationed in the Din Daeng area to the east ofgovernment house were replaced by soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Division Queen’s Guard, the royalistarmy regiment that had come to dominate the military power structure. Army chief Anupong was fromthe Queen’s Guard, as was his deputy (and successor) Prayuth Chan-ocha, who had particularly intimatelinks with Queen Sirikit and Prem Tinsulanonda. Several sources suggest that the switch of units was aresult of a conflict in the armed forces. In particular, Panlop Pinmanee, the dubious retired general whohad been a sworn enemy of Thaksin’s but now appeared to be an ally again, was widely reported to behelping direct violent militia members within the Red Shirts.

The royalist troops proceeded to launch an all-out pre-dawn assault on Red Shirt protesters at SamliemDin Daeng east of Victory Monument, under the command of Colonel Romklao Thuwatham, a rising starin the Queen’s Guard. The soldiers, in full combat gear, fired repeated volleys of automatic gunfire andalso used teargas. Very few journalists were present: those who were commented on the ferocity of the

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military assault. Although the military leadership was later to insist that soldiers had only fired liveammunition over the heads of protesters, multiple eyewitnesses confirm that some troops had fireddirectly at the Red Shirts. The protesters fought back with firebombs, slingshots and rocks. Soldiers werealso targeted by sporadic gunfire. Red Shirts set tires ablaze to make barricades against the advancingtroops. As April 13 progressed, fighting spread. Red Shirts massed at Victory Monument, andcommandeered several buses to use as barricades. Some were set on fire. Gas tankers were parked intwo places near Victory Monument: outside the Din Daeng apartments, a ramshackle complex that washome to hundreds of people, and outside the King Power Hotel on Soi Rangnam, owned by one of NewinChidchob’s cronies. Men wearing red shirts threatened to blow up both tankers. Skirmishes also brokeout between locals and Red Shirts in several neighbourhoods, some of which were Yellow Shirtstrongholds.

Unlike in 1973 and 1992, the military crackdown of April 13, 2009, did not turn public opinion in Bangkokdecisively in favour of the protesters. Although the army assault in the early morning had been verydisproportionate, the Red Shirts had lost significant public support because of the violent actions ofsome of those among them. The Din Daeng gas tanker incident was particularly damaging. Also, a fewRed Shirts carried firearms, and many carried small improvised explosives, clubs, swords and petrolbombs. Several of the most armed and violent elements among the Red Shirts wore black.

Meanwhile, a propaganda battle was being fought on international television between Abhisit andThaksin, as both tried to spin news coverage to their advantage. Abhisit was the clear victor. In a reversalof their domestic appeal — Thaksin communicates brilliantly with ordinary Thais while Abhisit is aloofand fumbling — the British-educated prime minister was plausible and likeable when speaking in Englishwhile Thaksin appeared shrill and unconvincing. This, too, helped turn the tide back in the government’sfavour. The mainstream Thai media overwhelmingly backed Abhisit, as Askew notes in Confrontationand Crisis in Thailand, 2008-2010:

The government-promoted view, which shaped the dominant media

narrative of the meaning of the Songkran turbulence, was that the

demonstrations and aggressive crowd action were a deliberate effort

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to seize state power by Thaksin and key UDD allies. They were aimed

towards creating public chaos and sowing divisions in the ranks of

the military to provoke a coup that would return Thaksin to power. It

is unclear that this was the case, although Thaksin had obviously

tried to exploit the events.

On April 14, after a tense but relatively uneventful night, and with a decisive military assault on theirmain camp at Government House expected imminently, the Red Shirt leadership announced an end tothe protest to avoid further bloodshed.

Abhisit and the military had won, but at the cost of further dividing the county and making theirhypocrisy and double standards more obvious than ever. In August 2008, Abhisit had helped sabotagepolice efforts to clear the PAD blockade of Government House. After October 7, the Thai elites haderupted in fury at the “brutality” of the police crackdown on the Yellow Shirts. The military had failed tohelp either Samak Sundaravej or Somchai Wongsawat enforce the rule of law. The PAD leaders who ledthe occupation of Bangkok’s airports remained free, and a leading PAD member was Thailand’s foreignminister. Now Abhisit and the army brass had overseen the ruthless suppression of the Red Shirts, andarrested their leaders. The sense of rage and bitterness felt by many Thais since the 2006 coup, furtherstoked by Sirikit’s funeral visit and the overthrow of the PPP government in 2008, now burned fiercerthan ever.

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Abhisit and the elite failed to understand the anger of ordinary people, in particular less wealthyresidents of Bangkok, and Thais in the north and northeast of the country. They believed the Red Shirtswere just pawns in a political game being played by Thaksin. There was some truth to this view. LeakedU.S. cable 09BANGKOK974 cites a conversation with one of Thaksin’s main lawyers, Manida “Micky”Zimmerman, showing that during the April 11-14 standoff, Thaksin was attempting — and failing — tonegotiate a deal of his own via backchannel contacts with the royalist elite:

Although the UDD has advocated a restoration of the 1997

Constitution and denounced the current government as undemocratic, we

believe that Thaksin has sought to use the UDD to advance his

objectives, many of which are narrow and personal rather than

ideological.

Manida “Micky” Zinmerman… a lawyer working for Thaksin, told us on

April 13 that Thaksin had made unsuccessful overtures to Privy

Council President Prem Tinsulanonda; part of Thaksin’s agenda, she

said, included the disposition of his family’s frozen assets,

amounting to over two billion USD. Manida indicated Thaksin’s efforts

were rebuffed, and she said the violence in effect showed, “This is

what happens if (the royalist/RTG side) doesn’t even consider

(Thaksin’s) offer.” Separately, Isra Sunthornvut, Deputy Secretary

General to the Prime Minister, told us on April 12 that there was

little reason for the RTG to try negotiating an end to the standoff

with the UDD, because Thaksin’s main demand was the release of his

family’s funds, and this was both legally difficult and a political

non-starter.

If… the mid-April violence was intended to improve Thaksin’s

bargaining position, we believe it must be judged a failure. We note,

too, that Thaksin recently indicated privately… he believed the UDD’s

protests would prove a historic turning point and could speed his

return to Thailand. We believe that Thaksin, who has been outside of

Thailand since August, may be making decisions based on poor quality

information, much of which may be provided by persons hoping to win

financial support from Thaksin…

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During the strife, rumors spread of a possible military coup d’etat.

Isra Sunthornvut, Deputy Secretary General to the Prime Minister,

admitted to us that the Prime Minister did not have the full support

of the Army, but Isra estimated approximately 90 percent of soldiers

backed the PM, with the other 10 percent being allied either with

Thaksin or with retired General Pallop Pinmanee. As the Army

dispersed UDD protestors, we saw no indication of less than full

support for the administration.

Just as the establishment had done in 2008, Thaksin was now playing with the lives of his supporters,spreading mayhem and trying to get some of them killed. But this was only part of the story. The rank-and-file Yellow Shirts and Red Shirts were not just pawns following their leaders, they were people whomostly cared passionately about important issues of governance and democracy, and cared enough totake to the streets. By ignoring the entirely legitimate grievances of the Red Shirts, and a huge number ofordinary Thais who sympathised with them, Abhisit and the establishment totally failed to understandthe seriousness of the legitimacy crisis facing the monarchy and the elite — a crisis entirely of their ownmaking.

Bhumibol had nothing to say. The king has always hated chaos and disorder, but he also hated Thaksin,and he knew that any attempt to intervene would only demonstrate his impotence. So he pretended tobe ill. As the U.S. embassy reported:

The monarchy’s position became difficult during the recent upheaval.

In late 2008, Surakiart Sathirathai, a former Foreign Minister with

close ties to the Palace, wrote an English language op-ed justifying

the lack of royal intervention to end the standoff that had shut

Bangkok’s airports. Surakiart argued that royal intervention in Thai

politics had only taken place — and would only be appropriate — in

response to widespread loss of life. This argument aimed to deflect

implied criticism of the monarchy for allowing the airport standoff

to continue as long as it did.

The most recent violence surely raised fear at the Palace that the

UDD’s actions would meet the high standard to which Surakiart had

referred and make King Bhumibol’s intervention seem necessary.

(Indeed, as the April crisis developed, a former Senate President,

Suchon Chaleekure, publicly initiated a petition appealing for royal

intervention.) …. Despite the King’s high status in Thailand, we

believe he is unable to intervene successfully in the current

context. In 1992, the King, who was above the fray, brought

contending parties before him and ended a period of strife. Now,

however, in many people’s minds, the King cannot serve as referee,

because he and Thaksin are among the principal players in a contest

for power and influence.

In 2008, Palace contacts and others privately expressed serious

concern to us that the King would suffer a drastic loss of prestige

were he to try unsuccessfully to restore calm. We were not surprised,

therefore, when we heard rumors days ago — traceable to Privy

Councilor Palakorn Suwanrath — that the King had fallen ill. We

believe those rumors were meant to justify Palace non-intervention

while avoiding an appearance of abdication of royal responsibility

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for Thailand’s well-being. (Not only did Abhisit tell the Ambassador

that the King was in good health — but an Australian diplomat also

told us the King was well, according to a doctor who had seen the

King on April 13.)

There was plenty wrong with this analysis. The idea that Bhumibol had been “above the fray” and ableto act as a “referee”, in 1992 or ever, was a fairy tale. He had always been a political schemer, and ahostage of the elite. Furthermore, the cable omitted to mention that in late October 2008 Bhumibol hadindeed suffered a drastic loss of prestige, after Sondhi Limthongkul mocked and cursed the king’smodest intervention to try to rein in the Yellow Shirts. But the core assumption of the embassy — thatBhumibol was highly unlikely to intervene even to prevent chaos and bloodshed — was plausible.

Sondhi Limthongkul, meanwhile, was talking too much. After the 2006 coup, Sondhi had been enragedthat Prem and Surayud failed to give him credit — or any reward — for his role in toppling Thaksin. Hegave an extremely indiscreet interview to Shawn Crispin in April 2007 in which he complained of beingused by the “feudal elite”:

I’m a threat to them now. They’re very scared of me now…

Their biggest mistake after kicking Thaksin out, instead of allying

with me and agreeing with me that there is a need to reform the whole

country, they look at me as a threat. So they cut me off…

I am being myself, I’m not serving anyone. I thought over the year

that I fought, certain times almost violently, I almost lost

everything that I have, I fought because I believe in this country.

And all of a sudden I see a new group of people and they’re coming

and sucking everything again, and that pisses me off.

Further revelations followed, including in a speech in the United States in August 2007, broadcast on hisASTV satellite channel, which annoyed the elite so much he had problems returning to Thailand. In 2008,Sondhi was again needed by the elite, and became very close to Sirikit. Once again, he felt used andignored after Abhisit came to power, and once again, he began talking indiscreetly, in particular abouthis links to the queen. As a U.S. cable observed in April 2009:

Contacts have told us that Sondhi privately told other Thais that

Queen Sirikit directly supported his efforts. In advance of a recent

application for a U.S. visa, Sondhi requested expedited procedures

for his appearance at the Embassy, citing concerns for his security.

The establishment was still in shock from the backlash over Sirikit’s decision to preside at Nong Bow’sfuneral rites, and the last thing they needed was Sondhi shooting his mouth off about his support fromthe queen. Prawit Wongsuwan was tasked with shutting up the media tycoon permanently.

In the pre-dawn darkness on April 17, assassins ambushed Sondhi when his black Toyota minivanstopped at a gas station during his regular morning drive to his office. Gunmen in two pickup trucks shotout the tires and fired more than 100 rounds and at least one M-79 grenade at the vehicle from relativelyclose range. Incredibly, Sondhi survived the attack, but suffered a head wound from a ricochet. Hisdriver was more seriously wounded. The grenade missed its target, hitting a bus parked nearby, and theassassins were forced to flee before completing the job. Predictably, the investigation went nowhere.

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Four suspects were named, three military and one police officer, but they could not be found. NickNostitz reported in Red vs. Yellow volume two that powerful figures wanted the truth hidden:

High-ranking police officers have commented in private to me that

they have faced massive interference from very high quarters in their

investigations, and that they doubt thet can find the people behind

the attack.

On May 11, Eric John invited privy council president Prem and his sideick Surayud to lunch. Prem’snotorious egotism was on full display in his assessment of Abhisit, as the ambassador noted in adeadpan interjection:

Prem reiterated his previously expressed support for current PM

Abhisit as the right man at the right time for Thailand. While

suggesting that Abhisit might not be the best or most talented

Premier Thailand has had in comparison to his predecessors (note:

Prem served as PM from 1980-88, Surayud from 2006-08. End note), Prem

viewed Abhisit as among the best in terms of integrity and

commitment to move the nation forward. Abhisit, moreover, was genuine

in his current efforts to promote political reconciliation.

A few days later, John met two key figures from the opposing side: Thaksin’s outspoken adviser PansakVinyaratn, and former minister Surapong Suebwonglee. Both commented that the palace had damagedits prestige by becoming entangled in politics and refusing to be content with a ceremonial role:

Surapong remarked that there was a relatively small degree of anti-

monarchy sentiment in Thailand, but this had grown, thanks partly to

unspecified rumors and partly to the actions of members of the royal

family, such as the Queen’s support of PAD in 2008. Consequently,

the monarchy had lost some prestige; it was important for the royal

family not to take any side in a political conflict.

Pansak was considerably more direct about the failures of the

institution. “We (Thaksin and company) tried so hard to help the

royal family survive the 21st century” was his unbidden opening

comment. Adding a reference to social turmoil under the Khmer Rouge

in neighboring Cambodia in the 1970s: “we weren’t interested in any

Pol Pot ends to a post modern democracy.” Pansak disparaged the

advisers to the King and Queen who, in his mind, lacked the spine to

propose a slimmed down monarchy along the lines of northern Europe

or Spain, which was the model which could work for Thailand in the

future. He also questioned the competency of the management of the

Crown Property Bureau’s (CPB) assets.

Part of the establishment plan to neutralise Thaksin’s influence was to allow Newin’s corrupt BhumjaiThai party to loot the funds of the three ministries it controlled and use this to finance a majorpropaganda and vote-buying campaign in north and northeastern Thailand. Abhisit and his alliesremained utterly ignorant about the real reasons for Thaksin’s popularity, assuming his electoral successwas purely a result of effective vote buying which won the support of uneducated rural Thais. And sothey thought allowing Newin to outbid Thaksin and giving him a free reign to unleash his dirty trickswould solve the problem. It was more evidence of how out of the touch the elite were, and of their

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contempt for ordinary people. Thai voters proved much smarter than they expected. In a by-election onJune 21, 2009 in Sakon Nakhon province, the Peua Thai candidate scored an impressive victory in spite ofNewin’s attempted bribery. As the U.S. embassy commented:

A pro-Thaksin candidate trounced the representative of coalition

member Phumjai Thai party in a June 21 House of Representatives by-

election in the upper northeastern province of Sakon Nakhon. The

election was widely seen as a test of the influence of both former

Prime Minister Thaksin and Buriram politician Newin Chidchob. The

election appears to confirm Thaksin retains substantial influence in

Thai politics, at least in the upper northeast heartland…

The two candidates and their parties devoted substantial efforts

toward their campaigns. Former PM Thaksin Shinawatra, still abroad,

phoned canvassers directly, according to press reports. Somphong

Amornwiwat, a veteran politician who is informally active in Puea

Thai, told us on June 18 that Buriram politician Newin Chidchob (the

informal top figure behind Phumjai Thai) had moved operatives from

his Buriram base in lower Isaan into Sakon Nakhon to lobby at low

levels on Pitak’s behalf, and the Sakon Nakhon Governor was

distributing funds to lower-ranking officials. (The Governor is under

the authority of the Interior Minister, who is a Phumjai Thai

official.) Somphong claimed Sakon Nakhon residents were accepting

Phumjai Thai money but planned to vote for Puea Thai’s candidate

regardless, primarily because of their loyalty to Thaksin.

Subsequently three U.S. diplomats travelled to Buri Ram province, Newin’s home territory and politicalpowerbase, to evaluate the strength of his support and gauge the Bhumjai Thai Party’s politicalprospects. What they discovered was that even in the local stronghold he had dominated for yearsthrough bribery and intimidation, Newin was losing the popularity battle to the exiled ThaksinShinawatra:

A range of contacts from the local Buriram powerbase for Newin

Chidchob in lower Isaan (northeastern Thailand) told us that Phumjai

Thai, Newin’s political party, held considerable advantages through

control of ministries and the allegiance of local power brokers.

While these advantages could help to expand the party’s influence,

the difficulty Phumjai Thai faced was that voters still remained

dedicated to former Prime Minister Thaksin…

After a sudden rise prominence as a key power broker after his late

2008 defection from the primary Thaksin-affiliated party allowed the

Democrats to form a government, Newin’s prospects for further

expansion of power appear to have leveled off, at least for now. A

wide range of actors in Newin’s home territory readily admitted that

Phumjai Thai faced significant challenges in appealing to voters who

were still drawn to Thaksin; it is likely that Newin will not be able

to supplant Thaksin and Puea Thai as the leading party in Isaan.

That said, Phumjai Thai is crucial to the continuing viability of the

Democrat-led coalition, and this standing will continue to allow the

Chidchob family the means to profit from control of key ministries…

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A petition organized by the Red Shirts to ask the king to issue a royal pardon for Thaksin caused furtherembarrassment to the elite. Abhisit and his colleagues denounced it as an unacceptable attempt to dragthe supposedly apolitical monarchy into politics, which only made them look even more ridiculous. By2009, Thais were simply not buying this kind of bullshit.

The petition was submitted on August 17, with around five million signatures in 38 boxes. Here is anextract:

We, and the people in general, are aware that double standards are

being used in the enforcement of law against two particular groups of

people which we consider as uncivilised and unacceptable approaches.

For this reason, we have staged rallies to demand justice and

legitimacy. If they hadn’t forced so many injustices upon us, we

would not have had to take such steps as there is a limit to

everyone’s patience.

We would like to tell Your Majesty that you are the one and only

person we know we can turn to for help. This is because Your Majesty

are always committed to improving the people’s well-being. You have a

long-term vision and adhere to good governance, and we have faith

that Your Majesty will not allow us to endure hardships for too long.

Just a few days later, the succession conflict erupted into the open once again, further tarnishing theimage of the monarchy and endangering the stability of Abhisit’s coalition. The prime ministerwanted General Prateep Tunprasert to be the new police chief, but behind the scenes Vajiralongkorn wastrying to shore up his succession prospects by quietly taking control of key institutions. The crown princefavoured a different candidate, General Chumpol Manmai, and through his links withAnuthin Charnvirakul persuaded Bhumjai Thai to back his choice. Thanks to his friendship with NiphonPromphan, the prince persuaded some Democrats — including Suthep — to also back his candidate.Infuriated, some Democrats sought to enlist Queen Sirikit’s help to thwart to the prince. The royalmother-son power struggle was now causing a major political scandal. The U.S. embassy reported onthe feud in several cables:

The simmering feud over the National Police Chief position continues

to exacerbate the bad blood between the Democrats and Phumjai Thai

and expose the Abhisit-Suthep fissures. Though PM Abhisit routinely

asserts that he will forward Police General Prateep Tunprasert’s name

for consideration again as the nation’s top cop, there are

indications that Phumjai Thai will not easily fall in line. This

time, however, they are looking to hide behind the apparent desire

of Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn to see Police General Jumpol Manmai

appointed Chief (Note: It is widely believed former PM Thaksin, while

in office, used Jumpol as a bag man to deliver funds skimmed from the

state lottery to the Crown Prince’s office to fund his lifestyle. End

Note.)

Phumjai Thai’s Supachai coyly told us that Phumjai Thai would

“support whomever Suthep and Niphol do.” The Crown Prince, currently

in Germany, had recently summoned Niphol Promphan, who handles his

finances but is also a Democrat MP and Secretary General of PM

Abhisit’s office, to Germany to receive instructions to support

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Jumpol’s candidacy, according to a wide array of contacts and press

reports. (Note: Phumjai Thai Party Leader Charawat’s son Anutin, the

Chair of construction giant Sino-Thai, is also seen as very close to

the Crown Prince, as a “friend” and financier. End Note.)

Intriguingly, the Crown Prince may not be the only member of the

Palace interested in shaping the race for the Police Chief position.

Deputy Democrat party leader Kraisak Choonhaven told us September 5

that he had appealed to several influential members in court circles

to have Queen Sikrit trump the Crown Prince’s support for Jumpol. The

Queen had conveyed her support to Abhisit for Prateep, Kraisak

claimed; Supachai acknowledged to us September 4 that they had heard

the Queen may indeed be backing Prateep. According to Kraisak, with

the Queen’s support in hand, Abhisit would be able to push Police

General Prateep through at the next Royal Thai Police Office Board.

Niphol’s overt promotion of the Crown Prince’s desires was dangerous

for Niphol and the party, Kraisak fumed.

The prince was spending most of his time in Germany, continuing to receive regular blood transfusions.As the U.S. embassy reported in late 2009:

Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn has spent most (up to 75%) of the past

two years based in Europe (primarily at a villa at a medicinal spa

20km outside of Munich), with his leading mistress and beloved white

poodle Fufu. Vajiralongkorn is believed to be suffering from a blood-

related medical condition (varying sources claim he is either: HIV

positive; has Hepatitis C; is afflicted by a rare form of “blood

cancer,” or some combination which leads to regular blood

transfusions). His current (third) wife Srirasmi and 4 year old son …

known as Ong Ti, reside in his Sukhothai Palace in Bangkok, but when

Vajiralongkorn travels back to Bangkok, he stays with his second

mistress in the retrofitted Air Force VIP lounge at Wing Six, Don

Muang Airport (note: both mistresses are Thai Airways stewardesses;

the Crown Prince has shifted from flying F5s to Thai Airways Boeings

and Airbuses in recent years. End note). Long known for violent and

unpredictable mood swings, the Crown Prince has few people who have

stayed long in his inner circle.

One key exception: boarding school classmate Niphon Promphan, who has

long tended to the Crown Prince’s finances/affairs at the palace and

recently resigned as PM Abhisit’s Chief of Staff due to the spat

between Abhisit and the Crown Prince over the Police Chief selection.

Niphon is widely tipped to be the likely next Privy Council Chair,

presuming Vajiralongkorn assumes the throne and cleans house. A

relatively new close associate and princely financier is banned

former Thai Rak Thai politician Anutin Charnvirakul, son of Interior

Minister/Phumjai Thai Chair Charavat, and executive of the Sino-Thai

construction conglomerate. Deputy Police Commander Chumpol (see

above) reportedly served for many years as then PM Thaksin’s bagman,

delivering funds skimmed from lottery proceeds to the Crown Prince

and his staff; more recently, Chumpol is alleged to have been the

conduit for Thaksin to “gift” a $9 million villa in Phuket to the

Crown Prince.

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Vajiralongkorn was spending vast sums of money flying his 737 from city to city in Europe with a largeentourage. Most of his time was spent with his mistresses, not Srirasmi. When he spent time in a hotel, hewould often reserve an entire floor, and one of the rooms would be turned into a private kitchen to cookthe prince’s food. He also routinely demanded that an elevator be reserved for him so he did not have toshare it with other guests. He went on high-profile shopping sprees, buying enormous amounts of tackyornaments. Foo Foo the poodle was in constant attendance.

As his wife and son feuded, Bhumibol was unable even to stop the infighting in his own family, let alonerestore national unity. He was a lonely, isolated, fading figure, as the U.S. embassy observed:

While there is no question the King is the most widely revered figure

in all of Thailand, his recent influence on actual political events

and actors is less than either his supporters or detractors

acknowledge. By one count, he — either by himself or though his

proxies — has issued notable public politically-related entreaties as

few as a half dozen times since 2001 (birthday speeches in 2001,

2003, 2005, and 2007, plus April 2006, November 2008, and April 21).

Only his April 2006 speech to judges had any discernible impact.

The King, for one, appears to recognize the limitations of his

rhetorical reach, apart from a fine appreciation of the

constitutional limitations on his actual power; we know this from

private comments made to American ambassadors over the decades. We

believe the King’s purported influence actually far exceeds his

actual ability to control events…

Now in the deep twilight of his long reign, the King remains deeply

venerated by the vast majority of his subjects, and symbolically he

remains the central pillar of Thai identity. Despite this adulation

and symbolic importance, however, the evidence suggests his ability

to influence current events in his Kingdom, on the rare occasions he

attempts to do so, is on the wane…

Bhumibol’s inaction was a grave disappointment to millions of Thais who had formerly revered him.Thais were losing faith in the monarchy, and a minority were becoming openly hostile to the palace, asU.S. diplomats reported:

Against the backdrop of the UDD’s next big planned protests, we

continue to hear reports of increasing factionalism within the red-

shirt camp. Vira Musikapong told us on August 21 that the so-called

“June 24” faction (named in honor of the date of the 1932 coup)

within the red-shirt movement had become increasingly difficult to

manage. He characterized the faction as a group of small “die hard

republicans willing to use violence.” He said UDD leaders would soon

meet in order try to bring order to the red movement and set

standards; those who refused to adhere to UDD policies would be

expelled from the movement.

Human Rights Watch consultant Sunai Phasuk seconded Vira’s claims of

increasing factionalism within the red-shirt camp, telling us August

25 that an increasingly vocal portion of the red-shirt camp was

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growing impatient and disillusioned with the movement’s glacial pace.

Sunai guessed that approximately 10 percent of the red-shirts were

“radicals” bent on using violence to topple the monarchy. He warned

that the moderate leaders were having more and more difficulty

reining this radical red-shirt sub-faction in.

On September 15, 2009, Bhumibol went to Siriraj Hospital for a routine check-up. The following day, hewas admitted to the hospital for further treatment. Curiously, army leaders close to Sirikit played downthe seriousness of the king’s ailments. The Royal Household Bureau also lied about the date of hishospitalization, as the U.S. embassy noted:

By all accounts, public and private, 81-year old King Bhumibol’s

ongoing ailments which led to his hospitalization September 16 are

not particularly serious. None of the insiders who would be genuinely

concerned were his health in true danger seem worried — in contrast

to December 2008…

Officially, King Bhumibol was admitted to Siriraj hospital on

Saturday September 19, according the Royal Household Bureau, which

started issuing daily bulletins on Sunday, September 20, the day that

a well-wishers book was opened for signature, starting with PM

Abhisit and Army Commander Anupong. The Ambassador was the first

diplomat to sign the book, on September 21; palace officials on hand

in the hospital were completely relaxed and indicated the King’s

health issues were not serious. Army chief Anupong and Chief of Staff

Prayuth, known to be very close to Queen Sirikit, told a small group

of diplomats September 22 the same thing, without any sense of

evident concern: the King was in good shape, the reasons for

hospitalization not serious.

As the days passed, however, and Bhumibol’s physical health appeared to improve, it became clear thathe had no intention of leaving hospital. He was to remain in Siriraj for almost four years.

The reasons for Bhumibol’s behaviour remain a mystery, but we can make some informed guesses.Firstly, the king is believed to have suffered bouts of severe depression all his life since his accidentalkilling of his brother King Ananda Mahidol in 1946. Several U.S. embassy contacts speculated that he wasagain deeply depressed:

There is clearly no way for anyone to analyze accurately the King’s

state of mind, or draw certain conclusions between political

developments, possible mental stress, and his physical ailments.

However, one long-time expat observer of the Thai scene, present in

Thailand since 1955, has repeatedly asserted to us over the past year

that the King shows classic signs of depression – “and why wouldn’t

he, seeing where his Kingdom has ended up after 62 years, as his life

comes to an end” – and claims that such mental anguish likely does

affect his physical condition/failing health.

Suthep Thaugsuban, the deputy prime minister, made the same point:

Tapping his forehead, Suthep claimed that the King’s physical health

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was okay, but that the [real] worry was his state of mind, depressed

at the state of affairs in his Kingdom at the end of his life.

Secondly, an aspect of Bhumibol’s hospitalization that was widely apparent to Thais but never publiclydiscussed was that it is an extremely bad omen for the king to be in hospital. For Thais who believe thatthe monarch is a microcosm of his kingdom, a hospitalized king means a disordered and sick country.Bhumibol is well aware of this symbolism. In the years since his glorious diamond jubilee in June 2006, hehad been humiliated, marginalized and ignored. His wife was actively plotting to sabotage thesuccession and become regent when he died. By refusing to leave hospital, Bhumibol may well havebeen sending a message to the elite and indeed all his people — he was bitterly unhappy about what washappening in 21st century Thailand.

Third, he may have believed — rightly or wrongly — that he was at risk of being murdered. A sense ofparanoia has always characterized his reign, and by 2009 there were actually plausible reasons whysome members of the elite — and even his wife — might want him dead. Elections had to be held by 2011,and there was a strong possibility that Thaksin would once again win control of parliament. If the elitewanted to have its best hope of managing the succession and keeping Vajiralongkorn off the throne, itwould be very convenient for Bhumibol to die before the next election.

Thaksin, meanwhile, continued to scheme behind the scenes. Ostensibly his main demands were a returnof his frozen billions and a pardon that allowed him to return to Thailand a free man. He vowedrepeatedly that he would quietly retire from politics. But the establishment knew that if Thaksin cameback to the country, and his vast fortune was restored, there would be nothing to stop him reneging onhis promises. He would be perfectly placed to ensure Vajiralongkorn became King Rama X, and the pairof them could proceed to dominate Thailand for decades. So the establishment refused to make a deal.A U.S. embassy cable discussed their implacable stance:

Privy Council Members and a palace official publicly and privately

September 2-3 have dampened speculation about the potential for any

pardon or “deal” for fugitive former PM Thaksin Shinawatra. The Thai

media widely reported the September 2 comments of Privy Councilor

Ampol Senanarong to a civil servant commission that Thaksin did not

exhibit the qualities of a virtuous leader, and fugitives from

justice could not file a petition seeking royal pardon. Privately,

deputy Personal Private Secretary Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn and Privy

Councilor GEN Pichit Kullavanijaya told us September 3, at a lunch at

the Ambassador’s residence held in honor of Privy Council Chair GEN

Prem Tinsulanonda, that while Thaksin was sending out continuous

feelers to palace personnel, there was no chance for Thaksin to cut a

deal and return to Thailand a free man. Meanwhile, former Deputy

Prime Minister and close Thaksin ally Sompong Amornvivat told us that

while Thaksin continued to profess optimism about an “imminent

return,” Sompong personally did not see any viable channels through

which this might occur.

While Thaksin himself told the Ambassador in July 2008 that he

expected a deal could be cut that would lead to a pardon for him and

a national unity government, much water has passed under the bridge

in the intervening year plus to undermine his hopes and assumptions.

Of most note are his October 2008 conviction and his April 2009 call

for “revolution” during the height of the red-shirt rallies that

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degenerated into mob riots in Pattaya and Bangkok. Recent rumors

about the renewed possibility of a pardon deal seem sourced to red

shirts or Thaksin associates; few give credence to talk of a

Democrat-Puea Thai alternate coalition, apart from being rhetorical

pressure for Phumjai Thai to fall in line. While it is understandable

why Thaksin would hope to cut a deal for a royal pardon, it is less

clear why anyone associated with the Palace would support such a

gambit just months after Thaksin openly called for revolution. Privy

Councilors and other officials in direct service to the King appear

to see Thaksin as an existential threat to the monarchy, an

institution they have devoted their lives to serving and protecting.

When asked whether Thaksin would ever return to Thailand, GEN Pichit

quipped: “Eventually, but most likely in a coffin.” …

Three Privy Councilors have broken the soft taboo against speaking

publicly on politically-related issues in recent years to speak out

publicly against fugitive former PM Thaksin. Privy Council Chair GEN

Prem is the most notable, and has drawn the wrath of red-shirt

demonstrators, who rioted in front of his residence in May 2007 and

demonstrated there again in April 2009. West Point grad GEN Pichit

has several times over the past year accused Thaksin of massive money

laundering through the Cayman Islands. On September 2, a lesser known

Privy Councilor, Ampol Senanarong, a life-long Agriculture Ministry

irrigation expert, waded into the anti-Thaksin fray, at a time when

rumors of alleged possible Democrat-Puea Thai “grand coalition”

arrangements and/or a pardon for Thaksin were on the rise.

Speaking on morals, ethics, and transparency at a seminar held at the

Civil Servant Commission, Ampol directly addressed the issue of

whether Thaksin were worthy of or eligible for a pardon. Citing the

“dasavidha- rajadhaama,” or ten principles of a righteous ruler,

Ampol contrasted the King’s virtuous behavior with Thaksin’s misrule

as Prime Minister, claiming Thaksin exhibited none of the ten

virtues. Ampol, who attended King Bhumibol’s two most recent

audiences, including the August 21 one in which the King called for

unity to prevent the country from falling into ruin, stated flatly

that Thaksin was ineligible for a pardon. Ampol cited three examples,

without naming the individuals involved, of convicts who had fled

instead of serving their jail terms, and whose pardon requests were

denied by the King on these grounds.

Ambassador held a September 3 lunch at the Residence in honor of GEN

Prem, who turned 89 on August 26. Six Privy Councilors (Prem, GEN

Surayud, ACM Sitthi, GEN Pichit, Sawad Wattanayagorn, and Atthaniti

Disatha-amnaj), plus the King’s PPS Arsa Sarasin and the Deputy PPS,

Ambassador Krit, attended.

Ambassador Krit, who served as Prem’s diplomatic liaison when Prem

was PM from 1980-88 and was recalled from his Ambassadorial

assignment in Washington early to assume the deputy PPS position in

2008, expressed regret that Ampol had spoken up so publicly September

2. He suggested that Prem had not authorized it and would have

preferred not to stir further public controversy. Ampol had been

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present in King Bhumibol’s two most recent public audiences, Krit

noted, and inevitably people would infer Ampol was speaking on the

King’s behalf. However, Krit proceeded to be equally emphatic in

ruling out any potential pardon or deal for Thaksin.

Acknowledging that Thaksin had sent “continuous feelers” to various

people associated with the palace over the past year, Krit stated

forthrightly that: “Arsa had shut down all such known channels.”

Citing what he considered Thaksin’s incendiary and irreverent

comments in April 2009 in the Financial Times and elsewhere, Krit

opined that a deal with Thaksin would be “unimaginable.”

GEN Pichit was equally blunt to us. Accusing Thaksin of attempting to

undermine the institution of monarchy and return to Thailand to serve

as “President,” Pichit said: “we won’t let him.” When asked whether

Thaksin had a chance of ever returning to Thailand, Pichit paused

before adding: “Eventually, but most likely in a coffin” after dying

abroad.

In a separate September 3 meeting, Thaksin ally and former Deputy

Prime Minister Sompong Amornvivat told us that Thaksin continued to

express optimism about his prospects for an imminent return to

Thailand. Sompong reported that he meets with Thaksin frequently in

Dubai — and will do so again in a few weeks — and that Thaksin often

ends their encounters by stating confidently: “I will see you in

Bangkok soon.” When we asked whether this confidence was well

founded, Sompong said that he was not aware of any mechanism by which

Thaksin could return to Bangkok any time soon, before adding that he

personally did not share Thaksin’s optimism.

In September 2009, in an interview with the Thai Post, Sondhi Limthongkul dropped remarkably obvioushints that he would never support Vajiralongkorn as monarch:

Today, we fight so Thailand can have the monarchical institution. No

matter who is the monarch, I’m happy as long as that person has the

virtues of a king. I want to stress this this. As long as that person

has the virtues of a king then Thailand must have the institution of

the monarchy.

In November, another Yellow Shirt leader, Suriyasai Katasila, now secretary general of the linked NewPolitics Party (NPP), was even more explicit in comments to U.S. diplomats:

For a party that was publicly built at least in part on a foundation

of loyalty to the institution of the monarchy, the NPP privately is

surprisingly schizophrenic on the succession question. Suriyasai

revealed to us that the PAD/NPP was split between those who

unreservedly supported the institution, and those who merely

supported the King personally. He counted himself in the latter

group, indicating a lack of support for the presumed heir to the

throne: Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn. This begs the obvious question

of what would happen to the party if – as expected – the Crown Prince

inherited the keys to the Kingdom? Suriyasai told us that he

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personally believed the monarchy needed to be reformed, and even went

so far as to characterize some elements of the royalist movement as

“dangerous,” perhaps even more so than the red-shirt movement backing

Thaksin.

His comments about the Yellow Shirts being divided were disingenuous. In fact, they are overwhelminglyopposed to Vajiralongkorn.

The same month, Thaksin was interviewed in Dubai by Times journalist Richard Lloyd Parry. Hedismissed the argument that he had been a rival to the king in the hearts of Thailand’s people:

When you have a son, he loves the wife and he loves the mother. It’s

a different kind of love. The people love me because they can touch

me. They can use me to improve their well-being. But the King, they

respect him very much like God. It’s a different kind of love. But

the people are trying to make it the same love. That’s really the

whole problem.

He explicitly accused Prem, the privy council, Sirikit’s ladies-in-waiting and other key establishmentfigures of manipulating the king and queen for their own ends:

The King is the most respected person. He’s become god in the

feelings of the Thai people. Thais don’t obey one another. They need

someone they really respect — that is the King. But the people who

surround the King and the Queen, what I call the palace circle, they

try to make influence…

That’s the problem in Thailand. The monarchy is not the problem. The

monarchy is good for Thailand. Thailand needs to have a monarchy but

it should not be abused or played by the palace circles.

Most controversially of all, he discussed the crown prince and the succession in detail:

Q: There will eventually be a change of monarch. What will that mean

for Thai politics and Thai society?

Thailand’s been governed by this dynasty more than 200 years. There’s

going to be a smooth transition but Thais need to reconcile their

differences first, before the reign change. The reign change will be

smooth.

Q: One day the Crown Prince will become King. How will his style be

different from that of the current King?

It may be different, but I think it will go smoothly because he’s a

constitutional monarch. The people around the Crown Prince will be

new, and the palace circle will not be that big because he will be

new. The Crown Prince, because he will be new, may not be as popular

as His Majesty the King. However, he will have less problem because

the palace circle will be smaller, because of being new in the reign.

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Q: How would you describe the Crown Prince’s character?

He’s the newer generation, modern.

Q: What kind of personality does he have?

He has a very strong determination to do what he really wants to

achieve. He has a strong determination.

Q: What does he want to achieve?

He’s not the King yet, he may not be shining. But after he becomes

the King I’m confident he can be shining to perform Kingship, because

he has observed His Majesty, his father, for many years. He learns a

lot from His Majesty. It’s not his time yet. But when the time comes

I think he will be able to perform.

Q: Sometimes even in a constitutional monarchy when a new monarch

succeeds to the throne there is a new spirit in the country. Do you

expect that will happen in Thailand?

I think His Royal Highness the Crown Prince — he has grown up abroad,

he had education abroad and he’s young. I think he understands the

modern world. For a constitutional monarch the world is changing. The

monarchy is evolving according to the changing world anyway.

Q: How do you think the Thai monarchy needs to evolve in the next

generation?

Being a constitutional monarch and understanding the changing world —

that is enough to be a change.

The Thai establishment reacted with fury, and sought to have Lloyd Parry and The Times charged withlèse majesté.

In December 2009 and January 2010, Eric John made a series of New Year visits to some of Thailand’smost influential elder statesmen: privy council president Prem, who was 89 at the time , retired air chiefmarshal Siddhi Savetsila, who had just turned 90, and former prime minister Anand Panyarachun, whowas a sprightly 78. All three men lied to the U.S. ambassador to conceal their active efforts to sabotagethe succession, but all were scathing about Vajiralongkorn, and Siddhi even expressed hopes that thecrown prince would die. Prem also inadvertently revealed the extent of his rift with Bhumibol,acknowledging when pressed by Eric John that he had not seen the king since his hospitalization. Asecret cable recounted their comments:

All three had quite negative comments about Crown Prince

Vajiralongkorn. While asserting that the Crown Prince will become

King, both Siddhi and Anand implied the country would be better off

if other arrangements could be made. Siddhi expressed preference for

Princess Sirindhorn; Anand suggested only the King would be in a

position to change succession, and acknowledged a low likelihood of

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that happening…

On the two most difficult and sensitive issues of the day in Thailand

— Thaksin and the monarchy — the Thai elite appear as unsure about

the future as any other sector of society. The stakes are significant

for all sides, and resolution of the political divide and royal

succession could still be far over the horizon…

Regarding King Bhumibol’s health, Prem indicated that the King was

exercising 30 minutes a day on a stationary bicycle at Siriraj

Hospital and passing a medicine ball with a physical therapist to

build up strength and regain weight. Prem acknowledged that he had

not seen the King since the hospitalization, but that the Queen and

Princess Sirindhorn saw the King daily. When Ambassador asked about

the Crown Prince’s involvement, Prem repeated: the Queen and

Sirindhorn visit him daily.

Prem acknowledged Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn probably maintained

some sort of relationship with fugitive former PM Thaksin, “seeing

him from time to time.” Prem, clearly no fan of either man,

cautioned that Thaksin ran the risk of self-delusion if he thought

that the Crown Prince would act as his friend/supporter in the future

merely because of Thaksin’s monetary support; “he does not enjoy that

sort of relationship.” When Ambassador asked where the Crown Prince

was currently, in Thailand or Europe, Prem replied dismissively: “You

know his social life, how he is.” (Note: a presumed reference to

Vajiralongkorn’s preference to spend time based out of Munich with

his main mistress, rather than in Thailand with his wife and son).

ACM Siddhi, in a similar vein, noted that the Crown Prince frequently

slipped away from Thailand, and that information about his air

hostess mistresses was widely available on websites; he lamented how

his former aide, now Thai Ambassador to Germany, was forced to leave

Berlin for Munich often to receive Vajiralongkorn. Siddhi raised

Thaksin’s controversial November Times On-line interview, which

Siddhi claimed cast the King in a bad light and attempted to praise

the Crown Prince as broad-minded and educated abroad, hinting that

Vajiralongkorn would be ready to welcome Thaksin back to Thailand

once he became King.

Ambassador mentioned to Siddhi the Crown Prince’s more engaging

approach in the early December King’s Birthday reception with

Ambassadors, shaking each envoy’s hand and appearing more at ease

than in the 2008 reception. Siddhi stated that succession would be a

difficult transition time for Thailand. According to Palace Law, the

Crown Prince would succeed his father, but added after a pause,

almost hopefully: “if the Crown Prince were to die, anything could

happen, and maybe Prathep (Sirindhorn) could succeed.”

Ambassador similarly raised the Crown Prince’s more confident

demeanor with former PM Anand in late December, seeking Anand’s

assessment of the dynamics in play as succession inevitably drew

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nearer. Anand’s response was similar to Siddhi’s, but more detailed

and blunt. Anand said that he had always believed that the Crown

Prince would succeed his father, according to law. However, there

could be complicating factors — if Vajiralongkohn proved unable to

stay out of politics, or avoid embarrassing financial transactions.

After a pause, Anand added that the consensus view among many Thai

was that the Crown Prince could not stop either, nor would he be

able, at age 57, to rectify his behavior. After another pause, Anand

added that someone really should raise the matter with the King,

before adding with regret that there really was no one who could

raise such a delicate topic (note: implied was the need for an

alternative to Vajiralongkorn).

ACM Siddhi expressed his personal concern about the declining image

of the royal family in Thailand, noting that something as simple as

excessive motorcade-related traffic jams caused by minor royals was

an unnecessary but enduring irritant. Personal Private Secretary Arsa

Sarasin had raised this with the King about eight years ago,

according to Siddhi, and the King had agreed, authorizing Arsa to

talk to royal family members and to set up new rules limiting

entourages and occasions when traffic would be stopped. Nothing had

changed; Siddhi noted that he had been caught up in traffic for 45

minutes the previous week returning for a meeting with the Chinese

Ambassador, due to a royal motorcade. Stories that the Crown Prince

now ordered second story windows closed as his motorcade passed

achieved nothing but additional popular resentment, Siddhi added

sorrowfully…

On the two most difficult and sensitive issues of the day in Thailand

— Thaksin and the monarchy — the Thai elite appear as unsure about

the future as any other sector of society. The stakes are significant

for all sides, and resolution of the political divide and royal

succession could still be far over the horizon.

Events were moving inexorably towards another showdown.

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In late 2009, rogue general Khattiya Sawasdipol, known by his nom du guerre “Seh Daeng” (“the redcommander”) emerged as an influential member of Thaksin’s circle. He said he was assembling a forceof 1,000 paramilitary rangers to protect the Red Shirts, and that the force would be present at a UDDrally on December 10. In comments to U.S. diplomats, Thaksin’s lawyer “Mickey” Zimmerman explicitlyconceded that Thaksin was putting together an armed militia:

Seh Daeng’s re-emergence as a public cheerleader for a more vigorous

red line is a potentially ominous development in the ongoing battle

between Thaksin’s supporters and the government; lawyer “Mickey”

called Khattiya a “warlord” who might be put in play in the possible

chaos of a messy transition scenario. Seh Daeng visited Thaksin in

both Cambodia and Dubai in recent weeks and was photographed

participating in Thaksin’s meetings with Hun Sen in Siem Reap and red

strategy sessions with UDD leaders in Dubai. His return to the red

limelight after laying low for seven months would not have happened

without Thaksin’s blessing. Given Khattiya’s troubling track record

of accurately predicting acts of violence and implicitly taking

credit with a wink and a nod, we are concerned that the next round of

extended protests, most likely in January, could get ugly.

A later U.S. cable confirmed that a force of black-clad rangers had been present at the December 10rally.

As promised, red-shirt agitator Maj. Gen. Khatthiya Sawasdiphol, aka

Seh Daeng, was present, as were dozens of black-clad guards

identified by Khattiya as thahan phraan (paramilitary rangers).

On January 21, Thai media reported that a week earlier, a M-79 grenade had been fired at the office ofarmy commander Anupong, and another fired at the Ministry of Defense. Nobody was hurt. Seh Daengdenied involvement, saying that if he had been behind the attacks, ”Anupong would be dead.”

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Meanwhile, the Supreme Court announced it would give its verdict on February 26 on whether more than$2 billion of Thaksin’s frozen assets should be seized or returned to him. Thaksin’s supporters begangearing up for what they billed as “the final battle”. But there was increasing dissent among the RedShirt leadership, over two issues in particular. The first was dismay among some senior Red Shirts thatThaksin’s narrow personal interests were being given too much importance when formulating strategy.As the U.S. embassy remarked:

the timing and nature of the upcoming protest is being dictated by

Thaksin, with an eye on the expected February 26 Supreme Court

decision on his frozen assets.

Secondly, there were differences over the extent to which it was acceptable for the movement to useviolence to help achieve its goals. One sign of this came in early February when Pallop Pinmanee, asinister military figure and a man who had switched sides repeatedly during the political conflict, visitedThaksin in Dubai with three other hardline Red Shirts — Seh Daeng, Arisman Pongruangrong andSuphon Attawong, aka “Rambo Isaan”. On their return, Pallop and Seh Daeng announced that a pro-Thaksin “people’s army” would be created, led by political heavyweight and former army chief ChavalitYongchaiyudh. Chavalit had been a protégé of Prem’s with delusions of grandeur and curiously muddledpolitics. His relationship with the privy council president was strained in 2009 when Chavalit brieflyagreed to lead Thaksin’s new political vehicle, Pheu Thai, and then changed his mind, probably due topressure from Prem. Now Chavalit backed down again, quickly disassociating himself from any plan fora people’s army. Jatuporn Prompan, one of the UDD core leaders, said the Red Shirts had notsanctioned the creation of a militia. Pallop then claimed he was renouncing the Red Shirts and would nolonger be involved with the movement. As the U.S. embassy commented in a confidential cable:

As the February 26 court decision on Thaksin’s assets draws closer,

there are growing indications the red-shirts are trying to influence

the decision-making process through intimidation, while

simultaneously laying the groundwork for trouble should the court

decision go against Thaksin. We have long urged red-shirt leaders to

distance themselves publicly from the actions and rhetoric of

Khattiya, yet ultimately it is Thaksin who calls the shots, and he

continues to summon various UDD leaders to meetings in conjunction

with Khattiya and Panlop. Public pronouncements by Chavalit and UDD

core leaders like Jatuporn saying they do not support Seh Daeng

and/or Panlop and the violent measures those men espouse are helpful

but ultimately beside the point. Thaksin’s willingness to be

photographed with those who embrace violence suggests a willingness

to condone their methods as longs as it suits his purposes.

On February 4, Eric John met veteran political godfather Banharn Silpa-archa, whose lack of principlesand enthusiasm for bribery had earned him nicknames including “the slippery eel” and “Mr ATM”.Banharn saw little hope of the crisis being resolved:

Banharn told the Ambassador that while he considered former PM

Thaksin a friend, he viewed him as utterly unpredictable. He

speculated that Thaksin — with whom he had not spoken in a long time

— was probably even more unpredictable than ever, now that the RTG

had “backed him into a corner.” As with anyone in this situation,

this made Thaksin potentially dangerous, and Banharn said he wished

the RTG would adopt a more flexible and compromising approach vis a

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vis Thaksin. By sticking to the letter of the law and remaining so

strident in its dealing with Thaksin, the RTG had eliminated any

possibility for reconciliation. Now both parties had gone “beyond the

point of no return.”

When the Ambassador asked Banharn for his prescription for dealing

with this problem, Banharn conceded that there was no one with the

requisite stature and reputation for impartiality to successfully

negotiate between both sides. Thaksin and the RTG had both drawn a

line in the sand on the question of Thaksin serving time in jail. In

Banharn’s mind, any successful compromise would have to be predicated

on the idea of putting this issue aside to start. In any case,

Banharn emphasized that Thaksin’s periodic comments to the press

stating that he was out of politics for good were laughable. Thaksin

was a political animal and would always seek to find a way back into

the game, a fact that helped explain why the RTG was so nervous.

On February 26, the Supreme Court made its ruling. In an apparent effort to defuse tensions and appearfair, even though the judiciary was overwhelmingly partisan and Yellow, the judges ruled that $1.4 billionof Thaksin’s fortune should be seized but he could keep around $900 million he had made beforebecoming prime minister.

If the supposed compromise was intended to placate Thaksin Shinawatra, it failed. He was incandescent.This was war.

Thaksin’s strategy was to stage the same deadly street theatre that has become traditional in Thaipolitical conflicts, to undermine the government’s legitimacy and provoke the security forces intooverreacting and killing enough Red Shirts to topple the Abhisit administration. But he would do it on afar bigger and grander scale, and to ensure the military took the bait, a secret militia mingling amongthe Red Shirts would use the tactics of urban insurgency to harass and attack soldiers. Seh Daeng was

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the public face of Thaksin’s militia, but this was misdirection: he and his force of rangers were given amainly defensive role, to guard and fortify Red Shirt protest encampments and provide security duringmarches. They were named the “Red Shirt Guards” but they wore black ranger-style uniforms with redneckerchiefs. They did not generally attempt to conceal their presence. Part warlord and part clown, SehDaeng openly swaggered around in full military uniform, always the centre of attention. Meanwhile, ahidden second militia of provocateurs, made up mostly of serving military personnel includingparatroopers and navy SEALS, was Thaksin’s secret strike force.

Two more elements added to the combustible mix. First, the military was split. Just as in wider Thaisociety, a rift between Red and Yellow ran right through the military.Most of the top brass were staunchlypro-Sirikit. But among more junior officers and rank-and-file soldiers, there was significant sympathy forthe Red Shirts. These troops were nicknamed “watermelon” soldiers — green on the outside, red on theinside. Military disunity went beyond Red versus Yellow, however. With Prem’s help, during the 21stcentury the most senior positions had become dominated by a single clique, from the Queen’s Guard, the21st regiment of the 2nd Infantry Division or “Eastern Tigers” based in Prachinburi. This caused greatbitterness in the traditionally dominant clique, the Bangkok-based “Clan of Angels”, the 1st InfantryDivision or King’s Guard. Their rivalry and mutual resentment mirrored the relationship between Sirikitand Bhumibol.

Second, several rogue agents with unclear loyalties and expertise in black ops were also jostling forposition in 21st century Thailand, including Newin Chidchob and his “blue” faction, and PallopPinmanee. This raised the possibility that a “third hand” could seek to provoke chaos or manipulate themayhem for its own interests.

During mid-March 2010, more than 100,000 Red Shirts converged on Bangkok from northern andnortheastern Thailand. Hysterical coverage from Thailand’s pro-establishment newspapers depictedthem as a furious feral horde.

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The protesters congregated and set up camp at Phan Fa Bridge in the historic districts aroundRachadamnoen Avenue near Thailand’s parliament where many past political battles had been fought.During March, there was a good-natured, carnival atmosphere in the Red camp and at their ralliesaround the city when thousands of Bangkok residents came out to cheer them on. But as Marchprogressed, several government and military buildings were targeted by M-79 grenade attacks. OnMarch 28 and 29, negotiations were held between Abhisit and the Red leadership, broadcast live on Thaitelevision. This was a welcome development, largely forgotten now in the light of the tragedy thatfollowed. It brought a brief moment of much-need transparency to Thai politics: instead of the eliteseeking to decide the fate of the country furtive backroom dealings, these negotiations could be watchedby all, and Thais could judge for themselves who was being reasonable and sincere. But Thaksin had nointerest in polite negotiation that made everybody look good. After a few days, to the dismay ofmoderate Red leaders, especially Wira Musikapong, Red hardliner Jatuporn Prompan broke off the talks.The order to do so came from Thaksin. He wanted confrontation.

On April 3, the Red Shirts occupied Ratchraprasong, a hectic traffic junction about two and a half mileseast of the old royal quarter. If Ratchadamnoen represents the heart of old Bangkok, Ratchaprasong isthe symbolic centre of the modern capital. As Benedict Anderson wrote in Withdrawal Symptoms :

As late as 1960, Bangkok could still be described as the “Venice of

the East”, a somnolent old-style royal harbour-city dominated by

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canals, temples and palaces. Fifteen years later, many of the canals

had been filled in to form roads and many of the temples had fallen

into decay. The whole centre of gravity of the capital had moved

eastwards, away from the royal compounds and Chinese ghettoes by the

Chao Phraya river to a new cosmopolitan zone dominated visually and

politically by vast office buildings, banks, hotels and shopping

plazas.

The Red Shirts turned Ratchaprasong into a sprawling urban village of makeshift tents housing foodstalls, dormitories, shops and clinics, surrounded by barricades made from tyres and sharpenedbamboo poles. Bangkok has long had a massive Lao population from Thailand’s impoverishednortheastern Isaan region: they are the underclass who work in the suburban factories and sweatshops,drive the buses and tuktuks and motorbikes and taxicabs, clean corporate offices and affluent homes,and service the sexual appetite of tens of thousands of customers in the massage parlours and sex barsof the capital’s industrialized prostitution industry. Bangkok’s more affluent residents used their servicesevery day, but never paid them much attention, until suddenly they took control of two square miles ofprime real estate in the middle of the modern city.

For Bangkok’s old establishment and increasingly prosperous and influential middle classes, it was anoutrageous inversion of hierarchy, a violation of the fundamental rules that held their whole cosmostogether. Ratchaprasong had become a zone of dangerous disorder, like the mass gathering of studentsin the grounds of Thammasat University in 1976, a very public challenge not only to the traditionalascendancy of the elite but also to the caste system in which the middle classes had carved out aprivileged position. It provoked enormous anger among those who felt their elevated place in society wasunder threat. It was an assault on the very foundations of order and harmony.

On April 7, hardline Red Shirt leader Arisman Pongruangrong incited protesters to smash their way intoparliament hunting for Suthep, and seized the weapons of one of his military police protection team.Suthep and other members of the government escaped into a neighbouring compound via a ladder, andwere later evacuated by helicopter. In response, the government declared a state of emergency and thefollowing day, a crackdown began – the military forced the Red Shirt television channel off the air,leading to clashes around the Thaicom satellite station in Pathum Thani to the north of the capital.

On April 10, on Suthep’s orders, the military launched an operation to clear the protesters out of theircamps, at Phan Fa bridge where around 5,000 Red Shirts had gathered, and at Ratchaprasong. Soldiersmoving towards Phan Fa were halted at the Makkawan Bridge in the early afternoon by Red ShirtGuards and ordinary protesters. Soldiers fired tear gas and rubber bullets, and used a water cannon.The crowd fought back with iron bars, clubs and stones. Army helicopters dropped more tear gas, andwere fired on by unknown shooters among the protesters. Around 4 p.m. soldiers fired live ammunitiontowards protesters. But the military failed to get past the Makkawan Bridge blockade, and by around5:00 p.m. the fighting subsided without the Red Shirts losing ground. At Ratchaprasong, the securityforces also failed to dislodge the protesters.

A few hours after dark, violence erupted again, in the Dinso Road area. The military commander on theground was Colonel Romklao Thuwatham of the Queen’s Guard, an officer who was a favourite ofSirikit’s circle and had been heavily involved in the violent suppression of the Red Shirt protests duringSongkran the previous year. His deputy was Lieutenant Colonel Kriengsak Nanda-photidej, half-brotherof Sirikit’s former lover. By 8:45 p.m., the atmosphere in Dinso Road was confrontational but relativelygood-humoured. A military “psy-ops” truck played piano music to try to calm the crowd. Red Shirts,laughing and dancing, brought their own sound trucks forward to drown out the military’s music. At 8:46

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p.m., soldiers fired tear gas from an armoured personnel carrier. Because of the wind direction, itimmediately blew back into army lines, forcing soldiers without gas masks to retreat. A shot rang outsomewhere near the front line, suddenly turning the mood darker. Red Shirts threw a hail of plasticbottles at soldiers standing on APCs. But the situation was far from out of control. Soldiers gesticulatedto the Red Shirt crowd to complain when a few glass bottles were thrown at them among all the plasticones. The confrontation was theatrical, sticking within boundaries, with no real harm being done.Soldiers advanced, firing in the air, but smiling. Some of their bullets grazed the four spires of theDemocracy Monument.

At 8:52 p.m., at his command post between two APCs at the southern end of Dinso Road facingDemocracy Monument, Colonel Romklao Thuwatham was assassinated in a targeted grenade attackthat also killed three other nearby soldiers. Several more suffered shrapnel wounds in their legs.Although widely reported to have been an M-79 fired from a distance, the grenade was most probablythrown or rolled by somebody nearby. Reuters cameraman Hiro Muramoto filmed the grenade blastand the panicked retreat of terrified Thai soldiers afterwards. The psy-ops piano music can be heard stillwafting in the background:

Moments later, a second grenade targeted Lieutenant Colonel Kriengsak Nanda-photidej, mortallywounding him. He lost consciousness immediately, and died some days later in hospital. The 200 soldiersin Dinso Road had lost both their commanding officers within the space of a sudden, shocking 30seconds. As the army perimeter facing Democracy Monument disintegrated, Red Shirts surged into DinsoRoad, some grabbing the helmets and weapons of the dead and wounded soldiers. Troops tried to dealwith and evacuate their wounded colleagues and the atmosphere of confrontation was replaced by asense of chaos and confusion. One Red Shirt, Wasan Puthong, began waving a flag at the Sattriwittayaschool pedestrian crossing. A shot rang out and the top of his head was blown off, spilling his brain ontothe road. Hiro Muramoto walked over to film his body. At this point, at least one soldier further up DinsoRoad fired a volley of high-velocity 5.56mm standard NATO-issue rounds at the Red Shirts andjournalists standing at the pedestrian crossing. Hiro and several others were killed.

It is unhelpful to try to make moral judgments about the events in and around Dinso Road on April 10based on a paradigm of Red Shirts versus soldiers. The appropriate ethical distinction is between thosewho were actively trying to kill people and those who were not. The overwhelming majority of Red Shirtsand soldiers did not intend for anybody to die that night.

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The death toll from the violence on April 10 was 25 people — 20 civilians and five soldiers.

The Red Shirt leadership, including hardliners close to Thaksin like Jatuporn, were taken by surprise bythe events on Dinso Road. They had not been aware it was going to happen. It remains unknownwhether Thaksin was aware in advance. The grenades were not thrown by Red Shirt Guards, or even byThaksin’s secret militia of provocateurs. This was a military-on-military attack, almost certainly carriedout by a uniformed soldier with links to the King’s Guard who infiltrated the ranks of the Queen’s Guardon Dinso Road and targeted the two commanders. It was intended as a brutal warning to Queen Sirikitand her allies in the top military leadership. It was a clear sign that the military was dangerously divided.This caused profound concern to Anupong in particular, a man whose own loyalties were divided — hewas very close to the queen but also retained links to Thaksin from cadet school days. He feared that tocontinue the military crackdown on the Red Shirts would break the army apart and even lead to civilwar.

After the April 10 violence, the Red Shirts abandoned the battle-scarred Rachadamnoen area butconsolidated their hold on the Ratchaprasong intersection. Red Shirt Guards defended and fortified theencampment, clearly with the knowledge and permission of the Red leadership. Meanwhile, Thaksin’ssecret force of “Black Shirt” provocateurs set up camp in Lumphini Park, and launched harassingattacks on soldiers and police after dark each night.

As Human Rights Watch reported in its 2011 investigation report Descent Into Chaos:

Human Rights Watch’s investigations found that the attacks did not

originate with Red Shirt Guards, but with a secretive armed element

within the UDD whom protesters and media called the “Black Shirts” or

“Men in Black”— though not all were dressed in black.

Members of these armed groups were captured on photographs and film

armed with various military weapons, including AK-47 and M16 assault

rifles, as well as M79 grenade launchers, during their clashes with

government security forces.

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The militia cleverly used the tactics of urban insurgency, mounting hit-and-run harassing attacks fromwithin groups of peaceful civilian protesters and then melting away. Most wore army-style uniforms ordressed like civilian protesters. They mostly struck after dark, and they were remarkably competent. Thiscaused genuine fear and confusion among regular troops, most of whom never saw the MIB even whenunder fire from them.

Meanwhile, more revelations about the royals were spilling out into the public domain. During April 2010,Australia’s ABC broadcast a documentary that openly addressed fears about the succession and theterrible reputation of Vajiralongkorn. Due to fears about how the authorities would react, ABCtemporarily closed its bureau in Bangkok, and stressed that the documentary had been made withoutthe knowledge of any of its Thai staff. Among the highlights of the programme was a scene in which avisibly uncomfortable Thanong Khanthong attempts to defend his newspaper’s failure to report on thecrown prince’s antics.

On April 19, Sukhumbhand Paribatra flew to Brunei to represent the government in face-to-face talkswith Thaksin. Little progress was made. On his return to Thailand, Sukhumbhand also begannegotiations with Red Shirt leaders, but a day later Abhisit appeared to change his mind, and ordered ahalt to the talks.

On April 22, M-79 grenades fired mortar-style from Lumphini Park by members of Thaksin’s secret militiahit the Sala Daeng skytrain station and members of a pro-government faction who had rallied on SilomRoad, killing one person and wounding scores. On April 28, in chaotic clashes on a highway in northernBangkok, soldiers fired live rounds at charging protesters; one soldier was killed, shot by accident by hisown side.

Hardline elements of the establishment linked to Sirikit’s circle pressured Anupong and Abhisit to take amore hawkish approach towards the Red Shirts, but both resisted. Anupong wasn’t sure the militarywould remain cohesive if soldiers were asked to fire on their fellow Thais. Abhisit wasn’t sure he couldtrust Anupong. Both men were relatively moderate by the extreme standards of the Thai establishment.

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And so, in early May, in a televised address, Abhisit offered a “peace roadmap”, proposing elections onNovember 14 and reforms to address social injustice among other concessions if the protesters endedtheir occupation.

It was a remarkable victory for the protesters at Ratchaprasong, and for common sense. As a result, itwas unacceptable to hardliners on both sides. Neither Thaksin nor Sirikit’s circle wanted to see apeaceful solution that required them to make concessions. The hawkish generals linked to the queen andPrem were disgusted by Abhisit’s “cowardice” and many ultra-royalists, include Yellow media figures likeThanong Khanthong, denounced his weakness. Meanwhile, after clarifying a few points of Abhisit’s offer,the Red Shirt leadership tentatively accepted his terms. But thanks to the direct intervention of ThaksinShinawatra in phone calls to Jatuporn Prompan and Seh Daeng, the Red leadership then began settingnew conditions, including the arrest of Suthep Thaugsuban. This was designed to sabotage the truce bymaking demands that would isolate Abhisit and enrage the hawks on the Yellow Side, and it worked.

On May 8, a drive-by shooting in the Silom area killed a policemen. On May 12, Abhisit withdrew hisproposed concessions, saying the reds had failed to grasp the opportunity of a peaceful resolution.Anupong was sidelined, with the hawkish Prayuth Chan-ocha, a favourite of Sirikit, taking overoperational responsibility for ending the Red Shirt protests. Water and power supplies to the Red campwere shut off. Meanwhile, Thaksin’s sabotage of the peace deal had split the Red leadership. Seh Daengdenounced Wira Musikapong and Nattawut Saikua. Wira left the Red camp. The moderates on both sideshad been defeated by the hardliners.

During May 13, soldiers fired indiscriminately at onlookers and protesters on Rama IV Road and Bon Kaion several occasions. In the evening, Seh Daeng was shot in the head by a sniper as he spoke to a NewYork Times journalist in the Red encampment; he died in hospital a few days later. From May 14, violencespiralled as soldiers tightened their grip on areas around the Red encampment; frequent gunfire andexplosions rang out in several areas of downtown Bangkok and plumes of smoke from burningbarricades darkened the sky. As Human Rights Watch reported:

Beginning on May 14, Thai security forces faced demonstrators who

were better organized and resorted more quickly to violent tactics.

Groups of mainly young men now openly attacked the army at the

barricades, especially in Bon Kai and Din Daeng, using flaming tires,

petrol bombs, slingshot-fired metal balls, and powerful homemade

explosives and other weapons. Most of the young men who joined the

fight at the barricades seemed to have little in common with the UDD

protesters at the camp. On numerous occasions, Black Shirt militants

appeared at the barricades to join the fight, firing assault weapons

and M79 grenade launchers at soldiers.

Meanwhile, the military announced new rules of engagement that effectively enabled soldiers to shoot atanybody suspected of being a “terrorist”. As Human Rights Watch noted:

Human Rights Watch’s investigations found that army snipers in

buildings overlooking the protest sites, as well as soldiers on the

defensive barricades on the ground, frequently fired on protesters

who were either unarmed or posed no imminent threat of death or

serious injury to the soldiers or others. Many of those whom soldiers

targeted apparently included anyone who tried to enter the “no-go”

zone between the UDD barricades and army lines, or who threw rocks,

petrol bombs, or burning tires towards the soldiers—from distances

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too great to be a serious threat to the soldiers’ lines.

While Thai authorities have not released comprehensive forensic

details of the wounds sustained by those killed between May 14 and

May 18, the incidents that Human Rights Watch reviewed show unarmed

protesters appeared to have been killed with single shots to the

head, indicating possible use of snipers and high-powered scopes…

Video footage and eyewitness accounts show the army frequently fired

into crowds of unarmed protesters, often wounding and killing

several.

On May 19, around dawn, troops breached the barricades of the red encampment and scattered theprotesters. Anthony Davis, an analyst for Jane’s Intelligence Review who witnessed the assault, toldHuman Rights Watch:

The whole operation was staggering in its incompetence. You had

scared young conscripts blazing away at the tents in Lumphini Park

without any fire control. There wasn’t the command and control that

you would expect during such an operation. There were two main

operations, the movement up the road and the operation to clear the

park. They were totally uncoordinated. When I was with the troops in

the park along the fence, they were opening fire at people in the

park, including on the other military unit that was inside the park.

You had incipient “friendly fire” incidents. The park was used

essentially as a free-fire zone, the soldiers moved and took shots

along Wireless and Rama IV Road.

Most of the Red Shirt leadership surrendered to police. In the chaotic hours that followed, dozens ofbuildings were targeted by arson attacks, including the Central World mall which was destroyed by fire.Beside the mall, gunfire killed six people inside the grounds of Wat Pathum Wanaram, a temple whichhad been designated as a safe haven and where hundreds of people were sheltering.

A wealth of eyewitness testimony, as well as photographic and video evidence has established beyondany reasonable doubt that soldiers from the 3rd Special Warfare regiment based in Lopburi, positionedon the elevated skytrain railway tracks overlooking the temple, fired into the grounds of Wat PathumWanaram and were responsible for the six deaths. The troops on the skytrain tracks were commandedby Major Nimit Weerawong of the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Special Force Regiment, and those who firedthe fatal shots were under the direct command of his subordinate Sergeant Major SomyotRuamchampa.

The combined testimony of dozens of witnesses including Red Shirts sheltering in the temple,paramedics treating the wounded, and at least three foreign journalists at Wat Pathum — AndrewBuncombe of the Independent, Mark McKinnon of Canada’s Globe and Mail and Australianphotojournalist Steve Tickner — describes how panicked civilians came under fire from camouflagedmen who could be seen on the elevated railway. An investigation by Thailand’s Department of SpecialInvestigation which was leaked to Reuters in December 2010 concluded that at least three of the deadwere killed by special forces soldiers on the Skytrain track and contains plentiful evidence that thesoldiers killed all six – the victims were all killed by high-velocity bullets and fragments of the distinctivegreen-tipped M855 bullet used by the special forces troops were found in four of the six corpses. The

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report also contains the testimony of several named special forces soldiers who admitted firing from theSkytrain tracks although they denied deliberately targeting civilians.

The killings at the temple were so inflammatory that it appeared they were a deliberate provocation. Yetthe soldiers involved insist they were under fire from armed provocateurs in front of the temple wall.They were exhausted, panicky and fighting a mostly unseen enemy, and night was falling. The mostcredible explanation for the killings at Wat Pathum Wanaram is that the soldiers fired indiscriminatebursts at actual or imagined “black shirt” assailants in front of the temple, and their shots “skewedhigh”, as tends to happen when firing from an elevated position. The soldiers on the Skytrain tracksended up spraying a lot of bullets over the temple wall and into the compound. It was probably tragicincompetence.

The final death toll from two months of unrest was at least 91, with more than 1,800 wounded.

When it was all over, nobody had won. The undeniable legitimacy of the demands and grievances of thetens of thousands of Red Shirt protesters who had sacrificed so much was undermined by Thaksin’s useof a secret militia to provoke confrontation. The total denial from Thaksin’s camp — including hisinternational legal team led by Robert Amsterdam — that the “black shirt” militia had played any role inthe violence, or indeed that it had ever even existed, was simply not credible. But the lies from the otherside — in particular, Abhisit Vejjajiva, Suthep Thaugsuban, General Prayuth Chan-ocha and preeningarmy spokesman Colonel Sansern “Kai Oo” Kaewkamnerd — were even more outrageous. Incrediblythey tried to claim that despite firing up to 117,923 bullets including 2,500 sniper rounds, the Thai armydid not kill or injure a single person. Every single death or injury, the military claims, was the work of theshadowy “men in black”.

“I can categorically deny that the army has killed or hurt any Red Shirts or protesters, including theJapanese journalist,” military spokesman Colonel Sansern insisted. “Killing those persons would bring usno benefit whatsoever.” Suthep Thaugsuban added insult to injury by claiming that some of those whodied maybe “ran into bullets“.

The establishment did its best to underplay the civilian casualties and exaggerate the damage and shockcaused by the May 19 arson attacks, even though these were plainly not the work of ordinary Red Shirtprotesters. In June, the government and foreign ministry circulated a biased and delusional “FrequentlyAsked Questions” document to journalists and diplomats. Among its extraordinary claims were:

The Thai monarchy is above politics. As a constitutional

monarch, His Majesty the King has not taken sides or involves

himself in political matters or conflict…

In recent years, however, the monarchy has been dragged into

the political conflict by different political groups. Calls for

the King to intervene this time are also politically motivated,

designed to draw the monarchy into the political fray. This

is something that has to be prevented and stopped…

The issue of royal succession is clear, both with regard to the

Heir to the Throne and rules and procedures as to what will

happen should the need arise. Relevant provisions in the

current Constitution also lay out the specific roles of the

Privy Council, National Assembly and Cabinet.

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Nevertheless, the succession is certainly a difficult issue for

Thais to discuss, given what His Majesty has done for more than

60 years for the well-being of all Thai people who regard him

as a father figure. It is thus normal for people to be

apprehensive.

Discussing the monarchy is not taboo. What is known as lèse-

majesté law in Thailand has not been an obstacle to

discussions, particularly academic ones, about the monarchy,

including how the monarchical institution itself has

continuously adapted to the changing environment over the past

700 years of its existence in the Kingdom…

For the present Government, there is only one standard and all

are equal before the law. It recognises frustration of some

people about the pace of the cases against the PAD. But the

fact is the judicial system in Thailand is independent and

separate from the executive system. The Government could not

interfere.

The events of April and May 2010 were catastrophic for the monarchy. Mass anti-monarchist sentimentthat had begun to emerge after the 2006 coup and surged due to the events of late 2008 became evenmore prevalent. Defying efforts to crack down on the movement, Red Shirts held a massive rally atRatchaprasong on September 19, 2010 — the fourth anniversary of the coup — at which anger anddisgust at the monarchy exploded into the open. A slogan began to be shouted among one group ofprotesters at the intersection and spread through the crowd until hundreds were shouting it over andover again. It was a denunciation, using a Thai insult that literally means “monitor lizard”, a particularlyreviled animal; the closest English-language equivalent is probably “bastard”:

The bastard ordered the killing. The bastard ordered the killing.

“The bastard” was King Bhumibol. Protesters also openly scrawled anti-monarchist graffiti on the thebillboards bearing banal slogans that had been erected around Central World.

This was an unprecedented development, a bombshell that showed beyond doubt that Thailand hadchanged forever. It was ignored by the overwhelming majority of Thai and foreign media, but a reportby Pravit Rojanaphruk bravely reported the chant:

Many angry red shirts repeatedly shouted “Abhisit, get out!” and

“B****** ordered the killing” in reference to the 91 deaths that

occurred between April and May.

Pravit also discussed the heretical graffiti, in an article entitled: “It may be time to take off the blindfold“.

In Red Shirt rallies later in the year, the chant was modified to include Queen Sirikit:

The bastard ordered the killing. The bitch ordered the shooting.

In December 2010, one of the most incendiary of all the WikiLeaks cables, 10BANGKOK192 from theprevious January, was made public. It was the cable that quoted Prem, Anand and Siddhi

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contemptuously castigating Vajiralongkorn. “Doubts over suitability of Thailand’s playboy prince,” wasthe headline in Britain’s Daily Telegraph. Vajiralongkorn was already well aware that the threeestablishment elder statesmen were actively working against him, but the fact it was now totally out inthe open — and all over the world’s media — raised the stakes even higher.

In early 2011, the Thai military and establishment watched in horror as the “Arab spring” unfolded andthe power of popular mass movements aided by social media to topple long-established regimesbecame painfully apparent to them.

Efforts by the royal family to repair the damage to its image only made things worse. In April 2011,Princess Chulaborn granted an interview to “Woody” Milintachinda, a bumptious young establishmenttalk-show host. Amid unintentionally comic scenes in which Woody grovelled on the floor, wept with lovefor the monarchy, and ate biscuits intended for Chulabhorn’s pet dog, the princess once again ignoredthe deaths of 2010 and focused on the damage to buildings:

I know that what happened last year, when the country was burnt,

brought great sorrow to Their Majesties the King and Queen. HM the

King had been able to relearn to walk, and then he collapsed. He had

a fever, had to be put on a saline drip and was confined to bed. HM

the Queen was also very sad. She said that it was even sadder than

when our country, Ayutthaya, was burnt by the Burmese because this

time it was done by the Thais ourselves.

A sinister incident involving Chulabhorn and Vajiralongkorn further tarnished the sacred aura of themonarchy. The princess’s consort, Chaichon Locharernkul, a respected professor of medicine, vanishedsome time in late 2010 or early 2011. Much about the episode remains murky, but it appears thatinfidelity had been discovered and the crown prince was enraged by the news. Chaichon fled Bangkok infear of his life, spending some time as a monk at the temple of the revered Luangta Maha Bua, whosedeath on January 30, 2011, at the age of 97 has even been linked to the saga in unconfirmed whisperedrumours. Chaichon has never been seen in public since. Sources close to his family insist that he is stillalive, living as a monk at a remote monastery. But they may have been intimidated into hiding the truth.Other very senior Thai sources say Chaichon has been murdered. The truth remains to be discovered,but Chaichon’s abrupt disappearance in a country that claims to be a democracy where the rule of lawis respected, in the 21st century, was an ominous reminder to Thailand’s anti-Vajiralongkorn elite of thedangers they would face if the crown prince became King Rama X.

Meanwhile, Abhisit and his Democrat Party had to do something even more distasteful to them thanallying with venal Buri Ram godfather Newin Chidchob — they had to hold elections and convince thepeople of Thailand to vote for them. They stuck with their cynical plan of allowing Newin’s Bhumjai Thaiparty to tackle Thaksin’s Pheu Thai head-on in its northern and northeastern strongholds, a clear signalthat they had learned nothing from the past decade and still considered poorer Thai voters to beuneducated cretins whose loyalty could be bought with a few hundred baht. The full might of the revivedmilitary ISOC structure was devoted to the task of backing the electoral hopes of the Democrats andtheir Bhumjai Thai cronies. Army chief Prayuth Chan-ocha, an almost comically inadequate figuretotally unable to comprehend the complexities of 21st century Thailand, weighed in with clumsyinstructions to voters to “elect good people… good and polite ones who intend to work for the nation”.

Proving once again that they were no fools, the Thai electorate overwhelmingly voted for the Pheu Thaiparty nominally led by one of Thaksin’s younger sisters, Yingluck. With a turnout of 75 percent, Pheu Thaiwon 265 seats, an overall majority. Once again, the fact that the establishment had made heavy handed

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attempts to sabotage Pheu Thai’s election prospects made their victory all the more remarkable. TheDemocrats again trailed in a distant second with 159 seats. Despite pouring a vast amount of money(looted from Thai taxpayers) into vote-buying, Newin’s Bhumjai Party was decisively routed, and wononly 34 seats. A campaign by the Yellow Shirts to persuade Thais to vote for nobody also bombed.

Abhisit and Newin had been humiliated at the polls, and their punishment was not over. In July 2011,after they had comprehensively lost the election but before they had handed over the reins ofgovernment, they were confronted with another crisis involving the crown prince that — for once — wasnot really his fault. His personal Boeing 737 was impounded at Munich airport by liquidators trying torecover debts owed to collapsed German construction conglomerate Walter Bau AG. The plane wasseized due to a financial claim against the Thai state — and specifically the Department of Highways —and did not involve a personal debt owed by the crown prince. However, liquidators for the German firmimpounded the plane in an aggressive move to embarrass Thailand into paying up.

Like the majority of the traditional Thai establishment, most leading members of the Democrat Partywere virulently anti-Vajiralongkorn, but this required them to go out of their way to pretend to be loyalto the crown prince. But the fumbling efforts of the Democrats to deal with the situation went from badto worse. They appeared unable to comprehend that, unlike Thailand, Germany had an independent-minded judiciary that could not be told what to do by the government. Foreign minister Kasit Piromya,a clearly unbalanced character, was sent to Germany as a troubleshooter, which was about as sensibleas tackling a blaze with a firehose full of gasoline. The government attempted to insist that the 737 wasVajiralongkorn’s personal property, which astonished many Thais. Vajiralongkorn ordered a second“personal” 737 to be flown to Munich and parked it alongside the impounded one, which hardly helped.

In August there was more embarrassment for Vajiralongkorn — his four estranged sons from his secondmarriage, who by now were grown men in the United States, sent a plaintive and provocative publicletter reminding Thais of their existence:

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Dear Friends,

This year marks the fifteenth year that we have been living abroad.

Over the years, we have received many kind words of encouragement and

well wishes over the Internet and elsewhere from the people of

Thailand; both from within Thailand and around the world.

We would like to express our heartfelt gratitude for your kind

regards, and we are thankful that so many of you have not forgotten

us. We have realized that some people were curious or had questions

regarding our whereabouts over the years. To eliminate confusion and

false rumors, we have decided to take this opportunity to disclose

our situation.

When we were younger, we did not understand the drastic change in our

lives, nor could we comprehend why we must live our lives outside of

our beloved country. Our mother would remind us that we have to

follow the orders of the Royal Family, and to show our gratitude and

respect. Our situation, at times, was not at all easy. However, we

did not stand idle. Instead we learned to push ourselves to our

highest potential, and to behave in a manner that would not bring

shame upon the Royal Family.

Juthavachara received a bachelor’s degree in avionics and maintenance

and a master’s degree in aeronautical science. After working in the

aviation industry, he is now attending law school in pursuit of a

Juris Doctor degree. Vacharaesorn, after receiving his bachelor’s

degree in political science, a Juris Doctor, and a Master of Law

(LLM), is now a practicing attorney. Chakriwat, received his

bachelor’s degree in psychobiology with chemistry minor, he is

currently attending medical school, and will soon begin hisclinical

rotations. Vatchrawee double-majored in International Business and

Finance, and has a Master of Business Administration. He is now

attending law school in pursuit of a Juris Doctor degree.

We are also aware of the many rumors being circulated regarding

Chakriwat’s health. The truth is Chakriwat has been battling

Neurofibromatosis (type II) since he was thirteen years old. The

disease causes tumors to appear along his nervous system, and surgery

or radiation treatment is required every year or so to remove or

otherwise treat these tumors. Due to numerous radiation treatments he

has received, there has been some damage to his acoustic nerve, and

he became deaf in one ear. He will receive another surgery in August

of this year. Despite having to undergo these exhausting procedures

on a regular basis,Chakriwat is determined to complete his medical

training.

Many people continue to speculate regarding our situation or to

spread false and malicious rumors about us. Rather than addressing

these issues in the open, and risk offending the institution, we have

chosen to remain silent. We merely wanted to use this correspondence

as an opportunity to thank the many Thais who still care about us and

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remember us, and to state clearly that, every day, we wish to return

to Thailand. For fifteen years, we have never set foot in our

country, and we miss it far too much. Until we are permitted to

return, however, we will remain loyal to the Royal Family, and pray

forthe future of our country.

We remain faithfully yours,

Juthavachara, Vacharaesorn, Chakriwat, Vatchrawee

The reason for the letter was that a problem had emerged in the establishment’s scheme of bypassingVajiralongkorn as the next monarch by having Prince Dipangkorn become Rama X with Sirikit as regent.The little boy was now six years old and it had become clear that something was seriously wrong withhim. A U.S. cable in 2009 noted that he:

appears to suffer from both physical and mental developmental delay

issues and reportedly has regular seizures.

It seemed likely the young prince could never be king. But there were no other legitimate male heirs inthe Mahidol line of the Chakri dynasty. Much of the elite had long hoped that Sirindhorn would one daybecome monarch, but this was not a long-term solution to the dynastic crisis facing the Chakrimonarchy — Sirindhorn was childless, had never married, and was now 56 years old. Moreover, while theelite thought they might be able to force Vajiralongkorn to agree to stand aside and allow one of his ownchildren to become monarch through a combination of threats to reveal his HIV and promises to let himaccess the immense royal fortune, they knew he would never accept Sirindhorn on the throne and woulddo everything he could to prevent it happening. Realistically, to have any hope of getting away with asuccession surprise, the elite had to put one of Vajiralongkorn’s children on the throne. Some favouredhis eldest daughter Princess Bajrakitiyabha, a relatively modern woman born in 1978 who had a law PhDfrom Cornell, and who had the “purest” bloodline of all Vajiralongkorn’s children — her mother wasQueen Sirikit’s niece Soamsawali. But many conservatives were uncomfortable about the prospect of afemale monarch, especially one who lacked Sirindhorn’s popularity and was regarded as close to thecrown prince. They saw the Vivacharawongse brothers as a more acceptable alternative. And somembers of the elite made discreet approaches to them in the United States. Vajiralongkorn’s rejectedsons were being brought into play in the succession struggle.

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Yingluck’s election victory changed the dynamics of the conflict once again. Thaksin was back on top. IfKing Bhumibol died, Thaksin would be able to use parliament to block any attempt by the privy councilto tinker with the succession. Reeling from the collapse in the monarchy’s prestige, and now no longer incontrol of parliament, the traditional establishment faced a desperate situation.

Moreover, Thaksin believed his sister’s thumping electoral mandate gave him the leverage he needed toget his corruption conviction overturned, reclaim his stolen billions, and return to Thailand a free man.The establishment regarded this as an existential threat. They believed — correctly — that if Thaksin wasable to come back to Thailand and become prime minister once again, or a very visible powerbrokerpretending to have renounced politics, their battle would be lost. The Thaksin juggernaut would crushthem. Even in exile, he was proving a formidable opponent. If he came home, the game was up.

It was widely assumed that the military would step in at the first opportunity they got, to seize power andremove Yingluck’s government from office. But in fact, for all Prayuth’s tough talk, by mid-2011 the Thaimilitary was in a position of severe strategic weakness. Firstly, the top brass knew that the army wasdangerously split — a huge proportion of junior officers and ordinary soldiers sympathized with oractively supported Thaksin, and would not tolerate another open attack on his political prospects oranother crackdown on the Red Shirts. If Prayuth were to attempt it, his army might disintegrate beneathhim. Secondly, the army leadership was also chastened by the Arab Spring, which appeared to show thatin the 21st century social media era, the tweet was mightier than the sword, and popular protestmovements could trump military might. If the conflict of April/May 2010 had taken place just a year later,it would probably have had a very different outcome, as the world’s traditional and new media wouldhave interpreted it as another of the dramatic Facebook-fuelled revolutions toppling authoritarianregimes around the globe. Thirdly, the military’s already very fragile legitimacy as a political player inThailand had been severely undermined by popular anger about the Bangkok massacre the previousyear. Finally, even fanatics like Prayuth were pragmatists at heart. The Thai military’s main aim wasalways to preserve the power and prestige of the Thai military. They had never fought a battle theydidn’t think they could win, and they weren’t inclined to start now.

Prayuth found himself uncomfortably sandwiched between two women. Sirikit, still dreaming her feverdreams of reigning as regent and convinced she was destined to save Thailand from the enemies whowished to destroy it, as Queen Suriyothai had done when she rode into battle on an elephant, badgeredhim to take a tougher line. Yingluck, who had been derided by the elite as a political neophyte who wouldquickly unravel under pressure, actually drew strength from her inexperience and inoffensiveness. Shewas a pleasant and attractive woman doing her best in a difficult position, and the establishment foundit impossible to demonize her. Most of the country’s elder statesmen couldn’t even bring themselves tohate her, and felt some degree of paternal protectiveness towards her. Caught in the middle, Prayuth’sfrequent gaffes and ill-tempered outbursts testified to his discomfort.

According to a June 2011 article by Shawn Crispin in the Asia Times, Thaksin had struck a deal with themilitary and monarchy in secret talks in Brunei in February between his ally Wattana Muangsook, QueenSirikit’s lady-in-waiting Jarungjit Thikara and Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan, in which they agreedto allow Pheu Thai to govern if it won the election:

According to a source familiar with the talks, the military has

agreed to allow Puea Thai to form a new elected government unopposed

in exchange for a vow from Thaksin not to pursue political revenge or

legal prosecutions of top military officials behind the 2006 coup and

last year’s crackdown, and to refrain broadly from intervening in

military affairs, including the annual reshuffle that determines the

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army’s leadership. Army Commander General Prayuth Chan-ocha, a palace

favorite and member of the elite Queen’s Guard, is eligible to serve

three more years in his position.

Thaksin’s representative has also been pressed at the talks to rein

in the anti-monarchy elements in his camp, including ranking members

of his aligned United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD)

protest group and Puea Thai party, according to the sources. Many

royalists believe the UDD’s overseas chapters are mainly responsible

for the flood of anti-monarchy material that in recent years have

been posted anonymously to the Internet.

Crispin’s speculation was only partially correct. Thaksin was indeed trying to make peace with themilitary and monarchy, but the Brunei talks were focused on seeking reconciliation with the palace, notthe army. Prawit Wongsuwan was there as a representative of Bhumibol — in the last few years he hasbecome a key member of the king’s inner circle, Rama IX’s fixer, as Prem and then Anand had beenbefore him. Thaksin used the talks to try to reassure Bhumibol and Sirikit’s representatives that he hadno intention of undermining monarchial prestige, and this was largely true. He remained a royalist atheart. Separately, he sought to reassure the military he would not interfere with its budget orpromotions process. But there was never a deal, even an informal one, with either institution.

Thaksin proceeded to try to bulldoze his way back to Thailand. Realising that the self-exiled tycoon wasoverwhelmingly likely to be the eventual victor in Thailand’s political conflict, establishment figures whohad not irretrievably committed themselves to the other side by actively working against Vajiralongkornbegan switching teams. Thaksin encouraged their defection by making generous promises about thepositions he would give them once he made his triumphant return to the country. EvenSonthi Boonyaratglin, the weak and corrupt former general who had been Prem’s front man for thecoup, was induced to ally himself with Thaksin. The establishment’s relatively united front againstThaksin and Vajiralongkorn was crumbling.

True to his world, Thaksin instructed Pheu Thai not to meddle with the military, and the authoritiescontinued to vigorously enforce the draconian lèse majesté law and Computer Crimes Act. AmponTangnoppakul, a 62-year-old grandfather, was sentenced to a staggering 20 years in prisonon November 23, 2011, for allegedly sending four SMS messages containing abuse about the monarchyto an aide of Abhisit Vejjajiva during the dark days of May 2010:

First SMS. May 9, 2010. ข้ึนป�ายด�วน อีราชนีชั่วมันไม�ยอมเอาเพชรไดรมอนด�ไปคืนซาอุฯ ราชวงศ�หัวควยมันพังแน� [Put it on billboards urgently, the evil queen refuses to return the diamond toSaudi, this dickhead dynasty will surely collapse.]2nd SMS, May 11, 2010. อีราชีนีชั่ว อีหีเหล็กมึงแน�จริงมึงส�งทหารเห้ียๆ มาปราบพวกกูซิวะ โคตรอีดอกทอง ชั่วท้ังตระกูล [The evil queen, the iron cunt, if you are brave enough, send your damnarmy to crack down on us, you master of whores, family of the bad people.]3rd SMS, May 12, 2010. สมเด็จพระเจ�าอยู�หัวหัวควย อีราชีนีหีเหล็ก ไอ�อีสองตัวน้ีมันบงการฆ�าประชาชน ต�องเอาส�นตีนเหยียบหน�ามัน [His Majesty dickhead king, the iron cunt queen, both ofthem ordered the killing of people. We will stamp on their faces with our heels.]4th SMS, May 22, 2010. ช�วยบอกไอ�สมเด็จพระเจ�าอยู�หัวหัวควยกับอีราชินีหีเหล็ก และลูกหลานมันทุกๆ คนต�องตาย [Please tell his majesty dickhead King, the iron cunt queen and all of theirchildren, you'll all die.]

The evidence against Ampon was exceptionally weak. The prosecution was unable to explain how hecould have obtained the mobile phone number of Abhisit’s secretary. Also, the phone number from

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which the messages were sent was not the same as Ampon’s number, but the prosecution alleged thatthe messages were sent from a phone with the same IMEI code as Ampon’s. The defence called Ampon’srelatives to testify that he respected the king and queen: one 11-year-old granddaughter told the courtthat Ampon had taken her to Siriraj Hospital in 2009 to sign a visitors’ book wishing good health to theking. Ampon’s lawyers and also shared evidence with the court showing how easy it was to clone IMEInumbers. Anyone with a little technical skill could have sent the text messages while concealing their realsource, using a fake IMEI number which turned out to be Ampon’s. But incredibly, although thejudges conceded that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond doubt that Ampon had sent theoffensive text messages, they convicted him anyway because he was unable to prove beyond doubt thathe had not. The court declared:

Since the contents of the said messages are an insult and expression

of malice aforethought towards Their Majesties the King and Queen,

are defaming them in a manner likely to negatively affect their grace

and bring them into hatred and contempt … and are of false nature in

contradiction to the fact already learnt by the people throughout the

nation that Their Majesties are full of mercy … the defendant is thus

guilty as charged.

The sentence shocked most Thais and drew international condemnation.

On December 8, U.S. citizen Joe Gordon was sentenced to two and a half years in jail for lèse majestéfor posting a partial Thai translation of Paul Handley’s The King Never Smiles online. He had been deniedbail multiple times while in detention, forcing him to eventually plead guilty in the hope of getting a quicktrial and a royal pardon. Thais who had hoped for saner enforcement of the lèse majesté law under theYingluck administration felt betrayed.

Catastrophic floods that inundated large swathes of the country, including parts of Bangkok, in the finalmonths of 2011 demonstrated the deterioration of Bhumibol’s aura. The weak and demoralisedopposition tried to exploit the natural disaster to attack Yingluck, but the response of the heradministration was no more inept than that of past Thai governments when responding to a crisis.Incompetence and corruption were systemic problems in Thai politics, by no means unique to Pheu Thai.Instead, it was the monarchy that suffered the most ideological damage. A key element of Bhumibol’smyth during his reign was his claimed mystical ability to master Thailand’s water resources, and hisalleged brilliance in devising anti-flooding measures. The message that many Thais (correctly) drewfrom the severity of the 2011 floods was that Bhumibol’s vaunted hydrological genius was just anotherlie. As Michael Montesano observed:

The floods have triggered a political and ideological contest

concerning the role of the Thai monarchy…

Smith Dharmasoraoja, a former director general of the Department of

Meteorology, has spoken in recent days of the flooding crisis as a

reflection of the country’s flawed approach to water management.

There is a growing understanding in Thailand that such long-term

factors as the degradation of watersheds and water catchment areas,

urban sprawl and industrialization and an inflexible water

bureaucracy with little idea of how best to manage its dams explain

the current disaster far more than do heavy rains in recent months.

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Concern that these factors will come to be associated with King

Bhumibol’s own legacy of interest in and influence over the

management of water resources is growing among observers of Thai

affairs. Many worry that the ideological strife to which that

association might lead could prove almost as destructive to the

country as the floods themselves.

In early 2012, Thaksin’s plan for getting himself home entered a decisive phase. He believed his strategyof placating the military and the establishment would persuade them to agree to his return. In aninterview with Prachachat newspaper in March 2012, his lawyer Noppadon Pattama said:

They may see Thaksin or the Pheu Thai Party as a threat to the

existence of the conservatives. But Thaksin has no policy to change

the power structure of the country. So we want them to rest assured.

Asked how Thaksin was reassuring them, Noppadon said:

By showing that we are not a threat to the current status of their

side. We are not doing anything which affects the main institution of

the country. We do not show any overwhelming ambition to change the

Defence Act, to interfere with the military reshuffle, or to amend

Section 112 of the Criminal Code.

It was true — Thaksin had no intention of changing the basic power structures of the country. Heintended to instal himself at the top of the existing structure, as a prime minister who could dominate thecountry for decades, alongside Vajiralongkorn as king. But this was exactly what the traditionalestablishment saw as an existential threat. Those who regarded it as inevitable did their best to ingratiatethemselves with Thaksin, but many could not bring themselves to accept such an outcome, or were inthe patronage networks of men like Prem and Anand who were implacable enemies of Vajiralongkorn.The diehards were fragmented, steadily losing support, and under siege, but they remained influential inelite circles and they were determined to fight to the end. That meant preventing Thaksin Shinawatracoming home.

Thaksin’s plan to secure his homecoming involved parliament setting up the House Committee onNational Reconciliation, a supposedly impartial body despite the fact a majority of its members werefrom Thaksin’s Pheu Thai Party and its head was his foe-turned-friend Sonthi Boonyaratglin. During aparliamentary debate in March, Sonthi was asked directly whether Prem Tinsulanonda had orchestratedthe 2006. His reply clearly indicated that this was true:

I don’t think I can answer. For some questions, you can’t answer even

if you are dead. When the time comes it will reveal itself.

In early April, the House Committee announced its recommendations for healing the country’s divisions.Scripted by Thaksin, at the core of the “reconciliation” plan were two highly controversial proposals. Thefirst — a broad amnesty for those involved in the violence in 2010, and even back to 2006 — outraged theRed Shirts. The second — a voiding of all corruption charges brought against Thaksin and hisadministration by the now defunct Assets Examination Committee set up by the military junta thatmounted the coup — outraged everybody else. The Democrat Party alleged — with some degree ofaccuracy, for once — that the talk of reconciliation was just a smokescreen to allow Thaksin to pursuehis own narrow self-interest.

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Thaksin believed the first proposal sweetened the deal enough for the establishment to accept it. Heflitted around Thaksin’s borders, showing up in Laos and then Cambodia, giving the impression he wascircling ever closer to Thailand and would soon be home. At a rally in Cambodia on April 14, attended bythousands of Red Shirts, he declared:

I can smell the air of my motherland. This year I’m confident it’s a

good year. It’s an auspicious year as the Prince will turn 60 and the

Queen will turn 80. There are a lot of indications that I’m going to

be back with my fellow brothers and sisters.

He thought he had won. To drive the point home, he burst into a rendition of My Way:

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But Thaksin’s behaviour was making many of his supporters deeply uncomfortable. Red Shirt prisonersarrested during 2010 were still in jail. The lèse majesté law was as oppressive as ever. Many believed thatinjustice and double standards would never be overcome in Thailand until members of the elite wereheld accountable for their actions. After a visit to a Red Shirt party to celebrate Songkran in PathumThani province, Nick Nostitz recounted the feelings of those he had spoken to:

A topic that came up often was the reconciliation process and the

planned amnesty, first propagated by the KPI report, and then

followed by the government. People there were very critical of the

planned amnesty, and especially about Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm

Yubamrung, whom they viewed not as part of the Red Shirt movement,

but as a politician they deeply distrusted. People stated that they

want the truth first before thinking about an amnesty. They said also

that the Pheua Thai Party is not bigger than the people, and has to

listen to the people first.

One of the leaders on the stage said that their fight is not just for

Thaksin, though they still love him, but for the future of their

children, and that people shouldn’t have died for nothing. He said

that Abhisit, Suthep and Yellow Shirt leaders should also be in

prison, and that the “Amart” should stay where they belong and not

interfere. Several of the local leaders said that the present

reconciliation process and the idea of an amnesty could result in

conflicts in the Red Shirt movement as some parts are for an amnesty,

but others are strongly opposed.

Somsak Jeamteerasakul, a brilliant Thammasat University historian and one of the most incisiveobservers of contemporary Thai politics, said Red Shirts should ask themselves what was moreimportant: bringing Thaksin home, or helping political prisoners? Thanks to his courageous andprovocative Facebook comments and his sardonic wit, Somsak had become a social media hero for

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many progressive younger Thais, who looked to him not only for political insight but also for sensiblemoral guidance. His comments added to the unease about Thaksin’s tactics.

On May 19, 2012, thousands of Red Shirts rallied at Ratchaprasong to mark the crushing of their protesttwo years earlier. In comments via videolink that shocked many of those present — and angered RedShirts across the country — Thaksin thanked them for their help and said they were no longer needed:

Today, we have reached the end of our path. It is like the people

have rowed me in a boat to the bank. From now on it is about climbing

a mountain. For this, I have to get into a car. The people do not

need to carry the boat on their shoulders and send me up the

mountain.

Prominent Red Shirt activist Sombat Boonngam-anong said the movement should carry on withouttheir “egotistic” patron:

I want to tell my fellow Red Shirts loudly that we have to continue

with our journey. The Dubai tycoon has left us and we have to live

with it.

In his 2013 article Thailand in 2012: A Year of Truth, Reconciliation, and Continued Divide, ChairatCharoensin-o-larn wrote:

In his speech, Thaksin asked the Red Shirts to put unity before

justice. In short, Thaksin’s amnesty was more important than the loss

of Red Shirt lives during the May crackdown. This example of the true

nature of the relationship between Thaksin and the Yingluck

government should serve as a second eye opener (taa sawang) among

those Red Shirts who fought wholeheartedly for Thaksin.

In Laos the previous month, Thaksin had promised his supporters he would soon find a “smooth way” tocome home. But he had gravely underestimated the determination of the Yellow bloc to stop him. DuringMay, another co-ordinated elite effort involving leading establishment royalists, the palace, the PAD, theDemocrat Party and anti-Thaksin newspapers began to unfold. Bhumibol’s health had severelyworsened during 2011, and it was unclear how aware he was of what was happening. But partly with thehelp of experimental stem cell treatment, he had improved a little by May 2012 and was slightly lesscadaverous. The establishment took advantage of his befuddled state to persuade him to participate in apublic appearance with Sirikit that would (falsely) signal they had put aside their differences, and givehope to the forces arrayed against Thaksin and Vajiralongkorn.

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On May 25, Bhumibol was wheeled out of Siriraj and taken on his first day trip out of Bangkok since hishospitalization in September 2009, accompanied by Sirikit and Sirindhorn. Martial imagery permeatedthe stage-managed theatrics: Bhumibol was dressed in an army uniform and loaded into a VW van to bedriven to Thung Makham Yong in Ayutthaya province, the battleground where Thai and Burmese troopshad fought four centuries before — and where Queen Suriyothai had rode into battle on the back of anelephant and saved her husband’s life. To make the connection even more explicit, the royal partystopped on the way to pay respects to a statue of Suriyothai. It remains unknown whether Bhumibol wasaware and assented to it, but he was being used by the palace and the establishment to send a messageglorifying Sirikit and the military. Afterwards he was driven back to hospital.

“King makes historic return,” proclaimed The Bangkok Post the following day. But it wasn’t Bhumibol inthe centre of the front-page photograph. It was Sirikit.

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The following day, the PAD resumed mass Yellow Shirt rallies, to protest against the proposedreconciliation bills. Meanwhile, the Democrat Party deliberately disrupted the parliamentary sessionsscheduled to consider the legislation. On May 30, Democrat MPs tried to physically drag parliamentspeaker Somsak Kiatsuranont from his lectern and removed his chair, after he called for a vote ongiving the bills urgent status. Police eventually restored order. On May 31, after Pheu Thai legislatorsvoted to give the bills fast-track consideration, Democrat MPs shouted abuse and hurled their papers atSomsak. Abhisit sought to defend his party’s actions by saying the national interest was more importantthan the Democrat Party maintaining a respectable image.

On June 1, the PAD blockaded parliament, forcing the first reading of the reconciliation bills to beadjourned. Later that day, in an extraordinary and unsupportable ruling, the Constitution Court orderedparliament to delay the third and final reading of a proposed constitutional amendment bill until it haddecided whether attempts to alter the 2007 charter were in violation of a clause in the constitutionoutlawing any actions that undermined Thailand’s “democracy with the king as head of state”. Thecourt was going far beyond its remit, not only in the broad sense that it was sabotaging legitimateparliamentary efforts to amend the constitution, but also more specifically because such matters werenot supposed to be decided by the Constitution Court at all. The issue should have been the remit of the

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Office of the Attorney General.

Faced with this clearly coordinated campaign of mass street protests, Democrat Party obstructionismand partisan judicial interference — all apparently given the royal stamp of approval by the king andqueen’s bizarre visit to Ayutthaya — Thaksin and Pheu Thai backed down, putting the reconciliation andconstitutional amendment bills on hold.

Shocked and angry at the establishment’s refusal to let him climb the mountain to political supremacy,Thaksin scrambled to jump back in the Red Shirts’ boat. At a video phone-in to a mass Red Shirt rallyat Muang Thong Thani in Nonthaburi on June 2, he apologised for his earlier “incomplete message”telling them to set aside their anger and support national reconciliation. Jim Taylor provided a partialtranslation of Thaksin’s remarks on New Mandala:

Today the country has no consistent rule of law for citizens to

follow because those who are supposed to reinforce the law clearly

lack virtue, consistency and basic honesty. They continue to use

double standards, which is causing deep divisions which cannot be

resolved. This social division will surely get worse. One would

think that having a female PM who does not want to argue with anyone

would create the conditions for peace in the country. However, it is

not possible when this works against the will of certain powers. If

this situation continues I have to ask people whether we should allow

them to bring down the power invested in elected government. Peoples’

power is the highest power. Let’s monitor closely the situation. The

parliament has to consider whether we should accept the power that

does not have the right to exert influence on the parliamentary

process. Each of us sacrificed blood expecting that we would have

reconciliation in Thailand…

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I have read Somsak Jeamteerasakul’s articles and have to thank him

and admit that many things he has written are in fact correct. Much

cannot be talked about, but I would like to thank Somsak for his

concern and well wishes. Today we have to help bring democracy back

to Thailand, even though some of the politicians are just emplaced

through electoral networks, but we have to go through this in order

to achieve full democracy.

On June 22, Constitution Court president Wasan Soypisudh told reporters he believed the proposedconstitutional amendments were intended to overthrow the monarchy. Besides being patently ridiculous,this statement was a blatant breach of his professional ethics. On July 13, the court gave its ruling.Instead of claiming that changing the charter was an attack on the monarchy, it found other ways tosabotage Thaksin’s plans, with a ridiculous judgment that because the 2007 constitution was approvedby a referendum, another referendum would be needed before amendments could be made.

On July 7, Bhumibol was wheeled out of Siriraj once again, in a naval uniform this time. He and Sirikitwere taken by boat to inspect various irrigation projects. Perhaps Bhumibol or palace courtiers believedit could help restore faith in the king’s mystical ability to harness Thailand’s water resources. Theestablishment was clearly trying to restore a more visible role for the king: plans were announced for afurther day trip later in the month, to Ratchaburi. But within a week, Bhumibol suffered another healthcrisis and the trip was postponed indefinitely. The Royal Household Bureau, which routinely lies aboutthe health of the king to downplay the seriousness of his ailments (miraculously, his health is alwaysreported to be improving, never getting worse) said he had suffered bleeding in his brain but wasalready much better.

In fact, Bhumibol was gravely unwell. According to #196 of the Hi-S Tales, a series of regular newsupdates about the royal family posted online by an unknown author which have been uncannilyaccurate about the machinations and health of the royals and their innermost circle, Bhumibol had

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suffered a minor stroke and attempts to treat him led to a subarachnoid haemorrhage. It added thatSirikit was pressing Prem and the privy council to declare that the king was incapacitated, which wouldallow the queen to assume the role of regent — and bypass the need for parliament to approve.Sirindhorn, according to the report, was opposed to the plan, leading to a blazing row at Siriraj Hospitalbetween mother and daughter, both cursing at each other.

On July 21, Sirikit collapsed in the grounds of Siriraj Hospital. As usual, the initial health bulletins fromthe Royal Household Bureau were upbeat, reporting that she was diagnosed with “a slight shortage ofblood to the brain after feeling dizzy and stumbling slightly at Siriraj Hospital on July 21”. In fact, shehad crumpled to the ground after suffering a severe stroke, and was unable to move or talk for severaldays afterwards. Not only did the palace hide the truth about the seriousness of her condition, it evensuppressed the fact that she had fallen to the ground, presumably believing this could damage royalprestige. But behind the scenes, the establishment and military leadership were in a state of shock. Thesky had fallen. It quickly became clear that Sirikit was severely incapacitated, and doctors said she wouldnever make a full recovery. She was unable to walk and her speech was badly affected. There was norealistic prospect that she could ever resume a prominent role providing inspiration and leadership inthe establishment’s struggle against Thaksin and Vajiralongkorn. It was inconceivable now that shecould ever be regent. The whole plan had fallen apart.

Vajiralongkorn’s 60th birthday — his 5th cycle, a major milestone for Buddhists — was a week later onJuly 28. The desultory public celebrations demonstrated just how little public or establishment supportthere was for the crown prince. On August 12, the incapacitated Sirikit turned 80, with the severity of herhealth problems still kept secret from Thailand’s people. As Serhat Ünaldi observed in a superb article onNew Mandala:

Thailand is changing… An analysis of the celebrations for HRH Crown

Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn’s 5th cycle anniversary and HM Queen

Sirikit’s 80th birthday reveals that the monarchy is no longer what

it used to be — and that it probably never will be again.

First, to describe public attendance for the official celebrations in

honour of the Crown Prince on 28 July 2012 at the royal field, Sanam

Luang, as below expectations would be euphemistic. Frankly, the whole

event was an embarrassment. And the fact that, on 12 August 2012, Her

Majesty spent her birthday at Siriraj Hospital where she continued to

be treated for a “shortage of blood in her brain” it is ever more

unlikely that the Queen will function as a regent after the death of

her husband to facilitate the transition process – a theory that

never seemed particularly plausible anyway. If anything, the

birthdays were a reminder that the end of the current Chakri reign

draws closer by the day.

One of the most striking features of the royal anniversaries was the

lack of effort by the monarchy’s propaganda machinery to effectively

promote HRH Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn ahead of the royal

succession. What better opportunity to start getting things rolling

than the man’s 60th birthday, or 5th cycle anniversary (one cycle

comprises twelve years)? There’s a whole lot of work to do on Thai

people’s perception of their next King. Yet looking back into history

this is not an impossible task. HM King Bhumibol Adulyadej became

King when the image of the monarchy was a far cry from what it is

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today. And what is the never convincingly resolved suspicion of

(accidental) fratricide compared to the Crown Prince’s frivolous love

adventures, diplomatic mishaps and petty crimes? True, the internet

and a changed national and international political environment don’t

make the work any easier but is it not about time, from the

perspective of royalists, to manage the transition by using their

proven ideological tools?

The decision makers seem to disagree. The absence of royal banners on

newspaper websites ahead of the Prince’s birthday was just one

indicator of the seeming lack of enthusiasm among the promoters of

the monarchy. Where in the past readers of online news usually had to

click on full-screen reminders of an upcoming royal celebration to

access a homepage, the editorial boards had decided not to put those

up for the Crown Prince. As for the media coverage itself, there was

a marked imbalance between the numbers of lines dedicated to both

birthday celebrations. A random comparison between the Thai language

newspapers Daily News and Thai Rath reveals that Thai Rath gave the

Crown Prince 83 lines the day after the celebrations at Sanam Luang

compared to 143 lines for the Queen’s anniversary festivities. Daily

News reported the Prince’s birthday over 103 lines versus 287 lines

for his mother (the coverage for the Queen stretched across three

pages).

Asked for his explanation for the lack of media support for the Crown

Prince a journalist answered frankly that, first, the Crown Prince

lacks his father’s standing. Second, an excessive promotion of

Vajiralongkorn at a time when King Bhumibol is still alive would be

indecent: “the heir apparent can never outshine the incumbent”.

However, the journalist remarked on the increase of royal TV programs

presenting scenes from Vajiralongkorn’s childhood, a time when he was

still fairly innocent in the eye of loyal subjects. Whether these

attempts to reconnect him with his roots as a male Chakri heir will

increase his popularity is a question only time can answer.

For now, it is possible to put an exact number on the difference in

significance between the Prince and the Queen, thanks to the release

of commemorative banknotes ahead of both the birthday of the Crown

Prince and his mother. The Queen is five times more unique than her

son. Whereas ten million 100 Baht banknotes were issued for the heir

apparent, the special 80 Baht notes printed in honour of the Queen

numbered only two million. Also, whereas the 100 Baht notes were

circulated in the regular financial system, the 80 Baht banknotes had

to be bought for 120 Baht, the surplus reportedly going to royal

charities. When I asked at a bank whether I could exchange a regular

100 Baht banknote for one with the Prince on the back I was met with

a confused look. It seemed I was the first person to make such a

request. Clearly, the Crown Prince is not considered on par with his

parents in the media, nor among Thailand’s bankers.

And certainly not among the general public. It was fascinating to

watch how little interest the great majority of people showed in the

books that had been placed at various spots throughout Bangkok for

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well-wishers to sign. While waiting at the Siam Paragon shopping mall

for a friend to show up I kept an eye on the setup that had just been

erected to honour the Crown Prince – consisting of a book with blank

pages on a table in front of a life-size picture of Vajiralongkorn

and ceremonial objects. Over one hour not a single person stopped to

sign the book. Only when the embarrassment became unbearable did one

of the mall’s security officers move towards the book to set a good

example by signing it. A few, but not many, passersby followed his

lead. The commemorative books for the Queen, on the other hand, were

much more popular and filled up relatively quickly with good wishes…

On the day of the Crown Prince’s birthday, 28 July 2012, none but the

poorest members of Thai society showed up at Sanam Luang. Apart from

government officers and employees who had been ordered to parade on

the royal grounds which make up the southern part of the field,

mostly men and women in unwashed clothes came for the free food and

beverages offered to them. Members of the middle class, dressed up

for a royal occasion – a familiar sight for anyone who has ever

attended such events in the past –, were completely absent. As if

realising the embarrassment, the security guards suddenly declared

the tents that were set up for ordinary visitors a VIP area, asked

the three dozen representatives of the lower strata of the people

(prachachon) to leave their seats and eventually placed them in a

corner opposite the tent where Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra

would later take her seat before going on stage for a candle-lighting

ceremony. The “VIP tents” remained largely vacant for the rest of the

evening (for the Queen’s birthday celebrations the same tents were

open to the general public because there was a middle-class public to

fill them).

When Prime Minister Yingluck finally arrived the prachachon were

disappointed yet another time when her black van parked in front of

them and Yingluck got off the car on the other side, effectively

shutting her off from the sight of the poor. She took her seat across

the square, went on stage to lead the ceremony – which was

overshadowed by the worst performance of the royal anthem this author

has ever heard – and left.

The celebrations for the Queen were much more popular despite heavy

rainfalls. It is, however, an exaggeration to state that Sanam Luang

was “packed” on 12 August as the Bangkok Post would have it. Most of

the photos disseminated in the media depicted government employees

and marching bands that had been ordered to appear anyway. Despite

the relatively strong attendance for the Queen’s anniversary

festivities the number of people dwarfed when compared to the

celebrations for King Bhumibol’s 80th birthday in 2007 which

stretched from Sanam Luang along the entire Ratchadamnoen Avenue and

even spilled over to the Thonburi side of the Chao Phraya River.

Whether the difference in size had anything to do with the respective

governments that organised the celebrations – a military junta that

excessively promoted the monarchy in 2007 vs. a democratically

elected administration whose legitimacy is less dependent on its

royalist credentials – is debatable. Maybe it’s just that the king

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had more fans in 2007 than the Queen has in 2012…

Yet, in light of the remarkable show of disinterest for the Crown

Prince’s birthday celebrations and the tame propaganda surrounding

them such a change of mind in favour of promoting him seems difficult

to imagine at this point. All the same, some may read the birthday

celebrations not as tame but as the slow but steady start to the

Crown Prince’s public promotion. Is it really just respect for the

ailing king that discourages a more outright promotion of his

successor? Has the general caution in the wake of an elite settlement

which seems to be underway in Thailand anything to do with this? Or

could it be that some decision-makers have grasped that the country

is in the process of moving beyond the monarchy as the central pillar

of the socio-political order? After all, Prince Vajiralongkorn’s 60th

birthday was also a reminder of the fact the he too is no longer a

young man. Given his own health conditions it is doubtful that the

Crown Prince will be able to keep the monarchy stable the same way

his long-lived father has done for more than 60 decades. Therefore,

the smartest solution would be for the Crown Prince to renounce the

throne in one way or another (definitely in a way that does not put

the legitimacy of the next king into doubt, which would preclude for

example an all-too comfortably timed death as a solution) to allow

royalists to press the reset button and call Vajiralonkorn’s four

sons home from American exile and place one of them on the throne. As

with American-born and Swiss-raised Bhumibol, a young King

Juthavachara Mahidol would be a nobody at first and therefore would

offer an opportunity to refashion the monarchy in a new mould.

Following Queen Sirikit’s debilitating stroke, the Thai establishment did indeed step up contacts withVajiralongkorn’s estranged sons, the Vivacharawongse brothers. It seemed like their last hope.

Sirikit’s stroke not only ruled her out as a future regent, it also ended her active participation in Thaipolitics. The royalists had lost their champion as well as their succession plan. Many of them began todrift away from the Yellow cause, leaving an increasingly isolated group of zealots to continue thebattle. Prayuth and his senior army comrades no longer had somebody in the palace to tell them whatto do, and the military began to revert to its traditional pragmatism. The hardcore members of theroyalist establishment still desperate to stop Thaksin and Vajiralongkorn could not count on armysupport any more. But they carried on fighting anyway. They didn’t have much choice.

Which brings us back to now.

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History, Karl Marx mordantly observed, tends to repeat itself — “the first time as tragedy, the secondtime as farce”. Events in Thailand since Sirikit’s stroke in July 2012 have been dominated by the inept,fumbling efforts of a militant die-hard royalist rump to recreate the coordinated Yellow campaign of2008 that brought down the People Power Party and made Abhisit prime minister. The dinosaurs arerefusing to accept that they face imminent extinction.

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Fragmented and feckless, they face a daunting challenge. The military leadership will not support a lostcause. Sondhi Limthongkul is — unsurprisingly — disinclined to offer much assistance, following PrawitWongsuwan’s failed effort to have him assassinated. Yingluck Shinawatra and her government retain thesupport of the majority of Thais, and there is no mass discontent with Pheu Thai. Vajiralongkorn isquietly consolidating power, waiting for his moment to come.

Meanwhile, Thaksin remains focused purely on coming home as a free man, and continues to exploit thelegitimate grievances and huge sacrifices of the Red Shirts to help achieve this. The royalistestablishment continues to use cynical undemocratic methods and undermine the rule of law to try tostop Thaksin succeeding. Thailand’s feuding elite factions show no genuine interest in healing thekingdom’s divisions or addressing the problems facing the majority of the country’s people. As ChairatCharoensin-o-larn observed earlier this year:

The overall political situation in Thailand in 2012 went beyond the

point of accommodation. Each side is waiting for the right moment to

wage a total war to eradicate the other side in the conflict in order

to set up a hegemony. In the process of hegemonic construction, truth

and reconciliation became a means of achieving this end… The politics

of truth and reconciliation had been dangerously played through the

politics of fear and hatred.

In November 2012, a group of elderly hardliners with links to Prem Tinsulanonda, calling themselvesPitak Siam, made a desultory effort to bring down the government. The group was led by formergeneral Boonlert Kaewprasit and former admiral Chai Suwannaphap, schoolmates of Prem’s loyalsidekick Surayud Chulanont from Class 1 at the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School. Anotherleading member was retired admiral Phajun Tamprateep, Prem’s former personal secretary. PrasongSoonsiri, a perennial ultra-royalist schemer, was also closely involved.

The geriatric plotters publicly called for a military coup, and Boonlert said a five-year “freeze” ofdemocracy was needed while corrupt politicians were weeded out and righteous men took charge. Thegroup assembled a relatively small rabble of off-duty soldiers and thugs and announced they wouldmarch on Government House on November 24. Knowing that the group intended to follow thetraditional plot of Thai street protest theatre and would attempt to provoke violence, the governmentinvoked the Internal Security Act as a precaution.

Instead of denouncing a clearly unconstitutional and undemocratic effort to bring down an electedgovernment, Abhisit coordinated the actions of the Democrat Party with them, calling a censure debatewhich would be held on November 25 to 27, followed by a no-confidence vote on November 28. Theparty’s satellite channel, Blue Sky TV, openly praised Pitak Siam, and royalist newspapers gave Boonlertsympathetic coverage, denouncing the government’s invocation of the ISA as a tyrannical overreaction.

The government had learned from past street battles, and adopted effective tactics in response, floodingthe area around Government House with disciplined police dressed in riot gear and carrying shields. Onthe day of the protest, it was clear that the turnout had fallen drastically short of Pitak Siam’s hopes.Fewer than 20,000 protesters marched towards Government House. They were blocked by concrete andbarbed-wire barricades at the Makkawan bridge and at the Mitsakwan intersection. Behind thebarricades stood rows of riot police. Some of the provocateurs enlisted by Pitak Siam began dismantlingthe barricades and trying to pick a fight. They used various tactics, including throwing tear gas canistersand home-made explosives, pepper-spraying police in the face, firing slingshots, and driving a six-wheeltruck into police lines. Dozens of police were hurt, but they remained disciplined. The police lines held,

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and there was no overreaction despite repeated provocation.

As this sinister pantomime was unfolding, Boonlert and his comrades were making repeated mobilephone calls to army commanders in Bangkok, claiming that peaceful protesters were being brutalizedby police defending a dictatorial government, and demanding military intervention to restore order andprevent a massacre. No help was forthcoming. Towards dusk, a dejected Boonlert called a halt to theprotest, claiming:

I did not want to see anyone die. I am already very sad to see people

injured.

The whole episode was a pitiful failure for the royalists.

Thaksin’s attempts to cosy up to the establishment had got him nowhere. Since the carrot had failed, hisnext strategy was to use the stick. Carefully avoiding confrontation with the military, he targetedDemocrat Party leaders Abhisit Vejjajiva and Suthep Thaugsuban. He enlisted the help of Tharit Pengdit,a weak and unprincipled bureaucrat who headed of the Department of Special Investigation, Thailand’sequivalent of the FBI. Under the Abhisit administration, Tharit had been intimidated by Prayuth intowhitewashing army involvement in civilian deaths during April and May 2010. Now, Thaksin and hispolitical enforcer Chalerm Yubamrung intimidated Tharit into mounting a partisan legal offensiveagainst Abhisit and Suthep. In December 2012, the DSI announced that Abhisit and Suthep would becharged with premeditated murder for their role in the death of Phan Khamkong, a 44-year-old taxidriver shot dead by a Thai soldier on the night of May 15, 2010.

Thaksin had no interest in supporting genuine accountability for the events of 2010, since he himselfwould be implicated if the full truth was ever known. His plan was to use murder charges to try to forceAbhisit and Suthep into accepting a legal amnesty that would also clear his own corruption convictions.Thaksin also began gathering information that could be used against Abhisit’s ally Korn Chatikavanij,seen as a probably future leader of the Democrat Party. He hired the services of at least one

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international investigations company to look into Korn’s past business dealings.

Abhisit and Suthep responded with defiant theatrics intended to stake their claim on moral high groundthat they had shamefully abandoned long before. They declared that unlike Thaksin, they respected therule of law and would not flee into exile like cowards or seek amnesty. They would fight the charges andrespect the decisions of the judiciary, even if this meant the death sentence. It was a good soundbite butit was meaningless. Both men were well aware that the prospects of them being executed are vanishinglyremote.

As the government geared up for another attempt to bring Thaksin home, several competing amnestyproposals were floated from within the Thaksin camp, part of a deliberate strategy of misdirection. Oneof them, submitted to parliament in March by 42 Pheu Thai Party MPs headed by Worachai Hema fromSamut Prakan, proposed a blanket amnesty for all political offences, excluding political leaders, fromSeptember 2006 to May 2011. Ostensibly it was primarily aimed at freeing hundreds of unjustlyimprisoned Red Shirts, without absolving Abhisit and Suthep of accountability or assisting Thaksin. TheUDD declared its support for the Worachai bill, rejecting a competing proposal from families of thosekilled in 2010.

On April 29, at a ministerial meeting in Mongolia for the Community of Democracies intergovernmentalgroup, Yingluck made a speech explicitly accusing the royalist establishment of being enemies ofdemocracy:

In 1997, Thailand had a new constitution that was created through the

participation from the people. Because of this, we all thought a new

era of democracy has finally arrived, an era without the cycle of

coups d’état.

It was not to be. An elected government which won two elections with

a majority was overthrown in 2006. Thailand lost track and the people

spent almost a decade to regain their democratic freedom.

Many of you here know that the government I am talking about was the

one with my brother, Thaksin Shinawatra, as the rightfully elected

Prime Minister.

Many who don’t know me say that why complain? It is a normal process

that governments come and go. And if I and my family were the only

ones suffering, I might just let it be.

But it was not. Thailand suffered a setback and lost international

credibility. Rule of law in the country was destroyed. Projects and

programmes started by my brother’s government that came from the

people’s wishes were removed. The people felt their rights and

liberties were wrongly taken away.

Thai means free, and the people of Thailand fought back for their

freedom. In May 2010, a crackdown on the protestors, the Red Shirts

Movement, led to 91 deaths in the heart of the commercial district of

Bangkok.

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Many innocent people were shot dead by snipers, and the movement

crushed with the leaders jailed or fled abroad. Even today, many

political victims remain in jail.

However, the people pushed on, and finally the government then had to

call for an election, which they thought could be manipulated. In the

end, the will of people cannot be denied. I was elected with an

absolute majority.

But the story is not over. It is clear that elements of anti-

democratic regime still exist. The new constitution, drafted under

the coup leaders led government, put in mechanisms to restrict

democracy.

A good example of this is that half of the Thai Senate is elected,

but the other half is appointed by a small group of people. In

addition, the so called independent agencies have abused the power

that should belong to the people, for the benefit of the few rather

than to the Thai society at large.

It was a fairly accurate summary of Thai political history in the 21st century, and it enraged thetraditional establishment. Obsessed with image and “face”, they found it unbearable to be accuratelydepicted as villains in a high-profile speech by the prime minister on the international stage. Opponentsof Thaksin and Yingluck claimed the speech was unpatriotic — it was “un-Thai” to discuss the country’sdirty secrets in an international forum. Ultraroyalist Thai Rath cartoonist Somchai Katanyutanancommented on his Facebook page:

Please understand: whores are not evil. They just sell their bodies.

But an evil bitch is going around selling her country.

The first reading of Worachai Hema’s reconciliation bill in parliament was scheduled for August 7. Afterthat, it would have to go through a legislative process that would take several months before it becamelaw. Behind the scenes, the remnants of the Yellow coalition of aristocrats, establishment poo yai, retiredmilitary men, upper-middle-class moralistic Bangkokians, Democrat Party politicians and royalistnewspapers began preparing another co-ordinated assault on the Yingluck administration. Theybelieved (correctly) that the Worachai bill was a smokescreen for an amnesty for Thaksin Shinawatra.They resolved to stop this, whatever the cost, and to bring down the government by the end of 2013.

The playbook was well established by now. Following the 2008 model, they intended to use disruption ofparliamentary processes, street protests, judicial interventions, biased newspaper coverage and furtivescheming by figures considered close to the palace to create the false impression the government hadlost control of the country and lost its legitimacy. Illustrating how depressingly out of touch they werewith the aspirations of the vast majority of Thailand’s people, they still clung to the delusional belief thatif they could somehow topple the government, they would then suspend democracy in Thailand for threeto five years, engineering the creation of a “royally appointed” government of elder statesmen. Duringthis time, they would weed out Thaksin loyalists from politics and the military, and launch acomprehensive indoctrination campaign that would convince ordinary voters of the error of their waysin supporting their false prophet living in exile abroad. It was a variant of the “New Politics” proposed bySondhi Limthongkul and the “freeze” that Boonlert had called for.

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The unspoken hope of the Yellow alliance is that King Bhumibol will die of old age during the suspensionof democracy, and then a pliant parliament would approve an alternative monarch proposed by theprivy council to prevent Vajiralongkorn becoming Rama X. If the elderly and ailing Bhumibol was stillalive by the time they had to hold elections some time towards 2018, their efforts to rid Thailand of thescourge of “Thaksinism” would hopefully have succeeded, and parliament would remain cooperative.Insane as it may seem, this is their plan.

Anand Panyarachun, who has twice served as prime minister despite never being elected, is eager tomake it a hat-trick and serve as royally appointed prime minister if Yingluck is deposed. But most of theestablishment favours another candidate, Prawit Wongsuwan, who has become the latest favourite ofthe conservative Thai aristocracy.

Events far away in Egypt emboldened the Thai establishment. The lesson of the Arab Spring hadappeared to be that trying to suspend democracy in the social media era would be suicidal. Popularresistance and international media attention would overcome any attempt to deny Thailand’s peopletheir democratic rights, even if the military cooperated in enforcing the plan. But on July 3, after massprotests against the Islamist government orchestrated by the secular military, Egypt’s army seizedpower, arrested the prime minister and embarked on a brutal campaign to crush the MuslimBrotherhood mass movement. To date, thousands have been killed and the army remains in control.This fuelled the fever dreams of conservative Thai royalists and military hawks.

Two anti-Thaksin movements that emerged in May were part of the establishment’s efforts to conjure upthe impression of mass non-partisan opposition to the Yingluck administration. Veteran extreme-rightroyalists Vasit Dejkunjorn and Kaewsun Atibodhi launched an initiative on May 4 that they called the“Thai Spring”, in an effort to emulate the online activism that brought down authoritarian governmentsin Tunisia and Egypt two years earlier. Yellow-aligned newspapers gave the quixotic venture extensivesympathetic coverage, but it quickly became apparent that the “Thai Spring” was basically just anInternet petition in support of an open letter to the Community of Democracies that gave a competingnarrative to Yingluck’s speech the previous month. Ironies abounded. Vasit and Kaewsun were elderlyzealots with no understanding either of 21st century Thailand or of online activism. Their outrage atYingluck’s speech and their hapless efforts to set the record straight demonstrated that for all theirhollow nationalist rhetoric, they cared deeply about how foreigners viewed Thailand. The text of theopen letter was so ludicrous that was difficult to believe it was not self-parody. But Vasit and Kaewsunwere not joking:

Ms. Yingluck’s assumption of office to continue and perpetuate her

family’s dominance is no different from that of Mr. Kim Jong Il’s

continuation of his family’s control over North Korea. Ms. Yingluck’s

tenure is totally dependent on the wishes and orders of her brother,

Thaksin Shinawatra.

Excellencies, although you saw the physical presence of Ms. Yingluck

before you, her thoughts and utterances were all directed from afar

by her manipulative and demanding brother.

Successes at past general elections were simply legalizing acts of

authorization of this authoritarian family to gain power, to capture

and subjugate the country. If your Excellencies were to be more

judicious and scrutinizing you would have found out that the

Shinawatra-owned Pheu Thai Party is full of stooges in the guise of

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Members of Parliament. They are no different from members of the

Communist Party of North Korea.

The Thai media in general behave in a similarly subservient manner,

being commissioned by the Shinawatra family to create personality

cults and promote public adoration for themselves. They behave no

differently from the North Korean media.

If you pay a visit to North Korea you will witness the omnipresence

of portraits of the leader. In Thailand it is the same. These two

likeminded families have thus been sending their followers and

subordinates to infiltrate all strata of their respective societies…

Human history has ascertained clearly that the holding of general

elections is not the only indication or proof of democracy. Dictators

dressed up as democrats are many in this world of ours. We would like

to assert therefore that the Shinawatra family’s rule is an amoral,

ultra-capitalist authoritarian one in the cloak of democracy…

We are against the Shinawatra family because this family is leading

Thailand into an abyss of darkness. It injects greed, misinformation,

anger and hate into the hearts and minds of the people in order to

divide Thai society, which is at every second in the state of

distancing itself from democracy and a peaceful environment…

We, the millions of Thai citizens, do not seek your help; we can

solve our own problems. This Open Letter is intended to present a

factual account and clarification that this lady Prime Minister of

Thailand is not a representative of Thai democracy, not a

representative of the truth, and not a responsible representative of

the Thai people at all.

The dinosaurs of Thailand’s establishment failed to realize the obvious fact that while it was true that aself-serving family had enriched itself immensely at the expense of the Thai people and fostered aNorth Korea-style personality cult with the help of subservient media and omnipresent portraits, itwasn’t the Shinawatra clan. And while they denounced Yingluck as a puppet of Thaksin, they appearedproud to consider themselves puppets of the palace — even though their plans to sabotageVajiralongkorn’s succession prospects defied King Bhumibol’s wishes. Note also their claim that theShinawatra family was “leading Thailand into an abyss of darkness”, another invocation of thedreaded กลียุค or dark age that ultra-royalists feared would follow Bhumibol’s death.

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Later in May, an equally bizarre group emerged, “V For Thailand”, also known as the “white masks”.Appropriating the symbolism and mythology of “Occupy” protests around the world and the“Anonymous” hacktivist collective, in particular their use of the Guy Fawkes mask and their lack offormal leadership or hierarchy, the movement tried to portray itself as a spontaneous uprising of social-media-savvy ordinary citizens against a tyrannical and corrupt government. In fact, it was a staunchyreactionary royalist movement organised by Samran Viroj, formerly a core member of the PAD, andintended to mobilize middle-class and white-collar professional Bangkokians against Thaksin, as theYellow Shirts had done in 2005 and 2006. Contrary to their V For Vendetta rebel swagger, the “whitemasks” believed in order, hierarchy, and respect for authority. They were not against power being in thehands of a small privileged elite, they just objected to the fact that a new elite allied to Thaksin waswrenching power from the hands of the old elite which they represented. They were not battling theprivilege and power of the “one percent” — on the contrary, they were Thailand’s “one percent”, plus asignificant chunk of the middle class which also feared the growing political clout of the poor.

Again, Yellow newspapers served as enthusiastic cheerleaders for the movement, systematicallyexaggerating its support and influence. Facebook photographs showing a small number of peoplewearing homemade masks in Hong Kong and Sydney were interpreted as demonstrating that themovement had “gone international“, and poorly attended rallies in Ratchaburi, Lampang and Surat

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Thani were held up as supposed proof that support for the “white masks” was sweeping the nation.“Dozens take part in upcountry white mask protests,” was one of the Bangkok Post‘s mostunintentionally funny headlines in June. Thailand has a population of 67 million. The Bangkok Post‘s starcolumnist, Voranai Vanijaka, did his best to bolster the group’s propaganda with an article thatdeclared:

The novelty, the likeability, of the Guy Fawkes movement is that – as

far as we know – it was born entirely from like-minded citizens

getting together in a common cause. No charismatic leader. No big

bank account. No dubious connections. No declared allegiance to any

cult of personality, as yet. Although some say they are just yellow-

shirts trying to find a new gimmick. Regardless, only a couple of

weeks after making their first appearance on social networks, there

they were on Sunday, some 700 in the streets, in masks and in a show

of unity and defiance, all started by a group of kids on Facebook, no

less — with a rather cute one in a nurse’s uniform.

Meanwhile, hackers affiliated to the group hacked Yingluck Shinawatra’s official website and defaced itwith the words: “I’m a slutty moron”.

Foreign journalists in Bangkok overwhelmingly failed to report what was really going on. The ForeignCorrespondents Club of Thailand had become dominated by conservative old-timers with overt royalistsympathies, on very friendly terms with Anand Panyarachun. Leading club member Dominic Faulderwas enlisted by Anand to produce a glossy hardback book extolling the palace, which was published in2011 by Editions Didier Millet with the title King Bhumibol Adulyadej: A Life’s Work. Besides Faulder, theforeign hacks who contributed were Nicholas Grossman, Julian Gearing, Paul Wedel, Richard Ehrlich,Robert Horn, Joe Cummings and Robert Woodrow. It was an atrocious, dishonest book, a crudehagiography marketed as a definitive scholarly account of Bhumibol’s reign. Inevitably, it proved highlypopular with establishment and middle-class Thais and sold extremely well. Editions Didier Millet alsoagreed to publish a vanity biography of Anand in 2014, authored by Faulder. It will undoubtedly be agrovelling fairytale similar to William Warren’s biography Prem Tinsulanonda: Soldier andStatesman, and it will undoubtedly sell very poorly, but it is Editions Didier Millet’s way of thanking Anandfor signing the lucrative contract to publish the Bhumibol book with them.

Journalists inside and outside the FCCT clique were terrified of the lèse majesté law, and by 2013 the vastmajority of them had given up making any effort to report on Thai politics accurately. They were soafraid that most refused to even criticize or challenge Article 112, and in January 2013 the FCCT

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disgracefully failed to stand up for Thai editor Somyot Pruksakasemsuk when he was jailed for morethan a decade for two articles that he didn’t even write, the gravest blow to Thai media freedom in ageneration. Foreign reporting on Thailand remains woefully superficial and misleading, and aChannelNews Asia story by FCCT president Anasuya Sanyal in June 2013 typified the abysmal quality ofmost mainstream international coverage of the country. Sanyal uncritically swallowed all the lies of the“V For Thailand” group, obediently reporting that it was a new movement with diverse aims butprimarily focused on corruption. This was sheer nonsense, of course, but the Yellow bloc consistentlyused incompetent foreign coverage of this nature to support its bogus claims to legitimacy. Sanyal’sreport even mentioned the “slutty moron” attack on Yingluck’s website by hackers, even though it wasunthinkable that ChannelNews Asia would ever mention a similar stunt that insulted Singapore’s leaders.

One intriguing aspect of the “V For Thailand” group was that, unlike past protest movements in Thailandwhich had almost invariably sought to ostentatiously proclaim their loyalty to the monarchy, the “whitemasks” initially attempted to conceal their royalist sympathies. Their use of Guy Fawkes masks,celebrating a man who had plotted to kill England’s king four centuries ago, was not an intentional partof this strategy, it was just an illustration of their ignorance. (A Facebook debate I had in May and Junewith Sakapan “Geng” Eamegdool, one of the backers of the movement, amply illustrated this point.) Butat first they genuinely tried to play down their royalist sympathies, pretending they were a new groupthat brought together Thais from a broad range of backgrounds and political viewpoints, all united intheir principled determination to free the country from the baleful rule of the corrupt Shinawatra clan.This attempted rebranding of anti-Thaksin activism was another dismal failure — most “white mask”protesters were unable to contain themselves and insisted on openly proclaiming their ultra-royalistviews.

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A third group to emerge as the August reading of Worachai Hema’s reconciliation bill approached wasthe “People Democratic Force to Overthrow Thaksinism”, or “Pefot” for short. This was a newincarnation of Pitak Siam, with the same cast of characters behind it, mainly retired military men withlinks to Prem. Pefot set up a camp at Sanam Luang, where they were joined by a fourth faction — a fewdozen elderly men representing the long defunct Communist Party of Thailand. Their presence at thePefot camp — loudly proclaiming their support for the monarchy — is explained by the fact that thefather of Prem crony Surayud Chulanont had been a member of the party, and elderly communists weregrateful to Prem for his forgiving attitude towards them when the CPT collapsed in the early 1980s. LikePefot, they were Prem’s men.

The fifth faction to align itself with this unholy alliance was a brand new street protest group set up bythe Democrat Party, the “Light Blue Shirts”, officially known as “Sai Loh Fah” or “the lightning rod”.Since the Democrats could not rely on Sondhi Limthongkul to obliging provide the numbers at politicalrallies, they attempted to create a mass movement of their own. Almost inevitably, it fell far short of theirexpectations.

The various groups of protesters attempted to focus on a few key themes they thought could win themwider support and conceal the fact that they were all just different factions of the anti-Thaksin-and-Vajiralongkorn movement. They insisted that the Yingluck administration was tyrannical, a“parliamentary dictatorship” dragging Thailand to ruin. This was news to the majority of Thais, whohad voted for Pheu Thai and thought the government was doing a decent job, all things considered.They denounced the fact that Yingluck was a “puppet” of her brother, and while this was largely true, itwas exactly why most people had voted for her in the first place, and it glossed over the inconvenienttruth that behind all of the anti-government protest groups were embittered old men pulling the strings.They also insulted Yingluck for her alleged lack of intelligence, but this also backfired. The prime ministerhas degrees from Thai and U.S. universities, while Bhumibol, Sirikit and Vajiralongkorn don’t have asingle degree between them.

Moreover, the protesters seemed incapable of getting their English-language slogans and propaganda

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right, which undermined their mockery of Yingluck’s proficiency in the language. None of the protestleaders appear to have deigned to get a native speaker to check their material, presumably thinkingthemselves far too clever to need any help writing grammatically correct English. The “PeopleDemocratic Force to Overthrow Thaksinism” couldn’t even manage to get its own name right in English,a rather glaring blunder that was also committed by one of the most popular anti-Shinawatra Facebookgroups, “Dislike Yingluck for Concentration Citizen”. (A Facebook conversation I had with a Thaisupporter of the group trying to explain its bizarre name went viral in May.) The hypocrisy of ultra-royalists mocking Yingluck’s educational credentials in pidgin English recalled an infamous bannerhoisted aloft by an earlier incarnation of the anti-Shinawatra protest movement, the “multi-colouredshirts”, when they confronted pro-Thaksin protesters on Silom Road in April 2010, mocking thesupposedly ignorant Red Shirts as “uneducate people”:

A significant problem facing the leaders of the Yellow bloc as they tried to rally the followers of the

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“network monarchy” was that Bhumibol and Sirikit were both absent from the public stage and isolatedin large private suites in Siriraj Hospital. Bhumibol’s senility had been growing increasingly apparent foryears, and despite the efforts of the Royal Household Bureau to hide the truth about Sirikit, it was widelyknown in royalist circles that she was still incapacitated following her stroke in July 2012. This made itdifficult to exploit the monarchy to inspire support for the anti-government offensive, and it made itextremely difficult for leaders of the Yellow movement like Prem, Anand and Prawit to credibly pretendthey were acting with royal authority and following instructions from the palace. So they arranged anextraordinary charade in an effort to convince their patronage networks, and the country as a whole,that Bhumibol and Sirikit were still united and still calling the shots.

In late July, palace courtiers announced that both the king and the queen had made a remarkablerecovery from their respective ailments and no longer needed in-patient treatment at Siriraj. Sirkit’sthinning white hair was dyed jet black and a hairpiece was fitted to make her appear less dishevelled. OnAugust 1, the royal couple were driven out of Siriraj in a VW van and conveyed to the royal summerpalace in the seaside resort of Hua Hin. Both of them were clearly decrepit and disorientated, staringblankly out of the van’s windows as it drove past crowds of flag-waving Thais who had assembledoutside Siriraj for the supposedly joyful event. Sirikit waved mechanically with her left hand, evidencethat she remained paralysed on her right side. The queen was held upright in her seat by an attendantsitting behind her and another crouching at her feet, to prevent her keeling over in the vehicle. Doctorsat Siriraj dishonestly told the media that both Bhumibol and Sirikit were able to walk unaided but hadbeen taken from their hospital beds to the van in wheelchairs as a precautionary measure to preservetheir strength.

It was another cynical pantomime, intended to create the illusion that Thailand’s elderly king and queenwere fit and well, and in control of the royalist establishment. The most haunting images of the day werephotographs showing Sirikit gazing uncomprehendingly out of the van’s window, her face frozen in aneerie rictus that was probably supposed to be a smile.

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Pefot set up camp in Lumphini Park and prepared for the latest assault on the elected government,scheduled for August 7, when the reconciliation bill would have its first reading in parliament. TheDemocrat Party set up their own protest site at the Uruphong intersection, and in another priceless pieceof unintended irony they named it “the stage of truth”. Once again, Yingluck invoked the InternalSecurity Act, and once again she was derided for doing do by Yellow newspapers and the Democrats.Meanwhile, Pefot circulated a letter to foreign embassies in Bangkok, which made various hystericalallegations, including wild statements that the Yingluck administration was “no different from the Naziregime spearheaded by Hitler” and that “the Thaksin regime has destroyed the Thai monarchy”. Itadded:

We cannot accept … fake democracy, and corrupt and inefficient

government.

It was a remarkable statement, given that this was exactly what the establishment had been responsiblefor during the previous three decades, particularly during the eight-year premiership of their mentorand patron, Prem Tinsulanonda. (The full letter can be viewed below. Click on the thumbnails to see alarger version. I apologize for the poor quality of the images.)

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The coordinated ultra-royalist protests on August 7 were another embarrassing failure, as had beenpredicted by Chulalongkorn University’s Thitinan Pongsudhirak, one of the very best analysts ofcontemporary Thai politics, when he was interviewed by The Guardian newspaper a few days before:

The protest really is designed to unseat the government. But the

anti-Thaksin coalition is not united, there is unlikely to be any

intervention by the military or the judiciary, and there is not

enough traction, not enough numbers, for them to really succeed.

Only a few thousand people turned up at the Pefot camp in Lumphini Park and the Democrat Partyrallying point at Uruphong. Once again, disciplined ranks of riot police prevented protesters gettinganywhere near parliament, despite a few desultory attempts by hardcore Pefot protesters to provokeviolence. Abhisit and Suthep marched towards parliament from the Uruphong intersection accompaniedby around 2,000 supporters. When they reached the police barricades at Rajavithi Road and were toldonly Abhisit and Suthep would be allowed to pass, since they were members of parliament, the two menquickly agreed and proceeded alone, abandoning their stunned followers who milled around for a whilein confusion and then went home. Once he made his way to the parliament chamber, Abhisit led theDemocrats in various time-wasting tactics, and he then tried to get deliberations on the reconciliation billdelayed, claiming that because the proposals had budgetary implications, they needed to be discussedby the chairmen of 35 parliamentary committees. Legislators shot down his proposed postponement bya majority of 301 to 160.

The following weeks and months followed the same pattern as the debacle of August 7. Pheu Thaipressed ahead with the reconciliation bill. The Democrats attempted one cynical delaying tactic afteranother to try to block it. Besides their procedural obstructionism — which included an ugly incident onAugust 21 when 57 members of the party stood up to heckle the parliamentary speaker, and one of themgrabbed a policeman by the throat as he tried to restore order — the Democrats also incited violent anti-government protests in their strongholds in southern Thailand. The protesters claimed to be ordinaryrubber farmers angry about the government’s failure to support the price at which they could sell thecommodity, but actually most of them were paid thugs.

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In a further depressing demonstration of the intellectual bankruptcy of the royalist establishment, theNational Human Rights Commission issued an execrable report on the violence of April and May 2010.The NHRC was a partisan body packed with poo yai harbouring explicit royalist sympathies chaired by ahighly unimpressive academic, Amara Pongsapich. The report was a clumsy attempt to exonerateAbhisit and the establishment of responsibility for human rights violations in 2010, instead putting mostof the blame on the Red Shirts. It was not just biased, but also totally incompetent. The report wasbrilliantly eviscerated by a young Thai journalist, Prach Panchakunathorn, in articles clearly anddamningly itemizing its biggest flaws. This kind of behaviour infuriated the elite, of course: in Thailand,young people are not supposed to question their elders. Amara declared that the NHRC “do not want tobe bothered any more” by criticism of the report.

In early September, Shane Thaugsuban, a Democrat MP and brother of corrupt southern godfatherSuthep, staged a furious one-man protest in parliament, flinging chairs around when his demands fordiscussion of the fake rubber crisis were rebuffed. A few days later, Abhisit Vejjajiva managed to find away to lower the tone of Thai politics even further, joining in the misogynist royalist barracking ofYingluck with a speech in which he called her a “dumb bitch“. As Bangkok Pundit, one of the most well-informed and sensible foreign bloggers writing about Thailand, observed:

It has been clear for a few months that Abhisit has given up any hope

on becoming PM again. The speeches he has been making on the Stage of

Truth campaign led by the Democrats (semi-regular events held by the

Democrats throughout the country) are a complete turn-around for the

refined Eton and Oxford graduate image when he was Prime Minister.

With each speech he pushes the boundaries more. No longer do we have

surrogates making insults, it is Abhisit himself.

Kaewmala, another astute and essential online voice, aptly described Abhisit’s antics as symptomatic of“Thailand’s stupidity politics“.

In Bangkok, from time to time, the Pefot protesters in Lumphini Park tried to march on GovernmentHouse and cause disruption. Each time, they were foiled by effective policing and the fecklessness of theirleaders. Sometimes they used Nazi symbolism, which did not do anything to improve their image.

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A group of protesters also set up camp around the Democrat Party stage at the Uruphong intersection.They claimed to be ordinary students enraged by Yingluck’s tyranny but, inevitably, it was just anotherlie. Their leader, Uthai Yodmanee, was a Democrat Party activist who had also been involved in theviolent protests by fake rubber farmers in southern Thailand. As Khao Sod reported, one banner at theprotest camp bore the slogan: “Underground al Qaeda is here.”

In the Pefot camp at Lumphini, protesters were preparing for the International Court of Justice ruling on

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Thailand’s border dispute with Cambodia over Preah Vihear temple, due on November 11. As the Thaiestablishment knows, it is inconceivable that the ICJ will rule in favour of Thailand. Preah Vihear belongsto Cambodia. As they have been doing since 2008, the ultra-royalists intend to exploit the issue to accuseThaksin and his allies of betraying the country and giving away Thai territory for personal financial gain,in the hope of stirring up nationalist opposition to the government. The accusations are complete fiction,but all that matters to the royalist establishment is whether they can use anger over the ICJ ruling toundermine the Yingluck administration. Banners and T-shirts denouncing the ICJ have already beenprinted, and can be seen all around the camp in Lumphini Park.

According to a Pefot supporter interviewed in the camp by British journalist Mark Fenn, the protesterswho can sometimes be seen in blackface in Lumphini are southerners who dress that way to representthe characters in a 19th century story written by Thailand’s King Chulalongkorn about a love triangleinvolving members of the Ngaw Pah tribe. The intended implication appears to be that this tribe, not theKhmer, are the true indigenous inhabitants of Cambodia.

On October 18, Thaksin’s plans for the Worachai Hema reconciliation bill became clear. A parliamentaryvetting committee dominated by Pheu Thai MPs voted to voted to amend the bill in order to extend it tocover people accused of wrongdoing by any official body set up since the 2006 coup. The mostprominent beneficiary of this change would of course be Thaksin himself, whose legal problems stemfrom the investigations of the Assets Examination Committee set up by the coup government to probecorruption allegations against him and his allies. But the bill would also give a blanket amnesty to allofficials and military officers responsible for the crackdown in April and May 2010. The Red Shirts wouldbe denied the justice they had been demanding.

Meanwhile, DSI boss Tharit Pengdit announced that instead of combining all the murder charges againstAbhisit and Suthep over the 2010 crackdown into one case, they would face separate trials over each ofthe alleged incidents in which people were killed or wounded. There is no conceivable benefit for the

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victims’ families from this approach, but it would mire Abhisit and Suthep in an interminable Kafkaesquelegal process that could last many years. It was another cynical attempt to force the Democrat Party toaccept the revised reconciliation bill and allow Thaksin to come home a free man.

There was widespread dismay in the Red Shirt movement over the blatant betrayal. Instead of respectingthe sacrifices the Red Shirts had made and seeking full accountability for April and May 2010, Thaksinintended to exploit the issue to serve his own narrow self-interest. The UDD said it opposed the changesto the bill, and Sombat Boonngam-anong’s Red Sunday movement returned to Ratchaprasong toprotest. But the Pheu Thai administration urgently pushed ahead with the legislative process.

As events moved towards another showdown, Thais were reminded yet again of the centrality of thesuccession to the political crisis. In response to the death of the aged supreme patriarch,Vajiralongkorn’s four banished sons e-mailed a statement to media organisations including Thai E-News:

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The most striking thing about the message was that the four brothers used their royal honourifictitles, Mom Chao, and instead of the surname Vivacharawongse which they had been ordered to adopt,they used the Mahidol family name. It was a highly significant — and provocative — gesture. Thebrothers were staking their claim to be legitimate heirs to the Chakri throne. They had become part ofthe establishment’s plan to prevent Vajiralongkorn ever ruling as king.

As 2013 draws to a close, Thailand remains locked in a destabilizing conflict that is doing immensedamage to the country and to the welfare of its people. The dark age, or กลียุค, which many Thais hadfeared would accompany the end of King Bhumibol’s reign is already upon us. Two implacable andunprincipled elite factions fixated on their own narrow self-interest are waging a fight to the death,trampling the aspirations of ordinary Thais underfoot. Both sides have sought to provoke killings andchaos as part of their strategy. Both sides have systematically undermined the rule of law and soughtto co-opt institutions of state that should be impartial. Neither side appears to care how much

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collateral damage they cause. Watching from afar, it breaks my heart.

Thaksin and his allies have failed to understand that his opponents will do whatever it takes to try toblock his return. This has nothing to do with principle, despite the posturing of the Democrat Party. It hasalways been standard practice for Thailand’s most powerful people to be forgiven for the crimes theyhave committed. The palace supported and enabled Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn’s return toThailand in 1976 just three years after his army massacred students and civilians on the streets ofBangkok. Manoonkrit Roopkachorn was given a royal pardon while in exile just three years afterlaunching the abortive April Fool’s Coup of 1985 during which he had openly defied the palace. Theclaims by the Thai establishment that they are unwaveringly committed to upholding the rule of law arehollow and dishonest.

The reason the traditional elite and the Democrat Party are so determined to keep Thaksin out ofThailand is that they believe his return would make a dark era of political domination by the formerprime minister in alliance with the crown prince inevitable. The dread they feel about this outcome maybe well-founded, but the disastrous tactics they have adopted to try to prevent it happening have causeda full-blown legitimacy crisis for Thailand’s monarchy and deep state. Ordinary people in Thailand areno longer prepared to accept being treated as the dust under the dust under King Bhumibol’s feet. Theyare disgusted and angry about the establishment’s repeated efforts to deny them their basic democraticrights. They will not stand for it any longer.

Yet another terribly damaging crisis is looming. The Yellow bloc will do its best to once again incitemayhem in Bangkok in coming days and weeks. The Democrat Party has totally abdicated its duty to bea responsible parliamentary opposition that holds the government to account via constitutionalmethods. Instead, they intend to continue to sabotage parliament’s ability to function, and then claimdemocracy in Thailand is no longer working. Four deputy Democrat leaders including Korn Chatikavanijresigned from their positions on October 30 to enable them to join illegal attempts to bring down thegovernment without (they hope) jeopardising the legal status of their party. The Yellow movement alsointends to create another damaging confrontation with Cambodia over Preah Vihear, to add to thechaos and rally nationalist Thais to their cause. They will attempt to mount more mass rallies inBangkok to paralyse the city. And when they have ramped up chaos and tension to fever pitch, theyintend to remove the government via a judicial coup by partisan judges. They will then seek to freezedemocracy for years and instal a government probably headed by Prawit Wongsuwan with nodemocratic mandate.

This plan is pure insanity. If it fails, as it most probably will, the Yellow establishment will try even moredesperate measures. Wild talk of kidnap and assassination, including the murder of Thaksin orVajiralongkorn or both, has become increasingly commonplace in the ultra-royalist camp. A few bullets,they believe, could fix the situation once and for all.

If the plan succeeds, as it may, Thailand will be plunged into vicious internecine conflict far bloodier eventhan the darkest days of 1976 and 2010. A mass popular uprising in Bangkok, Isaan and Lanna isinevitable. There are two ways it could end. Events could follow the same script as Egypt in 2011, withmass resistance to authoritarian rule forcing democratic elections. Or they could follow the script ofEgypt in 2013, in which the deep state enforces order and unity through military dictatorship and savagemassacres of those who dissent.

The chances are that Thaksin will win the struggle and Vajiralongkorn will become King Rama X. If thishappens, their opponents will finally understand the suicidal stupidity of the strategy they have adoptedsince 2005. The appropriate way to prepare for the rule of a populist strongman like Thaksin and a

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monarch like Vajiralongkorn, as some members of the establishment appeared to grasp in the 1990s,was to strengthen Thai democracy and the state institutions that act as checks and balances to executivepower, entrench the rule of law, and allow freedom of speech. Instead, they have done exactly thereverse. If Thaksin and Vajiralongkorn prove to be the kind of rulers the Yellows fear they will be, then thetables will suddenly turn on those who conspired to eviscerate Thai democracy, turn the judiciary andstate institutions into partisan tools of the powerful, and use the lèse majesté law to silence dissent. Theauthoritarian twisted Thailand they have created will remain, but they will no longer be its masters.

It can sometimes seem as if Thailand is too polarized and broken to ever come back from the brink. Butit can. The elite — Yellow and Red — have irretrievably lost their legitimacy, but the aspirations ofordinary Thais on opposing sides are remarkably congruent. They want a fair society. They want the ruleof law to be respected. They want their political leaders to respond to their needs. They want peace andprosperity. They want their voices to he heard.

A positive and credible way forward has already been formulated. The fearless proposals of the KhanaNitirat, a group of seven Thammasat University law lecturers led by Worachet Pakeerat, provide acompelling blueprint for turning Thailand into a better place, as the People’s Party that ended theabsolute monarchy in 1932 intended, before things went terribly astray. The core proposals includenullifying all that was accomplished by the 2006 coup, reforming the lèse majesté law and the judiciary,and drafting a new constitution that — unlike all the others since 1932 — is genuinely fair and built to last.These are proposals that the overwhelming majority of Thais can surely rally around.

The Nitirat proposals would enable Thaksin Shinawatra to return home a free man. But he — and all ofthe elite — would be subject to the rule of law, and accountable for crimes they have committed.

As implied by the central importance the Nitirat group places on reforming Article 112, Thailand’s elitealso need to end their insane efforts to suppress truth and replace it with self-serving myths and fairytales. Democracy and the rule of law can only flourish in a climate where freedom of speech is sacredand truth is able to trump lies. As David Streckfuss wrote in an article published in The Bangkok Post:

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Thai society, like most, has seen plenty ofviolence gone unanswered.

The culture ofimpunity has flourished in Thailand, emboldening

military leaders to crack down on resisters and carry out coup after

coup, giving themselves legal immunity by passing amnesties for their

actions.

No military official was ever tried for successfully overthrowing a

government. No Thai leader, military or otherwise, has ever gone

before the court charged with killing protesters.

In 1973, the ruling junta was allowed to leave the country. In 1978,

an amnesty was passed that absolved both leaders and protesters of

any wrongdoing in the bloody massacre of 1976.

After the military crackdown on protesters in May 1992, a report on

the incident issued years later was rendered useless on grounds of

defamation and established nothing other than protesters had been

killed. The record of these events was lost to time, all in the name

of repairing a divided society. As it turned out, it did seem that

Thai society was willing to forgive and forget.

Forgetting, though, exacts its own price. When the truth of events is

obscured time and again, the very value of truth itself is degraded.

People tell themselves they got by once again without dealing with

the truth. They are lulled into a false sense of confidence that they

don’t need the truth to get by…

The blanket amnesty threatens once again to banish truth from

Thailand. The obligations of history are lost to the present and

future.

Thai society has a chance to make such reckoning with history. It

should not miss it.

This article is part of my modest contribution to try to achieve some understanding of what reallyhappened during Thailand’s past dark decade. But my work is only of any value because Thais farwiser and more knowledgeable than me remain muzzled and unable to speak freely. One day, I hope,they will be able to tell the full history of Thailand’s กลียุค, and by doing so, enable the country totranscend it and thrive.

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CharlesEdwardFrith(@charlesfrith)

11/11 is a powerful number in some circles. I wouldn’t call it auspicious.

November 1, 2013 at 2:09 pm