Post on 30-Jan-2023
The Second Transition of the Hydrosocial Contract Theory: The Case of the
Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP)
By
Richard Meissner
Research Associate at the African Water Issues Research Unit (AWIRU) at the
University of Pretoria (UP)
Tel: (H) (+27 11) 955 5744
Tel: (W) (+27 11) 420 4486
Fax: (W) (+27 11) 420 3527
E-mail: meiss@mweb.co.za
Website: http://www.up.ac.za/academic/libarts/polsci/awiru
Paper prepared for a lecture at Oxford University and University of Middlesex,
Great Britain, October 2000
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Introduction
The human species has the ability to overcome almost any restrictions nature can
impose on it. This is quite true when it comes to the construction of structures
regarding our basic security needs. We have the ability to build houses to augment the
need for a secure living space. We are able to produce and distribute food at an
astounding and ingenious rate to feed ourselves, at least in some parts of the world.
When it comes to making water available for various purposes, this ingenious capacity
is even more spectacular. Over millennia the human mind has led to the development
of infrastructural projects that gave rise to our ability to bring water into our homes,
industries and agricultural sector. For instance, the Ancient Egyptians formed their
civilisation along the Nile River, by developing their society using water and soil for
the purpose of agricultural development. Annually the Nile River delivered just the
right amount of nourishing silt from the yearly floods to compensate for nutrients
humans removed from the soil by agriculture. In other words the river system ensured
the sustainable production of food within the basin and especially in Egypt.
At the same time the river flushed the accumulated salts out of the soil and into the
Mediterranean (Ohlsson, 1995:4), which helped to sustain the Egyptian civilisation.
In fact, it is argued by Sabine and Thorson (1973:9) that agricultural development
originated in the Middle East at around 6 500 B.C. It was here that humans changed
their social activities from hunting and gathering to farming. Also, from here farming
techniques spread steadily until by 3 000 B.C. grain growing agricultural communities
could be found along the coast of North Africa, in Europe and India, and across the
plateau of Iran into Central Asia. “Agriculture became civilization only under
particularly favorable circumstances, growing on the flood plain of great rivers - the
first of which was apparently that of the Tigris-Euphrates. Civilization by definition
requires social activities above the level of reproduction and subsistence farming, so it
is easy to see that the greater fertility created by spring floods of a great river could
provide an agricultural surplus capable of supporting characteristically ‘civilized’
forms of human activity” (Sabine & Thorson, 1973:9). We can assume that
civilisation and the origination of political systems, on a much grander scale than that
of the family or clan, originated along river flood plains, which could provide water
and soil for the production of agricultural surpluses.
It also indicates that water resources were used on a grand scale, for thousands of
years, either by simply regulating natural processes or by the building of irrigation
systems and other infrastructural projects such as dams. It was during the
industrialisation period, a few hundred years ago that water manipulation on an even
greater scale, than before, gained new meaning and momentum. This mobilisation of
water also led to the lessening of the threat of water borne diseases, by the provision
of wholesome fresh water for drinking and sanitation purposes. The approach
developed by the human species in order to achieve all these wonderful aspects of life
on our planet has led to the implementation and construction of water supply projects
and institutions to make life easier than in previous times.
This explains the “why” question regarding our ability to transport and use water
resources. What remains now for the political scientist, geographer, engineer, and
development specialist is to explain “how” these water management processes came
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about. One such theory that outlines our ability to use water resources on such a grand
scale is the hydrosocial contract theory developed by the seminal work of Turton and
Ohlson (1999). The hydrosocial contract theory is a step towards the direction in
answering the “how” question in water resource development. It explains the
processes humans implemented to deal with water scarcities in societies. The theory
needs further testing in order for us to understand its nature, and to determine whether
it adequately explains the relationship of users with their water resources and the
natural environment and other users. The purpose of this paper is to examine one
aspect of the hydrosocial contract theory, as outlined by Turton and Ohlson (1999) -
that of the second transition. It is the author’s intention to test the second transition by
means of a case study - the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), which is an
example of the first transition in the hydrosocial contract theory. The LHWP is
chosen as a case study, for there seems to be evidence that the LHWP is a
manifestation of the first transition to the second transition of the hydrosocial contract
theory. It is also possible that a third transition is manifested in the LHWP.
The paper will be divided into four parts. Firstly, the hydrosocial contract theory will
be outlined and explained. In this section the first transition and the second transition
will be identified, which will form the backbone of the paper. In the second part we
will take a closer look at interest groups as political actors in society. Thirdly, the
LHWP, and in particular interest groups’ role and involvement in the project, will be
sketched in order to analyse critically the hydrosocial contract theory’s second
transition. In this section of the paper a third transition of the hydrosocial contract
will come to light. The last part of the paper will be a conclusion with a dimension of
some future research topics on the hydrosocial contract theory.
The Hydrosocial Contract Theory
Before discussing the hydrosocial contract theory, it will be useful to consider theory
in general and why theories are important. According to Robert Cox, theories follow
reality in the sense that they are shaped by the world of experience. Theories also
precede the making of reality in that they orient the minds of those who, by their
actions, reproduce or change that reality. Theories matter, whether we like it or not
(in Williams, 2000:74). This means that theories can either be a description of reality
or they can become reality itself. Cox (1996:87) goes further, when he states that:
“Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective.
Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political
time and space (quoted in Williams, 2000:75). From this we can assert that the
hydrosocial contract theory is an explanation of how societies have developed the
water resources available. The hydrosocial contract theory therefore follows the
reality of the mobilisation of water resources for economic and other social purposes.
In this case Ziman (1984:28) notes that theories “appear as ordering principles that
explain general classes of observational and experimental facts”. Ziman (1984:28)
defines a theory as “covering a wide range of facts to a high degree of accuracy”. It is
therefore “the most compact and manageable form in which scientific information can
be recorded, manipulated, used, or understood. It is the vehicle by which a description
of natural phenomena is expressed as scientific knowledge”. This seems to be case
with the hydrosocial contract theory.
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How does the hydrosocial contract theory express scientific knowledge? By outlining
the basic arguments of the hydrosocial contract theory, we will be able to note the
underlying assumptions and the manner in which the theory “follows reality”.
The hydrosocial contract theory was first developed and presented by Turton and
Ohlson (1999) at the 9th
Stockholm Water Symposium. It has been referred to, after
this, by Warner (2000a, 2000b), “in a manner that shows conceptual development”
(Turton & Meissner, 2000). It is therefore a very new theory in the discourse of water
politics, albeit an important one, in that it outlines the theoretical assumptions of water
resource development in societies, which is not clearly understood at this point in
time.
The hydrosocial contract postulates that transitions during the history of human’s use
of water took place at different phases in the past and present. The first transition
occurs when a society experiences that it moves from water abundance to water
scarcity. For purposes of clarification, water scarcity can be defined as the condition
that exists when the demographically-induced demand for water exceeds the
prevailing level of local supply, meaning that supply-sided augmentation becomes
necessary (Turton & Ohlson, 1999). The first transition refers to that moment in time
when the prevailing condition of water scarcity is encountered by a given social entity.
This is usually accompanied by a major event such as a drought or flood, but not
necessarily. It can also be the result of the convergence of events such as a period of
rapid population growth and unchecked industrialisation that is punctuated by a major
drought. The first transition can also be accompanied by increased levels of induced
scarcity caused by the pollution of existing sources of water as the result of
unregulated economic activities. The Hobesian form of hydrosocial contract is often
the result of this series of events. This form of the hydrosocial contract is the result of
the interaction of hydropolitical dynamics during the first transition that often results
in a bipolar configuration between government and the water-consuming public
(Turton & Meissner, 2000). The result of such a social contract is the alienation of
people from an intimate contact with water (Turton & Ohlsson, 1999:3) and also in a
sense from nature. This alienation is manifested in the idea that technocratic solutions
can solve all the technical problems confronted by the human species. However, this
alienation can convert itself into a perceived control of people through technology.
People react in different ways towards this alienation in that defence mechanisms can
be developed in order to deal with the alienation and technocratic control. For
instance, after reservoir seismic induced activity (RISA) occurred in the region of the
Katse reservoir, many people in the vicinity of the dam believed that a mythical
creature inhabited the waters of the reservoir. It is unfortunately outside the ambit of
this paper to further discuss this social phenomenon. What is interesting to note,
though, is that a negative sentiment towards such projects can develop over time.
Interest groups can then oppose the alienation of people from nature, and water
resources in particular, in a very profound manner.
Furthermore, the first transition is dominated by a first order scarcity, which is defined
as water becoming scarcer directly proportional to population growth over time. As
populations increase and economic activity becomes more concentrated, water gets
perceptually and physically scarcer and the individual gets alienated from direct
contact with the resource. In order to facilitate the mobilisation of water, humans
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surrender the responsibility for marshalling more water to a centralised authority, in
much the same way as classic social contract theorists such as Hobbes, Locke and
Rousseau hypothesised (Turton & Ohlsson, 1999:3) about the establishment of
political societies.
This authority, or state, is given then the responsibility to oversee that water is readily
available to the citizens in order to conduct their water related activities in an
undisturbed manner. Also, people can then continue with activities, other than
collecting water for personal and/or household use, such as education in a way that
water related activities do not hinder their socio-economic development. In order for
the government to mobilise water in large quantities, it needs to set up an intricate and
interdependent infrastructure. This infrastructure usually takes the form of dams,
aqueducts, and water purification plants. Not only is a physical infrastructure created
and needed but also a bureaucratic system to manage this infrastructure. This comes
in the form of government departments, parastatal institutions and private water
utilities, that is given certain responsibilities and tasks, in accordance with the laws of
the state, to supply water to its users. It is at this point where humans intervene in the
hydrologic cycle on a grand scale but not altering it, and start moving water from
where it is in relative abundance to where it is needed.
These institutions and infrastructural projects can be called the “hydraulic mission”.
This “mission” is a very significant event in the understanding of the hydrosocial
contract theory. One can therefore conclude that the first transition from water
abundance to conditions of water scarcity, unleashes a number of critically important
dynamics in a hydropolitical sense. The most noteworthy of these is the establishment
of the “hydraulic mission” of the state, which has as its basic rationale to mobilise
more water for different socio-economic purposes. This mission is usually called the
supply-sided phase of water management. Engineers become the dominant discursive
elites with a clearly defined sanctioned discourse, with its foundation on the basic
paradigm of getting more water available, from greater distances, to satisfy the
miscellaneous socio-economic sectors of society. These engineers become very
important actors in the “hydraulic mission”, for it is on their shoulders that economic
development, growth and prosperity rest (Turton & Meissner, 2000). The engineer
therefore dominates the first transition from water abundance to water scarcity, with
government as the custodian and overseer of water resources. Engineers are tasked to
solve the problems of mobilising more water, and they do so with ingenuity and
passion.
In other words, the era of the engineer is born and the engineer is elevated to a certain
status in society - that of controller of nature and the provider of basic resources. In
fact, there is no end to their ability to mobilise more water. They first start the
“hydraulic mission” with simple dams, pipelines and water treatment plants, and their
skills develop in direct response to the levels of complexity that is encountered. In
this respect two aspects are important to the understanding of the hydrosocial contract:
With their basic grounding in Newtonian physics, no technical problem is
insoluble.
The philosophical base of the engineer is solidly cast on the desire to control nature
(Turton & Meissner, 2000).
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Engineers can therefore move water from one place to another, provided that three
necessary pre-conditions are met.
There must be enough money available to finance these increasingly complex
projects.
There must be sufficient energy available with which to move the water (Turton &
Meissner, 2000).
Bureaucratic institutions are also needed to implement such a project, which entails
human resources.
The second transition, from water scarcity to water deficit, serves to trigger another set
of social responses, such as the birth of some form of social conscience. In this case,
water deficit can be defined as the prevailing condition that exists when the use of
freshwater within a given social entity exceeds the level of sustainable supply (Turton
& Ohlson, 1999), and various interest groups question the ecological and financial
costs of additional supply-sided augmentation schemes. This social conscience is
usually in the form of environmentalism, or a pro-environmental ethic, triggered by
the increasing costs of water delivery and ecological damage (Turton & Meissner,
2000) these water delivery systems could cause. At this point interest groups start to
mobilise support and begin to question government’s interpretation of the hydrosocial
contract. These interest groups perceive government’s water policies to be out of
touch with rapidly changing social norms and perceptions on water use and delivery
(Turton & Ohlsson, 1999:8). This new social conscience emerges in a part of civil
society and starts to act as a strong counter-force to government dominance over the
sanctioned discourse. In other words, a part of civil society begins to challenge the
prevailing sanctioned discourse, and starts to suggest that an alternative to large water
supply projects must be considered (Turton & Meissner, 2000) and also implemented.
This can be regarded as be the birth of the demand management phase of water
management, with its components, the issue of equity (Turton & Meissner, 2000) of
people and the respect for nature. What is also of importance regarding this phase of
the hydrosocial contract is the development of an environmental ethic. This aspect
needs some elaboration. The traditional social contract theory is quite exclusive of
non-human life (Olen & Barry, 1992:336) and nature is therefore not part of. This is
manifested strongly in the first phase of the hydrosocial contract theory.
According to the social contract theory’s interpretation of morality, morality is a
product of an informal agreement between the members (humans) of a society.
Everyone agrees to follow certain rules and to obey specific obligations on the
condition that others do the same. The purpose of the agreement is to ensure that all
of us act in a dependable manner, providing the mutual trust necessary for social
cooperation. An important aspect of the social contract theory is that this informal
agreement is the source of all moral obligations, at least among humans. We have
moral obligations to others who have entered into the agreement with us. However,
we have no such obligations to those who are not part of the agreement. Non-human
life, that are incapable of entering into contracts, are not part of the agreement. The
environment is therefore not part of it, and also non-human species. Therefore, we
have no moral obligation towards non-human life (Olen & Barry, 1992:336) and
nature.
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There is therefore an evolution of the hydrosocial contract. Traditionally, the original
social contract did enforce a morality only onto humans, for it was humans that
produced an informal agreement among the members of society. Animal rights and
ecological considerations are not part of the contract and we have no moral obligation
towards them. Interest groups in the hydrosocial contract theory challenge this view
regarding non-human life and nature, and argue that we not only have a moral
obligation towards those humans that are affected by large dams, but also towards
nature and non-human species. This challenge is encapsulated in the resource use
perception concerning water and the environment. Water resource use perception is
the perceived utilisation of a resource within a distinctive mindset. The water
resource use perception of environmental interest groups differs widely from that of
government and water managers. It is because of differing water resource use
perceptions that the government, and sometimes, other institutions like consulting
engineers, and interest groups do not see eye-to-eye on large scale supply-side
management projects such as large dams. To illustrate the point the ecologist or
environmentalist could argue that nature is not only a supplier of water but it is also a
user of that water. Water should therefore be used accordingly, to secure the supply of
water from nature and at the same time that nature is not jeopardised as a user of water
resources in the future. For if an imbalance is created, it can concoct a vicious circle,
which can ultimately lead to the collapse of habitats and ecosystems on which life is
so dependent. This can, in the end, cause a drop in the water per capita available to a
country or region and can contribute to water deficits and even severe water shortages,
which can influence the economic development of a country or region. According to
environmentalists, the resource use perception is therefore a manifestation of the
anthropocentric1 ethic vs. the respect for nature ethic. These two divergent ethical
principles stand opposite each other, with the engineer taken the anthropocentric road
and the environmentalist the respect for nature side.
It is to this second transition that we now turn. The second transition will be tested
against the backdrop of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP). A short
historical overview of the LHWP will be provided in order to find out where the
second transition started. An in-depth look at the interests articulated by the interest
groups involved will give an indication of the kind of issues these interest groups are
promoting. Before going over to the manifestation of the second transition of the
hydrosocial contract theory, a few remarks on interest groups and their role in society.
Interest Groups in Society
Interest groups, like political parties, form one of the major links between government
and the governed in today’s society (Heywood, 1997:252), and they are distinguishing
features of democratic regimes (Sadie, 1998:280). Interest groups have but one
purpose in a political society and that is to influence the political decision-making
process (Ball, 1988:96) while remaining apart from it (Duverger, 1972:101). In other
words, interest groups are part of society, but they are apart from the decision making
process. They do not form part of government, except in cases where institutional
1 Anthropocentrism holds that humans are a central fact of the universe, and therefore stands above all
else.
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interest groups exist within government departments, and influencing public policy.
There is therefore a difference between an interest group and a political party. A
political party’s main purpose is to promote its cause by the nomination of candidates
for election. These political organisations are therefore particularly important in
interest aggregation2. By nominating candidates, who stand for a set of policies,
political parties try to build support for these candidates (Almond, Powell & Mundt,
1993:108) and in that way interest aggregation occur through these candidates if and
when they are elected to the government structures. A difference between interest
groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also exist. An NGO can loosely
be defined as a service orientated non-profit organisation. They perform functions
that fall traditionally within government’s domain. An example of such an
organisation would be the Salvation Army, which looks after the poor and destitute.
Within water politics a typical example of an NGO would be the Global Water
Partnership (GWP) or the World Commission on Dams (WCD). An interest group’s
main function is therefore to influence government policy. In water politics, interest
groups influence government policies regarding water resources management on a
wide array of issues. It should be noted that interest groups have no public power, but
they do have public and private resources entrusted to them (Holloway, 1998:93) that
can have a bearing on their influencing endeavours and issue articulation. The
difference between an interest group, NGO and political party boils down to the
functions these organisations fulfil in society.
Interest groups have a wide array of tactics and strategies at their disposal to influence
government policies. Different groups have different characteristics that produce a
variety of strategies of influence (Whiteley & Winyard, 1987:85). According to Sadie
(1998:284), “no group confines itself to a single strategy or tries to exert influence
through just one channel”. Two types of influencing techniques can be discerned:
direct personal communication with decisionmakers and indirect contact via the media
as well as public opinion. “Strategies of direct communication include deputations to
politicians and the personal presentation of research results and testimonies at
legislative hearings. These techniques are found to be the most effective” (Sadie,
1998:284). Litigation can also fall under this type of contact and can be just as
effective (Hjelmar, 1996:69) in some respects. Some interest groups have in-house
legal departments with employed lawyers at their disposal for just this purpose. Less
effective methods of impersonal communication are letters, telegrams and public
relations campaigns. Tactics that fall under indirect communication include petitions,
protests, strikes and demonstrations to civil obedience (Sadie, 1998:285). These
tactics are very popular with interest groups. The recent demonstrations in Prague
against the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) and in Seattle against
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in October 2000 are very good examples.
Although they are less effective than direct personal communication, tactics such as
mass demonstrations can have a bearing on the purpose of issue articulation. The
Prague and Seattle demonstrations were broadcast around the world and the awareness
level of people was raised regarding the issues concerning the global economy.
Another interesting example in water politics regarding the tactics of interest groups is
the demonstration of a few individuals at the World Water Forum (WWF) in The
2 The term aggregation refers to the conversion of political demands into alternative courses of action,
usually by political parties (McLean, 1996:5).
8
Hague in March 2000. These individuals presented themselves in the nude at the
opening ceremony of the WWF to protest against dams being build in Spain and
across the world. It is not sure though, whether they were promoting the interest of
dam affected communities or nudism. Be as it may the awareness level of dam
affected communities in Spain and elsewhere were most certainly articulated by these
individuals. This raises the question of the issues that are articulated by interest
groups in society and particularly in water politics and the debate regarding large
dams.
Human rights, the promotion of democratic accountability, gender, health, agricultural
development, social welfare and the environment are some of the issues that receive
attention from interest groups. Within water politics these are some of the issues
articulated by these organisations.
Two types of interest groups can be identified in the politics of the LHWP: those that
operate within the national status quo (Shepherd, 1996:424) and those that operate
across international borders. The latter are characterised by organised activities
occurring simultaneously in a number of countries; objectives that do not relate to the
interests within any given territory; (Holsti, 1995:61) and components that are
essentially political. In other words, interest groups operating across state borders can
have the same characteristics as transnational corporations (TNCs), although they are
different actors on the national and international stage.
The Hydrosocial Contract, the Second Transition and the LHWP
This section will focus on the involvement of interest groups in the LHWP, and in
particularly who they and their targets are, the issues concerned and the strategies they
employ. Firstly, a brief history of the LHWP will be sketched in order to outline the
first transition of the hydrosocial contract theory regarding the project.
The LHWP was first mooted in the late 1950’s when it was envisaged as a plan to
supply water from the head waters of the Orange (Senqu) River in Lesotho to the
Orange Free State goldfields near Welkom in South Africa. Ninham Shand, a
consulting engineer, did a reconnaissance study of the Lesotho Highlands in 1956, and
published his plan of a water scheme in that part of Lesotho in a report that came out
the same year. As South Africa’s needs for more water started to increase it was
realised that South Africa’s economic nucleus, concentrated in the Witwatersrand,
would be in dire need of water in the 1990’s and the early part of the 21st century. The
original focus of the LHWP shifted from the supply of water to the goldfields to that
of delivering water to the Witwatersrand area. The project was implemented in 1986
after much diplomatic fervour and political tension between Lesotho and South Africa
was resolved with a coup d’etat in Lesotho in the same year (Meissner, 2000:24). The
first transition of the hydrosocial contract theory, regarding the LHWP inter-basin
transfer (IBT) scheme, therefore occurred in 1986. However, prior to the
implementation of the LHWP, water was moved from a variety of other sources into
the Vaal Dam (Turton & Meissner, 2000) on the Vaal River for example the Thukela
River. The LHWP forms therefore only part of the hydrosocial contract theory in
South Africa.
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Most of the augmentation of the Vaal River comes in the form of IBTs where water
from another river system is harnessed and stored in a dam. This water is then
transferred through a watershed and discharged into an adjacent basin where it is
allowed to flow according to gravity (Turton & Meissner, 2000). The LHWP is but
one of a number of IBTs connecting the Vaal River system with other river basins
inside and outside of South Africa’s borders. The hydrosocial contract theory is
therefore a very dynamic social aspect in water politics. The first transition can occur
over a certain period of time depending on the situation a society finds itself in
regarding water scarcity. As water in a region becomes scarcer more and larger IBTs
are needed to augment the shortfall of water resources. This augmentation is likely to
continue in the Vaal River basin as plans for further IBTs are in the pipeline. These
are the Thukela Water Project (TWP), additional transfers from the Orange River,
either in the form of Phase 2 of the LHWP, or via a canal on South African soil, and
transfers from the Mzimvubu River via either the Thukela or Orange Rivers, to the
Vaal River (Turton & Meissner, 2000). The first transition has therefore not come to
an end in the Orange River basin, of which the Vaal River is a tributary. Because of
these elaborate transfer schemes and the subsequent impact of these projects on people
and the environment, interest groups can “come to the party” and articulate issues that
are in conflict with that of the engineer planning and constructing these projects. The
second transition of the hydrosocial contract theory is therefore borne when these
interest groups get involved against a project. In the next section we shall take a
closer look at some of the issues articulated and strategies used by interest groups
regarding the LHWP in recent years.
Interest Groups and the LHWP
Various interest groups from communal interest groups3, such as villagers in the area
where the LHWP is implemented, to non-associational interest groups4 in South
Africa and abroad have been involved in the LHWP in recent years. The reason for
their involvement stems from the perceived detrimental affects on the environment
and the people living in and around the areas of large dam projects. In the past, the
focus of interest groups’ lobbying activities was mostly directed at the World Bank
that provided partial funding to the LHWP. The governments of Lesotho and South
Africa and the project authorities, most notably the Lesotho Highlands Development
Authority (LHDA) and the Trans Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA) have also been
targets of advocacy campaigns. The World Bank seems to be the main target because
of its high profile in the financing or partial financing of large infrastructural projects,
like the LHWP, the world over (Internet: Horta and Pottinger, 1998). This is not to
suggest that the World Bank is the interest groups’ only target.
3 According to Heywood “The chief characteristic of communal interest groups is that they are
embedded in the social fabric, in the sense that membership is based on birth, rather than recruitment.
Examples of such groups are families, tribes, castes and ethnic groups. ..Communal interest groups are
founded on the basis of a shared heritage and traditional bonds of loyalties”. 4 Non-associational interest groups rarely are well organised, and their activities are episodic. They are
based on common interests of ethnicity, region, religion, occupation, or perhaps kinship (Almond,
Powell & Mundt, 1993:90). They differ from communal interest groups in that the members of non-
associational interest groups do not, necessarily know each other intimately, such as the village or
family group.
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The LHWP first came to the attention of interest groups in Lesotho in 1988. This was
after a workshop was organised by the Transformation Resource Centre (TRC) at the
request of church leaders in Lesotho, who work closely with the communities in the
Lesotho Highlands. A part of the workshop focused on the LHWP. The participants
at the workshop were concerned with some of the escalating environmental, socio-
political and economic problems likely to impact on the communities living in the
Highlands who were directly affected by the LHWP. At the workshop it was decided
by the participants that one interest group should be established. This organisation
was called the Highland Church Solidarity Action Group (HCSAG) (Internet:
Khits’ane, 1997:1). It seems as if those who are in constant contact with the affected
communities are very aware of the risks such projects pose to the environment and
people living in and around the site of the LHWP, and decided to act against such
risks.
At the opening ceremony of the Katse Dam, South Africa’s former Minister of Water
Affairs and Forestry, Kader Asmal, gave phase 1A of the LHWP a “clean bill of
health”, in spite of calls from interest groups that the project was fraught with
difficulties. He also lashed out against interest groups opposing the project, calling
them “green terrorists” and saying that they were ignoring the positive effects of the
LHWP. The World Bank said, however that there was a need for phase 1A to “be
cleaned up” and that the Bank would not go ahead with financing further phases of the
project until the existing problems had been resolved (Internet: Coleman, 1995). This
can be an example of the manifestation of the different resource use perceptions held
by the discursive elite and environmental interest groups. It is not sure, though,
whether it was a case of the World Bank acting because of concerns being raised by
these interest groups.
The issue of the construction of the Katse Dam played a central role in the complaints
by interest groups. The main issues for the HCSAG were the environmental and
social impacts of the project. The HCSAG is also providing counselling and advocacy
services for the local communities, particularly in relation to their compensation
claims. The group set up a monitoring and evaluation institution to have continued
liaison with the LHDA in all aspects concerning environmental degradation, gender
sensitivity, compensation and the resettlement process. It is also a priority of the
HCSAG to liaise with internal and external organisations to strengthen the work of the
HCSAG (Internet: Khits’ane, 1997). To liaise with other organisations explains the
solidarity between the HCSAG and other interest groups such as the International
Rivers Network (IRN) and Environmental Defence (ED) from the United States. The
HCSAG was in direct contact with the World Bank and the LHDA to try and offset
the negative effects of the project. In July 1996, this contact with the LHDA resulted
in a joint workshop between interest groups and the LHDA (Internet: Khits’ane,
1997).
In spite of the apparent closer affinity with the LHDA, interest groups maintained that
the LHDA’s policies are in violation of Article 7 Section 185 of the LHWP treaty,
5 The article reads as follows: “The Lesotho Highlands Development Authority shall effect all measures
to ensure that members of local communities in the Kingdom of Lesotho, who will be affected by
flooding, construction works, or other similar Project related causes, will be enabled to maintain a
standard of living not inferior to that obtaining at the time of first disturbance: Provided that such
11
which ensures the protection and compensation of the people’s lives and properties.
Nothing tangible on the side of the affected communities in the form of proper
compensation has come forward since the establishment of the LHDA (Internet:
Khits’ane, 1997), according to the HCSAG. Human rights as a issue therefore played
a pivotal role in the advocacy campaigns of the interest groups. The articulation of the
human rights issue gained strength after an incident at Butha Buthe.
On September 14 1996, police killed and injured striking workers at the village of
Butha Buthe. Interest groups in Lesotho, the Lesotho Council of Non-governmental
Organisations (LCN) in particular, came out strongly against the police confrontation
with the workers. The LCN released a press statement condemning the police of
improper conduct. The Lesotho interest groups contacted the IRN and the EDF,
petitioning them to add their voices to those of the Lesotho interest groups in calling
for justice in the matter. Together they called on the World Bank to use its good
offices to press the government of Lesotho and the LHDA to take proper measures
regarding the incident (Internet: IRN letter to the World Bank, September 26, 1996;
IRN press release of September 26, 1996). The event at Butha Buthe is an example of
the close scrutiny of interest groups regarding big dam projects, where every incident
is used in their campaigning against such a project (Meissner, 2000:25). Regarding
the solidarity of the different interest groups regarding the police action at Butha
Buthe, Berry (1977:254) notes “…that coalitions are extremely popular among public
interest lobbies. Coalitions, defined as explicit working relationships among groups
for the purpose of achieving a public policy goal, are not only popular, but are
seemingly easy to form as well”. Coalitions with other interest groups is seemingly
important because interest groups can overcome some of their inherent limitations.
All in all, coalitions are formed by interest groups to maximise the strength (Berry,
1977:255). These limitations can range from the size of the group to financial
resources at the disposal to interest groups.
What seems to be significant though, in terms of the hydrosocial contract theory, is
that the birth of a new social conscience does not only come to light unilaterally from
one actor, but sometimes from a set of participants in civil society.
The World Bank visited Lesotho in October 1996. The objective was to determine for
themselves what happened and a thorough study of the incident was conducted
(Internet: International Rivers Network, 1996a). The World Bank representative,
Stephan Klasen, did not only speak to officials of the government of Lesotho and the
LHDA, but also to the various interest groups that lodged the complaint with the
World Bank (Internet: International Rivers Network, 1996a). This can be an
indication of the impartiality of the World Bank. It does not seem as if the World
Bank suddenly withdrew funding from the project, but the Bank was clearly
concerned about the events that took place at Butha Buthe. The government of
Lesotho was asked to launch a credible, open and independent inquiry into the event
and to take appropriate action if such an inquiry found fault with actions of the police
or other entities. Although the interest groups asked for an international commission
Authority shall effect compensation for any loss to such member as a result of such Project related
causes, not adequately met by such measures (Article 7, section 18 of the Lesotho Highlands Water
Project Treaty, 1986:27).
12
of inquiry to be set up and criticised the government for its slow response, the World
Bank only recommended the government to launch an inquiry (Internet: International
Rivers Network, 1996a). After the incident at Butha Buthe, human rights started to
feature more prominently in the interest groups’ campaign against the LHWP and
their strategies took on a more direct approach.
For instance, before work started on the Mohale Dam in 1997, part of phase 1B,
villagers filed a lawsuit against the LHDA in the Lesotho High Court. The villagers’
argument for the suit is that the LHDA is violating national laws regarding the seizure
of land. The petition to the court stated that the village of Ha Nqheku had had its
fields, trees and water supply affected by the infrastructural aspects of the construction
of the project. This does not seem to be the real issue. The LHDA has not registered
the names of property owners in a “book of reference” as required by Lesotho law and
the project’s own legal documents. The claimants asked the court to “declare the
operations of the project a violation of our rights” and directed the LHDA to make the
books of reference available, or to stop construction if the project authorities refused.
They also questioned the legality of the project’s 1990 compensation regulations and
asked the court to “direct the authority to submit its accounts dealing with
compensation to be inspected by our representatives” (Internet: Pottinger, 1997). The
reason why litigationi was used in this instance is that it is an effective strategy. A
verdict can put an immediate halt to a given project (Hjelmar, 1996:69), while
personal contact and lobbying can take longer to bring about a change. The lawsuit by
the villagers and the construction of the Mohale Dam could be an example of the
synergy between the first and second transitions of the hydrosocial contract theory.
Using litigation in this regard can be seen as an attempt to influence the implementing
stage of the policy process (Whiteley and Winyard, 1987:107). However, one should
not take litigation at face value. There are many factors that influence the choice of
litigation by an interest group. One of the most important factors is whether or not a
group is structured to carry out litigation. Another seems to be the resources available
to such a group. Legal action is expensive, and most small interest groups do not have
the financial means to use litigation. Some interest groups do have in-house counsel,
which can be utilised for just such a purpose. Concerning the environmental side of
the LHWP, Berry (1977:229) notes that “…environmental questions have been
particularly vulnerable to litigation”.
At the end of 1998, a petition from the HCSAG was sent to the project authorities, the
World Bank and the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF). The petition
stated that the people living around Katse dam had not received fodder as
compensation for the loss of grazing land (Internet: IRN, Community petition
regarding compensation of communal lands, October 26, 1998). The issues suddenly
changed from “hard” to “soft” issues. In 1998 Lesotho interest groups suddenly
backed down from efforts to persuade the authorities to delay phase 1B, in part due to
political pressure (Internet: Pottinger, 1998), which intensified over the period from
1997-1998. It is not sure why pressure was put on the interest groups. Possible
explanations could be the internal political milieu of Lesotho and the importance of
the project to both Lesotho and South Africa. One thing is certain though, and that is
that the backing down of the interest groups in Lesotho was a forerunner for
something important to come.
13
In 1998 the interaction between interest groups and government institutions developed
from antagonism to a higher level of co-operation. A very important step towards co-
operation between interest groups and the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority
(LHDA) was the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in the same year.
The MOU came into effect after it was recognised that under the 1986 LHWP Treaty,
that South Africa and Lesotho are under legal obligations to safeguard the welfare of
the people and the communities affected by the LHWP. The IRN is not involved in
the MOU and only grassroots organisations in Lesotho participated in this watershed
event (Personal communication: Lori Pottinger, 7 April 2000). The MOU’s purpose
is to ensure through LHDA-interest group co-operation, the development and well
being of the affected people and communities. The following areas of co-operation
have been identified by the parties under the MOU:
Monitoring and evaluation activities.
Advocacy activities.
Community empowerment activities.
Service provision and delivery activities (Memorandum of Understanding,1999:4).
These are very broad activities which seem to encompass all the routes the interest
groups would like to take in their articulation of issues regarding the implementation
of the LHWP and the impact it has on affected communities.
One of the most important sections of the MOU are the principles of co-operation.
These principles, like any other principle in an agreement, have the task to guide the
parties’ co-operative endeavours as set out in the framework agreement. The
principles not only outlines the nature of the relationship between the LHDA and
interest groups but also the way interest groups will go about in their dealings with
affected communities. Section 6.1 and 6.2 are the principles outlining the nature of
the relationship:
6.1 Lesotho Highlands Development Authority and the cluster of NGOs commit
themselves to work in ways that ensure integrity, mutual respect, transparency,
accountability, efficiency, full disclosure and access to information in their
dealings with each other and affected communities.
6.2 The NGOs commit themselves to work in ways that ensure accountability to the
affected communities, integrity, effectiveness and accountability in their
implementation of specific programmes falling within the areas of co-operation
identified in section 5.0 of this MOU. The NGOs working on LHWP
programmes that are governed by this MOU shall be capacitated to perform the
services and carry out their obligations with due diligence, efficiency and
economy, in accordance with generally accepted techniques, practices,
professionalism and shall observe sound management and technical practices.
It seems as if momentum will not be lost after the signing of the MOU. In section 6.5
of the MOU the parties are asked upon to develop a code of conduct to govern the co-
operative relationship and which will apply to those activities carried out on behalf of
the affected communities (Memorandum of Understanding, 1999:5). It seems as if
this practice between governments, project authorities and special interest groups
could become the norm in future regarding large dam projects around the world. An
impediment that may hamper such a development in future could the willingness of
14
governments and project planners, desperate to implement water supply-sided
management projects, to exclude interest groups in such endeavours.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a critique of the MOU between the LHDA
and interest groups. It is, however, pertinent to note that the MOU is only between the
LHDA and the NGOs in Lesotho. Interest groups are excluded from the wording of
the document, although mention is made of advocacy in the MOU. Also, the scope of
the MOU falls only within Lesotho. No other interest group from outside Lesotho is
included. It would be useful to include the concept “interest groups” also, or to
change the wording of the document to something like “Memorandum of
Understanding between LHDA and non-state actors in the LHWP”. The wording of
the document is therefore ambiguous, and might lead to confusion in future regarding
the parties or actors involved. Also, it is not sure whether the MOU is a manifestation
of cooperation between the different parties or co-optation of the interest groups by
the LHDA. Still, the MOU seems to be the right idea for the time being and seems to
be a step in the right direction.
The signing of the MOU between the LHDA and interest groups regarding the LHWP
seems to be the third transition of the hydrosocial contract theory. This transition
seems to be a synergy of the mismatched resource use perceptions between interest
groups and the authorities implementing the project. This transition is, however, a
continuation of the agreement between humans, and still does not contain
environmental and animal rights. Mention of the ecology is made though within the
MOU. However, because environmental and human rights interest groups are directly
and/or indirectly involved in the project, the issues regarding the environment might
gain momentum and develop in the direction of an all inclusive environmental rights
ethic. This third transition is therefore from an informal hydrosocial contract,
containing elements of a new social conscience, to a formal agreement between
government and non-state actors articulating environmental and utilitarian obligations
and principles in water resource management.
Interest groups from South Africa
It is not only the interest groups in Lesotho that are expressing their dissatisfaction
towards the LHWP. A small number of South African interest groups also voiced
their concern towards the LHWP. The Alexandra Civic Organisation (ACO) in
conjunction with the South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO Soweto)
also showed their aversion. For instance, the ACO held a meeting with Minister
Kader Asmal in March 1998. At this meeting, according to the ACO, Asmal gave
them the Department’s commitment that the rest of the LHWP’s phases (phase two to
four) would not go ahead as planned (Internet: Southern African Environment Page
(SAEP), 1998).
At a meeting of the ACO Housing Workshop, held on 11 October 1998, the
participants agreed to continue the campaign to oppose the LHWP. This was after
they lodged a complaint with the World Bank in May 1998 that the Bank had violated
policies in pushing apartheid era plans to supply water to South Africa. They urged
the World Bank to delay phase 1B of the project. It should be noted that the issue at
stake is not the disruption of their livelihoods, as in the case of the people directly
15
affected by the LHWP, but the money spent on the Mohale Dam. This, the ACO
argues, would lead to water tariff increases in Gauteng and use up resources that could
be utilised to fix leaking pipes and taps, extend services to all residents and create
jobs. A combination of direct and indirect communication was used as methods to
exert influence in the lobbying campaign of the ACO, as was the case with interest
groups in Lesotho. It was agreed at the meeting that the ACO would respond to the
World Bank’s Inspection Panel (which found no connection between the project and
the poor state of water services in Gauteng) and build alliances with the other interest
groups that are opposed to the project (Internet: SAEP, 1998).
According to the ACO there is a link between the LHWP and the payments in arrears
of water services in the township. They are more concerned with the implementation
of water services than they are opposed to the LHWP. To make the LHWP the
scapegoat for their grievances, they focused the government’s attention on their plight,
because of the government’s commitment to the LHWP. Other interest groups that
also play a prominent role in the advocacy against the LHWP in South Africa include
the following: the Group for Environmental Monitoring (GEM), the Environmental
Monitoring Group (EMG) and Earthlife Africa (ELA). Interest groups from outside
Lesotho and South Africa also became involved in the LHWP, although at a later
stage than those in Lesotho.
Interest groups further afield
Interest groups from outside Lesotho and South Africa first became involved in the
LHWP in September 1994, after an article published in the International Rivers
Network’s journal, World Rivers Review criticised the apparent unsound engineering
work regarding the lining of the water transfer tunnels between Lesotho and South
Africa (Internet: Coleman, 1994:1-2). This is a clear-cut case where the engineer is
openly challenged as the dominant actor in the hydrosocial contract theory.
Foreign interest groups seem to be the most vociferous when it comes to campaigning
against the LHWP. Here two interest groups are particularly prominent: the
International Rivers Network (IRN), Environmental Defence (ED). The IRN
publishes most of their arguments against the LHWP in their mouthpiece the World
Rivers Review. Since 1995 the organisation, together with the ED, has published
numerous articles and briefs in this journal. In the December 1998 issue of the World
Rivers Review, the IRN and the ED focused on the slowness of the World Bank to
adapt to the world’s growing emphasis on sustainable water management. According
to the IRN and the ED, there is a prejudice by the World Bank towards big
infrastructure projects, which promotes unsustainable, inequitable water management,
which is a “perfect setting for future water wars”. They appealed to the World Bank
to reverse its approach to water management to one that would help avert rather than
worsen the world’s growing water crisis (Internet: Horta and Pottinger, 1998). It
seems as if the efforts by the interest groups are aimed at affecting the policies of
particular states and institutions created by the state (LHDA, TCTA, and the World
Bank). It is also important to note that interest groups also seek to create, revise, and
gain acceptance of global environmental norms and laws (Payne, 1995:171). This
seems to be the case with the interest groups from outside Lesotho and South Africa.
What this implies regarding the hydrosocial contract theory is that the birth of a social
16
conscience does not only occur within societies but within the international
community as well.
The first issue the IRN articulated, like the local interest groups, in their campaign
against the LHWP was the impact of the Katse dam on communities living in the area
around the reservoir. According to the IRN, the dam created social problems, which
were not given the required attention by the authorities. The issues raised by the IRN
were compensation, resettlement and the re-establishment of livelihoods (Internet:
Coverdale and Pottinger, 1996) of the people of the Lesotho Highlands. These would
be the issues raised during future contacts with the World Bank.
For instance, during a meeting on January 7 1997 between the IRN, ED and the World
Bank, the alliance gave their reasons for opposing the LHWP. Social and
compensation issues were raised at the meeting, although environmental issues also
started to surface. The IRN and ED were particularly concerned about the
improvement of living standards. The relocation of people from inundated reservoirs
was also raised. Human rights came to the fore at the meeting when the two
organisations raised the issue of police training, after the shooting incident at Butha
Buthe. The protection of endangered species and tourism development were also
discussed (Internet: Horta and Pottinger, 1997).
At the end of 1998 the IRN and ED took up the issue of compensation of communal
land after communities wrote to the World Bank and the LHDA requesting them to
deliver fodder for their cattle. The IRN and ED said in another letter to the World
Bank that a land-for-land compensation programme is the most effective way in
dealing with the issue of resettlement. Environmental concerns were again
articulated, especially the implementation of the environmental action plan and work
undertaken on the instream flow requirements study of the lower Orange River. The
issue of political and geopolitical effects of the LHWP was, for the first time, a subject
of the letter (Internet: IRN, Letter to World Bank from EDF and IRN, November 5,
1998). The reason for this was the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) led military intervention into Lesotho. This action made the interest groups
aware of the international political implications of the project. The interest groups
claimed. For instance, that the September 1998 SADC led intervention in Lesotho was
the first true “water war” in history (Meissner, 1999).
It seems as if the foreign interest groups echoed the sentiments of the groups in
Lesotho and South Africa. The compatibility of the articulation of issues regarding
the detrimental effects of the LHWP on the people and environment of the Lesotho
Highlands manifested in the form of a loose coalition between the interest groups in
the various countries. To elaborate further on the issue of coalition formation, Payne
(1995:173) states that “transnational policy success depends upon the ability of actors
outside the state to form or join winning coalitions within the target state, which
depends on the structure of the domestic political system”.
An interesting aspect of the articulation of issues regarding large dams across the
world, and the LHWP in particular, is the use of the World Commission on Dams
(WCD) as a forum. Various WCD hearings were held across the world concerning
the effects of large dams on communities and the environment. Interest groups in
17
South Africa used these hearings extensively by getting people from affected
communities to give testimonies at these hearings (Personal communication: Liane
Greeff, 3 October 2000). The use of the WCD as a forum is but one of the different
approaches at the disposal of interest groups to influence state policies, at the
international level (Mingst, 1995:237). It can therefore be said that interest groups do
not only use certain incidents, such as the one at Butha Buthe, to further their
influencing endeavours but also every forum at their disposal for the articulation of
issues. The birth of a social conscience is therefore manifested not only by a number
of actors, the articulation of a variety of issues, but also by the penetration of a great
deal of forums.
Interest groups have, therefore, used a number of strategies to promote their cause
against the LHWP. The writing of letters to the World Bank (which is funding 4% of
the LHWP) meetings with the previous Minister of the DWAF, Prof. Kader Asmal,
petitioning the World Bank and litigation, in one instance, were used. The interest
group most active in this respect is the International Rivers Network (IRN), with its
outright condemnation of the LHWP. This condemnation led to a “very strained
relationship” between the IRN and the TCTA (G. van der Merwe, personal
communication, 1999). The conflict between the interest groups on the one hand and
government institutions on the other seems to have an ideological edge to it. Jacobs
(1997:4) notes that the interpretations of sustainable development differ between
divergent actors: governments adopt a more conservative approach, “seeking to
balance economic and environmental goals”, while environmental organisations tend
to take a more radical line, “arguing for environmental limits and for the incorporation
of social and democratic objectives”. This is clearly illustrated in the case of the
LHWP. The South African and Lesotho governments are promoting the LHWP as an
environmental friendly project which will bring great benefit to both Lesotho and
South Africa. The interest groups are against the project because of the social
disruption of people’s life, the exclusion of organisations during the consultancy phase
of the project and the negative ecological impacts of the project (Meissner, 1999).
The degradation of the social fabric of society and the environment seem to be the
main issues to interest groups involved in the LHWP.
Conclusion
The first transition of the hydrosocial contract theory regarding the LHWP started
tentatively in 1956. It was only in 1986 that the transition came to fruition when the
LHWP agreement was signed with work on the project starting in 1987. It did not
take long for the second transition of the hydrosocial contract to kick in, in 1988.
This, after Lesotho interest groups, most notably the HCSAG and in some cases the
LCN started articulating issues regarding perceived negative effects on communities
living in and around the LHWP. Other interest groups from outside Lesotho also
started to get more involved in the articulation of issues against the LHWP.
Subsequent coalitions between foreign interest groups and those in South Africa and
Lesotho were established. These networks posed formidable challenges against the
dominant discursive elites in the hydrosocial contract theory. The dictum that there is
strength in numbers seem to be pertinent in this case. The challenge from the interest
groups can be discerned in the manner they articulated issues concerning the LHWP.
A wide variety of tactics and strategies had been used in recent years for raising the
18
perceived negative effects of the LHWP. These ranged from petitions and letters to
the World Bank to legal action and testimonies at the World Commission on Dams’
hearings. The manifestation of the second transition of the hydrosocial contract
theory, occur therefore within a wide range of issue areas, with the participation of a
number of actors, articulating concerns within a plethora of forums.
One interesting aspect regarding the interaction between interest groups in Lesotho
and the LHDA, is the signing of the memorandum of understanding in 1998. It seems
as if the signing of this agreement between two opposing parties, is not only
propelling the water politics of the LHWP into a direction of cooperation, but that it is
also the manifestation of the third transition of the hydrosocial contract theory. This
third transition seems to be manifested in the reconciliation of the anthropocentric
ethic and the environmental ethic. Also, the two opposing groups - the discursive elite
and interest groups - seem to have recognised each other as legitimate actors in water
politics. Therefore, it seems as if the LHWP has moved through three transitions of
the hydrosocial contract theory, in just under half a century.
Future Research Topics
How successful are interest groups in their campaigns against large water supply
projects such as large dams the world over?
Is there a place for memoranda of understanding between water utilities and/or
government and non-state actors in future supply-side water projects?
Do these MOU’s co-optation or cooperation between the different parties involved in
such a debate?
How will such MOUs influence future water politics?
Is there a third transition in the hydrosocial contract theory?
If so, how is it manifested in society regarding water resources management?
19
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