The Second Transition of the Hydrosocial Contract Theory: The Case of the

Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP)

By

Richard Meissner

Research Associate at the African Water Issues Research Unit (AWIRU) at the

University of Pretoria (UP)

Tel: (H) (+27 11) 955 5744

Tel: (W) (+27 11) 420 4486

Fax: (W) (+27 11) 420 3527

E-mail: meiss@mweb.co.za

Website: http://www.up.ac.za/academic/libarts/polsci/awiru

Paper prepared for a lecture at Oxford University and University of Middlesex,

Great Britain, October 2000

1

Introduction

The human species has the ability to overcome almost any restrictions nature can

impose on it. This is quite true when it comes to the construction of structures

regarding our basic security needs. We have the ability to build houses to augment the

need for a secure living space. We are able to produce and distribute food at an

astounding and ingenious rate to feed ourselves, at least in some parts of the world.

When it comes to making water available for various purposes, this ingenious capacity

is even more spectacular. Over millennia the human mind has led to the development

of infrastructural projects that gave rise to our ability to bring water into our homes,

industries and agricultural sector. For instance, the Ancient Egyptians formed their

civilisation along the Nile River, by developing their society using water and soil for

the purpose of agricultural development. Annually the Nile River delivered just the

right amount of nourishing silt from the yearly floods to compensate for nutrients

humans removed from the soil by agriculture. In other words the river system ensured

the sustainable production of food within the basin and especially in Egypt.

At the same time the river flushed the accumulated salts out of the soil and into the

Mediterranean (Ohlsson, 1995:4), which helped to sustain the Egyptian civilisation.

In fact, it is argued by Sabine and Thorson (1973:9) that agricultural development

originated in the Middle East at around 6 500 B.C. It was here that humans changed

their social activities from hunting and gathering to farming. Also, from here farming

techniques spread steadily until by 3 000 B.C. grain growing agricultural communities

could be found along the coast of North Africa, in Europe and India, and across the

plateau of Iran into Central Asia. “Agriculture became civilization only under

particularly favorable circumstances, growing on the flood plain of great rivers - the

first of which was apparently that of the Tigris-Euphrates. Civilization by definition

requires social activities above the level of reproduction and subsistence farming, so it

is easy to see that the greater fertility created by spring floods of a great river could

provide an agricultural surplus capable of supporting characteristically ‘civilized’

forms of human activity” (Sabine & Thorson, 1973:9). We can assume that

civilisation and the origination of political systems, on a much grander scale than that

of the family or clan, originated along river flood plains, which could provide water

and soil for the production of agricultural surpluses.

It also indicates that water resources were used on a grand scale, for thousands of

years, either by simply regulating natural processes or by the building of irrigation

systems and other infrastructural projects such as dams. It was during the

industrialisation period, a few hundred years ago that water manipulation on an even

greater scale, than before, gained new meaning and momentum. This mobilisation of

water also led to the lessening of the threat of water borne diseases, by the provision

of wholesome fresh water for drinking and sanitation purposes. The approach

developed by the human species in order to achieve all these wonderful aspects of life

on our planet has led to the implementation and construction of water supply projects

and institutions to make life easier than in previous times.

This explains the “why” question regarding our ability to transport and use water

resources. What remains now for the political scientist, geographer, engineer, and

development specialist is to explain “how” these water management processes came

2

about. One such theory that outlines our ability to use water resources on such a grand

scale is the hydrosocial contract theory developed by the seminal work of Turton and

Ohlson (1999). The hydrosocial contract theory is a step towards the direction in

answering the “how” question in water resource development. It explains the

processes humans implemented to deal with water scarcities in societies. The theory

needs further testing in order for us to understand its nature, and to determine whether

it adequately explains the relationship of users with their water resources and the

natural environment and other users. The purpose of this paper is to examine one

aspect of the hydrosocial contract theory, as outlined by Turton and Ohlson (1999) -

that of the second transition. It is the author’s intention to test the second transition by

means of a case study - the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), which is an

example of the first transition in the hydrosocial contract theory. The LHWP is

chosen as a case study, for there seems to be evidence that the LHWP is a

manifestation of the first transition to the second transition of the hydrosocial contract

theory. It is also possible that a third transition is manifested in the LHWP.

The paper will be divided into four parts. Firstly, the hydrosocial contract theory will

be outlined and explained. In this section the first transition and the second transition

will be identified, which will form the backbone of the paper. In the second part we

will take a closer look at interest groups as political actors in society. Thirdly, the

LHWP, and in particular interest groups’ role and involvement in the project, will be

sketched in order to analyse critically the hydrosocial contract theory’s second

transition. In this section of the paper a third transition of the hydrosocial contract

will come to light. The last part of the paper will be a conclusion with a dimension of

some future research topics on the hydrosocial contract theory.

The Hydrosocial Contract Theory

Before discussing the hydrosocial contract theory, it will be useful to consider theory

in general and why theories are important. According to Robert Cox, theories follow

reality in the sense that they are shaped by the world of experience. Theories also

precede the making of reality in that they orient the minds of those who, by their

actions, reproduce or change that reality. Theories matter, whether we like it or not

(in Williams, 2000:74). This means that theories can either be a description of reality

or they can become reality itself. Cox (1996:87) goes further, when he states that:

“Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective.

Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political

time and space (quoted in Williams, 2000:75). From this we can assert that the

hydrosocial contract theory is an explanation of how societies have developed the

water resources available. The hydrosocial contract theory therefore follows the

reality of the mobilisation of water resources for economic and other social purposes.

In this case Ziman (1984:28) notes that theories “appear as ordering principles that

explain general classes of observational and experimental facts”. Ziman (1984:28)

defines a theory as “covering a wide range of facts to a high degree of accuracy”. It is

therefore “the most compact and manageable form in which scientific information can

be recorded, manipulated, used, or understood. It is the vehicle by which a description

of natural phenomena is expressed as scientific knowledge”. This seems to be case

with the hydrosocial contract theory.

3

How does the hydrosocial contract theory express scientific knowledge? By outlining

the basic arguments of the hydrosocial contract theory, we will be able to note the

underlying assumptions and the manner in which the theory “follows reality”.

The hydrosocial contract theory was first developed and presented by Turton and

Ohlson (1999) at the 9th

Stockholm Water Symposium. It has been referred to, after

this, by Warner (2000a, 2000b), “in a manner that shows conceptual development”

(Turton & Meissner, 2000). It is therefore a very new theory in the discourse of water

politics, albeit an important one, in that it outlines the theoretical assumptions of water

resource development in societies, which is not clearly understood at this point in

time.

The hydrosocial contract postulates that transitions during the history of human’s use

of water took place at different phases in the past and present. The first transition

occurs when a society experiences that it moves from water abundance to water

scarcity. For purposes of clarification, water scarcity can be defined as the condition

that exists when the demographically-induced demand for water exceeds the

prevailing level of local supply, meaning that supply-sided augmentation becomes

necessary (Turton & Ohlson, 1999). The first transition refers to that moment in time

when the prevailing condition of water scarcity is encountered by a given social entity.

This is usually accompanied by a major event such as a drought or flood, but not

necessarily. It can also be the result of the convergence of events such as a period of

rapid population growth and unchecked industrialisation that is punctuated by a major

drought. The first transition can also be accompanied by increased levels of induced

scarcity caused by the pollution of existing sources of water as the result of

unregulated economic activities. The Hobesian form of hydrosocial contract is often

the result of this series of events. This form of the hydrosocial contract is the result of

the interaction of hydropolitical dynamics during the first transition that often results

in a bipolar configuration between government and the water-consuming public

(Turton & Meissner, 2000). The result of such a social contract is the alienation of

people from an intimate contact with water (Turton & Ohlsson, 1999:3) and also in a

sense from nature. This alienation is manifested in the idea that technocratic solutions

can solve all the technical problems confronted by the human species. However, this

alienation can convert itself into a perceived control of people through technology.

People react in different ways towards this alienation in that defence mechanisms can

be developed in order to deal with the alienation and technocratic control. For

instance, after reservoir seismic induced activity (RISA) occurred in the region of the

Katse reservoir, many people in the vicinity of the dam believed that a mythical

creature inhabited the waters of the reservoir. It is unfortunately outside the ambit of

this paper to further discuss this social phenomenon. What is interesting to note,

though, is that a negative sentiment towards such projects can develop over time.

Interest groups can then oppose the alienation of people from nature, and water

resources in particular, in a very profound manner.

Furthermore, the first transition is dominated by a first order scarcity, which is defined

as water becoming scarcer directly proportional to population growth over time. As

populations increase and economic activity becomes more concentrated, water gets

perceptually and physically scarcer and the individual gets alienated from direct

contact with the resource. In order to facilitate the mobilisation of water, humans

4

surrender the responsibility for marshalling more water to a centralised authority, in

much the same way as classic social contract theorists such as Hobbes, Locke and

Rousseau hypothesised (Turton & Ohlsson, 1999:3) about the establishment of

political societies.

This authority, or state, is given then the responsibility to oversee that water is readily

available to the citizens in order to conduct their water related activities in an

undisturbed manner. Also, people can then continue with activities, other than

collecting water for personal and/or household use, such as education in a way that

water related activities do not hinder their socio-economic development. In order for

the government to mobilise water in large quantities, it needs to set up an intricate and

interdependent infrastructure. This infrastructure usually takes the form of dams,

aqueducts, and water purification plants. Not only is a physical infrastructure created

and needed but also a bureaucratic system to manage this infrastructure. This comes

in the form of government departments, parastatal institutions and private water

utilities, that is given certain responsibilities and tasks, in accordance with the laws of

the state, to supply water to its users. It is at this point where humans intervene in the

hydrologic cycle on a grand scale but not altering it, and start moving water from

where it is in relative abundance to where it is needed.

These institutions and infrastructural projects can be called the “hydraulic mission”.

This “mission” is a very significant event in the understanding of the hydrosocial

contract theory. One can therefore conclude that the first transition from water

abundance to conditions of water scarcity, unleashes a number of critically important

dynamics in a hydropolitical sense. The most noteworthy of these is the establishment

of the “hydraulic mission” of the state, which has as its basic rationale to mobilise

more water for different socio-economic purposes. This mission is usually called the

supply-sided phase of water management. Engineers become the dominant discursive

elites with a clearly defined sanctioned discourse, with its foundation on the basic

paradigm of getting more water available, from greater distances, to satisfy the

miscellaneous socio-economic sectors of society. These engineers become very

important actors in the “hydraulic mission”, for it is on their shoulders that economic

development, growth and prosperity rest (Turton & Meissner, 2000). The engineer

therefore dominates the first transition from water abundance to water scarcity, with

government as the custodian and overseer of water resources. Engineers are tasked to

solve the problems of mobilising more water, and they do so with ingenuity and

passion.

In other words, the era of the engineer is born and the engineer is elevated to a certain

status in society - that of controller of nature and the provider of basic resources. In

fact, there is no end to their ability to mobilise more water. They first start the

“hydraulic mission” with simple dams, pipelines and water treatment plants, and their

skills develop in direct response to the levels of complexity that is encountered. In

this respect two aspects are important to the understanding of the hydrosocial contract:

With their basic grounding in Newtonian physics, no technical problem is

insoluble.

The philosophical base of the engineer is solidly cast on the desire to control nature

(Turton & Meissner, 2000).

5

Engineers can therefore move water from one place to another, provided that three

necessary pre-conditions are met.

There must be enough money available to finance these increasingly complex

projects.

There must be sufficient energy available with which to move the water (Turton &

Meissner, 2000).

Bureaucratic institutions are also needed to implement such a project, which entails

human resources.

The second transition, from water scarcity to water deficit, serves to trigger another set

of social responses, such as the birth of some form of social conscience. In this case,

water deficit can be defined as the prevailing condition that exists when the use of

freshwater within a given social entity exceeds the level of sustainable supply (Turton

& Ohlson, 1999), and various interest groups question the ecological and financial

costs of additional supply-sided augmentation schemes. This social conscience is

usually in the form of environmentalism, or a pro-environmental ethic, triggered by

the increasing costs of water delivery and ecological damage (Turton & Meissner,

2000) these water delivery systems could cause. At this point interest groups start to

mobilise support and begin to question government’s interpretation of the hydrosocial

contract. These interest groups perceive government’s water policies to be out of

touch with rapidly changing social norms and perceptions on water use and delivery

(Turton & Ohlsson, 1999:8). This new social conscience emerges in a part of civil

society and starts to act as a strong counter-force to government dominance over the

sanctioned discourse. In other words, a part of civil society begins to challenge the

prevailing sanctioned discourse, and starts to suggest that an alternative to large water

supply projects must be considered (Turton & Meissner, 2000) and also implemented.

This can be regarded as be the birth of the demand management phase of water

management, with its components, the issue of equity (Turton & Meissner, 2000) of

people and the respect for nature. What is also of importance regarding this phase of

the hydrosocial contract is the development of an environmental ethic. This aspect

needs some elaboration. The traditional social contract theory is quite exclusive of

non-human life (Olen & Barry, 1992:336) and nature is therefore not part of. This is

manifested strongly in the first phase of the hydrosocial contract theory.

According to the social contract theory’s interpretation of morality, morality is a

product of an informal agreement between the members (humans) of a society.

Everyone agrees to follow certain rules and to obey specific obligations on the

condition that others do the same. The purpose of the agreement is to ensure that all

of us act in a dependable manner, providing the mutual trust necessary for social

cooperation. An important aspect of the social contract theory is that this informal

agreement is the source of all moral obligations, at least among humans. We have

moral obligations to others who have entered into the agreement with us. However,

we have no such obligations to those who are not part of the agreement. Non-human

life, that are incapable of entering into contracts, are not part of the agreement. The

environment is therefore not part of it, and also non-human species. Therefore, we

have no moral obligation towards non-human life (Olen & Barry, 1992:336) and

nature.

6

There is therefore an evolution of the hydrosocial contract. Traditionally, the original

social contract did enforce a morality only onto humans, for it was humans that

produced an informal agreement among the members of society. Animal rights and

ecological considerations are not part of the contract and we have no moral obligation

towards them. Interest groups in the hydrosocial contract theory challenge this view

regarding non-human life and nature, and argue that we not only have a moral

obligation towards those humans that are affected by large dams, but also towards

nature and non-human species. This challenge is encapsulated in the resource use

perception concerning water and the environment. Water resource use perception is

the perceived utilisation of a resource within a distinctive mindset. The water

resource use perception of environmental interest groups differs widely from that of

government and water managers. It is because of differing water resource use

perceptions that the government, and sometimes, other institutions like consulting

engineers, and interest groups do not see eye-to-eye on large scale supply-side

management projects such as large dams. To illustrate the point the ecologist or

environmentalist could argue that nature is not only a supplier of water but it is also a

user of that water. Water should therefore be used accordingly, to secure the supply of

water from nature and at the same time that nature is not jeopardised as a user of water

resources in the future. For if an imbalance is created, it can concoct a vicious circle,

which can ultimately lead to the collapse of habitats and ecosystems on which life is

so dependent. This can, in the end, cause a drop in the water per capita available to a

country or region and can contribute to water deficits and even severe water shortages,

which can influence the economic development of a country or region. According to

environmentalists, the resource use perception is therefore a manifestation of the

anthropocentric1 ethic vs. the respect for nature ethic. These two divergent ethical

principles stand opposite each other, with the engineer taken the anthropocentric road

and the environmentalist the respect for nature side.

It is to this second transition that we now turn. The second transition will be tested

against the backdrop of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP). A short

historical overview of the LHWP will be provided in order to find out where the

second transition started. An in-depth look at the interests articulated by the interest

groups involved will give an indication of the kind of issues these interest groups are

promoting. Before going over to the manifestation of the second transition of the

hydrosocial contract theory, a few remarks on interest groups and their role in society.

Interest Groups in Society

Interest groups, like political parties, form one of the major links between government

and the governed in today’s society (Heywood, 1997:252), and they are distinguishing

features of democratic regimes (Sadie, 1998:280). Interest groups have but one

purpose in a political society and that is to influence the political decision-making

process (Ball, 1988:96) while remaining apart from it (Duverger, 1972:101). In other

words, interest groups are part of society, but they are apart from the decision making

process. They do not form part of government, except in cases where institutional

1 Anthropocentrism holds that humans are a central fact of the universe, and therefore stands above all

else.

7

interest groups exist within government departments, and influencing public policy.

There is therefore a difference between an interest group and a political party. A

political party’s main purpose is to promote its cause by the nomination of candidates

for election. These political organisations are therefore particularly important in

interest aggregation2. By nominating candidates, who stand for a set of policies,

political parties try to build support for these candidates (Almond, Powell & Mundt,

1993:108) and in that way interest aggregation occur through these candidates if and

when they are elected to the government structures. A difference between interest

groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also exist. An NGO can loosely

be defined as a service orientated non-profit organisation. They perform functions

that fall traditionally within government’s domain. An example of such an

organisation would be the Salvation Army, which looks after the poor and destitute.

Within water politics a typical example of an NGO would be the Global Water

Partnership (GWP) or the World Commission on Dams (WCD). An interest group’s

main function is therefore to influence government policy. In water politics, interest

groups influence government policies regarding water resources management on a

wide array of issues. It should be noted that interest groups have no public power, but

they do have public and private resources entrusted to them (Holloway, 1998:93) that

can have a bearing on their influencing endeavours and issue articulation. The

difference between an interest group, NGO and political party boils down to the

functions these organisations fulfil in society.

Interest groups have a wide array of tactics and strategies at their disposal to influence

government policies. Different groups have different characteristics that produce a

variety of strategies of influence (Whiteley & Winyard, 1987:85). According to Sadie

(1998:284), “no group confines itself to a single strategy or tries to exert influence

through just one channel”. Two types of influencing techniques can be discerned:

direct personal communication with decisionmakers and indirect contact via the media

as well as public opinion. “Strategies of direct communication include deputations to

politicians and the personal presentation of research results and testimonies at

legislative hearings. These techniques are found to be the most effective” (Sadie,

1998:284). Litigation can also fall under this type of contact and can be just as

effective (Hjelmar, 1996:69) in some respects. Some interest groups have in-house

legal departments with employed lawyers at their disposal for just this purpose. Less

effective methods of impersonal communication are letters, telegrams and public

relations campaigns. Tactics that fall under indirect communication include petitions,

protests, strikes and demonstrations to civil obedience (Sadie, 1998:285). These

tactics are very popular with interest groups. The recent demonstrations in Prague

against the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) and in Seattle against

the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in October 2000 are very good examples.

Although they are less effective than direct personal communication, tactics such as

mass demonstrations can have a bearing on the purpose of issue articulation. The

Prague and Seattle demonstrations were broadcast around the world and the awareness

level of people was raised regarding the issues concerning the global economy.

Another interesting example in water politics regarding the tactics of interest groups is

the demonstration of a few individuals at the World Water Forum (WWF) in The

2 The term aggregation refers to the conversion of political demands into alternative courses of action,

usually by political parties (McLean, 1996:5).

8

Hague in March 2000. These individuals presented themselves in the nude at the

opening ceremony of the WWF to protest against dams being build in Spain and

across the world. It is not sure though, whether they were promoting the interest of

dam affected communities or nudism. Be as it may the awareness level of dam

affected communities in Spain and elsewhere were most certainly articulated by these

individuals. This raises the question of the issues that are articulated by interest

groups in society and particularly in water politics and the debate regarding large

dams.

Human rights, the promotion of democratic accountability, gender, health, agricultural

development, social welfare and the environment are some of the issues that receive

attention from interest groups. Within water politics these are some of the issues

articulated by these organisations.

Two types of interest groups can be identified in the politics of the LHWP: those that

operate within the national status quo (Shepherd, 1996:424) and those that operate

across international borders. The latter are characterised by organised activities

occurring simultaneously in a number of countries; objectives that do not relate to the

interests within any given territory; (Holsti, 1995:61) and components that are

essentially political. In other words, interest groups operating across state borders can

have the same characteristics as transnational corporations (TNCs), although they are

different actors on the national and international stage.

The Hydrosocial Contract, the Second Transition and the LHWP

This section will focus on the involvement of interest groups in the LHWP, and in

particularly who they and their targets are, the issues concerned and the strategies they

employ. Firstly, a brief history of the LHWP will be sketched in order to outline the

first transition of the hydrosocial contract theory regarding the project.

The LHWP was first mooted in the late 1950’s when it was envisaged as a plan to

supply water from the head waters of the Orange (Senqu) River in Lesotho to the

Orange Free State goldfields near Welkom in South Africa. Ninham Shand, a

consulting engineer, did a reconnaissance study of the Lesotho Highlands in 1956, and

published his plan of a water scheme in that part of Lesotho in a report that came out

the same year. As South Africa’s needs for more water started to increase it was

realised that South Africa’s economic nucleus, concentrated in the Witwatersrand,

would be in dire need of water in the 1990’s and the early part of the 21st century. The

original focus of the LHWP shifted from the supply of water to the goldfields to that

of delivering water to the Witwatersrand area. The project was implemented in 1986

after much diplomatic fervour and political tension between Lesotho and South Africa

was resolved with a coup d’etat in Lesotho in the same year (Meissner, 2000:24). The

first transition of the hydrosocial contract theory, regarding the LHWP inter-basin

transfer (IBT) scheme, therefore occurred in 1986. However, prior to the

implementation of the LHWP, water was moved from a variety of other sources into

the Vaal Dam (Turton & Meissner, 2000) on the Vaal River for example the Thukela

River. The LHWP forms therefore only part of the hydrosocial contract theory in

South Africa.

9

Most of the augmentation of the Vaal River comes in the form of IBTs where water

from another river system is harnessed and stored in a dam. This water is then

transferred through a watershed and discharged into an adjacent basin where it is

allowed to flow according to gravity (Turton & Meissner, 2000). The LHWP is but

one of a number of IBTs connecting the Vaal River system with other river basins

inside and outside of South Africa’s borders. The hydrosocial contract theory is

therefore a very dynamic social aspect in water politics. The first transition can occur

over a certain period of time depending on the situation a society finds itself in

regarding water scarcity. As water in a region becomes scarcer more and larger IBTs

are needed to augment the shortfall of water resources. This augmentation is likely to

continue in the Vaal River basin as plans for further IBTs are in the pipeline. These

are the Thukela Water Project (TWP), additional transfers from the Orange River,

either in the form of Phase 2 of the LHWP, or via a canal on South African soil, and

transfers from the Mzimvubu River via either the Thukela or Orange Rivers, to the

Vaal River (Turton & Meissner, 2000). The first transition has therefore not come to

an end in the Orange River basin, of which the Vaal River is a tributary. Because of

these elaborate transfer schemes and the subsequent impact of these projects on people

and the environment, interest groups can “come to the party” and articulate issues that

are in conflict with that of the engineer planning and constructing these projects. The

second transition of the hydrosocial contract theory is therefore borne when these

interest groups get involved against a project. In the next section we shall take a

closer look at some of the issues articulated and strategies used by interest groups

regarding the LHWP in recent years.

Interest Groups and the LHWP

Various interest groups from communal interest groups3, such as villagers in the area

where the LHWP is implemented, to non-associational interest groups4 in South

Africa and abroad have been involved in the LHWP in recent years. The reason for

their involvement stems from the perceived detrimental affects on the environment

and the people living in and around the areas of large dam projects. In the past, the

focus of interest groups’ lobbying activities was mostly directed at the World Bank

that provided partial funding to the LHWP. The governments of Lesotho and South

Africa and the project authorities, most notably the Lesotho Highlands Development

Authority (LHDA) and the Trans Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA) have also been

targets of advocacy campaigns. The World Bank seems to be the main target because

of its high profile in the financing or partial financing of large infrastructural projects,

like the LHWP, the world over (Internet: Horta and Pottinger, 1998). This is not to

suggest that the World Bank is the interest groups’ only target.

3 According to Heywood “The chief characteristic of communal interest groups is that they are

embedded in the social fabric, in the sense that membership is based on birth, rather than recruitment.

Examples of such groups are families, tribes, castes and ethnic groups. ..Communal interest groups are

founded on the basis of a shared heritage and traditional bonds of loyalties”. 4 Non-associational interest groups rarely are well organised, and their activities are episodic. They are

based on common interests of ethnicity, region, religion, occupation, or perhaps kinship (Almond,

Powell & Mundt, 1993:90). They differ from communal interest groups in that the members of non-

associational interest groups do not, necessarily know each other intimately, such as the village or

family group.

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The LHWP first came to the attention of interest groups in Lesotho in 1988. This was

after a workshop was organised by the Transformation Resource Centre (TRC) at the

request of church leaders in Lesotho, who work closely with the communities in the

Lesotho Highlands. A part of the workshop focused on the LHWP. The participants

at the workshop were concerned with some of the escalating environmental, socio-

political and economic problems likely to impact on the communities living in the

Highlands who were directly affected by the LHWP. At the workshop it was decided

by the participants that one interest group should be established. This organisation

was called the Highland Church Solidarity Action Group (HCSAG) (Internet:

Khits’ane, 1997:1). It seems as if those who are in constant contact with the affected

communities are very aware of the risks such projects pose to the environment and

people living in and around the site of the LHWP, and decided to act against such

risks.

At the opening ceremony of the Katse Dam, South Africa’s former Minister of Water

Affairs and Forestry, Kader Asmal, gave phase 1A of the LHWP a “clean bill of

health”, in spite of calls from interest groups that the project was fraught with

difficulties. He also lashed out against interest groups opposing the project, calling

them “green terrorists” and saying that they were ignoring the positive effects of the

LHWP. The World Bank said, however that there was a need for phase 1A to “be

cleaned up” and that the Bank would not go ahead with financing further phases of the

project until the existing problems had been resolved (Internet: Coleman, 1995). This

can be an example of the manifestation of the different resource use perceptions held

by the discursive elite and environmental interest groups. It is not sure, though,

whether it was a case of the World Bank acting because of concerns being raised by

these interest groups.

The issue of the construction of the Katse Dam played a central role in the complaints

by interest groups. The main issues for the HCSAG were the environmental and

social impacts of the project. The HCSAG is also providing counselling and advocacy

services for the local communities, particularly in relation to their compensation

claims. The group set up a monitoring and evaluation institution to have continued

liaison with the LHDA in all aspects concerning environmental degradation, gender

sensitivity, compensation and the resettlement process. It is also a priority of the

HCSAG to liaise with internal and external organisations to strengthen the work of the

HCSAG (Internet: Khits’ane, 1997). To liaise with other organisations explains the

solidarity between the HCSAG and other interest groups such as the International

Rivers Network (IRN) and Environmental Defence (ED) from the United States. The

HCSAG was in direct contact with the World Bank and the LHDA to try and offset

the negative effects of the project. In July 1996, this contact with the LHDA resulted

in a joint workshop between interest groups and the LHDA (Internet: Khits’ane,

1997).

In spite of the apparent closer affinity with the LHDA, interest groups maintained that

the LHDA’s policies are in violation of Article 7 Section 185 of the LHWP treaty,

5 The article reads as follows: “The Lesotho Highlands Development Authority shall effect all measures

to ensure that members of local communities in the Kingdom of Lesotho, who will be affected by

flooding, construction works, or other similar Project related causes, will be enabled to maintain a

standard of living not inferior to that obtaining at the time of first disturbance: Provided that such

11

which ensures the protection and compensation of the people’s lives and properties.

Nothing tangible on the side of the affected communities in the form of proper

compensation has come forward since the establishment of the LHDA (Internet:

Khits’ane, 1997), according to the HCSAG. Human rights as a issue therefore played

a pivotal role in the advocacy campaigns of the interest groups. The articulation of the

human rights issue gained strength after an incident at Butha Buthe.

On September 14 1996, police killed and injured striking workers at the village of

Butha Buthe. Interest groups in Lesotho, the Lesotho Council of Non-governmental

Organisations (LCN) in particular, came out strongly against the police confrontation

with the workers. The LCN released a press statement condemning the police of

improper conduct. The Lesotho interest groups contacted the IRN and the EDF,

petitioning them to add their voices to those of the Lesotho interest groups in calling

for justice in the matter. Together they called on the World Bank to use its good

offices to press the government of Lesotho and the LHDA to take proper measures

regarding the incident (Internet: IRN letter to the World Bank, September 26, 1996;

IRN press release of September 26, 1996). The event at Butha Buthe is an example of

the close scrutiny of interest groups regarding big dam projects, where every incident

is used in their campaigning against such a project (Meissner, 2000:25). Regarding

the solidarity of the different interest groups regarding the police action at Butha

Buthe, Berry (1977:254) notes “…that coalitions are extremely popular among public

interest lobbies. Coalitions, defined as explicit working relationships among groups

for the purpose of achieving a public policy goal, are not only popular, but are

seemingly easy to form as well”. Coalitions with other interest groups is seemingly

important because interest groups can overcome some of their inherent limitations.

All in all, coalitions are formed by interest groups to maximise the strength (Berry,

1977:255). These limitations can range from the size of the group to financial

resources at the disposal to interest groups.

What seems to be significant though, in terms of the hydrosocial contract theory, is

that the birth of a new social conscience does not only come to light unilaterally from

one actor, but sometimes from a set of participants in civil society.

The World Bank visited Lesotho in October 1996. The objective was to determine for

themselves what happened and a thorough study of the incident was conducted

(Internet: International Rivers Network, 1996a). The World Bank representative,

Stephan Klasen, did not only speak to officials of the government of Lesotho and the

LHDA, but also to the various interest groups that lodged the complaint with the

World Bank (Internet: International Rivers Network, 1996a). This can be an

indication of the impartiality of the World Bank. It does not seem as if the World

Bank suddenly withdrew funding from the project, but the Bank was clearly

concerned about the events that took place at Butha Buthe. The government of

Lesotho was asked to launch a credible, open and independent inquiry into the event

and to take appropriate action if such an inquiry found fault with actions of the police

or other entities. Although the interest groups asked for an international commission

Authority shall effect compensation for any loss to such member as a result of such Project related

causes, not adequately met by such measures (Article 7, section 18 of the Lesotho Highlands Water

Project Treaty, 1986:27).

12

of inquiry to be set up and criticised the government for its slow response, the World

Bank only recommended the government to launch an inquiry (Internet: International

Rivers Network, 1996a). After the incident at Butha Buthe, human rights started to

feature more prominently in the interest groups’ campaign against the LHWP and

their strategies took on a more direct approach.

For instance, before work started on the Mohale Dam in 1997, part of phase 1B,

villagers filed a lawsuit against the LHDA in the Lesotho High Court. The villagers’

argument for the suit is that the LHDA is violating national laws regarding the seizure

of land. The petition to the court stated that the village of Ha Nqheku had had its

fields, trees and water supply affected by the infrastructural aspects of the construction

of the project. This does not seem to be the real issue. The LHDA has not registered

the names of property owners in a “book of reference” as required by Lesotho law and

the project’s own legal documents. The claimants asked the court to “declare the

operations of the project a violation of our rights” and directed the LHDA to make the

books of reference available, or to stop construction if the project authorities refused.

They also questioned the legality of the project’s 1990 compensation regulations and

asked the court to “direct the authority to submit its accounts dealing with

compensation to be inspected by our representatives” (Internet: Pottinger, 1997). The

reason why litigationi was used in this instance is that it is an effective strategy. A

verdict can put an immediate halt to a given project (Hjelmar, 1996:69), while

personal contact and lobbying can take longer to bring about a change. The lawsuit by

the villagers and the construction of the Mohale Dam could be an example of the

synergy between the first and second transitions of the hydrosocial contract theory.

Using litigation in this regard can be seen as an attempt to influence the implementing

stage of the policy process (Whiteley and Winyard, 1987:107). However, one should

not take litigation at face value. There are many factors that influence the choice of

litigation by an interest group. One of the most important factors is whether or not a

group is structured to carry out litigation. Another seems to be the resources available

to such a group. Legal action is expensive, and most small interest groups do not have

the financial means to use litigation. Some interest groups do have in-house counsel,

which can be utilised for just such a purpose. Concerning the environmental side of

the LHWP, Berry (1977:229) notes that “…environmental questions have been

particularly vulnerable to litigation”.

At the end of 1998, a petition from the HCSAG was sent to the project authorities, the

World Bank and the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF). The petition

stated that the people living around Katse dam had not received fodder as

compensation for the loss of grazing land (Internet: IRN, Community petition

regarding compensation of communal lands, October 26, 1998). The issues suddenly

changed from “hard” to “soft” issues. In 1998 Lesotho interest groups suddenly

backed down from efforts to persuade the authorities to delay phase 1B, in part due to

political pressure (Internet: Pottinger, 1998), which intensified over the period from

1997-1998. It is not sure why pressure was put on the interest groups. Possible

explanations could be the internal political milieu of Lesotho and the importance of

the project to both Lesotho and South Africa. One thing is certain though, and that is

that the backing down of the interest groups in Lesotho was a forerunner for

something important to come.

13

In 1998 the interaction between interest groups and government institutions developed

from antagonism to a higher level of co-operation. A very important step towards co-

operation between interest groups and the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority

(LHDA) was the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in the same year.

The MOU came into effect after it was recognised that under the 1986 LHWP Treaty,

that South Africa and Lesotho are under legal obligations to safeguard the welfare of

the people and the communities affected by the LHWP. The IRN is not involved in

the MOU and only grassroots organisations in Lesotho participated in this watershed

event (Personal communication: Lori Pottinger, 7 April 2000). The MOU’s purpose

is to ensure through LHDA-interest group co-operation, the development and well

being of the affected people and communities. The following areas of co-operation

have been identified by the parties under the MOU:

Monitoring and evaluation activities.

Advocacy activities.

Community empowerment activities.

Service provision and delivery activities (Memorandum of Understanding,1999:4).

These are very broad activities which seem to encompass all the routes the interest

groups would like to take in their articulation of issues regarding the implementation

of the LHWP and the impact it has on affected communities.

One of the most important sections of the MOU are the principles of co-operation.

These principles, like any other principle in an agreement, have the task to guide the

parties’ co-operative endeavours as set out in the framework agreement. The

principles not only outlines the nature of the relationship between the LHDA and

interest groups but also the way interest groups will go about in their dealings with

affected communities. Section 6.1 and 6.2 are the principles outlining the nature of

the relationship:

6.1 Lesotho Highlands Development Authority and the cluster of NGOs commit

themselves to work in ways that ensure integrity, mutual respect, transparency,

accountability, efficiency, full disclosure and access to information in their

dealings with each other and affected communities.

6.2 The NGOs commit themselves to work in ways that ensure accountability to the

affected communities, integrity, effectiveness and accountability in their

implementation of specific programmes falling within the areas of co-operation

identified in section 5.0 of this MOU. The NGOs working on LHWP

programmes that are governed by this MOU shall be capacitated to perform the

services and carry out their obligations with due diligence, efficiency and

economy, in accordance with generally accepted techniques, practices,

professionalism and shall observe sound management and technical practices.

It seems as if momentum will not be lost after the signing of the MOU. In section 6.5

of the MOU the parties are asked upon to develop a code of conduct to govern the co-

operative relationship and which will apply to those activities carried out on behalf of

the affected communities (Memorandum of Understanding, 1999:5). It seems as if

this practice between governments, project authorities and special interest groups

could become the norm in future regarding large dam projects around the world. An

impediment that may hamper such a development in future could the willingness of

14

governments and project planners, desperate to implement water supply-sided

management projects, to exclude interest groups in such endeavours.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a critique of the MOU between the LHDA

and interest groups. It is, however, pertinent to note that the MOU is only between the

LHDA and the NGOs in Lesotho. Interest groups are excluded from the wording of

the document, although mention is made of advocacy in the MOU. Also, the scope of

the MOU falls only within Lesotho. No other interest group from outside Lesotho is

included. It would be useful to include the concept “interest groups” also, or to

change the wording of the document to something like “Memorandum of

Understanding between LHDA and non-state actors in the LHWP”. The wording of

the document is therefore ambiguous, and might lead to confusion in future regarding

the parties or actors involved. Also, it is not sure whether the MOU is a manifestation

of cooperation between the different parties or co-optation of the interest groups by

the LHDA. Still, the MOU seems to be the right idea for the time being and seems to

be a step in the right direction.

The signing of the MOU between the LHDA and interest groups regarding the LHWP

seems to be the third transition of the hydrosocial contract theory. This transition

seems to be a synergy of the mismatched resource use perceptions between interest

groups and the authorities implementing the project. This transition is, however, a

continuation of the agreement between humans, and still does not contain

environmental and animal rights. Mention of the ecology is made though within the

MOU. However, because environmental and human rights interest groups are directly

and/or indirectly involved in the project, the issues regarding the environment might

gain momentum and develop in the direction of an all inclusive environmental rights

ethic. This third transition is therefore from an informal hydrosocial contract,

containing elements of a new social conscience, to a formal agreement between

government and non-state actors articulating environmental and utilitarian obligations

and principles in water resource management.

Interest groups from South Africa

It is not only the interest groups in Lesotho that are expressing their dissatisfaction

towards the LHWP. A small number of South African interest groups also voiced

their concern towards the LHWP. The Alexandra Civic Organisation (ACO) in

conjunction with the South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO Soweto)

also showed their aversion. For instance, the ACO held a meeting with Minister

Kader Asmal in March 1998. At this meeting, according to the ACO, Asmal gave

them the Department’s commitment that the rest of the LHWP’s phases (phase two to

four) would not go ahead as planned (Internet: Southern African Environment Page

(SAEP), 1998).

At a meeting of the ACO Housing Workshop, held on 11 October 1998, the

participants agreed to continue the campaign to oppose the LHWP. This was after

they lodged a complaint with the World Bank in May 1998 that the Bank had violated

policies in pushing apartheid era plans to supply water to South Africa. They urged

the World Bank to delay phase 1B of the project. It should be noted that the issue at

stake is not the disruption of their livelihoods, as in the case of the people directly

15

affected by the LHWP, but the money spent on the Mohale Dam. This, the ACO

argues, would lead to water tariff increases in Gauteng and use up resources that could

be utilised to fix leaking pipes and taps, extend services to all residents and create

jobs. A combination of direct and indirect communication was used as methods to

exert influence in the lobbying campaign of the ACO, as was the case with interest

groups in Lesotho. It was agreed at the meeting that the ACO would respond to the

World Bank’s Inspection Panel (which found no connection between the project and

the poor state of water services in Gauteng) and build alliances with the other interest

groups that are opposed to the project (Internet: SAEP, 1998).

According to the ACO there is a link between the LHWP and the payments in arrears

of water services in the township. They are more concerned with the implementation

of water services than they are opposed to the LHWP. To make the LHWP the

scapegoat for their grievances, they focused the government’s attention on their plight,

because of the government’s commitment to the LHWP. Other interest groups that

also play a prominent role in the advocacy against the LHWP in South Africa include

the following: the Group for Environmental Monitoring (GEM), the Environmental

Monitoring Group (EMG) and Earthlife Africa (ELA). Interest groups from outside

Lesotho and South Africa also became involved in the LHWP, although at a later

stage than those in Lesotho.

Interest groups further afield

Interest groups from outside Lesotho and South Africa first became involved in the

LHWP in September 1994, after an article published in the International Rivers

Network’s journal, World Rivers Review criticised the apparent unsound engineering

work regarding the lining of the water transfer tunnels between Lesotho and South

Africa (Internet: Coleman, 1994:1-2). This is a clear-cut case where the engineer is

openly challenged as the dominant actor in the hydrosocial contract theory.

Foreign interest groups seem to be the most vociferous when it comes to campaigning

against the LHWP. Here two interest groups are particularly prominent: the

International Rivers Network (IRN), Environmental Defence (ED). The IRN

publishes most of their arguments against the LHWP in their mouthpiece the World

Rivers Review. Since 1995 the organisation, together with the ED, has published

numerous articles and briefs in this journal. In the December 1998 issue of the World

Rivers Review, the IRN and the ED focused on the slowness of the World Bank to

adapt to the world’s growing emphasis on sustainable water management. According

to the IRN and the ED, there is a prejudice by the World Bank towards big

infrastructure projects, which promotes unsustainable, inequitable water management,

which is a “perfect setting for future water wars”. They appealed to the World Bank

to reverse its approach to water management to one that would help avert rather than

worsen the world’s growing water crisis (Internet: Horta and Pottinger, 1998). It

seems as if the efforts by the interest groups are aimed at affecting the policies of

particular states and institutions created by the state (LHDA, TCTA, and the World

Bank). It is also important to note that interest groups also seek to create, revise, and

gain acceptance of global environmental norms and laws (Payne, 1995:171). This

seems to be the case with the interest groups from outside Lesotho and South Africa.

What this implies regarding the hydrosocial contract theory is that the birth of a social

16

conscience does not only occur within societies but within the international

community as well.

The first issue the IRN articulated, like the local interest groups, in their campaign

against the LHWP was the impact of the Katse dam on communities living in the area

around the reservoir. According to the IRN, the dam created social problems, which

were not given the required attention by the authorities. The issues raised by the IRN

were compensation, resettlement and the re-establishment of livelihoods (Internet:

Coverdale and Pottinger, 1996) of the people of the Lesotho Highlands. These would

be the issues raised during future contacts with the World Bank.

For instance, during a meeting on January 7 1997 between the IRN, ED and the World

Bank, the alliance gave their reasons for opposing the LHWP. Social and

compensation issues were raised at the meeting, although environmental issues also

started to surface. The IRN and ED were particularly concerned about the

improvement of living standards. The relocation of people from inundated reservoirs

was also raised. Human rights came to the fore at the meeting when the two

organisations raised the issue of police training, after the shooting incident at Butha

Buthe. The protection of endangered species and tourism development were also

discussed (Internet: Horta and Pottinger, 1997).

At the end of 1998 the IRN and ED took up the issue of compensation of communal

land after communities wrote to the World Bank and the LHDA requesting them to

deliver fodder for their cattle. The IRN and ED said in another letter to the World

Bank that a land-for-land compensation programme is the most effective way in

dealing with the issue of resettlement. Environmental concerns were again

articulated, especially the implementation of the environmental action plan and work

undertaken on the instream flow requirements study of the lower Orange River. The

issue of political and geopolitical effects of the LHWP was, for the first time, a subject

of the letter (Internet: IRN, Letter to World Bank from EDF and IRN, November 5,

1998). The reason for this was the Southern African Development Community

(SADC) led military intervention into Lesotho. This action made the interest groups

aware of the international political implications of the project. The interest groups

claimed. For instance, that the September 1998 SADC led intervention in Lesotho was

the first true “water war” in history (Meissner, 1999).

It seems as if the foreign interest groups echoed the sentiments of the groups in

Lesotho and South Africa. The compatibility of the articulation of issues regarding

the detrimental effects of the LHWP on the people and environment of the Lesotho

Highlands manifested in the form of a loose coalition between the interest groups in

the various countries. To elaborate further on the issue of coalition formation, Payne

(1995:173) states that “transnational policy success depends upon the ability of actors

outside the state to form or join winning coalitions within the target state, which

depends on the structure of the domestic political system”.

An interesting aspect of the articulation of issues regarding large dams across the

world, and the LHWP in particular, is the use of the World Commission on Dams

(WCD) as a forum. Various WCD hearings were held across the world concerning

the effects of large dams on communities and the environment. Interest groups in

17

South Africa used these hearings extensively by getting people from affected

communities to give testimonies at these hearings (Personal communication: Liane

Greeff, 3 October 2000). The use of the WCD as a forum is but one of the different

approaches at the disposal of interest groups to influence state policies, at the

international level (Mingst, 1995:237). It can therefore be said that interest groups do

not only use certain incidents, such as the one at Butha Buthe, to further their

influencing endeavours but also every forum at their disposal for the articulation of

issues. The birth of a social conscience is therefore manifested not only by a number

of actors, the articulation of a variety of issues, but also by the penetration of a great

deal of forums.

Interest groups have, therefore, used a number of strategies to promote their cause

against the LHWP. The writing of letters to the World Bank (which is funding 4% of

the LHWP) meetings with the previous Minister of the DWAF, Prof. Kader Asmal,

petitioning the World Bank and litigation, in one instance, were used. The interest

group most active in this respect is the International Rivers Network (IRN), with its

outright condemnation of the LHWP. This condemnation led to a “very strained

relationship” between the IRN and the TCTA (G. van der Merwe, personal

communication, 1999). The conflict between the interest groups on the one hand and

government institutions on the other seems to have an ideological edge to it. Jacobs

(1997:4) notes that the interpretations of sustainable development differ between

divergent actors: governments adopt a more conservative approach, “seeking to

balance economic and environmental goals”, while environmental organisations tend

to take a more radical line, “arguing for environmental limits and for the incorporation

of social and democratic objectives”. This is clearly illustrated in the case of the

LHWP. The South African and Lesotho governments are promoting the LHWP as an

environmental friendly project which will bring great benefit to both Lesotho and

South Africa. The interest groups are against the project because of the social

disruption of people’s life, the exclusion of organisations during the consultancy phase

of the project and the negative ecological impacts of the project (Meissner, 1999).

The degradation of the social fabric of society and the environment seem to be the

main issues to interest groups involved in the LHWP.

Conclusion

The first transition of the hydrosocial contract theory regarding the LHWP started

tentatively in 1956. It was only in 1986 that the transition came to fruition when the

LHWP agreement was signed with work on the project starting in 1987. It did not

take long for the second transition of the hydrosocial contract to kick in, in 1988.

This, after Lesotho interest groups, most notably the HCSAG and in some cases the

LCN started articulating issues regarding perceived negative effects on communities

living in and around the LHWP. Other interest groups from outside Lesotho also

started to get more involved in the articulation of issues against the LHWP.

Subsequent coalitions between foreign interest groups and those in South Africa and

Lesotho were established. These networks posed formidable challenges against the

dominant discursive elites in the hydrosocial contract theory. The dictum that there is

strength in numbers seem to be pertinent in this case. The challenge from the interest

groups can be discerned in the manner they articulated issues concerning the LHWP.

A wide variety of tactics and strategies had been used in recent years for raising the

18

perceived negative effects of the LHWP. These ranged from petitions and letters to

the World Bank to legal action and testimonies at the World Commission on Dams’

hearings. The manifestation of the second transition of the hydrosocial contract

theory, occur therefore within a wide range of issue areas, with the participation of a

number of actors, articulating concerns within a plethora of forums.

One interesting aspect regarding the interaction between interest groups in Lesotho

and the LHDA, is the signing of the memorandum of understanding in 1998. It seems

as if the signing of this agreement between two opposing parties, is not only

propelling the water politics of the LHWP into a direction of cooperation, but that it is

also the manifestation of the third transition of the hydrosocial contract theory. This

third transition seems to be manifested in the reconciliation of the anthropocentric

ethic and the environmental ethic. Also, the two opposing groups - the discursive elite

and interest groups - seem to have recognised each other as legitimate actors in water

politics. Therefore, it seems as if the LHWP has moved through three transitions of

the hydrosocial contract theory, in just under half a century.

Future Research Topics

How successful are interest groups in their campaigns against large water supply

projects such as large dams the world over?

Is there a place for memoranda of understanding between water utilities and/or

government and non-state actors in future supply-side water projects?

Do these MOU’s co-optation or cooperation between the different parties involved in

such a debate?

How will such MOUs influence future water politics?

Is there a third transition in the hydrosocial contract theory?

If so, how is it manifested in society regarding water resources management?

19

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