an analysis of Bangalore's hydrosocial regimes - speculative ...

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1 Water crisis through the analytic of urban transformation: an analysis of Bangalore’s hydrosocial regimes By Michael Goldman and Devika Narayan Abstract: This paper explores intensified water crisis in Bangalore (or Bengaluru) in India by using the analytic of three hydrosocial regimes: the catchment-based regime, the hydraulic regime and the speculative urban regime. It uses a wide range of qualitative interviews, scientific reports and secondary sources to analyze shifting urban trajectories, agrarian relations and their interlinkages with water. Historical ruptures (in the realm of governance, urban growth and changing urban–rural dynamics) allow one to highlight the complex role of speculative logics that shape urban expansion and water scarcity. KEYWORDS Water crisis; speculative urbanism; political ecology; global cities; Bangalore Citation: Goldman, Michael, and Narayan, Devika. 2019. “Water Crisis through the Analytic of Urban Transformation: An Analysis of Bangalore’s Hydrosocial Regimes.” Water International 44 (2): 95–114. Introduction Water shortage has plagued Bangalore (or Bengaluru) in India for many decades, but it is only recently that government officials, journalists, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and citizens have adopted the language of crisis. In 2017, news headlines reflected this anxiety: Dry fact: Bengaluru is paying the price for killing its water bodies. (News Laundry, 2017) Bengaluru water crisis: Karnataka faces severe scarcity, 160 of 176 taluks (or sub- districts) declared drought-hit. (Financial Express, 2017) City of burning lakes: experts fear Bangalore will be uninhabitable by 2025. (The Guardian, 2017) Water Crisis: Is Bengaluru headed for Day Zero? (Times of India, 2018) In early 2018, reportage on the water problem again surged with a BBC (2018) report naming Bangalore as the second most likely city in the world (behind Cape Town) to run out of drinking water in the near future. The year 2018 saw the city’s largest lake catch fire multiple times due to the abundant toxins and debris that

Transcript of an analysis of Bangalore's hydrosocial regimes - speculative ...

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Watercrisisthroughtheanalyticofurbantransformation:ananalysisofBangalore’shydrosocialregimes ByMichaelGoldmanandDevikaNarayan

Abstract:ThispaperexploresintensifiedwatercrisisinBangalore(orBengaluru)inIndiabyusingtheanalyticofthreehydrosocialregimes:thecatchment-basedregime,thehydraulicregimeandthespeculativeurbanregime.Itusesawiderangeofqualitativeinterviews,scientificreportsandsecondarysourcestoanalyzeshiftingurbantrajectories,agrarianrelationsandtheirinterlinkageswithwater.Historicalruptures(intherealmofgovernance,urbangrowthandchangingurban–ruraldynamics)allowonetohighlightthecomplexroleofspeculativelogicsthatshapeurbanexpansionandwaterscarcity. KEYWORDS

Watercrisis;speculativeurbanism;politicalecology;globalcities;Bangalore

Citation:

Goldman, Michael, and Narayan, Devika. 2019. “Water Crisis through the Analytic of Urban Transformation: An Analysis of Bangalore’s Hydrosocial Regimes.” Water International 44 (2): 95–114.

Introduction

WatershortagehasplaguedBangalore(orBengaluru)inIndiaformanydecades,butitisonlyrecentlythatgovernmentofficials,journalists,non-governmentalorganizations(NGOs)andcitizenshaveadoptedthelanguageofcrisis.In2017,newsheadlinesreflectedthisanxiety:

Dryfact:Bengaluruispayingthepriceforkillingitswaterbodies.(NewsLaundry,2017)

Bengaluruwatercrisis:Karnatakafacesseverescarcity,160of176taluks(orsub-districts)declareddrought-hit.(FinancialExpress,2017)

Cityofburninglakes:expertsfearBangalorewillbeuninhabitableby2025.(TheGuardian,2017)

WaterCrisis:IsBengaluruheadedforDayZero?(TimesofIndia,2018)

Inearly2018,reportageonthewaterproblemagainsurgedwithaBBC(2018)reportnamingBangaloreasthesecondmostlikelycityintheworld(behindCapeTown)torunoutofdrinkingwaterinthenearfuture.Theyear2018sawthecity’slargestlakecatchfiremultipletimesduetotheabundanttoxinsanddebristhat

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weredumpedinit.Thepreviousyear,thelakehadbeeninthenewsforspewinglargequantitiesoftoxicfoamontothestreets(Upadhya,2017).Meanwhile,hydrologists,historiansandgeo-graphersarealsobeginningtoportraythewatersituationinIndia’scitiesasacrisis(Leleetal.,2013;Mehta,Goswami,Kemp-Benedict,Muddu,&Malghan,2013;Ranganathan,2010).TheshiftinthediscoursecharacterizingBangalore’swatersitua-tion,fromwatershortagetocrisis,offersanopportunityforacademicreflection(Prakashi,2017;Raj,2013a,2013b;Ramachandra&Aithal,2016a).

Inthispaper,wearguethatthemainfeaturesofBangalore’surbantransformation–growingfromamid-sizedtownintothe‘SiliconValleyofAsia’withpromisesofglobal-cityinfrastructureandexpansion–arerootedindistinctpracticesofurbanizationthatarecoupledwithshiftsinhydrosocialterritorialuse.ThisnotionofhydrosocialterritoriescomesfromBoelens,Hoogesteger,Swyngedouw,Vos,andWester(2016)whouseittocapturetherelationaldimensionscentraltothemakingandunmakingofwaterscarcitiesandcrisis.Theirconceptualthemesofthecentralityof‘territorialization’andthe‘politicsofscalarterritorialreconfigurations’notonlyunderlinethesignificanceofinteractionsamongsocialusesoflandandwaterbutalsoleadustoconsiderrelationalandscalardimensions.WebuildontheirworkbyconceptualizingBangalore’sinteractionswithitshydrologicalresourcesintermsofhydrosocialregimes,orrelativelystableperiodswheresourcesanddistributionsofwaterandtheirspatialandsocialfeaturesdevelopandyetbecomelimitedduetocontinualurbanexpansionfuelledbydifferentenginesofgrowth.Here,wetakeasourstartingpointpoliticalecology’sfoundationalargumentthatnaturalandsocialprocessesareco-constitutive,alwaysinfluencedbythecontextsofpoliticaleconomiesandecologiesinwhichtheyaresituated.

WeexamineBangalore’swaterinfrastructurethroughthelensofitsthreehydro-socialregimes:thecatchment-basedregime,thehydraulicregimeandthespeculativeurbanregime.Likerecentscholarshipofthepoliticalecologyofwater(Swyngedouw,2009;Bakker,2010;Budds,Linton,&McDonnell,2014),wecallfora‘repoliticization’ofwatersuchthatweaccountfortherelativeandunevendistributionofwaterscarcityandabundance.Weaddtotheirapproachesbymakingvisiblenewsociopoliticalpressuresonanalreadyfragile,crisis-orientedhydrosocialterrain,showinghowthesepressuresresultfromgrowth-basedandthenspeculativedynamics.Forexample,wedemonstratethegrowingimportanceoffinancecapitalinitsextractivecapacity,firstthroughdebtfinancingofthestate’swaterinfrastructure,andthenitsfundingofeconomicallyandecologicallyunviable,speculativeprojectsthroughitsonerous-debtfinancingofdevelopersandcityagencies.Here,wediscusstheprevalentspeculativeurbantendencytobankonrurallandvaluescontinuingtoincreaseandpeople’sinvestmentstorise,whichislinkedtotheimaginarythattheintensewaterwoesinboththecityandthe

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countrysidewillresolvethemselveswithoutdisruptionstothemodelofspeculativeurbangrowthandgovernance.

Bydelineatingthesetrendsas‘regimes’ratherthanstraightforwardchronologies,wewanttounderscorethepointthatitisnotpossibletoseparatecolonial,state-capitalandneoliberalerasofwateruseneatlysincethesehydrosocialdynamicsarenestedandoverlapping.Instead,weprefertostresskeyruptures,eventsandconjunc-turesinwhichthepolitical–ecologicallandscapechangesdramatically(Sheppardetal.,2015).OurapproachdemonstrateshowBangalore’shistoryofwaterstrugglesandcrisis,whenembeddedinanunderstandingofshiftingurban–ruralrelationsandscalarpowerdynamicsacross(local–national–global)governanceandeconomicstructures,canrevealthecentralimportanceofhydrosocialterritory-makingandthewaysitsintegritycanbeundermined(Hommes,Boelens,Harris,&Veldwisch,2019).

Theanalysisthatfollowsisbasedonacombinationofprimaryandsecondarydatasources.Forthefirsttworegimesweidentify,thedatacomeprimarilyfromhistoricaldocumentsandreports,complementedbyinterviewsbytheauthorsofthoseworksandotherexpertswhoareknowledgeableaboutBangalore’swaterhistory.Ourcharacteriza-tionofthethirdregimeisbasedonourextensiveresearchontheremakingofBangaloreasa‘globalcity’.Partofthisresearchhasinvolvedconductinginterviews(duringtheperiod2007–16)withindividualsworkingwithinthemunicipalwaterutility,BangaloreWaterSupplyandSewerageBoard(BWSSB),andwithitshiredconsultants(e.g.,LarsenandTubro,PricewaterhouseCoopers),andcurrentandretiredadministrators.Wehavealsointerviewedfarmers,landbrokers,realestatedevelopers,waterexperts,waterbrokers,seniorgovernmentofficials,ecologyresearchersandlow-levelbureaucratsaboutthemesrelatedtowaterinBangaloreaspartofalargerresearchprojectonthemakingofBangaloreintoaglobalcity,andusethoseinterviewstoinformthisanalysis.Althoughourlargerprojectonspeculativeurbanismstudiesthetransformationofthecityasawhole,muchofthedatawepresentherefocusontheareainthenorthernpartofBangalore,aroundthenewinternationalairportandinformationtechnology(IT)andbiotechindustrialzones.Thelasttwodatasourcesincludepublishedandunpublishedstudiesandreportsonthecurrentwatercrisis,andaseriesofpubliceventsonwaterinBangaloreinwhichweparticipated,includingtwoweco-organizedin2014and2016.Interviewswithpeoplewhoconductedactionresearchandsurveysonwateruseandagricultureintheearly1990shavegivenuniqueaccesstoahistoricaltimelinethathasbeencorroboratedbyscholarsoftheregion’secologicalhistory.

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Thecatchment-basedregime(I)

Makingthecitypossible

Thefirsthydrosocialregimeischaracterizedbyanintricatenetworkofpeople-madewells,lakesandtankslinkedbychannelsandcontouredembankmentsthatwereconstructedbylocalresidents,rulersandeventuallythecolonialgovernment(Mathur&DaCunha,2006).Webrieflydiscussitsevolutionandexplorethedestructionanddeclineofthiselaborate,decentralizedsystem.

The‘catchment-basedhydrosocialregime’hasitsoriginsintheeraoftheruleoftheMaharajaofMysore,expandedintheBritisheraofurbandevelopmentandcontinuedwithpost-Independencepublicworksprojects.Intheir2018report,Mundoli,ManjunathaandNagendraexplainthehistoryofthecityofBangaloreasrootedintheconstructionofwaterinfrastructure,datingbackto1537AD,whenKempeGowdaIinitiatedtheconstructionofSampangi,KaranjiandAgraharalakessurroundingwhatisstillthecentreoftheoldcity(Mundoli,Manjunatha,&Nagendra,2018).AsitisaplateauregionwithnoperennialriverandintherainshadowoftheDeccanPlateau,900metresabovesealevel,peopleconstructedBangalore’swaterinfrastructurebyusingtheundulatinglandscape,creatingawetlandsenvironmentofnumerouswater-holdingfacilities–calledkere,lakes,irrigationtanks,reservoirsorponds–someaslargeas1.7squaremiles.

Ramachandra,themostprominentscholaronthetopic,callsthebuilt-upecosystema‘wetlandstreasure’ofmaintainedforests,tocreatewhatwasonceadmiredasIndia’s ‘gardencity’(Ramachandraetal.,2016c).WhentheBritishEastIndiaCompanyandlatertheBritishCrowntookoverthecity,startingin1799,themilitarysettledinitscantonmentandconstructedaseriesofchannel-linked,gravity-drivenwatertanks(e.g.,Miller,Shoolay,SankeyandUlsoortanks)tosupplyamplewater,atleastforthecantonmentanditssurroundings.In1896,amajorreservoirwasbuiltacrosstheonce-thrivingArkavathiRivernorth-westofthecity:Hessarghattalake.Itswaterwasfilterednaturallyasitmovedthroughtheruralchannelstothecentreofthecity.Atthetime,Bangalorehadabout180,000peopleandthissystempromisedtodeliverapproximately10gallonsperpersonperday;butuseintheBritish-occupiedcantonmentwashigherandthereforenewprojectswererequired,aswellasstrictrationingfortheIndianpopulation.

Accordingtoourinterviewsandhistoricalaccounts,theareassurroundingthecitybeforethe1970swererichlyfertilewithplantedforests,pastures(knowninthelocallanguageofKannadaasgomalas),andwaterinfrastructurethatweresupported,main-tainedandprotectedthroughoverlappingpolitical,cultural,material,andreligiousrulesandnorms,locallyenforced.Someforests(gundu

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thopes)wereprotectedshrines;somewatertankswerereligiousartefacts;andtypicalvillagewater-usepracticesallowedforfoodcropstobeirrigatedfromthelakesonlywhentherainswereinsufficient,thusmaintainingtherechargecapacitiesofthewatertanksandlakesbuiltintheirarea(Mundolietal.,2018;Mundoli,Manjunatha,&Nagendra,2016).Plantedcropswerecommonlylow-waterconsumers.

Inthevillageswestudiedtothenorthofthecity(incorporatedaspartoftheexpanded‘globalcity’asof2007),villagersrepeatedlystressedtheirdependenceon,andthevitalityof,thenetworkedlakes,awatershednecessarytogeneratewaterforruralandurbanneeds.Today,theyargue,thewatershedandcatchmenthavebeendamaged,andmanyofthelakesandchannelsbuiltoverwithnewurbanandindustrialstructures.Forexample,intheeightvillagesdisplacedbytheconstructionoftheairport,completedin2008,residentswhowerestillinplaceandthoseresettledstatedhowtheyoncesharedtheuseandmaintenanceoftheirlocallake,Bettakote(interviewsin2015,2016and2017).Manyofthelakeshadbeenlinkedbychannelsacrosstheregion,andwateroverflowfilledlakesonalowergradient,andwaterthatflowedoverlakebanksallowedforanextracropseedingforlocalfarmers.

H.S.Sudhira,ascientistwhohasmappedtheregion’soldandnewwaterinfra-structures,suggeststhatthesystemwasdenseandintricate(Figure1).Sudhirahasusedmappingtechnologiestofindoldwaterchannelsburiedbeneathexistingbuildings,includinggovernmentones.Inourinterviewswithhim,heexplainedthatitwasnotmonsoonrainsalonethatallowedforhumansettlementacrosstheregion;rather,largewatertankswerecarefullycraftedtostorewaterandwereavital‘commons’thatreliedoncommunitymanagement.Thevastundulatingterrainaroundthecity,whencon-touredbylabourers,functionedasawatercatchmentsystemwithwaterflowscascadingfromonewaterbodytoanother,andcontainedwaterpercolatingdown,replenishingtheaquifersbelow(Mathur&DaCunha,2006).

Sudhirastressesthedamagingconsequencesofdestroyingthissystem:

Oncewestartedtoconcretize(i.e.,pourconcreteover)thecountryside(and)turnourbacksonthecatchmentsystem,inallitscomplexandfragilecomponents,inashorttimewebegantodestroythecarryingcapacityofthecity.(interview,June2018)

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Figure1.Mapoftheearly20thcenturydensenetworkoftanksandcanals.Courtesy:Sudhira(2018).

Bybuildingoveranderodingthecatchmentsystem:

thefarmingcommunitiessufferedthemost.Butitaffectsusall.[...]Justlookatthemaps(showingusaseriesoftime-lapsedmaps),andyoucanknowwhywhenitrainsinthecitynow,itfloodsinstantly.Thereisnoplacefortheraintogo.Wehavecompletelyforgottenhowthiscitywasbuilt.(interview,June2018)

Inasurveyofdatafromthepastfourdecades,leadingecologistsfoundthatthebuilt-up(andconcretized)areaofBangaloreincreasedby584%andthevegetationcorrespond-inglydeclinedby66%(Ramachandra,Aithal,&Sanna,2012).AttheIndianInstituteforScience,RamachandraandhisteamconductedresearchonBangalore’swater

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Figure2.MapofthemajorCauverywatersupplysystem.Courtesy:Sudhira(2018).

bodies,withinthecityboundaries,from1973to2015,andfoundthat80%ofthe105waterbodieshavebeenencroachedupon,convertedfromlaketodrybedtourbanrealestate,with‘lakecatchments[...]usedasdumpingyardsforeithermunicipalwasteorbuildingdebris’(Ramachandra&Aithal,2016b).Whilemanyhavedisappearedandconvertedintoprimerealestate,theremainingchannels,orrajakaluves,areextremelypolluted,transportingtoxicsludgefromnorthtosouththroughthecity.

AresidentlivingalongsideVarthurLaketothesouthofthecitystartedanNGOtoprotectthelake,oneoftheregion’slargest,fromitsslowdeath.HedemonstratedhowthewaterthatranfromnorthtosouththroughBangaloredrainsintothesecondlargestlakeintheregion(at440acreswithacatchmentareaof230km2),VarthurLake,onthecity’soutskirts,aswellastotheregion’slargestlakelinkedtoit,Bellandur(theregion’slargestat9000acres).Heexplained:

Only25yearsback,wewouldbathe,fish,anddrinkfromthelake.ThewastewaterthatflowedfromthecenterofthecitywouldtakemorethantwodaystowinditswayintoVarthurlake;inthattime,itwouldbefilteredalongtheway,anaturalprocess,throughthe

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city’sandvillagechannelsystemrunningnorthtosouth,withoutanymajordisturbancetothequalityofthelake.(interview,July2018)

Varthurhasbecomethedumpsiteforanestimated40%oftheurbansewagewaterfromthecity,andsince2015,ithascaughtfireandfrothedoverwithindustrialcontaminantsandsewagewasterepeatedly.EcologistsbasedattheATREEResearchCentrefoundthattheonlywaterthatdoesflowoutofthecitythroughtheonce-robustwaterinfrastructuresouthwardiswastewater,muchtothedismayoffarmersdependentonthiswatertoirrigatetheirfields(Thomas,Lele,Srinivasan,&Jamwal,2017).Asweshowbelow,thewater-usehabitsdevelopedaroundthecatchmentsystemsweregraduallyreplacedwiththeintroductionofthepiped-inCauverywatersystem,andtheunregulatedtechnologyofborewells,bothofwhichchangedthedynamicsofwateraccessandgenerationforthecity.

Thehydraulicregime(II)

Expandingthecity

ThesecondhydrosocialregimeisdefinedbypublicinfrastructureconstitutedofpipedwaterimportedfromtheCauveryRiverapproximately100kmfromBangalore.Herewelookatthehistory,contestationsanddisparitiesassociatedwiththissystemofwaterdistribution.Thenewwatersystemrepresentedamajorshiftinthewaywaterwasgovernedanddistributed,closelytiedtoanewmodelofurbangrowthdrivenbytheexpansionofpublicsectorindustriesandbasedonexpensiveandburdensomeloansfrominternationalfinanceinstitutionssuchastheWorldBank.Thenewcentralizedgovernancestructurechangedthelogicofwaterdistributionandinfrastructureman-agementandcreatedhighlyunevensocialandecologicalconsequences.

Intheperiodbetweenthe1940sandthe1960s,post-independenceBangaloreemergedasahubofgovernment-fundedindustriesin,amongotherfields,radar,aeronautics,telephoneandelectronics,establishingBangaloreasIndia’s‘ScienceCity’.Thisnewphaseofurbanexpansionputpressureontheexistingwaterinfrastructuresuchthat‘bythe1960s,apublicdebatewasragingaroundtheneedforalternativewateroptions’asBangalore’swaterdemandssurpassedwhattheregion’swaterbodiescouldprovide(Ranganathan,2010,p.43).Duringthisperiod,thelocalsystemofnetworkedtanksandwells,andthetwomajorreservoirs(HesaraghattaandTippagondanahalli)withtheirArkavathiriverbase,werereplacedbyasecondwaterinfrastructure,whichdefinesthishydraulicregime.

Atthetime,therewasmuchdiscussionaboutthesubstantialcostofpumpingwateruphilltoBangalore’splateau.Themainobstacleforthegovernmentwasfinancing.TheWorldBanksteppedinandofferedasolutionthathadadramaticeffectonthe

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regionalecology,thecity’spossibilitiesofexpansionandalsotheregion’sgovernancestructure.In1964,theWorldBankagreedtolendlargeamountsofcapitaloveraseriesofloansontheconditionthattheStateofKarnatakaempoweran‘independent’parastatalagencytooverseethiswaterinfrastructure.Themunicipalwaterutility,BangaloreWaterSupplyandSewerageBoard(BWSSB),wouldbecomeaccountableonlytotheinternationalfinanceinstitutionsthatissuedtheloansandtothestate’schiefminister(Heitzman,2004).TheWorldBanksawthisasthemostpropitiouswaytocreateapowerfulstateagencythatstoodapartfromlocalpoliticsandtheso-calledback-wardnessandprovincialitythatitblamedforIndia’sstalledprogress.Infact,theWorldBankhadcreatedoneofthemostpowerfulcity-buildingagencieswithlittleaccount-abilitytothepublic(Ranganathan,Kamath,&Baindur,2009).

IntheCauveryWaterSupplyProject,waterbecameahighlyextractive,centralizedandfinanciallyindebtedenterprise.Itwasruledbytwoforces:aparastatalagency(BWSSB)detachedfrompublicparticipationandoversight,beholdentotheinterna-tionalfinanceinstitutionsandtheobligationsofaloancontract;andthechiefministeroftheStateofKarnataka,apoliticalactorwhosepartyelectionsareoftendependentonpromisesofcheapresourcestothevotingpublicandconstructioncontractstoselectelites.Underthiscentralized-extractiveregimeofgovernance,waterbecameanassetusedtogeneraterevenuestohelppaybackaloan,anditsperceivedscarcityconjuredadependencyuponnewroundsoflendingbytheinternationalbanks,andnewpoliticalpromisesbythestate’spoliticalleaders.

Consequently,theBWSSBbecamethemostindebtedandyetoneofthemostpowerfulparastatalagenciesinBangalore,owingmorethanUS$35billiontointerna-tionalfinanceagenciesin2017alone,andyetakeyagencydecidingwhichofthenewresidentialandindustrialdevelopmentswouldgetthecrucialassetofwater,animpor-tantinputforvaluecreationforinvestors.ReportsrevealthatthenewloansnegotiatedinJanuary2018withtheJapanesegovernmentforafifthstageofthisprojectarevaluedatanadditionalUS$1billionwithundisclosedinterestratesandloancosts(ExpressNewsService,2018;Rath,2017).Overthedecades,theBWSSBhasbecomeincreasinglyfocusedonwaystomanageitsfinancialdebtandtoattaincostrecoveryfromwaterfeesratherthanproduceanequitableandsustainablecitywaterdistributionsystem.

LeoSaldanha,thedirectorofoneofthemostprominentenvironmentalorganizationsinBangalore,theEnvironmentalSupportGroup(ESG),andaseasonedresearchersincethe1980s,tellsthestoryoftheCauverywatersystembyforegroundingthepoliticsofdistributionandallocation,suggestingthatpowerrelationswereembeddedintheveryanatomyofthiswaterinfrastructure.First,itprioritizedthecityofBangaloreovertherestofKarnataka,andwithinthecity,the

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BWSSBprioritizedtheupper-andmiddle-classneighbourhoods.Thisreflectedaregionalpoliticalshifttotheneedsofthemetropolitanregion,andonlycertainsegmentsofit,attheexpenseofthecountrysidewherethebulkofKarnataka’spopulationlives.Heexplains:

[Withthe]favoring[of]metropolitanareas[...]farmerstendedtobethelosers.Farmersin2008actuallytriedtoblockwatertoBangalore.Itwasahugeprotest.Therewere(similar)riotsinthe90s.TheStateaggregateswaterasaresourceandyoucanseethedisparitiesinthedynamicsofwatersharing.TodaylessthanonehalfofBangalore’swaterdemandsaremetbytheCauvery.Alotofthewaterisallocatedtomiddle-andupper-classareas,whichmeanshalfofthecity’spopulationistappinggroundwatertosurvive,yetgroundwaterlevelshavefallensosharplythatmanycan’tliveoffit.Inoneneighborhood,afteralotofgovernmentpetitioning(andnoresults),(residents)useddynamitetoblowaholeandputinanetworkofpipestodivertthewater.(interview,July2016)

Todaythecityhasapopulationofover10millionandthepublicwaterutility,theBWSSB,pumpsaround1500MLD(millionlitresofwaterperday)fromtheCauveryRiver(Rajashekhar,2015).Itisdistributedunevenlyacrossthecityandcomesnowhereclosetomeetingthecurrentwaterdemand.Byoneestimate,ifaveragedacrossthepopulation,thecity’sresidentswouldhaveaccessto75litrespercapitaperday(LPCD),whichfallsshortofthe150–200LPCDregardedasaninternationalstandardforametropolitancitysuchasBangalore(Raj,2013a,2013b).Butofcourse,thewaterisnotevenlydistributed,withKarnatakaofficialspromisinganddeliveringdedicatedpipelinesexclusivelytoindustrialestatesincludingthenewairportandtheITcorridor.Aswell,thecityboundarieshavesorapidlyexpandedthattheirwaterinfrastructurehasnotbeenabletokeepupwiththesprawlingperiphery,despiteperiodicalaugmentationinwaterfromtheriver.Thespatialunevennessresultsinmiddle-classandelitehouse-holdsinthecentralareasreceivingthemajorityofthelimitedwaterconnections,whilepoorercommunitiesandnewlyincorporatedex-ruralcommunitiesrelyonsharedhandpumpsorprivatewatermarkets(Merchant,MohanKumar,Ravindra,Vyas,&Manohar,2014;Ranganathanetal.,2009).In2007,themunicipalboundariesofthecitywereredrawnsuchthattheBWSSB’sresponsibilitiesgrewby333%toincludeeightmoremunicipalitiesand110villages,withoutscalingupfundsandcapacity,leadingtoadesperatelackofinstitutionalinfrastructure(Zaerpoor,2012).Between2011and2013,theBWSSBincreaseditswithdrawalfromtheCauveryfrom900to1400MLD.However,duringthissameperiod,itsadministrativeboundariesexcludedmostofthenewerperipheralneighbourhoodsofthecity,yetaddedElectronicCitytotheeastandtheairportcomplexwithitsresidentialcomplexesandAerospacespecialeconomiczone(SEZ)tothenorth.

AsenioradministrativeofficeroverseeingamajorportfoliofortheKarnatakagovernment,onewhopubliclyclaimsheisnotcorrupt(purportedlyinstallinga

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closed-circuittelevision(CCTV)camerainhisoffice),spokeofthisspecialtreatment:

Wemeeteverydaytalkingaboutthecrisisofwater,atthehighestlevels.Butalltheactivityaroundwaterishappeningbelowus,andwedonothingtostopit.Forexample,someareasgetdedicatedpipelinesdirectlyfromtheCauvery,whilemanypartsofthecityandruralgowithout.(interview,June2015)

ThisofficialwasreferringtothededicatedCauverypipelinetotheairportandtheexclusivelinetotheITcorridor.ThelargestdevelopersaremakingdemandsthattheytooneedadedicatedpipelinetotheCauverysysteminordertoensureviabilityfortheirfuturelarge-scaleresidentialprojects.Hefurtherexpandedonthepoliticsofwaterallocation:‘Thereisdisplacementbyland,butthisisdisplacementbywater.Withfarmerslosingaccesstowater,andotherinterestsdemandingtheirs,waterhasbecomeaseriouspoliticalissue.’

Ascurrentandretiredadministratorshaveacknowledgedtous,thefocusoftheCauverywatersystemhasbeentoraisecapitalandexpandthepipedsystem,butbasedonacost-recoverylogicthatprivilegeslargeconsumersandlargeloans,notfarmersorthemajorityofcitydwellersoffthepublicwatergrid.AsthecitymanagersanddevelopersbetonanincreasedflowofCauverywater–againstscientificevidencethattheriver’svolumeisdecreasingandtheflowislessstable–theyshifttheirprioritiesawayfromcatchmentwatergovernancepractices.Nolongerbasingcalculationsonthelimitsofthewatercatchmentandlakesinfrastructure,insteaditisbasedonthepotentialfuturerevenuefromhighervolumesofwater,whichisastarklydifferent,riskyandhighlyspeculativecalculus(Nair,2005).

EconomistSharadiniRathexplainstheproblemthisway:

AllloanstotheStatearehiddenintheparastatals(suchasBWSSB,themanageroftheCauveryproject),andtheyareterrifying.Theyarelikethosefuturisticmonstersinthemoviesthatkeepgrowingandtakeoverthecity!BWSSB’sdebtissohuge,it’scrazy.Frommystudy,itisclearthatthecityandStategovernmentsonlyhavelandtosell,inhopesofpayingoffsomeofitsdebts.Whatawaytorunacity.(interview,June2016)

Speculativeurbanregime(III)

Landandwaterasfinancialassets

Thethirdregimeisdefinedbygrowingdependenceongroundwaterandtheburgeon-ingofaprivatewatermarketservicedbytheproliferationoftrucks(locallycalledwatertankers)transportingwaterintoandaroundthecity.This

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regimeischaracterizedbyrapidlyescalatingrealestatevalueandlarge-scalecommercialandindustrialprojectsthatareunviablefromeconomicandecologicalstandpoints.Inthissection,wehigh-lighttheunregulated,fragmentedandcrisis-orientedwaterinfrastructuresandtheirintersectionwithspeculativeurbandynamics.

Thisregimereflectsthepostliberalization(1991–present)eraofcitygrowthanditsentanglementswiththeimperativesofglobal-citymaking.Bangalore,duringthisperiod,enteredaperiodofboom,directlytriggeredbythegrowthoftheITindustryanditspromisesofanewurbancosmopolitanismbasedonthehigh-consumptivelifestylesofthefast-growingprofessionalclass(Upadhya,2016),withitsfreshappetiteforinvestinginportfoliosofcommercialandresidentialassets.Thisgrowthperiodhasmadetremendousdemandsonthecity’salreadystrainedwaterinfrastructureandpushedthecitytowardcrisis.Bangalorehaslost79%ofitswaterbodiesinfourdecadesanditsbuilt-upareahasincreasedfrom8%to77%inthisperiod,withaccelerationoccurringinbothcategoriessincethemid-1990s.Since1997,thewatertablehasfallenfrom10–12to76–91m,withover40%ofthepopulationrelyingongroundwater(Shekhar,2018).

Overuseofgroundwaterandproliferationofprivatewatermarkets

Muchofthepopulationiscompelledtofindalternative,informalmeansofmeetingtheirwaterneeds.Individualhouseholds,dependingontheireconomicabilities,drawuponmultiplesourcesofwater(privateborewells,Cauverywater,watertrucks),whiletheBWSSBprovideswatertoonlysomepartsoftheurbancore,particularlyolderprofessionalclassneighbourhoodsandbusinesscomplexes.OthersillegallysiphonwaterfromtheCauverywaterpipelinesthatrundirectlythroughneighbourhoodsthathavenotbeengrantedaccess(interviewswithSaldanha,June2016,andarealestateconsultant,June2016).

AroundthetimewhenthefirstfewphasesoftheCauveryschemewereimplemented(1970s),thetechnologyforthehigh-speeddrillingforgroundwaterandtheinstallationofelectricpumps(versushandpumps)slowlybecameavailable.Overthepast15years,thistechnologyhasproliferatedanditisnowcommonforwatertobeaccesseddirectlyfromunderone’sownpropertywithborewellsorelsefromprivatetankeroperatorssellinggroundwaterpumpedfromfarmland.Thediggingofborewellsandtheprivatewatermarketareunregulated,andthereisnoformalmonitoringorregulationofgroundwaterextraction.Morethanhalfthecity’swatersupplyismetfromlocalgroundwater,fromhouseholdwellsandthetankermarket(Leleetal.,2013).Intheruralperipherywherefarmlandisbeingconvertedintourbanrealestate,farmerswhoareabletoholdontoasliveroflandselltheir

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groundwaterbeneathittoathrivingmarketdistributedbyprivatewatertankersortrucks.

In2015,105,500privateborewellswereregisteredwiththeBWSSB,whileover200,000borewellswereestimatedtobeunregistered(Basu,2015).Theminingdepartmentcomparedwithdrawalandrechargeandfoundthatgroundwaterisbeingover-drawnby378%(Basu,2015).AcrossKarnataka,accordingtoMinorIrrigationDepartmentestimates,5000borewellsarebeingsunkeverymonth;inmanycases,theyarereplacingexistingborewellsthathavedriedup(Kanathanda,2017).Whenaskedaboutthedepthofnewborewells,farmersandurbanresidentsstatedthatwatertablesfrom300to400feethavedroppedinthepastfivetosevenyearstoaslowas1300feet,whichisinaccessibletomostpeoplewhodependonlimitedincomes,andatthesedepthsoftenaccessestoxicwater.

Thegapbetweenlimitsofmunicipalwaterandever-increasingdemandopenedupthespaceforavibrant,privatewatermarket.Watertankersestimatedtobeinthemanythousandsinnumberemergedasanindustryaroundtheearly2000s,andhaveincreasedinnumbersexponentiallysince2010(Ravishankar,2018).AresearcherwhorequesteddatafromtheBWSSBsummarizedthefindings:theBWSSBhadnotgivenoutanylicencesforcommercialtankerstotransportwater,andithas69watertankersofitsown.‘Theremaining3,000to4,000watertankersareillegal’and‘makeanannualturnoverofaroundRs.1,000crore(US$150million)’(Deepika,2017).Privatetankerssupplywatertoawiderangeofcustomers,includinglow-incomeneighbourhoods,gatedresidentialcomplexes,factories,hospitals,mallsandhotels.Thesuppliermarketisalsoheterogeneous:Itcomprisesofbothsmall-scale,independententrepreneursworkingoutsidethelawaswellasthe‘grassrootstentacles’oflarge-scalepublicandprivateutilitycompanies(Ranganathan,2014).Working-classandpoorcommunitiesaredependentonneighbourhoodhandpumps(whicharenowincreasinglyrunningdry)andtheoccasionalwatertruck,whilethemiddle-andupper-classneighbourhoodsrelyonprivateborewells(beneaththeirproperty),partialsupplyofCauverywaterandtheregularvisitsbywatertrucks.Lateatnight,onecanseethecitystreetscrowdedwithtrucksweigheddownwithsloshingruralwatersupplies.

Althoughthekeydistributionagentsarecalledbysomea‘watermafia’,thismarketfunctionsasamafianotnecessarilyinthesenseofaneconomicmonopolywhereinpriceiscontrolledandarbitrarilyincreased,butinthepoliticalsenseofsecuringloyaltyandreinforcingvotebanksforpoliticians.Whileasetofactorsdoindeeddominatethedistributionofwater,thismarketalsoworksasatoolforpoliticalpartiesandindividualstogainvotesandreinforceelectoralsupport.Aseniorbureaucratoverseeingwaterprojectsexplained:

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Thewatertankereconomyissymbolicofchangingpoliticalpower.Itusedtobethatpoliticianswouldgetvotesbyprovidingpublictaps,andthosewerefairlypermanent.Buttoday,theyonlysupplytankers[ofwater],whichcanbeofferedinexchangeforvotesandwithdrawnifnecessary[especiallyonceelectionsareover].(interview,July2016)

PaintedonthesideofsomeofthesecylindricalshapedtrucksaretheimagesoflocalMLAs(membersofthelegislativeassembly)andotherpoliticianswhodrumuppoliticalsupport,votesandfavoursthroughtheirsponsorshipofthedistributionofwatertoconstituencies.Here,weseethemessyblendingofeconomic,politicalandecologicalfactors,andtheentanglementofdifferentmarkets(land,water,politics).

Speculativeurbanandwaterdynamics

Inthishydrosocialregime,wefindtheprominenceofthepoliticaldiscourseofglobal-city-makingthatpromisesthe‘productive’dimensionofrapidurbangrowth,thatis,betterjobs,‘world-class’infrastructure,upwardlymobileclassconsumptionpatternsandlimitlessrealestatedevelopment.Thisfocus,however,failstotakeseriouslytheecologicalandsocialimplicationsoftherecentshiftofbusinesslogicandactivitycentredonlarge-scalelandacquisitionandrelatedfinancialspeculation.Changesinlanduseandtheexpansionofthecityaredrivennotjustbythespreadofindustrialexpansion,builtinfrastructures,newresidentialandcommerciallocalitiesbutalsobyspeculativestrategiesformaking‘moneyfrommoney’–thespreadofstrategiesformakingfinancialgainsthatincludedebtfinance,landusedascollateral,realestateinvestmenttrusts(REITs),initialpublicofferings(IPOs)andsharepricefluctuations,andlandacquisitionforspeculation.Thesefinancialstrategiesdonotnecessarilyleadtogreaterproductionorwiserinfrastructuralmanagement.

In2005,tosupportthenationalandKarnatakagovernments’salespitchforAsia’snewestglobalcity,landprotectionlawschangedtoallowforeignerstobuylandandforlandbrokerstoconvertrurallandmoreeasilyintourbanrealestate.Withthesedramaticnationwidereforms,thecentralgovernmentmadeitpossibleforanyonetoconvertrurallandintoafinancialassetwithoutanypromiseorcommitmenttomakeit‘productive’fortheeconomy,whichwastheofficialcriterionforrural-to-urbanlandtransfersbeforethe2005legislation(Levien,2018).ToBangalore’snorth,therewasarushtoacquiretensofthousandsofacressurroundingthenewinternationalairportanditspromisetoturntheregionintothenorthernwingofthenewglobalcity,creatingurbanrealestatewithunlimitedvaluepotential.RumoursthataerospaceandIT/biotechfirmswerereadytomoveinsparkedlandvalueincreasessuchthatBangalorehadneverbeforeseen.IntheDevanahalliarea,wefoundfarmerswhoselandhadbeenacquiredearlyfor500,000rupeesperacre(approximatelyUS$7000),which,in2017,soldforashighas50,000,000rupees(US$700,000),a9900%valueincrease.Asonelandbrokerexplained:‘Muchofthe

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landsoldbysmallfarmersexchangedhands8to10times,withmostofthelandvaluehikesnotlandingintheirbankaccounts,butinthehandsoflandbrokers,governmentagents,anddevel-opers’(interview,July2015).

Bangalore’sglobal-citytransformationbeganinthelate1990swiththeboominthesoftwaresectorcapturingtheimaginationofinvestorslocallyandworldwide,anditthrustthefarmingcommunityintoariskyandvolatileenvironment.Manyofthesmallfarmers,mostlylowcasteandDalit,werebeingpressuredtosellimmediatelyfor‘pilesofcash,thelikesofwhichmostsmallfarmershadneverseenbefore’,explainedaDalitfarmeradvocate.‘Howcouldtheyaskformore,theyhadnoideathatthatsameplotoflandwouldbesoldthenextdayformanytimesthepricetheyreceived’(interview,July2015).

Asnotedabove,muchofthelandsurroundingthecityiswithinaprotected‘greenbelt’ofvillagecommons,governmentforestandecologicalterrainthatsupportedthecomplexwatercatchmentsystem.Thus,thiseraofthelandrushincludedtheacquisitionofthelandonwhichthewatercatchmentsystemwasbuilt.Whereasundertheprevioushydrosocialregime,thecatchmentsufferedfromneglectandencroach-ment,startinginthemid-1990s,itwasbeingactivelyandaggressivelydismantledsoitcouldbeconvertedintoanassetfortherealestateindustry(withitsrootsinthepoliticalestablishment).WiththislandrushcamethenecessitytofindsystemicwateralternativestoboththecatchmentsystemandtheCauvery,sincetheybothprovedinadequateinmeetingtheneedsoftherapidlyexpandingcity.Consequently,thespeculative-urbanhydrosocialregimeismarkedbyadramaticriseinprivateborewellsbeingsunkandtapped,andtherapidgrowthandspreadofaprivatewatermarketinwhichruralborewellwaterisdistributedbythousandsofwatertankersplyingthecitystreets,collectivelysuckingdrythewateraquifers.

Speculativeinvestmentinrealestateandthechangesinlandandwateruseareinextricablytiedtothehollowingoutoftheagrarianeconomyoverseveraldecades.Agriculturenolongerprovidesasustainablemeansoflivelihoodforsmall,highlyindebtedfarmersintheregion,andthestateoffersmuchlesssupportthaninthepast,exceptlow-wageincomewhenthereisnoemployment(IndianInstituteofScience,2015;Sainath,2013;Vasavi,2009).Ourresearchinareassurroundingtheairportdocumentsthesteadydeclineofagriculturallivelihoodsthatmakesiteasierfortherealestatemarkettoaccessandconvertlandandwaterresourcesintocommodities,thelatterpumpedbyfarmersastheirlast,butnotlasting,assettosell.Thedepletioninsurfacewaterandrelianceongroundwaterhaveaffectedagriculturalandcroppingpatternsintheareasignificantly.Residentsofthesevillagesdrewourattentiontothefallingwatertablebynotingthatborewellsweredryingup(interviewsin2014,2015and2016).OnefarmerinBettakotevillagein

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theDevanahalliareasaid,‘Weknowthatborewellsreduceground-water.Butwhatelsedowedotolive?Wehavetolivedon’twe?’

Aswaterscarcityincreases,poorfarmerswithsmalltractsoflanddonothavesufficientresourcestoinvestinborewellsandhencetheygrowdependentonwealthierfarmersforwork.Smallfarmerswhohaveborewellsfinditdifficulttobeartherepairandmaintenancecoststheborewellrequireswhenpumpingatsuchadeeplevel.Weweretoldaboutmanyinstancesofborewellsgoingdry.AnofficialatBettakoteGramPanchayat(alocalgoverningbody)estimatesthat175borewellshavebeenduginjustthisvillagealoneoverthepast10years.(Theoncesprawling300-acreBettakotelakewasdrainedandencroachedonbytheairportauthorityin2008.)Manynon-elitevillagersintheregion,includingthosewhoownsomeland,havenowturnedtoextremelylowpaid,dailywagework.Thereisanevidentshiftinlabourfromagriculturaltonon-agriculturaloccupations,aswaterscarcityisforcingvillagerstostopfarming.Interviewswithteachersandprincipalsattwoschoolsneartheairportcomplexsuggestedthatlocalstudentsarenolongerdrawntoagricultureandtheirparentsactivelydiscouragethemfromfarming.Farmersattributewaterscarcityintheregionasaprimaryreasonforwhyagriculturehasbecomeuntenable(interviewsinJuly–August2015and2016).

Grandiosemasterplansofdevelopmentprojects,andthefinancialimperativetohoardlandtoanticipatethesefutureprojects’expansion,remainstrangelyimpervioustothefactthatwaterrepresentsalimit:neitherCauverywaternorthecrippledcatchmentsystemcanaccommodatetheglobalcity.Similarly,thenotionthatprivatetankerscanindefinitelyfeedtheproposedindustrial,residentialandcommercialzonesisuntenable(Mahapatra,Chanakya,&Ramachandra,2011).Eventhoughresearchconductedthreedecadesagodocumentedthewatershortageinthisarea(AsianInstituteofTechnology,1990;Reddy,Venugopal,Reddy,Madhukeshwar,&Lingaraju,1992),itdidnotpreventthegovernmentfromidentifyingtheDevanahalliregionforlarge-scaleairportdevelopmentprojectandanarrayofpotentialfutureindustrialandresidentialprojectsincludingluxurygatedcommunitiesandITcampuses.

Ironically,thespikeinlandvaluehasrecentlypreventedthegovernmentfromfollowingthroughwithland-acquisitionplansforthesefutureambitionsasitgetsensnaredbytheveryprocessinwhichithasparticipated.Atop-levelbureaucratinKarnataka’sadministrationadmitted:

It’sgoingtobedifficulttodevelopanythingclosetoBangalore.Landisnotavailable,thecostisveryhigh.Hugeshortageofland.Thereisalsoashortageofwater.Thatairportareaisverydeficientofwater.Ifyouwanttopurchaseathousandacresthenyouhavetospendathousandcrorerupees($150million).Isitworthit?It’sexorbitant.It’sveryeasyforindustrytocomeinwhenlandischeap.SothehighlandcostsinKarnatakaarecausinga

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bitofasetbacktothesettingupofindustry.Beyondtheairportwehavereserved1000sofacresforindustrialactivities.(interview,June2015)

Governmentagenciesacquirelandfromfarmerswithnoguaranteesofindustrialbuy-inoruse;thelandisnolongerdesignatedasforfarmingonly,anditlosesitsprotectivedesignationas‘greenbelt’,sothatfertilelandandtheruralwaterinfrastructurebecomeofficiallyincorporatedintothespeculativerealestateeconomy.Intheairportregion,landpriceshaveincreasedgreatlyoverthepastdecade,jarringthelocaleconomyandsettingnewprioritiesledbylandbankers,membersofgovernment,thebusinesscommunityand,morerecently,foreignfinancialinstitutions.Moreover,thestate,despiteverylowinterestfromindustry,continuestoacquirelandevenwhenitcannotaffordto.Itgoestoextremelengths,includingtakingonadditionaldebttosecurethisland.Forinstance,in2014,itborrowed1000crorerupees(US$150million)tofundlandacquisitiononbehalfoftheITsector(Kumar,2014),anindustrythatisnotlookingtobuildnewfacilitiesandoffices.Theseshortfallshavehadatumultuouseffectontheland-basedeconomy.Forexample,nocompanieshavecommittedtobuildandmoveintotheITInvestmentRegion,evenwhilethegovernmenthasbeenacquiringlandfromfarmerswhoweredisplacedandpaidapittancefortheirlandandpaidnothingfortheirdependenceonthesurroundingcommonsland(interviewsin2014–17).Moreover,employmentgrowthintheITsectorinBangalorehasfaltered,withthesectorlayingoffthousandsofemployeesin2017andmovingintolesslabour-intensiveservices(Narayan,2017;Sridhar,2017;Subramanian,2017).TheITsectornolongercanabsorbthegrowingworkforce,makingthetrendofinvestinginlandandwaterforspeculativepurposesmoreprominentbycomparison.

Becausethereisnoindustrialinterestinthesite,thepriceoflandofferedtofarmersisrelativelylow;butbecauselandpricesarerelativelylow,thebusinessofacquiringlandbecomesaspeculativeenterpriseinitsownright–buyandsellratherthanbuild.Aseniorofficialcandidlyexpressedgraveconcernsabouttheplightoftheairportregionandominouslymentioned‘vestedinterests’thatlinkgovernmentdepartmentswith‘therealestatemafia’.Inthisrevealinginterviewhecitedthe‘misuseoflandconversionlawswherelandislegallyconvertedsimplytoincreaseitsvalue’andcontinuedtosaywithdeepscepticism:‘andtheyclaimtheareawilldevelopdespitewatershortageandhugejumpsinlandvalue!’(interview,June2016).

Thesecriticalvoiceswithintheupperechelonsofthestate’sbureaucracydemonstratetheextenttowhichtheperi-urbanzoneisgovernedbythelogicofspeculativeurbanism(Goldman,2010,2011).Thelureofrealestatemarketsandlandspeculationoverrideslong-orevenmedium-termconsiderationsofaland-basedproductiveeconomyand/orsustainablewaterinfrastructure.Officialsatthe

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localplanningauthorityacknowledgedtousthatthewatershortagewasamajorunresolvedissueandtherewerenoconcreteplanstoaddressit.Meanwhile,global-cityplansdrivelandacquisition,displacecommunitiesandencouragethesellingoffoftheecologicalcommonsandwaterscapes.

On1January2014,thecitygovernmentwasforcedtodeclareitselfbankruptwhenthepublicbanksrefusedtolendanymoremoneyormanageitsinsurmountabledebts.Thebanksrequiredcollateralasliabilityforthecity’sdebts,andthecityofferedaportfolioofpublicbuildingsandland,includingthetownhall,amaternityhospital,centralpublicmarkets,andcemeteriesandslaughterhouses(Chaturvedi,2014).Becauseoftheriskystrategyofofferingtax-freeandsubsidizedlandandwater,global-cityinfrastructuralprojectsneverearnedcityagenciesenoughmoneytosupportthesespeculativeprojects.A2013auditoftheBangaloreCityCorporation,thebodythatrunsthecity,foundthatmonthlyexpendituresforbasicmaintenance,salaries/pensionsetc.werebeingpaidfromhigh-interestbankloansandnotpropertytaxesanduserfees–ariskyandunsustainablemodeofgovernance.

Insum,wefindthatwaterissimultaneouslyaproblem,acrisis,alimitandanopportunitytoaccesslandfromdistressedfarmers.Watercrisisisnotsolelyanurbanoraruralphenomenon,butintersectswiththepoliciesofrural–urbandisinvestmentandspeculation.Undertheimperativeofspeculativeurbanism,thevalueoflandandwater,aswellasthosewholiveoffofthem,isbeingheavilydiscountedasastrategytofurtherenticefinancialinvestorstoinvest.Thishydrosocialregimeexposestheparadoxofwatercrisis.Itrepresentsanactuallimittoagrarianlivelihoodsbutdoesnotpresentanabsolutelimittofinancialspeculationandgovernmentprojectionsofurbandevelopment.Thekeypointhereisthatwaterscarcityisapreconditionfortheeasyconversionofagrarianlandintourbanrealestateandyetitsscarcitydoesnotpreventspeculationandgrandioseprojectionsofurbandevelopment.However,thecurrentwatercrisisissooverwhelmingthatstateofficialsatvariouslevelsofthebureaucracyadmitinourinterviews,andthemediahighlight,thatithasbecomeamajorobstacle.Thissharpcontradictionofspeculativepromisesandrealitiesregardingacutewatershortagesanduntenablelandpricesdefinesthislastcrisis-basedhydrosocialregime.

Conclusions

Ofmaterialityandliquidity

InthispaperwehaveanalyzedBangalore’swatercrisisthroughthelensofthreehydrosocialregimes,eachanalyticalframefeaturinganentangledandcomplexterrainofwateraccess,watergovernanceandurbanexpansion.Wehavepaid

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specialattentiontotheintersectingdynamicsofurbanization,watersystemsandspeculativefinanciallogics.Relationalandscalardimensionsrevealthegrowinginfluenceoflocal,nationalandglobalformsoffinancecapitalwithdisruptiveeffectsonmarketsofurbanandruralland,waterandlabour.Specifically,realestatedevelopershavehadnoobligationtopreserveandstrengthentheexistingprecariouswaterinfrastructureandstateagencieshaveprioritizedriskyventuresintolandacquisitionandeconomiczonedevelopmentandignoredprotectionandregenerationofwatergenerationsystems,includingthecrumblingcatchment-basedwaterinfrastructure.Moreover,sincetheearly2000s,developershaveaggressivelybuiltatopwaterinfrastructure,affectingthesurvivabilityofthecountrysideaswellasthecityinwhichtheyhaveheavilyinvested.Onthecity’speriphery,wefindthatdevelopers–withtheaidofthelocalplanningauthority–primarilyacquirerurallandtohoardforfutureprofitorforwater-intensivebuilt-upeconomiczones,whichhaveenticedprivateequityfirmsfromasfarasNewYork,eyeingthearbitrageopportunitiesasdevelopersarecashstrappedandtheirlandbanks(withsky-rocketingvalues)canbeleveragedascollateral.Poorerfarmingcommunitiesontheurbanperiphery,meanwhile,havelittlechoicebuttoselltheirlandandwaterresources.Landisboughtandsoldatgreatspeed,withvaluesrisingateverytransaction,evenwhilesuppliesofwaterdisappearandecosystemsdegrade.

Since2010,boththerealestatesectorandcitygovernmentagencieshavebecomeindebtedtoforeigncorporatelenders,andincreasinglytoWallStreet-basedprivateequityfirms(Goldman&Narayan,2018).By2017,withrealestatefirms’anddevel-opers’debtsrising,publicbanksstoppedlendingtothem,creatingawideningmarketopportunityforWallStreetfirmssuchasGoldmanSachs,BlackstoneandKKR;theyhaveusedtheirpowerfulpositioninthemarkettoobtainhighratesofreturnsfromtheirshort-terminvestmentsinandaroundBangalore.Accordingtoconsultantcom-panyKnightFrank,by2017,‘closeto60%oftherealestatesector’sinstitutionalfundingrequirement’camesolelyfromprivateequityfirms,‘insharpcontrastto2010whenlessthanone-fourthfundingcamethroughthischannel’(Rathi,2017,p.12).Inthepastfewyears,astringofrealestatedealshasearnedUS-basedprivateequityfirmsannualizedratesofreturnsinIndiamuchhigherthantheirreturnsinChinaandtheUnitedStatesitself(Alexander&Antony,2018).Blackstone,asoneexample,hasbecomeIndia’slargestofficespaceownersince2014,buyingupdepressedassetsacrossIndia’smajorcitiesandtheirruralperipheries,earningsizeableratesofreturnsandfosteringanewglobalmarketintradablesecuritiesbasedonthefutureappreciationoflocalrents.Becauseofthiswealthaccumulationbyfinancialfirms,thecityhasbecomeeconomicallyandpoliticallydependentuponthespeculativeandvolatilerealestatemarket;itisamarketthatcanonlygrowwithrelativelycheapordiscountedaccesstoland,realestateandwater.

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Thus,wefindthatcrisispervades,expandsandintensifies.Thedestructionofthecatchment-basedhydrosocialregimeandtheuntenableexploitationofgroundwaterlaidthegroundworkforthecontemporarycrisis.Theseriesofeventsleadinguptothelarge-scalepollutionandprivatizationofthecity’smanylakeshave‘impactedtheresilienceoftheentirecity’(Nagendra,2016,p.174).Inthe1970s,whenahighlycentralized,capitalizedandauthoritativelymanagedwaterinfrastructurewasdevel-oped,leadersexpandedthecitywiththepromiseofanabundantriverwatersupplyandthehubristoturnitsbackontheage-oldwatercatchmentsystemthatbuiltandshapedthecityforgenerations.Today,underaspeculativeurbanistlogic,Bangalore’stensionsbetweenhydrosocialmaterialityandfinancialliquidityhaveneverbeenasprofound.

Acknowledgments

TheauthorsthankAnuradhaSajjanharforexcellentsupportintheresearchandeditorialprocess.TheyareindebtedtoRachelSchurmanforcrucialintellectualandeditorialinput;andManjunath,Mallesh,Prasanth,VinayBaindur,VidyaP.S.andIniPeriodiforprovidinginvaluableresearchsupport.H.S.Sudhiracreatedtwoexcellentmapsforthispaperandwasalwaysavailableforinterviewsanddiscussion.TheauthorsaregratefulforthefeedbackreceivedfromscholarshostedbyWageningenUniversity’s‘UrbanWaterChallenges’workshop,2016,especiallytheeditorsofthisspecialissue–LeilaHarris,RutgerdBoelens,LenaHommesandGertJanVeldwisch–whoofferedextremelyhelpfulcomments,theircolleaguesattheInstituteforSocialandEconomicChangeandNationalInstituteforAdvancedStudiesinBangalore;andCarolUpadhya,HemanginiGupta,VinayGidwani,HelgaLeitner,EricSheppard,LalitBatra,AnantMaringanti,LeoSaldanhaandmanyothersinthefield.

Disclosurestatement

Nopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthors.Funding

ResearchwasfundedbyanAmericanInstituteofIndianStudiesSeniorFellowship,DrV.K.R.V.RaoChairProfessorshipfromtheInstituteforSocialandEconomicChange,UniversityofMinnesotaresearchgrants,anInternationalWaTERSresearchandtrainingnet-workSSHRCgrant,andacollaborativeresearchprojectonSpeculativeUrbanismfundedbyNationalScienceFoundation[grantnumberBCS-1626437].

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