Post on 20-Feb-2023
The Political Ecology of Forest Policy in the Peruvian Amazon
Carlos Soria1 and Ernesto Ráez-Luna2
1Peruvian Ombudsman Office; 2Conservation International.
Paper prepared for the 2005 Working Forests Conference at the University of FloridaGainesville, February 14th, 2005
We discuss…• Structural and institutional challenges for policies that effectively promote sustainable development based on SFM in the tropics.
• Evidence from the implementation of Peruvian legislation on forests, [protected areas, the environment, mining, and agriculture].
We find…• Entrenched myths and invisible realities in the design and application of the law.– These are caused by socio-political structures, and lead to chronic and convoluted bargaining of law enforcement among forest stakeholders.
– In practice, bargaining distorts the spirit of the law and renders it ineffective.
– This favors powerful stakeholders who benefit from status quo and are therefore uninterested in SFM.
purposeful decisions within the State against adequate and transparent law enforcement
• Not to create OSINFOR and reassign its duties to INRENA
• Change the Add value definition• Regional vs. National government conflicts
• Minimize the role of dialogue and agreement through the national and regional dialogue boards
Grassroots stakeholders also make decisions based upon short-term benefit and recurrent (historical)
links to powerful actors
• Indigenous peoples’ movement is divided on the illegal logging issue (AIDESEP vs. COICAP in the Chorinashi case)
• Local rural and indigenous communities can only access the informal habilitation system
• AIDESEP boycotts participation in the dialogue boards
Peru’s policy-bleeding dynamics is not divorced from global ideological struggles
• Corruption • INRENA vs. PRODUCE• Multiple contending forces inside INRENA
• Small and big illegal loggers boycott dialogue
• Congress is out of phase with policy decision making
• Very little investment in a costly approach to enforcement
We propose that…• Recent political progress that transfers greater decision power at the local (municipal and regional/sub-national) scale offer new opportunities for the evolution of effective public policy on forest conservation and SFM in Peru and other Andean countries.
We propose that…• This local forces have to act in alliance with international forces in order to produce change at the national level
• We have to learn the lessons of the struggle for accountability in the oil and mining industries
Theoretical background• Environmental policy failure in the Third World.– Ascher & Healy 1990, Ascher 1999:
• Proximate causes influencing the behavior of policymaking and policy-enforcing officers and institutions.
• Patterns and circumstances of policy failure.
• What are the structural factors behind proximate causes and the behavior of institutions?
A Case Study: Peru• Political structure and circumstance.
• Amazon forests and the timber sector.
• Forest law reform and resistance.
Peru: Structures•Metropolis: Lima.
–(Post-) Colonial centralism.•Creole and European elite.•“Arrogance of the dominant”.
–Emergent capitalism and industry.–1/3 the country’s population.
•Periphery: “Provinces”.•Indian, marginalized population.•“Servilism of the dominated”.
–Natural resources: [Forests and mining fields].–Mercantilism and raw materials.
•Authoritarian tradition.
The Timber Sector in $• 1% of Peru’s 52,000 millions GDP.
• 47% round & sawn timber.• 50% of timber exports from one family group (Bozovich-Balarin).
• 80% of exports Broad-leaf Mahogany (20X one-hundred-year average during last decade).
• 51% of mahogany exports to the US in 2001.
Peru’s Timber Sector up to 1999
• One big family group
• Newman Lumber learns the business: The Mahogany War
• Illegal logging rules since 1821
• Mercantilism dominates the Amazon
Old vs. New• Direct access• Management plan overruled
• Fee for reforesting
• Overwhelming amount of small concessions
• The Mahogany War in 1999
• Public contest• Management Plan• Fee for hectares
• Promote medium enterprises
• Access to small forests harvesters through concessions
The New Forest Law Process• Centralist, authoritarian law development and approval. Generalized rejection in spite of some good aspects of the law. Ideological and practical weaknesses of law.
• Democratic negotiation of law implementation. 35 statutes approved through the dialogue board
Peru’s Forest Institutions• INRENA-Forest and Wildlife
– centralism – technical weakness – lack of transparency
– Internal forces move around the realm of the politically possible and the economically viable
– Some aim reform some aim status quo
The Timber chess players• The Croatian connection: the Bozovich Balarin family
• Newman Lumber and the intermediaries
• Small harvesters condemned to Doom.
• INRENA silent witness
• Customs and Taxation are out of the game board
• NGOs and IP struggle to have a say
Round & sawn timber
ADEX DATA TRADE http://www.adexdatatrade.com/inteligenciacomercial/informesectorial/descarga/MAD_ene%202004.pdf
Sawn timber prevails
In January 2005 INRENA modified the definition of added value to avoid transformation
Timber exports of the Bozovich-Balarin family group
ADEX DATA TRADE http://www.adexdatatrade.com/inteligenciacomercial/informesectorial/descarga/MAD_ene%202004.pdf
What is IIRSA?It is a multimodal transport initiative that will allow
access to the regions natural resources, posing threats to local control. It will prime the engine of
extractive industries against a manufacture
strategy.
The environmental and social impacts of this expansion to
America’s last frontiers will inequitably be afforded by local indigenous peoples
and the local rural and urban poor population.
What will the impact on forests be?
• Forests & PAs crossed by pipelines and flow lines of timber, coca leaf and other
• Forests & PAs affected by illegal logging• Forests & PAs impacted by ‘old fashion development’ (Amazonia: the periphery of the periphery)
• Indigenous peoples forced to contact• Colonists forced into workforce• Islands of private conservation
What barriers need to be overcome?
• Strengthen international market green demands
• Sectorial authority instead of integrated environmental authority
• Weak legislation and enforcement mechanisms
• Official constraints to participation due to poor third level regulations
• Poor investment on enforcement
Future trends• The Bozovich Balarin boycott to forest concessions
• Forest fragmentation• Social fragmentation• Short term growth at the expense of the forests and local populations
• Concession wiped out and returned
• Agricultural expansion over forest land
Alternatives• Buyer led intervention to force the Bozovich Balarin group to SFM
• International and national govt' and NGOs alliance to follow illegal logging chain of custody
• Legal and institutional support to local actors interested in control at the local level
• Strengthen social capital for SFM• IC shall invest in the reform process rather than in projects
SFM is a vessel in a sea of EM measures
• To develop the regional and local environmental management framework
• To educate and train civil employees and citizens
• To inform and train the population
• Citizen access to monitoring
• A citizen oriented education
• Invest in law compliance and enforcement