Post on 08-Feb-2023
The Family Construct Approach andPsychosomatic Research
by
H. G. Procter BSc. PhD. Dip. Psych.
(shortened version for publication)
Paper presented at the Seventeenth European Conference onPsychosomatic Research, Marburg, West Germany.
September 4th - 9th, 1988
In the thirty three years since Kelly's original opus the
creative potential of construct theory continues to be
realised in a steadily accumulating literature . Kelly's
influence, often unacknowledged, is evident in a wide
variety of writings.
My own work has involved using and extending Kelly's
theory for the study of and therapeutic intervention into
families. Kelly's ideas appealed because they resolved many
of the problems attached to psychoanalytic, behavioural and
cognitive psychologies (Procter, 1978). But Kelly's theory
was still primarily a psychology of the individual. Also
about this time, in the late sixties, I began to come across
the interactional literature on the family - Watzlawick,
Haley, Bateson - and was persuaded by the arguments that for
a full understanding of normal and pathological human
situations it is necessary to use an interpersonal, systemic
view that transcends intrapsychic theories. But in spite of
the tremendous advance in our understanding that the
systemic and cybernetic approach provided us with, it left a
rather impersonal and even mechanistic view of family
processes.
Laing had pointed out how vital it was in understanding
a situation to be able to enter the point of view of each of
the participants of the drama. This has for me been proved
valid time and time again both in my own experience and in
clinical practice. Personal construct theory became for me
the tool for beginning a systematic and rigourous approach
to the family that, whilst remaining consistent, would
simultaneously act as a descriptive system, a research
paradigm (for example in the repertory grid research with
families) , a tool for therapy and a way of subsuming and
reconciling the incompatablities of previous models. This
work has been described in a series of papers (Procter 1981,
1985a, 1985b, 1986, Dallos and Procter 1984).
Flowing from Kelly's person~as-a-scientist metaphor is
a vital principle, which was emphasised by Don Bannister,
who contributed so much before his recent death. This is the
principle of reflexivity - that any psychological theorising
should be able simultaneously to account for itself as well
as its subject matter. In practice this is an extremely
useful principle involving a continuous cross-check between
the content of the theory, the process of theorising and
back again. As far as families are concerned this means a
basic view that every family member is a person, like us,
struggling to make sense of the family situation, applying
theories and constructs to anticipate the events of family
life. The members are themselves systems theorists, whether
they know it or not, making constructions about the
relationships in the family and acting in accordance with
these constructions.
This principle is one of the attributes which construct
theory rather surprisingly shares with Hegel and indeed
dialectical thinking lies at the heart of Kelly's
psychology, a tradition he presumably picked up through
Dewey, who had been a Hegelian in his early career. Kelly
also has interesting correspondences at a philosophical
level with Marx's materialist dialectics which may open up
some interesting discussions with colleagues from Eastern
Europe.
The person in the system
Kelly insists on putting the "person9* at the centre of
his theory. Each of us makes choices. Constructs are
basically alternatives, not only in construing or thought
but in practice. It is essential to have this concept if one
is to do proper justice to the ethical issues of personal
responsibility in our model. Of course a person is not
simply free to generate any reality, and is constrained to
work within a construct system that is embedded in the
culture, family traditions and particular personal
experiences (Procter and Parry, 1978).
In this view, a family system consists of what emerges
when a number of people, each a person anticipating,
hypothesising, choosing are put together in the same family.
The family construct system consists of the sum of the
individual construct systems of each member in dynamic
relation with each other. The events or "evidence" that each
member is processing consists of the actions and opinions of
the others with whom they are interacting. There is
therefore the tendency for the family reality to "drift" in
idiosyncratic ways, in a manner not under the control of any
particular member. The family construct system has, as it
were, a life of its own. It is an entity in itself which
provides choice and constraint to the individual members. It
can be seen how this is rather different to Kelly's original
view, where the individual construct system was seen as the
most important determining entity.
As Kelly says of individuals, the assumption is that
each family has its own unique reality arising out of its
traditions and melded (or left fragmented) by the
negotiation that occurs between the partners of realities
built up in each of their families of origin. The family
construct system consists of a shared set of constructs. The
construing of each individual family member is not received
passively, however, but is built up painstakingly anew in
daily experience using the constructs on hand in the family
context. Each individual member is unique, but construing is
only evoked or even brought into existence in a particular
social context.
Bach family can be characterised according to
attributes of its construing system: constricted, tight,
loose, polarised and so on. The "boundary" of the family
system can be seen as the cleavage line discriminating (in
the family's construing) who is in or out of the group or a
subgroup. Indeed constructs may actually be formed from the
elements or figures in the system, even though we normally
think of contructs as generating our own particular version
of reality.
An important design feature of a theory of the family
is that it is anthropologically sound. By this I mean that
it allows one to enter the study of a family with the
minimum of preconceived assumptions that we might impose on
the situation so easily. It is an "open" theory, the
particular details being "filled in" as we proceed. This is
certainly not true of many earlier traditions in individual
and family therapy or in previous theories of family
functioning. There is no model here of "healthy functioning"
or "normal" family life. Indeed, within this model, when a
family has problems this is seen as intimately tied up with
how an external referring agent or figure is construing the
family. This might be such that a drift toward increased
polarisation of the construing occurs rather than problem
resolution. The crucial business occurs at the interface
between the family and the external system rather than being
simply internal to the family.
All this may sound rather philosophical but in actual
practice the theory has simplicity and elegance, attributes
I would value highly in our work, proven by the ability of
unsophisticated students in the health service setting to
grasp and utilise the method. Students are encouraged to
build up a picture of the family's construing in a step-by-
step jigsaw fashion. For example, analysis may start with a
particular dyad in the family at a particularly crucial
point in their interaction. The picture is built up in
levels. How they consrue themselves, each other, adding how
a third construes the pair's relationship, how each
construes the dyadic relations, how a forth construes the
threesome until sufficient sense is made of the situation.
This picture is then tested in practice with the family,
using Kelly's famous dictum "if you don't know what is
happening, ask the client, he may just tell you"!
My experience suggests that the approach is of great
value in family (and individual) therapy. It is also useful
in, and indeed arose out of research. My own work with
repertory grids examining interpersonal perception and using
a pooled family grid with various measures is interesting
not only for the empirical data that it can reveal but also
because it reveals a kind of grammar, or a table of possible
permutations and combinations of interpersonal construing in
families. Guillem Feixas and his group in Barcelona are
using the method to tease out these kind of processes in
families with alcohol problems (Feixas et al, 1987).
I think more and more people are now becoming aware of
the power of this approach. In my own group I would mention
the work of Rudi Dallos and David Aldridge (1986, 1987,
1988) on deliberate self harm and suicide and on the
processes of handing on constructs down the generations of a
family. The Neimeyer brothers have been enormously
productive in their work on construing in marital
relationships (eg. Neimeyer and Neimeyer, 1985) and
Alexander and Follette (1986) have taken the theory into the
treatment of incest. Vetere and Gale (1987) carried out a
project involoving the intensive participant observation of
normal families and Rosemary Hayhow (1987) is researching
the families of stutterers. Cunningham and Davis have looked
at families with mental handicap and how to help them. David
Reiss's work (1981) has developed in a slightly different
way, but shows the theory operating in the context of
experimental social psychology. Kenny's (1986) work on
cancer and the link with physiological process represents
another exciting new direction.
Implications for research into psychosomatic processes
Most research on psychosomatic processes has been
limited by its reliance on very general psychological
concepts, such as emotional states and personality traits.
Looking at construing especially as it occurs specifically
in its relational context may break us out of this impasse.
As long as we investigate a general process such as
"anxiety" or "stress" we will only learn very general things
about the associated physiology - such as general arousal
levels.
Kelly criticised the tyrany of the contruct emotion-
versus- cognition that we so readily project on to the world
-and then suffer the consequences of the apparently
objective split. He then went on brilliantly to define
emotional states in a radical new way as aspects of
construct structure and transition. But this aspect of his
thinking seems still intrapsychic. Emotions are
fundamentally interpersonal matters, especially when we look
at the actual events in a microprocess time frame. The way
forward seems to be to investigate these processes by
focussing on moment-by-moment events in the life of the
family.
It is my belief that the crucial processes occur at
quite specific points in construing and at particular points
in the interaction of the family. This is observable
clinically time after time. For example, a bulimic girl
begins to feel sick at a strategic point in the interaction,
triggered by the physiological signs of flushing with anger
in her mother. Mother's anger, in turn is the result of an
anticipation of her daughter, based in the way she construes
her behaviour, perhaps as "manipulative". These two events
have become coupled or linked, but not directly, only
because they are construed in a particular way by the two of
them.
Physiologists will have to develop biochemical,
neuroelectric and other physiological techniques to "trap"
these ephemeral processes. With an understanding that they
are anchored in a more predicatable way in family
interaction, we should be able to proceed.
Conclusion
The construct approach to families and other
relationships throws much light on processes in a highly
specific and precise way and yet with a flexibility that
allows many older alternatives to be synthesised in a new
and consistent theoretical language. It also begs new
questions; or rather poses old questions in a new way
allowing new avenues research to proceed.
Most importantly and excitingly I think it poses a
challenge to traditional models of psychiatric and other
medical research which should allow an enormous step forward
to be made. This is achieved by providing a methodology
which focusses on illness processes in the context,
specifically, of the interpersonal construing surrounding
the illness events, rather than arbitrarilly isolating an
individual and divorcing the study from these. Psychiatry
and Psychosomatic medicine have been stuck conceptually for
decades, stuck with general categories which can only
provide general truths.
References
Aldridge,D. and Dallos, R. (1986) Distinguishing familieswhere suicidal behaviour is present from families wheresuicidal behaviour is absent. J. Fam. Ther. 8,243-252.
Alexander, P.C. and Follette, V.M. (1986) PersonalConstructs in the Group Treatment of Incest. In Neimeyer,Rand Neimeyer, 6.(eds) A Casebook in Personal ConstructTherapy Springer Publications, New York.
Cunningham, C. and Davis, H. (1985) Working with parents:Frameworks for Collaboration. Open University Press, MiltonKeynes.
Dallos, R and Aldridge,D (1986) Change: How do we recognizeit? J. Fam. Ther. 8, 45-49
Dallos, R. and Aldridge, D. (1987) Handing it on: FamilyConstructs, Symptoms and Choice. J. Fam. Ther. 9, 39-55.
Dallos, R. and Aldridge, D. (1988) Choice of Pathology andSystems of Construing. J. Strat. Syst. Ther. 7, 1, 27-41.
Dallos,R. and Procter,H.6. (1984) Family Processes:An Interactional View. D307 Social Psychology Course,Open University, Milton Keynes.
Feixas, G. , Cunillera, C. and Villegas, M. (1987) PCT andthe Systems Approach: A theoretical and methodologicalproposal for integration. Paper presented at 7th Internat.Congress on PCT. Memphis, TN.
Hayhow, R. (1987) Personal Construct Therapy with Childrenwho stutter and their Families. In: Ledy, C. StutteringTherapies: Practical Aproaches. Crooro Helm, Beckenham.
Kelly, G.A. (1955) The Psychology of Personal Constructs,Vols 1 & 2. Norton, New York.
Kenny, V. (1986) Family Somatics: A personal constructapproach to cancer. In Neimeyer,R and Neimeyer, G.(eds) ACasebook in Personal Construct Therapy SpringerPublications, New York.
Neimeyer, R. and Neimeyer G. (1985) Disturbed relationships:A personal construct view. In B u t t o n , E . ( e d ) PersonalConstruct Theory and Mental Health. Croon Helm,Beckenham, Kent.
Procter, H.G. (1978) Personal Construct Theory and theFamily: A theoretical and methodological study. Unpubl. PhDthesis, University of Bristol.
Procter,H.G. (1981) Family Construct Psychology: An approachto Understanding and Treating Families. In Walrond-Sk inner ,S . ( ed ) Developments in Family Therapy.Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Procter,H.G. (1985a) A Construct Approach to Family Therapyand Systems intervention. In B u t t o n , E . ( e d ) PersonalConstruct Theory and Mental Health. Croom Helm,Beckenham, Kent.
Procter,H.G. (1985b) Repertory Grid Techniques in FamilyTherapy and Research. In B e a i l , N (ed) Repertory GridTechnique: Application in Clinical and EducationalSettings. Croom Helm, Beckenham, Kent.
Procter,H.G. (1986) Change in the Family Construct System:The therapy of a mute and withdrawn schizophrenic patient.In Neimeyer,R and Neimeyer, G.(eds) A Casebook in PersonalConstruct Therapy Springer Publications, New York.
Procter,H.G. and Parry,G. (1978) Constraint and Freedom: TheSocial Origin of Personal Constructs . InFransel la ,F . (ed) Personal Construct Psychology1977, Academic Press, London.
Reiss, D. (1981) The Family's Contruction of Reality.Harvard University Press, London.
Vetere, A. and Gale, A. (1987) Ecological Studies of FamilyLife. Wiley, Chichester.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Joady Brennan for her suggestions in editing themanuscript and to Tracy Flannaghan for helping with the typing.
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