Post on 31-Jan-2023
The art of making classes in Serbia:
Another particular case of the possible
Predrag Cveticanin a,*, Mihaela Popescu b
a Centre for Empirical Cultural Studies of South-East Europe, Serbiab California State University, San Bernandino, USA
Available online 5 November 2011
Abstract
The paper presents a construction of social space in Serbia using multiple correspondence analysis
(MCA) on data from a 2005 national survey based on a probability sample of 1364 interviewees. We discuss
the theoretical and methodological consequences of a different understanding of the principle of capital
composition in comparison with Bourdieu’s research practice. We argue that social capital should be
included not only in the theory of capitals, but also in the construction of social space, and that social capital
and cultural capital should be treated both in terms of their volume (quantity) and in terms of different types
(qualities). In Serbian society, we distinguish between ‘‘local cultural capital’’ and ‘‘global cultural capital’’
and between ‘‘social capital of solidarity’’ and ‘‘political social capital.’’ The results indicate (1) the strong
gravitational pull of the social space – i.e., that social space can be used as a predictive map for cultural
participation, taste, styles of material consumption, identities, attitudes, and political preferences of citizens
of Serbia; and (2) that four theoretical classes can be discerned in social space in Serbia (farmers, workers,
middle classes and higher classes).
# 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In Distinction (Bourdieu, 1984) and other works in which he considers the roles played by
different forms of capital in the construction of social space, Bourdieu discusses the shared
features, subtypes and mutual conversion of economic, cultural and social capital (Bourdieu,
1980, 1998; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). However, in his empirical research (Bourdieu and de
Saint-Martin, 1976; Bourdieu, 1984, 1996), the concepts of economic and cultural capital
perform the entire analytical work, while social capital disappears from the stage.
www.elsevier.com/locate/poetic
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: pcveticanin@gmail.com (P. Cveticanin), popescum@csusb.edu (M. Popescu).
0304-422X/$ – see front matter # 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.poetic.2011.09.006
Two reasons account for the exclusion of social capital from Bourdieu’s construction of social
space. The less important one pertains to his understanding of social capital as a resource that
contributes to the reproduction of social inequalities, a corollary of which is that respondents are
likely to be more reluctant to provide reliable data. The second, more important reason, is that in
contemporary, advanced (capitalist) societies, social capital is a less efficient principle of
differentiation than either economic or cultural capital, and consequently social capital plays a
smaller role in the reproduction and transformation of the social order.
However, in the appendix to the article ‘‘Social Space and Symbolic Space,’’ entitled ‘‘The
‘Soviet’ Variant and Political Capital,’’ Bourdieu (1998) identifies a divergence in the principles
of differentiation active in socialist societies and capitalist societies respectively. In socialist
societies, the blocking of the agency of economic capital expressed as ownership over the means
of production led, on the one hand, to the increased importance of cultural capital and, on the
other, to the appearance of political capital (or, as Bourdieu notes, a ‘‘political type of social
capital’’) as the key principle of differentiation.
Here, we argue that in post-socialist societies social capital has not lost its importance for
understanding the structures of social inequality and it should, therefore, be incorporated into the
construction of social space. Moreover, we maintain that neither social capital nor cultural capital
should be treated as a single resource and exclusively in terms of quantity – that is, volume of a
particular capital, as Bourdieu does. We use two distinct types of social capital (political social
capital and social capital of solidarity) and two distinct types of cultural capital (local and global)
to construct the social space in Serbia.
We hypothesize that in societies that were at some point in history ‘‘Westernized’’ – either
through colonization (e.g., India, China, Indonesia, Mexico, or Algeria) or through the activities of
their own elites (e.g., Serbia, Romania, Russia, or Turkey) – there is a constant tension and struggle
between global and local culture for the status of legitimate culture. In these societies, this tension is
more important than the one between high culture and popular culture. In general, we argue that one
cannot take for granted an equation between high culture and legitimate culture; rather, one has to
identify legitimate culture after studying the field dynamics that are specific to particular national
contexts. We performed this analysis for Serbia in a previous work (Cveticanin and Popescu, 2009),
and we build the present analysis on the basis of our previous conclusions.
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the nature of social and cultural capital in
Serbia. Second, after re-conceptualizing the notion of capital, we construct the social space in
Serbia using economic capital and subtypes of social and cultural capital. We demonstrate that the
main opposition previously identified in the field of cultural practices (Cveticanin and Popescu,
2009) – namely, that between global and local culture – also plays an important role in the
constitution of social classes in Serbia. We advance the analysis by showing how patterns of
identities, attitudes and political preferences align in the Serbian social space. Finally, we show that
by considering both differences in the volume and in the composition of capitals, we can reliably
construct four social classes in this social space: farmers, workers, middle classes and upper classes.
2. Social and cultural capital in Serbia
Despite the specificities of the Yugoslav path to socialism1 – the workings of market
mechanisms, the unimpeded operation of small entrepreneurs (petit bourgeoisie), as well as the
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468 445
1 See Allcock (2000), Barton et al. (1973), Denitch (1990), and Lazic (1995).
existence of obvious economic differences in society – in Yugoslavia, and likewise in
Serbia,2 political capital was as significant a principle of differentiation as in other socialist
countries.
The key competitors in a struggle to establish the dominant principle of domination in
Yugoslavia were, on the one hand, the party cadres of peasant or working class origins, who were
poorly endowed with cultural capital, but who had carried out the socialist revolution; and, on the
other hand, second-generation members of the nomenklatura3 who had secured their political
positions mainly due to their professional knowledge (technocrats). The struggle between these
groups – the holders of political (social) capital and cultural capital – took place between 1960
and 1990, with variable success on either side.4
The domination of social capital in socialist societies, including Serbia, was also enacted by
the use of personal networks and informal contacts for a variety of purposes – such as to ensure
goods and services in short supply, to find work and secure promotions, to influence official
decisions, or to bypass formal procedures. This use of informal networks in Serbia did not have a
special name, although in other socialist countries terms such as blat in the USSR (Ledeneva,
1998, 2006), guanxi in China (Smart, 1993; Yang, 1994) or załatwyc sprawy in Poland (Wedel,
1986) were invented. These informal practices represent a specific form of non-monetary
exchange, intermediate between commodity exchange and gift giving. Such informal exchanges
of favors and uses of ‘‘connections and acquaintances’’ are based both on personal relationships
and on positions of control over access to public resources.
The series of civil wars along with international isolation and sanctions in the 1990s further
increased the importance of social capital in Serbia. With the dissolution of the monetary system
and the shortage of basic goods, the networks of connections and acquaintances providing a
medium of exchange for goods and services became the only capital worth owning. Similarly, in
proportion to the collapse of official public institutions that enable the order and stability of
everyday life, the importance of political social capital and the relative power of its holders
increased.
Following the change of regime in October of 2000, the formal institutions in Serbia were
slowly restored to their normal functions. The availability of everyday consumption goods made
the role of informal exchange networks unnecessary in this domain, although ‘‘connections and
acquaintances’’ continued to function for securing services that were difficult to obtain through
public institutions (e.g., in the areas of health, education, etc.) or prohibitively expensive in
private ones (e.g., private clinics or private educational establishments). At the same time, under
conditions of mass unemployment and ineffective state service, social capital remained a key
resource in finding work and securing promotion, sidestepping bureaucratic processes or altering
official decisions.5
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468446
2 Serbia was the largest of the six republics that comprised the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia until 1991.3 Nomenklatura were elite groups in communist countries, usually appointed by the Community Party leaders
from a list of ‘‘approved names,’’ that held key management positions at all levels (see, e.g., Dogan and Higley,
1998).4 See Gagnon (2004).5 It should be noted that social capital played an important role in the transformation of the political elite into the new
dominant class in post-socialist societies. Even when they were divested of all other means of power, members of the
nomenklatura still had the acquaintance of other important members of society, some of whom owed them favors. During this
period, their former political social capital was transformed and functioned, following our proposed terminology, as social
capital of solidarity.
2.1. Types of social capital in Serbia
We argue that in Serbia there are two types of social networks that may be used as social
capital. We thus differentiate between political social capital (mainly impersonal and
instrumental) and social capital of solidarity (which, in addition to being instrumental, has
important expressive and emotional functions). Social networks represent political social
capital when they link people whose control over access to public resources (goods and services)
enables them to use these resources to satisfy the private needs of other members of these
networks and in this way accumulate power (and acquire access to the resources they do not
control). The sum of these networks represents the parallel, informal structure of power in
Serbian society.6 These positions of control over access to public resources are located in the
political sphere proper (politicians, representatives of the local, regional, and national
governments), but they can also be positions of authority in firms and public institutions (e.g.,
CEOs, deans, and military generals), or positions of expertise in public institutions (e.g.,
doctors, judges, and university professors). In principle, anyone who has control over access to
public resources, no matter how small the advantage conferred, possesses some political social
capital. But just occupying these positions is not enough. Rather, to put political social capital in
motion, the individual has to be willing to participate in the system of exchange of ‘‘favors’’ and
to accept the commitment of returning counter-favors. Unlike the social capital of solidarity, the
favors dispensed as part of the political social capital can go to complete strangers in exchange
for a corresponding counter-favor.7
In contrast, the social capital of solidarity is based on the existence of ‘‘primary ties’’ – social
networks of solidarity among neighbors, friends, relatives, or ‘‘countrymen’’ who can pitch in to
help with money, goods, services or emotional support. The emotional and expressive function of
these social networks is as crucial as the instrumental one. Importantly, however, these social
networks can also be used as capital. Unlike political social capital, which requires a trade-off in the
form of access to previously unavailable resources, the basis for requesting favors by virtue of social
capital of solidarity rests precisely in claiming ‘‘primary ties’’ – that is, being a relative, friend, or a
neighbor.
Note that we distinguish between capital and resources in general. Capital is a special type of
resource. Like any other social resource, capital provides access to valuable goods and other
resources. Capital can be accumulated, transmitted and, under certain circumstances, converted
into another type of capital. Another important characteristic of capitals is that they are field
specific. However, in our view the key feature that distinguishes capitals from other types of
resources is that capitals not only provide specific benefits to individuals and groups, but can also
be used to partially or fully deny those benefits to others. Therefore, we argue that social capital in
the sense proposed by, for example, Putnam (2000), and Putnam and Leonardi (1993) is a social
‘‘glue’’ or citizenship issue, not a form of capital, but simply an important resource.
2.2. Cultural capital in Serbia
A second group of resources that shape social space in Serbia is cultural capital. In a previous
paper (Cveticanin and Popescu, 2009), we demonstrated that two main oppositions structure the
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468 447
6 See Cveticanin (1997, 2001).7 The fact that political favors can go to total strangers distinguishes political favors from blat relationships and brings
them closer to bribery, although they do not involve monetary exchange.
field of cultural practices in Serbia: the opposition between local and global culture, and the
opposition between traditional culture and contemporary, popular culture.
These forces active in the field of cultural practices in Serbia produce seven types of distinct
cultural practices (see Fig. 1). There are four types of ‘‘pure’’ cultural practices: (1) traditional
folklore cultural practices (instances of traditional local culture); (2) neo-folk cultural practices
(examples of contemporary popular local culture); (3) contemporary global cultural practices or
urban cultural practices (cases of contemporary popular global culture); and (4) traditional elite
cultural practices (occurrences of traditional global culture). Additionally, there are three types
of omnivorous cultural practices, where by ‘‘omnivores’’ we understand those who cross
important cultural boundaries in one (in this case, Serbian) society8: (5) rurban omnivores (who
in their cultural practices cross the boundary between contemporary popular global and
contemporary popular local culture); (6) elite omnivores (who cross the boundary that separates
traditional global elite culture and contemporary popular global culture); and finally (7)
conformist omnivores (who cross both of the important symbolic boundaries in the field of
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468448
Fig. 1. Field of cultural practices in Serbia.
8 In the paper ‘‘Understanding Cultural Omnivorousness: Or, the Myth of the Cultural Omnivore,’’ Warde et al. (2007)
point out that there are two definitions of omnivorousness: the definition based on volume and the definition based on
composition. Here, we use the term omnivore closer to the latter definition. However, instead of adopting the a priori
distinction among highbrow, middlebrow and lowbrow genres, the identification of omnivores requires as an initial step –
namely, the identification of cultural boundaries that are considered ‘‘unbreachable’’ in a particular society. Only then can
omnivores be identified as those who cross these symbolic boundaries. This understanding highlights the cultural relativity of
omnivorousness, that is, that it can have different manifestations and different operationalizations in different societies.
cultural styles in Serbia: that between local and global culture and that between traditional and
contemporary popular culture).
In contrast to the French society described by Bourdieu, in Serbia, the basic opposition is not
between highbrow culture and popular culture, and highbrow culture does not automatically entail a
claim to legitimate culture. In Serbia, the main opposition between global and local culture9 enables
the formation of two types of cultural capital – local cultural capital and global cultural capital –
whose proponents struggle to promote their cultural resources as legitimate (see Fig. 1).
Generally speaking,10 cultural activities designated as local culture in Fig. 1 are either related
to rituals connected to important life events or rites of passage – such as births, christenings,
starting school or finishing one’s education, going into the army, marriages, the birth of a child,
divorce and death – or represent a part of everyday entertainment. Therefore, cultural activities at
the local culture pole in Serbia belong to the following types of social contexts: secular or sacral
celebrations (such as slava [a celebration of the family patron saint], christenings, weddings);
concerts, fairs and in kafanas (restaurants), where people sing and dance folk dances (kolo) to the
accompaniment of live music; as well as playing of musical instruments close to the local
tradition, such as the accordion, violin, trumpet, and in rural areas, bagpipes, frula and kaval
(both a sort of pipe that people in the villages make themselves). Among the institutions that
support and celebrate this local culture in contemporary Serbian society are the Serbian Orthodox
Church and, in particular, privately owned media.
Aesthetically, local culture in Serbia is based on traditional folk culture, but currently it also
includes contemporary elite and popular cultural forms based on folk culture. A particularly
important indicator of belonging to local culture is a preference for folk music in its different
forms (traditional folk music, newly composed folk music, turbo-folk). Additional indicators are
preferences for Serbian family television series – in particular, those that deal with life in the
villages, as well as a preference for a particular genre of popular Serbian television sitcoms
portraying the lives and troubles of the ‘‘little guy.’’ It is important to note, as a matter of course in
Serbia, that this type of aesthetic membership in local culture is often equated with membership
in lower social classes or with the status of the parvenu.
On the other hand, at the pole of the global culture we encounter participation in global
highbrow art forms such as theater, ballet, and opera – as well as the consumption of products of
global popular culture, such as jazz, blues, rock, hip-hop, and techno. After initial resistance in
the 1950s, modernization tendencies and the pro-Western orientation of Yugoslav socialism
resulted in the acceptance of genres such as jazz and rock n roll as legitimate forms of cultural
production, while the terms ‘‘mass culture’’ and ‘‘kitsch’’ continued to be associated with newly
composed folk music and local soap operas. Other stereotypical associations with global culture
in Serbia include: the use of the standard linguistic variety; knowledge of and use of foreign
languages; university education; knowledge of history and of the norms of the global elite and
popular culture; an ability to play ‘‘bourgeois’’ musical instruments, such as the piano, or
contemporary instruments such as the electric guitar; a high level of literacy in information
technology. In general, global culture is acquired and promoted mainly through the educational
system. To reiterate, association with the pole of global culture is a constitutive part of the social
identity of upper social classes.
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468 449
9 The multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) used to construct the field of cultural styles in Cveticanin and Popescu
(2009) showed that the first axis (explaining 77.28% variance) distinguished between global and local culture, while the
second axis (explaining 8.96% variance) distinguished between traditional culture and contemporary popular culture.10 See Cveticanin (2003, 2007).
3. Data and variables
The present study is part of a larger project to reconstruct the Serbian social space and field of
lifestyles based on data from the survey ‘‘Cultural Needs, Habits and Taste of Citizens of Serbia
and Macedonia’’ conducted on a national proportional probability sample of 1364 interviewees.
The fieldwork was conducted from October to December 2005. Of the planned 1485 respondents
in Serbia, 91.9% participated in the survey.
We relied on both approaches to Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) as outlined in
Lebart et al. (1984). Because in our previous paper (Cveticanin and Popescu, 2009) we presented
results of the application of the ‘‘reciprocal approach,’’ in this paper we will present only results
that directly pertain to the construction and analysis of social space in Serbia. We used indicators
of economic capital and two types of cultural and social capital as active variables.
We operationalized economic capital (Table 1) with five indicators: (1) average monthly
income of the respondent’s household per household member; (2) size of respondent’s dwelling
(if owner); (3) size of respondent’s summer house/cottage (if any); (4) amount of land owned by
respondent (if any); (5) the value of the respondent’s car (if any).
Cultural capital (Table 2) was operationalized using four indicators: (1) respondent’s
education; (2) respondent’s mother’s education; (3) respondent’s father’s education; (4)
respondent’s musical taste.11
We relied on four indicators of social capital (Table 3). The first two represent political-social
capital in a narrow sense: (1) respondent’s membership in a political party; (2) respondent’s
involvement in party leadership at the local, regional or national level.12 The third indicator
showed (3) whether the respondent had access to informal networks for favor exchange in state
institutions. In the absence of a better indicator of social capital of solidarity, we relied on (4)
responses to questions regarding whether respondents enjoyed attending family celebrations and
whether they maintained primary network ties, which is a prerequisite for using these ties as a
form of social capital.
We projected onto the social space constructed in the above manner, indicators of cultural
practices,13 styles of material consumption and worldviews, identities and political preferences
as supplementary variables.
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468450
11 In 2005, we did not have a clear understanding of the existence of subtypes of cultural and social capital, identified in
subsequent data analyses. In order to make it possible for these differences to reveal themselves in the construction of
social space, we used indicators that, in the original research, were not designed to were not designed to operationalize
subtypes of cultural and social capital. For cultural capital, we used as an indicator the response to the question relating to
favorite musical genre. For social capital of solidarity, we used the response to the question relating to whether
respondents enjoyed attending family celebrations – i.e., whether they maintained primary network ties, a prerequisite for
using these ties as a form of social capital.12 Members of party leadership make up 4% of our sample, so we gave a lot of thought to the issue of including them in
the analysis. What tipped the scales in the end was that these people represent a part of the field of power in Serbia that is
certainly ‘‘populated’’ by a small number of people. In order to assess the stability of the social space constructed, we
included in the analysis a further 21 members of party leadership from a study we had conducted in 2006 using the same
questionnaire, thus raising their participation in the sample to 5%. A repeated analysis resulted in a map nearly identical to
the map of social space presented in Fig. 2.13 Under the term ‘‘cultural practices,’’ we conceived of a ‘‘block’’ of inter-connected elements comprising cultural
needs (motivation for participating in cultural activities); cultural habits (actual participation in cultural activities); taste
(preferences); knowledge of cultural issues and cultural possessions (cultural equipment, books, paintings, musical
instruments, etc.). See Reckwitz (2002).
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468 451
Table 2
Distribution of indicators of cultural capital.
Variable, categories and map codes % Variable, categories and
map codes
%
(1) Respondent’s education (3) Father’s education
Elementary school or less (Self: �elem. sch.) 13.64 Elementary school or less
(Pa: �elem. sch.)
38.34
High school (Self: high sch.) 56.52 High school (Pa: high sch.) 42.52
College (Self: college) 12.17 College (Pa: college) 7.62
Graduate education (Self: BA+) 15.47 Graduate education (Pa: BA+) 9.38
Missing 2.20 Missing 2.13
100% 100%
(2) Mother’s education (4) Taste
Elementary school or less (Ma: �elem. sch.) 50.51 Folklore taste (FOLKLORE) 22.87
High school (Ma: high sch.) 36.95 Rurban omnivores
(RURBAN OMNIVORES)
36.58
College (Ma: college) 4.77 Urban taste (URBAN) 9.38
Graduate education (Ma: BA+) 5.79 Conventional taste
(CONVENTIONAL)
28.74
Missing 1.98 Elite taste (ELITE) 1.98
Missing 0.44
100% 100%
Table 1
Distribution of indicators of economic capital.
Variable, categories and map codes % Variable, categories and map codes %
(1) Family income per capita (4) Land size
Less than 50 EUR (I: �50 EUR) 19.65 No land (Land 0) 69.79
50–100 EUR (I: 50–100 EUR) 28.30 Up to 2 ha (Land �2) 12.24
101–250 EUR (I: 100–250 EUR) 37.10 2–10 ha (Land 2–10) 15.84
More than 250 EUR (I: 250+ EUR) 11.44 10+ ha (Land 10+) 1.98
Missing 3.52 Missing 0.15
100% 100%
(2) Size of house/flat (5) Cost of car
No house/flat (Flat 0) 10.85 No car (Car 0) 53.96
Up to 50 m2 (Flat �50) 14.30 Up to 1000 EUR (Car �1000) 18.18
51–75 m2 (Flat 51–75) 25.22 1001–5000 EUR (Car 1000–5000) 21.33
76–100 m2 (Flat 76–100) 23.83 5000+ EUR (Car 5000+) 6.45
100+ m2 (Flat 100+) 23.75 Missing 0.07
Missing 2.05
100% 100%
(3) Size of summer cottage
No cottage (Cottage 0) 81.31
Up to 50 m2 (Cottage �50) 7.04
51–100 m2 (Cottage 51–100) 5.65
100+ m2 (Cottage 100+) 6.01
Missing 0.00
100%
We used 26 variables as indicators of cultural practices: five indicators of cultural needs, six
indicators of cultural habits, eleven indicators of taste, two indicators of ownership of cultural
goods and two indicators of cultural knowledge. For indicators of style of material consumption,
we relied on 6 variables: indicators of the quality of respondents’ home equipment and indicators
pertaining to shopping for clothes and going away for a vacation (Table 4). To show how our
constructed social space organizes worldviews, identities and political preferences, we used eight
indicators (Table 5).
Finally, to demonstrate that our constructed social space, which uses both volume and
types of capitals, can be used to identify theoretical social classes, we constructed two
variables for respondents’ occupation and social class. First, we used respondents’
occupation – measured in the survey with a scale of 27 occupations – to construct nine basic
groups of occupations on the basis of the type and volume of resources used by respondents
in work and life strategies. Care was also taken to ensure that respondents who belong to each
of the nine have comparable levels of education and income and that their work conditions
are also comparable. These nine occupational groups include: (1) farmers; (2) unskilled and
semiskilled workers; (3) highly skilled workers; (4) lower-level experts; (5) clerks and lower
management; (6) small entrepreneurs; (7) experts; (8) big entrepreneurs, CEOs and upper
management; and (9) politicians and high ranking military and police officers. Second, after
showing how these occupations map onto our social space, we constructed four theoretical
social classes. (The frequency of each occupation and class in the sample will be displayed in
the respective maps.)
4. Results and analysis
In order to construct the Serbian social space, we employed multiple correspondence
analysis, or MCA (Greenacre, 2007; Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010; Le Roux et al., 2008; Lebart
et al., 1984). We used specific MCA (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010), with the ‘‘missing’’
categories as passive categories of the active variables. We use indicators of economic (21
modalities), cultural (17 modalities) and social capital (10 modalities) as active variables. Table
6 shows the eigenvalues and variances explained by the first 5 axes. Data were analyzed using
SPAD 7.3.
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468452
Table 3
Distribution of indicators of social capital.
Variable, categories and map codes % Variable, categories and map codes %
(1) Party membership (3) Access to informal networks for favors
Party members (Party+) 11.58 No connections (Connect 0) 39.88
Not party members (Party�) 86.95 Connections score between 1 and 4 (Connect+) 36.00
Missing 1.47 Connections score between 5 and 10 (Connect++) 23.83
Missing 0.29
100% 100%
(2) Party leadership (4) Access to ‘‘primary ties’’ networks
Party leaders (Party Leader+) 3.52 Enjoys family gatherings (Family+) 60.85
Not party leaders (Party Leader�) 96.26 Neither enjoy, nor dislike (Family+/�) 24.78
Missing 0.22 Dislike family gatherings (Family�) 10.04
Missing 4.33
100% 100%
P.
Cvetica
nin
, M
. P
op
escu /
Po
etics 3
9 (2
01
1)
44
4–4
68
4
53
Table 4
Distribution of cultural styles and material consumption indicators.
Modalities and map codes % Modalities and map codes % Modalities and map codes %
(1) Like going to theater (12) Like traditional folk (23) # books in home library
Yes (LikeTheater+) 34.09 Yes (Folk+) 56.01 Over 200 (Lib 200+) 15.91
Neutral (LikeTheater+�) 23.90 Neutral (Folk+�) 21.19 26–199 (Lib 26–199) 43.55
No (LikeTheater��) 37.46 No (Folk��) 17.52 Less than 25 (Lib <25) 38.05
Missing 4.55 Missing 5.28 Missing 2.49
(2) Like going to art galleries (13) Like newly composed folk (24) Types of cultural equipment
Yes (LikeArtGal+) 19.50 Yes (NewFolk+) 36.66 Lux (CultE++) 21.48
Neutral (LikeArtGal+�) 25.37 Neutral (NewFolk+�) 20.53 Standard (CultE+) 37.83
No (LikeArtGal��) 49.78 No (NewFolk��) 37.76 Basic (CultE) 40.69
Missing 5.35 Missing 5.06 Missing 0.00
(3) Like doing art (14) Like turbo folk (25) # correct answers to local culture
questions
Yes (LikeArt+) 14.15 Yes (TurboFolk+) 23.83 0 (local: 0ans) 8.65
Neutral (LikeArt+�) 14.66 Neutral (TurboFolk+�) 18.84 1–4 (Local: 1–4ans) 54.55
No (LikeArtGal��) 65.10 No (TurboFolk��) 51.83 5–8 (Local: 5+ans) 27.79
Missing 6.09 Missing 5.50 Missing 9.02
(4) Like going to sport events (15) Like easy listening music (26) # correct answers to global culture
questions
Yes (LikeSportEvent+) 29.99 Yes (EasyLis+) 58.50 0 (Global: 0 ans) 43.48
Neutral (LikeSportEvent+�) 18.99 Neutral (EasyLis+�) 20.16 1–4 (Global: 1–4 ans) 38.71
No (LikeSportEvent��) 46.26 No (EasyLis��) 15.98 5–8 (Global: 5+ ans) 8.80
Missing 4.77 Missing 5.35 Missing 9.02
(5) Like going to family events (16) Like classical music (27) Types of home equipment
Yes (LikeFam+) 60.85 Yes (Classics+) 27.42 Lux (HomeEquip: Lux) 10.56
Neutral (LikeFam+/�) 24.78 Neutral (Classics+�) 25.59 Standard (HomeEquip: Std) 39.08
No (LikeFam�) 10.04 No (Classics��) 42.01 Basic (HomeEquip: Basic) 50.37
Missing 4.33 Missing 4.99 Missing 0.00
(6) Went to theater past yr (17) Like jazz and blues (28) Freq. buying cloths abroad
Often (GoTheater++) 9.53 Yes (JazzBlues+) 25.59 Often (DressAbroad++) 2.27
Some (GoTheater+) 19.79 Neutral (JazzBlues+�) 20.60 Some (DressAbroad+) 15.62
No (GoTheater��) 68.70 No (JazzBlues��) 48.90 None (DressAbroad 0) 74.93
Missing 1.98 Missing 4.91 Missing 0.00
P.
Cvetica
nin
, M
. P
op
escu /
Po
etics 3
9 (2
01
1)
44
4–4
68
45
4
Table 4 (Continued )
Modalities and map codes % Modalities and map codes % Modalities and map codes %
(7) Went to art galleries past yr (18) Like rock (29) Freq. buying cloths at flea market
Often (GoArtGal++) 8.21 Yes (RockPop+) 44.28 Often (DressFlea++) 33.43
Some (GoArtGal+) 17.01 Neutral (RockPop+�) 15.84 Some (DressFlea+) 40.18
No (GoArtGal��) 73.09 No (RockPop��) 35.70 None (DressFlea 0) 22.29
Missing 1.69 Missing 4.18 Missing 0.00
(8) Went to sport events past yr (19) Like ‘‘dance and house’’ music (30) Freq. went on holidays (last 5 yrs)
Often (GoSportEvent++) 19.57 Yes (DanceHouse+) 24.34 Often (Holidays++) 18.18
Some (GoSportEvent+) 20.16 Neutral (DanceHouse+�) 15.91 Some (Holidays+) 33.87
No (GoSportEvent��) 58.36 No (DanceHouse��) 54.99 None (Holidays 0) 46.70
Missing 1.91 Missing 4.77 Missing 1.25
(9) Hours of TV in weekends (20) Like techno (31) Lodging while on holiday
More than 5 h (TV++) 9.90 Yes (Techno+) 12.32 Hotel (Hotels) 12.76
1–5 h (TV+) 71.55 Neutral (Techno+�) 13.27 Bed & Breakfast (B&B) 37.90
Less than 1 hr (TV��) 14.66 No (Techno��) 69.57 Didn’t go on holiday 48.24
Missing 3.89 Missing 4.84 Missing 1.10
(10) Freq. of internet use (21) Like hip-hop (32) Holiday destinations
Heavy (Internet++) 16.06 Yes (HipHop+) 8.21 Abroad (Abroad) 19.43
Low (Internet+) 24.56 Neutral (HipHop+�) 13.20 Local (Country) 31.52
None (Internet��) 53.45 No (HipHop��) 72.87 Didn’t go on holiday 46.33
Missing 5.94 Missing 5.72 Missing 2.71
(11) # of books read past yr (22) Like heavy metal
Over 8 (Books 8+) 13.93 Yes (HeavyMetal+) 9.90
1–7 (Books 1–7) 38.56 Neutral (HeavyMetal+�) 11.73
None (Books 0) 43.91 No (HeavyMetal��) 73.61
Missing 3.59 Missing 4.77
4.1. Social space of Serbia
Because of space limitations, we discuss only the plane defined by the first two axes (see
Fig. 2).14 Table 7 presents the contribution of the active modalities on the two axes.
Axis 1 – which explains the greatest part of the total variance, just as in Bourdieu’s model –
expresses the total volume of capital. As illustrated in Fig. 2, axis 1 distinguishes between high
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468 455
Table 5
Distribution of worldview variables.
Modalities and map codes % Modalities and map codes %
(1) Self-identification (same codes in maps) (5) Attitudes toward privatization
ID: man/woman 23.09 In favor (PrivateEc+) 28.96
ID: family 59.38 Neutral (PrivateEc+/�) 21.70
ID: occupation 1.91 Opposed (PrivateEc�) 47.21
ID: party 0.73 Missing 2.13
ID: inhabitant/local 1.03 100%
ID: inhabitant/region 0.44 (6) President vote
ID: nation 3.23 Tadic (Vote: Tadic) 39.15
ID: religion 1.98 Nikolic (Vote: Nikolic) 13.78
ID: race 0.15 Didn’t vote for president (Pres: No vote) 35.26
ID: citizen 0.44 Missing 11.80
ID: Balkan 0.59 100%
ID: European 1.32 (7) Party vote
ID: Cosmopolitan 1.83 DS (Vote DS) 22.14
ID: Other 0.07 G17+ (Vote G17+) 2.13
Missing 3.81 LDP (Vote LDP) 1.32
100% DSS (Vote DSS) 3.74
(2) Attitudes toward abortion SRS (Vote SRS) 10.78
In favor (Abortion+) 50.59 SPS (Vote SPS) 2.05
Neutral (Abortion+/�) 15.10 Didn’t vote for a party (Party: No vote) 41.72
Opposed (Abortion�) 32.62 Missing 16.13
Missing 1.69 100%
100%
(3) Attitudes toward homosexual marriage (8) Score on nationalism scale
In favor (Homosex+) 12.39 Score below 15 (Nationalism 1) 16.72
Neutral (Homosex+/�) 11.36 Score 16–20 (Nationalism 2) 18.70
Opposed (Homosex�) 74.49 Score 21–25 (Nationalism 3) 19.50
Missing 1.76 Score 26–30 (Nationalism 4) 13.64
100% Score above 31 (Nationalism 5) 11.66
Missing 19.79
(4) Well-being of the nation more important
than individual well-being
100%
Yes (Nation+) 28.67
Neither, nor (Nation+/�) 28.01
No (Nation�) 40.76
Missing 2.57
100%
14 As shown in Table 6, social space in Serbia is organized along three axes. The first one accounts for 62.11%, the
second for 10.34%, and the third one for 8.20% of the variance. The total cumulative modified weight of the first three
axes is 81%. The third axis systematically separated the extreme values of capital (minimum and maximum values) at one
pole and averages of all types and subtypes of capital values at the other pole.
total volume of capital (on the left – marked TVC++) and low total volume of capital (on the right
– marked TVC��). High volume of capital is indicated by monthly family income per
household member of over 250 EUR (I: 250 EUR+); apartment/house of over 100 m2 (Flat
100+); summer/weekend house/cottage of over 100 m2 (cottage 100+); university education of
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468456
57.057.0-
-2.25
-1.50
-0.75
0.75
Axis 1: 62.11%
Axis 2: 10. 3%
Self:<=elem. sch.
Ma: hig h sch .
FOLKLORE
I: 250+ EUR
Flat 0
Flat 100 +
Cottage 100 +
Land 0
Land 2-1 0
Car1000-500 0
Car 500 0+
Party+
Party Leader+
Connect0
Connect++
Self: BA+
Ma: <=elem. sch.
Ma: college
'Ma: BA+
Pa: <=elem. sch.
Pa: high sch.
Pa: collegePa: BA+
RURBAN OMNIV.
URBAN
CONVENTIONAL
ELITE
I: <=5 0 EUR
I: 50-100 EUR
I: 100 -250 EUR Cottage 0
Cottage 51-10 0 Land <= 2
Family +
Family+/-
Family -
Party-
Flat<=50
TVC--TVC++
LCC
GCC EC--
EC++PSC
SCS1
43
2
bisector II
bisector I
Fig. 2. Map of social space of Serbia.
Table 6
Eigenvalues, raw and modified inertia for the first five axes.
Axes 1 2 3 4 5
Eigenvalues (l) 0.2329 0.1484 0.1401 0.1030 0.0968
Raw inertia 9.11% 5.81% 5.48% 4.03% 3.95%
Modified inertia 62.11% 10.34% 8.20% 2.39% 2.21%
both parents (MA: BA+, PA: BA+) and of the respondent him/herself (Self: BA+); a large number
of active ties in public institutions (Connect++); membership in a political party (Party+); and
membership in the leadership of a political party (Party Leader+). Low volume of capital is
indicated by a concentration of modalities representing minimal values for all indicators:
monthly family income of under 50 EUR per capita (I: �50 EUR); apartment/house smaller than
50 m2 (Flat �50 m2); no ownership of a car, summer/weekend house/cottage or land (Car 0,
Cottage 0 and Land 0); primary and lower level of education of both respondent and respondent’s
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468 457
Table 7
Active categories in the construction of social space: Contributions (in %) to the first 2 axes (in bold, contributions of
categories selected for the interpretation of each axis).
Contributions (in %) Contributions (in %)
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 1 Axis 2
(1) Family income per capita (7) Mother’s education
I: �50 EUR 4.00 0.20 Ma: �elem. sch. 7.74 1.47
I: 50–100 EUR 0.99 0.02 Ma: high sch. 4.18 1.86
I: 100–250 EUR 1.54 0.93 Ma: college 1.61 0.06
I: 250+ EUR 3.82 2.26 Ma: BA+ 4.00 0.00
10.35 3.40 17.53 3.39
(2) Size of house/flat (8) Father’s education
Flat 0 0.32 3.47 Pa: �elem. sch. 10.38 1.56
Flat �50 0.92 1.39 Pa: high sch. 1.85 1.06
Flat 51–75 0.00 0.43 Pa: college 1.82 0.06
Flat 76–100 0.00 0.27 Pa: BA+ 5.88 0.00
Flat 100+ 0.27 5.70 19.93 2.68
1.51 11.26 (9) Taste
(3) Size of summer cottage FOLKLORE 10.22 2.34
Cottage 0 0.14 0.94 RURBAN OMNIVORES 0.01 0.06
Cottage �50 0.02 0.00 URBAN 2.48 0.96
Cottage 51–100 0.03 1.29 CONVENTIONAL 2.85 1.09
Cottage 100+ 1.12 6.45 ELITEa – –
1.31 8.69 15.56 4.45
(4) Land size (10) Party membership
Land 0 0.26 5.26 Party+ 1.44 12.21
Land 2–10 0.58 1.46 Party� 0.19 1.59
Land 10+ 0.20 11.71 1.64 13.81
1.05 18.43 (11) Party leadership
(5) Cost of car Party Leader+ 1.26 14.13
Car 0 1.39 3.27 Party Leader� 0.05 0.50
Car �1000 0.06 0.06 1.31 14.63
Car 1000–5000 1.18 3.40 (12) Access to informal networks
Car 5000+ 3.45 2.17 Connect 0 3.17 1.60
6.08 8.90 Connect+ 0.01 0.21
(6) Respondent’s education Connect++ 4.68 4.94
Self: �elem. sch. 8.81 1.69 7.86 6.75
Self: high sch. 0.01 0.52 (13) Access to ‘‘primary ties’’
Self: college 0.46 0.06 Family+ 0.32 0.51
Self: BA+ 5.34 0.00 Family+/� 0.16 0.78
14.62 2.27 Family� 0.78 0.03
1.25 1.32
a Passive category. Used for illustrative purposes only.
parents (MA: �elem. sch; PA: �elem. sch, Self: �elem. sch); lack of ties in state institutions
(Connect 0) and no membership in a political party (Party�) and, therefore, in party leadership
(Party Leader�).
When we draw the angle bisector through origin at 458 in relation to both Axes 1 and 2, we see
that plotted along bisector I are mainly indicators of social capital. Indicators of economic
capital are located in their vicinity. In the first quadrant of the map of social space in Serbia (top
right corner), we find a concentration of both low values of indicators of economic capital and
lack of indicators of political social capital (such as party membership and party leadership
membership or ties in state bodies), but also positive indicators of the social capital of solidarity
(Family+).
Conversely, in the third quadrant of the map (the lower left corner), plotted along bisector I
are indicators of political social capital (membership of political parties, membership of party
leadership, and a large number of ‘‘connections and acquaintances’’ in public institutions).
Also located in the vicinity of this axis are high values of economic capital indicators (such as
a large apartment or summer/weekend house/cottage, an expensive car and high family
income).
Similarly, when we draw the angle bisector through origin at 458 that passes through the
second quadrant (top left corner) and fourth quadrant (the lower right corner), we find indicators
of global cultural capital concentrated in the second quadrant (graduate education of respondents
and their parents and elite and urban taste), and indicators of low education of respondents and
their parents and folklore and rurban taste (in quadrant four).
This result strongly supports the idea that both volume and type of capital should be used when
constructing social space. In his research papers, Bourdieu treats capital composition as a relative
preponderance of economic or cultural capital. However, the results of the above analyses
suggest that we should also consider different types (qualities) of capitals, such as ‘‘local cultural
capital’’ and ‘‘global cultural capital’’ for cultural capital, and ‘‘social capital of solidarity’’ and
‘‘political social capital’’ for social capital. Our map of social space thus constructed indicates the
existence of different bases (resources) for social grouping in Serbia and therefore different
strategies available to these different groups.
This can be clearly seen when indicators of cultural practices and material style of
consumption (Fig. 3) and respondent worldviews and political preferences (Fig. 4) are
superimposed onto this map as supplementary variables.
4.2. Types of cultural practices and styles of material consumption
The second step is to test whether the social space constructed above can be used as a
‘‘predictive map’’ (Lebart et al., 1984) when it comes to types of cultural practices and styles of
material consumption in Serbia. To do so, we project onto it indicators of cultural practices and
material consumption as supplementary variables. These variables have 60 modalities (see
Fig. 3).
As Fig. 3 confirms, the angle bisector axis stretching from quadrant 4 (lower right corner) to
quadrant 2 (top left corner) is the axis that discriminates between local cultural capital (bottom
right corner, marked LCC) and global cultural capital (top left corner, marked GCC).15 In
quadrant 2, below this angle bisector axis and next to Axis 1, we find indicators characteristic of
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468458
15 This axis corresponds to Axis 1 in Fig. 1.
traditional elite cultural practices: frequent visits to the theater and art galleries (GoTheater++,
GoArtGallery++); large home libraries (Library 200+); and intensive use of the computer and
Internet (Internet++). Above this group of modalities, also in the second quadrant of the map,
plotted along the bisector axis we find indicators of the cultural practices of elite omnivores and
global urban cultural practices. Once again, in their cultural practices elite omnivores cross the
boundary that separates traditional global elite culture and global contemporary popular culture.
Their cultural practices are identified by indicators such as highest level of knowledge related to
global culture (Global: Ans 5+); a large number of books read in the twelve months before the
survey (Books 8+); and an affinity for classical music, but also jazz and blues, rock and pop
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468 459
0.15.05.0-0.1-
-0.50
-0.25
0.25
Axis 1
Axis 2
LikeTheater+
LikeTheater--
LikeArtGal +
LikeArtGal +/-
LikeArtGal --
LikeClass ical+
LikeClass ical +/-
LikeClass ical- -
LikeRockJazz +
LikeRockJazz +/-
LikeRockJazz --
LikeFolk+
LikeFolk +/-
LikeFolk--
LikeBooks+
LikeBoo ks--
LikeArt +/-
LikeArt--LikeSportE vent+
LikeSportEvent +/-
LikeSportEvent--
LikePlaySport+
LikePlaySport--
LikeFamEvent+
LikeFamEvent +/-
LikeFamEvent--
GoTheater++
GoTheater--
GoConcert++
GoConcert+
GoConcert--
GoArtGal++
GoArtGal+
GoArtGal--
GoLibrary++
GoLibrary+
GoLibrary--
GoS portEvent++
GoSportE vent+
GoSportEvent--
TV>5
TV1-5
PC++
PC+
PC--
Internet++
Internet+
Internet--
Books8+
Books1-7
Books0
Folk+
Folk--
NewFolk+
NewFolk +/-
NewFolk--
TurboFolk+
TurboFol k +/-
TurboFolk--
EasyLis +/-
Class ics+
Class ics--
JazzBlues+
JazzBlues--
RockPop+
RockPop +/-
RockPop--
DanceHouse--
Techno+HipHop+
HeavyMetal +
Lib200+Lib26-19 9
Lib<25
CultE++
CultE
HomeE++
HomeE+
HomeE
DressA++
Dress A+
Dress A0
Dress F++
Dress F+
Dress F0
Holi day++
Holi day+
Holi day0
Hotel
B&B Holi day0
Abroad
Holi day0
LCC
GCC EC--
EC++PSC
SCS
1
43
2
TVC--TVC++
Fig. 3. Cultural practices and material consumption projected on the social space (zoomed around the map center).
music, dance/house and techno music. The global urban cultural practices, on the other hand,
remain within the confines of contemporary popular culture and are expressed in terms of
preferences for contemporary forms of global pop culture, such as techno, dance/house, heavy
metal, and a dislike of contemporary forms of local popular culture, such as newly composed folk
music (NewFolk��) or turbo-folk music (TurboFolk��).
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468460
-0.75
0.75
-2.25
-1.50
-0.75
0.75
Axis 1
Axis 2
ID: occup ation
ID: party
ID: inhabitant/localID: inhabitant/regio
ID: nation
ID: religion
ID: race
ID: citizen
ID: BalkanID: Europe an
ID: Cosmopoli tan
Abortion+
Abortion-
Homosex+
Homosex-Nation+
Nation-
PrivateEc+PrivateEc-
Vote: Tadic
Vote: Nik olic
Pres: No vote
Vote DS
Vote G17+
Vote LDP
Vote DSSVote SRS
Vote SPS
Party: No voteNationalism 1
Nationalism 4
Nationalism 5
LCC
GCC EC--
EC++PSC
SCS
1
43
2
TVC--TVC++
Fig. 4. Identities, attitudes and political preferences.
In the central part of the map, we find indicators of two other groups of omnivores:
rurban16 omnivores (who cross the boundary between popular global and popular local
culture), and conformist omnivores (who cross both of the important symbolic boundaries in
the field of cultural practices in Serbia: that between local and global culture, and that
between traditional and contemporary popular culture). The latter group of modalities is
characterized by knowledge pertaining to both local (Local: Ans 5–8) and global culture
(Global: Ans 1–4); possession of slightly smaller home libraries (Library 26–199) and a
smaller number of books read in the year preceding the survey (Books 1–7). In the taste
domain, the conformist omnivores are characterized by a parallel affinity for classical music
(although not a marked one, Classic+�); an affinity for folk music singers of the older
generation; and a marked affinity for easy listening music, which is a distinctive preference of
this group (EasyListening++).
Rurban omnivores share many of the above-mentioned features in the field of cultural
consumption; however, in the taste domain, they display a mixture of products of global and
local culture, genres (techno and dance/house on the one hand and turbo-folk on the other)
and singers, DJs and bands that are typically treated as discordant. Further down this axis
(quadrant 4), we find the two remaining types that we have identified in the field of cultural
practices (Fig. 1). Indicators characteristic of these styles display an affinity for original folk
music (Folk+), as well as an affinity for the already-mentioned singers of the older generation
(for carriers of the traditional folk style), for neo-folk music (NewFolk+) and turbo-folk
music (TurboFolk+) and turbo-folk performers (such as Ceca Raznatovic and Jelena
Karleusa). Indicators also include a preference for family television drama produced in
Serbia, in particular drama depicting rural life, as well as a preference for a specific type of
popular Serbian television sitcoms. These styles are also characterized by a low level of
knowledge pertaining to both elite and popular global culture (Global: Ans 0); small home
libraries or no books in the home (Lib <25); absence of reading as a leisure activity (Book 0);
and a dislike of elite and popular global genres (Classics��; Jazz/Blues��; Rock/Pop��;
Dance/House��).
Along the second inserted axis, we find mainly indicators of material consumption.
The segment of social space characterized by a high level of economic capital and
possession of political social capital (quadrant 3) also displays conspicuous material
consumption: summer/winter holidays abroad (HolidaysAbroad); vacation accommodation
exclusively in hotels (Hotels); shopping for clothes abroad (DressAbroad); luxurious home
equipment (HomeEquip: Lux) and cultural equipment (CultE++). Along bisector II, the
leisure activities most often mentioned are sports-related activities (LikeSportEvent++,
GoSportEvent++).
At the opposite pole of bisector II, we find indicators that point to no summer/winter vacation
travel (Holidays 0); shopping for clothing at the flea market (DressFlea++); ownership of basic
home equipment (HomeEquip: Basic) and basic cultural equipment (CultE). In between the two
poles, close to the map center, we find the mean values of indicators of material consumption,
such as ownership of a standard set of home equipment and cultural equipment (HomeEqup: Std
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468 461
16 Rurban cultural practices represent a mixture of global popular cultural practices and local popular cultural practices.
The social carriers of these ‘‘neither-urban-nor-rural’’ cultural practices are mainly members of the second and third
generation migrants to cities in the course of rapid urbanization. Regarding this phenomenon of the peasant urbanities, see
also Simic and Hammel (1973).
and Cult. E+); summer/winter holiday travel within Serbia (Country) in B&Bs and camps
(B&B).
4.3. Social space and identities, attitudes and political preferences
The third step was to find out how particular patterns of identities, political
preferences and stands on social issues corresponded to our constructed social space. For
this purpose, we projected the eight indicators of worldviews, identities and political
preferences onto the social space (as supplementary variables). These indicators have 38
modalities.
As indicated in Fig. 4, high volume of total capital correlates with self-identification
as ‘‘European’’ (ID: European) or ‘‘citizen of the world’’ (ID: Cosmopolitan). The
respondents richest in cultural capital identified themselves as ‘‘Other’’ rather than with any
of the pre-defined answers we offered them (ID: Other), while respondents with political
social capital listed their political party as the most important basis for identification (ID:
Party). In this area of social space close to the pole of high total volume of capital, we
encounter indicators of positive attitudes toward the privatization of state property
(PrivateEc+); women’s right to abortion (Abortion+); and the right to marriage of adult
homosexuals (Homosex+); as well as the lowest scores on the nationalism scale (Nationalism
1). Therefore, the inhabitants of this area of the Serbian social space should be identified as
liberal. Those closer to the pole of global cultural capital (quadrant 2) support the Liberal-
Democratic Party (Vote LDP), a party whose members are mostly young people rich in
cultural capital, with a pro-Western orientation – a party that might be considered an example
of the ‘‘cultural left’’ in Serbia. On the other hand, the respondents from this same area of the
social space with high total volume of capital, but closer to the pole where indicators of high
economic capital and political social capital are located (quadrant 3), support G17+ (Vote
G17+), a party that developed from a think-tank expert organization (G17) and that promoted
a libertarian ideology and the interests of entrepreneurs and technocrats in its subsequent
political program.
On the right of the social spacewe find an exact opposite in ideological orientation: identification
with family (ID: family), traditional gender roles (ID: man/woman) and the nation (ID: nation).
This area of the social space is also characterized by a negative attitude toward the privatization of
state property (PrivateEc�) and the right of adult homosexuals to marriage (Homosex�), as well as
a negative (Abortion�) or ambivalent (Abortion+�) attitude toward women’s right to abortion. To
the right of Axis 1, which indicates a decrease in the total range of capital, we observe high scores on
the nationalism scale (Nationalism 3 and Nationalism 4), while the highest score on this scale in
social space (Nationalism 5) is located slightly lower, closer to the local cultural capital pole.
The dominant worldview in this area of social space (lower right hand corner) could be described as
conservative. Here, we find the voters of the Socialist Party of Serbia (Vote SPS) and the Serbian
Radical Party (Vote SRS), the main proponents of nationalistic politics and civil wars in the former
Yugoslavia in the 1990s. People who voted for Tomislav Nikolic (SRS candidate for president in
2005) are also to the right of the social space.
Closer to the central part of social space, an area characterized by average values of total
capital and a preponderance of conformist omnivores and rurban omnivores, we find self-
identification with the place of residence (inhabitant/region and inhabitant/local); religion (ID:
religion); and the Balkans as a geographical and cultural area (ID: Balkan). The central area of
the social space clusters ambivalent attitudes toward the privatization of state property
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468462
(PrivateEC+�) and toward the right of adult homosexuals to marriage (Homosex+�).
Interestingly, here we also find the electoral base of the Democratic Party (Vote: DS) and the
Democratic Party of Serbia (Vote: DSS), which formed the government when we conducted the
survey. This was precisely the electoral base that assured the 2005 victory of Boris Tadic, the
presidential candidate of the Democratic Party.
Next to Axis 2, in the upper area of social space, above Axis 1, characterized by low economic
capital, we find those who abstained from voting (Party: No vote and Pres: No vote). It seems
likely that their abstinence is equally the result of the lack of economic capital and the lack of
political social capital.
Overall, it appears that in Serbia, cultural practices and styles of material consumption,
identity sources, elements of worldviews and political preferences unequivocally respond to
the ‘‘gravitational pull’’ of social space. Our analysis shows that the endless variety of
social and cultural practices is far from random or idiosyncratic, even though it cannot be
reduced to social conditioning. Our results reveal that particular cultural practices, types of
material consumption, particular identities and political preferences are more probable in
certain areas of social space than in others. The types of resources available to the inhabitants
of particular areas of the social space clearly influence the social practices of citizens of
Serbia and represent the basis for particular social collectivities and their associated life
strategies.
4.4. The construction of theoretical social classes
Our final task was to reconstruct how these resources contribute to the constitution of social
classes in Serbia. To do so, we projected the nine occupational groups identified in Section 3 on
the cloud of individuals in the social space that we constructed, and then drew the concentration
ellipses (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010; Le Roux et al., 2008). The numbering of the quadrants
follows the convention in Figs. 2–4.
As Fig. 5 indicates, the nine occupation groups described in Section 3 above occupy
different areas of social space, and are therefore characterized by different combinations of
capitals, different cultural practices and material consumption styles, identities, worldviews
and political preferences. Farmers are on the whole located on the right-hand side of
social space and are subsequently characterized by a low total volume of capital, local
cultural capital, a low level of economic capital and reliance on the social resources
of solidarity. Given the area of social space they occupy, farmers are mainly characterized
by traditional folklore cultural practices and neo-folk cultural practices. They identify on the
basis of primordial relationships (identities related to gender roles, family and nation),
and exhibit a conservative worldview (negative attitudes toward the right of women to
abortion, homosexual marriages and the privatization of state property). And farmers have
high scores on the nationalism scale. They represent the social base of the Socialist Party of
Serbia and the Serbian Radical Party. Farmers are the group whose characteristics exhibit the
lowest level of variance, making them the most coherent group of all nine occupational
groups.
Unskilled, semiskilled and highly skilled workers cover the same areas of social space – with a
low and average total volume of capital, a relatively low volume of economic capital, reliance on
the social resources of solidarity and, unlike farmers, lack of unity in terms of belonging to local
or global capital. It is also worth mentioning that variance within the group of highly skilled
workers is lower than within the group of unskilled workers. We distinguish two clusters of
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468 463
individuals: one located more in the field of local cultural capital and another located more in the
field of global cultural capital. Presumably, this distinction is due to other social determinants
(such as gender, age, place of residence).
In contrast, lower-level experts, clerks and lower managers, as well as small entrepreneurs,
occupy an area of social space characterized by an average total volume of capital, average
volume of economic resources, a more pronounced reliance on political social capital than on
the social resources of solidarity, and membership in both local and global culture. Based on
their position in social space, these groups seem to be characterized by the cultural practices of
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468464
Fig. 5. Occupational groups in Serbia.
conformist omnivores and rurban omnivores. Their position in the social space also
indicates self-identification based on place of residence (local identity, regional identity,
Balkan identity) and on religion. These occupational groups are characterized by ambivalent
attitudes toward issues like abortion, homosexual marriages and the privatization of state
property and average scores on the scale of nationalism. Their political preferences in 2005
leaned toward the Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia (at that moment the
ruling parties).
Lastly, the occupational groups of CEOs and upper management, politicians and higher-
level experts are located to the left of Axis 2, which corresponds to high total volume of
capital. Experts are almost entirely located in the upper left area of the social space, which
corresponds to global cultural capital. Experts are characterized by elite cultural practices,
the practices of elite omnivores and global urban cultural practices. They self-identify either
as individualistic or European/cosmopolitan, hold liberal worldviews and vote mainly for the
Liberal-Democratic Party. Although predominantly located on the left of the social space, the
occupational group consisting of professional politicians, managers of state companies and
high-ranking police and army officers also occupies the central part of the map, as well as a
sizeable part of the area below Axis 1, characterized by local cultural capital. This
distribution partially matches the dispersion of middle classes in social space and cultural
practices, forms of identification, worldviews and political preferences of clerks, small
entrepreneurs and lower-level experts.
Finally, the group of large entrepreneurs is the group with the highest variance. They are
mainly located on the left area of the social space, along the axis that organizes indicators of
economic and social capital. However, the distribution of this occupational group also
encompasses a large area in the center of the social space and the area of local cultural capital.
They represent a highly incoherent group recently recruited from all possible social strata; hence,
their cultural practices range from traditional elite cultural practices to the practices of rurban
omnivores and neo-folk cultural practices. Similarly, in terms of self-identification, worldviews
and political preferences, this occupational group has high variance. The only constant for the
majority in this occupational group is the high volume of economic capital and the predominant
use of political social capital.
The analysis of Fig. 5 indicates that we can construct four theoretical classes based on a
composite of similarities/differences in the total volume of capital, cultural practices, material
consumption styles, identities, worldviews and political preferences: (1) farmers (lower right
area of social space, fourth quadrant); (2) unskilled and skilled workers (top right area, first
quadrant); (3) the middle classes comprising lower-level experts, clerks and representatives of
lower management and small entrepreneurs (central area); and, (4) the upper classes comprising
professional politicians, managers of state companies and high-ranking police and army officers,
large entrepreneurs and experts in state and private companies (left area of social space, high total
volume of capital) (see Fig. 6).17
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468 465
17 In the transformation of these ‘‘theoretical’’ classes into real and mobilized classes in Serbia, an important role is
played by ‘‘struggles on symbolic boundaries’’ between holders of global and local cultural capital in Serbia. These
struggles rage in Serbia on four symbolic battlefields: between the educated and the uneducated; between the urban and
the recently urbanized (and rural) groups; between residents of the (‘‘European’’) (Cveticanin and Popescu, 2009). North
of the country and residents of the (‘‘Oriental’’) South; and between ‘‘cosmopolitans’’ and ‘‘patriots’’ It is worth
mentioning that in the case of the opposition between the ‘‘European’’ North and ‘‘Oriental’’ South, we are dealing with
the poles of symbolic geography of Serbia, not its geographical coordinates. See also Bakic-Hayden (1995).
5. Discussion and conclusions
In sum, in this paper we have demonstrated the importance of including subtypes of social and
cultural capital in the construction of social space in post-socialist societies such as Serbia. We
have showed that the main opposition previously identified in the field of cultural practices
(Cveticanin and Popescu, 2009) plays an important role in constitution of social collectivities in
Serbian society. We have also showed that patterns of identities, attitudes and political
preferences in Serbia are homologous with social space. Finally, we have demonstrated that, by
considering both differences in the volume and in the composition of forms of capital, we can
reliably construct four theoretical classes in Serbia: farmers, workers, middle classes and upper
classes. In conclusion, we attempt to identify the theoretical and methodological consequences of
a different understanding of the principle of capital composition.
According to Bourdieu social space includes both material (economic) and symbolic
(cultural) factors whereas, in a Weberian conception, these are separated as ‘‘class’’ and ‘‘status.’’
P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468466
Fig. 6. Theoretical classes in Serbia: subclouds in plane 1–2 with mean points and concentration ellipses.
This understanding of the composition of capital as ‘‘a relative preponderance of economic or
cultural capital among available resources and powers’’ enabled Bourdieu (1984) to identify
only a few basic types of class habitus and habitus of class fractions, and also allowed him to
characterize and even label some of them (e.g., ‘‘distance from necessity,’’ ‘‘aristocratic
asceticism and bourgeois hedonism,’’ ‘‘pretension and cultural goodwill’’ or ‘‘the choice of the
necessary’’). Habitus thus identified has been used to explain social practices according to the
formula ‘‘[(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice.’’
Our conception of social space encompasses the influence of the many important ‘‘powers and
resources’’ in the social formation: the influence of economic factors (indicators of volume of
economic capital), cultural factors (indicators of local and global cultural capital), the influence
of formal authority (indicators of political positioning) and informal powers (indicators of social
capital of solidarity and political social capital). Thus conceived, social space represents a
complex social jigsaw puzzle, which is no longer based on uniform units of measure –
‘‘amounts’’ of economic capital and of legitimate cultural capital. Instead, it consists of regions
defined (in addition to overall volume of capital and volume of economic capital) also by
different types of cultural capital and social capital. Constructed in this manner, it is somewhat in-
between Bourdieuian geometrical space and more topological models of a field (as in the cases
ofthe hodological space of Kurt Lewin or the organizational field of the ‘‘new institutionalists’’).
Within it, in the attempt to explain social practices, different combinations of capital and
subtypes of capital characteristic for particular areas of social space are used. Clearly, this
represents an explicative principle of high complexity, but as we have shown in this paper, some
types of social groupings and some types of social practices are more probable in certain areas of
social space than in others.
It is well known that Bourdieu’s conception of class incorporates a network of interactive
factors which is made up of so-called primary properties (volume of capital, composition of
capital and social trajectory) and secondary properties (gender, place of residence, age). It is also
well known that Bourdieu aimed to replace linear thinking with the ‘‘structural causality of a
network of factors’’ (empirically reformulated) (Weininger, 2002, 2005). We believe that in
relation to this theoretical complexity, Bourdieu’s model of social space (‘‘the field of social
classes’’) is rather reductive. At least as far as the analysis of post-socialist society in Serbia is
concerned, a more complex model of social space, which incorporates sub-types of social and
cultural capital has proven exceptionally useful.
Acknowledgments
The study was supported by the European Cultural Foundation. The authors would like to thank,
first and foremost, the editors of this special issue, Elizabeth B. Silva and Tony Bennett, and all
members of the SCUD network. Our thanks also go to Jovana Dimitrijevic Savic for the translation
and encouragement; Ivana Spasic for the patient reading of our papers and the ‘‘creative
grumbling;’’ Vanda Krefft for input during the editing process; and to Eric Gordy for many years of
support. Finally, grateful thanks to two anonymous reviewers who amazed us with the depth of their
knowledge and helped us improve our article. Any remaining errors are our own.
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Predrag Cveticanin is the head of the independent research institute Center for Empirical Cultural Studies of South-East
Europe. He was a coordinator of the three major research projects on cultural consumption in Serbia (2002, 2005, 2010).
His research interests focus on links between social and cultural stratification in South-East Europe.
Mihaela Popescu is assistant professor in the Department of Communication Studies at California State University, San
Bernardino, USA. Her research focuses on communication law and policy, the first amendment, political economy of
media industries, and cultural consumption patterns in South-East Europe.
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