Post on 15-May-2023
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ThisisthefirstversionofthemanuscriptsubmittedtoCurrentSociology.Thismanuscriptwasfurtherrevised,acceptedandpublishedon25September2015.Therevisedandpublishedisavailableonlineathttp://csi.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/09/23/0011392115599815.abstract
CorruptionandPublicSecrecy:Anethnographyoffootballmatch‐fixing
DinoNumerato
AbstractThetopicofcorruptionhasrecentlymovedfromtheperipherytothecentreofsocialscientificattention.Notwithstandingtheincreasedinterest,researchintocorruptionhasbeenempiricallylimitedandunder‐theorized.Thisstudyaddressesthatgapbyprovidinganethnographicaccountoffootballmatch‐fixingintheCzechRepublic.Byqualitativelyanalysingbothprimaryandsecondarydata,thisstudyexaminesmatch‐fixingandcorruptionthroughthelensoftheconceptofpublicsecrecy.Threedifferent,narrowlyintertwinedformsofmatch‐fixingareidentified:directcorruption,mediatedcorruptionandmeta‐corruption.Thestudyfurtherexploreshowthepubliclysecretnatureofmatch‐fixingisnormalisedandhowthematch‐fixingcomplexisreinforcedbyacompromisingcomplicityofsocialactorswhoarebothvictimsandprincipals.Althoughthisstudyfocusesonasport‐relatedexample,ithasboththeoreticalandempiricalimplicationsforasociologicalunderstandingofcorruptionoutsideofthesphereofsport.
Keywords
Corruption,publicsecrecy,football,thematch‐fixingcomplex,ethnography
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Introduction
WhenFCFixboroughplayedAFCBribeshireinthethirdlowestdivisionintheCzech
Republic,AFCBribeshirewaspositionedinthecalmmiddleofthecompetition’stable,
whereasFCFixboroughwaspositionedtowardsthebottomofthetableandwasat
riskofrelegation.Threedaysbeforethegame,thecoachofFCFixborougharrived
afterthestartoftraining,secretlysmiling.‘Sorryforbeingabitlate,pals.Ihavebeento
Bribeshiretoarrangesomething.…’Thesecretsmilewassoonexplained.OnSaturday,
AFCBribeshirearrivedtoFixboroughwithoutthreekeyplayers.Aftersomeinitial
difficulties,FCFixboroughdominatedthegameandwon.Afterthegame,aplayer
fromFCFixboroughconfessedtohisopponentthatthegamewasfixed.Withoutbeing
particularlydisillusionedorangry,acceptingthefixedgameasamatteroffact,as
somethingnormal,theAFCBribeshireplayerreplied,‘Soitwasfixed?!Ididnotknow
that…Ourcoachdidnottellusanything,althoughIhonestlyfounditabitweirdthat
ourbestplayerscouldnotmakeittoday.’(Fieldnotes,participantobservation,Czech
Republic2007)
Althoughthisanecdotalevidenceprovidesaspecificexampleofmatch‐fixingina
Czechamateurfootballleague,itempiricallyinformsabroadersociological
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understandingofcorruption,notablywithregardstoitspubliclysecretnature.This
aspectisobservablethroughtheapparentdisclosureofmatch‐fixingaccompanied
withadispassionatereactionoftheAFCBribeshire’splayer.Althoughmatch‐fixingis
generallyperceivedtorepresentpartoffootballculture,itsspecificexpressionsare
stillconcealedandkeptinsecrecy.Thisambiguitybetweenhiddenandarticulated
andbetweenknownandunknownthataltogetherconstitutethepubliclysecret
natureofmatch‐fixingarefurtherexploredthroughoutthispaper.
Hence,theaimofthisstudyistoempiricallyandtheoreticallyinformtheliteratureon
match‐fixingandcorruptionmorebroadlybyprovidingacriticalexaminationof
corruptionthroughthelensofpublicsecrecy.Inparticular,thisstudyaddressesthe
followingquestions.Whatformsofmatch‐fixingcanweidentifyincontemporary
football?Whatarethemainpatternsofthepubliclysecretnatureofmatch‐fixing?
Whatimplicationsdoesthepubliclysecretnatureofmatch‐fixinginfootballhavefora
broaderunderstandingofcorruption?Toaddressthesequestions,thisstudyprovides
anin‐depthqualitativeinsightintoCzechfootball.Empiricalevidenceisprimarily
drawnonsemi‐structuredqualitativeinterviewsandonbothparticipantandnon‐
participantobservations.Thedirectdataevidenceisfurtherenrichedwithareviewof
newspaperarticlescoveringmatch‐fixinginfootballandinsportmorebroadly.
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Thepaperfirstprovidesabriefcriticaldiscussionofexistingresearchonmatch‐fixing
andonthesociologicalunderstandingofcorruption.Afterwards,themethods
employedoverthecourseofthisresearcharepresented.Interpretationofempirical
datafollows;abasicoutlineofmainformsofmatch‐fixingisprovidedfirst,followed
byadiscussionofcomplicityandnormalityastwomainaspectsofthepubliclysecret
natureofmatch‐fixing.Finaldiscussionsuggestssomeavenuesforfurtherresearch
andpolicyimplicationsforanti‐corruptioninitiatives.
AcademicAccountsofCorruptionandMatch‐Fixing:UnfinishedBusiness
Socialscientificaccountsofcorruptionhavemostlyrepresentedeitherrational‐choice,
structural,orrelationalmodels(Jancsics,2014).Whereastherational‐choicemodels
haveemphasizedtheindividualcost/benefitdecisionmakingprocessandthe
structuralmodelshavestressedthemacro‐socialdeterminingfactors,therelational
modelshavefocusedonthesocialnetworksthatsurroundcorruption.
Studiesofcorruptioninsportcanalsobereadthroughthelensesofthesebroader
theoreticalunderpinnings.Rational‐choicetheoriescapturedindividualdecision
makingprocesses(PrestonandSzymanski,2003).Morespecifically,theyfocusedon
cost/benefitsandmotivationsformatch‐fixinglikelowsalary(CashmoreandCleland,
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2014;Hill,2009a),possiblecareerprogress(BoeriandSevergnini,2011),andduress
(Carpenter,2012;Hill,2010a)aspotentialindividualfactorsinfluencingcorruption.
Structuraltheoriesexplainedmatch‐fixingbyemphasisingexternalsocietalpressures,
notablythecommercialisationofthegame(Giulianotti,1999;EdwardsandSkinner,
2006;CashmoreandCleland,2014)andbettingindustry(Forrestetal.,2008;Hill,
2010a;OxfordResearch,2010;GorseandChadwick,2012;McNamee,2013).Amore
broadphilosophicalinterpretationemphasisedtheverycompetitivenatureofsport
ethicsandisrelatedtothenotionof‘positivedeviance’asexcessiveover‐conformity
tosportnormsandvalues(HughesandCoakley,1991).Additionally,relational
approachesemphasisedtheroleofclientelisticnetworks(NumeratoandBaglioni,
2012;Lee,2008).
Itisbeyondthescopeofthispapertoprovideasystematicreviewoftheincreasing
bodyofliteratureoncorruptionandmatch‐fixinginfootball.However,thereareat
leastthreemajorcriticalaspectsthatwerearticulatedinpreviousstudiesonmatch‐
fixingorcorruptionmorebroadlythatareimportanttoaddress:empiricalpoverty,
analyticalreductionismandunder‐theorization.
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Firstly,regardingempiricalpoverty,academicaccountsnecessarilyrelyonimperfect
data,limitedtoreportedanddetectedcases.Ingeneral,empiricallyinformedresearch
intothetopichasbeenratherrare,anobservationthatholdsforbothgeneralstudies
ofcorruption(e.g.,Hodgkinson,1997;Khondker,2006;DeMaria,2008;Jancsics,2014)
andtostudiesofcorruptioninsport(Petroczi,2009;Masonetal.,2006;Maennig,
2005;GorseandChadwick,2009).Duetothesensitivityofthephenomenon,previous
researchwasfocusedprimarilyonsecondaryandarchivaldata(Maennig,2005;Di
RoncoandLavorgna,2014;AquilinaandChetcuti,2014;PrestonandSzymanski,2003;
Wardrop,2002),andthenumberofstudiesthatengagedwithdirectdatawaslimited
(Hill,2009a,2009b;2010b).
Secondly,regardinganalyticalreductionism,previousstudiesaddressedlimited
aspectsofthecomplexrealityofmatch‐fixing.Onestreamofstudiesthatbrought
match‐fixingintoacademicfocusdidsoprimarilyinadescriptivemannerand
providedamuchneededlistofmatch‐fixingcasesacrosshistoricalandgeo‐political
contextsandsportingcultures.Furthermore,methodologicalindividualismofrational
choicetheoriesandmacro‐sociologicalexplanationsprovidedonlyapartial
understandingofmatch‐fixing,withlessattentionfocusedonthesystematicnatureof
match‐fixinganditsculturalbackground.Thisapproachledtotheanalytical
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separationofempiricallyconnectedcategoriesofmanagementandcompetition
corruption,forexample(e.g.,Maennig,2005;GorseandChadwick,2012).
Thirdly,researchintomatch‐fixingisunder‐theorized.Theacademicinterestin
match‐fixingisnormativelyjustifiedbyemphasisingtheimmoral,unethicalorillegal
characterofcorruptionandbysuggestingpolicyimplicationstotacklecorruption.
However,thestudiesofmatch‐fixinghavebeenratherlimitedintermsoftheory.In
thisvein,corruptionor,morespecifically,match‐fixing,wastreatedasasocial
problemratherthanaphenomenonthatwouldbesociologicallyrelevantandcould
empiricallyinformsociologicallytheory.Furthermore,specificsocialscientific
conceptssuchasrationalchoicetheory,socialnetworksorsocialcapitalwererather
uncriticallyappliedtothetopicofcorruptionratherthanbeingfurtherelaborated
upon.
Againstthisbackdrop,theaimofthisstudyistoaddressthesegapsinexisting
research.Empiricalpovertyisaddressedbytheethnographicnatureofresearch,use
ofprimarydataandaprimaryfocusonmatch‐fixingatlowlevelcompetitions.
Analyticalreductionismisaddressedbytheengagementofseldom‐used
interpretativeapproaches.Lastbutnotleast,under‐theorizationisaddressedbythe
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conceptofpublicsecrecy.Notwithstandingtheapparentlysilentandsecretnatureof
corruption,theoriesofsecrecyorpublicsecrecyinacademicaccountsofcorruption
havebeenunder‐utilized.
CorruptionandPublicSecrecy
SociologicalinterestinsecrecyandsecretsocietieswasfirstundertakenbyGeorg
Simmel,whounderstoodthesecretasameansofcontroloverinformationinmodern
societies.Simmelexplainedhowsecretsocietiesorganizedonprinciplesofreciprocal
trustshareandprotecttotalknowledgeoverfactsthatremainundisclosedtonon‐
members.Thesecretthusoperatesthroughthelogicofexclusionandismarkedbya
differencebetweenfullsecretknowledgeandcompleteignorance.Inhisessay,
Simmelfocusedonsecretsocietiesthatrepresentedrelativelyclosedsystems.
However,thecircumstancesoftotalknowledgeandcompleteignorancecanhardlybe
materializedbecausethesecretisalwaysaccompanieddialecticallybythepossibility
thatitcanbediscovered(Simmel,1906).
Corruptionandsocialnetworksthatareconstitutiveofcorruption(e.g.,DellaPorta
andVannucci,1999;DellaPorta,2000;Warren,2001)representatypicalexampleof
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secretsocieties.Furthermore,assomeunderstandingofendemiccorruptionwould
suggest,corruptionrepresentnotonlyasecretbutalsoapublicsecret.Inthemacro‐
societalcontextinwhichcorruptionhasincreasinglybeendiscussedinpublicand
beenafocusofpolicymakers,itslatencyandpotentialpervasivenessisclearly
apparent.TheconceptofpublicsecrecyelaborateduponinTaussig’swritingsis
referredtoaswhat‘isgenerallyknownbutcannotbearticulated’(Taussig,1999,p.5).
Taussig’saccountprimarilyfocusesontheanthropologicalstudyofdefacement
rituals.However,healsousedtheconceptofpublicsecrecytoexplaincorruptionin
Franco’sregime.Omnipresentcorruptionwasapublicsecrecythatcompromised
citizensandtiedthemmorenarrowlytotheregime(Taussig,1999).Thisnotionis
relevanttotheendemicpresenceofmatch‐fixinginfootballandsituationsinwhicha
criticismofmatch‐fixingvictimsissilencedbecausethesevictimscommonlytakethe
roleofprincipals.Awidespreadpersonalexperiencemakesmatch‐fixingapublic
secrecysimilartothepoliticalsecrecypresentedbyHorn;toHorn,publicsecrecy
representssituationsinwhich‘everybodyeitherdoubtsorknowsthat“thereis
something”’(Horn,2011),althoughthecontentofthesecretsarerarelydisclosed.
Thepublicsecrecyisthusanorganizingprincipleofsocialrelations.The
constellationsofpublicsecrecyoperatenot(only)throughitsrealcontentbutalso
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throughtheeffectthatthisinvisible,unarticulatedyetsomehowknown,secret
contenthas.(Horn,2011;Newell,2013).Intheseconstellations,anyformofsecrecy–
inthespecificcaseofcorruption–mustbecomprehendedbothviaitsactualand
hiddenexistenceandinitslatencyandpotentiality.Thus,secrecyoperatesthrough
thelogicofactualityandthroughthelogicofpotentiality.Inotherwords,thesecretis
representedthroughthespecificcontentofsecrecyandthroughthesocialconditions
ofpublicsecrecyinandthroughwhichthiscontentoperates.Whereastheactual
secretreferstotheverycontentofcorruption,thepublicsecretreferstohidden
knowledge,or,putdifferently,activenon‐knowledgeanddistrustrelatedtothelatent
andpotentialnatureofcorruption.
Methods
Thisstudyisbasedonaqualitative,multi‐sited,ethnographicstudyofCzechfootball
thatwascarriedoutfromJanuarytoOctober2007.Semi‐structuredinterviewsand
non‐participantobservationsatmeetingsofalocalExecutiveCommitteeofthe
FootballAssociationoftheCzechRepublicwereenrichedwithparticipant
observationsatalocalfootballclub.Additionally,internetdiscussionforums,websites
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andnewspaperarticleswerereviewed.Thedatacollectionwasapartofthelarger
project‘[SportandSocialCapitalintheEuropeanUnion].’Match‐fixingwasnotinitially
anexplicitfocusoftheoverarchingproject,andthetopicofmatch‐fixingemergedas
theproductofexplorativeethnographicfieldwork.
Theethnographicapproacheasedtheaccesstodata.Anydisclosureofsensitive
informationcouldhavenegativeimpactsonjobs,careersandsecurityofresearch
participants,and,therefore,ahighlevelofanonymityhadtobeguaranteed.Thisis
whythemajorityofmatch‐fixingconversationstookplaceinacovertandoff‐record
manner.Thesensitivenatureofthesematch‐fixingdiscussionscanbeillustrated
throughdifferentrecordedcomments:
‘IfIhadtoldyoueverything,yourrecorderwouldhaveburst;Iwouldhavebeenfired’, ‘I
haveexperiencedsomethingfor16years,andIcanspeakaboutsomethingsandIcan’t
speakaboutsomeotherthing’, ‘Ishouldbecareful;otherwise,Irisklosingmyjob’.These
and similar comments about match‐fixing were made by persons I spoke with
primarily about governance and management‐related issues and with whom I had
onlyaneverydaylevelofconfidence.Theseactorssomehowdisclosedthattheyknew
something but that they couldnot articulatewhat theyknew.By thispublicly secret
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‘activenotknowing’ (Taussig, 1999, p.7), they suggested between the lines quite a
somethingwhileactuallysayingnothing.
Daily,direct,ethnographiccontactwithotherofficials,players,andrefereesprovided
mewithmuchneeded,detailedempiricalevidence.Itwasduringtheseeveryday
observationsandinformalchatswithfamiliarresearchparticipantsthatthe
previouslymentioned‘somethinghiddenbeyondnothing’gainedmuchclearer
contours.NothingcouldbetterexemplifythisprocessthanthemomentwhenIfirst
toldmyinformantsthatmyjobwastodoresearchonfootballgovernance.‘Well,then,
youmustspeakaboutmatch‐fixing,’reactedoneofmyinformers,who,inabroader
companyofothersixplayers,proceededtotellmeaseriesofstoriesofmatch‐fixing.
Thedatawereanalysedmanually.Theapproachofthematiccodingwasenrichedwith
axialandopencodingofdata.TheinterviewstookplaceinCzechandallofthe
quotationsthatappearinthispaperaretranslatedfromCzechtoEnglish.Toenhance
theanonymityofdata,thefieldnotesarenotexactlydatedandonlyfictitiousnames
offootballclubsareused.
TheContentoftheCorruptedSecrecy:DecipheringtheMatch‐FixingComplex
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Basedonexistingliteratureandempiricaldata,match‐fixingisunderstoodasan
exchangeduringwhichascenarioofcorruption‐i.e.,aspecificsportingperformance,
orthecreationofconditionsthatfavourcertainsportingperformances‐isexchanged
formaterialandsymbolicgoods,e.g.,money,gifts,services,positionsofpower,
statusesorsportingperformances.Match‐fixinghasmotivationsbothrelatedand
unrelatedtosport.Inadditiontothedirectlinkbetweensportingperformanceand
competition,corruptionisfrequentlyrelatedtosportgovernance.Match‐fixingcanbe
explainedaspartofthepathologicalcompetitivenessinthesphereofsportandthe
ideaof‘winningatallcosts’orinrelationtomorespecificobjectives,suchasa
championshipvictoryatstake,theriskofrelegationorthepossibilityofqualifyingfor
internationalcompetitions.
Generally,scenariosofcorruptioncanbeinfluencedbythreedifferenttypesofactors:
footballclubs(andtheirplayers,coachesandofficials);footballreferees;and
interpretersofthegame,e.g.,massmediaorfootballfederationofficials.Considering
thisplethoraofactorswhocanexertinfluenceoverascenarioofcorruption,three
basicformsofmatch‐fixingareidentified:directcorruption,mediatedcorruptionand
meta‐corruption.Whereasdirectmatch‐fixingrelatestoplayersaskeyactorswho
influenceascenarioofcorruption,thekeyactorsinthecaseofmediatedcorruption
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arereferees,whocancomplementdirectmatch‐fixingbyinfluencingtheconditionsin
whichanentirescenarioofcorruptionemerges.Finally,meta‐corruptionrefersto
hidingmatch‐fixingpatternsbyinfluencingtheassignmentprocessandcreatingbias
intheinterpretationofbothcorruptedperformancesandtheregulationof
performances.
DirectCorruption
Directcorruptionassumestheactiveanddirectinvolvementofplayersorcoachesin
facilitatingafixedscenarioofcorruption.Footballplayersandcoachesarethemain
actorswhoarebribedtodirectlyinfluencetheoutcomeofagameandtoperformina
scenarioofcorruption.
DirectcorruptionisprimarilyrepresentedbythedynamicbetweenaclubAandaclub
B,inwhichrepresentativesofclubAbriberepresentativesofclubB.Duringthisform
ofmatch‐fixing,aclub,groupofplayers,coachesorofficialsofclubBarebribedby
representativesofclubA,eitherdirectlyorthroughbrokers.Differentstrategiesare
employedtosecureaperformanceinoroutcomeofagame.Keyplayersmaynotplay,
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aclubdoesnotplayinitsstrongestformation,orsomeoftheplayersofclubBmay
deliberatelyplaypoorlytopositivelyinfluenceclubA’sperformance.
Alternatively,directcorruptioncanmaterializebythedirectinvolvementofclubA
only,withpotentialconsequencesforoneormorecompetingclubs.Inthiscase,club
Adeliberatelyunderperformstoloseand,consequently,gainotherprofits.ClubAcan
alsodeliberatelylosesothatclubB,aclubthreatenedbyrelegationtoalower
division,wins,withtheaimofensuringthatclubBremainsinthedivisionatthe
expenseofaclubC.Thistypeofmatch‐fixingcanhavesocio‐culturalorpracticaland
logisticalmotivations.Regardingsocio‐culturalmotivations,thisbehaviourcan
emergefromhistoricalanimositiesanda‘needforrevenge,’e.g.,clubAwithhistorical
animositytowardsclubClosesagainstclubB,whoissavedfromrelegationatthe
expenseofclubC.Regardinglogisticalandpracticalmotivations,clubAaimsto
influencetherelegationofclubCbecauseofclubC’sinsufficientfacilities,theirpoorly
keptpitch,orthelonganduncomfortabletravelrequiredtoplayagainstclubC.
Inadditiontosocio‐culturalorpracticalmotivations,directcorruptionhappensdue
allegiancesbetweencontemporaryfootballandthebettingindustry.Inthisvein,
directcorruptionreferstoadeliberateunderperformanceofclubAoritsseveral
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players.Thismateriallydrivenlose‐to‐wincorruptioninvolvesfootballplayers
underperformingtoprofitfrombettingonmatchesinwhichtheyareinvolved.Froma
structuralperspective,theyareapartofawidergroupofactors.Thereareavarietyof
strategiesusedtoconcealtheseefforts,whichcanalsorelatetobettingonfirstcorner,
firstyellowcardorthefirsthalfofthegame.
Mediatedcorruption
Whereasthemainactorsareplayersandcoachesindirectcorruption,thekeyactors
aretherefereesinmediatedcorruption.Mediatedcorruptionisbasedonthe
relationshipbetweenclubAandarefereewhoinfluencesagame,perhapsby
increasingthechancesofclubAachievingapositiveresultagainstclubBorby
influencingagamebetweenclubsCandDinfavourofclubA.Thefirstscenariois
describedasimmediatemediatedcorruption,andthesecondscenarioiscalleddistant
mediatedcorruption.
Incasesofmediatedcorruption,refereesemploydifferenttacticstosecurethe
scenarioofcorruption.Assigningpenaltykicksisthemostfrequentandmostevident
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strategy.However,moresubtleyetefficienttacticsarealsoemployed,asdescribedby
onerespondent.
‘Youknow,maybethisisnotthatobvious,buttherearerefereeswhowon’tevenallow
yourclubtocrossthemidfieldbycontinuouslywhistlingfoulsagainstyou,evenafterthe
slightestcontactyoumighthave…Therewasarefereeparticularlyskilfulinwhousedto
say:“Ifyoupaymewell,notevenRealMadridwouldwinhere”…’(Fieldnotesfrom
informalconversationwithafootballclubrepresentative).
Inthecaseoftheimmediatemediatedcorruption,arefereecanbefixedtofavourclub
AoverclubB.TheexampleofdistantmediatedcorruptioninwhichclubApaysa
refereetoinfluenceagamebetweenclubsCandDsuggeststhatmediatedcorruption
isnotnecessarilyconnectedwithagameoraroundthatdirectlyinvolvesthe
influencingfootballclub.Incasesofdistantmediatedcorruptioninfluencingdistant
games,mediatedcorruptioncanleadtoafavouringofoneoftwoclubswhoare
competitivepositionsintheleaguetablewithacorruptingclubA,orresultin
importantplayersfromothersteamsreceivingyelloworredcardsthatresultsin
thoseplayersmissinggamesagainstclubA.Inthecontextofthesecompetitionsbeing
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linkedwiththebettingindustry,refereesactionscanbebasedontheinterestsof
actorswhoareexternaltothegame,e.g.,socialnetworksorganizedaroundthe
bettingindustry,asopposedtotheinterestsofaspecificteam.
Meta‐Corruption
Meta‐corruptionprimarilyrelatestointerpretersofthegame,suchasfootball
associations'officials,mediarepresentatives(Numerato,2009)andinvestigators.
Meta‐corruptiontakestwodifferentforms:ex‐antemeta‐corruptionandex‐postmeta‐
corruption.Bothformsofmeta‐corruptionusuallyappearsimultaneouslywithother
formsofmatch‐fixing.Meta‐corruptionisusedtosecuretheefficiencyofandhidethe
tacticsofmatch‐fixing.
Thesignificantroleofmeta‐corruptionisimpliedbybothprimaryandsecondary
evidence.Afewexamplesfollow.Afootballofficialconfidentiallyconfessedthat‘the
competitionsaregovernedbycriminals,formerrefereesanddelegates.’Similarly,a
smallclubpresidentinarecentlypublishedinterviewsuggested,‘Themainprincipal
ismadebyclubs.Theyvotefortheirrepresentatives,whoshouldgovernfootballand
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shouldguaranteethatfootballisplayedinfair‐playenvironments.However,bribes
givenbyfootballofficialssimplyspoilthisidea.’(Miškovský,2015)
Ex‐antemeta‐corruptionisbasedontherelationshipbetweenrepresentativesofclub
Aandfootballassociationofficialsormediarepresentatives.Themainobjectiveof
thisformofmatch‐fixingistosecureadvantageousconditionsfromwhichclubA’s
playcanbenefit,suchastheassignmentofadesired,ofteneasilycorruptiblereferee.
Similarly,ex‐antemeta‐corruptioncouldalsoinvolvebribingthedelegateswhoare
responsibleforoverseeingareferee’sperformance.Phoneinterceptionsfromthe
match‐fixingscandalintheCzechRepublicsuggestedthatclubofficialshadcontact
withmediaeditorialboardsandcouldinfluencejournalistswhocouldbemadeto
hidequestionablerefereedecisions.
Ex‐postmeta‐corruptionincludesarelationshipbetweenclubAandrepresentativesof
themassmedia,likejournalistsoreditors,andfootballassociations’officials.Both
mediarepresentativesandfootballassociations’officialsareinterpretersofagame
and,inparticular,areferee'sperformance.Morespecifically,theaimoftheseformsof
bribingistoturnattentionawayfromsuspiciousmomentsinacorruptedgame.
Delegatesandfootballassociationofficialsarethereforetargetsforcorruption.
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DocumentationofthiscanbefoundinthefollowingclaimbyaCzechfootballplayer:
‘Theproblemisthattheleadersoflocalfootballassociationsarerecruitedfromformer
refereeswhoconcealthebribing,andthisiswhyitisdifficulttostrugglewiththe
corruption.’(idnes.cz,2015a)SomecriticsofCzechfootballgovernancegoonestep
furtherbyclaimingthatnotonlyiscorruptionpresentamongrefereesinleadership
positionsbutalsothatrefereesoftenhaveprofessionalbackgroundsthatconnect
themtocriminalpolicenetworks,resultinginpoliceandinvestigatorshavingstakes
inmatch‐fixing.Thevalidityoftheseaccountsshouldhoweverbefurtherverified,
consideringtheiranecdotalnature.Ex‐postmeta‐corruptioncanalsobeobserved
whencorrupterspressurethemassmedia.Mediaeditorshavethepowertohide
controversiesandcancreateabiasedpictureofrefereeperformances(e.g.Numerato,
2009).
Publiclysecretconditionsofmatch‐fixing
Generalpatternsandconfigurationsofmatch‐fixingwouldnotbenoveltosomeone
whowasinvolvedinCzechfootball,regardlesshisorherpersonalexposureto
corruption.Acommonlyexpressedobservationthat‘Iknowthatitexists,butIhave
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notdirectlywitnessedit’illustratesthepubliclysecretnatureofmatch‐fixing.The
interconnectednessofdifferentformsofthematch‐fixingcomplexsuggestshow
numerousfootballactorsarecomplicitwiththereproductionofcorruption.This
rangeofcomplicityisfurtherextendedtothoseactorswhoarenotdirectlyinvolved
butarestillawareofmatch‐fixing.Thenormalizationofcorruptionandomnipresent
complicityaltogetherconstitutestwomajorcharacteristicsofthepubliclysecret
natureofcorruptioninandthroughwhichthematch‐fixingcomplexinCzechfootball
reproduces.
Bothpatternsofcomplicityandnormalityareexemplifiedinacomplaintmadebya
coachwhoapproachedanadversary’scaptainandcriticisedthereferee’s
performance,makinganimplicitreferencetobribes.Thecaptain’sreplyapparently
didnotcontestthecriticismofthereferee.‘Areyousurprisedafterwhatyoudidtous
whenweplayedthelastawaygameatyourstadium?’Thisreplycanbeinterpretedas
asilentadmissiontomatch‐fixing;itsuggeststhatmatch‐fixingwasendemicin
footballculture,partofthegame,partofcompetition,somethinginescapable.Inthis
contextofomnipresentcomplicity,thetasteofrevenge–youdidittomesowhycan’tI
doittoyou–thatinitsverytotalitydoesnotdistinguishbetweenvictimsand
principals,isquitecommon.Thisshortillustrationalsosuggestshowdeeply
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embeddedmatch‐fixingwaslessthanyearstenagointheCzechRepublic.Match‐
bribingemergedinconversationsalmostasamatteroffactandasanormalised
strategytoplaythefootballgame.Thefollowingsectionsprovidein‐depthinsightinto
thepubliclysecretaspectsofmatch‐fixingintheCzechRepublicwithrespectto
normalityandcomplicity.
Thenormalityofmatch‐fixing
Corruptionisconsideredtobenormal,unproblematicandtakenforgranted.The
normalityofmatch‐fixingpersistsduetoasystemofpyramidaljustification.The
publicsecrecyaboutmatch‐fixingatthelowestlevel1isjustifiedbythefactthatit
happensinhigherlevelsoffootball,asdemonstratedbymatch‐fixingscandalsatthe
highestlevelsofCzechprofessionalfootballinthe2004/2005season.Paradoxically
enough,thedisclosureofcorruptionatthehighestlevelsdidnotprovokearadical
disruptiontothepracticeofmatch‐fixing.Instead,itcontributedtotheideathat
match‐fixingwassomethinglatent,possibleandinevitable.Inotherwords,the
presenceofmatch‐fixinginprofessionalfootballjustifiedahypocriticaltolerationof
corruptionatlowerlevelsoffootball.Moreover,thepresenceofmatch‐fixingin
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professionalfootballwasjustifiedbythefactthatitmirroredcorruptioninbroader
society.ThisisillustratedbyastatementmadebyaformerpresidentoftheCzech
footballassociationthatconveysaperspectiveoftenfrequentlyexpressedbysport
officials:‘Itisnotcorrecttoportrayfootballasacesspitinthecountry,where
corruptionisarulethatwemeeteverywhereineverydaylife.Wearenotworsethanthe
surroundingsociety.’(ihned.cz,2005)
Inadditiontothelogicofpyramidaljustification,corruptionisnormalizedthrougha
sharedmatch‐fixingknowledge,aknow‐howforhowtoengageinandconcealmatch‐
fixingaswellaswhomtoaddress.Theresearchsuggeststhattherewasan
unarticulated‘pricelist’indicatingcoststofixagameatdifferentlevelsandthatthere
existedasharedvocabularytoconcealcorruption.Theseobservationsagreewith
existentliteratureonmatch‐fixing(e.g.,Hill2009a,2010b).Thisisexemplifiedbya
testimonygivenbyaformerCzechnationalfootballplayerLadislavVízekinan
interviewwithaCzechdaily:‘Treatarefereewithaschnitzelinsteadofgivinghima
sausageandhewon’tmakeyoulose.Inthehighestdivisions,itiscleaner,inthelowestit
isaprimevalforest.’(Saiver,Krutil,Cirmaciu,2007).Theexistenceoftheseimplicit
rulesareillustratedbyaconversationinwhichalocalclubvolunteerarguedthathe
wouldliketotakeatrainingcourseforreferees:‘Youknow,fivehundred[Czech
24
crowns,about$20]pergametostartwith,itisagooddeal.’Thesecretlyshared
knowledgeaboutmatch‐fixingdoesnotinvolveonlythelanguageand‘pricelist’but
alsoafamiliaritywithactorswhoarefixable.Asoneofmyinformantsargued,
‘Noteveryonewouldgoforit.Sometimes,youwouldevenbesurprisedwhotakes….
Thereisawell‐knownrefereewhoisactiveatthehighestlevels,butaspartofhisduties,
hesometimesrefereesamatchatthelocallevel.Ihavebeentoldbymyfriendsthatonce
hejustputfivehundredcrownsnote(approximately$20)inhispocketsayingthis
shouldbeenoughforabreakfast.’
Theveryexistenceofthisstoryoutlinesanotheraspectofthenormalisationofmatch‐
fixing:itisoneofmanycirculatingstoriesthatcontributetoacorruptionmythology.
Themythologyofmatch‐fixingisreinforcedbothbysemi‐secretstoriesandmedia
representationsofmatch‐fixingscandalsthatarebasedontestimoniesgiven
confidentiallybyanonymousfootballplayersorreinforcedbypopculturecaricatures
ofthefootballworld(e.g.Giulianotti,1999).Thesesemi‐specificrevelationsdonot
preventfurtherconcealmentsandfurthermatch‐fixing.Inthesecircumstances,
25
almosteveryoneknows,admitsoratleastsuspectsthatmatch‐fixinghappens,butthe
disclosureofparticularcasesrarelyappears.Thearticulationofdistrustisritualized
andplaysastableroleintheconstructionofpublicsecrecy,reinforcingand
maintainingthepublicmythologyandcontoursofmatch‐fixingwithoutnecessarily
disclosingtherealfacetsofspecificmatch‐fixingsecrets.
Inthecontextofnormalizedcorruption,match‐fixingisunderstoodaspartofthe
gameratherthanasdisruptingagamethatis,intheory,basedontheprincipalsof
fair‐play.Thisisillustratedbythefollowingfieldnotesfromobservations.A
frustratedplayerfromFCFixboroughsittinginthechangingroomthrowshisjersey
ontothefloor.Thecoachoftheteamtakesadvantageofthepost‐matchrush,gets
closertoasmallergroupofplayersandsays:‘Youknowwhattheworstthingis?We
wentintothereferee[literallytranslationofthetermtodenotebribing].’Theplayer
replied:‘Well,playinglikethis,wejustmeritfallingdowntotheprimevalforestleague;’
andadded,half‐joking:‘Idon’tunderstandwhyyoudidnotfixgamesinautumn.We
wouldnotstruggleforrelegationnowandyoucouldhaveevensoldsomematches.’
Thecomplicityofmatch‐fixing
26
Normalityiscoupledwiththeextendedcomplicitythatbindsnumerousactorstothe
match‐fixingcomplex.ToreconnectwiththescenefromtheFCFixboroughchanging
room,thejerseythatthefrustratedplayerthrewdownwasnotacquiredinastandard
way.TheplayersofFCFixboroughweregiventhosejerseysafewyearsbyFC
Corrupthampton.Atthetime,onlyavictoryagainstFCFixboroughcouldsaveFC
Corrupthamptonfromrelegation.FCCorrupthamptonwonthegame,andthesetof
jerseyswasarewardforFCFixborough’shelp.AsaformerFixborough’splayer
remembers:
‘Thefunniestthingisthattheyplayedreallyterriblyandwedidnotknowwhatelseto
dotohelpthem.Theyhadproblemstoputitoverontheyoungerplayerswhoobviously
didnotknowthatitwasfixed.Thesethingswereusuallyagreedamongolderplayers.’
ThepositionofFCFixboroughwassimilartomanyotherclubsinwhichinvolvement
incorruptionwasbothactiveand‘passive.’
Withinthecontextofthisinstanceofextendedcomplicity,abroadrangeofactors
werebothcorruptingandcorrupted.Extendedcomplicitytendstoconcealthe
boundariesbetweenvictimsandprincipals.Inthecontextofcompromisingcomplicity,
27
inwhicheveryoneispotentiallyaprincipal,suspicionanddistrustbackedbypublic
secrecyarethemainoperatingprinciples.However,criticismismostoftenlimitedto
specificinstancesofmatch‐fixing,ratherthanexpandedtocoverthesystematic
factorsinwhichthecorruptedscenarioemerges.Match‐fixingisrarelyaddressed
structurally;instead,itistypicallyaddressedratheraccidentlybymeansofadhoc
assurancesthatbothadmititsgeneralexistenceandsimultaneouslypreventits
materializationinthosespecificcasesthataresurroundedbyomnipresentdistrust
andsuspicion.Thesemechanismsareexemplifiedbyarequestmadetoarefereeby
phoneinalocalExecutiveCommitteemeetingthatIobservedbeforeanimportant
match:
‘Listen,IamsittinghereatthemeetingoftheExecutiveCommitteeandI'mputtingyou
onspeaker,couldyoupleaseassuremeandthematesherethattherewillnoproblemsin
Riggedshiretomorrow.YouknowwhatImean,don’tyou?’(Fieldnotes,non‐participant
observation,CzechRepublic).
28
Thisphonecall,whichfollowedothersuspiciouscommentsbytheExecutive
Committeemembers,suggeststhatthegeneraloccurrenceofmatch‐fixingwasknown
andexpected.However,proofofspecificinstancesofmatch‐fixingwashidden,and
thematch‐fixingitselfwereneverfullyarticulated.Althoughfootballofficialsare
awareofmatch‐fixingandagreethatitdamagesfootball,theywouldacceptitasa
simplematteroffact,admittingitsexistencewithoutprovidinganysystematiceffort
tocombatitduetoalackofknowledge,lowcompetencies,thevoluntarynatureof
theirinvolvementinfootballgovernanceandtheresultinglackoftimetoproperly
addresslong‐termandstrategictasks.
Finally,complicityoperatesthroughanexclusionarylogicandtendstosilenceany
substantialandsystemiccriticism.Thishasimplicationsforanti‐corruptioninitiatives.
Effortstocombatmatch‐fixingdonotnecessarilysucceed,asissuggestedbyastoryof
alocalclubpresidentwhoaddressedalettertoallclubsplayinginthesamedivision,
callinguponthemtobreakwiththebadhabitofbribingreferees.Bribeswereeven
usedbyclubs’representativestoguaranteethatarefereewouldmakecorrect
decisions.Thishabitbecameanunwrittenrule,apartofthegame.However,the
29
president,whoaimedtochangethecultureofcorruption,failedinhiseffortbecause
heclashedwithdissentingrepresentativesfromcompetingclubswhorefusedto
disengagefromtheirhabits.Asaresult,hisclubwasvengefullyandsystematically
punishedbyrefereeswhowereinformedoftheanti‐corruptioninitiativebyafaction
ofclubs(Fieldnotes,CzechRepublic,2007).
Afterthisunsuccessfulefforttochangethesystemoffootball,theformerclub
presidentdecidedtoleavethefootballenvironmentaftermorethanthreedecadesof
volunteering.Thissortofexitisnotuncommon.Thetwofollowingexamples
documentsimilarexitsfromfootballbytwootheractorswhodecidedtoescapethe
endemiccultureofcorruption.Aformeryouthfootballcoachexplainedhismotivation
forleavingasfollows:
‘Youknow,theworstthingisthatthisdoesnothappenamongonlyadults.Howwould
youexplaintoathirteen,fourteenyearoldboythatamatchwaschinked[aliterally
translatedtermtosaythatthegameisfixed]?Ireallydonothavestomachforthis;I
feltsosorryforthoseboyswhoheavilytrainedduringtheweekandthenfeltsohelpless
onSaturday.’
30
Similarly,asecretarygeneralofaregionalfootballassociationtoldmeastoryabout‘a
talented,motivated,universityeducatedyoungreferee’whodecidednottoadvancehis
careerbecauseoftheconstantdistrustoffansthathefacedaroundthegames:
‘Hejustwrotemethathecannottakepartinthisworldanymoreashewasconstantly
exposedtosuspicionsandsometimesevenaggressionsoffanswhodidnottoleratesome
problematicdecisions.Thesuspicionofmatch‐fixingwasalwaysthere,buttomake
errorsisjusthuman;isitnot?’
Conclusionsanddiscussion
Throughthisstudy,whichdrewheavilyfromprimaryempiricalevidence,basicforms
ofmatch‐fixingwereidentified.Directmatch‐fixingcountsonfixedperformanceof
playersorteams.Mediatedmatch‐fixinginvolvesafixedreferee.Meta‐corruption
reliesonfixedsportassociationofficialsorjournalists.Theseformsofmatch‐fixing
arenotunderstoodasdistinct,theoreticallyseparatedcategoriesbutarerather
31
consideredtobeempiricallyintertwinedphenomena.Therefore,match‐fixingcanbe
fullyunderstoodonlythroughananalysisofthedynamicsbetweentheseforms,i.e.,
throughanin‐depthanalysisofthematch‐fixingcomplexthattheseformscreate
altogether.
Thenatureofthematch‐fixingcomplexisstructuredbytheclimateofendemic
corruption,extendedcomplicityandpublicsecrecy.Duringtheperiodunderstudy,
match‐fixingwasbothknownandunarticulatedand,inasenseofgeneralized
hypocrisy(Gambetta,2002),corruptionwasperceivedtobeunavoidable.Inthis
context,generaldiscourseaboutcorruptionwasquitecommon,yetspecificactsof
match‐fixingremainedmaskedandonlyrarelydisclosed,mostlyviacirculating
storiesandmyths.
AlthoughthisstudyisbasedonempiricalevidencefromtheCzechRepublic,itis
arguedthatitdemonstratesgeneralpatternsthatcanbeobservedacrossvarious
socio‐culturalandgeo‐politicalrealities.Thisstudyhasseveralimplications.Firstly,
thisstudyempiricallyinformsresearchoncorruptionbyprovidingmuchneeded
primarydata.Inthisregard,theempiricaldepthhelpsresearcherstobetter
understandtheunderlyingpatternsofmatch‐fixing.Secondly,thisstudycontributes
32
toscholarshiponmatch‐fixing.Thenotionsofmeta‐corruptionandthematch‐fixing
complexwouldsuggestaneedtorevisitandextendtheexistingdivisionsbetween
managementandcompetitioncorruption(Maennig,2005;GorseandChadwick,2012).
Inparticular,theinvolvementoffootballofficialsanddelegateswouldsuggestthat
managementandcompetitioncorruptionarecommonlyintertwinedanddonot
exclusivelyoperateindependently.Thirdly,researchonmatchfixinghasimplications
forthesociologicalunderstandingofcorruptionmorebroadly.Theendemicand
publiclysecretnatureofmatch‐fixingsuggeststhatcorruptionhastobeunderstood
inthecontextofthesocialstructuresandcultureinwhichitisembedded.This
understandingcomplementstheexistingresearchonrational‐choicetheorythat
addressedtheindividualmotivationsthataffectdecisionsforwhethertocorrupt.It
furthercomplementsthequantitativelydrivenresearchthatusessurveystudiesto
measureperceptionsofcorruptioninspecificnationalcontextsandthepossible
pressuresofcorruptingnorms(e.g.,Frič,2001).Researchoncorruptioncannotignore
theculturalandsocialcontextinwhichthesedecisionsareembedded.
Thispaperhasalsopolicyimplications.Previousstudiescalleduponausualmixof
education,transparency,accountability,regulationandinvestigation(e.g.,Aquilina
andChetcuti,2014;Bureš,2008;TransparencyInternational,2009).Theanalysisof
33
footballmatch‐fixingsuggeststhattheseindependentlydefinedrecipes,regardlessof
theirrelevance,canhardlybeimplementedastheyimplicitlyassumethatthey
penetratetheendemicandrelativelyautonomousmatch‐fixingcomplex.Anyabstract
outlineofananti‐corruptioninitiativeshouldcautiouslyconsiderthesocialand
culturalnatureoftheenvironmentinwhichthemixofanti‐corruptioninstruments
shouldoperate.Thematch‐fixingcomplexandbroadersystemofgovernanceinand
throughwhichitoperatesarerelativelyautonomous.Thismeansthatactorsinvolved
inthesystemofgovernancecementedbyreciprocallycompromisedclientelistic
networksarerelativelyimmunetoanyexternalattemptstochangetheexistingsocial
structures.Thisimmunitynotonlyinvolvesmechanismsofsocialclosureandana
prioriresistancetoexternalforcesbutalsoacapacitytocircumventanti‐corruption
initiativesthroughmimeticstrategiesofstrategicadaptation.
Futureresearchshouldfocusonacarefulmappingofsocialnetworksthatcould
eitherfavourorunderminematch‐fixingtoidentifypotentialbrokersofanti‐
corruptioninitiatives.Moregenerally,futureresearchoncorruptionshouldstrongly
engagewithprimaryandup‐to‐dateempiricalevidence.2Furthermore,therolesof
anti‐corruptionagenciesandinitiativesshouldbecriticallyexamined;theroleof
agenciessuchasTransparencyInternational,PlaytheGameorInternationalCentre
34
forSportSecurityhasbeeninvestigatedand,somehownormatively,recognized,but
theirimpacthasseldombeenexplored.Althoughthereisnodoubtthatthese
initiativessignificantlycontributedtobringingpublicattentiontomatch‐fixingand
corruptioninsport,thelong‐termconsequencesofanti‐corruptioneffortsareyetto
beobserved.Howaretheuniversalisticdoctrinesoftheseinitiatives(Larmour2008)
suitabletoaddressculturallyembeddedcorruption?Moreover,consideringthatthe
mainandemergingresearchagendaoncorruptionfocusesonthegloballinks
betweensportactorsandthebettingindustryandwouldmostlikelytakeadvantage
ofso‐calledBigDatatoanalysetheunderlyingpatternsofcorruption,ethnographic
studiesatboththeglobalandlocallevelsshouldcomplementtheseanalysesto
provideresearchintocorruptionthatdemonstrateswhatthematch‐fixingcomplex
meanstothosewhoaredirectlyinvolvedincorruptionandthosewhoareimplicitly
complicitincorruption.
35
Notes
1.Duringthestudyperiod,match‐fixingwasstronglyembeddedinfootballcultureto
thedegreethatitappearedinalesscompetitive,lessformalleagueofnon‐registered
players,organizedindependentlyoftheestablishedfootballassociationasIwastold
byanon‐registeredleagueplayer:“Ireallydonotunderstand.Iusedtoplayorganized
footballwherethiswasquitecommon.Youknow,oncewegotakegofbeer,oncewegot
apig…Iwouldneverexpectthisinanon‐registeredleague.Ijustcouldnotbelieveit
whenwewereofferedakegofabeartohelpouradversary”(Fieldnotes,informalchat,
sportsjournalist).
2.Thedatausedinthisstudywerecollectedin2007,anditisbeyondthescopeofthis
papertoverifywhetherthesetrendsstillpersist.However,arecentcriminal
investigationandthefollowingaccusationsof25persons,primarilydelegates,
refereesandclubofficials(idnes.cz,2015b),involvedinmatch‐fixinginlowerCzech
divisionswouldsuggestthatmatch‐fixingstillpersists.
36
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Richard Giulianotti and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful
and helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. The data collection was funded by
the European Commission FP6 Marie Curie Excellence Grant MEXT-25008. This paper
was further drafted under a FP7 Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship, FP7-PEOPLE-
2012-IEF, Grant number 331097. The contents of this article reflect only the views of the
author and not the views of the European Commission.
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