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ThisisthefirstversionofthemanuscriptsubmittedtoCurrentSociology.Thismanuscriptwasfurtherrevised,acceptedandpublishedon25September2015.Therevisedandpublishedisavailableonlineathttp://csi.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/09/23/0011392115599815.abstract

CorruptionandPublicSecrecy:Anethnographyoffootballmatch‐fixing

DinoNumerato

AbstractThetopicofcorruptionhasrecentlymovedfromtheperipherytothecentreofsocialscientificattention.Notwithstandingtheincreasedinterest,researchintocorruptionhasbeenempiricallylimitedandunder‐theorized.Thisstudyaddressesthatgapbyprovidinganethnographicaccountoffootballmatch‐fixingintheCzechRepublic.Byqualitativelyanalysingbothprimaryandsecondarydata,thisstudyexaminesmatch‐fixingandcorruptionthroughthelensoftheconceptofpublicsecrecy.Threedifferent,narrowlyintertwinedformsofmatch‐fixingareidentified:directcorruption,mediatedcorruptionandmeta‐corruption.Thestudyfurtherexploreshowthepubliclysecretnatureofmatch‐fixingisnormalisedandhowthematch‐fixingcomplexisreinforcedbyacompromisingcomplicityofsocialactorswhoarebothvictimsandprincipals.Althoughthisstudyfocusesonasport‐relatedexample,ithasboththeoreticalandempiricalimplicationsforasociologicalunderstandingofcorruptionoutsideofthesphereofsport.

Keywords

Corruption,publicsecrecy,football,thematch‐fixingcomplex,ethnography

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Introduction

WhenFCFixboroughplayedAFCBribeshireinthethirdlowestdivisionintheCzech

Republic,AFCBribeshirewaspositionedinthecalmmiddleofthecompetition’stable,

whereasFCFixboroughwaspositionedtowardsthebottomofthetableandwasat

riskofrelegation.Threedaysbeforethegame,thecoachofFCFixborougharrived

afterthestartoftraining,secretlysmiling.‘Sorryforbeingabitlate,pals.Ihavebeento

Bribeshiretoarrangesomething.…’Thesecretsmilewassoonexplained.OnSaturday,

AFCBribeshirearrivedtoFixboroughwithoutthreekeyplayers.Aftersomeinitial

difficulties,FCFixboroughdominatedthegameandwon.Afterthegame,aplayer

fromFCFixboroughconfessedtohisopponentthatthegamewasfixed.Withoutbeing

particularlydisillusionedorangry,acceptingthefixedgameasamatteroffact,as

somethingnormal,theAFCBribeshireplayerreplied,‘Soitwasfixed?!Ididnotknow

that…Ourcoachdidnottellusanything,althoughIhonestlyfounditabitweirdthat

ourbestplayerscouldnotmakeittoday.’(Fieldnotes,participantobservation,Czech

Republic2007)

Althoughthisanecdotalevidenceprovidesaspecificexampleofmatch‐fixingina

Czechamateurfootballleague,itempiricallyinformsabroadersociological

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understandingofcorruption,notablywithregardstoitspubliclysecretnature.This

aspectisobservablethroughtheapparentdisclosureofmatch‐fixingaccompanied

withadispassionatereactionoftheAFCBribeshire’splayer.Althoughmatch‐fixingis

generallyperceivedtorepresentpartoffootballculture,itsspecificexpressionsare

stillconcealedandkeptinsecrecy.Thisambiguitybetweenhiddenandarticulated

andbetweenknownandunknownthataltogetherconstitutethepubliclysecret

natureofmatch‐fixingarefurtherexploredthroughoutthispaper.

Hence,theaimofthisstudyistoempiricallyandtheoreticallyinformtheliteratureon

match‐fixingandcorruptionmorebroadlybyprovidingacriticalexaminationof

corruptionthroughthelensofpublicsecrecy.Inparticular,thisstudyaddressesthe

followingquestions.Whatformsofmatch‐fixingcanweidentifyincontemporary

football?Whatarethemainpatternsofthepubliclysecretnatureofmatch‐fixing?

Whatimplicationsdoesthepubliclysecretnatureofmatch‐fixinginfootballhavefora

broaderunderstandingofcorruption?Toaddressthesequestions,thisstudyprovides

anin‐depthqualitativeinsightintoCzechfootball.Empiricalevidenceisprimarily

drawnonsemi‐structuredqualitativeinterviewsandonbothparticipantandnon‐

participantobservations.Thedirectdataevidenceisfurtherenrichedwithareviewof

newspaperarticlescoveringmatch‐fixinginfootballandinsportmorebroadly.

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Thepaperfirstprovidesabriefcriticaldiscussionofexistingresearchonmatch‐fixing

andonthesociologicalunderstandingofcorruption.Afterwards,themethods

employedoverthecourseofthisresearcharepresented.Interpretationofempirical

datafollows;abasicoutlineofmainformsofmatch‐fixingisprovidedfirst,followed

byadiscussionofcomplicityandnormalityastwomainaspectsofthepubliclysecret

natureofmatch‐fixing.Finaldiscussionsuggestssomeavenuesforfurtherresearch

andpolicyimplicationsforanti‐corruptioninitiatives.

AcademicAccountsofCorruptionandMatch‐Fixing:UnfinishedBusiness

Socialscientificaccountsofcorruptionhavemostlyrepresentedeitherrational‐choice,

structural,orrelationalmodels(Jancsics,2014).Whereastherational‐choicemodels

haveemphasizedtheindividualcost/benefitdecisionmakingprocessandthe

structuralmodelshavestressedthemacro‐socialdeterminingfactors,therelational

modelshavefocusedonthesocialnetworksthatsurroundcorruption.

Studiesofcorruptioninsportcanalsobereadthroughthelensesofthesebroader

theoreticalunderpinnings.Rational‐choicetheoriescapturedindividualdecision

makingprocesses(PrestonandSzymanski,2003).Morespecifically,theyfocusedon

cost/benefitsandmotivationsformatch‐fixinglikelowsalary(CashmoreandCleland,

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2014;Hill,2009a),possiblecareerprogress(BoeriandSevergnini,2011),andduress

(Carpenter,2012;Hill,2010a)aspotentialindividualfactorsinfluencingcorruption.

Structuraltheoriesexplainedmatch‐fixingbyemphasisingexternalsocietalpressures,

notablythecommercialisationofthegame(Giulianotti,1999;EdwardsandSkinner,

2006;CashmoreandCleland,2014)andbettingindustry(Forrestetal.,2008;Hill,

2010a;OxfordResearch,2010;GorseandChadwick,2012;McNamee,2013).Amore

broadphilosophicalinterpretationemphasisedtheverycompetitivenatureofsport

ethicsandisrelatedtothenotionof‘positivedeviance’asexcessiveover‐conformity

tosportnormsandvalues(HughesandCoakley,1991).Additionally,relational

approachesemphasisedtheroleofclientelisticnetworks(NumeratoandBaglioni,

2012;Lee,2008).

Itisbeyondthescopeofthispapertoprovideasystematicreviewoftheincreasing

bodyofliteratureoncorruptionandmatch‐fixinginfootball.However,thereareat

leastthreemajorcriticalaspectsthatwerearticulatedinpreviousstudiesonmatch‐

fixingorcorruptionmorebroadlythatareimportanttoaddress:empiricalpoverty,

analyticalreductionismandunder‐theorization.

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Firstly,regardingempiricalpoverty,academicaccountsnecessarilyrelyonimperfect

data,limitedtoreportedanddetectedcases.Ingeneral,empiricallyinformedresearch

intothetopichasbeenratherrare,anobservationthatholdsforbothgeneralstudies

ofcorruption(e.g.,Hodgkinson,1997;Khondker,2006;DeMaria,2008;Jancsics,2014)

andtostudiesofcorruptioninsport(Petroczi,2009;Masonetal.,2006;Maennig,

2005;GorseandChadwick,2009).Duetothesensitivityofthephenomenon,previous

researchwasfocusedprimarilyonsecondaryandarchivaldata(Maennig,2005;Di

RoncoandLavorgna,2014;AquilinaandChetcuti,2014;PrestonandSzymanski,2003;

Wardrop,2002),andthenumberofstudiesthatengagedwithdirectdatawaslimited

(Hill,2009a,2009b;2010b).

Secondly,regardinganalyticalreductionism,previousstudiesaddressedlimited

aspectsofthecomplexrealityofmatch‐fixing.Onestreamofstudiesthatbrought

match‐fixingintoacademicfocusdidsoprimarilyinadescriptivemannerand

providedamuchneededlistofmatch‐fixingcasesacrosshistoricalandgeo‐political

contextsandsportingcultures.Furthermore,methodologicalindividualismofrational

choicetheoriesandmacro‐sociologicalexplanationsprovidedonlyapartial

understandingofmatch‐fixing,withlessattentionfocusedonthesystematicnatureof

match‐fixinganditsculturalbackground.Thisapproachledtotheanalytical

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separationofempiricallyconnectedcategoriesofmanagementandcompetition

corruption,forexample(e.g.,Maennig,2005;GorseandChadwick,2012).

Thirdly,researchintomatch‐fixingisunder‐theorized.Theacademicinterestin

match‐fixingisnormativelyjustifiedbyemphasisingtheimmoral,unethicalorillegal

characterofcorruptionandbysuggestingpolicyimplicationstotacklecorruption.

However,thestudiesofmatch‐fixinghavebeenratherlimitedintermsoftheory.In

thisvein,corruptionor,morespecifically,match‐fixing,wastreatedasasocial

problemratherthanaphenomenonthatwouldbesociologicallyrelevantandcould

empiricallyinformsociologicallytheory.Furthermore,specificsocialscientific

conceptssuchasrationalchoicetheory,socialnetworksorsocialcapitalwererather

uncriticallyappliedtothetopicofcorruptionratherthanbeingfurtherelaborated

upon.

Againstthisbackdrop,theaimofthisstudyistoaddressthesegapsinexisting

research.Empiricalpovertyisaddressedbytheethnographicnatureofresearch,use

ofprimarydataandaprimaryfocusonmatch‐fixingatlowlevelcompetitions.

Analyticalreductionismisaddressedbytheengagementofseldom‐used

interpretativeapproaches.Lastbutnotleast,under‐theorizationisaddressedbythe

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conceptofpublicsecrecy.Notwithstandingtheapparentlysilentandsecretnatureof

corruption,theoriesofsecrecyorpublicsecrecyinacademicaccountsofcorruption

havebeenunder‐utilized.

CorruptionandPublicSecrecy

SociologicalinterestinsecrecyandsecretsocietieswasfirstundertakenbyGeorg

Simmel,whounderstoodthesecretasameansofcontroloverinformationinmodern

societies.Simmelexplainedhowsecretsocietiesorganizedonprinciplesofreciprocal

trustshareandprotecttotalknowledgeoverfactsthatremainundisclosedtonon‐

members.Thesecretthusoperatesthroughthelogicofexclusionandismarkedbya

differencebetweenfullsecretknowledgeandcompleteignorance.Inhisessay,

Simmelfocusedonsecretsocietiesthatrepresentedrelativelyclosedsystems.

However,thecircumstancesoftotalknowledgeandcompleteignorancecanhardlybe

materializedbecausethesecretisalwaysaccompanieddialecticallybythepossibility

thatitcanbediscovered(Simmel,1906).

Corruptionandsocialnetworksthatareconstitutiveofcorruption(e.g.,DellaPorta

andVannucci,1999;DellaPorta,2000;Warren,2001)representatypicalexampleof

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secretsocieties.Furthermore,assomeunderstandingofendemiccorruptionwould

suggest,corruptionrepresentnotonlyasecretbutalsoapublicsecret.Inthemacro‐

societalcontextinwhichcorruptionhasincreasinglybeendiscussedinpublicand

beenafocusofpolicymakers,itslatencyandpotentialpervasivenessisclearly

apparent.TheconceptofpublicsecrecyelaborateduponinTaussig’swritingsis

referredtoaswhat‘isgenerallyknownbutcannotbearticulated’(Taussig,1999,p.5).

Taussig’saccountprimarilyfocusesontheanthropologicalstudyofdefacement

rituals.However,healsousedtheconceptofpublicsecrecytoexplaincorruptionin

Franco’sregime.Omnipresentcorruptionwasapublicsecrecythatcompromised

citizensandtiedthemmorenarrowlytotheregime(Taussig,1999).Thisnotionis

relevanttotheendemicpresenceofmatch‐fixinginfootballandsituationsinwhicha

criticismofmatch‐fixingvictimsissilencedbecausethesevictimscommonlytakethe

roleofprincipals.Awidespreadpersonalexperiencemakesmatch‐fixingapublic

secrecysimilartothepoliticalsecrecypresentedbyHorn;toHorn,publicsecrecy

representssituationsinwhich‘everybodyeitherdoubtsorknowsthat“thereis

something”’(Horn,2011),althoughthecontentofthesecretsarerarelydisclosed.

Thepublicsecrecyisthusanorganizingprincipleofsocialrelations.The

constellationsofpublicsecrecyoperatenot(only)throughitsrealcontentbutalso

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throughtheeffectthatthisinvisible,unarticulatedyetsomehowknown,secret

contenthas.(Horn,2011;Newell,2013).Intheseconstellations,anyformofsecrecy–

inthespecificcaseofcorruption–mustbecomprehendedbothviaitsactualand

hiddenexistenceandinitslatencyandpotentiality.Thus,secrecyoperatesthrough

thelogicofactualityandthroughthelogicofpotentiality.Inotherwords,thesecretis

representedthroughthespecificcontentofsecrecyandthroughthesocialconditions

ofpublicsecrecyinandthroughwhichthiscontentoperates.Whereastheactual

secretreferstotheverycontentofcorruption,thepublicsecretreferstohidden

knowledge,or,putdifferently,activenon‐knowledgeanddistrustrelatedtothelatent

andpotentialnatureofcorruption.

Methods

Thisstudyisbasedonaqualitative,multi‐sited,ethnographicstudyofCzechfootball

thatwascarriedoutfromJanuarytoOctober2007.Semi‐structuredinterviewsand

non‐participantobservationsatmeetingsofalocalExecutiveCommitteeofthe

FootballAssociationoftheCzechRepublicwereenrichedwithparticipant

observationsatalocalfootballclub.Additionally,internetdiscussionforums,websites

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andnewspaperarticleswerereviewed.Thedatacollectionwasapartofthelarger

project‘[SportandSocialCapitalintheEuropeanUnion].’Match‐fixingwasnotinitially

anexplicitfocusoftheoverarchingproject,andthetopicofmatch‐fixingemergedas

theproductofexplorativeethnographicfieldwork.

Theethnographicapproacheasedtheaccesstodata.Anydisclosureofsensitive

informationcouldhavenegativeimpactsonjobs,careersandsecurityofresearch

participants,and,therefore,ahighlevelofanonymityhadtobeguaranteed.Thisis

whythemajorityofmatch‐fixingconversationstookplaceinacovertandoff‐record

manner.Thesensitivenatureofthesematch‐fixingdiscussionscanbeillustrated

throughdifferentrecordedcomments:

‘IfIhadtoldyoueverything,yourrecorderwouldhaveburst;Iwouldhavebeenfired’, ‘I

haveexperiencedsomethingfor16years,andIcanspeakaboutsomethingsandIcan’t

speakaboutsomeotherthing’, ‘Ishouldbecareful;otherwise,Irisklosingmyjob’.These

and similar comments about match‐fixing were made by persons I spoke with

primarily about governance and management‐related issues and with whom I had

onlyaneverydaylevelofconfidence.Theseactorssomehowdisclosedthattheyknew

something but that they couldnot articulatewhat theyknew.By thispublicly secret

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‘activenotknowing’ (Taussig, 1999, p.7), they suggested between the lines quite a

somethingwhileactuallysayingnothing.

Daily,direct,ethnographiccontactwithotherofficials,players,andrefereesprovided

mewithmuchneeded,detailedempiricalevidence.Itwasduringtheseeveryday

observationsandinformalchatswithfamiliarresearchparticipantsthatthe

previouslymentioned‘somethinghiddenbeyondnothing’gainedmuchclearer

contours.NothingcouldbetterexemplifythisprocessthanthemomentwhenIfirst

toldmyinformantsthatmyjobwastodoresearchonfootballgovernance.‘Well,then,

youmustspeakaboutmatch‐fixing,’reactedoneofmyinformers,who,inabroader

companyofothersixplayers,proceededtotellmeaseriesofstoriesofmatch‐fixing.

Thedatawereanalysedmanually.Theapproachofthematiccodingwasenrichedwith

axialandopencodingofdata.TheinterviewstookplaceinCzechandallofthe

quotationsthatappearinthispaperaretranslatedfromCzechtoEnglish.Toenhance

theanonymityofdata,thefieldnotesarenotexactlydatedandonlyfictitiousnames

offootballclubsareused.

TheContentoftheCorruptedSecrecy:DecipheringtheMatch‐FixingComplex

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Basedonexistingliteratureandempiricaldata,match‐fixingisunderstoodasan

exchangeduringwhichascenarioofcorruption‐i.e.,aspecificsportingperformance,

orthecreationofconditionsthatfavourcertainsportingperformances‐isexchanged

formaterialandsymbolicgoods,e.g.,money,gifts,services,positionsofpower,

statusesorsportingperformances.Match‐fixinghasmotivationsbothrelatedand

unrelatedtosport.Inadditiontothedirectlinkbetweensportingperformanceand

competition,corruptionisfrequentlyrelatedtosportgovernance.Match‐fixingcanbe

explainedaspartofthepathologicalcompetitivenessinthesphereofsportandthe

ideaof‘winningatallcosts’orinrelationtomorespecificobjectives,suchasa

championshipvictoryatstake,theriskofrelegationorthepossibilityofqualifyingfor

internationalcompetitions.

Generally,scenariosofcorruptioncanbeinfluencedbythreedifferenttypesofactors:

footballclubs(andtheirplayers,coachesandofficials);footballreferees;and

interpretersofthegame,e.g.,massmediaorfootballfederationofficials.Considering

thisplethoraofactorswhocanexertinfluenceoverascenarioofcorruption,three

basicformsofmatch‐fixingareidentified:directcorruption,mediatedcorruptionand

meta‐corruption.Whereasdirectmatch‐fixingrelatestoplayersaskeyactorswho

influenceascenarioofcorruption,thekeyactorsinthecaseofmediatedcorruption

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arereferees,whocancomplementdirectmatch‐fixingbyinfluencingtheconditionsin

whichanentirescenarioofcorruptionemerges.Finally,meta‐corruptionrefersto

hidingmatch‐fixingpatternsbyinfluencingtheassignmentprocessandcreatingbias

intheinterpretationofbothcorruptedperformancesandtheregulationof

performances.

DirectCorruption

Directcorruptionassumestheactiveanddirectinvolvementofplayersorcoachesin

facilitatingafixedscenarioofcorruption.Footballplayersandcoachesarethemain

actorswhoarebribedtodirectlyinfluencetheoutcomeofagameandtoperformina

scenarioofcorruption.

DirectcorruptionisprimarilyrepresentedbythedynamicbetweenaclubAandaclub

B,inwhichrepresentativesofclubAbriberepresentativesofclubB.Duringthisform

ofmatch‐fixing,aclub,groupofplayers,coachesorofficialsofclubBarebribedby

representativesofclubA,eitherdirectlyorthroughbrokers.Differentstrategiesare

employedtosecureaperformanceinoroutcomeofagame.Keyplayersmaynotplay,

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aclubdoesnotplayinitsstrongestformation,orsomeoftheplayersofclubBmay

deliberatelyplaypoorlytopositivelyinfluenceclubA’sperformance.

Alternatively,directcorruptioncanmaterializebythedirectinvolvementofclubA

only,withpotentialconsequencesforoneormorecompetingclubs.Inthiscase,club

Adeliberatelyunderperformstoloseand,consequently,gainotherprofits.ClubAcan

alsodeliberatelylosesothatclubB,aclubthreatenedbyrelegationtoalower

division,wins,withtheaimofensuringthatclubBremainsinthedivisionatthe

expenseofaclubC.Thistypeofmatch‐fixingcanhavesocio‐culturalorpracticaland

logisticalmotivations.Regardingsocio‐culturalmotivations,thisbehaviourcan

emergefromhistoricalanimositiesanda‘needforrevenge,’e.g.,clubAwithhistorical

animositytowardsclubClosesagainstclubB,whoissavedfromrelegationatthe

expenseofclubC.Regardinglogisticalandpracticalmotivations,clubAaimsto

influencetherelegationofclubCbecauseofclubC’sinsufficientfacilities,theirpoorly

keptpitch,orthelonganduncomfortabletravelrequiredtoplayagainstclubC.

Inadditiontosocio‐culturalorpracticalmotivations,directcorruptionhappensdue

allegiancesbetweencontemporaryfootballandthebettingindustry.Inthisvein,

directcorruptionreferstoadeliberateunderperformanceofclubAoritsseveral

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players.Thismateriallydrivenlose‐to‐wincorruptioninvolvesfootballplayers

underperformingtoprofitfrombettingonmatchesinwhichtheyareinvolved.Froma

structuralperspective,theyareapartofawidergroupofactors.Thereareavarietyof

strategiesusedtoconcealtheseefforts,whichcanalsorelatetobettingonfirstcorner,

firstyellowcardorthefirsthalfofthegame.

Mediatedcorruption

Whereasthemainactorsareplayersandcoachesindirectcorruption,thekeyactors

aretherefereesinmediatedcorruption.Mediatedcorruptionisbasedonthe

relationshipbetweenclubAandarefereewhoinfluencesagame,perhapsby

increasingthechancesofclubAachievingapositiveresultagainstclubBorby

influencingagamebetweenclubsCandDinfavourofclubA.Thefirstscenariois

describedasimmediatemediatedcorruption,andthesecondscenarioiscalleddistant

mediatedcorruption.

Incasesofmediatedcorruption,refereesemploydifferenttacticstosecurethe

scenarioofcorruption.Assigningpenaltykicksisthemostfrequentandmostevident

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strategy.However,moresubtleyetefficienttacticsarealsoemployed,asdescribedby

onerespondent.

‘Youknow,maybethisisnotthatobvious,buttherearerefereeswhowon’tevenallow

yourclubtocrossthemidfieldbycontinuouslywhistlingfoulsagainstyou,evenafterthe

slightestcontactyoumighthave…Therewasarefereeparticularlyskilfulinwhousedto

say:“Ifyoupaymewell,notevenRealMadridwouldwinhere”…’(Fieldnotesfrom

informalconversationwithafootballclubrepresentative).

Inthecaseoftheimmediatemediatedcorruption,arefereecanbefixedtofavourclub

AoverclubB.TheexampleofdistantmediatedcorruptioninwhichclubApaysa

refereetoinfluenceagamebetweenclubsCandDsuggeststhatmediatedcorruption

isnotnecessarilyconnectedwithagameoraroundthatdirectlyinvolvesthe

influencingfootballclub.Incasesofdistantmediatedcorruptioninfluencingdistant

games,mediatedcorruptioncanleadtoafavouringofoneoftwoclubswhoare

competitivepositionsintheleaguetablewithacorruptingclubA,orresultin

importantplayersfromothersteamsreceivingyelloworredcardsthatresultsin

thoseplayersmissinggamesagainstclubA.Inthecontextofthesecompetitionsbeing

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linkedwiththebettingindustry,refereesactionscanbebasedontheinterestsof

actorswhoareexternaltothegame,e.g.,socialnetworksorganizedaroundthe

bettingindustry,asopposedtotheinterestsofaspecificteam.

Meta‐Corruption

Meta‐corruptionprimarilyrelatestointerpretersofthegame,suchasfootball

associations'officials,mediarepresentatives(Numerato,2009)andinvestigators.

Meta‐corruptiontakestwodifferentforms:ex‐antemeta‐corruptionandex‐postmeta‐

corruption.Bothformsofmeta‐corruptionusuallyappearsimultaneouslywithother

formsofmatch‐fixing.Meta‐corruptionisusedtosecuretheefficiencyofandhidethe

tacticsofmatch‐fixing.

Thesignificantroleofmeta‐corruptionisimpliedbybothprimaryandsecondary

evidence.Afewexamplesfollow.Afootballofficialconfidentiallyconfessedthat‘the

competitionsaregovernedbycriminals,formerrefereesanddelegates.’Similarly,a

smallclubpresidentinarecentlypublishedinterviewsuggested,‘Themainprincipal

ismadebyclubs.Theyvotefortheirrepresentatives,whoshouldgovernfootballand

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shouldguaranteethatfootballisplayedinfair‐playenvironments.However,bribes

givenbyfootballofficialssimplyspoilthisidea.’(Miškovský,2015)

Ex‐antemeta‐corruptionisbasedontherelationshipbetweenrepresentativesofclub

Aandfootballassociationofficialsormediarepresentatives.Themainobjectiveof

thisformofmatch‐fixingistosecureadvantageousconditionsfromwhichclubA’s

playcanbenefit,suchastheassignmentofadesired,ofteneasilycorruptiblereferee.

Similarly,ex‐antemeta‐corruptioncouldalsoinvolvebribingthedelegateswhoare

responsibleforoverseeingareferee’sperformance.Phoneinterceptionsfromthe

match‐fixingscandalintheCzechRepublicsuggestedthatclubofficialshadcontact

withmediaeditorialboardsandcouldinfluencejournalistswhocouldbemadeto

hidequestionablerefereedecisions.

Ex‐postmeta‐corruptionincludesarelationshipbetweenclubAandrepresentativesof

themassmedia,likejournalistsoreditors,andfootballassociations’officials.Both

mediarepresentativesandfootballassociations’officialsareinterpretersofagame

and,inparticular,areferee'sperformance.Morespecifically,theaimoftheseformsof

bribingistoturnattentionawayfromsuspiciousmomentsinacorruptedgame.

Delegatesandfootballassociationofficialsarethereforetargetsforcorruption.

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DocumentationofthiscanbefoundinthefollowingclaimbyaCzechfootballplayer:

‘Theproblemisthattheleadersoflocalfootballassociationsarerecruitedfromformer

refereeswhoconcealthebribing,andthisiswhyitisdifficulttostrugglewiththe

corruption.’(idnes.cz,2015a)SomecriticsofCzechfootballgovernancegoonestep

furtherbyclaimingthatnotonlyiscorruptionpresentamongrefereesinleadership

positionsbutalsothatrefereesoftenhaveprofessionalbackgroundsthatconnect

themtocriminalpolicenetworks,resultinginpoliceandinvestigatorshavingstakes

inmatch‐fixing.Thevalidityoftheseaccountsshouldhoweverbefurtherverified,

consideringtheiranecdotalnature.Ex‐postmeta‐corruptioncanalsobeobserved

whencorrupterspressurethemassmedia.Mediaeditorshavethepowertohide

controversiesandcancreateabiasedpictureofrefereeperformances(e.g.Numerato,

2009).

Publiclysecretconditionsofmatch‐fixing

Generalpatternsandconfigurationsofmatch‐fixingwouldnotbenoveltosomeone

whowasinvolvedinCzechfootball,regardlesshisorherpersonalexposureto

corruption.Acommonlyexpressedobservationthat‘Iknowthatitexists,butIhave

21  

notdirectlywitnessedit’illustratesthepubliclysecretnatureofmatch‐fixing.The

interconnectednessofdifferentformsofthematch‐fixingcomplexsuggestshow

numerousfootballactorsarecomplicitwiththereproductionofcorruption.This

rangeofcomplicityisfurtherextendedtothoseactorswhoarenotdirectlyinvolved

butarestillawareofmatch‐fixing.Thenormalizationofcorruptionandomnipresent

complicityaltogetherconstitutestwomajorcharacteristicsofthepubliclysecret

natureofcorruptioninandthroughwhichthematch‐fixingcomplexinCzechfootball

reproduces.

Bothpatternsofcomplicityandnormalityareexemplifiedinacomplaintmadebya

coachwhoapproachedanadversary’scaptainandcriticisedthereferee’s

performance,makinganimplicitreferencetobribes.Thecaptain’sreplyapparently

didnotcontestthecriticismofthereferee.‘Areyousurprisedafterwhatyoudidtous

whenweplayedthelastawaygameatyourstadium?’Thisreplycanbeinterpretedas

asilentadmissiontomatch‐fixing;itsuggeststhatmatch‐fixingwasendemicin

footballculture,partofthegame,partofcompetition,somethinginescapable.Inthis

contextofomnipresentcomplicity,thetasteofrevenge–youdidittomesowhycan’tI

doittoyou–thatinitsverytotalitydoesnotdistinguishbetweenvictimsand

principals,isquitecommon.Thisshortillustrationalsosuggestshowdeeply

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embeddedmatch‐fixingwaslessthanyearstenagointheCzechRepublic.Match‐

bribingemergedinconversationsalmostasamatteroffactandasanormalised

strategytoplaythefootballgame.Thefollowingsectionsprovidein‐depthinsightinto

thepubliclysecretaspectsofmatch‐fixingintheCzechRepublicwithrespectto

normalityandcomplicity.

Thenormalityofmatch‐fixing

Corruptionisconsideredtobenormal,unproblematicandtakenforgranted.The

normalityofmatch‐fixingpersistsduetoasystemofpyramidaljustification.The

publicsecrecyaboutmatch‐fixingatthelowestlevel1isjustifiedbythefactthatit

happensinhigherlevelsoffootball,asdemonstratedbymatch‐fixingscandalsatthe

highestlevelsofCzechprofessionalfootballinthe2004/2005season.Paradoxically

enough,thedisclosureofcorruptionatthehighestlevelsdidnotprovokearadical

disruptiontothepracticeofmatch‐fixing.Instead,itcontributedtotheideathat

match‐fixingwassomethinglatent,possibleandinevitable.Inotherwords,the

presenceofmatch‐fixinginprofessionalfootballjustifiedahypocriticaltolerationof

corruptionatlowerlevelsoffootball.Moreover,thepresenceofmatch‐fixingin

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professionalfootballwasjustifiedbythefactthatitmirroredcorruptioninbroader

society.ThisisillustratedbyastatementmadebyaformerpresidentoftheCzech

footballassociationthatconveysaperspectiveoftenfrequentlyexpressedbysport

officials:‘Itisnotcorrecttoportrayfootballasacesspitinthecountry,where

corruptionisarulethatwemeeteverywhereineverydaylife.Wearenotworsethanthe

surroundingsociety.’(ihned.cz,2005)

Inadditiontothelogicofpyramidaljustification,corruptionisnormalizedthrougha

sharedmatch‐fixingknowledge,aknow‐howforhowtoengageinandconcealmatch‐

fixingaswellaswhomtoaddress.Theresearchsuggeststhattherewasan

unarticulated‘pricelist’indicatingcoststofixagameatdifferentlevelsandthatthere

existedasharedvocabularytoconcealcorruption.Theseobservationsagreewith

existentliteratureonmatch‐fixing(e.g.,Hill2009a,2010b).Thisisexemplifiedbya

testimonygivenbyaformerCzechnationalfootballplayerLadislavVízekinan

interviewwithaCzechdaily:‘Treatarefereewithaschnitzelinsteadofgivinghima

sausageandhewon’tmakeyoulose.Inthehighestdivisions,itiscleaner,inthelowestit

isaprimevalforest.’(Saiver,Krutil,Cirmaciu,2007).Theexistenceoftheseimplicit

rulesareillustratedbyaconversationinwhichalocalclubvolunteerarguedthathe

wouldliketotakeatrainingcourseforreferees:‘Youknow,fivehundred[Czech

24  

crowns,about$20]pergametostartwith,itisagooddeal.’Thesecretlyshared

knowledgeaboutmatch‐fixingdoesnotinvolveonlythelanguageand‘pricelist’but

alsoafamiliaritywithactorswhoarefixable.Asoneofmyinformantsargued,

‘Noteveryonewouldgoforit.Sometimes,youwouldevenbesurprisedwhotakes….

Thereisawell‐knownrefereewhoisactiveatthehighestlevels,butaspartofhisduties,

hesometimesrefereesamatchatthelocallevel.Ihavebeentoldbymyfriendsthatonce

hejustputfivehundredcrownsnote(approximately$20)inhispocketsayingthis

shouldbeenoughforabreakfast.’

Theveryexistenceofthisstoryoutlinesanotheraspectofthenormalisationofmatch‐

fixing:itisoneofmanycirculatingstoriesthatcontributetoacorruptionmythology.

Themythologyofmatch‐fixingisreinforcedbothbysemi‐secretstoriesandmedia

representationsofmatch‐fixingscandalsthatarebasedontestimoniesgiven

confidentiallybyanonymousfootballplayersorreinforcedbypopculturecaricatures

ofthefootballworld(e.g.Giulianotti,1999).Thesesemi‐specificrevelationsdonot

preventfurtherconcealmentsandfurthermatch‐fixing.Inthesecircumstances,

25  

almosteveryoneknows,admitsoratleastsuspectsthatmatch‐fixinghappens,butthe

disclosureofparticularcasesrarelyappears.Thearticulationofdistrustisritualized

andplaysastableroleintheconstructionofpublicsecrecy,reinforcingand

maintainingthepublicmythologyandcontoursofmatch‐fixingwithoutnecessarily

disclosingtherealfacetsofspecificmatch‐fixingsecrets.

Inthecontextofnormalizedcorruption,match‐fixingisunderstoodaspartofthe

gameratherthanasdisruptingagamethatis,intheory,basedontheprincipalsof

fair‐play.Thisisillustratedbythefollowingfieldnotesfromobservations.A

frustratedplayerfromFCFixboroughsittinginthechangingroomthrowshisjersey

ontothefloor.Thecoachoftheteamtakesadvantageofthepost‐matchrush,gets

closertoasmallergroupofplayersandsays:‘Youknowwhattheworstthingis?We

wentintothereferee[literallytranslationofthetermtodenotebribing].’Theplayer

replied:‘Well,playinglikethis,wejustmeritfallingdowntotheprimevalforestleague;’

andadded,half‐joking:‘Idon’tunderstandwhyyoudidnotfixgamesinautumn.We

wouldnotstruggleforrelegationnowandyoucouldhaveevensoldsomematches.’

Thecomplicityofmatch‐fixing

26  

Normalityiscoupledwiththeextendedcomplicitythatbindsnumerousactorstothe

match‐fixingcomplex.ToreconnectwiththescenefromtheFCFixboroughchanging

room,thejerseythatthefrustratedplayerthrewdownwasnotacquiredinastandard

way.TheplayersofFCFixboroughweregiventhosejerseysafewyearsbyFC

Corrupthampton.Atthetime,onlyavictoryagainstFCFixboroughcouldsaveFC

Corrupthamptonfromrelegation.FCCorrupthamptonwonthegame,andthesetof

jerseyswasarewardforFCFixborough’shelp.AsaformerFixborough’splayer

remembers:

‘Thefunniestthingisthattheyplayedreallyterriblyandwedidnotknowwhatelseto

dotohelpthem.Theyhadproblemstoputitoverontheyoungerplayerswhoobviously

didnotknowthatitwasfixed.Thesethingswereusuallyagreedamongolderplayers.’

ThepositionofFCFixboroughwassimilartomanyotherclubsinwhichinvolvement

incorruptionwasbothactiveand‘passive.’

Withinthecontextofthisinstanceofextendedcomplicity,abroadrangeofactors

werebothcorruptingandcorrupted.Extendedcomplicitytendstoconcealthe

boundariesbetweenvictimsandprincipals.Inthecontextofcompromisingcomplicity,

27  

inwhicheveryoneispotentiallyaprincipal,suspicionanddistrustbackedbypublic

secrecyarethemainoperatingprinciples.However,criticismismostoftenlimitedto

specificinstancesofmatch‐fixing,ratherthanexpandedtocoverthesystematic

factorsinwhichthecorruptedscenarioemerges.Match‐fixingisrarelyaddressed

structurally;instead,itistypicallyaddressedratheraccidentlybymeansofadhoc

assurancesthatbothadmititsgeneralexistenceandsimultaneouslypreventits

materializationinthosespecificcasesthataresurroundedbyomnipresentdistrust

andsuspicion.Thesemechanismsareexemplifiedbyarequestmadetoarefereeby

phoneinalocalExecutiveCommitteemeetingthatIobservedbeforeanimportant

match:

‘Listen,IamsittinghereatthemeetingoftheExecutiveCommitteeandI'mputtingyou

onspeaker,couldyoupleaseassuremeandthematesherethattherewillnoproblemsin

Riggedshiretomorrow.YouknowwhatImean,don’tyou?’(Fieldnotes,non‐participant

observation,CzechRepublic).

28  

Thisphonecall,whichfollowedothersuspiciouscommentsbytheExecutive

Committeemembers,suggeststhatthegeneraloccurrenceofmatch‐fixingwasknown

andexpected.However,proofofspecificinstancesofmatch‐fixingwashidden,and

thematch‐fixingitselfwereneverfullyarticulated.Althoughfootballofficialsare

awareofmatch‐fixingandagreethatitdamagesfootball,theywouldacceptitasa

simplematteroffact,admittingitsexistencewithoutprovidinganysystematiceffort

tocombatitduetoalackofknowledge,lowcompetencies,thevoluntarynatureof

theirinvolvementinfootballgovernanceandtheresultinglackoftimetoproperly

addresslong‐termandstrategictasks.

Finally,complicityoperatesthroughanexclusionarylogicandtendstosilenceany

substantialandsystemiccriticism.Thishasimplicationsforanti‐corruptioninitiatives.

Effortstocombatmatch‐fixingdonotnecessarilysucceed,asissuggestedbyastoryof

alocalclubpresidentwhoaddressedalettertoallclubsplayinginthesamedivision,

callinguponthemtobreakwiththebadhabitofbribingreferees.Bribeswereeven

usedbyclubs’representativestoguaranteethatarefereewouldmakecorrect

decisions.Thishabitbecameanunwrittenrule,apartofthegame.However,the

29  

president,whoaimedtochangethecultureofcorruption,failedinhiseffortbecause

heclashedwithdissentingrepresentativesfromcompetingclubswhorefusedto

disengagefromtheirhabits.Asaresult,hisclubwasvengefullyandsystematically

punishedbyrefereeswhowereinformedoftheanti‐corruptioninitiativebyafaction

ofclubs(Fieldnotes,CzechRepublic,2007).

Afterthisunsuccessfulefforttochangethesystemoffootball,theformerclub

presidentdecidedtoleavethefootballenvironmentaftermorethanthreedecadesof

volunteering.Thissortofexitisnotuncommon.Thetwofollowingexamples

documentsimilarexitsfromfootballbytwootheractorswhodecidedtoescapethe

endemiccultureofcorruption.Aformeryouthfootballcoachexplainedhismotivation

forleavingasfollows:

‘Youknow,theworstthingisthatthisdoesnothappenamongonlyadults.Howwould

youexplaintoathirteen,fourteenyearoldboythatamatchwaschinked[aliterally

translatedtermtosaythatthegameisfixed]?Ireallydonothavestomachforthis;I

feltsosorryforthoseboyswhoheavilytrainedduringtheweekandthenfeltsohelpless

onSaturday.’

30  

Similarly,asecretarygeneralofaregionalfootballassociationtoldmeastoryabout‘a

talented,motivated,universityeducatedyoungreferee’whodecidednottoadvancehis

careerbecauseoftheconstantdistrustoffansthathefacedaroundthegames:

‘Hejustwrotemethathecannottakepartinthisworldanymoreashewasconstantly

exposedtosuspicionsandsometimesevenaggressionsoffanswhodidnottoleratesome

problematicdecisions.Thesuspicionofmatch‐fixingwasalwaysthere,buttomake

errorsisjusthuman;isitnot?’

Conclusionsanddiscussion

Throughthisstudy,whichdrewheavilyfromprimaryempiricalevidence,basicforms

ofmatch‐fixingwereidentified.Directmatch‐fixingcountsonfixedperformanceof

playersorteams.Mediatedmatch‐fixinginvolvesafixedreferee.Meta‐corruption

reliesonfixedsportassociationofficialsorjournalists.Theseformsofmatch‐fixing

arenotunderstoodasdistinct,theoreticallyseparatedcategoriesbutarerather

31  

consideredtobeempiricallyintertwinedphenomena.Therefore,match‐fixingcanbe

fullyunderstoodonlythroughananalysisofthedynamicsbetweentheseforms,i.e.,

throughanin‐depthanalysisofthematch‐fixingcomplexthattheseformscreate

altogether.

Thenatureofthematch‐fixingcomplexisstructuredbytheclimateofendemic

corruption,extendedcomplicityandpublicsecrecy.Duringtheperiodunderstudy,

match‐fixingwasbothknownandunarticulatedand,inasenseofgeneralized

hypocrisy(Gambetta,2002),corruptionwasperceivedtobeunavoidable.Inthis

context,generaldiscourseaboutcorruptionwasquitecommon,yetspecificactsof

match‐fixingremainedmaskedandonlyrarelydisclosed,mostlyviacirculating

storiesandmyths.

AlthoughthisstudyisbasedonempiricalevidencefromtheCzechRepublic,itis

arguedthatitdemonstratesgeneralpatternsthatcanbeobservedacrossvarious

socio‐culturalandgeo‐politicalrealities.Thisstudyhasseveralimplications.Firstly,

thisstudyempiricallyinformsresearchoncorruptionbyprovidingmuchneeded

primarydata.Inthisregard,theempiricaldepthhelpsresearcherstobetter

understandtheunderlyingpatternsofmatch‐fixing.Secondly,thisstudycontributes

32  

toscholarshiponmatch‐fixing.Thenotionsofmeta‐corruptionandthematch‐fixing

complexwouldsuggestaneedtorevisitandextendtheexistingdivisionsbetween

managementandcompetitioncorruption(Maennig,2005;GorseandChadwick,2012).

Inparticular,theinvolvementoffootballofficialsanddelegateswouldsuggestthat

managementandcompetitioncorruptionarecommonlyintertwinedanddonot

exclusivelyoperateindependently.Thirdly,researchonmatchfixinghasimplications

forthesociologicalunderstandingofcorruptionmorebroadly.Theendemicand

publiclysecretnatureofmatch‐fixingsuggeststhatcorruptionhastobeunderstood

inthecontextofthesocialstructuresandcultureinwhichitisembedded.This

understandingcomplementstheexistingresearchonrational‐choicetheorythat

addressedtheindividualmotivationsthataffectdecisionsforwhethertocorrupt.It

furthercomplementsthequantitativelydrivenresearchthatusessurveystudiesto

measureperceptionsofcorruptioninspecificnationalcontextsandthepossible

pressuresofcorruptingnorms(e.g.,Frič,2001).Researchoncorruptioncannotignore

theculturalandsocialcontextinwhichthesedecisionsareembedded.

Thispaperhasalsopolicyimplications.Previousstudiescalleduponausualmixof

education,transparency,accountability,regulationandinvestigation(e.g.,Aquilina

andChetcuti,2014;Bureš,2008;TransparencyInternational,2009).Theanalysisof

33  

footballmatch‐fixingsuggeststhattheseindependentlydefinedrecipes,regardlessof

theirrelevance,canhardlybeimplementedastheyimplicitlyassumethatthey

penetratetheendemicandrelativelyautonomousmatch‐fixingcomplex.Anyabstract

outlineofananti‐corruptioninitiativeshouldcautiouslyconsiderthesocialand

culturalnatureoftheenvironmentinwhichthemixofanti‐corruptioninstruments

shouldoperate.Thematch‐fixingcomplexandbroadersystemofgovernanceinand

throughwhichitoperatesarerelativelyautonomous.Thismeansthatactorsinvolved

inthesystemofgovernancecementedbyreciprocallycompromisedclientelistic

networksarerelativelyimmunetoanyexternalattemptstochangetheexistingsocial

structures.Thisimmunitynotonlyinvolvesmechanismsofsocialclosureandana

prioriresistancetoexternalforcesbutalsoacapacitytocircumventanti‐corruption

initiativesthroughmimeticstrategiesofstrategicadaptation.

Futureresearchshouldfocusonacarefulmappingofsocialnetworksthatcould

eitherfavourorunderminematch‐fixingtoidentifypotentialbrokersofanti‐

corruptioninitiatives.Moregenerally,futureresearchoncorruptionshouldstrongly

engagewithprimaryandup‐to‐dateempiricalevidence.2Furthermore,therolesof

anti‐corruptionagenciesandinitiativesshouldbecriticallyexamined;theroleof

agenciessuchasTransparencyInternational,PlaytheGameorInternationalCentre

34  

forSportSecurityhasbeeninvestigatedand,somehownormatively,recognized,but

theirimpacthasseldombeenexplored.Althoughthereisnodoubtthatthese

initiativessignificantlycontributedtobringingpublicattentiontomatch‐fixingand

corruptioninsport,thelong‐termconsequencesofanti‐corruptioneffortsareyetto

beobserved.Howaretheuniversalisticdoctrinesoftheseinitiatives(Larmour2008)

suitabletoaddressculturallyembeddedcorruption?Moreover,consideringthatthe

mainandemergingresearchagendaoncorruptionfocusesonthegloballinks

betweensportactorsandthebettingindustryandwouldmostlikelytakeadvantage

ofso‐calledBigDatatoanalysetheunderlyingpatternsofcorruption,ethnographic

studiesatboththeglobalandlocallevelsshouldcomplementtheseanalysesto

provideresearchintocorruptionthatdemonstrateswhatthematch‐fixingcomplex

meanstothosewhoaredirectlyinvolvedincorruptionandthosewhoareimplicitly

complicitincorruption.

35  

Notes

1.Duringthestudyperiod,match‐fixingwasstronglyembeddedinfootballcultureto

thedegreethatitappearedinalesscompetitive,lessformalleagueofnon‐registered

players,organizedindependentlyoftheestablishedfootballassociationasIwastold

byanon‐registeredleagueplayer:“Ireallydonotunderstand.Iusedtoplayorganized

footballwherethiswasquitecommon.Youknow,oncewegotakegofbeer,oncewegot

apig…Iwouldneverexpectthisinanon‐registeredleague.Ijustcouldnotbelieveit

whenwewereofferedakegofabeartohelpouradversary”(Fieldnotes,informalchat,

sportsjournalist).

2.Thedatausedinthisstudywerecollectedin2007,anditisbeyondthescopeofthis

papertoverifywhetherthesetrendsstillpersist.However,arecentcriminal

investigationandthefollowingaccusationsof25persons,primarilydelegates,

refereesandclubofficials(idnes.cz,2015b),involvedinmatch‐fixinginlowerCzech

divisionswouldsuggestthatmatch‐fixingstillpersists.

36  

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Richard Giulianotti and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful

and helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. The data collection was funded by

the European Commission FP6 Marie Curie Excellence Grant MEXT-25008. This paper

was further drafted under a FP7 Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship, FP7-PEOPLE-

2012-IEF, Grant number 331097. The contents of this article reflect only the views of the

author and not the views of the European Commission.

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