Post on 18-Mar-2023
MASARYK UNIVERSITY
Faculty of Social Studies
Department of Political Science
DISSERTATION THESIS
Brno 2017 Iveta Hlouchová
MASARYK UNIVERSITY
Faculty of Social Studies
Department of Political Science
Mgr. Iveta Hlouchová
Czech Approach toward Counterinsurgency
Dissertation thesis
Supervisor: prof. JUDr. PhDr. Miroslav Mareš, Ph.D.
Brno 2017
Anotace
Tato disertační práce se zaměřuje na popis a analýzu přístupu k protivpostalecké strategii ze
strany České republiky, aneb jak je protipovstalecká strategie NATO pojímána v českém
prostředí. Data a informace získané od expertů s přímou zkušeností s danou probematikou,
práce jsou s využitím SWOT a (především) CEG analytických nástrojů kriticky zhodnoceny
s cílem identifikovat klíčové principy, trendy a tendence českého přístupu k protipovstalectví.
Práce formuluje doporučení pro budoucí vývoj i budoucí výzkum dané problematiky. Je také
první analytickou případovou studií nové protipovstalecké doktríny NATO.
Annotation
This dissertation thesis focuses on description and analysis of counterinsurgency approach of
the Czech Republic, or, in the other words, how NATO counterinsurgency strategy is
approached in the Czech environment. Data and information obtained from experts with direct
experience with the topic are critically evaluated using SWOT and (primarily) CEG analytical
tools in order to identify key principles, trends and tendencies of the Czech approach toward
counterinsurgency. This thesis formulates recommendations for future development of the
approach as well as future research. It also serves as a first analytical case study of new
NATO counterinsurgency doctrine.
Klíčová slova
Česká republika, NATO, protipovstalectví, přístup, strategie
Key words
Approach, Czech Republic, counterinsurgency, NATO, strategy
Affidavit
I hereby honorably declare, that I am the only author of the dissertation thesis titled Czech
approach toward counterinsurgency and that I used all the sources listed in bibliography.
In Brno, 10th April, 2017
Iveta Hlouchová
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude and many thanks to prof. JUDr. PhDr. Miroslav Mareš,
Ph.D., for his willingness to help, advice, patience and guidance. I would also like to thank all
those who kept telling me that the research on this topic would not be possible, because their
discouragement gave me more motivation to keep going it till the end.
Table of contents
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 8
1.1 Structure of the thesis ...................................................................................... 11
2 Methodology .............. .......................................................................................... 12
2.1 Approach ......................................................................................................... 12
2.2 Research questions .................................... ..................................................... 13
2.3 Research methods ............................................................................................ 14
2.3.1 Historical method .......................................................................... 14
2.3.2 Process tracing ............................................................................... 15
2.4 Analytical models ............................................................................................ 18
2.4.1 SWOT model ................................................................................. 18
2.4.2 CEG model .................................................................................... 21
2.5 Data gathering techniques ............................................................................... 24
2.5.1 Interviews ...................................................................................... 24
2.5.2 Content analysis ............................................................................. 27
2.6 Limitations ...................................................................................................... 31
3 Summary of existing literature .............................................................................. 33
4 Theoretical part ...................................................................................................... 34
4.1 Theory of strategy ........................................................................................... 34
4.2 Conceptualization of counterinsurgency ......................................................... 46
4.2.1 David Galula .................................................................................. 55
4.2.2 David Kiclullen .............................................................................. 57
5 Empirical part ........................................................................................................ 64
5.1 Historical legacy? ............................................................................................ 64
5.1.1 The World War II (1939-1945) ..................................................... 65
5.1.2 The Communist regime era (1948-1990) ...................................... 67
5.1.3 WWII or Communist era legacy? .................................................. 69
5.2 Czech approach toward counterinsurgency – conceptual dimension .............. 70
5.2.1 Relevant NATO documents ........................................................... 73
5.2.1.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (AJP-3.4.4) .......81
5.2.2 Relevant documents of the Czech Republic ................................ 107
5.2.2.1 Political .................................................................................. 109
5.2.2.2 Military .................................................................................. 115
5.3 Czech approach toward counterinsurgency – practical dimension ............... 127
5.3.1 Kosovo ......................................................................................... 127
5.3.2 Iraq ............................................................................................... 131
5.3.3 Afghanistan .................................................................................. 135
5.3.3.1 Deployments of special operations forces (SOF) ................. 144
5.3.3.2 Training and advising to ANSF ............................................ 148
5.3.3.3 Reconstruction and stablization efforts ................................ 151
5.3.3.4 Logistical support for coalition forces .................................. 159
5.3.3.5 National Support Element (NSE) ......................................... 159
5.3.3.6 Relations with the Afghan population .................................. 160
6 Analytical part ..................................................................................................... 161
6.1 SWOT analysis .............................................................................................. 161
6.2 CEG analysis ................................................................................................. 170
7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 190
8 Bibliography ........................................................................................................ 205
8.1 Primary sources ............ ................................................................................ 205
8.2 Secondary sources ......................................................................................... 209
List of tables .......................................................................................................................... 216
List of figures ........................................................................................................................ 217
List of abbreviations ...................................................................................................... 218-220
Wordcount: 75 619
Characters with spaces: 519 632
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1 Introduction
One of the distinctive features of the 21st century security environment has been asymmetrical
war fighting, with major conflict parties being framed by many politicians, security
practitioners as well as researchers with labels of insurgencies of various kinds, sizes,
methods of fight they deploy and the interests they pursue. Closely aligned to this was also the
tendency to restore to the frequent use of the term “counterinsurgency” in reference to the
measures and efforts employed and carried out in order to minimize and essentially eliminate
activities of the contemporary non-state belligerents and/or war opponents, designated as
insurgencies.
The concept of counterinsurgency started gaining traction as related to the coalition
efforts in the post 9/11 conflict zones after the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan (overlapping
operations Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (OEF-A) and the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) and the 2003 invasion of Iraq (operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and
has been associated mai1nly with the discourse politicians, military officers as well as various
researches and commentators had been using under the administration of the then-US
President Barrack H. Obama. Since its introduction as one of the most effective ways of how
to best counter the contemporary security challenges in the post 9/11 conflict zones,
counterinsurgency has been one of the dominant military doctrines on the potential/possible
deployment of military (as well as, to some extent civilian) forces in the contemporary
security environment. As such, counterinsurgency as a military strategy and/or a military
doctrine has been studied, analyzed and discussed broadly and in depth, with most of the
attention focused on what are the most effective counterinsurgency principles, what does the
appropriate use of military force in counterinsurgency missions mean, how to reliably
measure any possible success of counterinsurgency operations. Factors like what level of local
knowledge and localization of the conflict is required for the mission to succeed/meet its
minimal objectives or how to best prepare military and civilian agents engaged in this type of
operations and how to make the military actors and the civilian actors cooperate with each
other effectively have been studied as well. Significant level of attention has also been
devoted to the best counterinsurgency practices and lessons identified and (ideally) learned
from the past to the future potential operations.
Major part of the relevant literature, studies and research project has addressed the
issue of counterinsurgency from the Western point of view, as the perspective of a country/a
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coalition of countries engaged in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations “abroad”, i.e.
not in its own territory (distinct, for instance, by the stress put on the element of the
development of a host nation security forces and the significance of assistance provided to
them). Most of those studies focused on strategies of individual sovereign states, most notably
those with the superpower status, mirroring the security environment vis-a-vis national
interest assessments and/or historical experience, like the United States (USA), the United
Kingdom (UK) or France or the Russian Federation (Russia), or the Philippines, India, Israel
or Colombia, as examples of the countries with long-term stakes in the potential effectiveness
of their counterinsurgency efforts, given the presence of ongoing insurgencies in their
sovereign territories. With regards to the coalition efforts (particularly) in Afghanistan, it was
also the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as another actor subjected to the closer
scrutiny of its counterinsurgency efforts on the Alliance level. Individual counterinsurgency
approaches and strategies differ in some of its principles, their framework, in both theoretical
and practical terms, is, however, common and mostly invariable.
Smaller countries, like the Czech Republic, have been spared the greater
counterinsurgency scrutiny, due to their limited means of projection of individual state power
beyond its borders unilaterally and the comparatively stable domestic security environment
with low likelihood of insurgent activity in their sovereign territories. Nevertheless, it was
such smaller countries that contributed greatly (in terms of resources and capabilities, but also
knowledge and connections) to various counterinsurgency operations, especially those in
Afghanistan and in Iraq, in order to help achieve the most effective level counterinsurgency
efforts of engaged multinational coalitions possible.
Specifically, in the case of the Czech Republic, as a country that lacked any broader,
direct experience with efforts considered to be falling with a framework of counterinsurgency
operations prior to its involvement in the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2002, it is
even more urgent to explore its conduct and approach in comprehensive manner in order to
identify the key attributes, principles, liabilities as well as unique features of “the Czech way
of doing counterinsurgency”. Such a comprehensive study, which this thesis aims to be, seeks
to critically assess and evaluate the current state of art and identify its potential effectiveness,
flaws, challenges or spheres for further development or yet unexploited potential.
The Czech Republic has been actively participating in the NATO counterinsurgency
mission in Afghanistan for almost 15 years now, and gained valuable broad
counterinsurgency experience during these engagements. And even though the Armed Forces
of the Czech Republic’s (along with other civilian state as well as non-state resources in the
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areas of reconstruction, development or humanitarian aid) deployment in Afghanistan marks
historically the longest combat mission of the Czech (and Czechoslovak) state, with the
largest and longest deployment of the greatest number of human, materiel, financial, etc.
resources and capabilities, several frictions, caused by discontinuous approach, have occurred
during the almost 15 years. The challenging discontinuity with its potential impacts on the
overall effectiveness of the mission, can be potentially costly (in human, financial or political
terms) and is linked to the non-existence of any comprehensive, unifying official document on
the governmental level, that would serve as a general framework of the Czech approach to
counterinsurgency operations, listing resources and capabilities available, specifying the
conditions and requirements of their use or oversight and control mechanisms.
Another added value of this dissertation thesis is also increased due to the basically
non-existent larger expert community in the Czech academic, political as well as
practitioner’s circles. The Czech contributions and conduct of counterinsurgency missions has
been mostly described (and perhaps analyzed) in a fragmented manner, with a research focus
placed on a specific issue or problem. This thesis seeks to fill this gap in the Czech as well as
international expert literature.
The deployment of the Czech civilian and military manpower and resources in
Afghanistan, as part of the NATO (but also the EU and UN) mission resulted in a progressive,
gradual learning process and in acquiring important combat, practical, counterinsurgency
experience, knowledge and understanding of a complex, out of area mission, useful and
beneficial for the power projections of the Czech state as well as the pursuit of its national
interests, even in the future security environment. As already mentioned, the Czech mission in
Afghanistan can be distinguished by the great amount and wide range and scope of both
military and civilian resources deployed in Afghanistan, in both the two simultaneously
conducted operations, OEF and ISAF, with various assigned tasks and efforts, as well as the
historically longest essentially combat deployment of the Czech military, making it the main
research subject of the author of this thesis.
Nevertheless, to draw any inferences or conclusions based on the exploration of just
one, even though major case study can be misleading and simplistic. Therefore, two other
foreign multinational missions the Czech Republic contributed to and that evinced significant
counterinsurgency features are described and analyzed in this thesis as well, i.e. the missions
in Kosovo and Iraq. Even though the counterinsurgency dimension of the Czech deployments
was comparatively limited, the fact that the Czech Republic deployed under the NATO
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command aids the ambition of this thesis to be first case study of the NATO
counterinsurgency doctrine.
The time frame of this research is long enough to allow for a proper process-tracing
method to be applied. It starts in 1999 with the Czech deployment to KFOR mission in
Kosovo, and ends with the end of 2013, when the Czech Republic withdrew the majority of
its assets and resources from the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Short historical excurse is
included in the text, and covers the periods of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia
(1939-1945) and the Czechoslovak (Federative) Socialist Republic (1948/1960-1990). The
overall impacts of these historical periods on the results of this research are, however, very
limited and mainly abstract. Dominant focus of this thesis is on the contemporary approach of
the Czech Republic toward counterinsurgency endeavor.
1.1 Structure of the thesis
In the first part of the thesis, the author introduces the methodology of the research at hand,
articulates the main research question as well as discussed major limits of such a research,
along with the sources she used. Following chapter introduces the theoretical framework of
the research. Firstly, theory of strategy developed by Harry Yarger is introduced, in
conjunction with theoretical equation model of strategy, developed by Arthur F. Lykke, Jr.
these two closely interconnected theoretical frameworks are applied in the text and help
explain why the Czech counterinsurgency approach doesn’t constitute strategy. Second, the
concept of counterinsurgency is addressed and discussed, with the purpose of establishing the
conceptual framework of this thesis, and to help readers better understand the topic.
Counterinsurgency theories of two well-known and distinguished experts are introduced –
David Galula and David Kilcullen.
Empirical part of this thesis starts with short historical excurse, which maps the
historical experience of Czechs with art of counterinsurgency. Secondary aim is to identify
potential existing legacy that can affect the current Czech approach toward
counterinsurgency. Then the contemporary Czech approach to counterinsurgency is described
and analyzed in two dimensions: (1) conceptual, when all official relevant documents at
NATO and Czech levels are presented, and (2) practical. The practical dimension then
addresses on the major Czech counterinsurgency contributions to three NATO operations – in
Kosovo, in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Importantly, these were multinational missions. Hence
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any examination of the Czech contributions to them is inherently very closely linked to the
overall missions’ mandate and settings.
The findings discovered in the empirical part are analyzed in the fifth chapter of this
thesis. Two analytical models, SWOT and CEG, are used to gain analytical inferences that
allow examine the research subject in comprehensive way. CEG model is then the main
analytical technique applied in this thesis. The main findings of the previous chapters are then
summarized in conclusions. Research questions are answered and recommendations for
improvement and future development of the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency, as
well as recommendations for directions and areas of future research in this topic are
formulated in the concluding chapter.
2 Methodology
2.1 Approach
This thesis was developed using the qualitative design of the research, with slight overreach to
the quantitative research design.1 The author seeks to overcome the state-centric tendency,
and includes the exploration of relevant sources of data and dynamics at the levels of NATO
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), who not necessarily coordinate their efforts
with the state. Empirical-analytical approach seems to be the most adequate one in the efforts
to address and explore such a topic, because it allows for unbiased and neutral work with data,
their interpretation and analysis, regardless any ideological or values’ tone and purpose.
Proper counterinsurgency research should be multidisciplinary in order to allow examination
of all important features and perspectives. The author approaches the counterinsurgency topic
from the perspective of political science/security and strategic studies field. Interdisciplinary
outreach of this thesis is limited, and includes mainly economy and psychology (especially
the issue of perception2).
This thesis is a descriptive analysis and a case study of a counterinsurgency approach
of an individual, smaller (in power, economical and geographical terms) European country,
1 This overreach has a form of an original metrics developed by the author for the purposes of measuring the
value of the gap existing between capabilities and expectations relevant for the Czech approach to
counterinsurgency, which serves as a research sub-tool generating important data and findings which are further
utilized and evaluated in the context of broader Czech counterinsurgency approach. 2 For more on the roles and significance of perceptions in the modern warfare, including counterinsurgency
missions see: McKeldin, T.R. – David, G.J. (2009): Ideas as Weapons: Influence and Perception in Modern
Warfare. Washington DC: University of Nebraska Press.
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that is a member state of NATO, the EU and UN. It also represents first academic case study
of a newly adopted (2011) NATO Counterinsurgency strategy doctrine. The aim of this
thesis is then to develop an evidence-based comprehensive study of the contemporary Czech
approach toward counterinsurgency by describing and analyzing its key features. Importantly,
the author doesn’t frame this research in the traditional theoretical approaches of realism and
liberalism, even though certain tendencies in terms of implicit diversions of the arguments to
one direction or another are noticeable thorough the thesis. Generally speaking, key pillars of
both approaches are important for the purposes of this thesis, i.e. a sovereign state acting in
accordance and pursuance of its national interests, and important roles played by individual
state agencies as well as non-state, non-governmental actors like private entities,3
humanitarian organizations, but also multinational organizations. Significantly, certain
patterns of activity are traced and identified through this research, considering the
complexities of the research topic that is distinguishable by its multifaceted, multidimensional
character, further complicated by the multiplicity of identities of the Czech Republic (i.e.
nation state, NATO member state, EU member state, UN member state, etc.).
2.2 Research questions
Given the fact that this dissertation thesis compiles and analyses data in order to draw a
framework of the contemporary Czech approach to counterinsurgency at its end, the research
questions articulated by the author intuitively mirror the so far unmapped landscape of the
researched topic. The main three research questions, enabling the author to fulfil the stated
aim and reach the objectives of this thesis are:
1. What are the key attributes of the strategic Czech approach toward
counterinsurgency, and how consistent is it?
2. How autonomous and how specific is the Czech approach toward
counterinsurgency?
3. What counterinsurgency model does the Czech approach adhere to, and how?
3 Some of the private entities have semi-governmental character, because its founders, directors and/or chief
executes tend to be closely linked to government individual on personal as well as wider basis.
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Proving sufficient and evidence bolstered answers to these three research questions require
not only an explicit scale for measuring the level of autonomy of the Czech counterinsurgency
approach, but also determining the level of consistency. Identification of the most problematic
or challenging principles as well as examination of the practical, not only theoretical
dimension of the research subject matter and their mutual reflection enables the author to
determine the level of consistency. As for the autonomy, the essential platform for
determining its level in case of the Czech counterinsurgency approach are established by
decision-making processes, ordinary functioning and the powers, responsibilities and
commitments of the individual nation states within NATO. The NATO factor is critically
important for the purposes of this thesis. The Czech Republic is a credible member of the
Alliance and cannot ignore its security and defense commitments stemming out of it. Also,
majority of the foreign missions the Czech Republic has ever deployed its assets and
resources to where conducted under the auspices of NATO. The individual theoretical or
conceptual models are introduced in the respective chapter below in the text.4 What the
individual counterinsurgency models differ in are the military vs. civilian dominance and
decision-making authority, the importance and specific measures of a kinetic action against
the enemy, the significance of stabilization, reconstruction and development or the level of
discretion assigned by nation states to their deployed military and civilian force.
2.3 Research methods
2.3.1 Historical method
First method applied in this research is the historical method used to examine the historical
record of the Czech experience with counterinsurgency activities in order to provide a written
account of this past experience, with the use of primary sources and other evidence. Collected
data are then described and analyzed through the lenses of historical reasoning, when
information is assessed in and against a certain context. Historical method is a systematic
body of principles and rules designed to aid effectively in gathering the source materials of
history, appraising them critically, and presenting a synthesis (usually in a written form) of
the results achieved, as being a procedure for the attainment of historical truth. Historical
4 In the field of political science, international relations and security and strategic studies, the term “autonomy”
often refers to self-governance. The level of autonomy or self-governance is usually determined by numerous
deals and agreements that explicitly state the areas of greater discretion. Therefore, any specific concept related
to the question of how to measure autonomy is not introduced and used in this research.
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method is generally approached from the standpoint of understanding it as the broadest
possible methodological context, covering general philosophical considerations of the subject
matter of the historical research (Porra, Hirschheim, Parks 2014: 538). Therefore, more than
using one or two specific techniques used in the history writing process, the author of this
thesis applies the historical method is its extended scheme, in order to, as Munslow
characterized it, create and eventually impose a particular narrative of the past (Munslow
1997: 3). This narrative can vary across the spectrum of researches, depending upon the
paradigm and approaches used by scholars studying the historical events and is
multidisciplinary (like the historical method as itself) in its nature. Effective use of the
historical method depends on adequate historical thinking skills of researchers, on their ability
to acquire, analyze, and contextualize complex historical material in three main stages: (1)
building a foundation to acquire historical knowledge, (2) analyzing and evaluating historical
material, and (3) context and interpretation. All of these three stages make up the essential
stages of any research, historical, present or future, what is different in the case of historical
method though is the availability and (sometimes disputed) credibility of the resources used as
well as the lures of so-called historical presentism5.
2.3.2 Process-tracing
Process-tracing allows the researchers to identify potential existing causal mechanisms in the
subject matter of the research, which further enables to recognize possible/existing
correlations, and perhaps even possible/existing causal relationships. Importantly, the author
doesn’t seek to determine existing causalities when determining effects of certain factor as
independent variables on other factors, functioning as dependent variables. The process-
tracing research method is applied with the purpose of tracing existing mechanisms that give
the scholar enough evidence for identifying existing correlations between individual variables
more than drawing conclusive causal inferences, that, after a proper, follow-up scrutiny, can
be classified as causal mechanisms, or existing casual relationships between an independent
variable (or a group of independent variables) and a dependent variable in the given
relationship. The author of this thesis truly explores the mechanism of causal processes.
5 Historical presentism is a cognitive bias process that can be mitigated or eliminating through the mechanism of
establishing the values and beliefs of the times as a lens to analyze the past, or using the values of the time to
analyze historical meaning rather than those of the 21st century. Other means for overcoming the tendency to
analyze the historical records through the use of historical presentism is based on efforts aimed at comparing and
contrasting the values of the past with those of the present (Brown 2010: 8).
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Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba understand process-tracing as the search
for intervening factors that link an independent variable with a dependent variable.
Uncovering these intervening steps is then viewed as part of the more fundamental goal of
identifying and assessing the potential causal effect of an independent variable studied. In
their understanding, process-tracing can increase the number of theoretically relevant
observations, however, the value of the causal inference drawn through process-tracing is not
very strong. King, Keohane and Verba consider process-tracing casual inferences only to
“promote descriptive generalizations and prepare the way for casual inference” (King,
Keohane, Verba 1994: 225-228), by detecting the link, the steps and the relevant variables
intervening in the relationship of an independent variable and a dependent variable, but
leaving the mechanics of their potential intervention to further inquiry. Given the number of
intervening causal steps between any independent and dependent variable, King, Keohane and
Verba talk about the infinite regress (Ibid: 86), any research using process-tracing encounters,
as the research method itself is generally unable to determine which of multiple potential
intervening factors and mechanisms really function as a link between an independent and a
dependent variable. For them, process-tracing is mainly a descriptive tool and a first step in
causal analysis, requiring further research. The understanding of process-tracing King,
Keohane and Verba present in their work has been subjected to a lot of criticism, whose
authors have sought to provide alternative tools for overcoming the perceived shortcomings of
the process-tracing research method. One of the most prominent tools at the disposal of
contemporary scholars aimed at overcoming the flaw of apparent inference regression is the
focus on “casual-process observation” (CPO), as opposed to “data-set observation” (DSO)
which accounts for merely a qualitative research equivalent to the normal statistical
observation. CPO, however, is “an insight or piece of data that provides information about
contexts, process or mechanisms, and that contributes distinctive leverage in causal inference”
(Collier, Brady, Seawright 2010: 277). Therefore, the discovery of CPOs through process-
tracing has a higher causal inference value than DSOs in a qualitative research design, where
data are more isolated in a form of a systemized set of variables, without broader
understanding or knowledge. By identifying and analyzing the existing CPOs in the subject
matter of this research, the author increases the value of disclosed correlation and potential
causations.
Indeed, process-tracing involves the examination of “diagnostic” pieces of evidence
within a case that contribute to supporting or overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses.
The core nature of the process-tracing method lies in the search for the observable
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implications of the hypothesized explanations with the goal of establishing whether the events
or processes within the case fit those predicted by alternative explanations. Process-tracing
can also play an important role in comparisons of cases, as it can, for instance, enable scholars
to assess whether a variable whose values differs in two most similar cases is related to the
difference in their outcomes (Bennett 2010). Process-tracing is also used as a method of
discovering hypothesis by its ability to determine the sequence of who, what, where, when,
why and how, including the response, going down to the lower levels of analysis. Moreover,
the process-tracing research method allows researchers to establish whether there is a causal
chain of steps connecting independent and dependent variables, and also whether there is such
evidence to identify other variables that might have caused the effect or might have
influenced the respective variables at hand, and how (Ibid). Two track process-tracing, from
observed outcomes to potential causes as well as forward from hypothesized causes to
subsequent outcomes, allows researcher to uncover variables they have not previously
considered, and thus provide new explanations or understandings. Case expertise and
substantive knowledge can play a fundamental role in any use of process-tracing method, as it
facilitates deeper understanding of a respective issue through sorting out explanations relevant
to the subject matter.
Importantly, process-tracing involves several different kinds of empirical tests, focusing on
evidence with different kinds of probative value and contributing to validation or falsification
of potential explanations.
The obstacles with determining the causal mechanism in the research of the Czech
counterinsurgency approach, its success and effectiveness, consequences and impacts,
properly lie mainly in the problems and challenges of an adequate metrics of the success or
effectiveness of counterinsurgency efforts in general. A number of distinguished scholars
criticized the existing metrics of success in the Afghanistan as well as the Iraq
counterinsurgency endeavors. Among the most prominent ones is an Australian strategist and
military doctrine expert David Kilcullen, who in one of his publications assessed the widely
applied, yet flawed metrics for tracking the progress of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.
What he suggested is an alternative framework for the success, effectiveness or progress
evaluation (see below). This thesis, however, doesn’t aim to evaluate the overall efficiency of
the Czech counterinsurgency efforts, because it is virtually impossible. It has not been an
isolated effort and strong mutual interdependency on other actors and factors exists. Also,
casual mechanisms like efficiency, effectiveness or success are usually measure to certain
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goals, which is problematic in the case of the Czech counterinsurgency approach, because not
enough data are available.
The essential major limitation is a result of insufficient, inadequate and poor focus of the
research community (in the field of security and strategic studies, peace studies or
development studies), on and its weak interest in any holistic, comprehensive examinations of
possible variations within the counterinsurgency framework itself. Apart from studies
describing, analyzing or criticizing counterinsurgency strategies of major, experienced actors
in the realm of effective measures aimed at elimination of various forms of insurgencies or
similar politically motivated violence a, there is a critical shortage of literature and adequate
relevant resources, addressing the issue of approaches of different actors or stakeholders to
superior counterinsurgency strategies and doctrines, particularly as part of various
multinational missions.
2.4 Analytical models
2.4.1 SWOT model
Being an established method in assisting critical evaluations and formulations of strategies
and strategic development processes, policies and approaches, the SWOT analysis6 is vital for
the achievement of the aim of this thesis, due to its potential to yield significant strategic
insights into recommended strategic actions. Given its simple methodology, SWOT analysis
is one of the most popular advanced analytical techniques applied in the private, but also
increasingly public sector, as it represents a proven developmental, results-oriented strategic
planning tool. Use of SWOT analysis helps identify the key elements of the Czech approach
towards counterinsurgency as well as direct future planning and strategy development in this
matter. The Czech counterinsurgency approach is analyzed through the SWOT analytical
model, generating recommended strategic or policy actions and directions to the future. The
6 For literature reviews, critical assessment of SWOT use, misuse and pitfalls, and analytical case studies on the
mechanics and use of SWOT analysis, see, for example, Helms, M. M. – Nixon, J. (2008): „Exploring SWOT
analysis – where are we now?: A review of academic research from the last decade“, Journal of Strategy and
Management, Vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 215-251; Chermack, TJ. – Kasshanna, B.K. (2007): „The Use and Misuse of
SWOT Analysis and Implications for HRD Professionals“, Human Resource Development International, vol. 10,
no. 4, pp. 383-399; Ghazinoory, S. – Ghazinoori, S. (2006): „Developing Iran’s government strategies for
strengthening the national system of innovation using SWOT analysis“, Science and Public Policy, Vol. 33, no.
7, pp. 529-540; Farazmand, A. (2014): Crisis and Emergency Management: Theory and Practice, Public
Administration and Public Policy, vol. 178, Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2nd Edition. On the methodology
behind the SWOT analytical technique, see Prunckun, H. (2010): Handbook of Scientific Methods of Inquiry for
Intelligence Analysis, Scarecrow Professional Intelligence Education Series, no. 11, Lanham: Scarecrow Press.
19
technique was devised primarily for long-term business planning, but it can be applied beyond
the private sector to countries and industries, in the intelligence or policy and military
planning realm, on both strategic and tactical level.
SWOT analytical model is one of the most popular analytic tools used by intelligence
analysts, for two reasons: (1) it can be used with a variety of unstructured data (qualitative
data from either primary or secondary sources), and (2) the focus of the research is not on
variable dependent, i.e. it can either be the target or the agency conducting the operation
against the target (Prunckun 2010). These characteristic attributes of SWOT analysis and its
use are of a particular utility in the case of the Czech Republic’s approach to
counterinsurgency, because the data collected and analyzed in this research exist in a highly
unstructured way, scattered across a number of primary and secondary sources. Moreover, as
the SWOT analytical model can be also used to analyze information in order to help
understand the current situation (i.e. as a situational analysis), it’s application more than fits
the framework, analysis and goals of this thesis, as no similar action has been taken in the
Czech or international academic circles thus far.
SWOT analysis follows several steps. First, an analyst defines the end-state (strategic
settings) or objective (tactical settings) of the use of SWOT in that particular case, i.e. what
he/she wants to achieve with the SWOT inquiry. Then, SWOT matrix7 is drawn:
HELPFUL/SUPPORTIVE HARMFUL/DETRIMENTAL
INTERNAL Strengths, i.e. attributes associated with
the (issue, problem, agency, etc. under
investigations) that are conducive to
achieving the end/state.
• What are the strengths?
• What does the subject do better
than others?
• What unique capabilities and
resources does the subject have?
• What do others perceive as your
strengths?
Weaknesses/liabilities, i.e. the attributes
associated with the (issue, problem,
agency, etc. under investigation) that are
detrimental or may prevent
achieving the end-state.
• What are the weaknesses?
• What do adversaries/other
partners do better?
• Where is the room for
improvement?
• What do others perceive as your
weaknesses?
7 Although a matrix typically displays a SWOT, SWOT analysis can be laid out in any way that is suitable for
the analyst (Prunckun 2010). It can be visualized as a list or other.
20
EXTERNAL Opportunities, i.e. the conditions (legal,
criminogenic, social, economic, political,
security, psychological, information, etc.)
that would assist in achieving the end-
state.
• What trends or conditions may
positively impact the subject?
• What opportunities are available
for the subject?
Threats, i.e. the conditions (legal,
criminogenic, social, economic, political,
security, psychological, information, etc.)
that might be detrimental for the subject
and its operations.
• What trends and conditions may
negatively impact the subject?
• What are the adversaries doing
that might impact the subject?
• Is solid financial support
available?
• What impact do the subject’s
weaknesses have on the threats to
it?
Table 1: SWOT matrix sample. Source: IH, inspired by Prunckun, J. (2010): Handbook of
Scientific Methods of inquiry for intelligence analysis.
Analyst then populates each of the four quadrants of the SWOT matrix with data and
information he/she collected or generated from a proper exploration of relevant primary or
secondary resources. For assessments on the strategic level, just it is the case in this thesis, it
is useful to apply a multidisciplinary approach to consider each of the four quadrants
thoroughly and from different perspective in order to get as broad and complex view as
possible. It allows allow gaining control over all factors functioning as variables influencing
the studied phenomenon in one way or another. After all the quadrants have been filled in, the
analyst assesses the factors one at a time and cross-checks then for agreement and arguments’
building. What the analyst has to ensure is that there are no contrary or paradoxical positions
stated in different quadrants. Prunckun suggest asking hypothetical questions to improve
assessment of the arguments build upon the data stated in the four quadrants. Questions like
“In what way can the strengths be used to an advantage?”, “How can the weakness be shored
up?”, “What is the best way to take advantage of each opportunity?”, “What needs to be done
to mitigate each threat?” or similar. (cf. Ibid). Analytical examination while applying SWOT
is not linear, but rather an iterative process, often embedded with the overall planning
processes. It has an extensive potential to be used in conjunction with other advanced
analytical techniques, like the PEST technique, perception assessment analysis, fishbone
analysis, or utilizing the analytic hierarchy process or similar hybrid methods.
The tactical dimension of the use of SWOT analysis is also relevant for this thesis, as
it helps examine operating structures of actors, their methods of operating, their capabilities,
21
their financial base etc., thereby allowing the actor of this thesis to examine the research topic
from different perspectives. Final steps of the SWOT analysis are then executed by
formulating strategy or policy recommendations (approach, in the case of this thesis), based
on combinations of the factors as follows:
• Strengths/Opportunities (Ways that will use strengths so that opportunities can be realized.)
• Weaknesses/Opportunities (Ways to address weaknesses in order to provide relief so that
opportunities can be followed.)
• Strengths/Threats (Ways that use strengths “offensively” to moderate threats.)
• Weaknesses/Threats (Defensive ways that will protect against threats.) (Ibid).
Table 2: SWOT policy recommendations. Source: IH, inspired by Ibid.
2.4.2 CEG model
Capability-expectations gap (CEG) model is based on a comparison of expectations and real,
credible capabilities to meet these expectations of an entity in a specific field. Use of CEG
model enables the author to investigate actual performance as different from potential
performance8 of the Czech Republic in the sphere of counterinsurgency operations, both
multinational and potentially unilateral. This additional analytical tool not only feeds the
scope and depth of the critical-analytical assessment presented in this dissertation thesis, but
also articulation of recommendations to the future.
American scholar Christopher Hill is recognized to be the main pioneer of the capabilities-
expectations gap analytical concept. In 1993, Hill developed the concept and used it for the
evaluation of the international role and the status of common foreign and security policy
(CFSP) of the EU, then European Community (EC). According to Hill, critical gap exists
between capabilities and expectations regarding the EC’s/EU’s roles in international system,
and this gap tends to widen instead of reduce itself. Hill devotes significant attention on the
part of third/external parties’ perceptions and expectations of the tasks and function the
EC/EU is and may be fulfilling. As Hill himself stresses, what is seeks is to “sketch a more
8 Similar to the CEG model, the so-called GAP analytical model is quite frequently applied across the business,
and increasingly public, sector in order to assess the actual vs. potential performance of a subject.
22
realistic picture of what the Community does in the world” (Hill: 1993: 306), and further
establishes that the whole study Hill presents in his paper is “essentially pre-theoretical”,
since he resorts to conceptualizing the Europe’s international capability rather than to
theoretical explanations and predictions of Europe’s behavior (Ibid). Inspired by Hill, the
author of this thesis also refrains from thorough theoretical framing of the research subject,
given its novelty, primacy and uniqueness in the research field. As suggested in the
concluding chapter, a number of theories can then be applied to the findings of this research in
order to develop the knowledge of this topic further and test the validity of the arguments
presented here.
Hill also recognized perilous potential of the CEG model as it could, in his own words,
“lead to debates over false possibilities”, and would “be likely to produce a disproportionate
degree of disillusion and resentment when hopes were inevitably dashed” (Hill 1998: 28;
comp. to Toje 2008). Hill developed the CEG concept further by dividing it into three main
components, in the capacity of indicators for measurement of the potential capabilities –
expectations gap, i.e. (1) its ability to agree; (2) its resources (and their allocation), and (3) the
instruments at one’s (the EC’s in Hill’s case) disposal (Hill 1993: 315). If the gap was to be
closed (or reduced), Hill argued, the performance of a studied entity has to be based on
demonstrated behavior rather than its potential and aspirations. For the purpose of closing the
gap, Hill urged that the studied entity must possess institutions to mobilize the instruments of
national power as well as the adequate decision-making mechanism to command them. The
alternative then is to simply lower the expectations in order to meet the more modest
capabilities at the disposal (Ibid). The author of this thesis argues that restructuring the
relevant institutions as well as improving decision-making procedures, acquiring more
appropriate resources and capabilities or bringing in new actors can all also narrow the gap.
On the contrary, the gap increases in situations where expectations grow faster than the pool
of capabilities and resources.
Keeping this in mind, the author of this thesis brings significant attention to the existing
governmental military, civilian, economic, information and other instruments and assets of the
individual relevant stakeholders, governmental as well as non-governmental ones, in such a
way that their potential to be mobilized in the overall context as part of the Czech
counterinsurgency approach. Considerable sections of the text also address the level of
agreement on the objectives of the Czech participation in multinational counterinsurgency
campaigns with its potential challenges, pitfalls and consequences in the broader context, as
well as internal agreement. It further examines the potential effectiveness and flexibility of the
23
relevant institutional structure on both the Czech and NATO levels, as well as the decision-
making capacities, their character, procedures and mechanics, shortfalls and its wider
implications. On the grounds of the CEG model, the actual as different from potential
performance of the Czech actors, (relevant to Czech counterinsurgency ambitions), is
assessed, and its inferences used for more precise articulation of more sufficient, cohesive,
pragmatic and realistic counterinsurgency approach.
Even though there are certain limits for of the CEG concept’s applicability on the case of
Czech approach to counterinsurgency (like the character of studied entity, because Hill
examines a multipurpose, multidimensional, semi-supranational, semi-intergovernmental
organization, whereas the main analytical unit of this research is a country),9 the use of such
analytical technique still represents a significant contributions to the author’s efforts to
analyze and evaluate the subject matter, and provide findings useful for its adjustments and
improvements. First, all the capabilities, both military and civilian, are described and
analyzed, and then compared to expectations voiced by various stakeholders (with the focus
placed on the Czech political representatives and the NATO/mission partners).
Figure 1: The capability-expectations gap scheme. Source: IH; inspired by Hill, Ch.: The
Capability-Expectation or conceptualizing Europe’s internal role.
All of the research methods, analytical techniques and analytical models listed above
enable the author of this thesis to bridge different levels and dimensions of analysis in order to
gain as broad and deep picture and understanding of the studied topic as possible. Given the 9 The author of this thesis is not the only Czech researcher who used the CEG analytical concept with the aim of
investigating certain security phenomena and issues, by their character differing from the EU’s CFSD. Oldřich
Bureš assessed the potential existing gap in case of the UN peacekeeping operations (for more, see Bureš, O.
(2008): United Nations Peacekeeping: Bridging the Capabilities-expectations gap, Saarbrucken: VDM Verlag).
24
fact that the Czech approach to counterinsurgency was, and still remains, a largely elusive
concept, the examination of different aspects, dimensions and sub-topics of the issue gives the
author enough data to identify the so-called patterns of behavior, the instruments and
mechanisms of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency as well as to assess individual
contributions of various parts (both positive and negative).
2.5 Data gathering techniques
2.5.1 Interviews
The main data gathering technique applied during the course of the research is several
face-to-face, semi-formal, semi-structured interviews with 64 (in total) subject matter experts
and military and civilian practitioners with the direct experience with counterinsurgency
operations and their Czech contributions to them, mostly as part of the ISAF mission in
Afghanistan. Out of the total number of 64 individuals, 40 were Czech (25 military personnel
(active duty), 15 civilians, including both civilian experts in reconstruction and political
representatives who took part in decision-making and planning processes, documents
development as well as representation on the ground in the areas of operations, and employees
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 18 were American (10 military personnel (active duty or
retired), 8 subject matter experts), 4 were German (3 military personnel (active duty), 1
subject matter expert), 1 French military person and subject matter expert in NATO
operations planning and rules of engagements (ROE) in NATO operations, and 1 Italian
retired military person. The Czech nationals willing to be interviewed by the author on the
research topic were selected to represent all forms of the Czech participation, military and
civilian in the NATO counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and in Kosovo. Additionally,
the author also interviewed representatives connected to the production of official documents
that started to put stress on counterinsurgency missions and all relevant engagements and
deployment of both civilian and military personnel. The foreign nationals interviewed by the
author were selected and approached based on their direct experience with the Czech
counterinsurgency efforts, on all three levels of mission – strategic, operational and tactical,
within NATO as part of the Alliance’s planning and decision-making process, command and
control structures as well as joint operations and projects. The author also spoke with 8
Afghan nationals (3 military personnel (active duty), 1 political representative on the state
25
level, 1 political representative of a provincial council, and 3 civilians living in the Logar
province10). These interviews were conducted in an informal, unstructured manner, and the
information gained through them contribute significantly to the overall picture and
understanding of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency, and to the ways the Czechs and
their activities have been perceived in Afghanistan by the local population.
List of questions asked during the semi-structured interviews with the non-Afghan
respondents:
• In your opinion, is it necessary for the Czech Republic to have her own coherent, official
document establishing the guiding principles, provisions and clear objectives of the
Czech approach to counterinsurgency, mainly as contributing to the Alliance’s
counterinsurgency efforts? Why? Is the current state sufficient and feasible to the future?
• Does the lack of a coherent, adequate framework, codified in an official policy document,
negatively affect/impact the practical implementation of the Czech counterinsurgency
approach on the ground during the course of a mission (in terms of lack of resources
deployed, duplicity of efforts, avoidance/ignorance/inability of essential
counterinsurgency principles)?
• What are the main principles, instruments and measures of the Czech counterinsurgency
approach in theory, in practice? Do they differ? What can this mean?
• Describe your assigned tasks, preferably at all three levels of analysis (strategic,
operational, tactical).
• What practical problems or challenges did you encounter in connection to the Czech
counterinsurgency approach and its implementation?
• Are there any unique features in the Czech counterinsurgency understanding and conduct
that would be specific for the Czechs, given their historical development, cultural
traditions, strategic culture and alike?
• What counterinsurgency principles were the most problematic or challenging to put into
practice? Why?
• Is the Czech Republic capable and willing to engage in a counterinsurgency mission in its
whole broad spectrum, as full-spectrum operations? Does the Czech approach mirror this
understanding of counterinsurgency? How? What does the proportionality of tasks look
like and mean?
10 The Logar province in eastern Afghanistan was the geographical gravity of the Czech counterinsurgency
activities, because of the relatively extensive deployment of the Czech assets and resources in Afghanistan under
the ISAF mission umbrella.
26
• Are there any problems, issues or challenges identifiable within the civil-military
cooperation (CIMIC), cooperation of military forces with civilian experts? What are the
potential (mainly unintended) consequences of the degree and nature of civil-military
cooperation within the Czech counterinsurgency approach?
• When it comes to the chain of command of the respective mission, do you see it as
effective or problematic? Why? Were there any issues in communications with other
partners/actors? What was the role and effects of existing national caveats, and how do
you personally asses this measure imposed by respective national commands? What
national caveats did the Czech imposed on their assets and resources deployed in
counterinsurgency missions?
• In your opinion, were the doctrinal guidance, the orders, the tasks and rules of
engagement clearly communicated, and compatible with those of other partners in the
mission? Can you recall any controversies related to this?
• Do you think that the results, the outputs of the Czech counterinsurgency efforts are
feasible to the future? Why?
• Do you consider the Czech counterinsurgency approach to be effective? How? Why/why
not?
• In your opinion, is there any historical legacy in a sense that could be identified as having
influence over the contemporary Czech strategic thinking and the Czech approach to
counterinsurgency (not the NATO strategy doctrine, indeed)?
• Are the fundamental principles of counterinsurgency strategy, doctrine and approach, and
their objectives articulated explicitly and clearly in the relevant documentation on both
national (Czech) and transnational (NATO) level? Are the counterinsurgency principles
defined and articulated vaguely and ambiguously in the relevant documents? Do the
Czech military and civilian actors, engaging in counterinsurgency activities and efforts,
adhere to these principles?
• Has the growing direct experience with counterinsurgency helped to articulate the
counterinsurgency principles and relevant objectives in the Czech conceptual, strategic,
policy documents more clearly? In the other words, can we track an evolution of the
Czech counterinsurgency approach, as the Czech military forces and civilian experts
were gaining more counterinsurgency experience? With what impacts?
• Did you experience any shortage of resources (financial, material, human, …)? In your
opinion, what additional capabilities does the Czech Republic need to contribute in order
to meet her full potential in terms of counterinsurgency efforts?
• Do the factors of political commitment and political will have any impact on the Czech
counterinsurgency approach in both conceptual and practical terms? How would you
27
assess this effect?
Table 3: Questions for respondents. Source: IH.
Respecting the wishes of the absolute majority of her respondents,11 in most of the case, the
author doesn’t name the source of that information provided, for obvious reasons regarding
their personal safety or their job assignments, limitations imposed on it or potential
consequences. In order to keep the respondents’ anonymity, she refers to them as
“respondents” or “a military/civilian interviewed”. Their background and experience are,
however, briefly sketched in order to maintain at least a certain level of credibility and
verifiability of findings, arguments and conclusions presented and asserted in this thesis, as
well as the overall reliability and objectivity of this research. In the instances, where the
respondents explicitly agreed to be named publicly in the text, the author refers to them by
their names.
The author is well aware of the potential biases in the accounts provided by the
individuals she interviewed, as they always make for one’s personal opinion and
interpretations of events. Therefore, she cross-referenced every piece of information she was
given during this interviews with other sources, in order to increase the level of triangulation
of data as much as possible and feasible, in order for her to work with only verified and
credible data in this research.12
2.5.2 Content analysis
The author applies content analysis technique to analyze the contents of a number of highly
relevant primary, secondary, and in few cases also tertiary, sources of data. Content analysis
is an approach of systematic, rule guided text analysis. The subject of attention here is the
objective information, arguments or facts stated in the text itself, without attributing any
normative connotations or meanings to them. Content analysis can be distinguished by its
certain basic principles – researchers work with units of analysis, step models, with
11 As a majority of respondents expressed their concerns regarding the direct attribution of their statements,
thoughts and opinions, and wished not to be named, but rather asked the author to abide by the so-called
Chatham House rules, based on a principle of non-attribution. 12 In instances, where the accounts of individual respondents are controversial and cannot be easily verified by
other sources of data, the author includes them in her research under conditions of making a significant
contribution to the research problem or to the discussion on it, by interpreting them and putting them into
perspectives.
28
categories, validity and reliability. The main purpose of the use of content analysis is to
achieve and induce replicable and valid inferences by interpreting and coding textual material,
by systematically evaluating documentary evidence (like historical records, existing official
documents of policy, strategic, conceptual or doctrinal nature, news reports, investigative
journalism reports, photographs, etc.; more on the sources of data see below in the text). Use
of content analysis also enables researchers to examine various nuances in behavioral
patterns, perceptions as well as various trends and tendencies. According to a number of
scholars (for instance, Duriau, Reger & Pfarrer 2007), content analysis stands at the
intersection of the qualitative and quantitative research traditions, as it usually generates a
significant number of qualitative data which can easily be transformed through coding into
quantitative research data.13 Following the established mechanics of any use of content
analysis, the author of this thesis organizes the data obtained through the application of this
research technique in a structure of clusters (or categories), where she pays attention to the
originator of the text, his/her relation to the subject addressed in the document, timing and
broader context of documents’ release, their stated or assumed target audience(s), main
themes of the texts, the character of documents (informative, factual, conceptual, doctrinal,
political, etc.), references used in the text, portrayal of events or actors, depiction of
principles, guidelines and legal provisions, subject’s placement in media, purpose of the
documents, as well as their implications and impacts.
In some instances, discourse analysis is also used in this research, particularly in cases
of critical evaluations of statements, speeches, hearings and debates of political or military
representatives, humanitarian workers, adversaries, and other relevant and interested
stakeholders. Discourse analysis is, essentially, content analysis of verbal data. Discourse
analysis is connected to ideological as well as socio-psychological dimensions of the
originator of that statement, as its focus is predominantly represented by the structure of
argument, the syntax, lexicon and concepts used, style, rhetoric, meanings, as well as
strategies, turns, gestures or sounds. Discourse analysis is generally used to present evidence
as an instrument of a means of interaction with the target audience(s) for effective
communications of a certain narrative or message (cf. Jorgensen – Phillips 2002).
Use of both content analysis and discourse analysis techniques in this research then
allows for identification and critical assessment of continuity, trends and tendencies, priorities
13 Harold Kassarjian, who introduced the content analysis methodology to consumer research in his Journal of
Consumer Research article, published in 1977 asserts that the content analysis methodology “must be objective,
systematic, and quantitative” (Kassarjian 1977: 9, italics in original).
29
as well as problems of challenges of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency. Specific
attention is devoted to recurrence of narratives and concepts used in those sources, explained
in broader context of potential causes and consequences (in terms of, for example, frequency,
contexts and time frames of use of the concept of counterinsurgency, etc.).
Most of the data are also scattered through the sources of various characters, release
dates and purposes. There is no unitary official document on the state level that would
introduce the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency in a holistic, whole of government,
whole of society, comprehensive manner (see below). The author of this thesis compiles data
and evidence obtained from various resources, and cross-references them to each other in
order to increase reliability, objectivity, validity and overall triangulation of the data she
works with. Significant numbers of relevant date are derived from observations and analysis
of practical implementation of the Czech counterinsurgency approach on the ground during
the course of relevant missions.
Main sources of data
• Military and civilian individuals with adequate background, adequate experience and relevant
information (on policy, decision-making, practical implementation
• Strategic political and military documents (CZE, US, NATO, other allies, Afghans, UN, etc.);
• Military conceptual doctrines, field manuals, operational orders (when available);
• Official and some internal policy papers – relevant decision made by the executive, the
legislative and the judicial branches and their institutions, regulating the Czech
counterinsurgency approach;
• Public statements, reports and press releases;
• NATO Summits’ declarations;
• Official as well as internal guidelines of non-governmental actors (NGOs, PSMCs)
• Media materials – news reports, investigative journalism reports;
• Expert publications, academic journals and articles.
Table 4: Main sources of data subjected to content analysis. Source: IH.
With such significant role of the from-the-ground practical observations and examinations
have in this research, it is noteworthy that it often is difficult to determine the proper
relationship in terms of independent and dependent variables, i.e. if changes in practical
30
implementation on the ground have been caused by a more informed and progressed
understanding of the counterinsurgency doctrine implementation (stemming from joint
exercises with partners, exchange of information, education and training initiatives) from the
side of relevant Czech stakeholders, or whether the evolution (and development) of the Czech
counterinsurgency approach has happened mainly on the ground in practical terms (through
learning from experience and from partners in the mission) have been later reflected in the
relevant documents. It is required to see these dynamics as a cycle, or rather a system of
cycles, where certain theoretical/conceptual aspects are caused by practical development and
experience, whereas others induce changes on the ground.
The research of the issue of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency is closely connected
to the fields of foreign policy of the country, its security and defense policy, as well as other
policies, like economic or development policy. However, the Czech Republic as a country and
important contributor to international counterinsurgency efforts in general doesn’t have any
single, unifying official document, establishing the fundamental principles, guidelines or any
general overall framework of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency, that would bring
together the interests, principles and efforts of relevant civilian as well as military
stakeholders, decision-makers and executioners in a comprehensive, coordinated and
integrated manner, at her disposal. Moreover, as linked to the research of such topic, there are
many independent and dependent variables in the research environment that might or might
not be relevant for the purposes of this research. In order to exert the highest level of the
environment control possible, the author uses only the data and information clearly relevant
and directly linked to the research topic. For instance, activities and projects by some Czech
NGOs in Afghanistan’s northern Badakshan province might seem as highly relevant for this
research, however, as the respective NGOs have been active in that part of the country before
2002, when the Czech approach to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan started to be formed,
their activities are mentioned in the thesis, but are not considered directly relevant or
significant for her specific research purposes. In case of data, where their potential connection
to the research topic can be perceived as weak, flawed or disputable, the author weighs on the
potential link and discusses wider context of the respective data. Significantly, control of
some variables goes beyond the capacities and possibilities of the author, as, for instance, the
accident factor or the chance factor have the potential to influence the bigger picture and the
consequences, as well as potential effectiveness and success, regardless the decision-making
and planning capacities, commitment or free will of the relevant actors (like a natural disaster
etc.).
31
2.6 Limitations
Any research of the subject matter of this dissertation thesis also encompasses several
significant limitations to it. Firstly, the nature of the studied topic inherently contains the so-
called classification restriction, where a lot of primary data cannot be used in the research, as
they fall under the Czech, NATO or other country’s classification regime. This limitation is
difficult to overcome or get over with, however, the author tries to manage this quite
significant objection by using her own critical-analytical skills and common sense, supporting
her arguments and claims by the evidence obtained from other available source. Furthermore,
any multinational military operation, as all the counterinsurgency missions the Czech
Republic has participated in so far have been, and its success and cohesion is tested by the
imposition of so-called “necessary evil”, represented by various limitations and restrictions
individual national governments of the troops contributing nations (TCNs) place on their
forces deployed in the mission. Such restrictions are often referred to as “national caveats”,
and most of them fall under varying levels of national classifications, and/or are undeclared
and thus difficult to observe.
The existence and use of national caveats (see below) are for the purposes of this thesis
important for two reasons. First, it helps understand the planning and execution phase of
multinational military campaigns, again, the ISAF mission in particular, as the caveats had a
significant function in the conduct of the ISAF operation, influencing the practical
implementation of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency in a mission on the ground as
well as all of the counterinsurgency efforts of other coalition partners.
Second, the exploration and analysis of the issue of imposition of national caveats in
multinational operations provides the author with another set of lenses, through which to
analyze her research subject matter. The classification of relevant primary sources of data
may, however, deprive the author from an access to important information that could help her
compose the puzzle of the Czech counterinsurgency approach in its whole integrity.
Apart from caveats, the limitation by document classification stretches also to the
documents obtained in historical archives of totalitarian regimes (Nazi regime, Communist
regime), as their declassification and public release may bring along addition research
challenges in terms of dealing with propagandistic materials or exaggerated or false first-hand
accounts. The issue of propagandistic material and disinformation is also important when
studying counterinsurgency, given the nature of such efforts and the substantial place of
perceptions, emotions and ideas have in their execution.
32
Also, special operation forces and intelligence agencies play tremendous roles in any
counterinsurgency campaigns. Their operations are not only highly classified, but often also
allow for the use of so-called plausible deniability clause, potentially steering the evidence in
false or adjusted directions, mainly for political, but also security purposes. All of these
limitations create research, where some of the claims or evidence is difficult, if not impossible
to verify.
Another significant limitation in this research is the close relationship of the
counterinsurgency research sphere with the one of counterterrorism, which is closely linked
and interconnected to each other, potentially producing certain distortion of the research
conclusions. Some of the activities of the Czech military in multinational operations explored
in this thesis, and, again, the ISAF mission in particular are counterterrorism rather than
counterinsurgency by their character. Nevertheless, the author decided to include them in the
research as those actions and efforts have either been conducted as a part of the examined
campaign, or had a profound impact on the counterinsurgency lines of action. Related to this
are other limitations or more of a challenge, represented by the varying and constantly
changing terminology. Thus actions that can be classified as counterinsurgency by their nature
and existing broader context, are labeled with other terms (see below),14 depending on the
trending policies and discourses, further complicating the research of such topic.
It is difficult to study the Czech approach to counterinsurgency as an isolated
phenomenon, and always has to be explored within the broader context, the NATO one in
particular. Therefore, significant space in this thesis is devoted to the NATO level of
analysis, it counterinsurgency strategy doctrine, planning procedures, decision-making
processes, command and control (C2) structures as well as burden-sharing, interoperability,
cohesion and joint operations. The NATO approach to counterinsurgency serves as a
fundamental defining and shaping framework of the Czech approach. A lot of the military
lines of actions and efforts described and analyzed in this research mirror the ones of the
Alliance, and more room for variability is available in the civilian domain. NATO norms and
principles are established for operations of different types, and the activities and tasks of the
Czech Armed Forces have to comply with and fall within the framework set up by the
Alliance doctrines, as arising from the NATO membership commitments and rights.
14 This is, particularly, the case of those multinational operations, and actions and efforts carried out as part of
them, that are not counterinsurgency by their mandate, but where exists enough evidence of their
counterinsurgency character on the ground, like the KFOR mission.
33
3 Summary of existing literature
As already mentioned, there is no comprehensive study of the Czech approach to
counterinsurgency, caused perhaps by the lack of interest in the issue, or by the prevailing
notion of the pointlessness of such research. Those critics are certainly right, in a sense that
given the Czech Republic’s membership in NATO and other transnational and international
organizations, any outlooks for an autonomous Czech approach look almost impossible.
Nonetheless, the same critics fail to realize the huge potential such a study has with all of its
potential conclusions and consequences, especially for the preparation of the Czech Armed
Forces as well as civilian entities for future missions, allowing them to learn from the
experience as well as exploitation of the relationships and reputations they have gained. No
comprehensive case study of the new, 2011 NATO counterinsurgency strategy doctrine that
would provide at least a simple lead or guide for this research has been conducted either.
The absolute majority of relevant literature addresses attributes, complexities and
various aspects of the counterinsurgency strategy doctrine in general, of the multinational
operations in general, NATO operations or specifically the ISAF mission and its various
aspects and challenges. The most prominent pieces of the academic literature dealing with
these topics are introduced and discussed in appropriate and corresponding parts of this
dissertation thesis.
As for the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency itself, apart from a number of
articles and reports by journalists of various quality and biases, any clearly academic research
study is absent, and so is any comprehensive political document or report. The Czech armed
forces’ Doctrine Department at the Training Command – Military Academy in Vyškov, in
cooperation with its NATO Allies and partners, has published a quite significant number of
internal documents, mostly dealing with the guiding principles of counterinsurgency
operations, or with the lessons learned from operations. Counterinsurgency principles are also
scattered around in several strategic documents, with an important part devoted to them in the
new Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (2010). However, any original
comprehensive strategic or doctrinal document tailored for the Czech armed forces is absent.
As some of the military respondents the author interviewed told her, all of the
counterinsurgency related documents circling around the members and units of the Czech
armed forces are direct translation of NATO documents and materials.
What can be considered as the closest material to resemble academic studies are:
34
• Article “NATIONAL CAVEATS” and its impact on the Army of the Czech
Republic”, authored by John Brophy and Miloslav Fisera, published in Economics and
Management journal of the Czech Defense University in Brno, Czech Republic, in
2007;
• Diploma thesis of Mgr. Josef Daňhel, an alumnus of the Masaryk University in Brno,
Czech Republic, contemporary approaches to counterinsurgency combat, with a
substantial part dedicated to the description and analysis of the potential effects the
ISAF mission in Afghanistan has had on the Czech Armed Forces as well as the
activities and tasks they performed when deployed as part of the ISAF mission from
2010.
The author herself partly addressed the issue of the Czech approach towards
counterinsurgency in her previous research and summarized her findings in her bachelor
thesis, defended at the Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic, in June 2010. Her thesis
is a comparison of the counterinsurgency strategy, or more approach, of the Czech Republic
with the sophisticated counterinsurgency strategy of the United States of America, and serves
as one of the research basis of this thesis. The author uses some of the arguments she worked
with in her bachelor thesis, redefines them, reflects them critically, analyzes and provides
them with support from other sources of evidence and data. This thesis is by no means a copy
of parts of her bachelor’s thesis. What is self-evident then is the ambition of this thesis to
become the pioneer of the research into this topic, providing reasonable justifications for it as
well as serving as a springboard, or a pilot study in a sense, of future researches to this
important topic with significant practical (security, defense, political, diplomatic, economic,
societal, business, etc.) consequences.
4 Theoretical part
4.1 Theory of strategy
Before detailed introduction of the principal concept of this dissertation thesis, i.e.
counterinsurgency, and thorough discussion on that central issue, it is critical to highlight the
underlying premise of this research. As already aforementioned in the text, the membership of
the Czech Republic in NATO and its participation in multinational operations under the
NATO command doesn’t allow the country to have an autonomous, let alone independent
35
counterinsurgency strategy. For having one, the Czech Republic lacks necessary geopolitical
power as well as adequate resources. Therefore, when deployed in counterinsurgency
campaign, the Czech Republic strictly follows and abides by the overall the strategic doctrines
of NATO, which makes cooperation with the partners in mission more flexible and effective,
as it allows for increased interoperability of forces (more discussion on this aspect of the
research problem can be find below in the text in its empirical and analytical parts). The
NATO framework of operations leaves little, yet some room for variability among its member
states and their partners, in terms of their activities performed, when deployed to a mission.
Essentially, NATO establishes the strategic framework within which individual member states
adjust the NATO strategy to their national conditions, their national interests, their available
capabilities and resources, cultural specifics, or political and public mood. Therefore, what is
explored in this thesis isn’t the Czech counterinsurgency STRATEGY, as there is no such
thing (and truly even cannot be), but the APPROACH Czech Republic pursues when met
with a counterinsurgency challenge or a counterinsurgency mission. Nonetheless, given the
very important function and role of the NATO level in this analysis, Harry Yarger’s theory of
strategy is applied, with its extended use in terms of hypothetical pondering of the author
about the assessment of “Czech way of counterinsurgency” through the prisms of Yarger’s
theory of strategy in the concluding parts of this thesis.
Intuitively, a strategy and an approach are not equal phenomena. Simply put, strategy
is a systematic action or set of actions (a plan) designed to achieve a specific goal or a set of
goals, whereas approach is more of a personal style of the way certain strategy is pursued,
depending up on the entity’s available resources and needs. Therefore, touching up on a
constructivist theory, the author particularly focuses on the, let’s say, Czech comprehension of
the overarching NATO counterinsurgency strategy.
Any complete theory of strategy, in order to be recognized and accepted as such, needs
to incorporate elements any other complete theory in the social sciences have: any theory of
strategy requires (1) essential terminology and definitions to draw upon; (2) an explanation of
the assumptions and premises underlying the theory included within; (3) substantive
prepositions translated into hypothesis which can be tested; and (4) methods that can be used
to test hypothesis and modify the theory as appropriate (Foster 1990: 43). Moreover, any
appropriate theory of strategy also has to have a potential for being tested by other, innovative
tools or approaches. As there is no commonly accepted definition of strategy, any agreement
on what constitutes a theory of strategy doesn’t exist either. The field of security and strategic
studies is also overwhelmed by an existing confusion over terminology and definitions and
36
underlying assumptions and premises, their mutual relationship or consequences of their
potential interdependencies, which further complicates the search for an appropriate theory of
strategy.
Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., a professor at the U.S. Army War College, developed a
theoretical strategy model in 1989 that has been utilized in numerous ways for the purpose of
strategy development and evaluation in the Anglo-Saxon area. In his article “Toward an
Understanding of Military Strategy”, Lykke introduces his understanding of what constitutes
strategy. As he pointedly notes, there is no universal definition of strategy, not even the
approximation of consensus, leading to the problem of when trying to decide between
alternative strategies, what actually happens is that apples are being compared with oranges,
because the relevant choices don’t address the same factors (Lykke 1989: 179). The use of the
term strategy has stretched over too many different phenomena, embraced too many different
factors, and the term itself is used altogether too loosely, often ending up with a situation
where it has ceased to be have clear understanding of what the concept is essentially about. A
lot of confusion has been brought to the strategy research, as the matter of what elements and
processes constituting strategy has not been understood and approached in a united fashion.15
The term strategy is often misapplied. The prevailing tendency is to use it for a plan,
concept, course of action or something of an “idea” of a direction in which to proceed.
However, such misuse of the concept is inappropriate. Much of the essence and philosophy of
what strategy is captured already in 1965 Henry Eccles, who described strategy as “(…) the
comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to obtain
objectives.” (Eccles 1965: 48). What Eccles points to with this definition is the requirement
for comprehensiveness of strategy that embodies some direction with a purpose to control
certain object or situation. Significant feature of this definition of strategy is also the notion
about the application of power instruments, tools and means to serve the interests of an
originator of strategy in a comprehensive way. Most of the existing literature focus on a
nation state as the fundamental analytical unit and referential object for any efforts to theorize
about strategy, is nature and basic elements. Then the exploration of the strategy dwells on the
study of the use of elements of power in a way that would serve state interests, even though
15 This challenge is of a particular concern in this dissertation, as it explores a strategy adopted and pursued by a
transnational organization NATO. Based on the inner structure as well as planning and decision-making
procedures and mechanisms, the individual nation states are still the fundamental and ultimate power and
decision-making actor. Potential uncertainty then arises about the common understanding of what nature
transnational strategy should have and what elements and layers it should entail. However, as the united NATO
strategic doctrine was already adopted, this challenge of lack of clear (sic!) consensus over the format of NATO
strategy is not considered as significant for the purpose of this thesis, even though the same challenge is critical
for the study of accompanying aspects of the strategy itself.
37
more and more non-state actor, just like it is also the case in this dissertation thesis, develop
and operate with their own strategies, let it be NATO as a political-military alliance of 28
countries, nationalist insurgency like the Afghan Taliban movement, a state-like entity like
the so-called Islamic State, Mexican drug cartels, or even the global terrorist franchise of al-
Qaeda. Nonetheless, the framework of approaching strategy purely from the state perspective,
strategy is understood as the “employment of the instruments (elements) of power
(political/diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve political objectives of
the state in cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own interests.”
(Yarger 2006: 45).16 With this assertion, Yarger added two more significant factors into the
study of strategy, and the theoretical framework of this research as well, as he (1) stresses the
political nature of the pursued objectives, and (2) integrates interactions with other actors. As
the author seeks to analyze the NATO strategy framework and the manner of how the Czech
Republic embodied and executed this strategy, the significance of military or economic
objectives relative to the political ones is assessed.17 Additionally, the both the NATO
strategy and its Czech embodiment are based on a strong factor of cooperation (with partners
and the host nation) and even stronger factor of competition with the adversary, as well as the
specific forms these dynamics had in various instances. The population in respective areas of
operations then falls under both categories, depending on specific vectors and platforms of
interaction on the ground.
The theoretical model for a study of strategy presented and applied in this thesis also
focuses on a national state as the referential object for his model. However, the model is both
16 Some analysts draw distinction between what elements of national power and instruments of national power
are. Even though as any attempts to study social phenomena depend on how we define the concepts, intuitively
we can identify central nuances between what elements and what instruments are, even if they, as often is the
case, overlap. Generally speaking, the category of elements of national power is more inclusive and comprises of
the realities serving as a power base of a nation states (like geographic or demographic characteristics), whereas
the instruments of national power, on the other hand, include tools and means used to exercise interstate
influence (like informational or psychological tools) (cf. Jablonsky 1995). Where the two categories overlap,
political, military, economical or societal capacities can be identified. The distinction between elements and
instruments of national power can also translate into what David Baldwin called “the paradox of unrealized
power: (Baldwin 1979: 163), i.e. the difference between potential power of a state and its actual power. Lewis
W. Snider also addressed the factor of power and its two dimensions in its capacity as a catalyst for achieving
state interests, i.e. (1) power as resource base, and (2) power as function (Snider 1987: 316-319). 17 Discussions are being waged regarding the problem of military instrument of power employed in pursuit of
state interests in form of political or economic, thus not necessarily military objectives. Concerns have been
voiced about the challenges accompanying the use of military force as an appropriate policy tool and the
difficulties of effectively linking feasible military objective to those stated in the promoted national policy. This discrepancy is notable, for instance, in the case of the imposition of national caveats on the military force
deployed in an area of operation. Generally speaking, counterinsurgency operations often suffer from this
discrepancy at higher rates than most of other types of military operations, even though the counterinsurgency
strategy doctrine is political military in its nature (see below).
38
universal and flexible enough, to allow for its use in a study of strategy of a non-state entity.
Arthur F. Lykke works with the definition approved by the U.S. Joint Chief of Staff:
“The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of
national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force.” (U.S. Department of
Defense 1987: 232).
Looking at this definition that served as a cornerstone of the Lykke’s strategy
development and analysis model, what is interesting is the notion of strategy being both art
and science, which raises the significance of the Sun Tzu’s writing even more. Also, even
though the Lykke’s model is built on a definition of strategy limited only to the armed forces
as the elements of power applied in a certain direction for a certain purpose, the model itself,
as shown below, doesn’t lose on his credibility and wider applicability. Lykke builds his
model on a characterization of strategy presented by General Maxwell D. Taylor during his
visit to the U.S. Army War College in 1981, who characterized strategy as consisting of
objectives/ends, ways and means. Lykke expresses this concept as an equation:
Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means
Table 5: Lykke’s strategy model. Source: IH; inspired by Lykke, A.F.: Toward an Understanding of
Military Strategy, p. 3.
As Lykke himself states, this general conceptual model can be used as a framework for
formulation of any type of strategy (military, political, economic, etc.), depending upon the
character, type, size and range of the element of state power employed (Lykke 1989: 3).
Based on this presumption, it is also possible to utilize the Lykke’s model for development
and formulation of more comprehensive strategies that combine different elements of state
power, just like counterinsurgency strategy, which is scrutinized in this thesis. The author of
Component Definition
ENDS Objectives; What do we want to achieve?
WAYS Courses of action; How will we achieve our
ends?
MEANS Instruments; What resources do we need?
39
this thesis further steps beyond the suggested analytical box, and uses the model for study of
an approach (as an individual customized for of strategy execution).
Importantly, ends, ways, and means often get confusing in the development or analysis
of a specific strategy. The most common mistakes include, for instance, the use of means to
describe ways or the formulation of objectives as ways. Clarity and understanding have to
exist over the Lykke’s model. Objectives answer the question of what one is trying to achieve,
the desired end state compatible with one’s interests. Ways describe and explain courses of
action required to achieve the stated objectives, including the fashion of how the resources at
one’s disposal will be used. Means describe and explain what resources and capabilities will
be used to execute the required course of action (cf. Lykke 1989; Yarger 2010). The means
(resources) can then be physical and countable (like individual branches of armed forces,
intelligence agencies and their assets, individual ministries and their personnel, NGOs, natural
resources, industries, facilities, equipment, but also resources of an organization one is a
member of, like NATO, or resources of international non-state organization, like the Red
Cross etc.), as well as abstract and uncountable (like will, commitment, industrial capacity,
coercion or persuasion potential, partnerships, intellect, information, etc.).
Interestingly, Lykke stressed the need for differentiation between national (grand)
strategy, being the highest level strategy, and subordinate military (etc.) strategies, that is just
a part of the all-encompassing national strategy. In the military domain, Lykke continues, the
military strategy at its highest level is distinguishable from operational strategies that are
being used as the basis for military planning and operations (Lykke 1989: 4). Bearing this
requirement in mind, the author of this thesis stressed the importance of the comprehensive
nature of any counterinsurgency strategy, that by its nature combines different elements and
instruments of national power (see below), even though is often understood as purely military
strategic doctrine. Indeed, militaries of different countries or NATO-like organizations
possess specific military counterinsurgency doctrines. One of the added ambitions of this
thesis then is to test the 2011 NATO counterinsurgency strategy doctrine through the lenses of
this Lykke’s assertion, highlighting the wider scope of the studied strategy doctrine. The term
doctrine itself suggest, however, strong military width, and evidence suggest that it is right the
2011 NATO counterinsurgency strategy doctrine what was being used as a main reference
point of military planning efforts as well as operational orders during the course of the ISAF
mission.
Building on the basis of the concept of strategy as combining ends, ways and means,
Lykke develops (what he calls) an approach to military strategy (Ibid). He states that “Ends”
40
can be expressed as military objectives, and “Ways” encompass various methods of applying
military force. In essence, the “Ways” part of military strategy is closely linked to military
strategic concepts that contain various courses of action that are designed to achieve military
objectives. “Means” then refer to military resources and capabilities (manpower, material,
money, forces, logistics, weapon systems, equipment, etc.) required to accomplish the mission
(Ibid). In the other words, military resources are deployed in a certain way, as required by
respective courses of action evaluated and identified as appropriate for achieving desired
military objectives. Based on Lykke’s approach to military strategy presented above, the
aforementioned equation can be reformulated as put into the military perspective as:
Military Strategy = Military Objectives + Military Strategic Concepts + Military Resources
Table 6: Lykke’s military strategy model. Source: IH; inspired by Lykke, A.F.: Toward an
Understanding of Military Strategy, p. 5.
Significantly, as Lykke himself asserts, this conceptual model can be applied in strategy
development and assessment at all three levels, i.e. strategic, operational and tactical. In
Lykke’s opinion, important fundamental similarities exist among strategy, operational art, and
tactics, as strategy planners at all three levels have to consider ways to employ means to
achieve ends (Ibid). This assumption, back by a substantial amount of empirical evidence
drawn from observations as well as actual comparisons of conceptual documents at all three
levels, adds yet another layer of justification to its use in this thesis.
Complimentary to the Lykke’s model of strategy is also his analytical distinction of
two levels of military strategy. Lykke separates strategies based on existing military
capabilities and strategies addressing future security environment and related military
requirements, acquisitions or adjustments. Short-range time period strategies lie foundation
for the formulation of specific plans for action of existing military capabilities in a theater of
operation (i.e. operational military strategy), whereas long-range strategies are often based on
estimates of future security environment with identification of future threats, objectives and
related requirement, not constrained by the recent force posture (i.e. force development
military strategy) (Ibid). Ideally, a strategy combines comprehensive puzzle of both in an
appropriate manner. However, in reality, the force development military strategies are often
underestimated, as is the case of the Czech Republic.
41
Arthur F. Lykke also warns against potential unbalance within individual elements of
a (military) strategy. In conditions, where military resources are not compatible with strategic
concepts or commitments and/or are not matched by military capabilities, the possibility of
loss or damage, or of not achieving an objective occurs. Direct proportion exists between the
level of imbalance and the degree of associated risk (Ibid: 6-7). In order to keep the highest
possible degree of balance, one of the three elements and/or their mutual relationship needs to
be adjusted. What is highly relevant for contemporary security environment, and for
counterinsurgency strategies in particular, is the requirement of flexibility of strategy, which,
however, also has its limits. As Lykke notes, “military strategy can change rapidly and
frequently, since objectives can change in an instant. However, it takes much longer to alter
the military forces so that they may be responsive to new objectives and concepts.” (Ibid: 8).
This assertion is of a particular importance for the purposes of this dissertation thesis, as the
relatively swift arrival of the efforts to frame certain multinational military campaigns as
counterinsurgency (i.e. ends and ways) was not met with corresponding adaptation of military
force (i.e. means).
In order to make the theoretical and conceptual framework of this thesis as complex as
possible, some additional attributes shall be added and included. Strategy is fundamentally a
choice, and reflects a preference for a future state or condition (Yarger 2010: 45). Harry R.
Yarger then developed a theory of strategy, further applied in the empirical-analytical part of
this thesis as part of the efforts to assess both the NATO counterinsurgency doctrine and the
Czech counterinsurgency approach. Yarger’s theory of strategy is built on eight fundamental
premises of the nature or character of any strategy.
Eight premises of Yarger’s Theory of Strategy
First premise – Strategy is proactive and anticipatory, because it not only provides direction for the
coercive or persuasive use of power, but it also seeks to control the environment, as opposed to
reacting to it.
Second premise – Strategy is based on proper understanding of the internal and external
environments, allowing for formulation of appropriate objectives leading to the desired end state.
Third premise – Strategy must identify and maintain an appropriate balance among the desired
objectives, the methods chosen to pursue the objectives, and the resources required and available.
Ends, ways and means must be consistent with each other.
Fourth premise – It is the political purpose that dominates all strategy. This political purpose is stated
42
in policy, with which strategy must comply. Policy dominates strategy by its articulation of the end
state and its guidance. Policy ensures that strategy pursue appropriate aims, objective that provide
purpose, focus, and justification for the actions embodied in a strategy. Hierarchy of objectives,
presented in the strategy document adopted on the highest level, i.e. national strategy, is then
determined by the political purpose of the state.
Fifth premise – Strategy is hierarchical, and this hierarchy represents both national consensus and
comprehensive direction. Political leadership ensures and maintains its control and influence through
the hierarchical nature of strategy, which facilitates span of control. Objectives, concepts and
resources should be appropriate to the level of strategy and consistent with one another. Strategy
differ from operational art and tactics in functional, temporal, and geographic aspects.18 The U.S.
Army War College (in consonance with Joint Publication 1-02) defines the levels of strategy within
the state as:
• National Security Strategy – the art and science of developing, applying, and
coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military,
and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security;
• National Military Strategy – the art and science of distributing and applying
military power to attain national objectives in peace and war;
• Theater strategy – the art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts
and courses of action directed towards securing the objectives of national and
alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened
use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater (this is,
where the counterinsurgency strategy lies within the hierarchy of strategy – note
IH).
Sixth premise – Strategy is holistic, that is comprehensive, concerned with internal and external
factors at all levels. Strategy is based on comprehensive knowledge of what is happening and the
potential first, second, third, etc., consequences, ideally both intended and unintended, on the efforts,
of the “big picture”, relevant institutional capabilities and resources, and the impact on the whole of
the environment. Strategy must be fully integrated with the strategies or efforts of superior, co-equal
and subordinate elements. Goo strategy is never deployed in isolation.
Seventh premise – Strategy is developed from a thorough analysis and knowledge of strategic
18 Tactics is the domain of battles, engagements of relatively short duration in a narrowly defined territory.
Operational art is the domain of the campaign, a series of battles occurring over a longer period of time and is
broader and more regional in orientation. Strategy is the level of war which encompasses the protracted level of
conflict among actors, armed or unarmed, of a theater-wide, intercontinental or global scope. Counterinsurgency
strategy is then, indeed, a strategy, as it addresses the situation in an area of operation as a whole, combining
both armed and unarmed efforts and long-term in its nature.
43
situation/environment.
Eight premise – Strategy contains a certain degree of an inherent risk. The best strategy can offer is a
favorable balance against failure. Failure can be either the failure to achieve desired objectives, or
providing a significant advantage to one’s adversaries.
Table 7: Eight premises of Yarger’s theory of strategy. Source: IH; inspired by Yarger, H. (2010):
Toward a theory of strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College strategy model, pp. 45-48.
The Lykke’s model of strategy is frequently used for analysis of numerous historical cases,
which allows for its thorough testing, and generally results in increased validity and reliability
Sof the model itself. Lykke proposes to break a strategy into its component parts as an
effective way of its examination and evaluation, both in the development stage through
proactive evaluation and in the post-development phase (during its execution or in retrospect).
He further argued that any strategy can be examined for its sustainability (relates to
ends/objectives – will its attainment contribute to accomplish the desired effects?), feasibility
(relates to ways/concepts – can the action be accomplished by the means available and
selected?), and acceptability (relates to both ways and means/concepts and resources - are the
consequences of cost justified by the importance of the desired effects?) (Ibid: 7). Lykke thus
presumes an inclusion of a proper cost-benefit analysis. Since the Lykke’s model has proven
itself adaptable to explaining differing aspects of strategic thought and capable of providing
the solid basis for clearly articulating and objectively evaluating various strategies, its
application in this research proves not only justified, but also reasonable. As this thesis serves
as yet another test for the Lykke’s model, it will challenge his validity, among other
perspectives, from the point of its potential complementarity with other broader analytical
techniques, like SWOT analysis.
Importantly, what neither Harry R. Yarger, nor Arthur F. Lykke don’t address though
is the superior level of the political-military alliances, like NATO, determined by the
agreements on accession and the rights and commitments stemming from it. Moreover, in a
capacity of a TCN to a multinational operation led by a coalition of states under auspices of a
regional/an international organization, the country is obliged to abide by and implement a
strategy of the commanding authority. Certain level of autonomy of individual nation state
decision-making can be assured in two ways in the setting of multinational operations, i.e. (1)
by inclusion in the planning process of the respective operation, and/or (2) by imposition of
44
restrictions or limitations on the assets committed and deployed to the respective mission by
individual nation states. Both of these factors have a significant level of relevance to the
subject matter of this research. The Czech Republic, being a member of the NATO Alliance,
possess an equal say, in principal as based on the inner provisions and procedures off the
Alliance established by its founding document the Washington Treaty of 194919, in processes
of adopting documents of strategic (and doctrinal) importance as well as in the processes of
decision-making and planning of operations NATO seeks to execute. In the case of
multinational operations led by a coalition of states, without a clear overarching mandate of
an international organization, nation states keep their privilege of sovereignty and their
sovereign decision to join the coalition and participate in the operation, thus accepting the
strategic doctrinal framework as a result of decision-making and planning processes, the states
didn’t necessarily have to part take in. Again, in instances of certain reservations, states
maintain their right to express their reservations and/or impose certain limitations/restrictions
on the forces and other civilian assets deployed to the respective operation.
These restrictions/limitations imposed by nation states commanding structures and
decision-makers are often labeled as “national caveats”. Essentially, national caveats are
political restrictions imposed on military forces (and other civilian actors, as necessary). No
single, commonly accepted definition of what national caveats are has been adopted, however,
a certain common understanding about what caveats are exists. Virtually, from the more
proper perspective of multinational operations than in general, national caveats represent
qualifications imposed by allies on their national contributions and roles and activities on the
ground. The research interest of the issue of national caveats has been increasing since their
negative practical implications on the operational and tactical level started to surface and
become a subject of investigations and inquiries. There is a common rule for all TCNs in a
mission to declare restrictions and limitations on their contributions during the planning
phases of operations, however, as substantial evidence suggests, nation states impose a
number of previously undeclared caveats, as necessary, creating confusion and mistrust
among allies and partners in the mission as well as potentially undermining overall
effectiveness of the mission. Caveats represent an important contribution to the framework of
what deployed military force (or civilian actors, when under direct authority of the state) can
or cannot do, what mission, tasks and assignments they can or cannot execute. The right to
19 The text of Washington Treaty can be accessed at
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf
(retrieved on February 9, 2017).
45
impose restrictions by a nation state on its military and civilian assets deployed in a
multinational mission limits the options of the commander of the mission on the ground in
terms of limitations on the use and maneuvering with the full force at the commander’s
disposal.
Caveats are commonly imposed on the operational and the tactical levels of the mission
and as such constituted a significant factor influencing the execution of the ISAF mission (see
below). Even though numerous negative effects of the use of national caveats by TCNs can be
identified, esp. on the operational and tactical level, there are certain positive effects the
caveats brought along as well. Analyzed through the prisms of the counterinsurgency
framework, which is the core character of a multinational operation scrutinized in this thesis,
positive effects can be observed predominantly at the strategic level, as it helps maintain
cohesion of the Alliance as well as legitimacy of the mission.20
As counterinsurgency is a political endeavor first and foremost, the practice of the use of
caveats has had more or less significant positive effects when put into the political
perspective. However, from the military perspective, caveats have been strongly perceived as
objecting or limiting successful accomplishment of various military goals. Again, from the
perspective of counterinsurgency, caveats undermined (or contribute to undermining of)
numerous fundamental counterinsurgency principles, including unity of effort, unity of
command, flaws in longer term continuance of efforts, or the what later became the very core
principle of NATO counterinsurgency efforts - winning hearts and minds of the population
(because of the factor of confusion in perception of the coalition forces, when ordinary
population were not able to distinguish between individual national contingents). Great
amount of mistrust affecting interoperability and, significantly, also intelligence-sharing
efforts has also been caused by national caveats (among other factors).
The imposition of restrictions in form of caveats on deployed forces of various
countries has also been one of the external factors shaping the Czech counterinsurgency
approach during the course of multinational (counterinsurgency) missions the Czechs
participated in. The sources of caveats in cases of individual nation states vary and don’t have 20 Nonetheless, detailed study of the relevant literature and mission reports suggests, caveats have never been
identified as a direct cause of any incident, wrongdoing or ineffective execution of individual assignments and
tasks as part of a mission, even though they have always been framed as carrying the major share of blame. One
of the limitations in attempts to determine how significant the impact of caveats actually is or can be is hindered
by the fact that they are mostly classified, and researchers can learn about them from reports or on the ground
observations, but generally cannot be granted a full access to the individual orders. Most notable examples of
national caveats are approvals from national capitals required before a certain action is taken, geographical
restrictions limiting the area of operation of a contingent, restrictions on participating in night operations,
restrictions on medical evacuations or restrictions on the weapon systems and other equipment allowed to be
used.
46
to be political per se, however, in most of the cases, the decision to impose caveats on
deployed forces are a mix of political, legal and partially also economic reasons. The status of
public opinion in home countries can also significantly influence the decision about the state’s
use of force. Most of the time, the real reasons behind the issuance of restrictions in form of
caveats are neither discussed, nor disclosed publicly. The narrative of “protection of forces”
has often been articulated and sold to the public, and, arguably, also has a significant impact
on the actual level of restrictiveness of the caveats. However, additional political, economic or
legal factors greatly contribute to the decision on imposition of the caveats, as well. The
“protection of forces” narrative cannot alone explain the caveats, as political and military
representatives of several NATO members used the very same narrative to advocate high
discretions levels among the forces deployed and against the use of caveats.
4.2 Conceptualization of counterinsurgency
Simply put, counterinsurgency strategy is a plan comprising of a series of measures to
minimize the potency and/or eliminate an insurgency in certain geographical area.
Nevertheless, as it is the case with a strategy or numerous other social phenomena, no
common, universally accepted definition of what counterinsurgency exactly is exists, even
though a certain common agreement on the basic premises on the nature of counterinsurgency
can be identified among practitioners as well as researchers. The NATO Glossary of Terms
and Definitions states that counterinsurgency (COIN), as well as counter-insurrection (thus
using the two concepts as synonymous to each other) comprises of “comprehensive civilian
and military efforts made to defeat an insurgency and address any core grievances.” (NATO
2013: 2-C-16).21 The US strategic conceptual and doctrinal documents have long played role
of the fundamental referential material for most of the NATO multinational operations, that
have been shaped as being counterinsurgency in their nature, both nominally and practically,
21 The NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions have undergone a number of revisions during which most of its
contents was either adjusted, or changed completely in order to better reflect the realities on the ground and
provide a more accurate conceptual framework for strategy development as well as execution. For example,
compared to the definition of counterinsurgency in the 2010 version (counterinsurgency as a mix of „military,
paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civilian activities executed by a government with the aim of
defeating an insurgency“ (NATO 2010)), the 2013 definition expands its scope to not only reactive activities
(defeat of an insurgency), but significant portion is also devoted to proactive, preventive efforts, as it seeks to
„address any core grievances.“ Furthermore, the less specific categories of the required activities in the 2013
definition might be interpreted as an effort not to specifically highlight or exclude certain activities that might
prove important in the course of counterinsurgency campaigns. The 2010 definition may also be perceived as
more military-centric than the 2013 one and as not sufficiently including the significant societal dimension (the
population) of counterinsurgency operations.
47
particularly long before a separate document on counterinsurgency strategy was approved and
enacted by all NATO member states at the NATO level in 2011 (see below). The U.S.
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms Joint Publication 1-02
(JP 1-02) has been one of these guiding documents. Its 2009 version provided the same
definition as the 2010 version of the NATO Glossary (see footnote no. 36 on this page).
However, as the publication dates of the two documents suggest, the US Military Dictionary
was used as the source of the definition, given both the dominant role of the US in NATO and
perceived accurateness of the definition. The latest (2016) amended version of the same
dictionary also provides a definition very similar to the one presented in the 2013 version of
NATO Glossary, i.e. it describes counterinsurgency as “comprehensive civilian and military
efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address root causes.”
(U.S. Department of Defense 2016: 53).
What is of a critical importance is the stress put on the word “simultaneously”,
suggesting the potential willingness of the US to commit a substantial number of various
resources in one specific time frame that NATO potentially can, given its character as an
alliance of 28 nations. The US Dictionary also describes more ambitious military and political
goal, as its understanding of counterinsurgency not only bears the responsibility of defeating
an insurgency, but possibly just “contain” it, giving the US somewhat more leverage in
practical terms. Another critically important document, for the US as well as for NATO
counterinsurgency operations (esp. ISAF) in particular is the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field
Manual no. 3-24/3-33.5 (commonly referred to as simply FM 3-24) that has essentially been
the corner stone of both the development and the execution phases of NATO operations. It
also provided the fundamental sources for actors lacking any previous direct experience (like
the Czech Republic) with counterinsurgency operations with a very useful blueprint of
counterinsurgency campaigns. One of the main reasons was behind the prominence of this
field manual in the theoretical and conceptual dimension of counterinsurgency was to ensure
as high level of interoperability in NATO multinational missions as possible, before the
separate document on the NATO level was adopted. Just like it was the case with the NATO
Glossary and the US Department of Defense Dictionary, the FM 3-24, originally published in
2006, has been revised according to the lessons learned and best practices obtained during the
counterinsurgency missions, particularly the one in Afghanistan, in order to reflect the
realities on the ground as thoroughly as possible and in order to provide potentially effective
guidelines and provisions for practical implementation of the document.
48
The 2006 version of FM 3-24 “filled an important doctrinal gap at a time when U.S.
forces were engaged in counterinsurgency operations.” (Department of the Army
Headquarters 2014: vii). Building on other relevant doctrines as well as the situation on the
ground in post-2003 Iraq, General David Petraeus and Marie Lt. General James N. Mattis,
along with a team at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center developed a new field manual on
counterinsurgency, published in 2006 under the markings FM 3-24/3-33.5. Application of the
principles presented in this manual by coalition forces in Iraq and later also (to a certain
extent) in Afghanistan meant a significant game-changer for the realities on the ground in
these two major areas of operation, as it provided the coalition forces in both theaters with
clear conceptual framework of their actions on the strategic and operational level
(complemented by numerous follow-up documents like the ISAF Commander’s
Counterinsurgency Guide; see below).
The 2014 version of the FM 3-24, renamed from being “Counterinsurgency” to the
new title “Insurgencies and Counter Insurgencies” marks an important evolution of the
conceptual understanding of counterinsurgency actions by the US. Compared to its 2006, the
2013 FM -24 provides more guidance for proper understanding of an adversary and a strategic
context, since the factor of thorough understanding and knowledge is the critically important
and should serve as a springboard for determining and defining effective efforts, or counter
measures, aimed at “defeating (or containing) an insurgency and addressing its root causes.”
Individual guidelines and provisions presented in this critical document are addressed,
introduced and discussed at the appropriate place in this thesis. At this point, it is important to
stress that the 2006 version of the FM 3-24 adopted and used the very same definition of
counterinsurgency as the 2010 version of the U.S. Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms (see above), however, the 2014 version of the FM 3-24,
adequately reflecting the experience from two major counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and
in Afghanistan, adopted the definition presented in the latest version of the US Department of
Defense Dictionary (Ibid: 1-2).
The Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (*2011) as the highest conceptual
and strategic document regarding any multinational counterinsurgency operations, binding for
all NATO member states, including the Czech Republic,22 proposes a new definition of
counterinsurgency, as being understood and used in the document, i.e. counterinsurgency as
22 The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2611. STANAG is an abbreviated
form of a NATO standardization agreement, which is “a normative document, recording an agreement among
several or all NATO member nations, that has been ratified at the authorized national level, to implement a
standard, in whole or in part, with or without reservation” (NATO 2013: 2-N-2).
49
“the set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological
activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances” (NATO 2011a:
Lexicon-1). This definition is more specific than the one stated in the NATO Glossary, as it
lists a range of specific efforts required in conduct of a counterinsurgency campaign,
however, it still maintains the duality in terms of objectives of NATO counterinsurgency
efforts, i.e. not only elimination of an insurgency, but including also more proactive measures
to prevent its potential re-occurrence in the future.
All the strategic and conceptual documents at the NATO as well as national level
relevant for the research of the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency are introduced and
discussed in the empirical part of this thesis. At this stage of the thesis, it is sufficient to
present only the definition of counterinsurgency, draw up from the principles of the Czech
Armed Forces deployed to a counterinsurgency mission. The definition can be found in the
key doctrinal document of the Czech Armed Forces, i.e. the Doctrine of the Army of the
Czech Republic, released in 2010.23 The 2010 version of the document states that
counterinsurgency comprises of “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological
and civil actions executed with the aim of elimination of an insurgency.” (Ministerstvo obrany
České republiky 2010: 42 footnote 31; translated by IH). Clear inspiration by the U.S.
Army/Marine Corps FM 3-24 (version 2006) is more than obvious. Majority of the
respondents the author interviewed, let it be politicians, military or civilian practitioners,
confirmed the overt and direct efforts to copy the principles and imperatives presented in the
FM 3-24, given the lack of both potential and capacities of the Czech Republic as a sovereign
state to develop its own counterinsurgency strategy and the long-term absence of a
comprehensive conceptual framework of counterinsurgency operations on the NATO level as
well. Until the release of the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency in February 2011,
NATO mostly followed the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy during the course of its ISAF
mission as well as the NATO contributions in Iraq.24
Significantly, the 2014 version of the FM 3-24 frames counterinsurgency as a concept
subordinate to the broader and more widely used concept of irregular warfare (Department of
the Army Headquarters 2014: 1-1). The issue of counterinsurgency and its relationship (and
potential overlap) with other types of military operations is critically important to be
23 Previous version of the same doctrine neither focused on the possibility of the deployment of the Czech armed
forces into a counterinsurgency mission, nor they developed a conceptual framework of the understanding of the
counterinsurgent military activity, including the definition and key principles of it, from the Czech perspective. 24 The rationale behind is not only the extensive experience the U.S. has with counterinsurgency character of
operations, but also the presence and functions of the American military officers and officials in the commanding
structures of the NATO counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
50
addressed and understood predominantly for the research and analytical as well as planning
purposes. Failure to acknowledge existing relationships, overlaps and differences can cause
serious confusion, lack of clarity and flawed judgement with significant analytical, conceptual
as well as practical consequences.
First, conceptual clarity is required in the case of the relationship between the terms
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Particularly the missions in Iraq and in Afghanistan
were, often, mislabeled as “counterterrorism” operations, not mirroring the whole nature of
the two respective campaigns. Indeed, this relationship, and any identification of contact
points, contact mechanisms and overlaps, gravely depends on how the term terrorism and the
term insurgency are defined, since any strategies aimed at countering the two respective
security challenges must inherently reflect their nature. Even though it is possible to identify
certain aspects of counterterrorism activities during the course of the ISAF mission, especially
since it was led in parallel with the operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (OEF-A),
which was counterterrorism by its mandate (see below), characterization of the entire ISAF
mission as such is greatly misleading. Terrorism and insurgencies are two distinctively
different, but still closely connected phenomena. Terrorism is mostly a tactical method or
technique applied by various state as well as non-state actors, including insurgents, as one of
their preferred courses of action. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, counterterrorism
can be executed as part of a broader NATO counterinsurgency mission, focusing at
instruments and measures aimed at countering one of the frequently used tactical methods of
the insurgents.25 The character of contemporary insurgencies, that frequently use the terrorist
method, requires that any research efforts of measures intended to counter the insurgent
activities also need to contemplate counterterrorism policies and strategic documents of
relevant stakeholders.
The Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (see below) significantly contributes
to the efforts to clarify the conceptual distinction between insurgency and irregular warfare
(and, correspondingly, counterinsurgency measures and measures aimed at countering
irregular activities as such). The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine defines insurgency as “the
actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect
or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading
or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion” (NATO 2011a:
25 For other possible definitions and conceptualizations of counterterrorism see, for example, The Routledge
Handbook of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism (2016), or the publication The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A
Guide for Decision-Makers by Boaz Ganor (2011).
51
Lexicon-4), and irregular activity as “the use of threat of force by irregular forces, groups or
individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a
challenge to governance and authority” (Ibid). Nuanced, yet clear distinction between the
two concepts is achieved by the inclusion of the element of criminal motivation in the concept
of irregular activity, thus suggesting that irregular activity is a broader concept. In the same
document, NATO explicitly disclaims that counterinsurgents cannot ignore the destabilizing
effects of irregular activity associated with the respective insurgency (Ibid:1-3), therefore
highlighting a clear relationship existing between an insurgency and irregular activity.
Irregular activity is also mentioned as a primary stage of an alternative political
activity in the conditions of a fragile state, that can, “if successful, even on a small scale, (…)
garner increased popular support and develop into an insurgency” (Ibid: 2-4), thereby adding
an additional dimension to an insurgency/irregular activity inquiry. Insurgency is considered
an irregular activity, carried out by an organized group or movement, in the Allied
counterinsurgency doctrine. Other specific types of irregular activity are described in the
document: (1) terrorism, (2) criminality, (3) disorder, and (4) subversion (Ibid: 2-15 – 2-17).
This understanding is, however, challenged in the same document as it also states, contrary to
this position, that “insurgents might employ irregular activities (criminality, terrorism,
disorder and/or subversion) in order to obtain funds to inhibit the opposing population,
disseminating instability and insecurity over the country, so that the state’s government
cannot control it” (Ibid: 3-2), therefore effectively positioning the four mentioned irregular
activities as tools or instruments that insurgents (or potentially other actors) can use in order
to project their power, pursue their strategies and, ultimately, achieve their goals. A visual
figure of general interconnection between what is considered regular activities and irregular
activities and insurgency is provided in the document, as follows:
52
Figure 2: Relationship between insurgency and irregular activity. Source: NATO (2011a): Allied Joint
Doctrine for Counterinsurgency – AJP-3.4.4, p. 3-2.
This figure serves as a good instrument for explanation of what irregular activities in the
context of an insurgency are (i.e. an alternative to regular activities). Although it is obvious
from the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine that insurgencies tend to have significant
transnational/regional outreach (see below), this figure might be misinterpreted as it portrays
irregular activities carried out only at the national level. The purpose here probably is to
contain and highlight the national character of an insurgency NATO might happen to engage
with, however, even strongly nationalistic insurgencies may have significant
transnational/regional and sometimes even international outreach by the irregular activities
they use (esp. criminality).
As for counterinsurgency as such, significant changes of the post-cold war security
environment in terms of newly emerging challenges, threats, trends and tendencies (sharp
increase in asymmetrical conflicts was only one of them), have been captured and reflected in
the strategic and conceptual doctrinal documents of the Western countries, esp. the US, as
well as the major relevant literature since roughly the mid-1990s (cf. Galatík et al. 2008: 136).
53
The terrorist attacks from 9th September, 2001 and the developments in the international
community and global security environment that followed them, then, among other things,
served as a catalyst and accelerator for the increased military, political as well as academic
interest in irregular, low intensity warfare, including the problems of counterinsurgency. The
formulation of counterinsurgency doctrines has become a task of respective doctrine centers
of individual countries’ armed forces (like the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) or the Czech Armed Forces’ Doctrine Department at the Training Command –
Military Academy. However, given the character of counterinsurgency operations, ministries
of foreign affairs of respective countries represent the leading elements in formation, planning
and execution phases of counterinsurgency efforts. Along with respective ministries of
foreign affairs and respective ministries of defense, other ministries and departments have
significant role in both planning and execution phases of counterinsurgency strategies, like
ministries of interior, homeland security, finance, actors relevant for foreign aid and
development aid provision, etc.). The level of cooperation and coordination of planning and
practical steps among the relevant stakeholders varies significantly on case by case basis.
Usually, the level of cooperation and coordination in this regards is directly
proportionate to the level of comprehensiveness and potential effectiveness of the overall
counterinsurgency strategy or counterinsurgency strategy approach. Uncoordinated actions
and efforts of major stakeholders in planning and execution of their respective strategies can
result in waste of resources caused by their abundance, in duplicity of efforts, in lack or
absence of essential resources and capabilities, in unclear definition of objectives, in
problematic relationship with partners and potentially damaged prestige, in lack of support,
flawed assessment, minimal commitment, etc.
Through the prisms of Yarger’s hierarchical structure and levels of strategy,
counterinsurgency strategy doctrine should be developed and understood as subordinate to the
National Security Strategy of a country, to its National Military Strategy and the Doctrine of
Armed Forces of the respective country. Counterinsurgency strategy doctrine is, by its nature,
a theater strategy that is formulated within the framework of the ends, ways and means
established in the strategies on superior levels. Theater strategies are then broken down into
strategies in the realm of operational art and further down in the tactical handbooks. The
hierarchical structure and relationship ensures that the subordinate levels of strategy comply
with and abide by the provisions of the higher level strategic documents. Superior level,
equally binding, is then represented by strategic doctrines and policies of international
organizations, and security alliances in particular.
54
Two basic approaches to counterinsurgency exist:
1. Enemy-centric approach, or “iron fist” approach (massive use of brutal force against the
insurgents as well as repressive against the segment of population that supports the
insurgents); or
2. Population-centric approach, or “hearts and minds” approach (ideological and emotional
appeal for the support of the populations, excluding the factors of repression and fear).
Table 8: Counterinsurgency approaches I. Source: IH; inspired by Collins, J. M. (2002): Military
strategy. Principles, Practices, ad Historical Perspectives.
Three categories of counterinsurgency activity:
1. “Search and destroy” – systematic pursuit and elimination of the insurgent forces;
2. “Clear and hold” – seizing key centers, winning the popular support, cutting the insurgent
supply lines and gradual expansion of the influence and control of the counterinsurgents; and
3. “Hold and harass” – combination of 1 and 2 – maintaining secure areas, while
simultaneously pursuing the enemy combat forces.
Table 9: Counterinsurgency approaches II. Source: IH; inspired by Ibid.
Gradually, building on the experience from Iraq and Afghanistan, a fourth category has been
developed and emphasized, i.e. so-called “Clear, hold, build” approach. This approach is
preferred by NATO and is introduced as a part of the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine. At
this point, the counterinsurgent side expand the second model to include military support for
reconstruction and development activities, beyond the framework full-spectrum of operations
(combining offensive, defensive and stabilization), as counterinsurgency campaigns are often
portrayed.
A number of distinguished scholars has attempted to develop an elaborated framework
of counterinsurgency, its fundamental pillars, principles and guidelines. Most of the theories
frame counterinsurgency as reactionary and multifaceted. It wasn’t until the post-9/11 Iraq
and even more Afghanistan experience when the preventive and proactive practices of
counterinsurgency efforts started to be incorporated into the broader counterinsurgency
framework.
55
4.2.1. David Galula
David Galula is one of the most prominent counterinsurgency theorists, given his extensive
experience with insurgencies in various environments, like China, Greece, Indochina or
Algeria. Galula developed a comprehensive framework of the insurgency-counterinsurgency
nexus, reflecting the Cold War dynamics and trends regarding insurgencies and measures and
approaches aimed to counter and/or eliminate them. He focused on all the important attributes
of an insurgency, with a specific focus placed on the importance of the power of ideology,
propaganda and disinformation campaign. Galula frames his understanding of an insurgency
as a revolutionary war, reflecting the character of the Cold War insurgencies inspired by the
strategy of protracted popular war by Mao Zedong. Galula describes and analyzes the
fundamental principles of counterinsurgency through the prisms of all the significant
attributes of insurgency and in the format of close interdependence of one with the other one.
He distinguished 3 different categories of a revolutionary war, building on the presumption
established by Carl von Clausewitz that “Insurgency is the pursuit of policy of a party, inside
the country, by every means.” (Galula 2006: 1). These 3 types include (1) revolution, (2) plot,
and (3) insurgency. The main difference between insurgency and the other 2 categories is that
insurgency is “a protracted struggle, conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain
specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order”, and
even though he states that “insurgency is a civil war”, he also points out that “there is a
difference in the form the war takes in each case” (Ibid: 2), meaning civil wars usually
resemble conventional interstate war, whereas insurgency struggles are asymmetrical and
protracted.
The asymmetry between the insurgents and the counterinsurgents makes up the
essential referential line in Galula’s research. Importantly, Galula works with the presumption
of a government functioning as a counterinsurgent force against an insurgency being waged in
a territory of one state. This fact imposes certain limitations on modern day situations where
the counterinsurgency force is often transnational in nature. Some of his analytical
conclusions are, however, still valid and applicable. Galula highlights the high ratio between
counterinsurgents and insurgents, asserting that the ratio of counterinsurgent costs to the costs
of the insurgents may be ten or twenty to one, or higher, as the counterinsurgents are
responsible for maintaining order (Ibid: 7), whereas the insurgents can still inflict significant
damage to the order, even when operating at low cost. Galula further states that “the insurgent
is fluid because he has neither responsibility nor concrete assets; the counterinsurgent is
56
rigid because he has both.” (Ibid). Galula thus underscores high adaptability of the insurgents
that is rarely matched by the same level of adaptability and flexibility on the side of the
counterinsurgent. Interestingly, one of the aspects of the Galula’s text where significant
influence of the Mao’s theory can be identified is Galula’s claim that “the insurgent is obliged
to remain fluid at least until he has reached a balance of forces with the counterinsurgent.
However desirable for the insurgent to possess territory, large regular forces, and powerful
weapons, to possess them prematurely could spell him doom.” (Ibid). Here, Galula is talking
about the readiness of the broader environment for such an evolution of the insurgents in
terms of their capacities, which requires sustainably high level of popular support, strong
ideological cause and strong organizational structure.
In Galula’s opinion, from the counterinsurgents’ point of view, a revolutionary war (an
insurgency) can be divided into two periods: (1) the “cold revolutionary war” (the insurgent
activity remains legal and largely non-violent), and (2) the “hot revolutionary war” (the
insurgent activity openly illegal and violent) (Ibid: 43). In the cold phase of a revolutionary
war, Galula outlines four general courses of action open to the counterinsurgents, which are
not mutually exclusive.
Four counterinsurgent courses of action according to Galula:
1. Direct action against the insurgent leaders;
2. Indirect action against the conditions that are propitious to an insurgency;
3. Infiltration of the insurgent movement; and
4. Strengthening of the political machine.
Table 10: Four counterinsurgent courses of action. Source: IH; inspired by Galula, D. (2006):
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, pp. 44-47.
In the phase of a “hot revolutionary war”, the range and scope of desirable counterinsurgent
actions change and widens, as it includes the efforts aimed at building support from the
population, which is not conditional, and is the main contested element of the insurgent-
counterinsurgent nexus. This support should be found through an active minority, supporting
the counterinsurgent cause (Ibid: 49-55). Any success of either side critically depends on the
so-called “neutral majority”, for which support the major battle is waged. Galula then derives
8 fundamental principles of a counterinsurgency strategy, which he lists as a step-by-step
process. These principles emphasized by Galula are solely of a political-military nature and
do not include the socioeconomic, developmental and reconstruction activities that form
57
significant part of contemporary counterinsurgency strategic thinking. Quite surprisingly, too,
Galula doesn’t emphasize the role of intelligence as much.
Eight fundamental principles of counterinsurgent strategy according to Galula:
1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents.
2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgents’ comeback in strength, install
these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives.
3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with
the guerillas.
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organization.
5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.
6. Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the soft and the
incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units.
7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement.
8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.
Table 11: Eight fundamental principles of counterinsurgent strategy. Source: IH; inspired by Ibid, pp.
55-56.
What is apparent here is the strong focus on the military and political dimension of the
counterinsurgency campaign. Galula doesn’t address the issue of economic development,
social cohesion, or reconstruction, in a direct opposition to today’s counterinsurgency
strategies, that accent the primacy of non-military activities. Although Galula discusses the
primacy of the political over the military power (cf. Ibid: 62-63), he doesn’t contemplate
reconstruction and development efforts. This fact may contribute to the broader debate over
the limits and boundaries of the modern counterinsurgency campaigns.
Interestingly, Galula dwells on the “experiment factor” of the counterinsurgency
campaign, as he works with the hypothesis that “the first area (is) as a test area” (Ibid: 73).
What he means is that in the initial phases of any counterinsurgency campaign, objective and
close observations have to be made on the counterinsurgent side to identify mistakes and
flaws, learn from them, being prompt and willing to alter what goes wrong.
4.2.2 David Kilcullen
The most prominent contemporary expert on modern warfare, who developed yet the most
comprehensive conceptual framework of what counterinsurgency means, as put into a broader
perspective of the contemporary security environment and contemporary warfare, is an
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Australian strategist, who also served as a senior counterinsurgency advisor to Gen. David
Petraeus, when he was the top commander of the operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as to the
then-US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and later to the Gen. Stanley McChrystal in
Afghanistan, David Kilcullen.
In his works, Kilcullen uses the concept of “conflict ecosystem”, which is
distinguishable by a high number of independent, but mutually interconnected actors, who try
to maximize their survival prospects and capabilities in the chaotic environment of a broader
conflict of insurgency (Kilcullen 2006: 2-3). In his most notorious publication
Counterinsurgency, Kilcullen introduces what he considers to be fundamental principles of
counterinsurgency on the company-level, alternative indicators for measuring progress (not
necessarily success) in counterinsurgency campaign, and use a case study of a rarely
discussed Indonesian insurgency and counterinsurgency. The findings he obtains from his
analysis Kilcullen further uses as lenses for a critical evaluation of the Taliban insurgency in
Afghanistan. His book then concludes with a conceptualization of what he calls global Islamic
insurgency. Elements of the phenomenon of global Islamic insurgency can be observed and
analyzed in close relevance to the NATO (and Czech) counterinsurgency efforts in both Iraq
and Afghanistan, and helped to shape the respective response and counter measures.
Kilcullen understands counterinsurgency as “a competition with the insurgent for the
right and the ability to win the hearts, minds, and acquiescence of the population.” (Kilcullen
2010: 29). Kilcullen sets up the framework of any counterinsurgency campaign by
establishing three fundamental pillars – security, political and economic.
Three counterinsurgency pillars according to Kicullen:
1. Security (military tasks, law enforcement tasks, public services, human security);
2. Political (legitimacy and efficiency of governance, institution building);
3. Economic (humanitarian and development assistance, resource management assistance, etc.).
Table 12: Counterinsurgency pillars. Source: IH; inspired by Kilcullen, D. (2006): Counterinsurgency
Redux, p. 5-6.
Presented as an important advice for military professionals of a presumed occupying (likely
NATO) troops, Kilcullen follows up with listing his 28 principles (or as he call them
“articles”) of counterinsurgency. Kilcullen is an advocate of the highest levels of discretion
and counterinsurgency mindset to the lowest levels of the echelon. He explicitly states that the
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list has been developed as a sum up of collective observations, lessons identified and lessons
learned from various counterinsurgency missions. Kilcullen also divides the principles into 4
categories, and he presents the last 28th principle after a systematic structure of the principles,
as they (should) follow in practice, during the course of counterinsurgency operation,
including a discussion of four key “what if” moments. The list of Kilcullen’s
counterinsurgency articles includes:
• Preparation phase (pre-deployment):
1. Know your turf (local knowledge of the environment – geography, demography;
understand the wider “area of influence”, develop a mental model of your area);
2. Diagnose the problem (who are the insurgents? Why and how are they getting
followers? Know your enemy);
3. Organize for intelligence (operations are driven by intelligence, but intelligence is
mostly gathered during operations, integrate intelligence analysts and linguists);
4. Organize for interagency operations (the State Department, aid agencies, local
police or fire departments; learn how not to scare the civilians; military operations
create temporary breathing space, it is, however, the civilians with their long-term
development projects and stabilization efforts what ultimately wins the war);
5. Travel light and harden your Combat Service Support (enable speed and mobility);
6. Find a political/cultural advisor (POLAD – a diplomat or military foreign area
officer, able to speak the language and navigate the intricacies of local politics,
who helps to shape one’s understanding of the environment);
7. Train the squat leaders – and trust them (train them to act intelligently and
independently without others; the training should focus on basic skills:
marksmanship, patrolling, security on the move and at the halt, basic drills);
8. Rank is nothing, talent is everything (mindset, flexibility);
9. Have a game plan (a mental picture of how you see the operation developing,
sometimes called “operational design”; this plan provides a robust idea what to
achieve, even if the means change; identify basic stages of the operation; simple
and known to everyone) (Kilcullen 2010: 30-35).
• The golden hour phase (entering your sector, initial phases of deployment):
10. Be there (establish presence; a residential approach in close proximity to the
population);
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11. Avoid knee-jerk responses to first impressions (don’t act rashly, get the facts first,
try to avoid a rush to judgement; different understanding of “normalcy” on the
local level, so you need to learn what the normality looks like);
12. Prepare for handover from day one (you will not resolve the insurgency under your
watch; prepare handover folders for your successors, including lessons learned,
details about the population, village and patrol reports, updated maps,
photographs; create a corporate memory);
13. Build trusted networks (the real meaning of the phrase “hearts and minds” –
“hearts means persuading people their best interests are served by your success,
“minds” means convincing them that you can protect them, and that resisting you
is pointless and counterproductive; calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what
counts; these networks include local allies, community leaders, local security
forces, NGOs and other friendly or neutral non-state actors in your area, and the
media; identify the needs of the community, follow through meet them, build
common interests and mobilize popular support; actions (even killing high-profile
targets) that undermine trust or disrupt your networks help the enemy);
14. Start easy (maneuver still matters; don’t go straight for the main insurgent
stronghold, try to provoke a decisive showdown, or focus efforts on villages that
support the insurgents; instead, start from secure areas and work gradually onward;
first win the trust of people in a few villages understand local power and business
relations and expand your influence through the trusted local networks, local
allies);
15. Seek early victories (stamp your dominance in your sector from the very
beginning; you might achieve victory by resolving long-standing issues, or
coopting a key local leader; a little goes a long way);
16. Practice deterrent patrolling (establish patrolling methods that deter the enemy
from attacking you, including multiple “satellite” patrolling, where you flood an
area with numerous small patrols working together; blue-green patrolling, where
you mount daylight overt humanitarian patrols which go covert at night and hunt
specific targets; constant and unpredictable activity required);
17. Be prepared for setbacks (recover your balance; give local commanders the
freedom to adjust their posture to local conditions, this creates elasticity that helps
you survive setbacks);
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18. Remember the global audience (the omnipresence of the media, the significance of
social media; the adversary seeks to defeat you in the court of global public
opinion; assume that everything they say or they do will be publicized; good
relationships with non-embedded media - especially indigenous media –
dramatically increase your situational awareness, and help your message across the
global and local audience);
19. Engage the women, beware the children (through targeted social and economic
programs; the role of female counterinsurgents; keep the children at arm’s length,
stop throwing candies or presents to children, as it attracts them to the
counterinsurgents, the insurgents seek to exploit the children);
20. Take stock regularly (develop metrics early in the tour and refine its indicators as
the operation progresses; they should cover range of social, informational,
military, and economic issues; typical effective metrics include: percentage of
engagements initiated by our forces versus those initiated by the insurgents;
longevity of friendly local leaders in positions of authority; number of tip-offs on
insurgent activity that originate spontaneously from the population; economic
activity at markets and shops, including the indicator of presence or price of exotic
vegetables and fruits in market stalls) (Ibid: 35-41).
• Groundhog day phase (the steady state, established in the sector, the most productive
phase):
21. Exploit the “single narrative” (know how people are mobilized; opinion-makers
are often local leaders, pillars of the community, religious figures, media
personalities, and others who set trends and influence public perceptions; a simple,
unifying, easily expressed story or explanation that organizes people’s experience
and provides a framework for understanding events; the importance of national
and ethnic historical myths, sectarian creeds provide such narrative; develop an
alternative narrative that excludes the insurgents; find a single mobilization
narrative that emphasized the inevitability and rightness of your ultimate success
after trusted local allies and thorough understanding of environment are
established);
22. Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves (go against the natural
tendency to build the local security forces in the counterinsurgents’ image; instead,
local indigenous forces need to mirror the enemy’s capabilities and seek to
supplant the insurgent’s role; they should move, equip and organize like
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insurgents, but have access to support; training, raising, and employing local
indigenous auxiliary forces (police and military); correlates with the expansion of
trusted networks and winning local allies – who want to take up arms in their own
defense)26;
23. Practice armed civil affairs (focus on meeting basic needs first, track the progress
in meeting them over time; intimate cooperation with interagency partners –
national, international, and local – don’t control them, but associate with them
loosely, as they need to preserve their perceived neutrality; a shared diagnosis of
the problem; the military role is to provide protection, identify, needs, facilitate
civil affairs, and use improvements in social conditions as leverage to build
networks and mobilize the population; there is no such thing as impartial
humanitarian assistance or civil affairs in counterinsurgency);
24. Small is beautiful (another natural tendency is to go for large-scale, mass
programs, but they take longer and don’t have to meet the specific local needs; test
them on a small scale and replicate them on a larger scale);
25. Fighting the enemy strategy, not his forces (if things go well for the
counterinsurgents, the insurgents go on an offensive, spikes of insurgent activity
late in the campaign is normal;27 the counterinsurgents shall still focus on the
countering the insurgent strategy (through cooptation of contested population, or
prevention of a sectarian conflict);
26. Build your own solution – only attack the enemy when he gets in the way (try not
to get distracted by the desire to capture of kill the insurgents; implement the game
plan you develop early in the campaign; environment-centric more than enemy-
centric approach; learn to negotiate with the enemy; exploit opportunities to coopt
segments of the enemy; at this stage, defection is better than a surrender, surrender
is better than a capture, and capture is better than a kill) (Ibid: 41-45).
• Getting short phase (maintain the previous activities and add):
27. Keep your extraction plan secret (the insurgents may exploit it to score a high-
profile hit, recapture the population’s allegiance by scare tactics that convince
them they will not be protected once you leave, or persuade them that your
successor unit will be oppressive or incompetent) (Ibid: 46).
26 Major problem in Afghanistan – local security architectures were poorly integrated into the broader ANSF
system. 27 This is, however, an ideal case scenario. In reality, spikes of offensive insurgent activity may also result from
them seizing the momentum and initiative, perceiving the counterinsurgent side as weak and losing.
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• Four “what ifs” to consider:
a) What if you get moved to a different area? Apply the understanding and
knowledge gained there. This time the process is easier and faster.
b) What if higher headquarters doesn’t “get” counterinsurgency? “First do no harm.”
Try not to create expectations that higher headquarters won’t let you meet.
c) What if you have no resources? Focus on self-reliance, keep it small and
sustainable, prioritize effort. Be honest with local leaders and discuss possible
projects with them. They will often find the translators, building supplies, or
expertise you need, and will only expect your support and protection in making
their projects work.
d) What if the theater shifts under your feet? Have a flexible, adaptive game plan.
Drop back a stage, consolidate, regain balance, and prepare to expand again when
the situation allows (Ibid: 46-48).
• Last but not least:
28. Whatever else you do, keep the initiative (if the enemy is reacting to you, you
control the environment; don’t be drawn into purely reactive operations: focus on
the population, build your own solution, further your game plan, and fight the
enemy only when he gets in the way) (Ibid: 48).
Majority of the Kilcullen’s fundamental counterinsurgency attributes has been adopted and
integrated in the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency. Nevertheless, their practical
execution proved to be more difficult and challenging by various factors like the reluctance to
adopt the counterinsurgency mindset by individual soldiers deployed in NATO
counterinsurgency missions. Furthermore, Kilcullen doesn’t address the issue of national
caveats and the limitation and restriction they entail and the negative impacts they can have,
which, in reality, again showed to be a significant, yet mostly underestimated28 factor.
Another particularly significant contribution to counterinsurgency research is Kilcullen’s
emphasis on the environment-centric, as opposed to the enemy-centric, approach in
counterinsurgency. Kilcullen expands the conventional understanding of the dichotomy
population-centric vs. enemy-centric counterinsurgency to include all the important factors
and vectors occurring and functioning in the environment of a mission. Importantly, when a
mission mandate changes from other type of operation to counterinsurgency, it requires
28 Two main reasons behind the lack of efforts to regulate or minimize the use of caveats by TCNs usually are
the efforts (and hopes) to maintain the cohesion and legitimacy of the mission on the strategic level.
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increasing the numbers of deployed troops to an appropriate level to meet the needs of the
theater.
5 Empirical part
5.1 Historical legacy?
As part of any efforts to study and analyze the contemporary Czech approach to
counterinsurgency thoroughly and in a comprehensive way, a researcher must focus of the
attribute of its potential continuity. In the case of the Czech Republic with such long historical
development, full of occupation and regime changes, it is obvious that the historical excurse
may prove very beneficial in the efforts to identify past experiences with activities we call
counterinsurgency today, as well as patterns, trends and tendencies. Although it is clearly
impossible to track or assume that any of the pre-1989 regimes could have any impact or
direct or indirect effect on the counterinsurgency strategy of NATO (given the NATO’s
history, structure, institutionalization and membership base, together with the fact that
honoring the commitments that the membership in the Alliance brings about means for the
Czech Republic (or other individual nation states) that it has to adopt and abide by the NATO
strategic documents and doctrines),29 such excurse can help identify certain unique features in
the mindset of the Czech political representatives or both civilian and military practitioners
who engage in counterinsurgency activities, or other factors that have helped shape the Czech
strategic culture of counterinsurgency conduct in direct or indirect way. Because of this
limited impact the historical excurse can have on the conclusions of this research, the
identification of the potential historical legacy is brief.
There were two periods in the modern history of the lands that now constitute the
sovereign state of the Czech Republic to which certain (but still very limited) data about the
counterinsurgency activities (labeled differently) are available for the research.30 A certain
29 Two members of the Czech armed forces were assigned to the task of aiding the development of the NATO
counterinsurgency strategy doctrine in 2011, however, their direct influence over the document, which is
essentially a consensus among 28 individual nation states, cannot be reliably traced or verified. 30 Although several other episodes in the Czech history bear a counterinsurgency mark, their deeper and more
thorough research is not included in this thesis. Such research would work predominantly with sources of data in
the Czech language and would be difficult to verify by sources of data written in English, and thus available to
all potential readers of this thesis. To name just the most significant or notorious historical examples, the
Czechoslovak government supported the fight against Russian Bolsheviks on the Russian front during the First
World War, where they, quite interestingly engaged in activities of a reconstruction character, next to direct and
supportive fighting roles. In the interwar period, the Czechoslovak authorities had to tackle the threat of the
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tradition of resistance (or insurgency, using the modern terminology) can be traced throughout
the Czech history. The activities of the Czechoslovak Legionaries during and after the First
World War on the territory of then-Czechoslovakia and Russia, with their roles, operational
capabilities, as well as with the presumed impacts of their actions can serve as a good
example supporting this claim.31 Also, the geostrategic location of the Czech
Republic/Czechoslovakia literally in the middle of the European continent attracted the
modern history world powers seeking to expand and project their power through the control
over the Czech lands. Certain grievances resulting from the attempted or successful power
seizures and occupations by some of the world power can still be sensed and felt among the
Czech population.
5.1.1 The World War II (1939-1945)
Historically, as probably the greatest impulse for any form of violent resistance can, quite
reasonably, be considered the 1938 Munich agreement. The Munich Agreement was a
settlement permitting Nazi Germany to annex portions of then-sovereign country of
Czechoslovakia, predominantly populated by ethnic Germans or German speakers, called
“Sudetenland”. This agreement signed Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy is
widely recognized and interpreted as a failed attempt to appease and satisfy the expansionist
ambitions of the Nazi Germany. The areas included in the concept of Sudetenland were,
however, of great strategic importance to Czechoslovakia, because most of its border defense
lines and systems as well as important industrial base were located there. Czechoslovak
political representatives were not invited to the Munich conference. What followed was a full
occupation of the territory of Czechoslovakia and declaration of the Protectorate Bohemia and
Moravia by the Nazi occupying power in March 1939 (cf. Wheeler-Bennett 1965; Fic 1990;
Bryant 2002; Crowhurst 2013).
In the aftermath, the Czech resistance started to form. It had two major dimensions –
external resistance (with the power centers in London and Moscow, where the Czech political
representatives exiled to) and internal/domestic resistance, and had various forms, mostly in
ethnic German Freikorps paramilitary group active in the Sudeten, emboldened by the successes and nationalistic
rhetoric that was gaining traction in Germany at that time after the German defeat in the First World War. (cf.
Jurado 2001). The Czechoslovak authorities also had to fight against Hungarian, Polish and Ukrainian separatists
that had escalated their armed campaign at the end of the 1930s. 31 More information about the Czechoslovak Legion and their operations inside and outside the country can be
found in the Richard C. Frucht’s publication Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Lands, and Culture
(Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO 2005), or a brochure The Czech Legion 1914-20 by David Bullock (Osprey
Publishing 2009).
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reaction to the activities of the Nazi occupying power. The insurgency, titled partisan
movement, was one of the forms of the Czech resistance in the domestic territory. The
apparatus of the occupying power tried to defeat and eliminate the centers of partisan
resistance from its early stages in 1942-1944. Nevertheless, the counteroffensive operation
Tetřev (operation Grouse) displayed the weaknesses, lack of flexibility and inefficiency of the
Nazi security apparatus in terms of counter-guerilla strategy. The Nazis tried to restructure the
security system in order to be more effective, and ultimately successful, in the elimination of
the centers of armed resistance, like the personal changes in the leading positions, deployment
of more elite SS paramilitary units (virtually counter-partisan special forces Einsatzkommand
and Jagdkommand) and an establishment of a special counter-resistance/counter-partisan
center in close proximity to the most active centers of armed resistance.
Important function during the Nazi counterinsurgency campaign, and later for the
Czechoslovak counterinsurgency efforts, had a grouping named Werwolf. This paramilitary
unit was established in 1944, originally as a SOF unit tasked with subversive actions behind
enemy lines (like cutting off lines of communication) of the Allied militaries fighting to
liberate the Czechoslovak territory. The character of Werwolf gradually changed with the
shifting context, security environment and conditions, and in the final stages of the WWII and
shortly after, Werwolf’s tasks focus on creating anti-Bolshevik resistance (Biddiscombe 1998;
Etscheit 1990; Pešl 2005). The actual operations, activities and achievements of Werwolf
remain veiled in uncertainty and confusion. Given their clandestine character, it is usually
difficult to determine that Werwolf was, indeed, perpetrator of a studied act, especially since
the portfolio of their tasks included false flag operations.
The approach the Nazi Gestapo pursued was generally strictly the iron fist one and the
population was mostly perceived through the lenses of the collective guilt and punishment.32
One special tactic the Nazi apparatus applied frequently was the method of infiltration of the
resistance movement, and placing individuals acting as provocateurs of Russian or Ukrainian
origins, seemingly in order to provoke and discredit the partisans, labeled as “bandits” for the
purpose of their de-legitimization in the eyes of the population. This fact shows a minimal
level of consideration of the factor of popular support by the Nazi occupying forces. The
Nazis didn’t underestimate the resistance and after the failed 1944 counteroffensive, they
deployment substantial forces and capabilities to the counter-resistance/counter-partisan
campaign. Evidence, however, indicates flawed intelligence-sharing activities among the
32 Including methods of targeted killings and assassinations of leaders of the resistance, public executions,
extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances.
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individual units deployed in a dense net of local special counter-resistance police stations and
centers. Although the number of the occupational security forces deployed to the counter-
partisan campaign, their efforts didn’t limit the activities of the armed resistance, which kept
increasing with higher intensity, forcing the occupying forces to escalate the conflict,
including the use of agents-provocateurs. That led to further escalation of the activities of the
partisans, that succeeded in expanding their territorial reach significantly. With the
intensification of the partisan activity across the territory of the then-Protectorate, the
partisans managed to hold key urban centers until the arrival of the Soviet Red Army troops,
correlating with the disintegration and demoralization of the Nazi counter-partisan forces
(Černý 2006; cf. Crowhurst 2013; Blood 2006; Macek-Uhlíř 2001).
5.1.2 The Communist regime era (1948-1990)33
Another significant historical period, from the perspective of the research subject in this
thesis, is the era of the Communist regime of Czechoslovakia. Soon after the seizure of power
by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, after their victory in post-WWII elections, in
February 1948, the resistance started to form. Likely building on the experience from the
WWII era, the anti-Communist resistance had two dimensions – external one (centers in
foreign countries, where many Czech and Slovak emigrated to after the WWII) and domestic
one. Even more significant growth and intensification of the resistance can be traced after the
occupation of the Czechoslovak territory by the Soviet troops in August 1968 and in the
following era of “normalization.” There wasn’t any more systematically organized resistance
or partisan movement operating in the territory of Czechoslovakia, due to the firm grip of the
regime and occupational forces. Majority of the responsibilities for eliminating any centers of
both armed and unarmed anti-communist resistance was assigned to the domestic intelligence
agency Státní bezpečnost (State Security; StB), from 1979 Státní národní bezpečnost (State
National Security; SNB). This domestic intelligence agency designated its 10th office as the
office responsible for the fight against an “internal enemy” (titled X. správa kontrarozvědky
33 In the 1945/46-1948 period, so-called Banderovci or Ukrajinská povstalecká armáda (the Banderists -
Ukrainian Insurgent Army in translation) engaged in irregular armed activities on the Czech/Czechoslovak
territory. The Czechoslovak authorities urged local population to provide them with critically important
intelligence on movements and possible whereabouts of the Banderists. It is important to mention, that the
Banderists didn’t enjoy large popular support in Czechoslovakia, given their criminal activities and foreign
origins. For a comprehensive study on activities of the Banderists is the post-WWII Czechoslovakia, see
Zemanová 2007, available at
https://is.muni.cz/auth/th/63654/ff_m/Pronikani_banderovcu_do_Ceskoslovenska_v_letech_1945_-_1948.pdf
(retrieved on February 10, 2017).
68
pro boj proti vnitřnímu nepříteli), suggesting strongly militarized approach to any potential
resistance occurring in the Czechoslovak territory. It also implicates heavy ideological
influence over the activities and operations of this office. The category of “internal enemy”
was understood broadly and included any form of resistance and dissent, including priests, the
youth and signatories of the Charter 7734. In 1981, second office of the domestic intelligence
service StB was established, the 14th office (titled XIV. správa kontrarozvědky pro boj proti
mimořádným a zvláštním formám trestné činnosti), which was responsible for fighting
extraordinary and special forms of organized criminality. The X. správa was still active,
however, the scope of the counter-resistance/counter-partisan activities broadened, and the
language and narratives used softened. With the criminality label, the Communist regime
attempted to appeal to certain portions of the population by delegitimizing any potential
resistance (Archív bezpečnostních složek 2008-2013; cf. Mitáček-Vykoupil eds. 2008;
Macek-Uhlíř 2011). One of the most important tools of the Communist regime in their often
preemptive or preventive counterinsurgent efforts was a creation of paramilitary groupings
intended to function as an extended hand of the regime with the aim of eliminating any
pockets of potential resistance and providing valuable intelligence (cf. Mareš 2012).
American military researcher Lester W. Grau revealed to the author that as part of the
Cold War eastern communist bloc of countries, Czechoslovakia committed some armed
forces to the counterinsurgency operation after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979,
particularly in training and advising role (Grau 2015), distinguishable by heavy iron fist and
scorched earth approach. The author wasn’t. however, able to explore this area of the Czech
experience with counterinsurgency campaign more in depth, because she couldn’t find
credible sources addressing the roles, functions, tasks or accounts about the presence and
participation of the members of the Czechoslovak armed forces in the Soviet war in the
territory of Afghanistan from the period of 1979-1989. Available evidence shows that major
contribution to the counterinsurgency endeavor of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the
1980s was in the form of training and educational programs on the Czech territory,
specifically in a training facility codenamed “Přístav” (Harbour in translation) of the Ústav
zahraničních studií Vysoké školy SNB in Zastávka u Brna, established on 1st May 1982
(Foreign Studies Institute of the National Security Corps’ University in Zastávka u Brna,
34 An informal civic initiative in the Communist Czechoslovakia, established after the Communist regime signed
the 1975 Helsinki Pact on the universality of human rights. Its signatories called for the accountability of the
Communist regime and its proper compliance with the Helsinki Pact. The text of the Declaration of the Charter
77 can be accessed at https://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/archive/files/declaration-of-charter-77_4346bae392.pdf
(retrieved January 2, 2017).
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Czech Republic). This training facility run numerous training and educational programs,
focused primarily on support and logistical functions and activities, specializing in secretive
tradecraft of surveillance, training scouts, radio operators, cipher clerks, as well as guards,
commanders and planners of the members of respective national police corps with
paramilitary attributes. Such cooperation with countries like Afghanistan (more than 400
officers) and Nicaragua, but also Cambodia, Congo or Angola in training state forces facing
an insurgent or guerilla challenges in their own country was being conducted leveraging the
bilateral relations with other ideologically aligned regimes around the world on a commercial
basis. Communist Czechoslovakia also supplied numerous regimes (some of which were
engaged in counterinsurgency missions in the respective period of time) with high-quality
military material, weaponry and other equipment,35 again predominantly for commercial
purposes.
5.1.3 WWII or the Communist era legacy?
To identify the main features of the legacy of the pre-1989 historical period is difficult,
particularly because of the significant regime change and reformulation of the Czech national
interests and policies. Historically, counterinsurgency campaigns carried out on the Czech
territory is distinguishable by a vital role of paramilitary groupings, directed and supported by
the governing regimes. This feature can today be identified in the vital function of SOF in the
contemporary Czech approach to counterinsurgency. Drawing any direct links or even
correlations between the two attributes is, however, not possible, mainly because of the more
credible influence of other internal and external variables, like the general recent
developments across the NATO members’ armed forces.36 Virtually, due to the lack of any
larger or more significant direct experience on the side of the Czech political representatives
and military professionals in counterinsurgency (or similar operations), it can be assumed that
they started from a blank page with the increasing counterinsurgency efforts from the NATO
side. Tendency to avoid massive or larger use of force, largely present in the mindset of
interviewed military and civilian practitioners for the purposes of this thesis, and preference
of the political and civilian activities could potentially be the legacy features, to certain extent.
It can be, however, argued that the preference of non-military activities is more a result of the
resources the Czech Republic has at its disposal, and is willing to commit to a multinational
35 Notorious general-purpose plastic explosive Semtex or Scorpio submachine firearms. 36 Preferrence of small professional, expeditionary force.
70
counterinsurgency operation, preferably under the NATO command. The absence of a united,
common document presenting the basic principles and features of the Czech approach toward
counterinsurgency can also be explain by the historical inexperience with counterinsurgency
operations, but more by the fact, as also revealed by some of the respondents, that the
likelihood of an insurgency occurring and waged in the territory of the Czech Republic is
close to zero (see below).
The major historical legacy thus can be identified as the so-called 1968 narrative,
frequently mentioned by Afghans, when asked about their perceptions and experience with
the Czech military and civilian actors deployed to the ISAF counterinsurgency operation.
Based on the testimonies and accounts of all three Afghans as well as majority of practitioners
interviewed by the author, some of the older Afghans with some knowledge of the history
perceive the Czechs as “brothers, very similar to us, who suffered under the Soviet
occupation the same way we did”. As shown below in the text, this perception contributed to
shaping the Czech approach to counterinsurgency, because the friendlier perception enabled
or facilitated the reconstruction efforts by the Czech PRT or the ANSF training efforts by the
Czech OMLT.
Perhaps even more important us legacy is then represented by the reputation the Czech
Republic has in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, gained through
commercial trade relations with them during the Cold War. Moreover, the Czech Republic
maintains its status as a global exporter of military material, including weaponry and other
military equipment. The Czech Republic also continues to provide numerous training and
educational programs for interested militaries on its territory, a clear Cold War legacy, but
with a changed focus – the Czech Republic mostly provides training in air force capabilities,
CNBR protection, EOD functions or dog handling skills nowadays. Such training and
education activities are usually conducted on bilateral basis and allow the Czech Republic to
further promote its brand in different regions.
5.2 Czech approach toward counterinsurgency – conceptual dimension
This part of the text addresses the conceptual level of the Czech counterinsurgency approach.
The main and most relevant official documents – policies, action plans, strategic documents,
conceptual doctrines, operational level doctrines, techniques, tactics and procedures, official
reports or statements linked to or with reference to the Czech approach toward
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counterinsurgency are introduced and analyzed. This chapter not only aids the political,
strategic and conceptual framework of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency, it also
generates data and findings critical for conducting the capability-expectations gap assessment
of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency, conducted in the analytical part of this thesis.
Another important added value of this detailed inquiry of the relevant conceptual documents
is the potential to broaden and deepen the overall scope of this research by allowing for a
comparison of the “ideal character” of the Czech counterinsurgency approach with its
practical executions, explaining what the identify differences mean in the broader context of
Czech security and military policies and the role of the Czech Republic in NATO to the
future. Importantly, this chapter doesn’t work with media reports or academic works
addressing the issue of the Czech counterinsurgency activities, the Czech activities in Kosovo,
in Iraq or in Afghanistan, unless it directly refers to some relevant primary source. Only
primary sources are presented and examined in order to establish the framework of the Czech
counterinsurgency framework that would be as clear and comprehensive as possible. Relevant
media reports or analyses, news or academic publications are used and analyzed as sources of
data in the chapter addressing the practical dimension of the Czech approach to
counterinsurgency.
The data in this chapter are systematically structured in a top-down format. First, all
relevant documents of NATO (published by NATO agencies or commanders of NATO
counterinsurgency missions), its Strategic Concept and Allied Joint Publications, as well as
less official publications like letters or reports are analyzed. Second, the official documents of
the Czech government and/or its individual ministries and agencies (policies, strategies,
visions, action plans, etc.) are subjected to a thorough scrutiny. Third, relevant public
documents (strategies, action plans) of the non-government actors, like the Czech NGOs are
presented with the purpose of building as comprehensive conceptual framework of the Czech
counterinsurgency approach as possible.
The highest official strategic document of the Czech government, Bezpečnostní
strategie České republiky (Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, *2015) states that “the
basic framework of the fundamental values and laws of the development and application of
the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic is represented by the constitutional order of the
Czech Republic, particularly the Constitution of the Czech Republic, the Charter of
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, and the fundamental law no.110 (1998), on the security
of the Czech Republic, unabridged. Integral parts of the legal framework are the laws
connected to and following the constitutional order of the Czech Republic, and further allied
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and other international commitments resulting from the membership of the Czech Republic in
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the United
Nations (the UN), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).”
(Government of the Czech Republic 2015: 5; translated by IH). The official strategic and
conceptual documents of NATO are thus fundamentally important for the strategic and
conceptual framework of the Czech security policy, including its approach to
counterinsurgency.
The process of adoption and implementation of the standardized NATO doctrinal
documents (mainly Allied Joint Publications) by the Czech Ministry of Defense has certain
specifics and is directed by internal regulations of the Ministry. Until 2009, the adoption was
realized through integration of the Allied doctrines into the Czech national doctrines or into
military publications of doctrinal character, which allowed for the adoption and
implementation process to be conducted as quickly as possible (1-2 years), without long
legislative and approving procedures, in order to transfer the best practices and lessons
learned stated in NATO doctrines to the Czech armed forces units with the intention to
facilitate standardization and interoperability with other NATO partners. Nevertheless, in
2009, the Ministry of Defense issued an order no.29 (2009) aimed at modifying this adoption
and implementation process. A specific internal regulation is now required for the adoption of
NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs) on specific, individual basis. The proposed
internal regulation needs to go through specific comment procedure of several phases through
several working organs of the Ministry, before being approved for final adoption and
implementation. This modified process has, however, significantly prolonged the respective
process, and may also be one of the reasons of inadequate adoption of the Allied
counterinsurgency doctrine, for instance. Such a decision was reportedly made with the
intention of increasing the leverage of the Ministry in decision-making about any future
planning and management processes of the Czech armed forces. On the positive side though,
the new process may also provide a platform for the relevant Czech organs to incorporate
certain specifics or unique imperatives of a Czech approach towards some doctrine or
strategy, reflecting the resources and capabilities, importance, goals (limited?), strengths,
weaknesses, etc. of the Czech Republic with regards to the subject of reviewed NATO
STANAG. Significantly, the Czech Republic, as a NATO member, contributes to and is
deeply involved in the NATO Defense Planning Process as well as development of its
strategic and conceptual documents and doctrines, reflecting the internal regulations of
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decision-making in NATO, where all the member states are equal and have the veto or final
approval right at the national level.
5.2.1 Relevant NATO documents
The highest official strategic document of NATO is its Strategic Concept. The original
version of NATO Strategic Concept didn’t address the issue of counterinsurgency anymore
specifically or in detail. It wasn’t until November 2010 when the new Strategic Concept was
adopted at the NATO Lisbon summit. Only one reference to the practice of counterinsurgency
can be identified in the document. Counterinsurgency is framed as part of a broader category
of NATO non-Article 5 Crisis Management operations. The 2010 Strategic Concept
highlights the need to “further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary
operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations.”
(NATO 2010b: 21). It was until the new Strategic Concept was adopted, when the strategic,
conceptual and doctrinal basis of the NATO counterinsurgency operations started to be
developed, culminating in adoption of the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency
(AJP-3.4.4) in February 2011, which the basic guiding document for all the NATO forces
committed to NATO counterinsurgency operations. Quite interestingly, the 2010 Strategic
Concept puts counterinsurgency at the same level as stabilization and reconstruction efforts,
suggesting the tendency to NATO to underscore the higher importance of the stabilization
phases of counterinsurgency campaigns and long-term commitment to them. Other than this
reference, the document stresses the need of “a comprehensive political, civilian and military
approach for effective crisis management operations”, as the NATO operations in
Afghanistan and the Western Balkans proved (Ibid: 19).
The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine is addressed in more detail below. Other Allied
Joint Publications and other documents are important for the understanding of the NATO
counterinsurgency strategy. On the page xiii of the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine, 16
other counterinsurgency relevant documents are referred to, signaling their relevance, both
direct and indirect, to the subject of counterinsurgency. As they constitute the conceptual
basis of the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency, they are also highly relevant for the
Czech approach to counterinsurgency as such, since they played a major role in the NATO’s
counterinsurgency activities before the join counterinsurgency doctrine was adopted in
February 2011.
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The list of counterinsurgency-relevant NATO Allied Joint Publications includes:
• AAP-6 Glossary of Terms and Definitions
• AAP-15 Glossary of Abbreviations
• AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine
• AJP-2.5 Captured Persons, Materiel and Documents
• AJP-3 Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations
• AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations
• ATP-3.2.1 Allied Land Tactics
• ATP-3.2.1.1 Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks
• AJP-3.2.3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police
• AJP-3.4 Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations
• AJP-3.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations
• AJP-3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations
• AJP-3.10.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations
• AJP-3.15 Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering Improvised Explosive Device
(C-IED)
• AJP-9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)
doctrine
• C-M (2008)0029-COR1 Comprehensive Approach Action Plan (2 April 2008)
Table 13: Counterinsurgency-relevant Allied Joint Publications. Source: IH, inspired by NATO
(2011a): Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency – AJP 4.3.3, p. xiii.
The Glossary of Terms and Definitions (AAP-6) and the Glossary of Abbreviations used
in NATO Documents and Publications (AAP-15) establish the basic framework of the issue
by providing important definitions of the subject matter in order to clarify NATO’s
understanding of the concept (see above).
The Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP-01) doesn’t include any specific reference to
counterinsurgency, though its strong relevance to the topic is given by the guidelines and
principles introduced in the publication. The principal purpose of the document is to provide
Allied armed forces with a framework of guidance for the conduct of operations. It introduces
principles and guidelines on how the NATO operations should be directed, mounted,
commanded, conducted, sustained and recovered. It further underscores the importance of the
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joint doctrine, that is commonly accepted and applied by member states, by stressing its
importance for effective collation building, for enhancement of interoperability on the
intellectual and the procedural level. The intellectual interoperability is explained as that it is
“allowing commanders from different nations to have a common approach to operations”,
the procedural interoperability is explained in terms of the ability of “land forces from one
nation (to) request and direct air support from another” (NATO 2010c: 1-1).
The Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations (AJP-3.2) document provides the
doctrinal underpinning for the counterinsurgency campaign theme and its relationship to the
conduct of operations across the full range of military activities. It virtually develops the
provisions of the Allied Join Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations (AJP-3). Although
the publication makes a specific reference to the counterinsurgency campaign theme, it
doesn’t develop it further. The publication only directly refers to the Allied counterinsurgency
doctrine in a footnote to give readers an idea about what specifically NATO understands as
insurgency and counterinsurgency. Interestingly, even in this publication, insurgency is
framed in a context of wider irregular activity (NATO 2011b: 1-3 footnote 3).
The Allied Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO; AJP 3.4)
addresses all the important considerations relevant to the successful conduct of various types
of complex operations, including the specific designation of insurgency as being one of the
identified irregular threat that NATO has to counter. Counterinsurgency is also listed among
the basic forms of NATO non-article 5 crisis management operations, i.e. peace support
operations, counter irregular activities, support to civil authorities, search and rescue
operations, search and rescue mission, non-combatant evacuation, extraction, but also
sanctions and embargoes or freedom of navigation and over-flight.
Another potentially highly relevant publication may soon be added to the list of the
counterinsurgency-relevant NATO doctrines. The Allied Joint Doctrine for Military
Support to Stabilization and Reconstruction (AJP-3.4.5) have been undergoing drafting
process in the main relevant NATO agencies and departments. This publication would
complement the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine and would provide a broader framework
for the potential roles and functions of Allied armed forces deployed to a mission in support
of stabilization and reconstruction activities, slightly different from military stabilization
operations as such. Its draft version specifically refers to the counterinsurgency campaign
theme, asserting that stabilization and reconstruction activities will “overlap those activities
of other operations, such as peace support and counterinsurgency (COIN), especially when
they take place within a fragile environment.” (NATO STUDY DRAFT 4: 1-2), suggesting
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that NATO’s understanding of counterinsurgency (contrary to other forms of operations)
depends on the variable of fragility of a state. It follows with stating that “both include
strengthening the ability of the HN to provide the elements of a stable state while fostering
legitimacy.” (Ibid).
Importantly, Comprehensive Approach Action Plan (C-M (2008)0029-COR1) is
also listed one of the relevant referential sources of the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine.
The publication refers to its 2008 version, which was further updated in March 2011. What
the Action Plan stresses is the fact that different actors contribute to a comprehensive
approach, combining political, civilian and military instruments, based on a shared sense of
responsibility, openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths,
mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy (cf. NATO 2011c). In
practical terms, however, the implementation of the comprehensive approach as established in
the Action Plan was sometimes hindered by the lack of determination the same way by all of
the relevant actors, as well as flawed sense of responsibility. Not all of the relevant
stakeholders viewed the NATO counterinsurgency missions, especially ISAF, from the same
perspective as potentially important for pursing their national interests and the factors of their
sense of shared responsibility and determination were weakened. The factor of openness, too,
proved difficult to meet fully in practice, as demonstrating by the number of national caveats
imposed on deployed forces, and the character of those caveats. It further explicitly states that
the implementation of the comprehensive approach is “a permanent mindset of the Alliance’s
internal and external strands of work” (Ibid). The Alliance has increasingly adopted the
understanding of the importance of comprehensive approach, as the military means, although
essential, are not enough on their own to meet many complex challenges arising from the
contemporary security environment, as NATO acknowledges in the Action Plan. It
underscores the essential basis of any potential successful operations, stating that nation states
are required to contribute in a concerted effort and coordinate with international organizations
and non-governmental organizations, when responding to a crisis situation (Ibid).
Significantly, what all the efforts to update counterinsurgency-relevant doctrines or
create entirely new ones reflect is the Political Guidance on Ways to Improve NATO’s
Involvement in Stabilization and Reconstruction (2011). The essentiality of having such a
document available at the political level, potentially guiding other efforts, was stressed at the
NATO summit in Lisbon in 2010 (which all the updates or new NATO publications with the
high non-article 5 crisis management operations response to) and further at 2010 meetings of
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Defense Ministers of the NATO countries. This political guidance helps to clarify and explain
NATO’s role and ambitions in stabilization and reconstruction efforts. General principles of
this guidance are introduced in the document as following, divided accordingly to a cycle of
operation’s phases:
1. preparation for operation involving stabilization and reconstruction: (a) early
analysis and assessment of the situation in the conflict area, combining both
civilian and military expertise to account for all contributing factors and
implications of the conflict, and taking into account local political, social and
economic circumstances and sensitivities, incl. assessing the impact of military
operations; (b) early consultations with other international actors present, or who
may be present, in theater as well as if possible with relevant national authorities,
in accordance with the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan; (c) benchmarks
developed in close coordination with others involved; (d) facilitate pre-deployment
training for Allied and non-NATO contributors’ personnel in terms of responding
to stabilization and reconstruction requirements in line with established NATO
standards and provide assistance when appropriate and within available resources;
(e) development of appropriate standards and methodologies for providing
training and advice to indigenous security forces; and (f) coordination of strategic
communication on NATO’s role and activities (NATO 2011d: 6).
2. Execution of an operation involving stabilization and reconstruction: (a)
establishing secure and stable environment and freedom of movement; (b)
restoring public security (incl. law and order, the rule of law, the basic legal
infrastructure, like an elementary justice system); (c) help restore basic services,
ensure their provision by the local government, and restore basic infrastructure; (d)
facilitate support to humanitarian aid; (e) help lay down the ground for meeting
longer term governance and development needs; (f) support political institutions
and civil and economic infrastructure (incl. assistance with the elections); and (g)
establishment of coordination arrangements involving relevant actors in the field
(Ibid: 7).
3. Transition of stabilization and reconstruction activities: (a) close cooperation
with other actors; (b) progressively draw down capabilities, as appropriate to the
situation; and (d) continue to participate in coordination arrangements at
headquarters and field level units the exit (Ibid: 7-8).
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As it is obvious from the general principles listen in the political guidance to activities,
stabilization and reconstruction efforts in NATO’s understanding very closely resemble its
understanding of counterinsurgency, including its individual phases and most important
courses of action. Confusion may thus arise over the mandate of a mission. Generally
speaking, any application of the NATO counterinsurgency strategy is generally assumed in a
fragile or failed state environment, whereas no explicit mention about the character of the
environment can be identified with regards to the stabilization and reconstruction-relevant
publications in general.
On the operational level, one specific document, outlining or addressing the
comprehension of counterinsurgency by NATO in practice, stands out, i.e. the ISAF
Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance. There were two forms, issued by the then-
ISAF Commanders, one by Gen. Stanley McChrystal in August 2009, and the other one was a
letter issued by Gen. David Petraeus a year later, in August 2010, after Petraeus replaced
McChrystal. The installation of Gen. Petraeus was made in the high hopes of replication of
what was widely considered a counterinsurgency success under Gen. Petraeus from Iraq to the
situation in Afghanistan.
Gen. McChrystal’s guidance, titled “ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency
Guidance: Protecting the People is the Mission” (2009) is more of an introductory direction
to ISAF conducting counterinsurgency and stability operations in Afghanistan,37 building up
on the U.S Army/Marine Corps FM 3-24 in conjunction with the specifics of the situation in
Afghanistan. The guidance starts with a comprehensive and concise explanation of why
counterinsurgency practice is important, focusing on the factor of popular support. First, it
explains how insurgents operate and what is their center of gravity (i.e. the population) and
why, and follows with a depiction of a counterinsurgent behavior that plays “into their
hands”. Then, McChrystal stresses the critical importance of “changing our mindset” that
functions on the presumption that “the will of the people is the Objective”, explaining the
importance of such a mindset from the perspective of how it works with regards to the efforts
of defeating and/or ultimately eliminating an insurgency. A list of the key principles and their
concise explanations of the preferred courses of actions in compliance with the changed
mindset is then presented, and include:
37 This is an important and very interesting distinction, indicating the mood and discourse in the period of the
issuance of the McChrystal’s guidance. Counterinsurgency just started to be adopted as the appropriate label for
the ISAF mission, before that considered a stabilization mission. No clear distinction between what constitutes a
stabilization mission in NATO’s view, and how it differs from a counterinsurgency mission is explicitly
mentioned in any official NATO document. However, the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine defines and frames
stabilization efforts as one part (final phase) of counterinsurgency efforts.
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1. Embrace the people – think before you act. Understand the consequences of your
actions through the eyes of the Afghans; be an expert on the local situation, build
connections and hold routine meetings with tribal elders (jirgas); listen to the
population and adjust accordingly; earn their trust; develop their ownership; be a
positive force in the community, shield the people from harm and foster stability;
use local economic initiatives to increase employment (McChrystal 2009: 5);
2. Partner with ANSF38 - live, eat, and train together, plan and operate together,
depend on one another, and hold each other accountable; their success is our goal;
you are equal partners, respect them and coach them (Ibid);
3. Build governance capacity and accountability – facilitate and enable transparent
and accountable governance from national to community level; confront corrupt
officials and demand the Afghan higher leadership take appropriate action (Ibid:6);
and
4. Get better every day – learn and adapt (more quickly than the insurgents); improve
daily; learn how to shape the environment, and how to achieve greater effects;
listen to and learn from the Afghans; communicate and share ideas; this is a battle
of wills (Ibid).
After Gen. McChrystal’s replacement on the position of the commander of ISAF by Gen.
Petraeus, a letter signed by the ISAF Commander himself was sent out to the ISAF troops, the
COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance (2010), inspired by a Counterinsurgency Guide
he published while serving as the commander of the coalition forces in Iraq. Gen. Petraeus,
considered to be one of the biggest counterinsurgency experts, elaborates on the key
imperatives stated in the McChrystal’s guidance, in more detail and, as he acknowledges, with
the feedback from the Afghan partners, special forces and some local elders, as following:
1. Secure and serve the population;
2. Live among the people;
3. Help confront the culture of impunity (insurgency as well as inadequate governance,
corruption, and abuse of power);
38 Afghan National and Security Forces. Increasingly, a Pashto phrase “shona ba shona” (shoulder by shoulder)
became integrated as referring to one of the perceived fundamental imperatives of the NATO’s training and
advising actions in Afghanistan. Notably, this aspect of counterinsurgency is not elaborated on in more details
yet in the document.
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4. Help Afghans build accountable governance (help them develop checks and balances
to prevent abuses);
5. Pursue the enemy relentlessly (special focus put on the efforts to seek out and
eliminate those who threaten the population, and to target the whole network, not just
individuals);
6. Fight hard and fight with the discipline (aim to reduce civilian casualties to an
absolute minimum);
7. Identify corrupt officials;
8. Hold what we secure (incl. the prioritization of population security over short-
duration disruption operations and the beginning of transition to Afghan lead);
9. Foster lasting solutions (create good governance and enduring security, meet the
needs of locals, incl. small projects are often beautiful);
10. Money is ammunition; don’t put it in the wrong hands (institute “COIN
contracting”, how we spend is often more important than how much we spend);
11. Be a good guest (treat Afghans and their property with respect);
12. Consult and build relationships, but not just with those who seek us out (spend time,
listen and consult);
13. Walk (gain situational awareness through face-to-face interactions);
14. Act as one team (unity of effort and cooperation with the international and Afghan
partners);
15. Partner with the ANSF (be a good role model);
16. Promote local reintegration (help to address the grievances);
17. Be first with the truth (avoid spinning, acknowledge setbacks and failure, get accurate
information to the press);
18. Fight the information war aggressively (challenge disinformation);
19. Manage expectations (strive to under-promise and over-deliver, not the other way
around);
20. Live our value;
21. Maintain continuity through the transitions (maintain operational tempo and local
relationships throughout transitions);
22. Empower subordinates (flatten reporting chains; enable decentralized action);
23. Win the battle of wills (learn and adapt more quickly than the enemy; outsmart the
insurgents); and
24. Exercise initiative (Petraeus 2010).
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Both documents in their capacity of the ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency guidance also
were binding for the Czech military forces and civilian actor deployed in ISAF, assigned
various tasks. Moreover, majority of the Czech respondents, especially the military
professionals, interviewed for the purposes of this thesis, stated that it was the exactly these
two documents, and more the Gen. Petraeus’ letter what introduced them to the concept of
counterinsurgency, which was gradually being applied to the ISAF mission and which they
didn’t have any close prior experience with. Therefore, both represent important primary
sources of data in this research, functioning as helping shape the practical even more than
conceptual dimension of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency, due to their semi-official
character and specific focus.
5.2.2.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (AJP-3.4.4)
In February 2011, the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency was officially adopted. It
came in 8 years after NATO officially assumed the leadership and command of the most
notorious counterinsurgency campaign in the post-Cold War era – the ISAF mission in
Afghanistan. The Alliance itself, not just most of its members, had lacked any direct and/or
extensive experience in counterinsurgency efforts before the gradual transformation of the
ISAF mission (see below). The joint counterinsurgency strategy doctrine at the NATO level
represents an attempt by the Alliance to unite efforts of its members in counterinsurgency
campaigns led under the NATO command. Importantly, the Allied Joint Doctrine for
Counterinsurgency was drawn from the Afghan experience in particular, combined with
principles of the 2006 US counterinsurgency doctrine, long employed on the ground in
Afghanistan before that as the main guiding counterinsurgency framework for the NATO
ISAF mission, and the best practices of other member states, like the Great Britain. The long-
time gap that existed between the inception of the NATO’s takeover of the ISAF
responsibilities in 2003 and the final approval of the united NATO counterinsurgency
doctrine in 2011 mirrored the evolution of the Afghan insurgency as well as growing criticism
over the lack of clear counterinsurgency guiding framework at the NATO level with the
increasing involvement of the coalition forces, along with the increasing number of resources
deployed to the ISAF mission. In 2009, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, then Commander of the
ISAF mission in Afghanistan issues the ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance
intended as a predecessor to the then planned and being decided upon Allied Joint Doctrine
for Counterinsurgency. Considering the institutional structure of NATO and its planning and
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decision-making procedures, the idea of adopting a united document on the NATO level
serving as a join doctrine for counterinsurgency efforts of the Allies had been approved as
soon as the unsustainability of the ISAF mission efforts had been revealed on the ground,
after a thorough process of observing and identifying possible lessons from the progress, or
lack of it, in the mission. Possible existence of any classified comprehensive NATO draft
document, or at least a sufficient level of agreement among relevant parties, on
counterinsurgency efforts of all the coalition forces, used solely for the purposes of the ISAF
mission on the ground, before adoption of AJP-3.4.4 cannot be excluded, especially since
highly over a dozen of non-NATO partner countries contributed to the ISAF mission in
various, direct and indirect ways (see below).
By its character, as a unifying allied doctrine, the individual NATO member states
allowed for reservations being raised and recorded in the document itself (NATO 2011a: ix,
xi). In the end, the United Kingdom and the United States were the only NATO member state
openly expressing their reservations that mostly concern conceptual framing of the contents in
the document. The author of this thesis assumes that the reasons behind the reservations
expressed by the two countries could have been driven by the vast past experience these two
NATO members had had with counterinsurgency and to a certain extent differing approaches
of the two respective countries toward the art of counterinsurgency efforts in general, even
though the United States explains their rationale behind their reservations as generally not
being consistent with binding terminology documents and glossaries of NATO (Ibid: xi).
The Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency provides a comprehensive
framework of NATO counterinsurgency missions. Nevertheless, in order to gain, ensure and
maintain agreement among all of the NATO countries, the Allied Joint Doctrine for
Counterinsurgency seems to be more general the counterinsurgency doctrines of individual
states, like the United Kingdom, the United States or France. Moreover, originally intended
not only as a guiding doctrine for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, but potentially for any
future NATO counterinsurgency endeavors as well, this joint doctrine is still too
“Afghanistan-heavy” or “Afghanistan-centric”. The author of this thesis acknowledges the
critical importance of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan for both the NATO Alliance,
including in the sphere of identifying the lessons and best practices, adopting them and
learning them. However, the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency provides room for
adaptability only in certain passages and aspects, whereas in others, the complex Afghan
context clearly determines the wording of the principles presented in the joint doctrine. To
give NATO strategy planners and developers some credit though, the self-evident focus on
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Afghanistan could be a result of NATO’s considerations about its possible future involvement
in Afghanistan (like the current Operation Resolute Support and beyond), and is also
understandable when put into a broader perspective of the vast amounts of high quality
resources and capabilities of NATO member states and their partner countries, hence
considering the utmost importance the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan had for the
Alliance. What is also noteworthy is the lack of conceptualization of counter-narcotics
operations or the measures aimed at countering organized crime activities which often make
up for a generous source of revenue of the insurgents.
The Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency AJP – 3.4.4 also represents the
highest strategic guidance for any Czech counterinsurgency efforts. The NATO document
also serves as the fundamental cornerstone of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency, as the
broader and more general character of the Allied doctrine creates room for modifications and
adjustments according to the country’s specifics. Furthermore, most of the NATO member
states don’t have sufficient level and scope of resources and capabilities, as required for a
complex execution of the principles stated in the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine, available.
This significant fact further underlines the reasons behind the more generic than detailed
character of the counterinsurgency principles introduced in the respective Allied doctrine.
Importantly, each NATO member state had equal opportunities to express their reservations
or opinions on the wording, structure or overall text of the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine
both during the process of the document development as well as in the final approval stage, as
complying with the regular NATO practice of strategy development and adoption. The Allied
doctrine itself doesn’t, however, specify if a consent of a presumed host nation is required
prior the operation, or any specific essential legal provisions underpinning the legal
framework of a NATO counterinsurgency operation at the stage of its launch, apart from
general statements like any such operation “will be launched and executed in accordance with
the relevant provisions of international law and will abide by the relevant international law.”
(Ibid: 1-1).
As specified in the preface of the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN),
the document “provides a common NATO doctrine to guide commanders and staffs of
operational formations and units engaged in the conduct of COIN. The publication also
informs a wide range of civil actors and organizations, involved in security and stabilization
of the full range of capabilities that the military may contribute to a joint, interagency and
multinational response to the resolution of complex challenges, such as caused by
insurgency.” (Ibid: xiii) The publication of the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency
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also provided researchers interested in the topic of planning and execution NATO
counterinsurgency efforts, approaches or perspectives with a great tool for analysis and more
thorough understanding of the Allied counterinsurgency missions, both prior to February
2011 and after the doctrine’s release date. Even though the document itself has been
developed primarily for use at the operational and tactical levels, it gives the so far most
comprehensive insight into the NATO’s counterinsurgency strategy. Interestingly, NATO
agencies and representatives specifically refrain from labeling the document as strategy.
Indeed, certain differences exist between strategy and doctrine. NATO, reflective of its
nature, defines what a military strategy is in its Glossary of Terms, i.e. “that component of
national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be
developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations.” (NATO
2013: 2-M-6). The same document then differentiates doctrine as being “fundamental
principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is
authoritative but requires judgement in application.” (Ibid: 2-D-9).
The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine describes counterinsurgency as one of the main
campaign themes. As such, the description of counterinsurgency as a separate campaign
theme has been evolving since its recognition as a separate campaign theme in connection
with the operation in Iraq around the years 2005 and 2006 from the US side, and, for the
NATO part, with the evolution of the security situation and dynamics in the security
environment in Afghanistan around 2008/2009. NATO also considers counterinsurgency as
probably the most demanding variant of the several possible types of countering irregular-
activity campaigns (Ibid), which leads to the argument about the forms of potential
relationship and interactions between the concepts of (counter) insurgency and (counter)
irregular warfare in practical terms. The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine provides a
description of the complex operational environment with its key elements, trends and
characteristics, its actors and all important influencing factors, serving as potential
independent variables for the purposes of this research (cf. Ibid). The document also
characterizes insurgency as “the most dangerous and challenging irregular activity that can
occur in a failed or fragile state” (Ibid). Even though the document describes the major
characteristics of an insurgency, its motivations, objectives, preferred courses of action,
resources and other factors potentially functioning as influencers, like key conditions,
vulnerabilities or overall dynamics of an insurgency, the conditioning of the failed or fragile
nature of a state is not accurate and can be potentially misleading, since the document doesn’t
define any indicators or attributes of such failed or fragile state, except for a brief notion that
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“a characteristic of fragile states is the inability of their governments to discharge their
responsibilities effectively.” (Ibid: 1-1). This definition is, however, too narrow and general.39
Even though a more complex conceptualization of the fragile/failed state concept is
introduced in the second chapter of the document, where operational environment of potential
NATO counterinsurgency campaigns is described in general terms, elements of a stable state
are addressed and the downward spiral of state instability is charted, the state fragility (or
failure) is still viewed to narrowly as regarding the government dysfunction, loss of its
legitimacy and loss of its monopole over legitimate use of force (Ibid: 2-3). Basically, state
fragility is presented as regime fragility and as a separate factor complementing other aspects,
like societal disintegration, national fragmentation and economic collapse. Such a
comprehension of state fragility may, hypothetically speaking, derail an analysis by
potentially misidentifying causes and consequences, their mutual relationship and patterns of
interdependencies existing in the respective operational environment. Nevertheless,
importantly, the documents states that the sense of collective will of the insurgents is usually
relatively much greater than the governments of fragile states have (Ibid: 3-3).
Description of the insurgency phenomenon then establishes a solid framework for
(what itself calls as) “a comprehensive description of the attributes of counterinsurgency, the
planning and the military contribution” (Ibid), and highlights the areas and what can be
understood as a minimal level of potential of involvement of non-military/civilian actors and
coordination and cooperation with them. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents “employ
varied tactics and methods. These include political, military, economic, social, information
and infrastructure activities (ways), in an attempt to reach a favorable outcome (ends) and
within the resources available, including time (means).” (Ibid: 1-3). This assertion is clearly
formulated on basis of the perceived advantages of the Lykke’s theoretical model of strategy
and its general applicability, thereby providing another layer of justification for its use in this
thesis, in terms of both critical examination of the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine and
descriptive analysis of the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency.
Since insurgency is generally understood to represent politically motivated violence,
its political dimension is far more important and potent than any military considerations, as
the main struggle is for the population, its support and consent. Any measures designed and
intended to counter such a phenomenon effectively have to reflect this critical aspect of any
39 For more information on the concept of failed/fragile states, see, for example, publication When States Fail:
Causes and Consequences written by Robert I. Rotberg in 2010 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), or the well-known Failed (now Fragile) State Index published annually by the Fund for Peace, available at
http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/ (retrieved on February 9, 2017).
86
insurgent struggle. Hence any counterinsurgency measures should not only “support a
political resolution to the problem” (Ibid), but also recognize the supreme importance of
political activities. This fundamental principle is significant when considering those
“organisations that contribute to humanitarian assistance and economic development efforts,
some of whom operate in an impartial and neutral manner” (Ibid).
From the insurgents’ perspective, such organizations cannot be perceived as neutral,
but rather as promoting the legitimacy of the government they seek to overthrow. This issue
was particularly acute and relevant during operations executed by civilian parts of PRTs in
Afghanistan. Association with a coalition military force in the eyes of both the population and
the insurgents stripped them of their intended status of neutrality and effectively made them a
legitimate target of the insurgent activity. Perceptions of civilian elements of PRTs by the
local Afghan population were more complex and had several dimensions. Not only the locals
associated them with the foreign/occupying military force, traditions and customs played a
significant role as well (the best example of related friction was frequent reluctance of the
decision-making authorities on the local level, the elderly jirgas, to negotiate with young
civilian experts, even more so in situations where the respective civilian expert was a woman,
with its potentially far-reaching consequences for coalition counterinsurgency efforts;
rotations of civilian expert teams and contingents of PRTs complicated the efforts further; see
below). This fact represents one of the most complex issues and dilemmas of NATO
counterinsurgency campaigns, as it affects overall effectiveness and efficiency of the entire
mission, because it gives the insurgents vulnerabilities to exploit (and NATO is well aware of
this problem; Ibid).
Moreover, the doctrine states that “civil authorities should normally have the lead for
delivering internal security and stabilisation. However, the lack of a permissive environment
may require military forces to contribute more widely to security and capacity-building tasks.
As a result the military contribution may dominate the early phases of a campaign during the
contest to deliver a favourable security environment that protects the population.” (Ibid).
Military element of a counterinsurgent force thus can act as the entity critical for laying the
foundation of the legitimacy and capacity of the government, providing state security and
building human security and stimulating economic activity and growth, as it not only executes
the task of providing security to the local population and ensuring stability of the security
environment for further actions, like humanitarian or development efforts, but may perform a
plethora of other, essentially non-military tasks, like “restoration of essential services,
support to economic and infrastructure development, establishment of interim governance
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and security of communication” (Ibid). The doctrine also advocates the fundamental need of
providing “the military contribution within a unified and comprehensive approach (…).
Civilian and military actors must work together in a coordinated and integrated manner.”
(Ibid). This ideal case scenario suffers from several fault lines, stemming from different
mentalities of the military vs. non-military actors, differing jargon used, personal sympathies
and relationships, differing priorities, competition and rivalry over the leading position,
different understanding of the mission and assigned tasks, differing opinions over
prioritization and preferences on activities and partners, autonomous planning, problematic
information sharing, differing impacts of political decisions, or differing patterns of
obedience, transparency and accountability.
The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine stresses the essential importance of the
existence of unity of purpose and unity of effort (cf. Ibid). That being said, maximum level of
cooperation and coordination of not only activities, but also consistent public pronouncements
and coherent behavior when dealing with partners or adversaries is required40 in multinational
counterinsurgency operations. As discussed more in detail below in the text, overall, the ISAF
mission suffered from critical flaws in unity, be it unity of purpose, unity of effort or unity of
command, affecting the progress and potential ultimate success of the mission as well as
performance of its individual TCNs, like the Czech Republic. Lack of unity also contributes
to the factors shaping the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency overtime.
The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine also devotes significant space for the
discussion over the fundamental principle of any counterinsurgency operation, i.e. the factor
of popular support. It states that “the support of the population must therefore be a key factor
throughout the planning and execution of COIN campaigns. (…) it is essential that both the
political and military apparatus address the strategic context of the operational environment
to ensure that any political settlement is both enduring and self-sustaining.” (Ibid: 1-4). In the
other words, addressing root causes of insurgency should be the primary focus of both
military and civilian actors deployed in a counterinsurgency operation, as it helps win the
popular support more significantly than a pure military defeat. Knowing what to focus on and
where the root causes are is vital for any efforts to bring an end to the insurgency. This
assertion is also phrased based on an assumption of political reform(s) as a way leading to
solving the root causes.
40 “The synchronization and coordination of information activities and public diplomacy are critical to the
success of a COIN campaign.” (NATO 2011a: 1-4).
88
One of the significant advantages of the 2011 Allied counterinsurgency doctrine, in
both practical and comparative terms, is the inclusion of private security companies and their
contact points and contact mechanisms in terms of interaction in the NATO
counterinsurgency campaign framework (see Ibid: 2-15).41 More clarity and a comprehensive
analysis of what potential private military and security companies have in NATO
counterinsurgency operations.42 This thesis aims to partially fill this gap by drafting a SWOT
analysis matrix in its concluding chapter as part of recommendations to the Czech
counterinsurgency approach, generated from the findings described and analyzed in the main
body of the text.
What the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine doesn’t address though is the issue of
radicalization and potential counter-radicalization measures executed as part of
counterinsurgency activities, possibly because such actions are generally carried out by
civilian actors. In the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) settings, however, counter-
radicalization/counter-messaging measures were executed by the Czech civilians in close
coordination with CIMIC/military information and psychological operations. Hence, certain
reference to counter-radicalization efforts as part of a broader counterinsurgency campaign
could increase the inclusiveness of the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine, which address only
the issue of the use of information (in conjunction with legitimate use of force) to defeat
insurgents’ ideology (Ibid: 5-5; see below), and touches upon the counter-messaging issue just
very briefly (Ibid: 3-21; see below) Nevertheless, as the any effective counterinsurgency
efforts require use of a whole-of-society approach in the affected country, any counter-
radicalization efforts must go beyond the limited scope introduced in the Allied
counterinsurgency doctrine.
The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine also introduces the concept of PRTs. As a tool,
PRTs are decreed as an innovative instrument of reconstruction and development efforts as
part of broader category of stabilization activities tasked with provision of support in initial
phases of restoration of governance and services to population in the doctrine. PRTs are
defined as “small units that are responsible for coordinating, and in some cases, enabling, a
plethora of reconstruction tasks. Each of these is dependent on context but may include such
41 Contrary to, for instance, the U.S. equivalent doctrine FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Counter Insurgencies, which
includes just one single reference to “private security agents” in a context of different types of informal grouping
of military power and paramilitary character (U.S. Department of the Army 2014: 2-6). 42 Several academic studies have been published, focusing more on the challenges and negative impacts the use
of private security companies had in Iraq and Afghanistan, like Peter W. Singer’s study Can’t Win With ‘Em,
Can’t Go to War Without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency, available at
http://iraqslogger.powweb.com/downloads/singer200709.pdf (retrieved on February 9, 2017).
89
activities as building schools, well construction, or providing veterinary advice and support
for local farmers. The name may change in other theatres of operation.” (Ibid: 5-26 footnote
30). At the same place, the publication claims that PRTs were first used in Afghanistan (Ibid),
which is only partially true, even from the NATO perspective. First PRTs were established as
part of the coalition counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq.
The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine is based on an underlying assumption that any
NATO or NATO-led operations involving counterinsurgency will be launched and executed
in accordance with the relevant provisions of international law and will abide by the relevant
international law. The doctrine explicitly states that “any provisions, definitions or obligations
in this AJP may not be interpreted or construed as state practice or a change in effective
agreement of the law of armed conflict (LOAC).” (Ibid: 1-1). In the other words, none of the
provisions or obligations stated in this doctrine has the power of law (i.e. is not legally
binding) nor it replaces, substitutes or supplements any provisions or obligations of neither
the law of armed conflict (the Geneva Conventions), nor the international humanitarian law
(the Hague Convention). Other critical legal aspect is addressed in the doctrine. The legal
principle of state sovereignty, which is addressed from 2 perspectives in the doctrine; (1) this
doctrine doesn’t apply in situations of an insurgency occurring in the sovereign territory of
any NATO member state, as such situations shall be governed and managed within the
framework of domestic law of the affected country; and (2) as this doctrine understands an
insurgency as an irregular activity occurring in the conditions of a fragile/failed state, whose
sovereignty effectively eroded by transnational/cross-border influences (both internal and
external actors), the international norm of sovereignty doesn’t apply anymore, further
supported by the legal requirement of the approval and mandate by a UN Security Council
resolution. Restoration of a state’s sovereignty by strengthening legitimacy, credibility,
performance and institutions of a host nation government (in terms of restoration of the
government’s over the whole territory of a state) is also one of the fundamental objectives of
counterinsurgency operations (cf. Ibid).
The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine describes an insurgency, its key conditions, key
dynamics and its significant vulnerabilities. In order to develop an effective counter-strategy,
both the operational environment and the insurgency phenomenon, which create the broader
context for counterinsurgency have to be thoroughly understood. The definition of insurgency
presented in the doctrine is introduced above (on the page 61). The doctrine states that
insurgency and counterinsurgency cannot be viewed in isolation, even though they represent
distinctly different activities. The two phenomena interact with each other, influence each
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other, react (or should react) to each other’s dynamics, and significant mutual
interdependency dynamics occur and work between the two. A comprehensive approach
emerges as potentially the most effective way of dealing with an insurgency. What the Allied
counterinsurgency doctrine is encouraging and demand is “a broader cooperation and
planning in accordance with the principles and decisions of relevant senior NATO bodies.”
(Ibid: 1-4). “(C)oordinated action from an appropriate range of civil and military actors,
enabled by the orchestration, coordination and de-conflicting of NATO’s political and
military instruments with the other instruments of power” (Ibid) is presented as the bottom
line for achieving any potentially effective comprehensive approach at the NATO level. The
Allied counterinsurgency doctrine further stresses that NATO’s engagement in a
comprehensive approach to crisis management should include 3 levels, all of which “must
function in a complementary manner to achieve success” (Ibid).
Three level What should NATO focus on
Political and strategic • building confidence and mutual understanding
between international actors
Theater • empowered to conduct effective cooperation and
coordination with indigenous local authorities and
other international actors in the execution of
operations
Operational • cooperate with other international actors in the
overall planning for complex operations in which a
large degree of civil-military relations will be
required
Table 14: Levels of NATO’s comprehensive approach. Source: IH; inspired by NATO (2011a): Allied
Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency, p. 1-4.
Importantly, in theory, every attempt to achieve a maximum level of comprehensiveness in
approaches of various state as well as non-state actors has to reflect three essential dimensions
of what the term “comprehensive approach” actually means. First, the fundamental element of
a comprehensive approach theory should be local ownership. Second, any efforts in terms of
development of a comprehensive approach have to reflect its inherent core objectives –
effectiveness and accountability of all stakeholders involved. Third, for any comprehensive
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approach to be successful and/or effective, it needs to be strongly political in its nature, it has
to be holistic and it also has to be technical (Roloff 2016). The principles of a NATO
comprehensive approach introduced in the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine don’t necessary
meet all three dimensions.
The sketched NATO comprehensive approach in counterinsurgency campaign is very
general, but a certain sense of political as well as holistic nature can be identified. It is
obvious though, that the NATO planners and strategy and doctrine developers didn’t adjust
the common comprehensive approach to NATO actions to the unique characteristics and
dynamics of counterinsurgency efforts. One of the reasons here could be the inclusion of
counterinsurgency campaigns into a broader category of non-article 5 and crisis management
operations by the relevant NATO bodies. This inclusion is logical, given the character and the
guiding principles of counterinsurgency, and the significance any stabilization activities have
in any crisis management operation (indeed, depending on the type of a crisis that is supposed
to be managed, here insurgency).
The doctrine, however, highlights the “need to proactively coordinate the activities of
wide range of actors.” (Ibid). It is also based on the assumption that a comprehensive action
seeks to “stimulate a cooperative culture within a collaborative environment, while
facilitating a shared understanding of the situation. It should invigorate existing processes
and strengthen relationships at the joint, inter-agency and multinational levels.” (Ibid), an
underlying principal that turned out to be quite problematic to fulfill in practice. Significantly,
the document further states that as operating alongside not only government actors, but also
NGOs or international organizations and other non-state actors, the military element of
counterinsurgency force “do not own, nor should they expect to lead, this comprehensive
approach, but they should aim to foster and create those conditions where cooperation and
collaboration support the campaign.” This important statement can be perceived as a partial
disclaimer, but it still is a very significant contribution to the efforts of gaining deeper
understanding of counterinsurgency in theory and practice. NATO thus explicitly declares
military subordination to civilian elements of counterinsurgency force (and the primary
function of political and other civilian activities during a course of counterinsurgency
campaigns). Indeed, as many theorists of counterinsurgency stressed, military force in any
counterinsurgency campaign should have a supportive role to more important political efforts
(see above), and so does the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine, as it states “Priority should be
given to addressing the political dimension of insurgency in which he military force of the
counterinsurgent plays a vital but essential supporting role.” (Ibid: 3-18).
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The key principles (called “attributes” in the document) of the NATO
counterinsurgency doctrine include (with their core lines of effort, as specifically listed in the
doctrine):
• Political primacy (and a clearly defined political objective) – the primacy of
the political dimension will have an impact on all campaign aspects, and
military campaign design must reflect and be in accordance with clearly stated
and achievable political goals; the requirement for political will to underpin
military effort and its sustainability (Ibid: 3-20);43
• It is a struggle for the populations, not against the population – population
as the center of gravity (COG); the perceptions of the population are critical;
counter-messaging efforts with the counter-narrative that is timely, transparent,
open, honest, verifiable and accessible, and clearly articulates the goals and
purposes of the legitimate political authorities, highlights military and political
achievements and successes, and manages public expectations44; engagement
with local authorities; smaller self-contained and agile units enabling deeper
integration of the military forces into the population (deployment of
detachments throughout the population, unit dispersion, dismounted patrols,
etc., leading up to potential greater risks for the counterinsurgent force);
planning and execution of operations measured against their potential effect on
the population, not just the insurgents (Ibid: 3-2);
• The relevance of the legitimacy factor – 2 basic levels: (1) the population’s
perception of the legitimacy of the HN government and their security forces,
and (2) the perception of the legitimacy of the Allied security forces by
international authorities, the HN and the TCNs; the insurgents will try to
undermine the legitimacy of the coalition forces and the government by
various means and simultaneously will seek to increase their legitimacy in the
eyes of both the population and the international community (Ibid). Here, the
Allied counterinsurgency doctrine doesn’t address the factor of the factor
legitimacy perceived by the domestic populations of the TCNs to its fullest
43 “persistent contest of political wills” both at home and in the theater of operations (NATO 2011a: 3-20) 44 As empirical evidence and testimonies of the Afghan respondents of this research show though, it is the factor
of public expectations what plays the crucial role and what has the critical impact on variations of the popular
support. For instance, during the course of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, public expectations were not, for
various reasons, managed properly, which then contributing to decreasing levels of popular support to the
coalition forces and the Afghan government, fluctuating over time, and a certain sense of disillusionment among
the population.
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potential. It does note the critical need to consider the public opinions and the
public support at the domestic stage in the TCNs, as it has the potential to force
withdrawal of the troops, (which further can damage alliance cohesion, be
claimed as a success by the insurgency, and undermine capabilities committed
to the campaign), the publication, however, fails to discuss the potential of
public support as related to possible political hijacking of the mission (as it
happened in the case of the Czech Republic; see below), and to possible lack of
unity of purpose and effort in more detailed terms;
• Intelligence-driven operations – requires close engagement with, and
understanding of, the target population, including its political, social and
cultural organization; utilization of all sources of intelligence with a special
emphasis om human intelligence (HUMINT); accurate and actionable
intelligence is key to defeating an insurgency; an efficient HN intelligence
architecture must be developed and accessible; strong preference for unified,
integrated and centralized information management, and decentralized for
information gathering; analysis of intelligence information at the lowest
possible level allowing for an effective tactical action; intelligence gathering
should be continuous and focused and should prioritize collection assets in
direct contact with the local population; skills of linguistic ability and deep
cultural understanding and local knowledge (Ibid: 3-22 – 3-23);
• Unity of effort (prerequisited by a coordinated government structure) – at all
levels to avoid “organization friction” inherent among all various stakeholders;
shared understanding of the problem; comprehensive and fully coordinated,
multifaceted approach combining political, economic and security solutions;
liaison elements among the various structures and elements (Ibid);
• Neutralize the insurgents – physical, economic and psychological isolation of
the insurgents from the population; insurgent communication disruption;
addressing the core grievances of the insurgency; application of appropriate
force to detect, capture or combat insurgents and the imposition of population
control measures; factor of counterproductive impact on both the population
(too restrictive control measures) and the insurgents (martyrs, recruitment;
collateral damage and resentment); amnesty, reintegration and rehabilitation;
efforts to discredit and demoralized the insurgents (Ibid: 3-24);
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• Prepare for a protracted campaign – considerable expenditure of time and
resources; political understanding and a recognition of the effect, in terms of
the human and economic costs; efforts to maintain popular support; military
defeat of the insurgents is not the end of the counterinsurgency campaign, as
political, social and economic programs must continue to be resourced (Ibid: 3-
25).
• Security under the rule of law is essential – establishment of a secure
environment is one of the pillars of counterinsurgency strategy in order to
allow to achieve the overall campaign objectives through sustaining all the
programs and reforms required; military commanders require capabilities and
resources allowing for them to meet the basic needs of the population in initial
stages; the aim is to reduce the level of violence as soon as possible in order to
allow law enforcement forces to assume their task of maintaining order and
establishing the rule of law, followed by an establishment of local government
institutions (esp. the law enforcement system); local culture, tradition and
idiosyncrasies should be respected and Western models should not be
replicated; the use of military forces for law enforcement tasks should only
occur in extraordinary circumstances and for a short period; countering
organized crime networks is required through development of the police and
justice authorities; undermining the rule of law in the name of military
expediency is always counterproductive; rectitude is a vital part of
counterinsurgency campaigning; avoidance any engagement in human right
abuses and any illegal activity (even more damaging to the counterinsurgency
objectives today with the speed and reach of the media); counterinsurgency
forces of the HN and NATO must ensure the fast dissemination of their public
affairs/information message through the media to counter any manipulation of
insurgent propaganda alleging human rights abuses (Ibid: 3-25). One of the
tools of ensuring accountability of NATO forces in a foreign country can be a
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) containing appropriate technical
arrangements of the presence of NATO forces in the country. However,
depending on the specific provisions of individual SOFAs, the public
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(domestic as well as in the respective foreign country) may object and protest
to the mechanisms of such agreement.45
• Hand over responsibility to the local forces as soon as practicable – in
order to transition to the next phase of the counterinsurgency operation;
development of reliable local leaders and institutions, and capable police and
military forces; provision of support when required to the strong local
institutions and forces preferable over the NATO’s leading role in operations;
ideally, “leading from behind” by providing support in terms of capabilities
and resources HN forces lack (like intelligence, helicopters, engineers, medical
care, the training of local forces; etc.);46 otherwise, the insurgency is likely to
present its cause as a struggle against an occupation force; transition of
responsibility at all levels of the counterinsurgency campaign;47 local forces
have a deeper understanding of the local culture and environment which allows
for gaining political momentum and avoids NATO units being considered to be
occupying forces; it also preservers NATO combat power (esp. in terms of
troops) in a situation where there may be scarce NATO forces (Ibid: 3-26); and
• Learn and adapt quickly – ideally more quickly that an insurgent; interactive
action-reaction process of the battle, it is competitive learning; the party of the
conflict which is able to adapt its techniques and understanding faster seizes
the initiative and progressively wins control of the operational environment;
flexible mechanisms to identify and implement appropriate changes must be in
place; tactics, campaign plans and the overarching strategy must be flexible
enough to account for shifts in government policy, public sentiment and
insurgent methods, while resources must be readily available to implement
decisions rapidly; an effective training program is essential, so is the good
management of lessons learned, all units should be able to analyze, outline and
implement lessons learned, and asses the results obtained; experiences and
45 Jurisprudence is usually one of the sensitive issues, and also friction points between the two distant public
pools, where the domestic population usually favors accountability over their forces being executed in a home
country, but the HN population prefers foreign forces falling under local jurisdiction. 46 Especially with this provision, the inspiration by the ISAF mission in Afghanistan is apparent. All listed
capabilities have been the major support contribution to the ANSF during the course of ISAF, because ANSF has
been lacking these critical capabilities and their development has not been among the main priorities of the
NATO efforts in the country. 47 However, as the NATO experience from Afghanistan showed the local understanding of counterinsurgency
may significantly differ from the NATO one, as it is based on the dominant mindset, which might not be as
flexible as needed and which might be heavily dependent up on traditions and customs of the respective region.
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lessons identified and learned from recent NATO missions should be
disseminated to units preparing for and while on operations (Ibid: 3-27). What
is essential here is to really understand the complexity of the situation in order
to avoid misinterpretation and false assessment.
All of these 10 fundamental pillars of NATO counterinsurgency approach/strategy have been
tested and heavily contested mainly during the course of the NATO ISAF mission in
Afghanistan, which also exposed major challenges regarding the provisions in this doctrine,
which are discussed in the chapter addressing the ISAF mission the ways in which the
campaign contributed to shaping the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency below. These
fundamental attributes are also meant to guide execution of the major lines of operation
(LOOs) of a NATO counterinsurgency campaign from the military perspective.
Determination of the best and also alternate LOOs usually follows determination of the
overall approach. LOOs connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives.
Commanders use them to focus combat power toward a desired end state, applying power
throughout three dimensions of space, time and purpose in a logical design that integrates all
the military capabilities of a joint force in order to converge upon and defeat the center of
gravity of their adversaries. They are key for visualizations of operational design, especially
in as complex campaign themes as counterinsurgency. LOOs describe the linkage of various
cross-sector actions on nodes and decisive points, as well as connect tasks and effects to
nodes and decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective. LOOs also define the
interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy. Counterinsurgency
missions then require synchronizations of activities along multiple primary and
complementary LOOs in order to attain tactical and operational objectives. (Ibid: D-1-1). In
the counterinsurgency setting, some of the LOOs focus on the population, whereas other are
aimed at countering the insurgent activities or gathering support for the HN government. The
military conditions and the overall conditions for a stated counterinsurgency end state are
interdependent, meaning all of the LOOs must lead to one joint end state of the
counterinsurgency mission. The following table shows some of the essential LOOs of
counterinsurgency missions:
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Figure 3: Examples of Counterinsurgency Campaign End State and Lines of Operations. Source:
NATO (2011a): Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency – AJP-3.4.4, p. 4-9.
The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine fails to draw a distinct line between LOOs and
lines of effort (LOEs), it rather merges them together. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps FM 3-24
differentiates between LOOs and LOEs in the context of joint operation planning and states
that LOEs are based on “using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward
establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions.
Because counterinsurgents are often more oriented towards an intended outcome or purpose
than an enemy force, counterinsurgency operations generally use lines of effort. If a line of
operation is spatially oriented, then that line of effort is purpose oriented and is appropriate
when positional references to an enemy or adversary are not the determining factor in
friendly action. Because counterinsurgency operations involve many nonmilitary factors, lines
of effort may form a way to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the desired end state. Lines of
effort help commanders visualize how to integrate their military capabilities into the efforts of
the rest of the unified action community.” (U.S. Department of the Army 2014: 7-7).
Considering this definition, it seems that NATO doesn’t differentiate between LOOs and
LOEs and integrates both under the term LOOs in the publication, because it either considers
the nuanced differences existing between the two categories as minimal and thus irrelevant, or
works with the presumption that synchronization of activities along all LOOs and LOEs leads
to unity of effort, which is one of the fundamental pillar of any counterinsurgency campaign.
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To put the basic NATO counterinsurgency attributes into a broader context of
indicative activities and tasks of NATO counterinsurgent force within the three essential
elements of building human security, stimulating economic growth and development, and
cultivating and promoting HN governance and legitimacy (the three pillars of state stability
introduced in the NATO counterinsurgency doctrine; see p. 86),the Allied counterinsurgency
doctrine puts forward a following table, demonstrating the critical interdependencies existing
among the individual activities and tasks. The cycle dynamics is important here, as it shows
that efforts executed within one pillar have to be in balance proportionate to efforts conducted
in other two pillars. What is noteworthy is the innovative nature of this table, because neither
any counterinsurgency theoreticians, nor any counterinsurgency strategy doctrine (like FM 3-
24 or other) contemplate the counterinsurgency activities from this perspective.
Figure 4: Indicative Activities and Tasks in Counterinsurgency. Source: NATO (2011a): Allied Joint
Doctrine for Counterinsurgency – AJP-3.4.4, p. 3-27.
The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine also defines NATO’s preferred operational approach
to counterinsurgency. It determines its basic principles and provisions within a broader clear,
hold, build (CHB) approach. Essentially, CHB counterinsurgency approach is based on a
civil-military cooperation and combination of efforts of NATO, HN and civil actors, and must
be driven, virtually, by an in-depth understanding of the operational environment.
Counterinsurgency operations being full-spectrum operations, CHB encompasses all major
four types of military activities – offensive, defensive, stability and enabling activities (NATO
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2011a: 5-13). “CHB establishes control over the population and areas so that HN governance
and internal development programmes can be pursued in a secure environment. It also
supports development operations by preventing insurgent interference.” (Ibid: 5-14). The
following table visualizes the key phases of CHB efforts and all the potential actors involved
in them, including the range of their potential involvement. What it also shows is the
assumed, ideal case evolution of each counterinsurgency mission, which, most likely, starts as
primarily offensive campaign through the process of gradual decrease of the offensive phase
all the way to fostered stability activities, an evolutionary process marked with shifting
proportion of the key phases. Notably, the publication mentions the concept of enabling
activities, executed as part of a counterinsurgency mission, but the respective table uses the
term paramilitary forces instead. For the purposes of the doctrine, the term paramilitary forces
“refer to those forces or militias which have risen in some inhabited areas aiming at ensuring
self-protection for the population and the rule of law. These forces are under the control of
the HN authorities and work closely with NATO forces.” (Ibid: 5-14 footnote 20).48
Figure 5: Clear, Hold, Build interconnected and evolving activities. Source: NATO (2011a): The
Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency, p. 5-14.
48 During the most significant NATO counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan, ISAF, numerous paramilitary
forces were integrated (or meant to be integrated) into the broader counterinsurgency campaign. However, given
significant structural, cultural as well as behavioral problems, that often impacted the overall NATO campaign
negatively, no more specific framework of their integration has been developed and implemented.
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The doctrine further lists key capabilities of an effective CHB approach to counterinsurgency,
as follows:
1. physically and psychologically separate insurgents from the population;
2. provide the conditions for economic, political and social reforms;
3. safeguard the population and key infrastructure;
4. provide training and opportunities for HN security forces to improve and take the lead
in taking and maintaining control;49
5. provide opportunities for the HN police and other governmental institutions to
establish and maintain the rule of law;
6. provide essential services and address the core grievances of the insurgency;
7. assist with resettling displaced persons and refugees to their homes (this task is done
by UNHCR, and only in extreme circumstances will the military be asked for
assistance);
8. use and train local workers and materials to rebuild and provide a sustainable
economic and social system;
9. deny the enemy active and passive support; and
10. gain support of the populace (Ibid: 5-15 – 5-16).
Significantly, for the purposes of this thesis, the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine also
establishes a clear framework of the key CHB phases, allowing for both easier understanding
of the topic and more precise and pointed evaluation of individual campaigns and missions,
including the case of the Czech Republic and its efforts and activities.
The publication establishes total of four phases for successful execution of the CHB
approach, i.e. planning phase, clear phase, hold phase and build phase. The non-linear nature
in progression is highlighted, along with the fact that all four are linked to a series of decisive
conditions that allow transition of responsibility and authority to the HN (Ibid: 5-16).
Comprehensive approach and sufficient resources are required. The list of typical activities of
each of the phases follows, as stated in the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine:
49 Any security sector reforms cannot, however, be designed according to any Western model of security sector
system and attempted to be replicated in different environment, which can have significant consequence in the
longer term period. One of the critical challenges is temptation to (re)build local security forces as a
counterinsurgency force, mirroring the immediate security threat, but still underestimating or ignoring intended
and unintended consequences of such efforts (like in the case of the Afghan National Security Forces).
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(1) PREPARATION PHASE (2) “CLEAR” PHASE
(primarily offensive activities)
• an assessment of the situation
and resources and the vetting of
HN personnel;
• conducting overall planning;
• assigning responsibilities to civil
and military elements;
• conducting combined/joint
training and rehearsals;
• beginning information activities
and/or information engagement
operations; and/or
• establishing temporary facilities
for basic services to civilians
being displaced in the area to be
cleared.
• information activities;
• cordon and search;
• neutralizing armed elements; and
• removing those who have
infiltrated the HN government or
security forces
in order to deprive the insurgents of their
control over the territory.
(3) “HOLD” PHASE
(primarily defensive activities)
(4) “BUILD” PHASE
(primarily stability efforts)
• information activities;
• providing basic essential services
and humanitarian assistance;
• conducting infrastructure
assessment;
• establishing combat outposts;
• fortifying police stations;
• cordon and search;
• combined and joint dismounted
presence patrols;
• building intelligence networks;
• identifying and neutralizing
remaining insurgent underground,
auxiliary and leaders;
• recruiting local police and security
forces; and
• reassessing the situation and the
resources.
• CIMIC activities, in particular
establishing / holding liaison
network with local key leaders,
• information activities;
• promoting the legitimacy of
the HN’s authority;
• beginning the transition of
authority to the HN
government and security
forces, shifting to advisory
and support roles for NATO
civil-military elements;
• providing security for the
reconstruction efforts;
• providing security for
infrastructure; and
• training, equipping and
advising police and civil
defense forces.
• CIMIC activities, in
particular keeping close
contact with key leaders, the
populace and agencies
engaged in stabilization
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reassessing the civil environment
and initiating quick impact projects
if required.
In order to ensure that areas freed from
enemy control remain so. This requires the
control of the HN government with and
adequate HN security force presence.
activities and reconstruction
efforts
In order to build the capacities of local
institutions to deliver services, advance the
rule of law and nurture civil society.
Table 15: Activities of each phase of CHB counterinsurgency approach. Source: NATO (2011a): The
Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency, pp. 5-15 – 5-17.
The following figure represents a visualization of the evolution of CHB operations,
demonstrating especially the shifting the significance proportion of offensive, defensive and
stability activities during all CHB phases. The most important independent variable
influencing the progress/evolution of CHB counterinsurgency operations is the stability of
security environment in the area. The figure depicts an ideal case of the CHB evolution. In the
reality, the insurgents’ endeavor challenges all the counterinsurgency efforts, slowing or
entirely stopping the progress. Variables of the level of effort and capacity of key actors are
included in the visual.
Figure 6: Evolution of roles during the main stages of counterinsurgency. Source: NATO (2011a):
The Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency, p. 5-18.
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The figure depicting evolution of roles during main stages of counterinsurgency shows some
interesting assumptions. First, the insurgent capability is thought to be severely degraded
during the second phase of an operation, i.e. the “hold” (defensive) phase. Not knowing the
methodology of this projection, what is likely is that the insurgents would be deprived of the
population base support proportionate to the increase in defense and stability activities,
complementing reconstruction and development efforts. Second, it (apparently) doesn’t work
with significant factors like organized crime, corruption or strong dynamics of tribalism,
assuming a progressive HN government, gradually gaining strength and capabilities. Third,
the figure doesn’t show an end or a termination point of the activities of the NATO
counterinsurgency force and the training and advising portion of the mission (Operational
Mentor and Liaison Teams, OMLT), assuming the long-term engagement in area of
operations. The projection of the increasing capabilities of the HN security forces is also more
austere, showing modest increase during the first two phases and a stable level in the third
“build” phase, correlating with the projections of the level of NATO involvement.
The doctrine also emphasizes the reconciliation efforts, which should be supported by
NATO forces during the stabilization phase of counterinsurgency campaign (as part of efforts
to support initial restoration of services and initial governance), led by the HN government.
The population is considered as the main actor in the process (Ibid: 5-25). Reconciliation
should be part of a broader reintegration, demobilization, disarmament and reconciliation
programs and initiatives. The way detainees are treated can have a profound impact on these
efforts, especially with respect to the future mobilization and recruitment potential of the
insurgency. The integration of the former insurgents within the local armed forces, that will
further provide a useful knowledge about the insurgent system and the ways in which they
operate (Ibid: 5-26). What the doctrine doesn’t consider is the human factor present in the
potential reintegration efforts, i.e. how the former insurgent will be perceived by and treated
by the fellow servicemen, potentially undermining the cohesion of the corps.
The importance of available expertise during the course of counterinsurgency is stressed
in many provisions of the doctrine, highlighting the key role civilian and military experts have
in counterinsurgency efforts. The expertise by not only government civilian and military
experts, but also subject matter experts from the private sector should be utilized (Ibid: 2-15).
As acknowledged in the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine, history has shown that
counterinsurgency may be counterintuitive to more traditional or conventional types of
warfare, as the strategy itself brings along a number of paradoxes of varying importance and
impact on the actual conduct of a mission. Different, adaptive and flexible mindset is required
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of the all military force engaged in counterinsurgency. Even though the doctrine states that
“these paradoxes are offered to stimulate thinking, not to limit it. The applicability of the
thoughts behind the paradoxes depends on the context faced by the commander in any given
insurgency.” (Ibid: 5-10). However, as the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, and to some extent
even the KFOR mission in Kosovo, showed, these paradoxes might have significant negative
impacts on the practical level and execution and success of the mission, when not managed
adequately at all levels. The potential for counter-productivity or blowback of certain
counterinsurgency provisions is underestimated (or intentionally downplayed) in the
publication. The paradoxes don’t have to apply in all cases, and the list of the paradoxes
presented in the doctrine and here is not exhaustive. The major paradoxes of
counterinsurgency according to NATO are (Ibid: 5-10 – 5-11; comments by IH):
• The more you protect a force, the less secure you may be – often in form of national
caveats imposed on national military (and to a certain extent civilian) contributions;
isolation from the population, which is supposed to be the essential center of gravity of
counterinsurgency efforts; population may perceive it as a sign of weakness (“If the
well-equipped and technology savvy foreign troops are not leaving their compounds,
the insurgents must pose a very significant threat to them. They are afraid.”, as the
author of this thesis was told by all the Afghan respondents she interviewed about the
Afghan perception of the NATO presence and activities in their country); freedom of
action ceded to the insurgent who enjoy a greater freedom of movement, and are
generally perceived as the stronger side, when the coalition forces are restrained in
their activities; the doctrine states that “commanders should find a balance between
implementing restrictive force protection measures and the need to maintain close
contact with the locals” (Ibid), but even these commanders are limited by political
decisions and restrictions in their management of the mission; restrictive force
protection measures also complicate or hinder intelligence gathering activities;
• The more force is used, the less effective it may be – again closely linked to the issue
of national caveats where some of the TCNs may impose restriction on the use of
force in adherence to their constitutions and national laws, allowing to use deadly
force only in self-defense, i.e. when being directly targeted (Francavilla 2015); this
fact might have both positive and negative impacts on the population; NATO
highlights the positive dimension by asserting that “the greater the force applied, the
greater the chance of collateral damage and mistakes” (NATO 2011a: 5-10),
however, on the other hand, as the author was told by several respondents, the
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coalition forces then cannot shoot a person planting an IED, which might kill civilians
later; the key point for counterinsurgents is to understand when more force is needed
and when it might be counterproductive; efforts to minimize or avoid collateral
damage are crucial;
• The more successful a counterinsurgency operation is, the less force can be used
and the more risk must be accepted – this paradox is based on the underlying ideal
case evolution of counterinsurgency campaigns, where more responsibilities and
reliance are meant to be placed on law enforcement forces, and the rules of
engagement of foreign troops may be tightened accordingly (see above); in many
cases, it is difficult to determine how much the counterinsurgency operation actually is
successful given the complexity of the security environment as well as often poorly
defined objectives that should lead to a desirable end state;
• If a tactic works today, it might not be the case on the following days; if it works in a
given area, it might not work in another area – the environment of counterinsurgency
campaign is usually very dynamic, flexible and influenced by a high number of
external and internal factors which might evince varying levels of significance in
different areas of an AO; insurgents are generally very adaptive and have advantages
of deep local knowledge and a widespread network of contacts; the more effective
some counterinsurgency tactic, technique or procedure is, the more insurgents might
seek to counter it and adapt; a certain level of common doctrine and set of tactics is
required among counterinsurgents to “provide a common understanding on the
planning and execution of military activities which creates a starting point for
adaptation” (Ibid: 5-11);
• Tactical success alone guarantees nothing – political actions and decisions matter the
most; tactical actions must be linked to strategic and operational military objectives,
but also to the political goals of the HN government and (to a certain level) NATO; in
situations where tactical success is not met with strategic success or political
achievements, the effects don’t spread beyond the tactical level; effective military
forces on the tactical level cannot substitute for a lack of political will and political
commitment of the most relevant stakeholders;
• Doing nothing may be the best reaction – insurgent calculus (especially with
insurgencies widely using the terrorist tactic) is to cause overreaction, among other
things, on the counterinsurgent side, which the insurgents can further exploit;
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• The host nation doing something tolerably is often better than the force doing it well
– critical importance of local ownership of the action; even though in societies with
deep tribal, clan or ethnic cleavages, the foreign actor may be trusted more by the local
population than local establishment; another factor countering the local ownership
narrative might be the prevailing mindsets of actors (for instance, the understanding of
preferred counterinsurgency approach and methods may differ between NATO and a
HN); cultural understanding represents an important advantage in favor of increasing
local ownership.
Interestingly, the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine mentions the potential of providing
external support to an insurgency by various actors, including the prospects of waging a
“proxy war”, which can have a significant destabilizing effect (Ibid: 3-9). The doctrine
underestimates the nature and potential of proxy war fighting by not providing any clearer
guidance on how to counter the unique inherent dynamics of using proxies by other interested
stakeholders in their own interests, and the potential consequences (intended and unintended,
as well as longer term) the practice can have on a respective counterinsurgency mission.
As it is more than obvious from both the attempts to theorize about counterinsurgency
efforts and the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine itself (or other military conceptual
documents, like the U.S. Army/Marine Corps FM 3-24), the military dimension of
counterinsurgency is clearly and systematically defined, conceptualized and the guiding
principles are established in a coherent and structured way to allow for an effective practical
implementation. The civilian dimension of counterinsurgency campaign is, however, under-
conceptualized, the basic attributes of civilian counterinsurgency efforts are incoherent and
unsystematic. Indeed, an objection about the requirement of customized civilian approaches
can be raised, given the specific conditions and context and the unique set of internal and
external forces functioning in an area of operation. Although such potential for variability of
civilian counterinsurgency approaches is useful in terms of research and their potential
adaptability and flexibility in practice, it might also cause problems in terms of coherence or
lack of coherence of the activities of civilian actors within one approach in both the planning
and the execution phases of an operation. In most of the cases, counterinsurgency
stakeholders (like the Czech Republic, other states or even NGOs) usually don’t have a
united, common framework or action plan outlining their counterinsurgency approaches in
detailed terms, combining both civilian and military activities.
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The following visual figure summarizes the complexity and interconnectedness of the
operational environment, where insurgents and counterinsurgents battle each other. It also
helps to understand the dynamic interactions between the two opposing forces. What the
figure clearly shows is the imperative that the military contribution is part of a solution to the
problem, but not the complete solution to countering insurgents. In so far as insurgency takes
benefit from different fields, COIN must address all these fields.
Figure 7: Nature of Counterinsurgency. Source: NATO (2011a): The Allied Joint Doctrine for
Counterinsurgency, p. 3-19.
5.2.2 Relevant documents of the Czech Republic
The official counterinsurgency-relevant documents adopted and published by the government
of the Czech Republic, or its ministers or agencies, can be divided in two categories, i.e.
political and military. The political category includes official documents published by the
government, both chambers of the Parliament, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (as the leading
actor in counterinsurgency) or other ministers, including the Ministry of Defense, in cases of
documents outlining or addressing policies of the ministry, and other civilian non-state actors,
if applicable. The military category then includes documents relevant for the Czech armed
forces, their counterinsurgency tasks, experience and preparation and training materials.
There is no united, commonly agreed and accepted document, introducing the key
goals and objectives, preferred courses of action, fundamental principles and imperatives and
potential resources of the approach to counterinsurgency of the Czech Republic in a
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comprehensive manner, i.e. integrated the objectives, activities, attributes and tools of all
relevant civilian and military actors, governmental and non-governmental, with the
experience with and engaged in counterinsurgency activity.50 Most of the available primary
resources are designed to reflect and present the military perspective, most likely because the
civilian sector doesn’t usually label the activities they can potentially contribute with (or
already do so) to counterinsurgency missions as “counterinsurgency”. This fact may have a
certain effect on the potential distortion of the conclusions draw from the data presented in
this research, as only those civilian actors either specifically referring to counterinsurgency, or
those active in the area where a NATO counterinsurgency mission is underway are considered
for the analysis, with the purpose of keeping the research as coherent as possible.
As some of the respondents told the author, especially two civilian officials
responsible for the counterinsurgency campaign theme at the Czech armed forces’ Doctrine
Department at the Training Command – Military Academy in Vyškov Ondřej Socha and
Pavol Varga, the rationale behind the absence of such a comprehensive, common
counterinsurgency document is the absolute minimal likelihood of an insurgency erupting and
operating in the territory of the Czech Republic,51 as well as the commitment to abide by and
honor NATO strategies and doctrines. This rationale is, however, feasible particularly from
the military point of view. From the political perspective, as also acknowledge by the former
ambassador of the Czech Republic to Afghanistan retired Major General Petr Pelz, it can
create problems and challenges in terms of the apparent lack of clarity of goals and lack of
clarity on coordination of efforts of relevant civilian and military stakeholders (what the
Czech Republic wants to achieve, how and why, including potential utilization of the
experience to future). Pelz noted, that the absence of the common official document outlining
50 Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs have internal reports and evaluation material at their disposal,
including the analysis of the benefits and challenges of the Czech activities in Afghanistan, including drawn
lessons learned, such documents are not publicly releasable though. 51 Certain features of insurgent elements active on the Czech territory have been identified, for instance reported
training camp of the Chechen separatists close to South Moravian town of Mohelno in the 1990s (Mareš 200).
Territory of the Czech Republic is, however, generally exploited as a logistical hub my foreign insurgent or
terrorist entities (cf. Mareš 2011), thus not requiring full-fledged counterinsurgency response by the Czech
authorities. Domestic paramilitary units active in the Czech territory could, theoretically, develop into an
insurgency. Nevertheless, their very limited, if any, success thus far maintains the likelihood of such
developments at a very low level. Another possible phenomenon that could, theoretically, develop into an
insurgency, or aid such developments, is represented by the Czech citizens leaving the country as volunteers or
foreign fighters to join various conflict. When (if) they come back, they can try to utilize their experience and
skills through starting a subversive campaign in the Czech territory, for various reasons. The numbers of Czech
foreign fighters has, however, remained comparatively very low. The fact that the potential of an insurgency
occurring in the Czech territory in the foreseeable future is weak or minimal, yet still present provides another
reason for researching the issue of contemporary Czech approach toward counterinsurgency, as well as for an
adoption of a united document outlining its main attributes, principles and perspectives by the relevant
governmental as well as non-governmental stakeholders.
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the Czech approach to counterinsurgency (and to counterinsurgency specifically in
Afghanistan) causes the inability of the Czech Republic to exploit the full potential of our
participation, especially in terms of the absence of clearly formulated objectives and demands
of what we want from our NATO partners, Afghans and other international partners in
exchange for our contributions, thus severely decreasing the negotiation leverage of the Czech
Republic in the context of wider international relations.
In general terms, the issue of counterinsurgency started to become part of political and
military debates in the Czech environment in connection to the participation of the Czech
civilian and mainly military agents in the NATO counterinsurgency operation in Afghanistan.
The Czech military professionals themselves confirmed that they learned about the art of
counterinsurgency from the Kilcullen’s conceptualization, as well as the US counter-
insurgency relevant documents and materials, later into the deployment, and gradually also
during the preparation pre-deployment phase. Related to this, the same respondents also claim
that the Czechs deployed to Afghanistan realized in essence counterinsurgency tasks, without
knowing or labeling them as counterinsurgency, especially during the phases of ISAF
preceding the counterinsurgency guidance material issued by the ISAF commanders.
5.2.2.1 Political
As aforementioned, the highest official strategic document of the Czech Republic in the field
of its security and international relations is Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky
(Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, 2015). Due to the character of the document, there
are no explicit or specific references to the issue of counterinsurgency. What the document
establishes and what is relevant to the efforts of shaping and/or examining the range and
scope of the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency is the explicit reference to the
commitments linked to the membership in NATO, EU, UN and OSCE (see p. 72).
The document further states that NATO and its policies and strategic not only
contribute significantly to the fundamental principles of the Czech security policy, it also is
one of the country’s strategic interests, formulated as “strengthening cohesion and effectivity
of NATO and the EU, and maintaining functional and credible transatlantic bond”, along
with “fulfilling the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, including strengthening
their cooperation in complementary development of defense and security capabilities” (Vláda
ČR 2015: 7; translated by IH).
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Other counterinsurgency-relevant parts of the document include conflict prevention
and management of local and regional conflicts and mitigating their impacts, and support to
international stability through cooperation with regional partners (among the Czech strategic
interests; Ibid), as well as NATO or EU crisis management operations beyond the
geographical boundaries of the Eurasian space (Ibid: 10). Membership in NATO is considered
to be one of the fundamental instruments of the pursuit of national interests and objectives.
The document also highlights the cohesion, proportionate burden-sharing and solidarity
among Allies. The reliability and credibility of each of NATO member states, including their
participation in NATO’s programs and policies, is then considered as the prerequisite for
maintaining the NATO collective defense pillar (Ibid: 13). On the same page, the principle of
the Czech Republic “creating conditions for an active participation in NATO, EU and UN
conflict resolution missions across their wide spectrum” (Ibid; translated by IH), i.e. conflict
prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution missions.
It further notes that “when honoring these commitments, (the Czech Republic) adheres
to the principles of a comprehensive approach to crisis management operations” (Ibid;
translated by IH). This, essentially, means, in more specific counterinsurgency context, that
the Czech Republic is willing to contribute to all possible tasks and types of activities of a
mission, as long as they fall within the comprehensive counterinsurgency framework of
NATO (or EU). As an example of conflict prevention and management through capability-
building efforts in third countries on international or bilateral basis, the document explicitly
use the tasks of training of indigenous security forces and assistance in security sector reform,
especially via involvement of civilian and military professionals (Ibid), which constitute two
of a broader range of fundamental activities in counterinsurgency missions. Furthermore,
according to the document, in situation, when conflict prevention efforts fail, the country
“will join the coercive mechanisms in accordance with its commitments to NATO and the EU,
abiding by the provisions of the Charter of the UN.” (Ibid: 14). Additionally, the document
states that the Czech Republic recognized the risks, threats and challenges resulting from the
growing instability in the regions of the North Africa, Sahel as well as the Middle East (Ibid:
15), and that the Czech Republic also contributes to the “counterterrorism efforts of NATO
via intelligence sharing, development of adequate capabilities, expanding the framework of
consultations with partners, and its active participation in the Alliance’s operations and
missions.” (Ibid). Put into the counterinsurgency perspective, the more general language and
use of the term “counterterrorism” instead of “counterinsurgency” suggest divergent
tendencies from counterinsurgency efforts, reflective of the general tendencies occurring and
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increasing within NATO, especially to the future, even though the document is clearly heavily
influenced by the Czech experience with counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. The apparent
avoidance of the term itself, and use of other terms (crisis management, counterterrorism)
supports this hypothesis.
Importantly, what is also relevant to the purposes of this thesis, and is worthy of
notice, in the Czech Security Strategy is the provision of activities of the Czech Republic in
the field of development and transformational cooperation and humanitarian aid provision.
The Czech Republic considers these three important activities as effective tools contributing
to regional and global efforts aimed at provision of security and ensuring stability (Ibid: 15).
Development activities are important and integral part of any counterinsurgency campaign.
Directly subordinate to the Security Strategy document is the Czech military strategy,
outlined in the document titled Obranná strategie České republiky: Odpovědný stát a
spolehlivý spojenec (Defense Strategy of the Czech Republic: Responsible State and
Responsible Ally; 2012). This document builds upon and further develops the principles and
imperatives stated in the security strategy document. As for the counterinsurgency-relevant
parts of the text, no specific, direct or explicit mention of either insurgency, or
counterinsurgency can be identified. Nevertheless, as the title of the document itself (i.e.
“reliable partner”) suggests, alliance bonds and partnership play an integral and critically
important role in the security and defense system of the country. The Defense Strategy
presents the basic principles of development and functioning of the defense system of the
Czech Republic, main tasks of the armed forces, and political-military ambitions. It further
mentions compliance with the NATO Strategic Concept and relevant security and defense
documents of the EU, and the pillar of NATO collective defense system, in accordance with
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (Ministerstvo obrany ČR 2012: 4-5). Both the Security
Strategic and the Defense Strategy even more highlight the importance of the Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty (1949),52 the founding treaty of NATO, as a cornerstone of the overall
52 „The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be
considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert
with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result
thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.“
(NATO 1949).
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security and defense policies of the country. This fact is particularly important for the efforts
to examine the Czech counterinsurgency approach, which has been shaped primarily by the
Czech active participation in the NATO counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan, ISAF.
ISAF was directly linked to the operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan, which was waged
simultaneously with ISAF in the same area of operation (see below). Operation Enduring
Freedom was then a direct response to the historically first activation of the Article 5 clause in
reaction to the terrorist attacks from 9th September, 2001.
The document further notes that the Czech Republic “has been developing its
capabilities in the field of cooperation of its armed forces, other public administration
institution and the civilian sector as part of so-called comprehensive approach during peace
support operations and security and civil-military missions” (Ibid: 8; translated by IH).
Strong emphasis in both security and defense (and counterinsurgency) relevant documents on
comprehensive approach is clearly closely linked to the experience of civilian and military
actors from counterinsurgency (not only, but mainly, given the character of counterinsurgency
campaigns in general, as well as the emphasis NATO places on comprehensive approach),
especially gained in Afghanistan. However, same tendency of framing the foreign/out-of-area
missions more broadly as crisis management is traceable in the document. Paragraph 26 of the
document on foreign military operations follows as “in foreign operations, the Armed Forces
of the Czech Republic cooperate with Allied armed forces on the basis of international
agreements and commitments. Out-of-area deployments are executed as part of broader
efforts of international community in accordance with the provisions of international law.
They are capable of deployment in peace enforcement, peace support and peace keeping
operations and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions. Members of the Czech
armed forces can further fulfill tasks as part of humanitarian mission, rescue and evacuation
activities, and contribute to other civilian operations or monitoring missions of international
organizations.” (Ibid: 9; translated by IH). Compared to its previous version from 2008,
where a specific reference to the operations aimed at countering insurgencies was made in the
part of the text addressing foreign deployments of the Czech armed forces, in order to
minimize its impact on security interests of the Czech Republic and its allies (Ministerstvo
obrany ČR 2008: 4), this direct reference is clearly absent. Mirroring the NATO trend the
later version of the strategy works with term “stabilization and reconstruction”. The author of
this thesis suggests that such developments in the conceptual dimension of NATO operations
reflects certain disillusionment with ambitious counterinsurgency mission after the Afghan
experience, with exposed the existing fault lines among the Allies regarding their potential
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willingness and/or capabilities to commit to a large-scale counterinsurgency mission in the
future. As the notion from the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine (about the efforts to establish
counterinsurgency as another campaign theme; see p. 85) suggests continuing relevance of the
concept. With preference of the use of other concepts by individual member states, however,
this relevance of counterinsurgency is decreasing.
Even though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs represents the leading actor of any
counterinsurgency efforts by default, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not developed
any common strategy or plan for the Czech contribution to counterinsurgency efforts. The
Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs also doesn’t use the term counterinsurgency at all, not even
when referring to its activities in Afghanistan as part of ISAF. It designates the respective
activities as “humanitarian aid”, “development aid” or “reconstruction”, indicating that in the
Czech context, the term counterinsurgency is used only in military (and academic)
environment.
Considering the nature of counterinsurgency as a joint civilian-military endeavor, the
Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Czech Ministry of Defense developed and
published joint conception Střednědobá koncepce působení České republiky v operacích
v zahraničí (Mid-term Concept on the activities of the Czech Republic in operations abroad)
in 2009, i.e. during the peak of counterinsurgency discussions. It stated that the Czech
Republic seeks to actively engage in reconstruction and development activities, capacity
building of local security forces, along with deployments of special operation forces and
contributing with other capabilities to the ISAF force (Ministerstvo obrany ČR, Ministerstvo
zahraničních věcí ČR 2009). Although no specific reference to counterinsurgency can be
identified in the document, the explicit reference to ISAF means that the document listed the
Czech priorities for its engagement in the NATO counterinsurgency area of operation.
In November of the same year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also published a
concept on its priorities and preferred and potential trajectories of developed of the Czech
contributions to the stabilization efforts in Afghanistan in the time period of from 2010 to
2012, titled Perspektivy účasti České republiky na stabilizaci Afghánistánu 2010-2012.
The document summarizes the volume and character of the development and humanitarian aid
provided to Afghanistan until 2009. It specifies three main areas of the Czech engagement and
activities in the country as (1) institution building, good governance and the rule of law
support; (2) reconstruction and development; and (3) security. The main pillar of those efforts
(esp. areas 1 and 2) is considered to be the Czech PRT Logar (see below). Monetary volume
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of the developmental and humanitarian aid provided to Afghanistan until 2009 are presented
in the document. What is noteworthy is the strong emphasis placed on the activities aimed at
development the Afghan economy (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2009a).
Furthermore, in the official document of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Koncepce ZPS ČR 2010-2017 (Concept of Czech FPS 2010-2017; 2009), the fundamental
principles and imperatives of the Czech foreign policy for the given period of time are
outlined. In this conceptual document, Afghanistan is designated as a “special security-
development priority” of the Czech foreign policy. It develops to state that the Czech
Republic “has been supportive of the Afghan government’s efforts to achieve political,
security and economic stabilization of the country”, and specifically underscored the
activities of the Czech PRT Logar (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2009b: 13; translated
by IH). It also lists three main areas of developmental cooperation with Afghanistan:
environment, agriculture, economic development (including security sector) (Ibid: 34). Same
same information can be found in document Koncepce zahraniční rozvojové spolupráce
České republiky na období 2010-2017 (Foreign Development Cooperation Concept of the
Czech Republic for 2010-2017; 2009).
The executive arm of the developmental policies of the Czech Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Česká rozvojová agentura (Czech Development Agency) list Afghanistan among its
geographic and territorial priorities. Afghanistan hold a status of “bilateral development
cooperation” country, with education sector and agricultural sector as the main areas of
development activities, mirroring the sector priorities introduced in document Program
rozvojové spolupráce 2013-2017 Afghánistán (Program of Development Cooperation 2013-
2017 Afghanistan). Additionally, Afghanistan is also prioritized in documents Operační
strategie humanitární pomoci ČR (Operational Strategy of Humanitarian Aid of the CZE;
published and updated annually).
The scope of the development and humanitarian assistance provided to Afghanistan on
the basis of bilateral cooperation reflects the long-term outlook of the stabilization phase of
counterinsurgency operation. The Czech development ambitions are only partially match by
the military deployment, widely reflecting the official transition of responsibility for security
to the Afghan security forces at the end of 2014, assuming that the security tasks of the
counterinsurgency operation would be delivered by indigenous security forces. None of the
documents of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, frames the topic in such terms.
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Separately, but in coordination with the government efforts, Czech NGO Člověk
v tísni (People in Need) is very active in Afghanistan in terms of humanitarian aid and
development assistance. In the works of its workers, Člověk v tísni seeks to disassociate
themselves from the coalition military forces operating in Afghanistan in order to preserve
their neutral status and perceived imparity. They publish own development strategies and
plans, based on a program-to-program basis, which are, however, not publically releasable.
Each Czech military contingent deployed to a mission, particularly to the Czech PRT
Logar also developed their own operational plans (for the civilian side) and operational orders
(for the military side). Neither these sources of primary sources of data are, however,
releasable to public. The author learned about their existence and about some of their contents
from the respondents she interviewed. Military operational orders contained ROE were in
accordance with the orders of the higher echelon of the ISAF command (i.e. it specifically
dealt with individual counterinsurgency principles and tasks), which were drafted in the
Czech Republic before the deployment itself. The key rule of engagement for the Czech
military was the legal use of force only when an adversary’s weapon is visible (i.e. open
carry), or when directly shot at. The operational plans of the civilian part of the PRT Logar
were, reportedly, focused on reconstruction and development efforts, and didn’t address the
topic of counterinsurgency as such or in its wider complexity. The civilian plans presented
priorities of the individual contingents, individual steps, metrics of progress, time frames and
budget.
5.2.2.2 Military
Contrary to the evolution of the language and framing of the Czech defense strategy, the
Czech highest doctrine, Doktrína Armády České republiky (Doctrine of the Army of the
Czech Republic, 2010) has undergone an opposite trend. Its first 2004 version talks about
capabilities of the Czech armed forces allowing for their deployment to the full-spectrum of
operations – combat (both offensive and defensive) and non-combat, in the territory of the
Czech Republic as well as out of the area, in peace (stabilization) and support missions
(Ministerstvo obrany ČR 2004). The updated 2010 version of the Czech army doctrine,
approved and released before the NATO counterinsurgency doctrine was published, refers to
counterinsurgency 17 times in the document. Firstly, it states that the Allied Joint Doctrine
(AJP-01) is the creates both the foundational basis and springboard for the Czech Army
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doctrine, as it “creates the conceptual basis for operational standardization” (Ministerstvo
obrany ČR 2010: 4; translated by IH). Counterinsurgency operations are listed among the
main possible types of operations (or campaign themes) the Czech armed forces can be
deployed to, i.e. combat operations (war), counterinsurgency operations, peace support
operations, and peacetime military engagement (Ibid: 30, 34). Counterinsurgency operations
are considered to be the type of an operation that is the closest to the combat deployment (to
war), and can only be conducted by the Czech army either as an Article 5 operation, or a non-
Article 5 operation with the UN mandate (Ibid: 34). In the other words, counterinsurgency
operations, even though limited, require commitment of a high number of military forces and
substantial volume of military resources.
In the doctrine, counterinsurgency is defined in close connection to definition of
insurgency, suggesting its variable contents, dependent on local circumstances and the
context. A clear definition is stated only in a footnote, as follows “military, paramilitary,
political, economic, psychological, and civilian activities, conducted with the aim of defeating
an insurgency” (Ibid: 42 footnote 31; translated by IH), copied from the 2008 version of the
NATO Glossary. The provisions of the doctrine further states that the Czech army will
execute counterinsurgency operations only “with political agreement (on the national level –
note IH), only based on the UN mandate” (Ibid; translated by IH). It follows with elaborating
“under such conditions, the Czech army can be deployed to a counterinsurgency mission,
where the goal is to defeat an insurgency with military or paramilitary forces (police forces,
local militias), simultaneously with political, economic, psychological and civilian activities,
and mitigate the conflict to the level where the efforts of peace support and infrastructure
building (reconstruction assistance) can solve the conflict” (Ibid: translated by IH). The
presented definition of counterinsurgency indicates that the Czech armed forces can be
deployed in collaboration with all possible actors during all phases of the NATO-defined
counterinsurgency mission framework.
The doctrine further stresses the shift from enemy-centric to population-centric
counterinsurgency activities. It also mentions concept of “embedded partnering”, which has to
be based on trust and friendship (Ibid). NATO doesn’t work with this concept in its strategic
counterinsurgency documents. Even though it is a different term for the “shoulder by
shoulder” principle originating from NATO/ISAF documents, its inclusion into the main text
of the Czech army doctrine may serve as an indirect evidence of the conceptual dimension of
the Czech approach to counterinsurgency reacting to the evolution of the practical dimension,
more than vice-versa. In the other words, in the case of references to counterinsurgency and
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its framing in the main Czech conceptual documents followed practical execution, suggesting
a certain lack of conceptual guidance of the Czech counterinsurgency approach on the
national level.53 To allow for “geographic and command flexibility”, the NATO troops should
accompany host nation forces into a mission. The doctrine also states that units must be
deployed for long enough time period to build necessary relationships, and highlights the
change in the duration of individual rotations to 12 months (Ibid) from previous 6 months.
It concludes with listing what it calls as 4 NATO counterinsurgency strategy priorities.
NATO counterinsurgency strategy priorities according to the Doctrine of the Army of the
Czech Republic
• Improvement of the population security;
• Indigenous local forces’ capabilities-building, and their leading role in the tasks of provision
of security;
• Good governance and development support;
• Negotiations with neighboring countries.
Table 16: NATO counterinsurgency strategy priorities in the Doctrine of the Army of the Czech
Republic. Source: Ministerstvo obrany ČR (2010): Doktrína Armády České republiky, p. 42.
Clearly, the framework of counterinsurgency presented in the Czech army doctrine assigns
primacy to human security over state security during the duration of an insurgency. What is
indicated is a tendency to ensure state security through diplomatic means (i.e. negotiations
with neighboring countries).
Moreover, the Czech army doctrine also contextualizes counterinsurgency differently
than NATO. Whereas the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine explicitly mention the conditions
of fragile or failed state (see p. 85-6), the Czech army doctrine states “An insurgency will,
most likely occur in states with racial, cultural, religious and ideological differences among
different groups of population, which lead to the lack of national cohesion, and,
simultaneously, weak, incapable or unpopular government rules. Additional factors, like
corruption or external intervention, can facilitate the occurrence of insurgency” (Ibid: 43;
translated by IH). Unpopular government doesn’t necessarily translate to state fragility, even
though it may serve as one of its indicators or facilitating factors. The stated perspective also
53 An argument can be raised, the NATO, too, reacted to the developments on the ground with the adoption of
the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine in 2011. As in the case of the Czech Republic, such assumption is valid
only partially, due to the initiatives of the US commanders of ISAF mission.
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doesn’t specifically mention ethnical cleavages, but it goes deeper to “cultural” differences,
which can also be interpreted as cultural differences among tribes, on the urban vs. rural
cleavage or any other culturally determined groups existing within the society. The same
contextualization also emphasizes the transnational dimension of both insurgency (“external
intervention”, indicating, when viewed in its close relation to the rest of the relevant parts of
the text in the doctrine neighboring countries), and counterinsurgency, noting that
“counterinsurgency operations should not focus only on suppression of an insurgency in the
territory of a state, but should also aim at destroying the ties between regional insurgencies
and their external supporters” (Ibid; translated by IH). This explicit demand places further
emphasis on the activities to counter flows of external support to insurgencies, and indicates
clear inspiration by the Afghanistan experience. This also, again, indicates the reactionary
nature of the Czech counterinsurgency-relevant documents to the developments on the
ground.54
Clearly, the framework for counterinsurgency operations introduced in the Czech army
doctrine doesn’t necessarily cover the whole scope of the general nature of counterinsurgency.
The presented conceptualization is adjusted to the conditions of the Czech Republic, and the
resources and capabilities it has available to commit and deploy.
Detailed and more specific elaboration of the individual key provisions of the Czech
army doctrine are presented in doctrines on the hierarchically lower level – military
operational doctrines, tactical doctrines and military regulations of individual missions and
tasks of the Czech Armed forces, branches of armed forces and their character, their services,
and for commanders and military staff headquarters at all C2 echelons. For obvious reasons,
however, these regulations are not releasable to the public. Their relevance for this research
thus varies, dependent on their specific subject and target audience.
Other military sources, containing counterinsurgency-relevant data are handbooks and
tactical manuals issued by the Doctrine Department at the Training Command – Military
Academy in Vyškov. Majority of these handbooks is, however, either classified, or publicly
non-releasable. Therefore, the information these publications contain could not be cited and
work with in this thesis. The handbooks and tactical field manuals are either framed as
preparation material in the pre-deployment phase of forces, and present the fundamental
attributes of counterinsurgency operations, that are usually adopted from NATO and US
54 Side-note: in the list of abbreviations, a factual mistake can be found in the Czech army doctrine. When
explaining the (frequently used) abbreviation COIN, the doctrine wrongly explains its meaning as “contingency
plans” instead of “counterinsurgency operations”, even though the Czech translation of the abbreviated meaning
is correct (Ministerstvo obrany ČR 2010: 97).
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relevant materials (as confirmed by 13 military respondents), as well as the best practices and
lessons learned from the practice on the ground (always the ISAF mission), or as general
learning and training material for increased awareness, efficiency and interoperability of the
Czech armed forces with other NATO Allies during exercises as well as missions. Study of
subject-relevant articles, published in the journal Doktríny (Doctrines; by the Doctrine
Department at the Training Command – Military Academy in Vyškov, from 2014 then
University of Defense in Brno as Economics and Management) by Czech subject matter
experts can help to frame the understanding of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency, by
looking at what they focus on and the language they use. Nonetheless, again, potential
limitation on variability and research value of such articles can be represented by the
translation of NATO or US materials, which are critically analyzed in a professional and
standardized way. Shared experiences, best practices and lessons learned addressed in the
articles provides useful insights into individual types of missions, tasks and assignment of the
Czech actors in ISAF, like the CIMIC unit operating as part of the Czech PRT in Logar
province (see below). Particular attention deservers an article titled “Je možné zvítězit v
Afghánistánu bez afghánských žen?” (Is victory possible in Afghanistan without the
involvement of Afghan women?), published in the Doktríny journal by Ing. Jozef Buza
(Doktríny 2/2010). Existence of this articl can also serve as evidence of strong emphasize of
the Czech efforts in Afghanistan on the gender-related and women empowerment issues.
Another highly relevant official document of the Czech Ministry of Defense is its Bílá
kniha o obraně (White Paper on Defense; 2011). The publication describes the current state
the Czech Armed Forces find themselves, presented in realistic light, and proposes systematic
changes for their improvement and increase of efficiency, including suggestion to terminate
some of non-essential military capabilities. It categorically refuses the opinion that, due to the
fact that the Czech Republic is a NATO member, it doesn’t need to aim at developing its
armed forces’ capabilities, and stresses the importance of the very opposite. The paper
justifies the development of such a critical analysis of the current state of armed forces by the
dynamically changing security environment, experience and lessons learned gathered from the
operations, the new NATO Strategic Concept, updated Security Strategy of the country, along
with impact of the economic crisis on the Czech Republic’s budget (Ministerstvo obrany ČR
2011). The analysis presented in the document also addreses the current state of miltiary
capabilities at the Ministry of Defense’s disposal. It also generates key recommendations in
terms of future development of the armed forces and their capabilities. Counterinsurgency-
relevant are all of them, nevertheless only the most relevant ones (either recommendations
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refering to as developed based on lessons learned or the new NATO Strategic Concept, or
recommendations refering to foreign deployments of the Czech armed forces, keeping in mind
the prevailing assumption of the very low likelihood of the insurgency occuring in the Czech
territory) are listed below:
• Strictly prioritize investments into the development of military capabilities according
to their contributions to roles, functions and international commitments of the Czech
armed forces;
• Increase the defense spending on the basis of specific and justified investment
requirements and projects;
• In defense planning, prioritize requirements depending on the availability of sources
and risk assessment in terms of postponing or cancelling a requirement;
• Strive to stabilize defense expenditure and maintain a long-term planning
predictability through the development of a sliding-scale budget outlook for the
current fiscal year with a four-year outlook;
• Rationalize structures and functions of current training and educational activities and
institutes; maximize educational capacities and programs both at home and abroad;
• In terms of military capabilities, retain the tactical Air Force for defending the
country’s airspace, supporting land forces and taking part in joint operations;
withdraw the Mi-24/35 attack helicopters from active service (not interoperable by
NATO standards); reassess mobilization needs, primarily retain and develop the HN
Support (HNS, i.e. capacities for the operational preparation of the territory to receive
allied support); increase interoperability, deployability and sustainability of the forces
according to NATO standards; commit to material and equipment that will most likely
be deployed in operations within the next five years and achieve a high added value;
fulfill tasks within NATO’s Network Enabled Capability (NEC), i.e. the NATO’s
integrated information environment; increase the protection of deployed forces by
strengthening the capacities of unexploded ordnance disposal and improvise explosive
device (IED) protection;
• Invest in research, development and innovations, and concentrate efforts in
perspective areas such as unmanned and robotic devices, cybernetic systems and
applications focused on cybernetic security;
• Support cooperation in the field of military defense and civil security research;
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• Search for ways of sharing, interconnecting or in the joint development of military
capabilities with NATO/EU allies;
• Decrease the scope and number of military training areas so as to be appropriate to the
Czech armed forces’ needs (Ibid).
The publication further states that “the expected character of operations call for deploying
smaller units capable of maintaining a high operational tempo and minimising logistical
demand. Their effectiveness is increased by reduction of numbers and unification of the types
of armament; equipment is highly reliable and economical; command and control systems are
effective and supported by appropriate technologies for gathering information by using
sensors, processing, distributing and sharing information in real time throughout the entire
spectrum of forces. They operate in the system of Network Enabled Capability (NEC) with
high level of cybernetic protection and interoperability with the allied systems.” (Ibid: 96).
The document also specifically works with the experience of the Czech armed forces’
deployment in Afghanistan, when it stresses the necessity of proper coordination between
military and civilian capabilities, pointing to the PRT Logar and missions in the Balkans as to
the good examples of CIMIC cooperation. It further calls for creation of a national lists of
experts55 with appropriate training to be sent abroad, as necessary, and underscores the
importance of civilian and military lessons learned such training has to reflect, and include
variety of activities (like survival courses, military planning, rules of engagement, etc.) (Ibid:
97). The strong emphasis on the role of subject matter experts and their utilization during
counterinsurgency operations is consistent with the broader NATO counterinsurgency
strategy.
The publication further calls for efficient cooperation among central administrative
offices for adequately “coordinating international and security policy, as well as for
formulating approaches to key missions such as cybernetic protection, comprehensive crisis
response or counter-terrorism measures” (Ibid). This statement is particularly important due
to its deliberate wording – the concept of counterinsurgency is not present in the document,
whereas the terms counter-terrorism and comprehensive crisis response are. This fact serves
as further evidence supporting the hypothesis about gradual regression from the ambitious
counterinsurgency missions after the NATO Afghan experience. It also serves as an indication
that counterinsurgency is subordinate to comprehensive crisis response, since counter- 55 It, however, is not clear from the document how such a list would be systematically created, structured or
used.
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terrorism deployments of military force don’t usually include stabilization activities, unless
understood from the broader counter-terrorism perspective. The White Paper doesn’t,
however, provide any clarification of the terms and the roles of armed forces in these types of
operation, or what is understood by them, causing confusion and bringing another layer of
discrepancy to the research of the Czech counterinsurgency approach.
Moreover, the White Paper notes that “in an armed conflict, coordinated cooperation
between the Czech Armed Forces, governmental, nongovernmental as well as international
organizations play a significant role. Its success is dictated by respecting fundamental
principles that the organizations follow (i.e. impartiality, independence and neutrality in case
of non-governmental organizations) and knowing their missions, mandates and capacities.
Adequate training of experts at a national level and engagement in multinational projects is
essential for accomplishing operational missions and running effective cooperation among
the Czech Armed Forces, governmental, non-governmental as well as international
organizations.” (Ibid). In the other words, familiarization with all of all of the actors, who
would be a part of the deployed contingent, along with coordination activities among them
need to begin in already in the early pre-deployment phase, in order to facilitate easier
interoperability, mutual understanding and cooperation and coordination of activities. The
White Paper further presents a set of long-term recommendations in this regard:
“In the long-term, the following activities shall be supported:
• building awareness of different attitudes to responding to crisis situations by various
actors and the necessity of their mutual cooperation;
• sharing information on crisis and conflict areas. Bearing in mind that the emergence
of crises is an unpredictable factor, this capability must be institutionalised,
continuous and inclusive of external experts (outside the public administration), such
as members of the academia and security communities;
• collection, evaluation and sharing of lessons learned from activities by civilian and
military components in responding to crisis situations both in the Czech Republic and
abroad, and their application in personnel training;
• capability development of CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) units.” (Ibid: 97-98).
The CIMIC capabilities of the Czech armed forces were among the underdeveloped
capabilities of the Czech armed forces. First CIMIC teams were created in 1998 and with their
gradually increasing importance as part of military tasks and missions. The Czech CIMIC
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units participated in missions in Bosnia & Herzegovina (SFOR), Kosovo (KFOR), Iraq
(NTM-I) and Afghanistan (ISAF), what indicates a certain counterinsurgency component in
varying level in all four theaters.
Document Dlouhodobý výhled pro obranu 2030 (Long-Term Defense Outlook
2030; 2015) contains the data highly relevant for study of the Czech approach to
counterinsurgency. Building on a basis of forecasted future strategic environment, the
document discusses most likely forms of future deployments of the Czech armed forces,
contemplates implications of these deployments on development of military capabilities and
outlines major presumptions and prerequisites that need to be met in order to meet the level of
required military capability. The document builds upon legal provisions and strategic
documents of the Czech Republic and draws the main principles from security and defense
documents of NATO and the EU. The document also creates framework for elaboration of a
concept of capability-building of the Czech Armed Forces.
The document accurately reflects the trends and tendencies occurring in the global
security environment. The list of the major future security challenges includes hybrid warfare,
weak governance, failed states, spread of extremism, the phenomenon of foreign fighters,
ethnic and religious conflict, climate change or migrant flows (Ministerstvo obrany ČR
2015a: 6-7). What the document doesn’t include is a notion of insurgencies posing a major
challenge to peace and security in the broader security environment, indicating, again, the
tendency to avoid the insurgency label.
The character of future security environment also requires adequate capabilities and
resources for effective mitigation/elimination of the challenges it poses. The Outlook
document mentions rapid response and strategic distance capabilities; full-spectrum
operational capabilities for large-scale, corps missions; flexibility, increased readiness and
mobility of forces; international cooperation, and increased combat readiness of NATO and
the EU in particular; comprehensive approach56 (Ibid: 7). The capabilities included in this list
suggest not only reference to the key security documents of the Czech Republic, NATO and
the EU, but also indicate an inspiration by the Afghanistan experience, and don’t a priori
exclude deployment of the armed forces to counterinsurgency mission. Quite contrary, all the
capabilities included in the list are required and critically important to have for effective and
successful NATO counterinsurgency missions.
56 The document defines comprehensive approach as “the ability of all components of armed forces to execute
joint operations, and the ability to execute combined operations with participation of intelligence, military and civilian elements on traditional battlefield, as well as in cyberspace and media space.” (Ministerstvo obrany ČR
2015a: 7; translated by IH).
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The document continues with forecasting the most likely character of future Czech
armed forces’ deployments. It considers the Czech contribution to multinational operations
(NATO, EU, UN) outside the Czech territory as the most likely and the most frequent form of
deployment in the next 20 years, and determines that it will be a formation of task force,
“drawn from the organic units, complemented by other capability modules, as required, like
combat support service and combat logistics in particular” (Ibid: 8; translated by IH). What
is also noteworthy is the specification of capabilities the Czech armed forces should have at
their disposal, if deployed in Article 5 operations as well as crisis management operations, i.e.
aerial supremacy and air support of land forces, firepower superiority, maximal protection of
deployed forces, information dominance, real time situational, area of operation awareness,
flexibility and mobility of units, joint activities of all components of the deployed armed
forces, and individual special capabilities and logistical support on long distance range (Ibid:
9). Again, development and maintenance of all of these listed capabilities are key for maintain
initiative and overall effectiveness of counterinsurgency missions in general as well.
Achieving an appropriate level of standardization in accordance with NATO standards
is designated as priority in the document (Ibid: 10). Another noteworthy requirement, as
stated in the document, is represented by the active utilization of lessons learned57 and the
possibility of expert consultations based on the Reach Back system58 (Ibid). The concept of
Reach Back system was not included in the previous strategic documents, and thus signals an
innovation in the Czech military environment. In the context of counterinsurgency campaign,
being able to use such system would greatly help troops deployed on the ground with timely
decision-making, potentially increasing effectiveness of the counterinsurgents, as it would
help avoid cultural misunderstandings or low level of awareness about tribal relations in a
HN. Such system has not been used by the Czech armed forces in any of the
counterinsurgency missions they contributed to. Therefore, it represents an important
innovation in the Czech military environment.
The document further stresses the important continuance of efforts to develop
specialized capabilities, essential for their deployability in out-of-area missions, and with a
significant added value of the Czech armed forces in the context of the Czech NATO
commitments. There are two major areas of specialization of the Czech armed forces: (1)
57 The document doesn’t, however, specify, how the lessons learned are meant to be systematically catalogued
and stored. It, however, correlates with the provisions stated in the White Paper about the need of having a list of
subject matter experts potentially available (see p. 122). 58 Defined as a “system of information support Reach Back represents a capability of providing the commander
and headquarters staff of the units in a mission with timely and credible expert information from external
sources” (Ibid: 10; translated by IH).
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protection against weapons of mass destruction and (2) passive surveillance system as part of
ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) (Ibid). Seven key
capabilities then represent a core of any capability-building efforts – prepare; project; engage;
sustain; consult, command, and control (C3); protect; and inform (Ibid: 12).
The key emphasis is put on the element of interoperability in all seven key capability
areas. The critical importance of counterinsurgency is further reinstated in connection to the
acquisition of weapon systems and other equipment, including interoperability with
international partners, primarily then NATO and the EU (Ibid: 17). These seven capability
areas are necessary to fulfill NATO commitments as well as execute all required missions and
tasks successfully. The capability-development of the Czech armed forces also has to reflect
the strategic relevance of individual capabilities in general terms, and need to be developed
accordingly (special operation forces or real-time complex awareness about the area of
operation) (Ibid: 13-15).
Based on all of the imperatives and principles stated above, the likelihood of the
deployment of the Czech armed forces to counterinsurgency (by nature and mandate, not their
designation label) missions in the future is still fairly high. Certain reluctance to work with the
concept of insurgency/counterinsurgency in most of the Czech strategic documents indicates
that future deployments will be limited in their scope and range, and not necessarily achieve
as high volume as ISAF did.
Potentially significant is the occurring discrepancy between the Doctrine of the Army
and other military strategic documents of the Czech Republic. The doctrine addresses the
counterinsurgency campaign theme is more complexity and detail and recognizes it as one of
the major 4 types of operation (see p. 117), but other potentially relevant documents don’t
mention or discuss the topic at all. Such discrepancy can lead to increased tension in terms the
same language used across the Czech military environment per se, friction over wording and
interpretation of mandate of deployed forces, misinterpretation of political decisions in the
military environment, or uncertainties during the forces’ preparation, education and training.
Koncepce výstavby Armády České republiky 2025 (Concept of Development of
Army of the Czech Republic; 2015) has relevance to this research as well. Not only it puts
forward main guidelines and principles of the future development of the Czech armed forces,
but also identifies the existing challenges and offers recommendations for the way ahead. The
document is closely linked to the Security Strategy, Defense Strategy and Long-term Outlook
publications, however, its relationships with the White Paper on Defense in largely
unspecified and unclear. The SWOT analysis of the current state of the Czech armed forces is
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realistic and critical, and includes criticism on not meeting a number of NATO standards,
resulting from a flawed transformation process of the Czech armed forces. No explicit or
direct reference to counterinsurgency can be found in the text of the document.
What the document mentions though is the impact foreign deployments had on the
Czech armed forces, and ISAF mission in particular, especially in terms of what problems,
weaknesses and challenges the foreign deployments exposed in terms of their capabilities and
equipment. Mainly negative impact of these foreign deployments is addressed, represented by
the “acquisition of the equipment reflecting urgent operational needs (…) led to limited
preparation of forces, commanders and headquarter staff for all main combat types,
significant wearing of material, overburdened personnel, and suppressed conceptualization
potential of the Czech armed forces development.” (Ministerstvo obrany ČR 2015b: 9).
This narrative is interesting when contrasted to the often claimed positive impacts of
the foreign deployments of the Czech military. One of the major issues with the ISAF mission
was, as several respondents disclosed, overloading and overburdening of only certain units of
the Czech army (expeditionary forces, special operations forces, forward aerial controllers,
etc.; see below). Such disproportion in the capabilities deployed then caused significant
discrepancies between individual units of the Czech armed forces in terms of their
preparation, education, training and combat or stabilization experience, potentially leading to
a leap of these prepared, educated, trained and experienced individuals or units being
deployed again, shall the opportunity or necessity arise, as the ministry and the General Staff
don’t have to invest too much money into their pre-deployment preparation. Even though
there were certain attempts to avoid this discrepancy, it largely remained a topical challenge.
The Concept also criticizes the insufficient level of interoperability both inside and
outside of the Czech armed forces, as well as inaccurate exploitation of full potential of the
military personnel (Ibid: 9-10). Among the strongest characteristics though, the document lists
the combat experience and level of preparedness of special operation forces, the potential of
military personnel for their future development (adaptability, flexibility and creativity) as well
as the strategic transport, reconnaissance and communication capabilities (Ibid: 9). All of
these forces and capabilities have been tested (and developed) during their deployments in
foreign missions, especially the KFOR and even more the ISAF missions, and provide a
strong basis for their further development and utilization to the future.
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5.3 Czech approach to counterinsurgency – practical dimension
5.3.1 Kosovo
One of the major foreign missions the Czech armed forces have been deployed to was NATO
operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo, the KFOR mission. KFOR has become the principal
foreign mission of the Czech Armed Forces in the Balkans. KFOR started operating on 12th
July, 1999 as a multinational peacekeeping operation under NATO command. The KFOR
mandate was established by a UN Security Council Resolution no. 1244,59 adopted on 10th
June, 1999, in order to provide resolution to the deep-rooted and dangerously escalated
ethnical nationalistic conflict between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Kosovar Albanians60. The
Resolution 1244 effectively established an international protectorate over the territory of
Kosovo under the auspices of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), serving in its capacity as
a transnational governance regime and administration over the territory. The security
dimension of the UNMIK mission was provided by the NATO-led mission KFOR. NATO
signed a Military Technical Agreement (MTA) with the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
and Serbia, since the Kosovo territory was still part of its sovereign territory.
The mandate of KFOR was to support the UNMIK mission and contribute to
establishing and preserving secure and stable environment for continuation of reconciliation,
negotiations and peace building activities between the opposing parties with the efforts to
transition to and establish sustainable democratic governance regime in Kosovo, allowing for
the ultimate withdrawal of the multinational military forces. The KFOR operation was
categorized as a UN Charter’s Chapter VII operation in capacity of a peacekeeping mission.
However, in reality the rules of engagement of KFOR troops as well as the form of practical
execution of the KFOR mandate was virtually peace enforcement with important
counterinsurgency features, as the author was told by plk. Ing. Hynek Pavlačka, Czech army
officer with extensive experience from Kosovo and Afghanistan operations and an UN
mission in the Democratic Republic of Kongo. Plk. Ing. Pavlačka was assigned as a military
liaison element to the UNMIK mission. Therefore, he didn’t take a direct part in KFOR
activities, but can be understood more of a direct observer of the mission and its execution.
59 Text of the Resolution 1244 can be accessed at https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement (retrieved on February 9, 2017). 60 For more information about the conflict in Kosovo see, for example, publication Religion and the Politics of
Identity in Kosovo by Ger Dujizings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), or Neighbors at War:
Anthropological Perspectives on Yugoslav Ethnicity, Culture, and History by Joel M. Halpern and David A.
Kideckel (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2000).
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Plk. Ing. Pavlačka shared with the author several examples of why he considered
KFOR as effectively a counterinsurgency campaign. In his view, what started as peace
enforcement with peace keeping mandate gradually progressed to counterinsurgency in
practice. He claims that KFOR troops have, couple times, been forced to overstep their rules
of engagement in order to either save own or civilian lives, or prevent severe violations of
human rights.
Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence on 17th February, 2008, in a move that
legally amounted for a violation of the 1244 Resolution. The declaration and events that
followed led to a strengthening of resistance by ethnic Serbs living still living in certain parts
of Kosovo, especially as KFOR significantly scaled down its numbers and limited its tasks.
The Serbian resistance wasn’t monolithic and had its active and passive elements. According
to plk. Ing. Pavlačka, the passive element of the resistance don’t recognize the efficiency of
violence in resistance, and resort to boycott of the Kosovar government bodies and
institutions and close collaboration with the Serbian authorities in Belgrade. The active
Serbian resistance adopted violent methods for manifestation of their discontent – they
organize demonstrations, build barricades or clashed with the KFOR forces, which they
perceive as strongly pro-Albanian. Plk. Ing. Pavlačka also disclosed that the ethnic Serbs
living in Kosovo keep their paramilitary security forces active and mobilized (they are
reportedly armed, well organized with united C2 structure and good means of
communication). The Serbian Defense Corps are not supposed to be armed, according the
existing legal framework in Kosovo, as their main tasks should be disaster relief (widespread
fires, etc.). However, facing increasingly confident Kosovo Albanians, the Kosovo Serbs
started providing arms and weapons to their defense units.
Tensions escalated twice throughout the KFOR deployment – in 2004 and in 2008.
According to plk. Ing. Pavlačka, it was in these two years when the pogroms of non-Albanian
ethnic groups (especially the Serbs) occurred in Kosovo. The KFOR forces had to prevent
mass violations of human rights. Nevertheless, the record of KFOR is disputable in this
regard, according to several first-hand accounts shared with the author. Reportedly, live
ammunition was also fired by the KFOR forces in order to restore order. Some accuse KFOR
of blocking the access of medical personnel or the UNMIK representatives (Krstic – Bytyci
2012). Such reports cannot, however, be independently verified.
The genesis of the Czech military presence in Kosovo can be divided into several
phases, reflecting the wider process of re-structuralization of KFOR itself. The Czech
Republic has contributed its forces to KFOR since its inception in 1999. It was the
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reconnaissance unit of 126 servicemen, followed by a mechanized unit. In February 2002, the
Czech military battalion was extended and integrated the Slovak military element into a joint
Czech-Slovak KFOR battalion that contributed to the Multinational Brigade CENTRE, with a
common ratio of 500 Czech and 100 Slovak military men and women.
In April 2005, the NATO operation Joint Guardian was restructured and renamed to
Joint Enterprise, with the Czech Republic becoming a lead nation of the mission for a year.
The Parliament of the Czech Republic approved the deployment amounting 660 military
personnel as part of the Multinational Task Force CENTRE (MNTF(C)), where a mechanized
unit was the core of the deployed contingent. The Czech Task Force eventually left its base at
Sajkovac in 2011, where their KFOR participation significantly changed and transformed into
the deployment of 9 Czech officers as part of the KFOR headquarters in Pristina. Currently,
11th Task Force of the Czech army is present (its mandate terminates in February 2017). The
key capabilities of this Czech Task Force are represented by 3 Czech specialists of the
Deployable Communication Module of the CIMIC unit of the Czech army (Ministerstvo
obrany ČR – KFOR).
The Czech army capabilities deployed to KFOR and their assigned tasks have been
widely variable during the development of the KFOR mission itself. Reconnaissance unit and
an aerial component were gradually complemented by a mechanized unit, guard teams as well
as the CIMIC unit, newly created with limited experience from Bosnia, and Military Police
forces. 4th Rapid Deployment Brigade then replaced the reconnaissance capability already in
1999, suggesting the practical character of the mission. In the other words, deployment of
forces trained in rapid deployment and combat to a peacekeeping mission may indicate its
significant enforcement dimension. The main tasks assigned to the Czech KFOR troops was
to monitor and guard the border between Kosovo and Serbia and its surrounding areas,
registering and allowing for a safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs),
along with creating an environment favorable to reconciliation and peaceful coexistence
between the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs living in Kosovo (Kosovo Force 2017).
The CIMIC unit also started to closely cooperate and coordinate with the Czech NGO
People in Need, and contributed to the initiatives aimed at reconstruction of schools, or with
other Czech companies engaged in reconstruction of the area. These mandated tasks are very
significant for the purposes of this thesis. The Czech Army’s CIMIC units engaging in
reconstruction and development, simultaneously with the military force executing tasks of
providing for a secure and stable environment and elimination of potential threats fits the
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conceptual framework of counterinsurgency, as established in the theoretical/conceptual part
of this thesis.
The Czech special operations forces, the 601st Special Forces Group, were also
actively participating in the KFOR operation. Most of the information regarding their
activities and foreign deployments is classified. However, their official website suggests that
they were present in Kosovo as part of KFOR in the period from 1999 to 2006. The KFOR
experience was also confirmed by two members of the Czech special operations forces,
without providing any further details, the author interviewed.
Other evidence validating the argument about the significant counterinsurgency
element of the KFOR mission can be interpreted as the mandated task to provide secure and
stable environment for peace effort and democratic development of the society in Kosovo,
after the reconstruction in 2002, when the area of responsibility of the Czech-Slovak battalion
expanded. The main concrete tasks of the Czech military forces by then were to irregular
search operations, checkpoint controls, escorting people and vehicles, riot control, training,
assistance and oversight of the Kosovo Protection Corps or assistance to UNMIK.
Furthermore, the contribution of the military element to the reconstruction and humanitarian
efforts was explicitly stated (cf. Kosovo Force 2017; Ministerstvo obrany ČR – KFOR II –
Česko-slovenský prapor, od 2/2002, Kosovo, 2 400 příslušníků). During the escalated violence
in 2004, the Czech KFOR contingent as a protective element of the Serbian population in
Kosovo, their property, but also the cultural heritages (like churches, which were a popular
target for the Kosovo Albanians as they put a number of them on fire), according to some of
the respondents, who were deployed to Kosovo. Since 2005, the Czech contingent was
expanded by inclusion of artillery unit, and later air wing of military helicopters Mi-17 in
2007 (Ibid). Main tasks in this period included border monitoring, provision of security to
ethnic minorities and the cultural heritage sites. As NATO has significantly scaled down its
forces since 2008, the counterinsurgency element of the KFOR mission has been reduced as
well.
The mandate stated like this perfectly fits any counterinsurgency handbook, as it
basically covers the full spectrum of efforts of counterinsurgency operations in general,
especially the NATO-preferred CHB counterinsurgency approach (see pp. 99-100). Certain
limitation of classifications of the KFOR mission as peacekeeping or peace enforcement can
be underscored by two arguments: (1) peacekeeping efforts usually don’t require active
creation of the stable environment by the peacekeeping forces, and (2) peace enforcement
forces don’t commonly execute stabilization tasks and do not actively contribute to
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reconstruction tasks. Moreover, both peace keeping and peace enforcement don’t include
training and assistance mission by default.
In the other words, the argument about significant counterinsurgency dimension of
Czech military activity and tasks as part of KFOR is validated by the scope and range of the
tasks assigned to the forces. Indeed, drawing a conclusive inference is disputable as it is not
clear what the respondents considered as counterinsurgency or peace enforcement. However,
keeping in mind the framework provided by the 2010 version of the Doctrine of the Army of
the Czech Republic, the counterinsurgency narrative seems to fit the KFOR case in several
ways. First, the inherent CHB framework of the assigned tasks mirrors the CHB framework
presented in the theoretical/conceptual part of this thesis, i.e. clear the territory from
subversive violent elements (not labeled as insurgency in the Kosovo case, however!),
establish control and security environment, protect the population, assist in development of
their democratic institutions and train the security forces as well as active assistance in
reconstruction and humanitarian efforts. Second, the military dimension of the operation itself
also fits the counterinsurgency narrative, as the assigned task of conducting search operations
and deployment of special operations forces indicates offensive element in the Czech KFOR
deployment. Third, the Czech troops also directly supported and sought to facilitate
reconciliation efforts, which is one of the key components of counterinsurgency. As part of
KFOR, they also indirectly contributed to the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration
(DDR) efforts, by monitoring the flow of good crossing the border, which included arms
smuggling. Importantly, the original mandate of KFOR doesn’t allow for clear identification
of the parties that could function as insurgency in this KFOR counterinsurgency argument, a
fact, that limits the argument itself, but doesn’t entirely deny or falsify it.
5.3.2 Iraq
Another significant foreign deployment of the Czech armed forces with strong
counterinsurgency framing was represented by their participation in the Multinational Force -
Iraq (MNF – Iraq), aka operation Iraqi Freedom, and in the NATO Training Mission – Iraq
(NTM-I). The involvement of Czech military forces in Iraq was, however, limited in its scope.
Importantly, disclaimer: this thesis doesn’t intend to discuss the justification, legality or
legitimacy of the entire operation Iraqi Freedom, nor it seeks to address the evolution of the
operation itself in its complexity, character of the insurgency or overall security landscape, all
of its external and internal aspects or intended or unintended consequences. The focus of this
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thesis remains strictly placed on the participation of the Czech Republic in counterinsurgency
efforts in the country, put into the perspective of broader, but relevant or closely related
counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq.
The coalition campaign against Iraq in March 2003 was carried out by a coalition of
forces from different countries, some of which were NATO member countries and some were
not. NATO as an organization had no role in the planning or decision-making of the operation
to undertake or conduct it (cf. NATO 2015a). The operation was named Iraqi Freedom, an
apparent reference to the operational Enduring Freedom with the aim of underscoring the
presumed counter terrorism (al-Qaeda) connection and connotation. The stated objectives of
MNF-I were to stabilize the security situation in the post-invasion environment and after the
ouster of the regime of Saddam Hussein, and to restore the basic administrative and governing
functions, and provision of services to the population. The Resolution of the UN Security
Council no. 1637 (2005)61 then provided the MNF-I with its clear mandate.
Mirroring the development of the situation on the ground, the operation Iraqi Freedom
was gradually shaped and framed as counterinsurgency, a process which culminated in the
installation of four-star Gen. David Petraeus as Commanding General of the MNF-I from
February 2007 to September 2008. As commander of MNF-I, he then oversaw all coalition
forces present in Iraq. Gen. Petraeus is also, along with Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, the
overseeing commander of the publication of FM 3-24 on Counterinsurgency. As the “world’s
leading expert in counterinsurgency warfare, Gen. Petraeus then implemented his
counterinsurgency expertise in Iraq, and published his “Commander’s Counterinsurgency
Guidance” to help guide the coalition forces in Iraq, later re-issued in Afghanistan (see p. 79).
This guide is, however, relevant for the research of the Czech counterinsurgency approach
only partially,62 due to the limited number of the Czech contribution to the MNF-I.
The Czech government along with both chambers of the Czech Parliament approved
the deployment of the Czech element to the MNF-I gradually from December 2003 to
December 2008, when the Czech armed forces were withdrawn. At its highest peak, 300
Czech servicemen and women were deployed to Iraq. The time frame of the Czech
participation suggests the relevance of the Gen. Petraeus’ counterinsurgency guidance for the
activities and tasks of the Czech forces. But again, their involvement was rather limited (423
61 Text of Resolution 1637 can be accessed at http://gjpi.org/wp-content/uploads/res16371.pdf (retrieved on
February 9, 2017). 62 Can be found at
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20081031_art004.pdf
(retrieved on February 9, 2017).
133
in total), especially in comparison to their mission in Afghanistan. The number of the
deployed Czech personnel steadily decreased to 17 servicemen comprising the last, 5th Czech
contingent deployed to the MNF-I before they were ultimately withdrawn in December 2008.
The main tasks of the Czech MNF-I element were to defend and protect the base of the
multinational forces close to the City of Basra, and performance of certain police and law
enforcement tasks outside the base perimeter, under the British command, as part of the
Multi-National Division South-East. The Czech troops also worked as instructors training and
assisting the Iraqi military in maintenance and service of Iraqi T-72 tanks and BVP-1 infantry
fighting vehicles, given the extensive experience the Czech military has with these types of
equipment.
Another mission the Czech Republic contributed its military forces to was the NATO
Training Mission – Iraq (NTM-I). The number of the Czech soldiers deployed to this
operation was small, 4 people, located at the NTM’s headquarters in Baghdad. NATO didn’t
have a direct role in the international stabilization efforts in post-invasion Iraq, the Alliance
contributed to the efforts to help Iraqi military to gain a sustainable level of operational
capability in order to take over the responsibility for the security in Iraq by the Iraqi armed
forces. NATO helped to train the Iraqi military and police personnel and supported the
development of Iraq’s security institutions in order to develop a democratically-led and
enduring security sector. NATO also functioned as a coordinator of the delivery of the
equipment for the forces of its members deployed in Iraq for the Iraqi forces. The mission was
established in 2004 and its mandate expired on 31st December, 2011, as the agreement about
the legal status of the NATO troops in Iraq past 2011 wasn’t reached with the governing Iraqi
regime. Importantly, the NTM-I was set up at the request of the Iraqi Interim Government and
in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution no. 1546 (2004),63 that established
mandate of the NTM-I as training and mentoring of the Iraqi security forces, as well as
equipment donation and coordination of its delivery. The Alliance also established a
structured cooperation framework to develop its long-term strategic partnership with Iraq
(NATO 2015b).
The Czech armed forces’ CIMIC unit was also deployed in Iraq in 2003. Its mission
was to contribute to the humanitarian operation in the City of Basra from May to December
2003, and its concrete tasks included area assessment, reconstruction of school and delivery of
the humanitarian aid in close cooperation with Czech NGOs (like ADRA, Člověk v tísni
63 Text of Resolution 1546 can be accessed at https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/381/16/PDF/N0438116.pdf?OpenElement (retrieved on February 9, 2017).
134
(People in Need), Červený kříž (Red Cross), Česká katolická charita (Czech Catholic
Charity), and the Stonožka (Centipede) movement). (Ministerstvo obrany ČR - 103. centrum
CIMIC-PSYOPS2004-Irák). The Iraq deployment cannot, however, be included into the
overall analysis of the Czech counterinsurgency approach, given its short time length. 2003
was also a year of post-invasion stabilization and reconstruction efforts, not
counterinsurgency per se yet.
Czech special operation forces, the 601st Special Forces Group, were also deployed to
Iraq in 2004 as part of the MNF-I (website). Any details about their mission and tasks are,
however, not available. Only discussions and speculations can be led about their assignment –
whether they were deployed to counter the threat of the rising insurgent threat in Iraq.
Nevertheless, this argument can be countered by the absence of any records of their later
deployments in Iraq, when the insurgency was at its peak. Therefore, it is more likely, that the
Czech special operation forces were committed to the efforts of searching, capturing or killing
of the highest representatives of the overthrown Baath regime, or perhaps Saddam Hussein
himself.
The main counterinsurgency tasks performed by the Czech military then included
guarding the perimeter of a multinational base and conducting police and law enforcement
tasks outside its perimeter until 2008. The geographical location of the Czech contingents was
the calmest and more peaceful area of Iraq that didn’t suffer from the escalation of violent
extremism, thereby the Czech experience with counterinsurgency activities is rather limited,
especially in the last year of their deployment, when the operation Iraqi Freedom increasingly
started to be framed as counterinsurgency, along with the application of counterinsurgency
principles on the ground by the MNF-I Commander Gen. Petraeus. What was also a
significant contribution to the overall counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq was the Czech
participation in the training and advising role of the HN forces by the coalition forces. The
reported deployment of the Czech special operations forces in Iraq cannot, however, be
considered as being linked to the coalition counterinsurgency campaign in the country.
Therefore, even though some elements potentially shaping the Czech counterinsurgency
approach can be identified from this deployment, the overall impact can be understood as
limited.
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5.3.3 Afghanistan
The best exemplary case for efforts of researching the Czech counterinsurgency approach is
the Czech involvement in the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Importantly,
disclaimer: this thesis doesn’t intend to address the overall NATO mission in Afghanistan, its
progress, success or effectiveness, in its entire complexity, nor it seeks to provide an
exhaustive assessment of the insurgency with all of its objectives, preferred courses of action,
evolution or sources of external support, unless directly linked to the issue of Czech approach
to counterinsurgency. The author doesn’t aim to provide a complex and comprehensive
analysis of the developments of the security situation, or at the political level, in Afghanistan
or exhaustive introduction into the genesis of ISAF and OEF-A either, as well as she doesn’t
discuss the activities not directly linked to the NATO/Czech counterinsurgency efforts (like
activities and operations of UNAMA or EUPOL) in more detail, only in terms of how they
contributed to the overall Czech counterinsurgency approach and efforts. The focus of this
thesis remains placed strictly on the Czech missions and efforts, contributions to the NATO
counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, put into the perspective of broader, but still only
relevant and related NATO counterinsurgency efforts in the country.
It is also important to understand the framework as well as the key principles and
mechanics of the NATO counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. Two foreign missions
were authorized to take place in Afghanistan by the UN Security Council resolutions, i.e.
operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A)64 and the International Security
Assistance Mission (ISAF), both executed in parallel, under the same C2 structure65, but with
different mandates in the same area of operations. In practice, however, given the joint chain
of command, the two operations merged, as confirmed by interviewed respondents. The U.S.
military personnel on the ground, according to their accounts, sometimes didn’t even know
themselves where they were assigned tasks under the OEF-A banner or ISAF. Indeed, running
two parallel missions without clear borderline between the two creates more confusion in
conceptual and theoretical terms, although in practice, no such confusion was mostly
noticeable, and the missions supplemented one another and supported their objectives. An
64 OEF-A has frequently also been referred to simply as operation Enduring Freedom, creating a certain level of
confusion by the inclarity of the meaning of the term in the context it was used. 65 The ISAF Joint Command Headquarters in Kabul changed its organizational structure with the aim of
increasing effectiveness of the ISAF chain of command in the increasingly complex security environment and
with the transition to the new preferred doctrine of counterinsurgency. Strategic and every-day operational
functions of the headquarters were separated, and commanders were interconnected to each other. The
organizational structure then included higher strategic command, ISAF headquarters, two operational
headquarters IJC, along with NTM-A headquarters (Kurej 2011).
136
argument can be raised regarding the relationship of superiority between the two missions. As
already stated in the conceptual chapter of this text, the OEF-A is considered supplementary
to ISAF, as counterterrorism operations are often one preferred course of action within the
broader counterinsurgency framework, since the terrorism tactic is a popular modus operandi
of insurgents. Therefore, both OEF-A and ISAF are subjected to analysis and included in this
research.
OEF-A lasted from 7th October 2001 to 31st December 2014, and was a reaction to the
historically first activation of the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty about collective self-
defense in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on New York City and Washington, DC on 9th
September 2001. The legal mandate was given to it by the UN SC Resolution no. 1368
(2001)66 which, adopted unanimously, strongly condemned the terrorist attacks on the US and
called on all countries to cooperate in bringing the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the
attacks to justice, and that those responsible for harboring or supporting the perpetrators,
organizers or sponsors would be held accountable. The document also called upon the
international community to increase its efforts aimed at suppressing and preventing future
terrorist activities through cooperation and implementation of anti-terrorist conventions and
all relevant UN SC resolutions, particularly Resolution no. 1269 (1999)67 regarding
combating terrorism (UNSC 2001). Effectively, OEF-A was then counterterrorism operation,
whose theaters included not only Afghanistan, but also the Philippines, Somalia, Pankisi
Gorge in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan or the Sahara (so-called Maghreb) region, virtually anywhere
where the terrorist network al-Qaeda, the designated perpetrator of the terrorist attacks of the
9th September, 2001, established its presence, franchise or recruiting and support base. OEF-
A was initiated as a joint U.S., U.K. and Afghan operation in October 2001, and the rest of
NATO joined the campaign in 2003, after assuming its leading role of ISAF. This observation
can serve as yet another argument highlighting the practical merge of the two operations.
The decision to established International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was
adopted during the Bonn conference in December 2001. Its mandate was set by 18 UN SC
Resolutions – i.e. resolutions no. 1368, 1413,68 1444,69 1510,70 156371, 1623,72 1707,73 1776,74
66 Text of Resolution 1368 can be accessed at https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement (retrieved February 9, 2017) 67 The text of Resolution 1269 can be accessed at https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/303/92/PDF/N9930392.pdf?OpenElement (retrieved on February 3, 2017). 68 Text of Resolution 1413 can be accessed at https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/397/33/PDF/N0239733.pdf?OpenElement (retrieved on February 9, 2017). 69 Text of Resolution 1444 can be accessed at https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/397/33/PDF/N0239733.pdf?OpenElement (retrieved on February 9, 2017).
137
181775, 1833,76 1890,77 1917,78 2011,79 2041,80 2069,81 2096,82 2120,83 2145,84 and 218985
which only further highlights the strong legal basis of the mission. ISAF was then first
deployed to Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan authorities with its original mandate,
authorized by the UN SC, was to assist the Afghan Transnational Authority, elected during
the Bonn conference, in maintenance of security in the capital Kabul and its surrounding areas
with the primary aim to enable the operations and activities of the UN agencies and the
Afghan government itself in the secure and stable environment and supporting the
reconstruction efforts. Although ISAF was not a UN force, it was a UN-mandated
international force under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter.86 The Afghan insurgency,
represented mainly, but not only by the Taliban movement, was still in its pre-natal stages,
recovering from the defeat they sustained during the initial phase of OEF-A. The mission was
initially limited to the Kabul area, with the intentional to gradually extent its area of operation
throughout the country as the influence and control of the central Kabul government would be 70 Text of Resolution 1510 can be accessed at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1510(2003) (retrieved on February 9, 2017). 71 Text of Resolution 1563 can be accessed at
http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1563.pdf (retrieved on February 9, 2017). 72 Text of Resolution 1623 can be accessed at http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1623.pdf
(retrieved on February 9, 2017). 73 Text of Resolution 1707 can be accessed at http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1707.pdf
(retrieved February 9, 2017). 74 Text of Resolution 1776 can be accessed at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1776(2007) (retrieved February 9, 2017). 75 Text of Resolution 1817 can be accessed at https://www.incb.org/documents/PRECURSORS/Resolutions-
Precursors/SecurityCouncilRes1817.2008.pdf (retrieved February 9, 2017). 76 Text of Resolution 1833 can be accessed at http://www.mofa.go.jp/ICSFiles/afieldfile/2009/08/21/1833.pdf
(retrieved on February 9, 2017). 77 Text of resolution 1890 can be accessed at http://afghanistan-un.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/sres1890_2009.pdf (retrieved February 9, 2017). 78 Text of Resolution 1917 can be accessed at
https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/march222010scunamamandate.pdf (retreved on February 9,
2017). 79 Text of Resolution 2011 can be accessed at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2011(2011) (retrieved on February 9, 2017). 80 Text of Resolution 2041 can be accessed at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2041(2012) (retrieved February 9, 2017). 81 Text of Resolution 2069 can be accessed at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2069(2012) (retrieved February 9, 2017). 82 Text of Resolution 2096 can be accessed at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2096(2013) (retrieved on February 9, 2017). 83 Text of Resolution 2120 can be accessed at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2120(2013) (retrieved on February 9, 2017). 84 Text of Resolution 2145 can be accessed at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2145(2014) (retrieved on February 9, 2017). 85 Text of Resolution 2189 can be accessed at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2189%20(2014) (retrieved on February 9, 2017). 86 Text of the Chapter VII can be accessed at http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/ (retrieved on
February 3, 2017). Articles 42-47 are most relevant to ISAF. Initially, ISAF was then launched as a peace
keeping operation which with the gradual spread and rise of insurgency transformed into peace enforcement and
ultimately counterinsurgency.
138
spreading across the country’s provinces. The ISAF nations assumed the command of the
mission on a six months rotational basis. Along the way, the ISAF Commander also signed a
detailed Military Technical Agreement with the Afghan Transnational Authority in January
2002, which provided additional guidance for ISAF and its operations.
NATO assumed leadership of ISAF in August 2003, and NATO became responsible
for the command, coordination and planning of the operation, including the provision of a
force commander and its multinational headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan (NATO
2015c). In October 2003, the UN SC Resolution no. 151087 extended ISAF’s mandate to
cover the entire country. The expansion of the mission happened in 4 stages:
• Stage 1 – to the north
• Stage 2 – to the west
• Stage 3 – to the south
• Stage 4 – to the east (with ISAF effectively taking responsibility across the
entire country, and ISAF regional commands were established in their
respective area of responsibility) (Ibid).
The expansion of ISAF, and thus the expansion of the NATO’s area of operations, was
completed in October 2006, when the command of eastern Afghanistan was taken from the
US-led coalition. This fact further supports the argument about a symbiotic relationship
existing between OEF-A and ISAF. The expansion was also reflected in the revised
operational plan, which conceptualized the greater role of ISAF in the country. The revised
operational plan included the deployment of ISAF training and mentoring teams to Afghan
National Army units at various levels of command, while retaining its initial tasks of
providing secure environment for reconstruction efforts, and support to the central Afghan
government. Already during the stage 1, NATO adopted the model of PRTs as the most
suitable one for the reconstruction of Afghanistan in highly unstable security environment,
and the military components of the already existing PRTs were subdued under the NATO
command. The expansion of the ISAF mandate was also mirrored by the growing number of
forces, capabilities and resources deployed in the mission.
The ISAF mission had two major dimensions:
• Capacity building and transitioning to Afghan lead (NATO provided support to the
Afghan government and international community in security sector reform (SSR),
87 Text of Resolution 1510 can be accessed at http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1510.pdf
(retrieved on February 3, 2017).
139
including mentoring, training and operational support to the Afghan National Army
(ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) with the aim of building professional,
independent and sustainable forces able to provide security to the population across
the country; this task was executed simultaneously by the NATO Training Mission
Afghanistan (NTM-A), ISAF’s Joint Command (IJC) and the EU Police Mission in
Afghanistan (EUPOL88), along with other important national actors with clear division
of responsibilities89); and
• Support for reconstruction and development (contribution to the reconstruction and
development efforts by securing areas in which reconstruction work was conducted by
national or international actors, mainly in the PRT framework90; in close coordination
with UNAMA, ISAF provided practical support for reconstruction and development
efforts as well as support for humanitarian assistance conducted by other actors)
(Ibid).
Such framing of the ISAF’s mandate indicates NATO’s efforts to create as comprehensive
framework for ISAF operation as possible, in close cooperation with other national and
international partners. However, for instance, the structure of the HN capability-building
efforts, divided among three different entities with seemingly clear division of responsibility,
can prove to be very challenging in practical terms and potentially also undermining certain
key attributes of counterinsurgency. It not only gravely increases the bureaucratic burden of
all activities and efforts by the international coalition in Afghanistan, potentially challenging
the processes of transition, and communication and coordination between the respective
organs, particularly with separate EU framework of operations.
Such structure can also undermine the counterinsurgency actions in a sense of not
adhering to the unity of command imperative. The overall security sector reform was also
technically and practically flawed, with potentially negative consequences in the long-term
outlook, as it sought to copy the Western model of security sector, with centralized
democratic oversight over the armed forces.
88 EUPOL didn’t, however, have the mandate to leave the compound. 89 NTM-A was responsible for the training of initial recruits and building institutional training capability of the
ANSF, whereas IJC focused on developing fielded ANSF units through mentoring, advice and assistance. 90 PRTs also helped the Afghan authorities strengthen their institutions as part of wider efforts to establish good
governance and the rule of law and to promote human rights in the country, with the goal of building Afghan
capacity, support the growth of governance structures and promote environment in which governance can
improve. Mirroring the transition process, all PRTs canceled their operations by the end of 2014, and handed
over their functions to the Afghan government, traditional development actors, NGOs and the private sector
(NATO 2015c).
140
Local ownership of the SSR process has been often emphasized as the key attribute of the
SSR in post-conflict environments. However, Afghanistan was not in a post-conflict state, but
the SSR has been carried out in the environment of a continuing low intensity conflict91. As
distinguished expert on Afghanistan Antonio Giustozzi notes political authority in
Afghanistan has remained highly contested, and the profound level of insecurity has ensured
that locals have been preoccupied with short-term survival more that any efforts to manage,
let alone plan for their security sector. Moreover, Afghan capacity to initiate or mitigate
reform has been seriously damaged by decades of continuous conflict environment, and the
SSR has been deeply intertwined with the politically charged state-building efforts (Giustozzi
2008: 215-232). Local ownership of the SSR in Afghanistan has thus been absent or very
minimal, which led to lack of accountability of the state itself in terms of its control and
oversight mechanisms over the armed forces. The challenge of the minimal local ownership
also undermined efforts aimed promoting nationalistic feeling among the recruits.
Another major challenge for the ANSF capacity building was represented by the realities
on the ground and the necessity to fight the insurgent anti-government elements in order to
secure and stabilize the country. Additionally, the revised operational plan of ISAF put
additional pressure on building the ANSF as primarily counterinsurgency force, instead of
regular national armed forces system. Such tendency was understandable in a short-term, but
had (and will continue to have) negative impact and consequences in long-term projections.
Some of these implications has manifested after the ISAF mission was terminated and
replaced by the NATO training mission Resolute Support, like the huge disproportionality in
preparedness of difference armed forces components (very well trained and equipped Afghan
special operation forces vs. ill-equipped and unprepared border guards, let alone the Afghan
air force), that reflected the priorities of the counterinsurgency/counterterrorism campaign.
Assistance in reconstruction was very significant endeavor. Nonetheless, it was met with a
critical challenge of balancing the neutrality, impartiality and independence of NGOs and
their activities in the absence of permissible security environment. The concept of PRTs is
one of the most effective concepts of CIMIC cooperation in stabilization and reconstruction in
theory, but it faces multiple challenges and obstacles when implemented, like the perception
of civilian workers as a party of conflict by the locals (as confirmed by all of the respondents
91 The SSR in post-2001 Afghanistan has been established with the understanding and perception that the
adversary was defeat. Initial warning signs were ignored and the realities on the ground in Afghanistan gravely
misunderstood. For more on this topic, see Bergen, P. – Tiedermann, K. (2013): Talibanistan: Negotiating the
Borders between Terror, Politics, and Religion (OUP USA), or Giustozzi, A. (2012): Decoding the New
Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (Hurst Publishers).
141
interviewed). Other NGOs refused military protection in order to avoid such a perception and
to maintain their impartial status. In the unstable security environment of Afghanistan, with
the widespread culture of impunity, NGOs have, however, become a target of several violent
attacks92 several times already. The NGOs operating independently without military
protection thus can become victimized by a widespread perception, where in the eyes of
Afghans foreign civilian reconstruction and humanitarian workers along with their local
employees are associated with military force accompanying them. Targeting of NGOs can
also be understood in the context of increasing adoption of the civilizational struggle and
jihadism narratives by the insurgents. This fact represents an additional challenge for
counterinsurgency campaigns. Technically, the concept of PRTs in a sense partially
undermines the principles stated in the Long-Term Outlook for the Czech defense sector,
about respecting and maintaining the status of civilian workers (see p. 86). The document
was, however, adopted after the Czech PRT Logar terminated its operations, and thereby a
clear argumentative connection cannot be established here. The stated principle may also be
promoted a lesson learned from the Afghan experience.
Main LOOs of the ISAF mission, which included protection of the population, ANSF
capability-building, support of socio-economic development, support of the regional and local
governance as well as elimination of insurgent activity were coordinated, synchronized and
conducted simultaneously, in conjunction with one another. Counterinsurgency doctrine was
then implemented through all five ISAF LOOs.
ISAF’s role progressively changed from leading operations to enabling the Afghan
security forces to conduct independent operations themselves, under the mentoring and
supervision of the coalition forces. Accordingly, the ISAF mission gradually evolved from the
one primarily focused on combat operation (military-centric counterinsurgency approach) to
an enabling Security Assistance Force (SAF) role, centered on training, advising and assisting
the HN security forces with the goal of preparing them to fully assume responsibilities for
security in the country by the end of 2014. This became the main focus of ISAF in 2011 and
onward.
With the evolution of the mission itself, its narrative framing as well as preferred
strategies for its execution changed with the dynamic security environment, the growing
Taliban insurgency, and also reflective of the developments in Iraq. The coalition forces surge
92 One of the most notable ones happened in Mazar-e Sharif on June 2, 2015 (see
http://www.voanews.com/a/ngo-employees-gunned-down-afghanistan/2804066.html (retrieved February 4,
2017). This attack targeted workers of the Czech NGO People in Need.
142
in 2009 and issuance of counterinsurgency guidance materials by the two consecutive ISAF
commanders prove the growing preference for counterinsurgency efforts, which culminated in
the adoption of the NATO counterinsurgency strategy doctrine in 2011. The
counterinsurgency label of the coalition efforts in Afghanistan was gradually dropped,
attempting to reframe the mission as counterterrorism with nation-building campaign and
alike, mirroring the growing unwillingness of individual ISAF TCNs to engage in such
demanding and long-term efforts, reflective of the growing public discontent with the mission
as well. It, however, didn’t prove the inadequacy or relevance of counterinsurgency strategy
to the attempts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan per se, as it was more of a political
decision. Closely linked to this issue is different understanding of the mission’s ill-defined
objectives by different ISAF TCNs, manifested in the use of national caveats (see p. 31). The
incoherence of ISAF in terms of how limited the goals and the end state of the mission were
posed one of the fundamental challenges to its efficiency and success. This discrepancy in
different goal setting also mirrored differences between individual countries on what
counterinsurgency means and how to best approach it. Many countries, like the Czech
Republic, also mostly abstained from using the counterinsurgency narrative in their policies.
The transition process was broken down into six phases and was mirrored by the gradual
drawdown of the coalition forces (NATO 2015c). NATO itself asserts that this drawdown was
conducted in a “coordinated, measured and gradual way in line with the ANSF’s capacity to
manage the security situation” (Ibid). However, as manifested by the recent developments
and as noted by the majority of the respondents, the capacities and capabilities of the ANSF
were greatly overestimated. For instance, 1st Lt. Staněk disclosed that on the highest levels of
policy and strategy planning the transition was executed according to the pre-planned
schedule, however, the reality on the ground was completely different.93 The transition
process was agreed on during the NATO summit in Lisbon 2010,94 launched in July 2011 and
completed by the end of 2014.95
The country of Afghanistan also represents particularly challenging case
counterinsurgency efforts in general, as it bears some unique features and characteristics that,
potentially, can hamper the effectiveness and success of the counterinsurgency efforts,
93 The notion of the proper transition as scheduled could have also been caused by the flawed metrics of progress
in ISAF. 94 The summit declaration can be accessed at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68828.htm
(retrieved on February 4, 2017). 95 According to some of the respondents, the later phases of the transition process were marked by weakening of
counterinsurgency efforts on the ground by individual troops, with the justification of them knowing their
deadline for final withdrawal/transformation of the mission.
143
especially when contrasted to the overall characteristics of Kosovo or Iraq. Universal
application of counterinsurgency is, indeed, impossible, as local conditions, specific
developments and unique features must always be considered (which is also one of the key
imperatives of counterinsurgency in general). In case of Afghanistan, the challenge of
implementing counterinsurgency strategy has been hampered by its topography (high
mountainous ranges and dry deserts), its history of decentralized governance and previous
absence of historical experience with centralized government and its infrastructure across the
entire country, at the time of the 2001 invasion three decades of constant state of conflict in
the territory of Afghanistan, widespread organized crime activity and vast poppy fields,
overabundance of militias and other armed non-state actors, power struggles between
warlords virtually ruling the country, ethnic composition of the population and resulting
tensions and rivalries, strong tribalism and respect to the tribal authority and customs,
traditions and culture96, and rivalries and conflicts existing between tribes or clans, as well as
its geopolitical and geostrategic location and involvement and deep interests of external actors
in the country, particularly Pakistan and Iran. The Taliban movement, let alone the Afghan
insurgency is by no means a monolithic entity, and comprises of numerous groups with
differing, and sometimes even mutually antagonistic ideologies and goals. Majority of the
respondents interviewed by the author also claimed that switching sides, alliances and
allegiances on a daily basis is a common occurrence in the Afghan landscape of the armed
actors. In the other words, a tribal militia cooperating with ISAF and the government changes,
for opportunistic reasons, its preference and starts to cooperate with the Taliban, only to go
back to the coalition/government side one month later.
Based on the interviews the author conducted and on the thorough study of relevant
primary and secondary sources of data, she discovered that the involvement of the Czech
Republic in the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan comprised of three main lines of
effort:
• Deployments of special operations forces (SOF);97
• Training and advising to the ANSF; and
• Reconstruction and stabilization efforts. 96 Even the Taliban themselves combine elements of the Pashtun tribal code Pashtunwali with deo-bandi Islamic
motives in their ideology. See, for instance, Brahimi, A. (2010): Taliban’s Evolving Ideology, accessible at
http://www.lse.ac.uk/globalGovernance/publications/workingPapers/WP022010.pdf (retrieved on February 4,
2017). 97 Even though they were initially officially committed to OEF-A, the existing relationship between OEF-A and
ISAF and the author’s decision not to analyze the two operations separately (see p. 136) means the inclusion of
Czech special operation forces’ activities is not only appropriate, but also beneficial and necessary for the
purposes of this research.
144
5.3.3.1 Deployments of special operations forces (SOF)
According to the respondents familiar with such deployments, as well as according to the
official websites of the Czech special forces and the Czech Ministry of Defense, the Czech
SOF, 601st Special Forces Group (601SFG)98 first deployed to Afghanistan from March to
August 2004, in compliance with the mandate approved by the Czech government and both
chambers of the Czech Parliament, in the capacity of 120 soldiers. More detailed information
about this deployment is not available to the public. Speculations are circulating about the
engagement of 601SFG in the operations along the eastern and southern border with Pakistan,
aimed eliminating the al-Qaeda elements from the area, in coordination with the Pakistani
armed forces at that time. Clearer idea about the 2004 601SFG deployment can also be
obtained through the examination of the deployments that followed. It is, however, important
to keep in mind dynamics and evolution of the security environment in respective time
frames, which affect the scope and range of the mandate of 601SFG during respective
deployments. In general, the individual tasks of 601SFG are derived from the NATO
directives and doctrines as well as based on their definition by the highest national command.
601SFG was redeployed in 2006 with the assigned tasks of special reconnaissance,
direct action and other kinds of special operations in the southern Kandahar province aimed at
elimination of the adversary’s activities (nominally Taliban and al-Qaeda), and hence
contribute to the efforts to create secure and stable environment in Afghanistan. 601SFG was
subordinated to the Multinational Special Operations Command of OEF-A. The 2006 601SFG
deployment marked historically second combat deployment of the Czech armed forces (601.
skupina speciálních sil generála Moravce a), indicating that even their 2004 deployment
included combat operations. 601SFG was actively engaged in combat missions on a regular
basis and participated in all of the coalition significant offensives (like operation Mountain
Thrust, lasting from 15th May to 31st July, 2006),99 without sustaining any combat casualties
(Ibid). Cooperation with legitimate local authority and assistance to the population was
reportedly also among the main mandated tasks 601SFG was committed to. Any details in this
regard are, however, absent.
98 601SFG doesn’t have capabilities and resources for continuous deployment, was thereby deployed several
times. This further poses challenges for counterinsurgency efforts, as the impact of their operations wasn’t
sustainable as no one immediately replaced them. 99 More information about operation Mountain Thrust can be found at
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/06/three_days_of_operat.php (retrieved on February 4, 2017).
145
Third deployment of 601SFG to Afghanistan was served in the operation 18 months
during 2008 and 2009 with three rotations of 100 personnel. The assigned tasks executed
during this deployment reportedly remained the same – special reconnaissance, direct combat
action and other special operations, and followed the two previous deployments. Even though
the main base with headquarters, C2 elements and logistic support was located on the
Kandahar Air Field base, the main area of operations of 601SFG during this deployment was
neighboring Uruzgan province, where a multinational forward operational base was
established (601. skupina speciálních sil generála Moravce b).
601SFG asserts that this deployment contributed to strengthen security of local
population, as key figures of the insurgent anti-government elements, providing them with
financial and logistical support were eliminated. This reportedly further led to the decrease
and limitations of operational capabilities of the insurgents, because they were not able to plan
and conduct coordinated attacks against coalition forces or ANSF in the area anymore (Ibid).
The combat action escalated during the 2009 presidential elections, with the total of 200 direct
combat encounters in the 18 months’ period. 601SFG’s website also emphasizes the gradual
progress of ANSF in improving their operational capabilities, combat skills and gaining
respect and legitimacy in the eyes of the population (Ibid), suggesting that 601SFG also
participating in efforts to train and advise Afghan SOF.
Considering the fact that training activities of Afghan SOF are generally considered a
rare success of the mostly unsuccessful SSR in Afghanistan, 601SFG would then contributed
to one of major successes of the overall ISAF mission. 601SFG further emphasizes their
population-centric approach to their actions, along with meetings with tribal elders and
provision of medical and material aid to the population. Great attention was also devoted to
minimization of civilian casualties resulting from their actions (Ibid).
In accordance with the decision of the Czech government from October 2009,
approved by both chambers of the Czech Parliament, 601SFG also functions as the guard at
the Embassy of the Czech Republic in Kabul, and provides personal security detail to its
employees, from February 2010 to this day (601. skupina speciálních sil generála Moravce c).
The decision to deploy SOF to guard a nation’s embassy is uncommon procedure, as countries
usually deploy rapid response unit of national police forces, or hire services of private security
actors. The decision to utilize 601SFG for this purpose was justified by the deteriorating
security situation in the Afghan capital, and was met with a wave of criticism along the main
lines of argumentations of inadequate use of SOF or their overloading with tasks.
146
The last recorded combat deployment of 601SFG was in eastern province of
Nangarhar in 2011100 and 2012, with two six months long rotation of task force of 100
servicemen, as part of the Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (SOJTF-A)101.
601SFG admits to engaging in full spectrum of special operations with the home base
HOMBRE in Jalalabad. It also emphasizes the task of training, mentoring and advising to the
special response unit of the ANP, so-called Provincial Response Company Nangarhar (601.
skupina speciálních sil generála Moravce d). This fact not only validates the argument about
the flaws of the Afghan SSR, but also indicates escalated training efforts after the July 2011
announcement of the time specific transition process, because military SOF training a police
unit may, potentially, prove counterproductive, as it can lead to militarized police force. Other
assigned tasks of 601SFG during this deployment consist of information-sharing, cooperation
and coordination of efforts with all intelligence and SOF units deployed in the area of
operation, along with other agencies responsible for counterterrorism, counter-narcotics
operations or measures aimed at elimination of other forms of criminal activity (like arms
smuggling) (Ibid). The key operations also included elimination of the network producing and
distributing narcotics (used to finance insurgent activities), seizure of caches of arms,
weapons and explosives (including IED producing factories), capture of high-value targets, or
operations aimed at freeing kidnapped hostages (Ibid).
Details and specifics about 601SFG deployments and operations in Afghanistan
remain murky and classified. The unit itself publicizes only the basic information about their
activities, for obvious reasons. Therefore, their potential involvement in night raids or in
cross-border operations on the territory of Pakistan remains publicly unavailable, as well as
the statistics of their deployments (number of high-value targets captured vs. killed, number
of civilians killed as direct/indirect result of the 601SFG actions, etc.).
Sources claim that no serviceman of 601SFG was killed, captured or went missing in
action, demonstrating the level of preparedness, training, equipment as well as
interoperability, skills and abilities of the Czech SOF. To measure effectiveness of their
actions in Afghanistan is impossible, given the fact that they mostly operating in multinational
task forces, as confirmed by respondents familiar with this matter. Two of them made a case
of the zero casualty count as proving their efficiency and good intelligence collection as a
100 Fall 2011 marked the culmination of the Czech foreign deployment at the peak of 800-850 military
professionals deployed to Afghanistan, which in the Czech context (considering the resources available) is a
great force and enormous expenditure. 101 More information on the SOJTF-A can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/sojtf-
a.htm (retrieved February 4, 2017).
147
special operations force. Respondents also stressed the reputation and respect 601SFG earned
among the allies and partner countries for the psychological resilience, professionalism and
heroism proved in their actions. Furthermore, 601SFG also engaged in other activities,
deemed critical for the success of counterinsurgency campaign, like provision of aid to the
population and respecting local authorities, which, along with their stated principle of
avoidance of civilian casualties, indicates their preference of population-centric approach to
counterinsurgency.
Additionally, the Czech Military Police also deployed its Special Operations Group
(SOG) to Afghanistan in 2006-2009 in Helmand and later also Logar provinces. The mandate
of SOG comprised of rapid response unit during security operations of coalition forces,
counterterrorism operations, and, at the request, provision of personal security detail to high-
ranking officers and high political representatives, along with protection of significant
facilities, civilian aircraft, but also police protection for especially dangerous criminals.
According several sources of data, SOG also participated in target operations of individuals
involved in serious organized crime gangs operating inside and outside the Czech military (cf.
(Ministerstvo obrany ČR – SOG v Afghánistánu; SOFREP 2015; Česká televize 2008). SOG
deployment in Afghanistan also marked the first Czech combat death since the WWII, when
SOF operator Milan Štěrba died in a suicide attack in Helmand on 17th March, 2008.
Existence and operations of the SOF unit are accompanied by series of serious accusations
and criticisms (most notably about their alleged reluctance to fight, which allegedly resulting
in abandoning their British partners in the battlefield with the insurgents)102. The unit was
dissolved after this scandalous accusation in 2009. As eight respondents informed the author,
the members of SOG often complained about the lack of clear guidance from the national
command. Therefore, this accusation may turn out to be a result of an undeclared caveat
issued by the Czech authorities, classified and previously not known to the force deployed on
the ground, or by the police as opposed to the military mentality of the SOG members. As
such, the deployment and activities of SOG provided important contribution to the overall
counterinsurgency efforts of ISAF, especially with their focus on the activities of organized
crime.
Czech FAC operators have also been deployed to Afghanistan on individual basis,
mostly with the task of supporting operations of the US with cooperation with forces of other
102 See, for instance an article on Gurdian, acvailable at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/czechrepublic/5200990/Czech-troops-abandoned-British-
soldiers-in-Afghanistan.html 9retrieved on February 4, 2017).
148
partner countries. Skills and activities of the Czech FAC operators have been, as the author
was told by two of them, greatly appreciated, honored and valued by other coalition partners,
especially the Americans, and are reportedly considered to be among the top few in their field
of specialization, as the American soldiers told the author. FACs are operating from FOBs,
and the Allied Glossary of Military Terms defines them as “qualified individuals who, from a
forward position on the ground or in the air, directs the actions of combat aircraft engaged in
close air support of land forces” (NATO 2013: 2-F-6). More details about their operations
are, however, subjected to classification, for obvious reasons. Nonetheless, considering their
role in military contributions, it is fair to state that the deployment of Czech FAC operators
was among the most significant and valuable contributions to the NATO counterinsurgency
operation in Afghanistan.
5.3.3.2 Training and advising to ANSF
Training and advising of the HN security forces represent another key pillar of the Czech
counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. Generally speaking, training and mentoring HN
security forces is widely considered the fundamental pillar of sustainability and success
counterinsurgency efforts in a long-term. It also is the only line of effort (excluding the
protection of the Czech Embassy by 601SFG) the Czech Republic continues to engage in as
part of operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan. This line of effort also in certain sense
connects the other two (SOF deployments and reconstruction and stabilization) categories,
because as stated above, 601SFG helped to build capacities of the ANP units, and as shown
below, the Czech PRT Logar also ran its ANP training program, and so did the specialized
personnel deployed to the Kabul International Airport. Important difference existed between
numerous ANSF capacity building initiatives – OMLT and POMLT teams accompanied the
Afghan units they were responsible for to the front lines103, but other training programs didn’t
require the front line mentoring (it wasn’t their priority).
Separate autonomous training, advising, assisting and mentoring missions were
represented by:
Czech OMLT Team in Wardak (March 2010 – April 2013; 5x54 personnel) – training,
advising, assisting and mentoring the ANA at the battalion (Kandak) at the Carwile Base
(Solthan Kheyl) in south of Wardak. The major task of the unit was to help the ANA rifle unit
in process of C2 planning in order to upgrade operational capabilities of all units of the 103 According to some reports up to 95 percent of the activities, particularly search operations.
149
Kandak. The goal was to build secure environment, ensure the freedom of movement within
the respective area of responsibility104 and planning and setting the conditions for future
operations. Czech and Afghan soldiers, along with their American partners operates from
three FOBs in the area. According to the statement of the Czech Ministry of Defense, as all as
testimonies of 5 Czech military respondents who served in each of the OMLT contingents, the
Czech Task Force was fully equipped and capable of independent engagement and operations
in the respective area with their Kandak, autonomous from the US actions. The 1st OMLT
contingent along with their assigned ANA Kandak started their training at the Black Horse
Base in Kabul. After the Afghans got the basic training and basic operating procedures were
optimized and coordinated, the Kandak with its Czech instructors moved to Wardak to fulfil
tasks received from the ANA command. Majority of the Czech military personnel deployed to
the OMLT was from the 43rd Airborne Mechanized Battalion (Chrudim), supplemented by
other specialists (air controllers, artillery) to meet the requirements for completion of specific
tasks. (Ministerstvo obrany ČR – Afghánistán Wardak (OMLT ISAF); Staněk 2013). Then 1st
Lt. Jiří Staněk who served in the Czech OMLT unit in Wardak shared with the author his
views on the main challenges and problems of that deployment. In his opinion, the main
problem severely hindering the effectiveness of the OMLT mission were the Afghan
themselves. Three to four decades of constant state of conflict in Afghanistan caused a wide
spread illiteracy among the population and strong spiritual and religious believes, combined
with their mountainous stubborn mentality based on respect to traditions was, reportedly,
sometimes difficult to deal with. Another major problem was reportedly the existence of
ethnic quotas for the composition of Afghan units. As evidence gathered from numerous
resources shows the prevailing ethnic tensions and mistrust was prevalent during the training.
Connected to the negative impacts of the factor of ethnicity was also the language barrier
when often different ethnicities don’t understand each other. 1st Lt. Staněk mentioned an
example of one Tajik in one team, where the rest were Pashtuns. Not only he couldn’t
understand his colleagues, but they, allegedly, also didn’t treat him fairly. Another significant
challenge, he mentioned was the strict restrictions imposed on the ANSF recruits, as they
were not allowed to work in the area they live, for security reasons.105
104 More specifically, the Taliban smuggled their fighters and weapons to Kabul through the Wardak province,
along the mountainous range, which, however, was also in the close proximity to the perimeter of the Carwile
Base. 105 They relatives reportedly didn’t even know they were undergoing military or police training. The rationale
behind was to prevent tipping of the families of soldiers and retaliation by the insurgents.
150
Training Units of the Military Police in Wardak (October 2010 - March 2013; 4x12
personnel) – a joint Czech and Slovak military police training program for the ANP as part of
a team of international mentors led by France, which included mentors from Portugal and
Romania as well. The main tasks of the unit included mentoring of the instructors of the
National Police Training Center in Wardak, supervision of their organization and planning of
the training at the respective Training Center, and support the efforts aimed at building
command corps along with extensive preparation of the key staff of the Police Training
Center (Ministerstvo obrany ČR – Afghánistán, Wardak (Vojenská policie, ISAF));
ISAF Military Advisory Team (MAT)106 in Wardak (April – October 2013; 59 personnel) –
the main mission of the MAT unit was to advise, assist and support ANA Kandak at the staff
level in operational planning and combat use of its units, but also to cooperate and coordinate
with other coalition units and participate in their operations, as necessary. The main effort and
focus of the mission were placed on the improvement of the Kandak’s combat capabilities,
their autonomous planning, decision-making and operational maneuvering, and their ability to
lead professional operations without support of the coalition forces. The Czech MAT
contingent included also medical personnel teaching the Afghans in the practice of life saving
support and treatment of patients on a daily basis (Ministerstvo obrany ČR – Afghánistán
Wardak (1. MAT ISAF)); and
ISAF Military Advisory Team (MAT) in Logar (March – October 2013; 64 personnel) –
tasked with advising the command staff and personnel of ANA Kandak in order to facilitate
their professional growth in command and planning procedures, and included military
medics/combat support personnel as well (Ministerstvo obrany ČR – Afghánistán Lógar (1.
MAT ISAF)).
Significant portion of the training activities as one of the signature features of the
contemporary Czech approach toward counterinsurgency is represented by the utilization of
the training facilities in the Czech Republic itself. Training activities on the Czech territory
are conducted by the elements of the Czech armed forces, but also increasingly by Czech
private corporate entities (like the flight training programs in Hradec Králové)107.
106 MAT is basically OMLT at the officers’ level. 107 For some information see, for example, http://zpravy.idnes.cz/zbehli-afghanci-v-cesku-07u-
/domaci.aspx?c=A120828_112048_domaci_jw (accessed on January 17, 2017).
151
5.3.3.3 Reconstruction and stabilization efforts
According to the Czech military and political representatives the author interviewed, and
confirmed by Ing. Varga from the then Doctrine Department at the Training Command –
Military Academy in Vyškov, the primary focus and line of counterinsurgency efforts of the
Czech Republic are stabilization and reconstruction efforts.
As stated in the ISAF mandate itself (see p. 139), great and key part of the ISAF
operation was represented by reconstruction and stabilization activities, mainly in the format
of PRTs, which were both national and multinational. First direct experience with the
operations and activities of a PRT the Czech military gained in the period from March 2005 to
November 2007, when 600 Czech soldiers were deployed in 6 rotations to support a German
PRT in Fayzabad the northern province of Badakshan. PRTs generally operate on the
principle of civil-military partnership. The main tasks of the Czech military personnel
deployed to Badakshan were to support provision of security in the area, provide security to
the international units of civilian and military teams of the PRT, monitoring of the security
situation in area of responsibility, patrolling and convoy escorts, as well as cooperation with
the local population in reconstruction projects. The core unit of the Czech task force was
formed by the members of 102nd Reconnaissance Battalion of General Karel Paleček (102.
průzkumný prapor generála Karla Palečka in original), based in Prostějov. Therefore,
reconnaissance activities also played a significant role during their deployment, more details
about their operations are, however, classified. The Czech personnel were assigned to the
military component of the German PRT, sized 200 in total, along with Danish and German
military. As three servicemen of the Czech Reconnaissance battalion disclosed, one of the
main drivers behind this deployment was existing national caveats on the side of the German
military, who were restricted in the use of force and the Danish contingent wasn’t able to
provide security to the entire PRT by itself (cf. Ministerstvo obrany ČR – Fayazabad). This
marks the first time the Czech military has been directly exposed to counterinsurgency
activities, even if in such limited fashion. What this deployment proved though, was not only
the professionalism of the Czech reconnaissance servicemen, but also their level of
interoperability with their coalition partners, particularly in a situation when some of them is
restricted by their national caveats.
According to report published by Lubomír Světnička in 2005, the major source of
insecurity and hostile reactions from the locals was represented by their continued efforts of
poppy growing. The prevailing perception was, that the “war was over” and the fears that the
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foreign troops are still present in the country with the goal of destroying their poppy fields,
which they didn’t have mandate for anyway (Světnička 2005). His report also discloses
information about adjusting the procedures and protocols of patrols, convoys through villages
as well as direct contact with the locals, based on the situation on the ground and the activities
of the population (Světnička mentions “throwing rocks” at the Czech forces; Ibid). Such
adjustments to local conditions continued throughout the various deployments of the Czech
forces in ISAF, as confirmed by the Czech respondents.
The greatest contribution to ISAF counterinsurgency efforts in terms of support to
reconstruction, development and stabilization activities was a joint project of the Czech
Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, autonomous Czech national PRT108 which
operated from the US FOB Shank in the eastern Afghan province of Logar. The solely Czech
PRT started to operate in Logar in March 2008 and terminated its activities by July 2007.
2.500 personnel (and up to the third of them several times)109 comprised of the Czech army
professionals and civilian experts rotated in six months long rotation 11 times, with the last
contingent (January to July 2013) tasked with withdrawing equipment and material, part of
them sending back to the Czech Republic and responsible for the transition phase of handing
over the last reconstruction projects of the Czech PRT to Afghan authorities. Each contingent
included 4-12 civilian experts from Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the fields of construction
engineering, agriculture, veterinary medicine, security and media. 39 civilian experts than
rotated with several of the contingents deployed to PRT Logar. Civilian experts were then
protected by 290 Czech soldiers on the average (Ministerstvo obrany ČR – ISAF PRT). The
military component was basically a task force put together from various units of the Czech
army (including logistic support, medical and EOD personnel, and Military Police). Both
military and civilian PRT personnel were then in equal position to each other, except for the
security protocols and procedures, when the civilians are obliged to follow the orders of the
military commander, as stated and confirmed by numerous respondents.
Established at the NATO request for military and reconstruction reinforcements, PRT
Logar represents the most direct and the largest single unit experience with counterinsurgency
108 According to Mjr. Ivo Zelinka, the PRT model of the deployment meant new modus operandi for both the
Czech military and civilians, accompanied by confusion in the early phases. Particularly then, the deployment of
a team of civilian experts was new for the Czech Republic, that didn’t keep any database of civilian experts
available, trained, prepared and willing to be deployed. 109 The repeated deployment had its positive as well as negative consequences. The positive ones are represented
by the ability to enable and maintain certain relationships with locals on the personal level, an imperative for
effective counterinsurgency, especially in a country like Afghanistan. The negative consequences manifested
themselves, again, in overburdening and overloading of just certain units and the discrepancies created within the
Czech armed forces in level of their preparedness and funding.
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Czech military and civilian professionals gained in Afghanistan and have gained thus far.110
In total numbers, the Czech PRT Logar completed and realized 138 reconstruction and
development projects and 107 Quick Impact Projects111 during the five years’ period
according to the Czech Ministry of Defense, and 248 projects in total according to the Czech
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all in the line with the Czech national development strategy.112
The main focus and efforts of PRT Logar can be divided into three major categories,
consistent with the main official documents addressing the issue of development and its
priorities in Afghanistan (i.e. Afghanistan Compact, Afghan National Development Strategy
and Provincial Development Plan):
• Support of the Afghan authorities at the provincial level and provision of
supplies (including a sophisticated media program ( and support to distribution
of development and humanitarian assistance, in close cooperation with the
Afghan government and UNAMA mission, when appropriate);
• Provision of security and stabilization of the environment (securing the area
in which construction work is conducted by other national and international
actors, construction of checkpoints and prisons; including the training program
for the ANA and the ANP and counter-narcotics operations in the area of
responsibility; key also was to maintain freedom of traffic on the main
highway to Kabul passing through Logar); and
• Reconstruction and development (infrastructure projects like building bridges
or roads; agriculture projects, including reconstruction of diaries, delivery of
seed grains; water management (reconstruction of irrigation systems or the
Surchab dam); education (construction of schools for local boys and girls);
health (construction of hospitals and delivery and maintenance of emergency
vehicles) (Ministerstvo obrany ČR – ISAF PRT; Ministerstvo zahraničích věcí
ČR – PRT Logar).
110 And in the words of the Czech Ministry of Defense “(…) 1st Contingent PRT Logar (…) launched the new
chapter of Czech participation in ISAF operations in ensuring both security and reconstruction efforts in favour
of Afghan people.” (Ministerstvo obrany ČR – ISAF PRT; the grammar and spelling mistakes maintained in the
direct citation). 111 Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are small-scale, low cost projects implemented in a short time frame and
generally understood as a confidence-building tool. QIPs can range from community irrigation systems, clean
water supply or road improvements to small power systems or construction or reconstruction of government
buildings and facilities, schools, and clinics to gender-related activities, job placement and media projects. 112 The numerical difference between the two counts has been explained by the Czech Ministry of Foreign
Affairs as “only three projects of this number were not finished due to security or technical conditions.”
(Ministerstvo zahraničích věcí ČR 2013).
154
From the civilian point of view, 3 core pillars of PRT Logar can be identified as:
• Support for the provincial government and Logar’s public administration (including
provision and support security and good governance);
• Support for the province’s economic development; and
• Support for the media (support for independent radio stations, development of the
provincial branch of the state radio service) (Ministerstvo zahraničích věcí ČR 2008).
Another major initiative of PRT Logar was focused on gender-related issues and support to
women’s rights (like training about the voting rights for women, or women-only meetings).
Construction of an agricultural high school was probably the largest project of PRT Logar.
The capacity of the high school was 500 students, and it was the first specialized school in the
province. Agriculture represents the main source of income in the province, and thereby the
school was built with the primary motivation to significantly increase the level of business in
the area (Ibid). PRT Logar also organized a number of educational and training initiatives for
Afghan would-be farmers, veterinarians, government officials as well as journalists.
Czech political representatives highlight the long term impact of the activities of PRT
Logar, as it, in their words, enabled to grow education and working state administration in the
province. The truth, however, is that it is still too soon to evaluate any long-term impacts of
the PRT Logar operations, as well as to really assess the efficiency of the activities, since no
Czech is currently present in Logar. Therefore, the real contemporary state of the projects
built by PRT Logar is difficult to access, as confirmed during interviews with the respondents
with personal PRT Logar experience.
In 2009, PRT Logar developed its strategy for the Logar province. This strategy could
potentially serve as a springboard for a united Czech document defining and clarifying the
main principles, imperatives, goals, preferred courses of actions and tools and resources
available of the Czech counterinsurgency approach, shall there be the need or request to
develop one.
In its 2009 strategy, PRT Logar introduced main principles and areas of its main focus, as
follows:
o Sustainability – the capacity of local communities to manage the projects PRT Logar
builds in a long term perspective and in a way that would not impose unrealizable
demands on financial and human resources (PRT Logar expressed their awareness of
the limited resources of the Afghan government in terms of finances of human capital,
and emphasized their preference of extension of an existing school over a construction
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of a new one, as the Afghan government would not have the resources to equip and
maintain the school operations);
o Participation of local communities – respect to the local social structure and
communication and negotiations with the tribal elders were amongst the main
imperatives of the PRT Logar operations, including the inclusion of communities in
decision-making processes and providing security and secure environment;
o Cooperation with provincial authorities – PRT Logar helped strengthen legitimacy of
the local government, as well as contributed to building trust of the population by
supporting projects resulting from the official district development councils and
provincial development plans, including the activities aimed at increasing capacities of
the local authorities;
o Needs assessment – an objective assessment of the needs of the community and
identification of the so-called wish lists; what the PRT Logar strategy doesn’t specify
though is how the Czech experts handled the imperative of thorough local knowledge
or how much were the Afghans included in the needs assessments113;
o Long-term effect – PRT Logar didn’t support interim or provisional, short-term
solutions;
o Transparency – in selecting and awarding contracts in order to avoid prejudice of
favoritism, such conduct also helped set standards of ethical behavior in the Afghan
market environment, which, however, according to some respondents, didn’t resonate
with the Afghans too much; and
o Local companies, materials – PRT Logar awarded contracts to local companies which
helped to increase the employment of local suppliers and the local workforce with the
vision of building capacities of the companies and simultaneously encouraged local
economy (cf. Ministerstvo zahraničích ČR 2009).
As evident, localization (“afghanization”) was a very strong and important priority of PRT
Logar, which can be considered an important specific of the Czech approach, as it differs
from the operations of some other ISAF partners (particularly the US and those who copied
the US model of PRT). This hypothesis provides a space for further deeper research into this
specific matter. The reason of the strong “afghanization” of PRT Logar activities may be
considered as stemming from the Czech mindset and strategic culture, it can, however, also
113 According to the interviewed respondents, the locals were involved significantly, which, however, the PRT
military element was hesitant about for security and safety reasons.
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reflect limited resources at the Czech disposal (or limited willingness to commit sufficient
resources). Again, the long term viability and impact of the PRT Logar’s operations is
difficult to measure, especially in terms of sustainability of the Afghan companies, work
force, work ethic and the local economy the efforts of PRT Logar sought to promote. Five
years long period of operations didn’t have to be enough of a time to make a viable and
sustainable economic footprint, especially when put into the broader Afghan context. At the
same time, according to several respondents with the direct experience in this matter, the
chain of development and humanitarian aid delivery was heavily bureaucratic, flawed and
corrupted that sometimes only 5 percent of the initial amount. The abundance of resources
and related waste gravely undermined the success of entire counterinsurgency campaign, as it
not only didn’t achieve the intended objectives and resulted in not meeting the expectations of
the local population, but it also contributed to the culture of bribe-taking and corruption.
Importantly though, this challenge existed in the operations of other ISAF nations as well,
which further complicates any attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of the mission.
For the military part, the CIMIC task force played a particularly significant role in the
PRT Logar’s operations, as it functioned as the enabling and facilitating factor between the
military component and the civilian expert of PRT Logar and in their joint reconstruction
efforts, making contacts and establishing relationships with the local population (including
negotiations with tribal elders), gaining their trust and support, decreasing security risks to
both PRT Logar and the population and helping the civilian experts to be more effective and
productive in their operations (Ministerstvo obrany ČR - 103. centrum CIMIC-PSYOPS2004-
2014b). The role of CIMIC professionals was essential and especially important given their
extensive experience from their previous deployments in various conflict environments. The
civilian experts themselves had not, necessarily, have experience with working in a conflict
environment and in close cooperation and coordination with military actors before their
deployment to Logar. Their different mindsets and preferences from those of the military thus
had to be bridged and aligned to the most convenient level in order to allow for a productive
cooperation and coordination of efforts of the two entities. Coordination and synchronization
of the civilian and military components of PRT Logar, their planning, prioritization and
activities are critically important imperatives of the effectiveness, efficiency and ultimate
success of the PRT operations in general. The author, however, encountered conflicting
reports about the level of such synchronization, coordination and mutual understanding from
the respondents serving in several of the first PRT rotations. This possible tension can be a
result of improper pre-deployment preparation and lack of relevant guidelines from the
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highest national commands and sending institutions (particularly the Czech Ministries of
Defense and Foreign Affairs), partially also mirroring the possible lack of coordination
between the two Ministries at the initial phases of the PRT Logar’s mission.
Other CIMIC’s tasks, that were key to operations of the entire PRT Logar include first
reconnaissance and assessment missions with the aim of mapping the living standard in a
previously uninvolved area; negotiations with the locals (including the very first contact
which including presentation of the mission of PRT Logar and ISAF as such); contact with
the population aimed at gathering information about their needs and preference which were
later used for the realized reconstruction and development projects; and cooperation and
coordination with the ISAF partners in psychological operation (PSYOPS) and information
operations (INFOOPS), like the leaflets distribution, etc. The CIMIC unit was also
responsible for the QIPs realized by PRT Logar (like acquisition and distribution of school
supplies, construction of volleyball playground, acquisition of supplies for police force
working at checkpoints, ANP training or training of the ANA drivers, to name just a few)
(Ibid). Importantly, CIMIC task force was also deployed in 2005, 2006 and 2007 to
Badakshan, most likely because the partners lack experienced CIMIC units. The 2005
deployment was focused on executing PSYOPS.
In addition to the PRT activity, the Czech Republic also had significant presence and
function at the Kabul International Airport (KAIA). From 2002 onwards, the Czech Republic
kept its presence at KAIA in the capacity of field hospital units which were tasked with
medical support of the ISAF troops as well as with provision of humanitarian services
(including medical aid) to the Afghan population. The field hospitals also included a
designated field surgical team from January to April 2003. In 2003, a Czech Explosive
Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Detachment was deployed to KAIA. The main task of the Czech
EOD personnel was to demine and dispose any ordnance in the area of KAIA and its close
proximity, explosives-related reconnaissance, and the IED disposal in the entire Kabul area of
responsibility. Additional task the EOD personnel fulfilled while deployed to KAIA was an
anti-explosive preparation of equipment (from hand-guns to armored vehicles). Another
significant contribution was represented by the Czech contingents of meteorological
professionals, which included air traffic controllers, air traffic information service, aerial
security and safety personnel, and logisticians. The “meteo team” was tasked with
management of all KAIA operations, provision of security to civilians around KAIA, as well
as preparation to hand over the responsibility for KAIA to the Afghan authorities, which also
included preparation and training of the ANA personnel in air traffic safety and control and
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other related tasks. Also, in 2007, the Czech KAIA contingent took over the role of lead
nation of the ISAF KAIA forces (Ministerstvo obrany ČR - KAIA).
In 2007 and 2008, the Czech KAIA contingent was expanded by a field hospital
personnel (81 personnel) and Chemical Detachment (8), at the request of the Allied Command
of Operations (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. SHAPE requested to deploy a medical facility and
the Czech government decided to comply with the request by committing a field hospital,
chemical detachment and a squad of the Military Police (3), which contributed to a contingent
of 8 Czech soldiers serving in the OMLT capacity. The KAIA OMLT task force was tasked
with maintenance of the ANA helicopters (and their training in maintenance), directly linked
to the delivery of the Mi-171Š helicopters (Ibid).
Other periodical contributions of the Czech Republic to the coalition
counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan was a deployment of Czech airborne military
professionals to Uruzgan province in the period from 2007 to 2009. At the request of the
Dutch government, the Czech government decided about the deployment of a task force was
responsible for the protection and security of the Dutch PRT based in Camp Hadrian, its
perimeter as well as the base entry points and traffic in a capacity of 63 personnel in each
contingent (total of 4 contingents was deployed). In 2009, the Czech protection unit was
replaced by the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic (Ministerstvo obrany ČR - Uruzgan).
The Czech field hospital was responsible for provision of medical services to the ISAF
troops at KAIA and in the area of 10km radius around KAIA, preventive as well as veterinary
medical care for the local population, and participated in medical preparation initiatives and
programs for the ANA and ANP personnel. The chemical detachment was responsible for
biological, chemical, radiation and nuclear protection (CBRN) in the area of responsibility.
The most significant Czech non-governmental reconstruction, development and
humanitarian activities in Afghanistan are conducted by the Czech NGO People in Need.
Afghanistan is one of the priority countries of this NGO and it has completed or executes 10
projects in the country since 2002, when it started to operate in the country. The operations of
People in Need in Afghanistan focus on provision of humanitarian aid and reconstruction,
disasters prevention (finished), education initiatives (like support to the Afghan Ministry of
Education capacities – finished, or support and increase in quality of agricultural high
schools), local development in terms of construction of infrastructure in villages (finished)
and support to sustainable use of natural resources, increase in food security in and around
Mazar-e Sharif, support to small local businesses or increasing the efficiency of agricultural
production, and access to drinkable water (finished) (Člověk v tísni). Most of the projects
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mirror the focus of the operations of PRT Logar, including the strong “afghanization” of the
projects in terms of work force and supplies, however, given their longer presence in the area
and indirect association with military forces, the project of People in Need appears to be more
beneficial and potentially also effective. Also, the level of coordination with the Czech
government efforts in Afghanistan is not immediately clear, but the prevailing assumption is
that there exists a minimal level of contact between the two parties, as confirmed by two
respondents who worked for People in Need in Mazar-e Sharif. These respondents also
disclosed to the author that the efficiency of funding of the project is severely limited by the
abundance of financial support from donor which is not always used effectively, claiming
high amounts of money waste accompanying the operations of People in Need in
Afghanistan.
5.3.3.4 Logistical support for coalition forces
Additionally, Czech helicopter unit was deployed to Paktika (December 2009 – December
2011; 700 personnel) – in total seven Czech units served along with the US Air Force and
Portuguese Air Force as the Task Force HIPPO and as part of the US Helicopter Task Force
FALCON (simultaneously) at FOB Sharana. The Czech Republic deployed 3114 upgraded
military helicopters Mi-171Š with 20 flying personnel and 80 logisticians and service and
maintenance personnel, modified for both active and passive defense. Both formations
fulfilled transportation tasks (transportation of personnel, equipment and other material) in all
climate conditions during both day and night, visual reconnaissance missions as well as
medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)115 in the RC-East area of responsibility (Ministerstvo
obrany ČR).
5.3.3.5 National Support Element (NSE)
Each country which contributes and participates in ISAF has own NSE assigned to the ISAF
Joint Command HQ. NSE functions as liaison officers between national capitals and the
114 Two fully combat ready and one under maintenance and servicing. 115 Certain ISAF national imposed their caveats on MEDEVAC helicopters – because of the equipment,
appropriate clearances or even trust/mistrust factor, MEDEVAC units were not allowed to fly MEDEVAC for
injured Afghan soldiers, or some coalition partners (Johnson 2015). This, however, was not the case of Czech
helicopters, because the Czechs also trained the Afghans with the same type of aircraft at the Kabul International
Airport (KAIA). Imposing MEDEVAC caveats thus would be potentially counterproductive for the Czech side.
Also, none of the respondents confirmed the existence of such caveats during the Czech deployment, even
though a number of them confirmed their existence in general (without providing any additional details).
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contingents deployed to ISAF, and was responsible for overall logistic support, material and
supplies for all Czech military units deployed in ISAF. The Czech NSE started to operate at
KAIA in 2007.
According to the officers deployed to the Czech ISAF NSE, the positions they were
deployed to included a position of liaison officer for the ISAF HQ with NTM-A. This liaison
officer was assigned to facilitate appropriate information sharing between the two missions,
functioning as the point of contact for all the NTM-A relevant questions, keep updating the
NTM-A about the ISAF operations and activities in the joint area of responsibility, and
similar (Kurej 2011).
5.3.3.6 Relations with the Afghan population
As the population progressively became the center of gravity of the coalition
counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan, the perception on the side of the Afghan population
should be examined for any study to be truly comprehensive and in order to consider all
relevant factors shaping the Czech counterinsurgency approach. Perceptions of the local
population can provide important information about the effectiveness or success of certain
activities, willingness to cooperate, and potentially also more secure environment, as in
counterinsurgency, positive relations with the population in an area of operation correlate with
better HUMINT or potentially also support of local defense militias or other armed groupings.
Contrary to case of Kosovo, were the population predominantly perceived the KFOR
forces as strongly pro-Albanian, as plk. Ing. Pavlačka disclosed to the author, the Afghan
population was generally favorable of the Czech presence. Mainly the older generations of
Afghans, according to Petr Pelz, remembered goods116 then-Czechoslovakia exported to the
country before 1979, which created a generally solid basis for friendly relationships. Afghans
themselves quite repeatedly emphasize and use the so-called 1968 narrative (see p. 70).117
Some of them go even further to claim that the Czech disapproval of the Soviet invasion
inspired them to start their own anti-Soviet resistance after the 1979 invasion, a claim which
is very difficult to verify. Logically though, even though there could have been some
motivation gained from the Czech experience, fatwas calling for defensive jihad issued after
the USSR (non-Muslim) invaded a Muslim country for the historically first time could serve
116 Trolleybuses in Kabul, Jawa motorbike (reportedly very popular among the Taliban and former mujahideen
fighters), machinery and equipment for coal mines, bakeries, etc. (Hlouchová 2015). 117 Interestingly, the same Soviet generals who planned the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia prepared plans for
the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.
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as a greater source of motivation to resist the invader. Importantly, according to Matyáš Zrno,
who served as director of the civilian element of PRT Logar two times (in 2010 and 2011),
the Czechs also utilized this narrative during negotiations with locals.
Majority of the interviewed Czech and Afghan respondents agreed on the friendly
relationship existing between Czechs and Afghans. Afghans reportedly liked Czechs, who
they perceived as friendly and opposite to the “arrogant Americans”, whom they didn’t like.
The perception of Americans as “arrogant and ignorant” was also confirmed by the American
respondents interviewed. One of the major difference that played role in the differing
perceptions was the heavily militarized PRT of the US, whereas the Czech PRT had an
important civilian component, even though the locals sometimes didn’t respect the decision-
making authority of young experts and women, given their strong respect to traditions and
culture. Nevertheless, the dichotomy existing between the perceptions of Americans and the
prevailing perceptions of Czechs could help to explain an opinion of some of the Czech
military professionals that the insurgents didn’t attack basis with a strong presence of
Afghans, explaining it by the intentions to inflict casualties and loses to the coalition forces,
which was countered by some of the interviewed American soldiers who didn’t share this
view at all, claiming attacks on their multinational FOBs (like Shank itself). According to 1st
Lt. Staněk, the FOB in Wardak wasn’t attacked because of the absence of the American
forces, a claim difficult to verify. Reportedly, affiliation with the partner Jordanian forces,
based in Shank, also helped to perceive the Czechs more favorably (sometimes even as
Muslims).
6 Analytical part
In order to accomplish the aim of this thesis as well as provide transparency in the processes
of drawing conclusions, selected analytical models are applied to the information presented in
the empirical part.
6.1 SWOT analysis
As established in the methodology chapter, SWOT analysis starts with defining the end state
of it, the reason why it is being done and what is meant strategic setting is meant to aim at and
ultimately achieve. The end state for SWOT analysis in this thesis is to identify spaces for
162
further development of the Czech counterinsurgency approaches in order to increase its
effectiveness, and ultimately contribute to a pursuit of national interests and strategic
objectives. Analyzing the data presented in the empirical part, the author then populates the
four quadrants of SWOT matrix are populated as follows:
HELPFUL/SUPPORTIVE HARMFUL/DETRIMENTAL
INTERNAL STRENGTHS:
• Flexibility, adaptability, quick
to learn;
• Progressive evolution of Czech
approach;
• Significant attention to the
issue, certain prioritization;
• Reliability;
• Reputation;
• Professionalism and efficiency;
• Interoperability;
• Effective security forces’
training efforts (expertise);
• Mindset, strategic culture,
historical legacy;
• High-quality specialized
military capabilities;
• Preference of localization of
efforts;
• Strongly population-centric;
• Strong NGO sector;
• Willingness to cooperate;
• Intelligence-sharing;
• Clarity of military
OPORDs/ROE;
• Effective NSE;
• Level of discretion;
• Ability to mobilize maximum
resources;
• Minimal involvement in local
organized crime;
• PSYOPS/INFOOPS;
WEAKNESSES/LIABILITIES:
• Strong fractionalization;
• Lack of clarity on goals;
• Lack of clear guidance and
management;
• Lack of previous experience;
• Limited of local knowledge;
• Lack of experts (including
interpreters);
• Limited own intelligence-
gathering, esp. HUMINT;
• Bureaucratic and long process
of decision-making;
• Insufficient preparation in the
pre-deployment phase;
• Limited leverage over
partners;
• Undeclared caveats;
• Waste of resources;118
• Ineffective, counterproductive
reconstruction projects;
• Rather short-term planning;
• Flawed synchronization;
• Political pressure;
• Limited capabilities and
resources;
• Too much focus on infantry
patrols.
118 Some of the respondents also stated that they perceived deployments of the SOG contingents to Afghanistan
as a waste of valuable resources, that could have been deployed somewhere else more effectively.
163
• Emphasizing negotiations;
• Theoretically effective model
of PRT;
• Full-spectrum of military
activity;
• Strong contribution to
economic development.
EXTERNAL OPPORTUNITIES:
• Gained combat experience;
• Utilization of experience in
local knowledge;
• More confident and bold in
foreign deployments;
• Utilization of experts;
• Broadened understanding of
different cultures and religions
(Islam);
• Private security sector;
• Counter violent extremism;
• Industrial and technological
innovations;
• Good relations with Allies as
well as Muslim countries,
popularity;
• NGOs.
THREATS:
• Not meeting the full potential;
• Loss of the acquired level of
interoperability;
• Insufficient conceptualization
in official documents;
• Lack of clarification of the
relationship between civilians
and military elements at the
strategic level;
• Inability to fully utilize lessons
learned;
• Flawed metrics of
progress/success;
• Weakening of the cohesion the
EU/NATO.
Table 17: SWOT analysis of Czech approach towards counterinsurgency. Source: IH.
As the cases examined showed, key strength and advantage of the Czech Republic is its
ability to mobilize a maximum amount of capabilities and resources at its disposal in one time
point, even though it may not be for a prolonged period of time, the level of maximal amount
of resource was the Czech Republic able to maintain for more or less a year (without missing
the resources anywhere else), which marks significant accomplishment. Striking is also the
ability of the Czech Republic to deploy several different training teams to help in HN security
forces’ capacity building efforts and the variety of capabilities and specializations they were
able to teach and mentor. The Czech Republic committed two OMLTs, two MATs, Air
Mentoring Team in Kabul, Military Police Training Unit, PRT Logar had its own training
initiative, so had the Czech SOF as well as the smaller contingents of air traffic controllers or
EOD detachment. Additionally, the Czech Republic also contributed policemen to the
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EUPOL mission, and deployed its military trainers and advisors to Iraq. All of these training
deployments were deemed successful, when measure to their limited goals of preparing an
assigned group of ANSF, which can result from the recent Czech experience with its own
transition to democratization and rebuilding its security sector. This fact means certain, at
least minimal level of efficiency of the Czech counterinsurgency efforts.
Moreover, trainings and other educational initiatives were also executed by civilians
(PRT, NGOs) in Afghanistan and Kosovo. The subjects of these programs mirrored the
extensive expertise existing on the Czech expert market (agriculture, technical sciences, etc.),
that greatly contributed to meeting the needs of local populations. Perhaps that has been the
reason why the Czech counterinsurgency approach has shown to be very sensitive to local
needs with strong emphasis on localization of the efforts (that reportedly is a Czech feature).
As much flawed as the practical implementation of this localization could have been (see
below), the intention to include locals in planning and decision-making is quite unique. The
prevailing Czech mindset of open mindedness, adaptability, flexibility and friendliness has
proved to be a vital advantage, relative to other counterinsurgency partners. Strong
commitment and ability to learn quickly have also been demonstrated, by the speed of
implementation of the NATO counterinsurgency imperatives in the Czech context and the
evolution of the Czech counterinsurgency approach can be traced, from an actor who didn’t
know anything about it (not even the term itself) to a professional, reliable and popular ally
capable of providing vital support in counterinsurgency campaigns.
Also, the emphasis Czechs place on negotiations is relatively unique, and further
demonstrates the general readiness and appropriateness for executing counterinsurgency
tasks. The Czech Republic also strongly contributed to the economic development of the
theaters, particularly Afghanistan, not only by the reconstruction projects and utilization of
local workforce, supplies and companies. The meteo task force operating at KAIA contributed
significantly, due to their capable flight safety management.
The Czech approach to counterinsurgency thus proved to be very strongly population-
centric, even by the part of SOF in their activities, which included kinetic military tasks. The
deployed civilians as well as military forces demonstrated a high level of professionalism, and
gained an incredible recognition and respect among international partners. The Czech
Republic has manifested it is a reliable ally in counterinsurgency missions, as it was able to
deployed resources at the requests by other coalition partners, who couldn’t deploy their own.
Due to its historical legacy, the Czech Republic is also popular among Muslim-majority
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countries119 and maintains good relations with many international partners, an attribute vital
for any effective participation in multinational counterinsurgency mission.
For the military part, deployed forces demonstrated an incredible level of
interoperability with other coalition partners (even without complex preparation before
deployment, if any, see below), and were able to operate with forces of different nations in an
effective way. This feature is vital for any future multinational counterinsurgency missions, as
interoperability represents one of the fundamental pillars of successful counterinsurgency in
theory. Furthermore, recent counterinsurgency missions enabled to recognize of the high level
of preparedness and skills of the Czech specialized military capabilities – SOF,
reconnaissance task force, Military Police, air force (transport capabilities and FAC), EOD
detachment, medical personnel, CBRN protection units as well as very experienced CIMIC
task forces, and helped further develop and expand these capabilities for any potential future
deployments. The Czech military is capable of deployment to the full spectrum of
counterinsurgency operations (offensive, defensive, stabilization), as well as to provide vital
and important logistical support to not only the Czech elements, but to all coalition partners.
PSYOPS/INFOOPS executed by the CIMIC detachment were assessed as effective, as they
managed to deliver the main message to rather a broad target audience, especially when
combined with the PRT Logar’s efforts to stimulate the media activities in the area. The
model of PRT Logar also proved to be theoretically effective and productive in the
counterinsurgency context, because the civilian and military elements were mostly to each
other in most of their responsibilities (apart from security). PRTs of some other coalition
countries, particularly the US, were heavily militarized, and weren’t generally perceived well
among the local population, contrary to the overall Czech experience.
Counterinsurgency efforts have gained a certain priority in the Czech context,
especially in the military sphere (civilians refrain from use of this term) as well as to the
future, which is demonstrated by the prolonged involvement and strategic bilateral
cooperation with Afghanistan, the main consumer of the Czech counterinsurgency services.
Afghanistan has been prioritized in strategic documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
terms of provision of development and humanitarian assistance as well as foreign policy in
general, because Afghanistan also provides great business opportunities for the Czech
business sector.
119 Due to the export of weapons by Czechoslovakia to countries in the Middle East, in case of Afghanistan the
USSR invasion, as well.
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Significant liabilities and weaknesses of the Czech counterinsurgency approach can,
however, be identified as well. Majority of these weaknesses is cause by or closely connected
to the lack of previous experience with the art of counterinsurgency. The Czech
counterinsurgency approach remains strongly fractionalized, with too many different actors
involved with inappropriate level of coherence of their strategies/policies and of coordination
of their activities. Manifested by the absence of a united common document that would
outline the main goals (in the mission, from the partners), preferred courses of actions and
appropriate resources of the Czech counterinsurgency approach shows to be a critical flaw
and disadvantage, particularly when compared to other countries. The explaining assumption
of the very low likelihood of insurgency occurring on the Czech territory seems to be a priori
by default. Inconsistent prioritization of the counterinsurgency theme in the official Czech
documents further exposes lack of mutual understanding between military and civilian
components. Although a memorandum of understanding was signed between the two Czech
ministries of defense and foreign affairs, lack of coordination clearly manifested itself the
early stages of the PRT Logar’s operations, when the activities of military and civilian
components not only weren’t adequately synchronized, but they, reportedly, sometimes
refused to negotiate with each other, and often also resulted in too much focused put on
infantry patrols, when put into military perspective.
The PRT concept itself was new for the Czech Republic and it clearly didn’t know
how to manage its operations. This fact was further undermined by the overall lack of
coordination of reconstruction efforts among the ISAF nations. The fractionalization is
closely connected to the vital weakness of lack of clarity on common goals and preferred end-
state between the military side and their civilian counterparts, as well as among coalition
partners. Unknown aims of the activities, as well as inherent reconciliation of some of the
preferred courses of action between the military and civilians often significantly undermined
progress, efficiency and effectiveness of the overall counterinsurgency efforts. Furthermore,
contrary to the officially declared long-term commitments, strong political pressures on
transition as scheduled resulted in rather short-term focus of projects. Even though the Czech
Republic maintains strong bilateral relations with Afghanistan and the projects were planned
and designed in long-term perspective, the overall drawdown and transformation of the
mission significantly decreased the sustainability of these projects.
Furthermore, a significant number of the respondents in particular complained about
the lack of clear political guidance (in a sense of “a vision”), which only shows poor oversight
and management mechanisms by the Czech political representatives. Even though the
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political pressure on foreign deployments, including counterinsurgency, is high (and can turn
counterproductive for the actions on the ground), the reluctance of Czech political
representatives to even talk about the Czech counterinsurgency deployment in the public was
strong (and potentially undermining effectiveness of counterinsurgency; see below), let alone
to utilize certain leverage over the coalition partners (obtained by the willingness to meet the
requests). Czech political representatives didn’t (and still don’t) know how to utilize this, even
if still limited leverage for own national gains. The flawed and/or inappropriate management
was also demonstrated in some of the projects completed by PRT Logar, which proved
ineffective, counterproductive and unsustainable in a longer-term in particular. Even though
the level of utilization of local business and local work market was strong, limited rights and
authority of the coalition forces to avoid working with corrupt governmental officials led to a
significant waste of resources within the Czech counterinsurgency approach. Long and
heavily bureaucratic decision-making procedures on the national level also significantly
decreased the potential of effectiveness of the Czech counterinsurgency efforts (in Kosovo
potentially even more than in Afghanistan). According to some of the Czech respondents,
PRT Logar also contributed to bribe the Taliban in exchange for safety of their projects. The
author wasn’t able to verify this claim, but the history of ISAF in Afghanistan keeps the
record of such instances, thereby such claim wouldn’t be surprising, if true. In the opinion of
some of the respondents, even the Czech contribution to EUPOL was a waste of resources
that could have been used more effectively in other counterinsurgency task.
Particularly the ISAF mission showed that the Czech Republic doesn’t have enough
resources not only to execute a counterinsurgency operation unilaterally, but also to provide
for at least a sustainable level of preparedness and experience across the Czech army’s units.
Limited intelligence gathering resources by the Czech units themselves, particularly in
HUMINT, represents a critical liability of the contemporary Czech approach toward
counterinsurgency that has to be mitigated and managed for any potential future operations, as
it could significantly undermine the effectiveness of their security operations. Additionally,
overall ineffective and insufficient preparedness in the pre-deployment phase, as well as the
inappropriate utilization of civilian experts in both pre-deployment and deployment phases,
along with resulting overburdening and overloading of only certain Czech military units and
capabilities, meant initial limited local knowledge that slowed the progress of Czech
counterinsurgency ambitions and efforts. The direct counterinsurgency experience also
exposed critical shortage of experts on particular areas of operation as well as language
experts, who could possibly work as interpreters during counterinsurgency missions. Even
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though the function of interpreters is vital for any success of counterinsurgency, the Czech
Republic doesn’t have any program on their training or further accommodation, after the
mission is completed. Another potentially critical liability is an existence of so-called
undeclared or unofficial national caveats. Its existence and real impacts are, however, difficult
to prove.
The analysis also exposed significant space of opportunities for increasing
effectiveness of the Czech counterinsurgency approach, particularly in connection to
increasing the security and defense capabilities of the Czech Republic and pursuing its
national interests. The greatest opportunity is represented by the acquired experience than
should be utilized for future deployments in all of its phases (preparation, planning, execution,
withdrawal). The combat experience has already been, reportedly, utilized during the Mali
deployment. Furthermore, the Czech counterinsurgency deployments brought significant
attention to the issue by both the public and the experts. The Czech political and military
representatives should identify and adopt measures to integrate and utilize these experts in the
future. Increased attention and interest in the areas of deployment also bears significant
societal opportunities in promoting multicultural dialogue and exchange, and greater mutual
understanding, by increasing the awareness on both sides of the spectrum.
Direct experience from foreign counterinsurgency deployments also exposed potential
points and mechanisms for utilization of a private security sector and experts, perhaps in the
field of countering violent extremism. The knowledge gain throughout the deployments as
well as the media and gender-related activities of PRT Logar should serve as a solid base for
such efforts. Underestimating the potential of both private security market (regulated through
clear contracts) as well as of counter violent extremism in counterinsurgency campaign
significantly limits the overall potential of the Czech Republic in this regards. Also, the use of
unmanned aerial vehicles and exposure to other forms of technical innovations during these
deployments might help to stimulate domestic production of such technologies.
Most importantly, the Czech Republic should not hesitate to utilize the good relations
it maintains with a number of countries, particularly those potentially strategically important
for further counterinsurgency operations. Its performance during these deployments further
increased the Czech, yet limited leverage that can be used for accomplishing foreign, security
or economic policy goals and interests. Also, the NGO and civil society scene in the Czech
Republic is strong and active, and possesses important potential for any future Czech
counterinsurgency endeavors, if properly managed and synchronized.
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Certain threats to the Czech counterinsurgency approach exist as well, potentially
significantly undermining its effectiveness, success or contribution to the overall security and
defense of the country, as well as to the potential of the Czech Republic to maintain the status
of responsible and reliable ally in international relations. The key threat identified is the
failure to meet the full potential the country has – in terms of its resources, not meeting the
opportunities fully or not managing them effectively. Another big threat is not learning the
lessons identified and learned during the recent counterinsurgency deployments, or adopting
best practices from other allies adequately to the Czech context. This inability or
unwillingness to grow and progress in terms of counterinsurgency conduct, civil-military
cooperation and multinational foreign deployments could lead to critical loss of
interoperability, which would damage the position and reputation of the Czech Republic in
international relations, severely decrease the level of its defense preparedness and its ability to
respond to new emerging threats or other developments in security environment. The threat of
maintain the flawed metrics of success/progress in counterinsurgency operations and
following it in the future can threaten the lives of the Czech civilian and military professionals
in these operations, to further waste of resources or their ineffective use, as well as to not fully
understanding the realities of the area of operation. Additionally, the case of Afghanistan also
showed that this can contribute to increased instability of international security, including
increased security threat level for the Czech Republic itself.
Loss of interoperability could also be caused by the unwillingness or inability to improve
preparation of the forces in general, not only pre-deployment phases of operations. With
resolving the critical weakness of insufficient preparedness within the Czech
counterinsurgency approach, threat of the absence of sufficient clarification of the civil-
military relationship would be managed. If not met with appropriate proactive action, the lack
of clarification on this relationship gravely damages the operational capabilities of the
resources that can be potentially deployed to future operations. This could further damage the
reputation of the country and minimize its already limited leverage in international relations,
and thus also the overall capabilities required to secure national interests. The Czech Republic
should seek to resolve the flawed, slow and heavily bureaucratic decision-making, oversight
and management process to avoid increasing the threat potential of these challenges.
It would also contribute to mitigate the threats stemming from insufficient
conceptualization of the Czech counterinsurgency approach in official documents has
generally created a lot of confusion and tension during its execution among variety of actors.
Insufficient, or sometimes contradictory, conceptualization leads to insufficient preparedness
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of both civilian and military elements, which further causes not meeting the full potential of
operational capabilities. If not resolved, this issue can severely decrease the effectiveness of
the Czech efforts, not only in terms of negotiations with allies or other countries, but also the
potential inability to manage operations on the ground, to maintain continuity of the process
or to truly reflect and meet the needs, potentially also endangering the Czech civilian experts
and military professionals deployed in a foreign mission. This threat is closely connected to
the inability or lack of will or resources to fully utilize the experience gained in the most
recent deployments.
Perhaps the more important threat to the Czech counterinsurgency approach and its future
efficiency and significance is represented by the latest trends in the transatlantic security
environment, which indicates a gradual weakening, if not disintegration yet, of the EU as an
individual entity, and more gravely NATO. NATO being the fundamental pillar of the
security and defense of the Czech Republic, weakening of NATO represents an existential
threat to the Czech national interests themselves, not only its counterinsurgency approach,
which would lose traction, importance, but more importantly vital guidance and resources the
Czech Republic doesn’t have, which also shape the approach and significantly contribute to
its execution. If unresolved, lack of clarity on goals within the Czech Republic as well as
among the allies only further undermines the strategic cohesion of the two transnational
institutions. Waste of resources should be transformed into more effective and increase
defense spending that could, consequently, inspire other actors to reform their defense
budgets as well. Such developments would help strengthen the bond and cohesion of NATO
(as well as the EU to a certain level), and thus mitigate the threat of their weakening.
Potential use of undeclared caveats also negatively impacts the limited leverage within the
two blocs the Czech Republic currently has. If anything, the Czech Republic should
emphasize the importance of synchronization and coordination of civilian efforts among
partners in multinational counterinsurgency operations, and for its credibility should resolve
its issue of uncoordinated civilian-military operations which can further serve as an example
in this regard.
6.2 CEG analysis
Second analytical method aimed at delivering inferences further used to answer the research
question and to achieve the stated goal of this thesis is CEG model. CEG model helps identify
and explain actual performance and how it differs from intended (or wished for) performance
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by the Czech political and military representatives within the Czech counterinsurgency
approach. This task is complicated by the inconsistent conceptual framework existing in the
official documents and the grave lack of clarity on its strategic goals. Importantly, the CEG
concept itself is static (cf. Hill 1993: 322), and is thus not allowing to capture all the
complexities and their mutual dynamics in the relevant field of the Czech approach to
counterinsurgency, which is constantly evolving, and so are its impacts. The main added
value of this CEG analysis is thus its usefulness as a starting point, as it enables both the
researchers and practitioners to see potentially dangerous tensions within the Czech approach
toward counterinsurgency, with the space for their management by either increasing
capabilities, or decreasing expectations (when put simplistically).
The author decided to deal with this obstacle by using the objectives of the individual
official documents that are relevant for the Czech counterinsurgency approach as an
imaginary bar for the expectations the Czech authorities had in this regard.120 In consideration
of real capabilities, the author utilizes both the empirical part of this thesis and her SWOT
analysis conducted above, with the focus on Hill’s indicators of (1) ability to agree, (2)
resource allocation, and (3) available instruments and tools (Ibid: 315). Importantly, Hill
doesn’t introduce a clear methodological mechanics behind his EC’s CEG assessment.
Nevertheless, his research provides numerous concepts and indicators that could be used as
criteria for evaluation of possible CEGs existing in terms of certain policies (and approaches)
of the Czech Republic. Therefore, in addition to the three basic indicators of the ability to
agree, resources and their allocation, and the instruments at the disposal, factors like the
degree and the number of expectations held of the Czech Republic by external actors in the
sphere of counterinsurgency. Use of the concepts of “actorness” and “presence”, which Hill
introduces in his work (Ibid: 308-310), provide significant inputs for the analysis of the Czech
approach toward counterinsurgency, as well.
Any attempts of measuring the actual volume and range of the gap existing between
the capabilities the Czech Republic can realistically commit to counterinsurgency operations
and the expectations about its performance, functions and roles are severely complicated by
the lack of methodological underpinning of this inherently quantitative exploration. Hill
120 Public statements of the political and military representatives generally correlate with these goals. The author
doesn’t consider the rhetoric of generally anti-establishment Communist Party of the Czech Republic, only the
political parties that formed government coalitions during the researched period of 1999-2013, i.e. ČSSD, ODS,
US-DEU, SZ, TOP-09, KDU-ČSL and VV/Lidem. Furthermore, foreign deployments got hijacked several times
for political and personal purposes, therefore any objections political parties, or their individual representatives,
had with regard to the Czech participation in counterinsurgency operations can’t be used as credible data for this
research, because determining their real motivation was beyond the ability of the author. Moreover, strategic
approaches are generally shaped by adopted documents, not public proclamations of politicians per se.
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avoids any debate that would potentially provide even the basic guidance in the efforts to
measure the actual CEG volume. It appears, that it is necessary to assign numerical values to
both the expectations and the real capabilities on the same scale, and use these numerical data
to generate the actual value of the gap.
Regarding the level of expectations, the Czech Republic has participated in
counterinsurgency operations under the NATO command. Therefore, the expectations and
key goals NATO establishes serve as a solid basis for the expectations raised with regards to
the Czech counterinsurgency approach. NATO emphasizes building confidence and mutual
understanding between international actors, effective cooperation and coordination with HN
authorities and other international partners in execution of an operation, as well as
cooperation with other international actors in the overall planning for complex operations in
which a large degree of civil-military relations is required. Furthermore, individual mandates
and priorities of NATO operations usually followed key LOOs framed as protection of the
population, HN security forces capability-building, support to socio-economic development,
support of good local governance and the rule of law as well as elimination of the insurgent
activity and capabilities. The efforts aimed at negotiating with external actors in the region,
where a mission is carried out, are stressed as well.
At the Czech level, its Security strategy states the strategic importance of
strengthening cohesion and efficiency of NATO and the EU, including its participation in
NATO or EU crisis management operations beyond the geographical boundaries of the
Eurasian space across their wide spectrum. Furthermore, when honoring its commitments, the
Czech Republic seeks to adhere to principles of a comprehensive approach in these foreign
deployments. In Afghanistan, the Czech Republic prioritizes its contributions to institutions
building, good governance and the rule of law, reconstruction and development, along with
provision of secure and stable environment. The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs further
specifies the priority fields of reconstruction and development as economy, environment and
agriculture.
During its counterinsurgency deployments, the Czech Republic contributed to
confidence building between international actors on the political as well as theater level
answering the requests of its partners for increased contributions. On the other hand, however,
mutual understanding between international actors has been undermined by the lack of clarity
on goals and different perceptions of counterinsurgency mission by the Czech Republic and
other international actors. The cooperation with HN authorities was effective only to limited
degree, considering the reports of working with the corrupt officials and inherent differences
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between Czechs and locals, which were, however, managed to a certain, “workable” level.
Effective cooperation and coordination with other international actors during the execution of
an operation can be divided into two dimensions – military and civilian. From the perspective
of the Czech military contribution, the cooperation and coordination with other actors was
smooth and effective. Nevertheless, for the civilian part, counterinsurgency operations lacked
any coordination among contributing countries whatsoever. Evidence indicates efforts to
coordinate at least with the UN agencies in provision of humanitarian aid in area of operation.
The expectation embedding in the factor of coordinated planning can be subverted by the
existence of undeclared caveat and restrictions imposed on the contingents deployed, which,
however, has not been verified and proved in this thesis. Large degree of civil-military
relations has shown to be the most challenging expectation to meet on the Czech side, given
its mostly lacking previous experience with the significance of the civilian element and its
coordination and synchronization with the military component during deployment in a
conflict zone.
Furthermore, the Czech capability deployed in counterinsurgency missions generally
contributed to provision of security to the local population. The predominant lasting positive
effect (or success, perhaps) of ISAF has been the space for operational maneuver the coalition
forces created for the ANSF. After the withdrawal of the coalition forces from most parts of
the countries and their increased concentration only at the big military bases caused an
exposure of the population to the insurgent or criminal activity again. The real level of
security provided to the population thus remains disputable, especially when considering the
population that collaborated with the foreign troops (and PRTs). Not even in the Kosovo case
the population has been protected completely, considering the inability of the KFOR troops to
prevent or react to the escalation of inter-ethnic tensions.
The expectation of HN security forces capability-building has been met by a
significant amount of resources committed to this counterinsurgency pillar by the Czech
Republic. Also, the remarkable variety of specialized military components executing
capability-building tasks in all three studied cases, and particularly Iraq and Afghanistan,
indicates minimal gap between expectations and resources in this regard. Support to socio-
economic development then widens the scissors though. The prioritization of economic
reconstruction and development, commitment of substantial resources to it during the
existence and operations of PRT Logar as well as the dedication of the Czech NGOs have
been undermined by flawed and ineffective decision-making and management of the
reconstruction efforts, as well as by their disputable long-term sustainability. Support of good
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local governance and the rule of law provide conflicting accounts as well. The presence of the
Czech military (and civilian) professionals and their operations generally greatly contributed
to positive impact on the overall situation in general. On the other hand, however, working
through corrupted Afghan officials and the reported investments of Afghan warlords in the
reconstruction and development projects realized by PRT Logar, for instance, as well as the
relatively short-term presence of the Czech counterinsurgency force didn’t improve the
situation on the local level in this regard at all.
The Czech military forces have also proved capable of deployment in the full spectrum
of counterinsurgency operations in wide variety of functions. The Czech military operations
have been deemed successful and greatly contributing to the efforts of eliminating the
insurgent networks, particularly due to their professionalism, remarkable level of
interoperability and adaptability as well as apparent non-existence of national caveats
imposed on their actions and clear ROE. However, in the broader perspective, these military
successes were gravely undermined by other factors, which were beyond the control of the
Czech military professionals, or their possible ability to mitigate them. Measuring the effect
of the Czech civilian efforts on addressing the root causes of insurgency is not possible for
obvious reasons. Although the Czech Republic highlights the importance of negotiations with
external actors as well, the real scope and range of the resources it has devoted in this regard
is not immediately measurable. Diplomatic relations have been leveraged by the Czech
Republic to help achieve the missions’ goals, however, the involvement of intelligence
agencies in the process makes any efforts to measure real Czech impact impossible.
By its willingness to mobilize maximum resources and answer requests of its allies as
well as by apparent inexistence of caveats the Czech Republic contributed enormously to
maintaining the cohesion of NATO and the EU with regards to crisis
management/counterinsurgency efforts. The wide variety and spectrum of professionals
deployed to NATO counterinsurgency missions further strengthened the efficiency of its
efforts, which was, however, undermined by a palette of other factors already stated above.
The fact that Czechs contributed to the EUPOL mission as well indicates the willingness to
mobilize resources in order to meet these expectations. What showed to be challenging is
maintaining comprehensive approach during foreign developments, as indicated by the
general lack of synchronization and coordination as well as the grave lack of clarity on the
goals of the missions. Furthermore, the inability to utilize civilian experts to their full
potential further weakened the expected comprehensiveness of the overall approach, and so
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did the challenge of overburdening of only certain military capabilities of the Czech armed
forces.
Specifically, in Afghanistan, the Czech Republic contributed to institutions building
mainly by its military efforts aimed at ANSF capacity-building, however, the potential of
utilization own experience of recent democratic transition wasn’t fully exploited. The Czech
Republic could have, for instance, provided experts in the fields of democratic oversight of
the security forces or anti-corruption initiatives, perhaps even for countering organized crime
activities. The expectations related to the support to good governance, rule of law, security
and reconstruction and development have been addressed above. As for the Czech priority
fields, in the studied time frame of 1999-2013, the Czech Republic to the significant level met
the expectations only in the sphere of agriculture where it run several trainings and projects.
The efforts to stimulate local economic development by utilizing local workforce, local
supplies and local companies were mostly hampered by factors like dealing with corrupt
officials, bribing, waste of resources, unstable security situation as well as poor oversight,
management and decision-making measures and procedures in place. When it comes to the
field of environmental challenges and protection, the focus of the Czech actors was strictly on
the issue of water management, which doesn’t reflect the full scope of such expectation.
Additional follow-up research is required in order to measure the real scope of the gap
existing between expectations and capabilities with regards of the Czech counterinsurgency
approach. Generally, the gap tends to widen when considering the civilian dimension of
counterinsurgency, probably caused by the lack of clear goals aimed to achieve, which wasn’t
the issue for clearly stated ROE of the counterinsurgency military forces.
The analysis above indicates that in the Czech context, the ability to agree exists
basically only at the strategic level on the general topics like contributing specific resources to
a certain counterinsurgency mission. Where the ability to agree is dangerously low is the area
of goals settings, manifested in minimal coordination between the individual important
players, resulting in lack of political guidance and strategic management from the highest
levels of decision-making authorities.
Similar dynamics can be traced with second Hill’s indicator of resource allocation,
where, again, at the strategic level, required resources have been generated and allocated
relatively quickly and as needed, without any greater objections. Significant dichotomy also
exists between the military component of the Czech counterinsurgency approach and the
civilian one. Interviewed Czech military professionals didn’t raise any concerns or
dissatisfaction with the level and quality of logistical and financial support of their
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deployments. Quite contrary, the NSEs reportedly worked effectively and quickly. On the
civilian side, however, the allocation of adequate resource was significantly slowed down by
the reported long and heavily bureaucratic decision-making procedures regarding approvals of
funding for specific projects requested by the PRT civilian component, which then further
negatively impacted the community and potentially also usefulness of the project, due to its
limited amount of time to get it completed. Even though the author didn’t collect any data that
would point to negative impacts on the relations with the local population (in terms of not
meeting their needs or expectations), such an unintended consequence of postponing a certain
project could, in theory, severely damage relation with the population. Such a harm would
then produce additional challenges for the Czech counterinsurgency activities by undermining
its core pillar of the importance of popular support as well as redirection of resources to win
the trust and support again, potentially also endangering lives of military and civilian
professionals in the process.
Considering the instruments the Czech Republic has as its disposal, and their
utilization for counterinsurgency campaigns, both positive and negative dynamics can be
observed. The country has been capable to mobilize a substantial amount of capabilities and
resources, which culminated in fall 2011. What was especially remarkable was the range of
military capabilities the Czech Republic has been capable to provide to counterinsurgency
missions, as requested by NATO or other partner countries. The civilian landscape of
instruments available for execution of counterinsurgency missions was, however, not exploit
to the fullest potential. Experts were not appropriately utilized, perhaps due to their
inadequate preparedness to deployment in a conflict zone. Funding of activities of the civilian
component was reportedly abundant and needlessly exceeded the required amount, which led
to huge waste of resources at the also. Also appropriate oversight and management
mechanisms were not in place, that would at least mitigate this waste, which then reportedly
led to funding and supporting those internal factors of the conflict situation (like corruption,
power of warlords, funds for insurgents) that ultimately made any Czech counterinsurgency
efforts unproductive.
Hill considers “actorness” in the context of the ability and capability of an entity (EC,
or CZE) to act as a genuine international actor in wider contexts (multinational
counterinsurgency operations in this research). As Hill (1993: 309) points out himself,
examining the character of “actorness”121 “provides us with a theoretical perspective which
121 Any efforts to measure levels of “actorness” would be hampered by insufficient operationalization of the
concept in the existing literature, and stretches beyond the research scope of this thesis anyway.
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can incorporate both the internal dynamics of institutional development (…) and the changing
nature of the international environment in which it has to operate.” Modified and adapted to
the research subject of this thesis, the efforts to explore “actorness” of the Czech Republic in
the sphere of campaigns aimed at eliminating an insurgency contributes important data to the
overall inquiry on the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency.
Importantly, there has been an increase in the scope of actorness, as well as the
consequences in the respect of more organic changes in the relations between the CZE and the
rest of the world, when but into the broader counterinsurgency perspective. This increase has
correlated with the gradual progressive exposure of Czech military and civilian actors to both
conceptual and practical dimensions of counterinsurgency as one of the main contemporary
campaign themes (using the NATO conceptualization; see p. 85). As the empirical data
presented above indicate, the Czech Republic has progressively also become one of the more
generous and committed partners in the counterinsurgency missions it has participated in. On
the other hand, however, the strong commitment has also severely weakened over the course
of the foreign missions, particularly ISAF, mirroring the persisting implicit inconsistency and
confusing relevant policy making. Political will of the Czech government representatives to
ensure required counterinsurgency performance of its military and civilian assets in areas of
operation has coincided with the general trend of decreasing political will of other NATO
member states, but also reflect the pervasive problem of the lack of clear definition of the
objectives and goals of the Czech Republic as a sovereign country and actor in the field of
multinational counterinsurgency operations. Efforts to increase actorness of the Czech
Republic in the sphere of counterinsurgency are identifiable. This increase has had several
important consequences as well, particularly in terms of stronger confidence of the Czech
Republic in terms of preparation of its military forces and civilian assets to be deployed to a
multinational mission abroad, as well as utilizing the gained direct experience from several
perspectives (combat experience, interoperability with partners, CIMIC, etc.) further.
Reputation of the Czech Republic as a credible and reliable partner, generally easy to
cooperate and collaborate with during multinational deployments, has also been positively
affected by the Czech “counterinsurgency actorness” increase.
Hill further works with a concept of international actor developed by G. Sjoestedt in
1977. Following Sjoestedt, Hill introduces three key attributes of an international actor as an
entity which is (1) delimited from others, and from its environment, (2) autonomous, in the
sense of making its own laws and decisions (resembling the concept of sovereignty), and (3)
in possession of structural prerequisites for action on the international level (like legal
178
personality, a set of diplomatic agents and the capability to conduct negotiations with third
parties) (Ibid). For the purposes of this thesis, these indicators are modified and adjusted to
the topic of individual stakeholders in the realm of multinational counterinsurgency
campaigns. All three indicators are virtually applicable to the research subject in this thesis
with the goal of achieving yet another perspective on the data sets of general Czech approach
to counterinsurgency. The first indicator, delimitation of an actor, in the sphere of
multinational (NATO) counterinsurgency operations is clearly established by the importance
of the national level of planning and decision-making about all individual steps or
contributions in the multinational setting. The Czech Republic as a sovereign country can
decide by itself, in compliance with its own national interests, risk assessments and threat
perceptions what kind and what amount of resources and capabilities it would commit to a
mission. Even in terms of the developments on the ground during the missions, the Czech
Republic has often kept semi-autonomous profile in the eyes of local population, most notably
in Afghanistan. Even though the Czech forces and civilian experts comprised an integral part
of the ISAF coalition forces, they also maintained strong national profile, lately culminating
in signing numerous bilateral strategic agreements with the Afghan government.
Second indicator focuses on the level of autonomy in a sense of making own laws and
decisions. As already mentioned with the first indicator, the level of importance of national
decision-making has been strong during the courses of the counterinsurgency missions the
Czech Republic contributed its resources to. As a sovereign state, the Czech Republic could
have expressed its reservations or disapprovals, usually in forms of national caveats, a
practice that has allowed for maintaining high level of cohesion of the Alliance as well as
legitimacy of the mission. Such decision-making autonomy of nation states has also been
manifested in the leeway given to them mainly on the tactical level, up to the level of
OPORDs that are usually issued by national C2 structures for respective national contingents
deployed to multinational missions. However, such leeway is limited and framed by the
NATO documents like STANAGs, and by the strong emphasis on interoperability between
(the deployed) NATO member states’ forces. The Czech Republic as a comparatively smaller
state with less negotiating power within NATO/EU cannot resort to drafting and adopting its
own national legislation separate and different from the legislative frameworks established by
NATO/EU as such. As determined by the Czech constitutional law, the NATO/EU legal
provisions are superior to those of individual nation states. In terms of structural prerequisites,
the third indicator of actorness in counterinsurgency sphere, the Czech Republic has proved it
can mobilize substantial number of resources relevant and effective in counterinsurgency
179
endeavors in military and economic terms. Political dimension of the Czech approach to
counterinsurgency is difficult to measure and delineate accurately. The country has quite
capable diplomatic corps at its disposal, indicating relatively high capability to conduct
negotiations with third parties. This potential has been illustrated by the discussions and
negotiations the Czech political and military representatives held both in NATO format and
bilaterally with the Afghan government. Nevertheless, the exact leverage and influence the
Czech Republic has had in the NATO structures regarding the counterinsurgency operations,
their planning, execution or evaluation, cannot be accurately determined.
Despite the fact the Czech Republic essentially met every request the Allies made with
regards to reinforcement of forces and capabilities deployed to a counterinsurgency mission
and has been able to mobilize fairly maximum of the resources at its disposal to its
boundaries, the actual negotiating power and leverage in relations with other Allies or
partners is generally understood to be rather limited by the comparatively small amount of
resources and capabilities it can offer, regardless their high quality. Additional influential
variable is the lack of geopolitical power on the site of the Czech Republic in general. The
country’s relevant military and civilian actors has essentially failed to exploit the reputation
the Czech Republic gained among its coalition partners as well as local population to its
greater advantage. Lack of previous direct experience, weak political will, minimal public
awareness and public debate along with the absolute lack of any appropriate clarification or
definition of desirable objectives, goals and end states (mainly in political terms) can be
identified as some of the major reasons behind this inability meet and exploit the acquired
potential for its own benefits.
Another major factor with a profound impact on actorness of the Czech Republic in
the field of multinational counterinsurgency operations, as well as on the character, scope and
overall evolution of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency, is the one of flawed
coordination of activities on the levels, i.e. (1) among Czech military and civilian
counterinsurgency executioners, and (2) among the coalition partners, incl. the NATO
platform. Based on the data obtained and analyzed in this research, despite the fact that
interoperability has long been promoted as one of the essential operational capabilities of
armed forces of NATO member states and partner countries, its maximum was never reached
on the ground during the missions. One of the major impediments of effective interoperability
and coordination among coalition military forces was the practice of use of national caveats
restricting the rules of engagements of individual national contingents. On the same mission
level, as the ISAF case showed in particular, civilian (reconstruction and development) efforts
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were not coordinated on the highest mission command levels. The individual contributors
were granted significant leeway in their actions and operations, at the expense of the
coherence and consistency of the mission per se. Civilian dimension of multinational/NATO
counterinsurgency operations generally provides more research opportunities and space, given
its strong national character, providing for a greater variation of the research subject and
enabling identification of patterns, specifics and interests that comprise a national approach to
a united, common strategy.
Internal issues with coordination, mainly in terms of complex cooperation between
military and civilian elements of the Czech counterinsurgency contingents, affected the
“counterinsurgency actorness” of the Czech Republic through strong inconsistency of the
overall efforts. Problems with coordination and consistency was also reinforced with the
rotational character of the PRT Logar. Individual sequential contingents usually developed
their own mission program with specific priorities, not always matching the priorities of the
previous contingents they replaced. Some reports also suggest strong personalized character
of the mission programs of individual PRT Logar contingents of civilian experts, reflecting
the background, interests and ideological leanings of the leadership elements of the civilian
part of PRT Logar. Coordination issues in the mission on the ground then reflected the issues
and problems in coordinating negotiations, planning, decision-making and practical
implementation between the governmental (and non-governmental) agencies and institutions
relevant for counterinsurgency conduct of the Czech Republic on the strategic and political
level. This challenge closely mirrored the inexperience of the Czech Republic with
counterinsurgency, CIMIC and the PRT concept as such. Even though the CIMIC units of the
Czech armed forces generally have quite extensive experience with deployments, the concept
of CIMIC has encountered difficulties in transferring it to a broader political Czech context
and in consequent manifestations that surfaced in a form of commitment of abundant
resources and their ineffective management, use and spending. This issue is then closely
connected to the critical requirements of the necessity to improve planning and concrete
budgeting chapters of the specific Czech contributions to multinational/NATO
counterinsurgency missions, in order to increase the overall efficiency and actorness of the
Czech Republic in the field of counterinsurgency efforts. Both such individualistic efficiency
and actorness is, however, difficult to measure adequately, given the complexities of the
context and interconnectedness with other actors of different character and influence. Hence
this thesis only outlines the framework and key attributes and tendencies in this regard.
181
Follow up research is necessary to thoroughly understand the Czech actorness in
multinational/NATO counterinsurgency operations.
Hill also works with the concept of “presence” as highly relevant for methodological
framework of capability-expectations gap case studies. For the purposes of this thesis, the
character of “presence” of the Czech Republic with regards to multinational
counterinsurgency campaigns. Such presence is heavily influenced by variable and
multidimensional presence of the Czech Republic in international affairs,122 as well as
NATO/the EU or different bilateral relations. Hill further suggests using the variables of the
outside perceptions of the studied entity (EC/Czech Republic) and the significant effects it has
on both the psychological and the operational environments of third parties (Ibid). In the
context of the Kosovo and Iraq deployments, the Czech Republic’s contribution to the
mission was generally perceived as a part of the bigger multinational force. In Kosovo, it was
largely due to the general simplistic view of the conflict as having two sides, the zone of
neutrality was greatly eliminated from the specter of perceptions of third parties (local public,
domestic public, neighboring countries, regional and global powers, interested non-state
stakeholders) under the veil of heavy emotions accompanying the predominantly ethnical
conflict. In such conflict landscape, the KFOR force was, for various reasons, perceived as
pro-Albanian. The author didn’t succeed in obtaining credible data regarding the third parties’
perceptions of the specifically Czech activities in the mission. What could have had a decisive
influence on this absence of credible data is the very limited and rather sporadic Czech
contributions to the overall mission.
On the contrary, the case of Afghanistan evinced different dynamics. Undoubtedly, the
Czech Republic could have been, and sometimes also was perceived merely as a “coalition
force”. However, the testimonies of respondents indicate that, especially in the areas with the
physical presence of the Czech military professionals and civilian practitioners, the overall
perceptions were relatively positive, distinguishing the Czech Republic as an individual,
sovereign actor in the landscape of the Afghan conflict, in some occasions also among the
insurgent ranks. Where the Czech presence was reportedly observable the most were the areas
of provision of security, reconstruction and primary socioeconomic development.
122 Czech Republic functions in the international relations across several parallel systems – as a sovereign nation
state in the bilateral format, as a member state of NATO, EU, OSCE, UN and other international and regional
organizations, and private sector (military industry, NGOs). These parallel systems of international relations then
shape the multiple identities of the Czech Republic in the international system. The form of the Czech
involvement may be governmental, semi-governmental and non-governmental, depending on the level of
government involvement and authority. Specifically, the semi-governmental involvement in military industry as
part of a wider counterinsurgency engagement is worth researching deeper.
182
The prevailing framework of the counterinsurgency missions the Czech Republic has
participated in is the multinational/NATO command. Therefore, any attempts to explore
outside perceptions of the presence of the Czech Republic are blurred with the perceptions
about the presence and performance of other coalition partners. This blurred line can also be
demonstrated by the emerging confusion among third parties over when to negotiate with the
Czech Republic as an autonomous actor and when to negotiate with NATO itself.
Exploration of the existing capability-expectations gap in the current Czech approach
toward counterinsurgency should, logically, start with identification and analysis of the
demands relevant influential insiders and outsiders have or might have on the Czech Republic
and its contribution to and performance in multinational counterinsurgency operations. As a
basis of his examination of the CEG present in the foreign and security performance of the
EC/EU, Hill identifies a list of external demands on the EC/EU’s foreign and security policy
performance in two time periods: (1) EC functions in the international system up to the
present (i.e. 1993), and (2) conceivable future functions for the EC in the current flux (i.e.
security environment of the first half of 1990s) (Ibid: 310-315). The fact that Hill himself
doesn’t elaborate on the proper methodology of his CEG analysis, nor does he present provide
any explicit guidance or reasoning behind his two lists of presumed EC functions, in terms of
justifications or explanations of how he identified the individual functions listed and their
indicators, gives future researchers significant flexibility and numerous loose ends, yet still
allowing for being conducted along the key pillars of the Hill’s CEG analysis. The main three
attributes of the Hill’s analysis – the ability to agree, the resources, and the instruments at its
disposal – have already been applied to the case of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency
and discussed above (see pp. 173-177).
What is also important to emphasize here is that the underlying starting points of a
CEG analysis are usually translated into language of number and degree of the expectation of
outside actors as well as the studied entities themselves. CEGs tend to emerge and start to
widen at a point where the researched entity (EC/the Czech Republic) is no longer capable of
fulfilling expectations articulated in connection to its future performance and actorness in the
respective field. Many of these expectations are, indeed, distinguishable by a high degree of
irrationality they usually encompass, as indicated in the case of Czech approach toward
counterinsurgency as well. Demands and expectations on the functions and performance of
the Czech military and civilian assets deployed to multinational counterinsurgency operations
generally reflected changing perceptions of the Czech assets by the outsiders and third parties
that, mirroring the developments on the ground (like progressively increasing and expanding
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Czech participation in the period of 2008-2011/2012). Accompanied by relatively high level
of irrationality, high third-party expectations on the Czech counterinsurgency performance
have tended to reflect the general (unreasonably) high expectations imposed on the entire
counterinsurgency mission itself.
Strong irrationality present within the Czech approach to counterinsurgency,
connected to the misunderstanding, miscomprehension or inadequate knowledge of the
developments on the ground or the complexities of the issue itself, demonstrated its influence
in two dimensions. First, reflective of the generally high expectations from the coalition
forces themselves, respective (and responsible) political representatives in individual TCNs,
in partner and/or neighboring countries as well as indigenous local population tended to
expect from the Czech military and civilian assets committed to a counterinsurgency mission
more than they were capable to deliver. The challenge of meeting the high expectations was
exacerbated by existing ineffective and bureaucratic decision-making procedures, reported
ineffective coordination and collaboration between key stakeholders, critically insufficient
definition and clarification of the objectives of respective missions (in political and military
terms) as well as the novelty of the phenomenon in the Czech environment. Confusion over
the source of the CEG in this regard evinces two major dynamics – lack of the resources and
capabilities needed to meet those expectations, and ineffective management of the resources
and capabilities available. Problematic resource management could have, theoretically,
contributed to widening the existing CEG even more.
Second, the domestic Czech population was generally confused about the functions
and performance of the Czech resources deployed to counterinsurgency missions. Inadequate
understanding and minimal awareness, resulting from the failure of the Czech political elites
to inform the public on the deployments properly, consequentially widened the existing CEG,
because it generated broadened range of demands and expectations on the Czech functions in
counterinsurgency endeavors. Such minimal awareness within the Czech society produced
incoherent mismatch in terms of the expectations the Czech public had from the Czech
counterinsurgency performance. Two major tendencies can be identified – on the one side,
Czechs expressed their support to the counterinsurgency and mainly development and
reconstruction efforts in the country, on the other hand, increasingly disapproving (or
disillusioned in a sense) sentiment started to gain traction across the Czech society. The
common narratives articulated by this opposition sentiment was drawn along the lines of not
understanding the purposes and objectives of the Czech participation in the missions,
especially ISAF, complemented by economically and to some extent security charged
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arguments. According some of the respondents the author talked to, and supported by
empirical evidence, the obvious reason behind the strong resentment was the ineffective
communication of the political and military representatives with the public. A kind of
information vacuum was created and later hijacked by anti-establishment and populist parties
active in the Czech political landscape for their own political goals and benefits, exploiting
the huge lack of awareness, understanding and knowledge. An interesting difference is thus
observable here – even though the INFOOPs and PSYOPs realized in the foreign missions
have generally been deemed as effective and successful to some extent, the public relations
and strategic communications part of the Czech political and military representatives has been
falling short of any sophisticated channels and mechanics.
Consequentially, any management of high expectations various parties had for the
Czech engagement in counterinsurgency has been exacerbated by variables of lack of
understanding and knowledge, minimal clarity on the desired realistic objectives and end
states and, perhaps to some extent, the prevailing Czech strategic culture and mindset of
maintenance of (historically determined) secrecy of the activities of the Czech armed forces.
The factor of inexperience or novelty of the art of counterinsurgency in the Czech context is
only partially plausible. Despite the fact that it projected itself to the ineffective decision
making and coordination mechanisms among the relevant agencies, the general public
awareness remained remarkably low, even as the Czech military professionals and civilian
practitioners progressively gained valuable experience in their foreign deployments and as the
public awareness campaigns started to be held more often.
The issue of ineffective resource management is also closely linked to the challenge of
consensus building. The fact that the Czech Republic deployed considerably high number of
resources to counterinsurgency operations indicate the ability to overcome dissent at the end
of the decision-making process and reaching a consensus in settings of parliamentary
democracy. The decision-making process was, however, based on the testimonies of the
Czech respondents the author talked to, marked with different language and understandings of
the Czech role and importance in respective counterinsurgency missions between relevant
stakeholders (mainly along the civilian – military dichotomy). Troublesome consensus
building is also reflected in the absence of a united document outlining the priorities and
ambitions, major instruments as well as long term vision of the nature of the Czech
involvement in multinational counterinsurgency operations, and, most demonstratively, in the
absence of clearly defined objectives of such involvements. Building on the works of
Christopher Hill, researcher Asle Toje elaborated the concept of CEG and transformed it into
185
his original concept of “consensus-expectations gap” (Toje 2008). Main argument of his work
is that the EC/EU succeeded in attempts to close the existing CEG highlighted by Hill in
terms of increasing or adjusting the character and volume of resources available to meet the
expectations of its foreign policy roles and functions, however, the gap is still present in a
reduced form (Ibid). For the purposes of this thesis, Toje’s concept is useful in identification
of additional attributes of the still evolving Czech approach toward counterinsurgency.
Restructuring of the counterinsurgency-relevant resource pool and base in particular, along
with the requirement to rationalize decision-making processes serve as main illustration of a
solid basis of existing consensus and agreement building among the relevant stakeholder. On
the contrary, evidence of flawed synchronization and coordination of efforts between the key
agencies indicates persisting challenges in efforts to reach unanimous consensus on issues
relevant for Czech counterinsurgency performance. Closer and more throughout research on
the application of the consensus-expectations gap concept in the context of the Czech
counterinsurgency approach though.
Any credible attempts to measure the CEG existing within the Czech approach toward
counterinsurgency must reflect the dichotomy in expectations Hill emphasizes. Hill
distinguishes two different dimensions of expectations, as indicated in the text of this
subchapter above, (1) own ambitions of the studied entity, and ways of communicating the
facts to the outsiders, so that the limits of one’s actorness and intentions and clearly visible,
and (2) perceptions by others (Hill 1993: 322). The Czech Republic considerably and largely
failed to define, articulate and communicate its own ambitions for the Czech contributions to
NATO counterinsurgency missions. Czech political representatives didn’t officially express
what they seek to gain or achieve through these deployments. Some of the ambitions can only
be identified in broad general terms complying with the objectives stated by NATO or the
missions’ mandates themselves. Important positive attribute of the Czech approach toward
counterinsurgency and the CEG existing within it is the minimal level of both declared and
undeclared national caveats imposed on the deployed military forces and civilian capabilities.
This fact increased actorness of the Czech Republic in the field of counterinsurgency
operations and helped clarify the military intentions of the Czech Republic. Confusion and
prevailing obscurity of the objectives and ambitions of the Czech Republic shaped the
perceptions of others as well. The greatest challenge in this regard was represented by the
very high expectations the presence of foreign military forces and humanitarian, development
and reconstruction aid created within local populations, particularly the Afghans. The military
professionals and civilian practitioners sought to manage such expectations through their
186
activities and negotiations with the locals, but the degree to which these efforts managed the
existing high expectations is difficult to determine and questionable.
In terms of capabilities, Hill names three attributes that are required to be evaluated,
i.e. (1) cohesiveness, (2) resources, and (3) operational capacity (Ibid: 318-321).
Cohesiveness of the Czech capabilities deployable to counterinsurgency missions abroad must
be understood and evaluated within the broader context of cohesiveness of the entire mission
and NATO itself (i.e. on the collective level). Functioning of NATO is generally structured
and institutionalized to accommodate strong role of individual NATO member states. On the
national level, cohesiveness of the Czech approach was undermined by ineffective
coordination and synchronization of efforts between the civilian and military components of
the Czech counterinsurgency contingents, occasional political hijacking as well as ambiguity
of the desirable realistic objectives, goals and end states of the Czech participations in
counterinsurgency missions. Internal cohesiveness was also curtailed by the problematic
continuity of the individual deployments, especially to PRT Logar, visible particularly in the
early years of its operations. Individual contingents tended to have different mission priorities,
not necessarily following and building up on the priorities and projects of the contingents they
replaced.123 Furthermore, resources the Czech Republic can deploy to a counterinsurgency
operation are generally limited in their numbers, but mostly their preparedness. Previous
inexperience with counterinsurgency craft represents a significant influencing factor in this
regard. Limited monetary resources are also mirrored in the tendency to re-deploy military
units, but also some civilian experts, that had been prepared, trained and deployed previously.
This inclination seeks to reduce the costs of the counterinsurgency deployments, possibly
reflecting the opposing sentiment in the Czech society with its economic argument, however,
it has also created quite significant discrepancy within the pool of Czech military
professionals and civilian experts deployable to foreign missions in the future, as well as
within the structures of the Czech armed forces, their funding and educational and training
programs. On the contrary, operational capacity of the Czech resources deployable to
counterinsurgency campaigns evinced to be remarkably high. The military forces (and civilian
experts to some extent) deployed to foreign counterinsurgency mission were able to learn and
123 Deeper research into the issue of cohesion of the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency would require
study and analysis of a potential convergence in voting procedures and results as well as public statements of
representatives of political parties that had presence in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies of the
Czech Parliament. Connected to this is another significant factor of domestic policies and their potential
influence over the character of the conceptual vs. practical approach to counterinsurgency of the Czech Republic.
187
adapt quickly,124 and showed impressive interoperability skills in their actions with other
coalition partners. Also, as already aforementioned, the Czech Republic succeeded in
mobilization vast amount of resources to the ISAF mission, demonstrating slowly, but
steadily growing institutionalization of the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency.
Measuring the Czech achievements in counterinsurgency field must be carried out
against theoretical characteristics of a single, effective counterinsurgency strategy doctrine.
For the purposes of this thesis, it is necessary to evaluate the Czech counterinsurgency
performance to the key attributes of the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine, as realized in the
concluding chapter of this thesis. But, again, to clearly determine the existing capability-
expectations gap in the research subject represented a challenge, due to the practical
inexistence of clearly articulated objectives and goals of the approach, which complicates
efforts to identify expectations in more precise or detailed terms. Czech approach toward
counterinsurgency is still evolving. Therefore, any attempts to explore, analyze and evaluate
the present capability-expectations gap within must be subjected to future re-examined.
More of capability-expectations gap than exists particularly in the context of the
civilian component of the Czech counterinsurgency approach. The striking dichotomy
between the preparedness of the military component on the one hand, and the insufficient
preparedness and mobilization of civilian resources on the other requires to be adequately
bridged by improved preparedness of both components of the Czech counterinsurgency
efforts. This existing dichotomy has then manifested itself in dubious level of
synchronization and sometimes challenging coordination of activities between the two
components. The military-civilian dichotomy was also underscored by the existing minimal
clarity on the common goals and objectives of the Czech counterinsurgency mission.
Whereas, even in theory, the military counterinsurgency component usually derives goals of
its tasks and missions from OPORDs/ROE, the civilian part of the Czech counterinsurgency
landscape lacks any clear guidance for its efforts. Minimal or unclear political guidance then
also affects civil-military cooperation back. Particularly efficiency and effectiveness of the
Czech counterinsurgency approach could also be examined through analysis of the existence
of capability-expectations gap from the local perspective, i.e. what expectations the local
population had and what was the reality of the Czech performance. Such research is, however,
beyond the scope of this thesis. May this dimension serve as recommendation for one
direction of any future research of this subject matter.
124 Learn and adapt has long been accented as one of the fundamental pillars of any counterinsurgency efforts.
188
The two figures below illustrate the major findings of the evaluation of capability-
expectations gap existing within the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency. First figure
visualizes two axes that function in the respective approach. What the table evinces is the
character of the capabilities the Czech Republic committed to NATO counterinsurgency
missions it participated in,125 and its decomposition into practice according to individual
expectations. Key attributers stated in the NATO counterinsurgency doctrine are used as
categories of expectations. This figure works only with character of the capabilities, their
specifications are defined in the concluding chapter of this thesis, answering the first research
question.
Politic
al
prima
cy
Popul
ation
-
centri
c
Impor
tance
of
legiti
macy
Intelli
gence
Neutr
alize
the
insurg
ents
Protrac
ted
Rule of
law
Transiti
on of
respons
bility
Learn
and
adapt
Collec
tive126
POL
DIPL
MIL
HUM
DEV
DIPL
MIL
HUM
DIPL
MIL
POL?
DIPL?
MIL
HUM
DEV
MIL
HUM
DEV
POL?
DIPL?
MIL
HUM
DEV
POL?
DIPL?
MIL
DEV
POL
DIPL
MIL
HUM
DEV
Natio
nal
POL
DIPL
MIL
ECO
SOC
INF
PSY
DEV
REC
MIL
ECO
SOC
INF
PSY
DEV
REC
DIPL
MIL
ECO
SOC
INF
PSY
DEV
REC
DIPL
MIL
ECO
SOC
INF
PSY
DEV
REC
DIPL
MIL
ECO
SOC
INF
PSY
DEV
REC
DIPL
MIL
SOC
INF
PSY
REC
DIPL
MIL
ECO
SOC
INF
PSY
DEV
REC
DIPL
MIL
ECO
SOC
INF
PSY
DEV
REC
DIPL
Figure 8: Two axes of CEG in the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency. Source: IH.
125 Short forms of characteristics are used in the figure: POL – political, DIPL – diplomatic, ECO – economic,
MIL – military, PSY – psychological, INF – information, SOC – societal, HUM – humanitarian, REC –
reconstruction, DEV – development. DIPL in the cluster of national efforts include negotiations with locals.
Importantly, national policies outlining what individual states do and don’t do set limitations for collective
policies. 126 With the direct involvement of the Czech Republic. This category includes deployments as part of a larger
multinational force (like SOF deployments). National efforts include all sovereign Czech missions (like PRT
Logar or OMLT Wardak).
189
The data presented in the figure as related to the two key axes of CEG existing in the Czech
counterinsurgency approach indicate the range of resources the Czech Republic deployed to
counterinsurgency missions abroad. What the figure doesn’t show, however, is the
quantitative value of these data and the extent to which the committed capabilities meet the
individual expectations (attributes). Hence figure 8 should be used as one of the possible
springboards and directions for farther research that is required for deepening the
understanding of the research subject.
Second figure, a table represents a visualization of the CEG in Czech
counterinsurgency approach. The author of this theses first assigns numerical values on the
scale 0-1 to the degree to which individual listed expectations are met by the capabilities
committed and deployed. Importantly, the list of individual expectations (assigned value 1)
reflects key LOEs of NATO counterinsurgency and major characteristics of broader contexts.
Numerical values assigned to the Czech deployments reflect both the character and numbers
of the contributions. This table uses figure 1 (see p. 23) as springboard, however, modified to
allow to illustrate the fluctuation of the CEG in Czech approach toward counterinsurgency in
the studied period of time. In order to generate similarly graphical illustration, numerical
values would must be assigned to the individual expectations as well, reflective of their
demanding character. Nevertheless, the listed expectations are only loosely based on ill-
defined or absent expectations and objectives formulated by relevant stakeholders. Additional
research is required in this regard.
Expectations (value 1-5) Value Capabilities (value 0-1)
Security of the population
(full spectrum operation)
0.9 SOF, SOG, PRT, EOD
HN capacity building - political 0.2 No evidence on specific political initiatives. Cooperation
with local authorities, but complaints about corruption.
HN capacity building – military 0.9 Almost exemplary, “the sole success”, but complaints.
HN capacity building – civilian-
other
0.75 Socioeconomic development – projects, trainings,
including specialties (KAIA METEO)
Reconstruction 0.6 Infrastructure projects, incl. KAIA, limitations, some of
them reportedly accepted by the Taliban.
Humanitarian assistance 0.8 Provision of supplies, facilitation of humanitarian
deliveries of other actors.
Development 0.8 Localization of efforts, but corrupted officials.
Third parties – negotiations, other
involvement
0.2 Not clear how the CZE leveraged its reputation;
facilitation of the relations-building of locals with
coalition partners.
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Countering organized crime 0.4 Partially by SOF, SOG, border monitoring in Kosovo.
INFOOPS/PSYOPS 0.85 CIMIC, media development.
DDR 0.4 Limited, mainly in Kosovo, partially EOD.
Expectations of locals 0.5 Expectations too high, capable of managing those just to a
certain level, interconnected with the broader context.
Expectations of coalition partners 0.85 Minimal caveats, met the requests, great reputation, but
SOG allegations.
Expectations of domestic public 0.3 Not clear, information embargo, opposing arguments, bad
or minimal public awareness and communication
campaign.
Media 0.6 Reflecting confusion about the issue, progressively
positive reporting and portrayal.
Expectations by adversary (if
clearly identifiable)
0.5 Friendly and strongly population-centric approach,
reputation and the 1968 narrative.
Table 18: List of expectations and capabilities. Source: IH.
What the table shows is the scope of existing capability-expectations gap in Czech
counterinsurgency performance. The Czech Republic has adequate and sufficient military
capabilities to meet the basic expectations in the military and security sphere, however, non-
military areas indicate perilous gaps between what the Czech Republic is expected to
accomplish and what it is capable of accomplishing in counterinsurgency context. The
greatest deficiency is apparent in the political/diplomatic affairs, which can serve as another
illustration of the need of articulating clear political objectives of the Czech
counterinsurgency deployments. The table also discloses the vital need to improve strategic
messaging on the side of the Czech Republic to the third parties’ audiences. This task won’t,
however, be effectively undertaken, until agreement is reached on the desirable objectives,
end states and ambitions across the domestic political, military and civilian landscape, until
the strong positive reputation of the country abroad can be leveraged and unless the lessons of
the recent counterinsurgency deployments are learned and followed.
7 Conclusions
The Czech approach towards counterinsurgency represents a challenging research subject. All
relevant data are scattered across various sources, and researchers must pay considerable
attention to the practical manifestation in form of execution on the ground and must consider
the broad context and specific conditions of the dominance of NATO and its framework of
military strategies for the Czech Republic’s foreign and security policies. This also means that
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the Czech Republic is obliged to adopt NATO strategies, excluding existence of any
autonomously Czech counterinsurgency strategy per se. What is the subject of research in this
thesis then is the way Czech Republic adopts NATO counterinsurgency strategy framework
and further translates it into the Czech context, with the Czech resources and capabilities, i.e.
the approach. This thesis is thus a case-study of the NATO counterinsurgency doctrine,
among other added values of it. Research of the counterinsurgency topic in general requires
multidimensional research combining various military, political, socioeconomic and even
psychological sciences of various relevant state and non-state actors, in order to provide as
comprehensive results as possible. Furthermore, the previous lack of any direct experience
with the counterinsurgency vocabulary and its key attributes in multinational foreign
operations further complicates the research landscape of the topic of Czech approach toward
counterinsurgency, and so does the dynamic nature of its practical implementation,
distinguishable by strong interdependency on the changes in nature, organization, funding
schemes, preferred modes of operandi and other features of the adversary, here insurgents.
The Czech Republic represents quite a unique case in the counterinsurgency research
field, given its relatively small geopolitical power and resource base in international relations
as well as short direct experience with the research subject in both conceptual and practical
terms, a topic which generally got little attention in the academic discourse. Absence of
existence of an official common document that would outline the desired goals, key attributes
and features and resource base available to deploy in the context of the Czech approach to
counterinsurgency demonstrates the pervasive confusion over how to best comprehend and
manage the challenge of counterinsurgency in the Czech context.
Desired aim of this thesis was to fill the gap in the Czech as well as international
expert literature by developing a comprehensive study of the contemporary Czech approach
toward counterinsurgency by describing and analyzing its key features. The justification for
this ambition is that such a pilot study of this topic would allow interested actors to learn
about the Czech counterinsurgency experience, understand its key internal dynamics,
challenges, problems and limitations it must face, as well as to understand where the strengths
of the Czech approach are and why. Moreover, this thesis brings closer attention to the
resources the Czech Republic has, to their preparedness and conditions of their use. All these
variables are important for managing expectations for any possible future counterinsurgency
deployments the Czech Republic would most likely participate in. By systematical analytical
process, this thesis provides critical descriptive analysis of the current state of the Czech
approach toward counterinsurgency, identifies and discusses its potential efficiency as well as
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its strong and unique features and liabilities. It also provides recommendations for further
development of the approach by addressing the opportunities and threats to it as well as the
key areas where a significant gap between expectations and real capabilities in the context of
the Czech counterinsurgency approach lie.
The thesis is divided into three main parts, closely linked to each other, i.e. theoretical
part, empirical part and analytical part. In the theoretical part, conceptual framework of the
research is established by defining the scope of what constitutes a strategy, and where does an
approach stand in this. The author uses the theory of strategy developed by Harry Yarger with
the 8 underlying premises of what constitutes a strategy, complemented by theoretical model
developed by Arthur J. Lykke, who approaches strategy as a balance visualized in an equation
“strategy = ends + ways + means”. Their use for the purposes of analyzing the Czech
counterinsurgency approach is limited, since no “Czech counterinsurgency strategy” exists. It,
however, helps to understand, why an autonomous Czech counterinsurgency strategy even
cannot exist (apart from the conditioning by the commitments and obligations stemming from
the NATO membership). The basic conceptual framing is conducted also for the topic of
counterinsurgency itself, in order to understand the essence and limits of the subject for the
purposes of this thesis.
In the empirical part, relevant historical legacy is studied on two cases of the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,
acknowledging the limited connection and influence over the current Czech
counterinsurgency approach. In the following part, the Czech counterinsurgency approach is
addressed, and its key attributes presented, in two dimensions – conceptual and practical.
Conceptual dimension introduces the official strategic documents of the NATO and the Czech
level, which are highly relevant for the Czech participation in counterinsurgency operations,
with special attention devoted to the NATO counterinsurgency doctrine, which represents (or
should represent) the ultimate conceptual and strategic framework of the Czech
counterinsurgency approach. The subchapter on the practical dimension of Czech
counterinsurgency approach then describes and analyses three foreign deployments of the
Czech military and civilian professionals, that helped shape the overall Czech
counterinsurgency approach, i.e. Kosovo, Iraq and predominantly Afghanistan. Given the
significance of the Afghanistan deployments for the subject of this research, analysis of this
case study provided most of the data needed to achieve the aim of this thesis. Deployments to
Kosovo and Iraq were limited from the perspective of the Czech counterinsurgency approach,
because they included only military component of the overall counterinsurgency force.
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In the analytical part, SWOT analytical model and CEG analytical model are applied
and used to analyze the key findings from the empirical part, generating a set of key positive
and negative features, tendencies and inherent dynamics that allow the author to answer the
research questions she formulated in the satisfactory manner.
First research question (see p. 13) sought to identify the fundamental key attributes of
the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency, and potential consistency of this approach.
The author was able to identify a number of key features within the research subject. First, the
Czech Republic has a solid capability and resource base than can be used throughout the full
spectrum of counterinsurgency operations, and was able to mobilize maximum of it for its
foreign counterinsurgency deployments, and answer the requests of its allies, particularly in
case of the mission in Afghanistan. Military capabilities and resources are specialized and of a
high quality, with distinctive level of interoperability and professionalism. The Czech
counterinsurgency efforts have been strongly focused on HN security forces’ capability-
building in different areas, at different levels, in different specializations and sizes. Focus on
expertise and specialization is yet another key attribute of the Czech counterinsurgency
approach, considering also the number of not only military, but also training programs and
initiatives in areas of operations. Vital feature is then represented by focus on reconstruction
and development complemented by significant localization of efforts in terms of stimulating
local security, stability and economic growth, by HN security forces’ capacity-building, as
well as use of local workforce, companies and supplies in reconstruction and development
projects. Considering the lack of any previous direct experience, the Czech counterinsurgency
force proved to learn quickly, be adaptive and flexible as well as culturally sensitive. The
population and its security, safety and well-being constitute the center of gravity of the Czech
counterinsurgency approach. The Czech counterinsurgency efforts resulted in significant
contributions mainly to security and economic development in area of operation.
Structural identification of the key features of Czech counterinsurgency approach and
its overall consistency can be achieved through applying the key counterinsurgency attributes
defined in the NATO counterinsurgency doctrine:
• Political primacy and clearly defined political objectives – the Czech Republic
didn’t develop a clear political guidance for its deployments in
counterinsurgency operations, it also didn’t clearly defined goals and
objectives its sought to achieve by and through their counterinsurgency
contributions;
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• Struggle for the population, not against it – the Czech Republic’s
counterinsurgency approach is strongly population-centric, population and its
security and well-being was at the center of gravity of all the deployed forms
of Czech counterinsurgency contributions, including SOF;
• Importance of legitimacy – the legitimacy factor must be viewed in two
dimensions – at the local level in area of operation, the Czech Republic sought
to gain legitimacy for itself as well as HN government it supported, by strong
focus on the population and their needs as well as by INFOOPS/PSYOPS and
development of media sector; it also sought to avoid any civilian casualties. On
the other hand, however, Czechs had to cooperate with corrupt local officials
(and reportedly bribe them even themselves), which significantly undermined
the positive efforts. The legitimacy of the mission in the eyes of the public
audience was problematic and too challenging to measure, as the Czech
political and military representatives rarely addressed the counterinsurgency
deployments to the public and, more importantly, were not able to explain to
the public the importance, goals and real assessment of its progress;
• Intelligence-driven operations – the Czech Republic itself exercised limited
intelligence gathering capabilities, particularly with regards to HUMINT, given
the coalition nature of the efforts. However, its willingness to share
intelligence in a timely manner has been widely acknowledged by its
international partners. The manner or level of intelligence sharing between the
civilian and military component in general is unclear and not readily possible
to assess;
• Unity of effort – the Czech Republic didn’t meet the required of
comprehensive and fully coordinated approach, given the huge discrepancy
existing between the military and civilian components of its counterinsurgency
approach, in both conceptual and practical dimensions, manifested in lack of
clearly defined goals and reported lack of synchronization and coordination of
efforts between the two. The Czech Republic, however, greatly contributed to
security and economic programs within the overall counterinsurgency
missions, which, however, suffered from lack of coordination themselves;
• Neutralize the insurgents – the Czech military professionals were deployed to
the full spectrum of counterinsurgency operations (offensive, defensive,
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stabilization), with strong focus on avoidance to civilian casualties. It also
helped counter the insurgent propaganda by running own PSYOPS/INFOOPS,
and by efforts to build and establish local media capability;
• Prepare for a protracted campaign – the only programs the Czech Republic
continue to source are the economic programs as part of bilateral Czech-
Afghan partnership, however, the Czech Republic is not involved in the HN
security forces’ capability building initiatives after termination of the ISAF
mandate in the Afghan territory, it has never been involved in any political
reforms or programs. In a sense, the Czech Republic contributed prepared
Afghans themselves for a protracted campaign by its strong, significant and
relatively effective training, advising, assisting and mentoring activities during
ISAF, along with the continuing training and education programs and
initiatives for the members of the ANSF in the Czech Republic itself;
• Security under the rule of law – even though the Czech Republic committed
significant resources to the training of HN police forces, provision of secure
environment during the time of its deployment, also negotiated and dealt with
local tribal elder authorities, demonstrating its strong devotion to localization
of the counterinsurgency efforts and their outputs;
• Hand over responsibility as soon as practicable – mostly achieved, even
though the respondents stressed the political pressures on adherence to the
schedule of transition, the Czech security forces’ capacity-building efforts are
generally deemed effective; and
• Learn and adapt – the Czech military and civilian professionals showed
remarkable ability for both.
As evident, what the Czech approach to counterinsurgency doesn’t include are efforts to
address the core grievances functioning as root causes of the insurgency, as any political
action is absent from the approach. The Czech counterinsurgency approach also evinces great
level of inconsistency, at two levels. First, the practice is not fully consistent with the
conceptual framework stated in most of the relevant official Czech documents. This could
have been caused by the fact that conceptualization in the Czech environment was more of a
reaction to the developments at the NATO level and on the ground as well as the lack of
previous experience with the subject. The second dimension of inconsistency marks the
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existing dichotomy between the military and civilian component in both conceptual and
practical terms, and generally strong fractionalization of the Czech counterinsurgency
approach. The Czech Republic wasn’t involved in the reconstruction and development
counterinsurgency efforts until 2008, when it deployed its own PRT to Afghanistan. The
Czech government should learn from the lessons it identified during counterinsurgency
deployments to avoid waste and counterproductive or ineffective courses of action, and in
order to exploit the potential it has in the counterinsurgency realm to the highest level
possible. Certain evolution of the Czech counterinsurgency approach is possible to track, and
if and how it develops further greatly depends on the importance of counterinsurgency efforts
in general, in the Czech context as well as on the utilization of the lessons learned and best
practices of the allies.
Second research question sought to identify the potential level of autonomy of the
Czech counterinsurgency approach and its unique features. Our membership in NATO
doesn’t allow for high level of autonomy by default, especially in military terms. The space
left for the variations among individual nation states’ approaches is terms of the scope of their
involvement, the resources they deploy and, mainly, the reconstruction component of their
counterinsurgency efforts. As stated above, reconstruction and development efforts within
ISAF were not coordinated. Quite unique is the importance of the civilian component of the
Czech counterinsurgency approach, further underlined by the deployment of experienced,
capable and strong CIMIC detachments. Furthermore, strong preference of localization of
stabilization, reconstruction and development, with hiring local companies, employing local
workers and using local supplies, is perhaps even more significant. The attention on
contributing to the economic security and development of a HN is remarkable (from business
stimuli to provision security of the airspace or main lines of communications, like highways).
Unique feature of the Czech counterinsurgency approach is certainly also its popularity in the
Muslim world (caused by the historical legacy as well as friendly attitude), resulting in mostly
highly positive perception of the Czech presence in the countries of counterinsurgency
deployments, that further facilitate the core pillar of any counterinsurgency – winning hearts
and minds, and support of the population. The Czech Republic also proved remarkably
capable to mobilized maximum resources (for a limited period of time), specialization and
expertise and further share it with HN security forces and population, and thereby perhaps
utilizing its experience from its own most recent democratic transition, security sector reform
and economic reform. The devotion of the Czech representatives to training and preparation
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of HN security forces is demonstrated in the effective utilization of the training facilities in
the Czech Republic, too. Such training initiatives and programs stretch the outreach of the
Czech counterinsurgency activities into the longer outlooks, and can potentially serve as an
illustration of growing political commitment to the recent counterinsurgency activities it
engaged in abroad. Also, quite interestingly, the unique Czech experience with countering
organized crime in its own territory was attempted to be exported to the counterinsurgency
deployments in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, which represented a culmination point in this
regard with the deployment of the police SOG unit as well as the certain participation on
counter-narcotics missions during the deployments.
The third research question about the counterinsurgency models is closely connected
to the theoretical and conceptual part of this thesis. Through the prisms of the typology
developed by John M. Collins (see p. 54), the Czech counterinsurgency approach is strongly
population-centric, distinguishable by extensive efforts and devotion to winning hearts and
minds of the population during all phases of counterinsurgency missions, including the
offensive one. As Collins further categorized three different categories of counterinsurgency
campaigns, the Czech approach fits his third category “hold and harass”, i.e. simultaneous
efforts aimed at pursuing the insurgents and securing an area of responsibility. However,
again, the Czech counterinsurgency approach is highly fractionalized, including in terms of its
continuity and cohesiveness of action, i.e. the Czech Republic generally engages in smaller
individual mission tasks in various time periods (which may overlap). The Czech presence
and activities in areas of counterinsurgency operations contributed to or by itself enabled at
least opening of the hearts and minds of local populations, by providing them with alternative
opportunities and alternative narratives to those of anti-government forces. Ultimate winning
of those hearts and minds would require much longer and generally greater presence and
activities of the Czech forces and capabilities.
NATO in its counterinsurgency doctrine stresses its preference of so-called “clear,
hold, build” model of counterinsurgency campaign. The Czech approach meets most of its
core attributes and requirements:
• Physically and psychologically separate insurgents from the population – the Czech
Republic greatly contributed to continuous kinetic efforts to pursue and eliminate the
insurgents, mostly also its sources of funding, and also engaged in PSYOPS and
INFOOPS aimed at countering the insurgents’ propaganda;
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• Provide conditions for political, social, economic reforms – the deployments were
short for establishing any solid foundations for sustainable reforms, however, the
Czech Republic generally sought to stimulate the economic development and greatly
contributed to economic security. It also shared some of its transitional experience in
security forces and business capacity building;
• Safeguard the population and key infrastructure – among the Czech
counterinsurgency priorities was provision of security to the local population from all
potential threats (i.e. including avoidance to civilian casualties), maintaining freedom
of movement on key lines of communications by building check points as well as
local security forces;
• Training and opportunities for HN security forces to improve – extensive part of the
Czech counterinsurgency approach in all phases of HN security forces preparation
and especially mentoring and assisting to improve their capabilities on the front lines;
frequent and effective utilization of training facilities on the territory of the Czech
Republic itself then also represents another unique feature of the Czech approach
toward counterinsurgency;
• Opportunity for HN police forces and other government institutions to establish
and maintain rule of law – the Czech Republic contributed vast resources to training
efforts of the HN police forces, however, continued to work with corrupt local
officials and therefore contributed also to maintaining the existing culture of impunity
in area of responsibility;
• Provide essential services and address the core grievances of the insurgency – the
Czech Republic coordinated its efforts and helped with humanitarian aid delivery by
its own as well as by other international actors and sought to meet the basic needs of
the population through provision of secure and stable environment and projects that
meet the needs of locals, some of them included essential services like water
irrigation system. The Czech Republic didn’t, however, participate anyhow
significantly in efforts to address and solve the core grievances of the insurgency.
• Assistance with refugees and IDPs – the Czech Republic didn’t directly participate
in this line of operation;
• Use and train of local workers and materials to build and provide a sustainable
economic and social system – the Czech Republic considered stimulating economic
development of in the areas of responsibility as one of its priority efforts, and
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developed on this focus by continued prioritized bilateral development arrangements.
Strong localization of counterinsurgency efforts, especially in terms of realization of
reconstruction projects by utilizing local capacities is one of the most defining
features of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency;
• Deny the enemy active and passive support, along with the last principle of
• Gain support of the populace also proved to be the fundamental attributes of the
Czech counterinsurgency approach, enabled by friendly and respectful mutual
relationship, which can also help to explain the absence of any green-on-blue attacks,
committed by the trained Afghans targeting the Czech forces.
When the author attempts to apply the Yarger’s theory of strategy and the Lykke’s
theoretical model of strategy on the key characteristics of the Czech approach to
counterinsurgency in order to evaluate whether or not it could theoretically be considered a
strategy, the results build a strong argument against any claims of strategic nature of the
Czech approach towards counterinsurgency. The Yarger’s theory of strategy is based on 8
fundamental premises, which the Czech counterinsurgency approach greatly fails to meet:
1. Proactive, anticipatory nature of strategy – the Czech counterinsurgency approach
has been largely reactive in both conceptual and practical terms;
2. Formulation of appropriate objectives and the desired end state – the desired end
state of the Czech counterinsurgency efforts mirrors the overall desired end states of
the entire missions, whereas clear and appropriate objectives were not clearly defined
and specified in the Czech context;
3. Appropriate balance between the ends, ways and means – the Czech
counterinsurgency approach fails especially within the first pillar, as demonstrated by
below with the Lykke’s theoretical equation of strategy, modified to the basic
characteristics of the Czech counterinsurgency approach below;
4. Political purpose – the Czech counterinsurgency approach suffers from lack of clear
political guidance and vision of what the Czech Republic wants to achieve as a
sovereign state in more specific terms;
5. National consensus and comprehensive direction – the Czech approach to
counterinsurgency is distinguishable by huge discrepancy between its military and
civilian components;
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6. Holistic nature – the Czech counterinsurgency approach is based on a compilation of
individual deployments of military and civilian resources with specific mission tasks;
7. Knowledge of the environment – the Czech Republic long lack experts on the areas
of counterinsurgency operations and gravely failed to effectively and systematically
utilized them; and
8. Inherent risk (either failure to achieve objectives, or providing significant advantage
to the adversary) – the Czech Republic generally achieved some isolated inherent
objectives of the deployments of its resources in terms of completed reconstruction
projects or trained and prepared HN security forces’ units (especially SOF, which the
Czech SOF help train), however, their long-term sustainability is questionable;
furthermore, allegations occur about bribing the Taliban, which didn’t provide
significant advantage to the adversary per se, however, it contributed to grow its
sources of funding. Complete withdrawal with limited successes left behind can also
be perceived as bigger advantage handed over to the adversary.
The Czech approach toward counterinsurgency translated and visualized in the form of
Lykke’s strategic equation would look similar to this:
CZECH STRATEGY = ??? + SOME OF THE WAYS + SOME OF THE MEANS
Table 19: Czech approach toward counterinsurgency – Lykke’s strategy model. Source: IH.
The goals of the Czech counterinsurgency approach have never been clearly specific.
However, great amount of confusion and lack of clarity exists with multinational/NATO
counterinsurgency missions in general, as many different actors pursue different objectives
and interests. For instance, in the case of ISAF itself, whether the desired objectives of the
mission were focused on preventing the terrorist network al-Qaeda, its affiliates and allies
from establishing their safe-haven in Afghanistan once again, and thus prevent any future
attacks by this terrorist entity on Western targets and interests (i.e. limited objectives), or
whether the ultimate objective was democratic transition in Afghanistan (i.e. total objective)
remains unclear.
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Czech approach toward counterinsurgency also doesn’t fit the counterinsurgency model
outline by David Galula. From the four counterinsurgent courses of action Galula
characterizes (see p. 56), the Czech counterinsurgency performance has contained elements of
the first two courses of action in combination, i.e. direct action against the insurgent leaders
and indirect action against the conditions that are propitious to an insurgency. With the
deployment of the Czech SOF to multinational SOF task forces across Afghanistan the Czech
Republic contributed to the capture or kill missions targeting leadership of the Taliban. Other
forms of the Czech counterinsurgency contributions has fallen under the indirect actions
against the conditions propitious to insurgency, as they including HN security forces
capability building, economic development and human security efforts and activities. These
tasks were generally also considered to promote the legitimacy of the local government,
thereby it can be argued that the Czech approach towards counterinsurgency touches up on
the fourth course of action outline by Galula (strengthening of the political machine),
however, the evidence suggest no direct or greater political involvement of the Czech
Republic. Infiltration of the insurgent movement was virtually impossible from the side of the
Czech military and civilian actors, given their initial minimal preparation, let alone the
language barrier. Galula also draws 8 main principles that are, in his view, vital for success in
counterinsurgency campaigns (see p. 57). Considering the limited resource base the Czech
Republic has and can commit to a multinational counterinsurgency operation, it is difficult to
categorize the Czech counterinsurgency performance according to Galula principles.
Moreover, one of his key principles is based on the necessity to replace corrupt or
incompetent officials from administrative positions, a competency the Czech civilian and
military contingents clearly lacked. Where solid contact points with the Galula’s
counterinsurgency principles can be identified is in the activities of making a frequent contact
with the population and facilitation of functioning of provisional local authorities, including
support to elections. Nevertheless, the Czech counterinsurgency deployments inherently
couldn’t meet the criteria of “enough” armed forces concentrated in an area or them being
embedded with the local population.
David Kilcullen’s counterinsurgency expertise was repeatedly stressed by the respondents
as the most important learning material during their deployments. Kilcullen’s
conceptualization then gradually became one of the key preparation materials for the military
(and civilian) professionals in the pre-deployment phases. His 28 counterinsurgency
principles (see p. 59-63) thus represent a key guiding material for the Czech
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counterinsurgency performance. Some of those principles are, however, too strategic to allow
for an appropriate application in the Czech context. David Kilcullen also recognizes 3 main
pillars of counterinsurgency – security, political and economic (see p. 58). The Czech
Republic committed its resources to the security and economic pillars in particular, as the
main tasks of their counterinsurgency execution included military and to certain extent law
enforcement tasks, provision of public services and human security, as well as resource
management assistance, along with some humanitarian and development assistance to the
Afghan population. Involvement in activities that Kilcullen categorizes under the political
pillar (legitimacy and efficiency of government and institution building) were limited and
included provision of public services, development and reconstruction aid and HN security
forces training and capacity building tasks. Even though the activities of the Czech
contingents themselves were meant and framed in the promotion of legitimacy of the local
government narratives, the locals were often differentiating between the services and projects
handed to them by the foreign (Czech) contingents, and thereby gave the local authorities
minimal, if any credit and appreciation. Promotion of legitimacy of the local government has
thus been one of the most challenging tasks of the Czech counterinsurgency deployments.
The research conducted in this thesis demonstrated that the Czech Republic has its potent
approach toward counterinsurgency missions, which has undergone recent and swift
evolution. The major problems and challenges that it entails are largely connected to the
inexperience of the Czech Republic in this field. This research also showed that in the Czech
context, counterinsurgency has been widely understood solely as a military theme. This fact
can be partially explained by the lack of clear conceptualization of the counterinsurgency
topic of the civilian agencies and organizations the Czech Republic is a member of. Strong
militarization of the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency is also mirroring the previous
unfamiliarity of the topic, as the Czech civilian agencies and institutions have not been able to
establish a clear policy and conceptual framework on their part of the overall Czech approach
toward counterinsurgency. The research conducted in this thesis also generates a highly
hypothetical hypothesis that from both qualitative and quantitative points of view, the Czech
Republic would not be able to tackle the challenge of eliminating an insurgency unilaterally
on its own. Variables of very limited resources as well as still quite limited practical
experience, inconsistent and scattered across the scope of relevant civilian and military actors,
and still critically insufficient preparation of these actors (and the prevalent prioritization in
this regard) prevent any more ambitious counterinsurgency endeavors of the Czech Republic.
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However, the Czech Republic as a united country should sought to overcome existing
liabilities existing within the approach and learn how to best utilize the precious experience,
contacts and reputation it gained through its most recent counterinsurgency deployments. It
should also seek to further develop this approach to be more effective by integrating other
actors (like private security sector or cooperation with NGOs), themes of activities (CVE,
gender-related issues), as well as by establishing effective mechanisms of coordination,
negotiation and synchronization of activities and efforts of all relevant state and non-state
stakeholders, along with effective and flexible decision-making procedure and oversight and
management mechanisms. Most importantly, the Czech Republic should articulate its
objectives and goals, what it seeks to achieve by and through their counterinsurgency
deployments from the mission, from its allies and partners as well as HNs. Moreover, the
Czech political and military representatives should prepare united common document that
would outline the framework and key characteristics of the Czech counterinsurgency
approach, and should make it publicly available. The general communication with the
population is essential for any future support of similar missions, especially in terms of clearly
explaining them why the Czech Republic deploys its assets, capabilities and resources to a
counterinsurgency campaign. The common document would then serve also as an instrument
of transparency and credibility in the eyes of the public.
This thesis was a first ever attempt to provide a comprehensive study of the Czech
approach toward counterinsurgency, and evinces numerous spaces and potentials for future
research. The Czech counterinsurgency approach can be compared to other countries of
Visegrad Group or to the approaches of other countries with similar characteristics to the
Czech Republic in terms of their political, military and economic capabilities. Deeper look
into issue of national caveats deserves more attention as well, so does the potential Czech
private security sector has with regards to supporting, expanding or developing the Czech
counterinsurgency approach to the future. Other areas can cover the capability-expectations
gap existing from the perspective of perception by coalition partners and by the local
populations the Czech Republic deployed its resources and capabilities to, or the domestic
population at home, as well as comparisons of different national PRTs and their operations.
The Czech counterinsurgency experience can also be examined in the contexts of EU or UN
crisis management missions, or broader Czech foreign and security policies with
identification of potential impacts the Czech counterinsurgency deployments had in this
regard, like the preparedness of the Czech military and civilian professionals. Content and
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discourse analysis of the PSYOPS/INFOOPS the Czech Republic engages in during
counterinsurgency missions is yet another potential extension of the scope of this research,
which generally yields significant practical conclusions and recommendations. The topic of
Czech approach toward counterinsurgency can be subjected to numerous theoretical
examinations as well – applying theories of realism, liberalism, neo-institutionalism and neo-
functionalism can greatly contribute to the overall research in the respective topic, and so
would explorations directed through the lenses of theory of implementation, theory of
dependency and theory of bureaucratic behavior. The research presented in this dissertation
thesis can serve as a solid starting point for such further theoretical as well as practical
studies, as the ambition of this thesis was to build a pre-theoretical, more realistic, arguments-
charged and process-oriented study of the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency.
The Czech Republic’s approach toward counterinsurgency is still evolving, so far has,
however, been reactive more than proactive. With the growing experience, an increase in
assertiveness and confidence of the relevant stakeholders can be identified. What is required
now for the relevant stakeholders is to reach an agreement on the desirable objectives and end
states, setting priorities and demands as well as defining and understanding of external and
internal, intended and unintended longer term consequences of recent and future
counterinsurgency deployments of the Czech Republic’s resources in order to rationalize
decision-making processes, enact wider institutional reforms, achieve better preparedness for
countering future security challenges and increase defensibility of the Czech Republic as a
sovereign country in the international system along with its democratic accountability in the
domestic sphere. Interesting extension of the scope of the research presented in this thesis
would also be a deeper exploration of the counterinsurgency campaigns conducted in the
territory of the Czech Republic from a historical perspective.
205
8 Bibliography
All electronic sources were accessed again on February 10, 2017 (to check for their
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List of tables
Table 1 SWOT matrix sample …………………………………………...……….. 19-20
Table 2 SWOT policy recommendations ……………………………………………. 21
Table 3 Questions for respondents ……………………………………………… 25-27
Table 4 Main sources of data subjected to content analysis ………………………… 29
Table 5 Lykke’s strategy model ……………………………………………………... 38
Table 6 Lykke’s military strategy model ……………………………………………. 40
Table 7 Eight premises of Yarger’s theory of strategy ………….……………..… 41-43
Table 8 Counterinsurgency approaches I ………………………………………….… 54
Table 9 Counterinsurgency approaches II ………………………………………….... 54
Table 10 Four counterinsurgent courses of action by Galula ……………………….… 56
Table 11 Eight fundamental principles of counterinsurgent strategy ……………….… 57
Table 12 Counterinsurgency pillars ………………………………………………….... 58
Table 13 Counterinsurgency relevant Allied Joint Publications …………………….. 74
Table 14 Levels of NATO’s comprehensive approach ……………………………….. 90
Table 15 Activities of each phase of CHB counterinsurgency approach ……….. 101-102
Table 16 NATO counterinsurgency strategy priorities in the Doctrine of the Army of the
Czech Republic …………. …………………………………….……………117
Table 17 SWOT analysis of Czech approach toward counterinsurgency .......….. 162-163
Table 18 List of expectations and capabilities ………………………………….. 189-190
Table 19 Czech approach toward counterinsurgency – Lykke’s strategy model ……. 200
217
List of figures
Figure 1 CEG scheme ………………………………………………………………… 23
Figure 2 Relationship between insurgency and irregular activity ……………………. 52
Figure 3 Examples of Counterinsurgency Campaign End State and Lines of Operation …. 97
Figure 4 Indicative Activities and Tasks in Counterinsurgency …………………….... 98
Figure 5 Clear, Hold, Build interconnected and evolving activities ………………….. 99
Figure 6 Evolution of roles during main stages of counterinsurgency ……………… 102
Figure 7 Nature of counterinsurgency ………………………………………………. 107
Figure 8 Two axes of CEG in the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency……… 188
218
List of abbreviations
601SFG 601 Special Forces Group
AJP Allied Join Publication
ANA Afghan National Army
ANP Afghan National Police
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces
AO Area of Operation
C2 Command and Control
C3 Consult, Command and Control
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CEG Capability-Expectations Gap
CHB Clear, Hold, Build
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation
COIN Counterinsurgency
COMISAF Commander ISAF
CPO Causal process observation
CSFP Common Security and Foreign Policy
CVE Counter Violent Extremism
CZE Czech
ČR Česká republika (Czech Republic)
DDR Diarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration
DSO Data-set observation
EC European Community
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EU European Union
EUPOL EU Police Training Mission in Afghanistan
FAC Forawrd Air Controller
FM Field Manual
FOB Forward Operational Base
HN Host Nation
HQ Headquarters
HUMINT Human Intelligence
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
219
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IJC ISAF Join Command
INFOOPS Information Operations
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
KAIA Kabul International Airport
LOAC Law of Armed Conflict
LOEs Lines of effort
LOOs Lines of operation
MAT Military Advisory Team
MNF-I Multinational Force - Iraq
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEC Network Enabled Capability
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NSE National Support Element
NTM-A NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan
NTM-I NATO Training Mission - Iraq
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
OEF-A Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
OMLT Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
OPORD Operational Order
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
POLAD Political Advisor
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSMCs Private Security and Military Companies
PSYOPS Psychological Operations
QIP Quick Impact Projects
ROE Rules of Engagement
SAF Security Assistance Force
SNB Sbor národní bezpečnosti (National Security Corps)
SOF Special Operation Forces
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement
SOG Special Operations Group
220
SOJTF-A Speacial Operations Joint Task Force - Afghanistan
STANAG Standardization Agreement
StB Státní bezpečnost (State Security)
SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
TCNs Troops Contributing Nations
TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
UK United Kingdom
UNAMA UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNMIK UN Mission in Kosovo
US United States
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWII Second World War