MASARYK UNIVERSITY

Faculty of Social Studies

Department of Political Science

DISSERTATION THESIS

Brno 2017 Iveta Hlouchová

MASARYK UNIVERSITY

Faculty of Social Studies

Department of Political Science

Mgr. Iveta Hlouchová

Czech Approach toward Counterinsurgency

Dissertation thesis

Supervisor: prof. JUDr. PhDr. Miroslav Mareš, Ph.D.

Brno 2017

Anotace

Tato disertační práce se zaměřuje na popis a analýzu přístupu k protivpostalecké strategii ze

strany České republiky, aneb jak je protipovstalecká strategie NATO pojímána v českém

prostředí. Data a informace získané od expertů s přímou zkušeností s danou probematikou,

práce jsou s využitím SWOT a (především) CEG analytických nástrojů kriticky zhodnoceny

s cílem identifikovat klíčové principy, trendy a tendence českého přístupu k protipovstalectví.

Práce formuluje doporučení pro budoucí vývoj i budoucí výzkum dané problematiky. Je také

první analytickou případovou studií nové protipovstalecké doktríny NATO.

Annotation

This dissertation thesis focuses on description and analysis of counterinsurgency approach of

the Czech Republic, or, in the other words, how NATO counterinsurgency strategy is

approached in the Czech environment. Data and information obtained from experts with direct

experience with the topic are critically evaluated using SWOT and (primarily) CEG analytical

tools in order to identify key principles, trends and tendencies of the Czech approach toward

counterinsurgency. This thesis formulates recommendations for future development of the

approach as well as future research. It also serves as a first analytical case study of new

NATO counterinsurgency doctrine.

Klíčová slova

Česká republika, NATO, protipovstalectví, přístup, strategie

Key words

Approach, Czech Republic, counterinsurgency, NATO, strategy

Affidavit

I hereby honorably declare, that I am the only author of the dissertation thesis titled Czech

approach toward counterinsurgency and that I used all the sources listed in bibliography.

In Brno, 10th April, 2017

Iveta Hlouchová

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude and many thanks to prof. JUDr. PhDr. Miroslav Mareš,

Ph.D., for his willingness to help, advice, patience and guidance. I would also like to thank all

those who kept telling me that the research on this topic would not be possible, because their

discouragement gave me more motivation to keep going it till the end.

Table of contents

1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 8

1.1 Structure of the thesis ...................................................................................... 11

2 Methodology .............. .......................................................................................... 12

2.1 Approach ......................................................................................................... 12

2.2 Research questions .................................... ..................................................... 13

2.3 Research methods ............................................................................................ 14

2.3.1 Historical method .......................................................................... 14

2.3.2 Process tracing ............................................................................... 15

2.4 Analytical models ............................................................................................ 18

2.4.1 SWOT model ................................................................................. 18

2.4.2 CEG model .................................................................................... 21

2.5 Data gathering techniques ............................................................................... 24

2.5.1 Interviews ...................................................................................... 24

2.5.2 Content analysis ............................................................................. 27

2.6 Limitations ...................................................................................................... 31

3 Summary of existing literature .............................................................................. 33

4 Theoretical part ...................................................................................................... 34

4.1 Theory of strategy ........................................................................................... 34

4.2 Conceptualization of counterinsurgency ......................................................... 46

4.2.1 David Galula .................................................................................. 55

4.2.2 David Kiclullen .............................................................................. 57

5 Empirical part ........................................................................................................ 64

5.1 Historical legacy? ............................................................................................ 64

5.1.1 The World War II (1939-1945) ..................................................... 65

5.1.2 The Communist regime era (1948-1990) ...................................... 67

5.1.3 WWII or Communist era legacy? .................................................. 69

5.2 Czech approach toward counterinsurgency – conceptual dimension .............. 70

5.2.1 Relevant NATO documents ........................................................... 73

5.2.1.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (AJP-3.4.4) .......81

5.2.2 Relevant documents of the Czech Republic ................................ 107

5.2.2.1 Political .................................................................................. 109

5.2.2.2 Military .................................................................................. 115

5.3 Czech approach toward counterinsurgency – practical dimension ............... 127

5.3.1 Kosovo ......................................................................................... 127

5.3.2 Iraq ............................................................................................... 131

5.3.3 Afghanistan .................................................................................. 135

5.3.3.1 Deployments of special operations forces (SOF) ................. 144

5.3.3.2 Training and advising to ANSF ............................................ 148

5.3.3.3 Reconstruction and stablization efforts ................................ 151

5.3.3.4 Logistical support for coalition forces .................................. 159

5.3.3.5 National Support Element (NSE) ......................................... 159

5.3.3.6 Relations with the Afghan population .................................. 160

6 Analytical part ..................................................................................................... 161

6.1 SWOT analysis .............................................................................................. 161

6.2 CEG analysis ................................................................................................. 170

7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 190

8 Bibliography ........................................................................................................ 205

8.1 Primary sources ............ ................................................................................ 205

8.2 Secondary sources ......................................................................................... 209

List of tables .......................................................................................................................... 216

List of figures ........................................................................................................................ 217

List of abbreviations ...................................................................................................... 218-220

Wordcount: 75 619

Characters with spaces: 519 632

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1 Introduction

One of the distinctive features of the 21st century security environment has been asymmetrical

war fighting, with major conflict parties being framed by many politicians, security

practitioners as well as researchers with labels of insurgencies of various kinds, sizes,

methods of fight they deploy and the interests they pursue. Closely aligned to this was also the

tendency to restore to the frequent use of the term “counterinsurgency” in reference to the

measures and efforts employed and carried out in order to minimize and essentially eliminate

activities of the contemporary non-state belligerents and/or war opponents, designated as

insurgencies.

The concept of counterinsurgency started gaining traction as related to the coalition

efforts in the post 9/11 conflict zones after the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan (overlapping

operations Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (OEF-A) and the International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) and the 2003 invasion of Iraq (operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and

has been associated mai1nly with the discourse politicians, military officers as well as various

researches and commentators had been using under the administration of the then-US

President Barrack H. Obama. Since its introduction as one of the most effective ways of how

to best counter the contemporary security challenges in the post 9/11 conflict zones,

counterinsurgency has been one of the dominant military doctrines on the potential/possible

deployment of military (as well as, to some extent civilian) forces in the contemporary

security environment. As such, counterinsurgency as a military strategy and/or a military

doctrine has been studied, analyzed and discussed broadly and in depth, with most of the

attention focused on what are the most effective counterinsurgency principles, what does the

appropriate use of military force in counterinsurgency missions mean, how to reliably

measure any possible success of counterinsurgency operations. Factors like what level of local

knowledge and localization of the conflict is required for the mission to succeed/meet its

minimal objectives or how to best prepare military and civilian agents engaged in this type of

operations and how to make the military actors and the civilian actors cooperate with each

other effectively have been studied as well. Significant level of attention has also been

devoted to the best counterinsurgency practices and lessons identified and (ideally) learned

from the past to the future potential operations.

Major part of the relevant literature, studies and research project has addressed the

issue of counterinsurgency from the Western point of view, as the perspective of a country/a

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coalition of countries engaged in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations “abroad”, i.e.

not in its own territory (distinct, for instance, by the stress put on the element of the

development of a host nation security forces and the significance of assistance provided to

them). Most of those studies focused on strategies of individual sovereign states, most notably

those with the superpower status, mirroring the security environment vis-a-vis national

interest assessments and/or historical experience, like the United States (USA), the United

Kingdom (UK) or France or the Russian Federation (Russia), or the Philippines, India, Israel

or Colombia, as examples of the countries with long-term stakes in the potential effectiveness

of their counterinsurgency efforts, given the presence of ongoing insurgencies in their

sovereign territories. With regards to the coalition efforts (particularly) in Afghanistan, it was

also the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as another actor subjected to the closer

scrutiny of its counterinsurgency efforts on the Alliance level. Individual counterinsurgency

approaches and strategies differ in some of its principles, their framework, in both theoretical

and practical terms, is, however, common and mostly invariable.

Smaller countries, like the Czech Republic, have been spared the greater

counterinsurgency scrutiny, due to their limited means of projection of individual state power

beyond its borders unilaterally and the comparatively stable domestic security environment

with low likelihood of insurgent activity in their sovereign territories. Nevertheless, it was

such smaller countries that contributed greatly (in terms of resources and capabilities, but also

knowledge and connections) to various counterinsurgency operations, especially those in

Afghanistan and in Iraq, in order to help achieve the most effective level counterinsurgency

efforts of engaged multinational coalitions possible.

Specifically, in the case of the Czech Republic, as a country that lacked any broader,

direct experience with efforts considered to be falling with a framework of counterinsurgency

operations prior to its involvement in the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2002, it is

even more urgent to explore its conduct and approach in comprehensive manner in order to

identify the key attributes, principles, liabilities as well as unique features of “the Czech way

of doing counterinsurgency”. Such a comprehensive study, which this thesis aims to be, seeks

to critically assess and evaluate the current state of art and identify its potential effectiveness,

flaws, challenges or spheres for further development or yet unexploited potential.

The Czech Republic has been actively participating in the NATO counterinsurgency

mission in Afghanistan for almost 15 years now, and gained valuable broad

counterinsurgency experience during these engagements. And even though the Armed Forces

of the Czech Republic’s (along with other civilian state as well as non-state resources in the

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areas of reconstruction, development or humanitarian aid) deployment in Afghanistan marks

historically the longest combat mission of the Czech (and Czechoslovak) state, with the

largest and longest deployment of the greatest number of human, materiel, financial, etc.

resources and capabilities, several frictions, caused by discontinuous approach, have occurred

during the almost 15 years. The challenging discontinuity with its potential impacts on the

overall effectiveness of the mission, can be potentially costly (in human, financial or political

terms) and is linked to the non-existence of any comprehensive, unifying official document on

the governmental level, that would serve as a general framework of the Czech approach to

counterinsurgency operations, listing resources and capabilities available, specifying the

conditions and requirements of their use or oversight and control mechanisms.

Another added value of this dissertation thesis is also increased due to the basically

non-existent larger expert community in the Czech academic, political as well as

practitioner’s circles. The Czech contributions and conduct of counterinsurgency missions has

been mostly described (and perhaps analyzed) in a fragmented manner, with a research focus

placed on a specific issue or problem. This thesis seeks to fill this gap in the Czech as well as

international expert literature.

The deployment of the Czech civilian and military manpower and resources in

Afghanistan, as part of the NATO (but also the EU and UN) mission resulted in a progressive,

gradual learning process and in acquiring important combat, practical, counterinsurgency

experience, knowledge and understanding of a complex, out of area mission, useful and

beneficial for the power projections of the Czech state as well as the pursuit of its national

interests, even in the future security environment. As already mentioned, the Czech mission in

Afghanistan can be distinguished by the great amount and wide range and scope of both

military and civilian resources deployed in Afghanistan, in both the two simultaneously

conducted operations, OEF and ISAF, with various assigned tasks and efforts, as well as the

historically longest essentially combat deployment of the Czech military, making it the main

research subject of the author of this thesis.

Nevertheless, to draw any inferences or conclusions based on the exploration of just

one, even though major case study can be misleading and simplistic. Therefore, two other

foreign multinational missions the Czech Republic contributed to and that evinced significant

counterinsurgency features are described and analyzed in this thesis as well, i.e. the missions

in Kosovo and Iraq. Even though the counterinsurgency dimension of the Czech deployments

was comparatively limited, the fact that the Czech Republic deployed under the NATO

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command aids the ambition of this thesis to be first case study of the NATO

counterinsurgency doctrine.

The time frame of this research is long enough to allow for a proper process-tracing

method to be applied. It starts in 1999 with the Czech deployment to KFOR mission in

Kosovo, and ends with the end of 2013, when the Czech Republic withdrew the majority of

its assets and resources from the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Short historical excurse is

included in the text, and covers the periods of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia

(1939-1945) and the Czechoslovak (Federative) Socialist Republic (1948/1960-1990). The

overall impacts of these historical periods on the results of this research are, however, very

limited and mainly abstract. Dominant focus of this thesis is on the contemporary approach of

the Czech Republic toward counterinsurgency endeavor.

1.1 Structure of the thesis

In the first part of the thesis, the author introduces the methodology of the research at hand,

articulates the main research question as well as discussed major limits of such a research,

along with the sources she used. Following chapter introduces the theoretical framework of

the research. Firstly, theory of strategy developed by Harry Yarger is introduced, in

conjunction with theoretical equation model of strategy, developed by Arthur F. Lykke, Jr.

these two closely interconnected theoretical frameworks are applied in the text and help

explain why the Czech counterinsurgency approach doesn’t constitute strategy. Second, the

concept of counterinsurgency is addressed and discussed, with the purpose of establishing the

conceptual framework of this thesis, and to help readers better understand the topic.

Counterinsurgency theories of two well-known and distinguished experts are introduced –

David Galula and David Kilcullen.

Empirical part of this thesis starts with short historical excurse, which maps the

historical experience of Czechs with art of counterinsurgency. Secondary aim is to identify

potential existing legacy that can affect the current Czech approach toward

counterinsurgency. Then the contemporary Czech approach to counterinsurgency is described

and analyzed in two dimensions: (1) conceptual, when all official relevant documents at

NATO and Czech levels are presented, and (2) practical. The practical dimension then

addresses on the major Czech counterinsurgency contributions to three NATO operations – in

Kosovo, in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Importantly, these were multinational missions. Hence

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any examination of the Czech contributions to them is inherently very closely linked to the

overall missions’ mandate and settings.

The findings discovered in the empirical part are analyzed in the fifth chapter of this

thesis. Two analytical models, SWOT and CEG, are used to gain analytical inferences that

allow examine the research subject in comprehensive way. CEG model is then the main

analytical technique applied in this thesis. The main findings of the previous chapters are then

summarized in conclusions. Research questions are answered and recommendations for

improvement and future development of the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency, as

well as recommendations for directions and areas of future research in this topic are

formulated in the concluding chapter.

2 Methodology

2.1 Approach

This thesis was developed using the qualitative design of the research, with slight overreach to

the quantitative research design.1 The author seeks to overcome the state-centric tendency,

and includes the exploration of relevant sources of data and dynamics at the levels of NATO

and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), who not necessarily coordinate their efforts

with the state. Empirical-analytical approach seems to be the most adequate one in the efforts

to address and explore such a topic, because it allows for unbiased and neutral work with data,

their interpretation and analysis, regardless any ideological or values’ tone and purpose.

Proper counterinsurgency research should be multidisciplinary in order to allow examination

of all important features and perspectives. The author approaches the counterinsurgency topic

from the perspective of political science/security and strategic studies field. Interdisciplinary

outreach of this thesis is limited, and includes mainly economy and psychology (especially

the issue of perception2).

This thesis is a descriptive analysis and a case study of a counterinsurgency approach

of an individual, smaller (in power, economical and geographical terms) European country,

1 This overreach has a form of an original metrics developed by the author for the purposes of measuring the

value of the gap existing between capabilities and expectations relevant for the Czech approach to

counterinsurgency, which serves as a research sub-tool generating important data and findings which are further

utilized and evaluated in the context of broader Czech counterinsurgency approach. 2 For more on the roles and significance of perceptions in the modern warfare, including counterinsurgency

missions see: McKeldin, T.R. – David, G.J. (2009): Ideas as Weapons: Influence and Perception in Modern

Warfare. Washington DC: University of Nebraska Press.

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that is a member state of NATO, the EU and UN. It also represents first academic case study

of a newly adopted (2011) NATO Counterinsurgency strategy doctrine. The aim of this

thesis is then to develop an evidence-based comprehensive study of the contemporary Czech

approach toward counterinsurgency by describing and analyzing its key features. Importantly,

the author doesn’t frame this research in the traditional theoretical approaches of realism and

liberalism, even though certain tendencies in terms of implicit diversions of the arguments to

one direction or another are noticeable thorough the thesis. Generally speaking, key pillars of

both approaches are important for the purposes of this thesis, i.e. a sovereign state acting in

accordance and pursuance of its national interests, and important roles played by individual

state agencies as well as non-state, non-governmental actors like private entities,3

humanitarian organizations, but also multinational organizations. Significantly, certain

patterns of activity are traced and identified through this research, considering the

complexities of the research topic that is distinguishable by its multifaceted, multidimensional

character, further complicated by the multiplicity of identities of the Czech Republic (i.e.

nation state, NATO member state, EU member state, UN member state, etc.).

2.2 Research questions

Given the fact that this dissertation thesis compiles and analyses data in order to draw a

framework of the contemporary Czech approach to counterinsurgency at its end, the research

questions articulated by the author intuitively mirror the so far unmapped landscape of the

researched topic. The main three research questions, enabling the author to fulfil the stated

aim and reach the objectives of this thesis are:

1. What are the key attributes of the strategic Czech approach toward

counterinsurgency, and how consistent is it?

2. How autonomous and how specific is the Czech approach toward

counterinsurgency?

3. What counterinsurgency model does the Czech approach adhere to, and how?

3 Some of the private entities have semi-governmental character, because its founders, directors and/or chief

executes tend to be closely linked to government individual on personal as well as wider basis.

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Proving sufficient and evidence bolstered answers to these three research questions require

not only an explicit scale for measuring the level of autonomy of the Czech counterinsurgency

approach, but also determining the level of consistency. Identification of the most problematic

or challenging principles as well as examination of the practical, not only theoretical

dimension of the research subject matter and their mutual reflection enables the author to

determine the level of consistency. As for the autonomy, the essential platform for

determining its level in case of the Czech counterinsurgency approach are established by

decision-making processes, ordinary functioning and the powers, responsibilities and

commitments of the individual nation states within NATO. The NATO factor is critically

important for the purposes of this thesis. The Czech Republic is a credible member of the

Alliance and cannot ignore its security and defense commitments stemming out of it. Also,

majority of the foreign missions the Czech Republic has ever deployed its assets and

resources to where conducted under the auspices of NATO. The individual theoretical or

conceptual models are introduced in the respective chapter below in the text.4 What the

individual counterinsurgency models differ in are the military vs. civilian dominance and

decision-making authority, the importance and specific measures of a kinetic action against

the enemy, the significance of stabilization, reconstruction and development or the level of

discretion assigned by nation states to their deployed military and civilian force.

2.3 Research methods

2.3.1 Historical method

First method applied in this research is the historical method used to examine the historical

record of the Czech experience with counterinsurgency activities in order to provide a written

account of this past experience, with the use of primary sources and other evidence. Collected

data are then described and analyzed through the lenses of historical reasoning, when

information is assessed in and against a certain context. Historical method is a systematic

body of principles and rules designed to aid effectively in gathering the source materials of

history, appraising them critically, and presenting a synthesis (usually in a written form) of

the results achieved, as being a procedure for the attainment of historical truth. Historical

4 In the field of political science, international relations and security and strategic studies, the term “autonomy”

often refers to self-governance. The level of autonomy or self-governance is usually determined by numerous

deals and agreements that explicitly state the areas of greater discretion. Therefore, any specific concept related

to the question of how to measure autonomy is not introduced and used in this research.

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method is generally approached from the standpoint of understanding it as the broadest

possible methodological context, covering general philosophical considerations of the subject

matter of the historical research (Porra, Hirschheim, Parks 2014: 538). Therefore, more than

using one or two specific techniques used in the history writing process, the author of this

thesis applies the historical method is its extended scheme, in order to, as Munslow

characterized it, create and eventually impose a particular narrative of the past (Munslow

1997: 3). This narrative can vary across the spectrum of researches, depending upon the

paradigm and approaches used by scholars studying the historical events and is

multidisciplinary (like the historical method as itself) in its nature. Effective use of the

historical method depends on adequate historical thinking skills of researchers, on their ability

to acquire, analyze, and contextualize complex historical material in three main stages: (1)

building a foundation to acquire historical knowledge, (2) analyzing and evaluating historical

material, and (3) context and interpretation. All of these three stages make up the essential

stages of any research, historical, present or future, what is different in the case of historical

method though is the availability and (sometimes disputed) credibility of the resources used as

well as the lures of so-called historical presentism5.

2.3.2 Process-tracing

Process-tracing allows the researchers to identify potential existing causal mechanisms in the

subject matter of the research, which further enables to recognize possible/existing

correlations, and perhaps even possible/existing causal relationships. Importantly, the author

doesn’t seek to determine existing causalities when determining effects of certain factor as

independent variables on other factors, functioning as dependent variables. The process-

tracing research method is applied with the purpose of tracing existing mechanisms that give

the scholar enough evidence for identifying existing correlations between individual variables

more than drawing conclusive causal inferences, that, after a proper, follow-up scrutiny, can

be classified as causal mechanisms, or existing casual relationships between an independent

variable (or a group of independent variables) and a dependent variable in the given

relationship. The author of this thesis truly explores the mechanism of causal processes.

5 Historical presentism is a cognitive bias process that can be mitigated or eliminating through the mechanism of

establishing the values and beliefs of the times as a lens to analyze the past, or using the values of the time to

analyze historical meaning rather than those of the 21st century. Other means for overcoming the tendency to

analyze the historical records through the use of historical presentism is based on efforts aimed at comparing and

contrasting the values of the past with those of the present (Brown 2010: 8).

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Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba understand process-tracing as the search

for intervening factors that link an independent variable with a dependent variable.

Uncovering these intervening steps is then viewed as part of the more fundamental goal of

identifying and assessing the potential causal effect of an independent variable studied. In

their understanding, process-tracing can increase the number of theoretically relevant

observations, however, the value of the causal inference drawn through process-tracing is not

very strong. King, Keohane and Verba consider process-tracing casual inferences only to

“promote descriptive generalizations and prepare the way for casual inference” (King,

Keohane, Verba 1994: 225-228), by detecting the link, the steps and the relevant variables

intervening in the relationship of an independent variable and a dependent variable, but

leaving the mechanics of their potential intervention to further inquiry. Given the number of

intervening causal steps between any independent and dependent variable, King, Keohane and

Verba talk about the infinite regress (Ibid: 86), any research using process-tracing encounters,

as the research method itself is generally unable to determine which of multiple potential

intervening factors and mechanisms really function as a link between an independent and a

dependent variable. For them, process-tracing is mainly a descriptive tool and a first step in

causal analysis, requiring further research. The understanding of process-tracing King,

Keohane and Verba present in their work has been subjected to a lot of criticism, whose

authors have sought to provide alternative tools for overcoming the perceived shortcomings of

the process-tracing research method. One of the most prominent tools at the disposal of

contemporary scholars aimed at overcoming the flaw of apparent inference regression is the

focus on “casual-process observation” (CPO), as opposed to “data-set observation” (DSO)

which accounts for merely a qualitative research equivalent to the normal statistical

observation. CPO, however, is “an insight or piece of data that provides information about

contexts, process or mechanisms, and that contributes distinctive leverage in causal inference”

(Collier, Brady, Seawright 2010: 277). Therefore, the discovery of CPOs through process-

tracing has a higher causal inference value than DSOs in a qualitative research design, where

data are more isolated in a form of a systemized set of variables, without broader

understanding or knowledge. By identifying and analyzing the existing CPOs in the subject

matter of this research, the author increases the value of disclosed correlation and potential

causations.

Indeed, process-tracing involves the examination of “diagnostic” pieces of evidence

within a case that contribute to supporting or overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses.

The core nature of the process-tracing method lies in the search for the observable

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implications of the hypothesized explanations with the goal of establishing whether the events

or processes within the case fit those predicted by alternative explanations. Process-tracing

can also play an important role in comparisons of cases, as it can, for instance, enable scholars

to assess whether a variable whose values differs in two most similar cases is related to the

difference in their outcomes (Bennett 2010). Process-tracing is also used as a method of

discovering hypothesis by its ability to determine the sequence of who, what, where, when,

why and how, including the response, going down to the lower levels of analysis. Moreover,

the process-tracing research method allows researchers to establish whether there is a causal

chain of steps connecting independent and dependent variables, and also whether there is such

evidence to identify other variables that might have caused the effect or might have

influenced the respective variables at hand, and how (Ibid). Two track process-tracing, from

observed outcomes to potential causes as well as forward from hypothesized causes to

subsequent outcomes, allows researcher to uncover variables they have not previously

considered, and thus provide new explanations or understandings. Case expertise and

substantive knowledge can play a fundamental role in any use of process-tracing method, as it

facilitates deeper understanding of a respective issue through sorting out explanations relevant

to the subject matter.

Importantly, process-tracing involves several different kinds of empirical tests, focusing on

evidence with different kinds of probative value and contributing to validation or falsification

of potential explanations.

The obstacles with determining the causal mechanism in the research of the Czech

counterinsurgency approach, its success and effectiveness, consequences and impacts,

properly lie mainly in the problems and challenges of an adequate metrics of the success or

effectiveness of counterinsurgency efforts in general. A number of distinguished scholars

criticized the existing metrics of success in the Afghanistan as well as the Iraq

counterinsurgency endeavors. Among the most prominent ones is an Australian strategist and

military doctrine expert David Kilcullen, who in one of his publications assessed the widely

applied, yet flawed metrics for tracking the progress of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.

What he suggested is an alternative framework for the success, effectiveness or progress

evaluation (see below). This thesis, however, doesn’t aim to evaluate the overall efficiency of

the Czech counterinsurgency efforts, because it is virtually impossible. It has not been an

isolated effort and strong mutual interdependency on other actors and factors exists. Also,

casual mechanisms like efficiency, effectiveness or success are usually measure to certain

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goals, which is problematic in the case of the Czech counterinsurgency approach, because not

enough data are available.

The essential major limitation is a result of insufficient, inadequate and poor focus of the

research community (in the field of security and strategic studies, peace studies or

development studies), on and its weak interest in any holistic, comprehensive examinations of

possible variations within the counterinsurgency framework itself. Apart from studies

describing, analyzing or criticizing counterinsurgency strategies of major, experienced actors

in the realm of effective measures aimed at elimination of various forms of insurgencies or

similar politically motivated violence a, there is a critical shortage of literature and adequate

relevant resources, addressing the issue of approaches of different actors or stakeholders to

superior counterinsurgency strategies and doctrines, particularly as part of various

multinational missions.

2.4 Analytical models

2.4.1 SWOT model

Being an established method in assisting critical evaluations and formulations of strategies

and strategic development processes, policies and approaches, the SWOT analysis6 is vital for

the achievement of the aim of this thesis, due to its potential to yield significant strategic

insights into recommended strategic actions. Given its simple methodology, SWOT analysis

is one of the most popular advanced analytical techniques applied in the private, but also

increasingly public sector, as it represents a proven developmental, results-oriented strategic

planning tool. Use of SWOT analysis helps identify the key elements of the Czech approach

towards counterinsurgency as well as direct future planning and strategy development in this

matter. The Czech counterinsurgency approach is analyzed through the SWOT analytical

model, generating recommended strategic or policy actions and directions to the future. The

6 For literature reviews, critical assessment of SWOT use, misuse and pitfalls, and analytical case studies on the

mechanics and use of SWOT analysis, see, for example, Helms, M. M. – Nixon, J. (2008): „Exploring SWOT

analysis – where are we now?: A review of academic research from the last decade“, Journal of Strategy and

Management, Vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 215-251; Chermack, TJ. – Kasshanna, B.K. (2007): „The Use and Misuse of

SWOT Analysis and Implications for HRD Professionals“, Human Resource Development International, vol. 10,

no. 4, pp. 383-399; Ghazinoory, S. – Ghazinoori, S. (2006): „Developing Iran’s government strategies for

strengthening the national system of innovation using SWOT analysis“, Science and Public Policy, Vol. 33, no.

7, pp. 529-540; Farazmand, A. (2014): Crisis and Emergency Management: Theory and Practice, Public

Administration and Public Policy, vol. 178, Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2nd Edition. On the methodology

behind the SWOT analytical technique, see Prunckun, H. (2010): Handbook of Scientific Methods of Inquiry for

Intelligence Analysis, Scarecrow Professional Intelligence Education Series, no. 11, Lanham: Scarecrow Press.

19

technique was devised primarily for long-term business planning, but it can be applied beyond

the private sector to countries and industries, in the intelligence or policy and military

planning realm, on both strategic and tactical level.

SWOT analytical model is one of the most popular analytic tools used by intelligence

analysts, for two reasons: (1) it can be used with a variety of unstructured data (qualitative

data from either primary or secondary sources), and (2) the focus of the research is not on

variable dependent, i.e. it can either be the target or the agency conducting the operation

against the target (Prunckun 2010). These characteristic attributes of SWOT analysis and its

use are of a particular utility in the case of the Czech Republic’s approach to

counterinsurgency, because the data collected and analyzed in this research exist in a highly

unstructured way, scattered across a number of primary and secondary sources. Moreover, as

the SWOT analytical model can be also used to analyze information in order to help

understand the current situation (i.e. as a situational analysis), it’s application more than fits

the framework, analysis and goals of this thesis, as no similar action has been taken in the

Czech or international academic circles thus far.

SWOT analysis follows several steps. First, an analyst defines the end-state (strategic

settings) or objective (tactical settings) of the use of SWOT in that particular case, i.e. what

he/she wants to achieve with the SWOT inquiry. Then, SWOT matrix7 is drawn:

HELPFUL/SUPPORTIVE HARMFUL/DETRIMENTAL

INTERNAL Strengths, i.e. attributes associated with

the (issue, problem, agency, etc. under

investigations) that are conducive to

achieving the end/state.

• What are the strengths?

• What does the subject do better

than others?

• What unique capabilities and

resources does the subject have?

• What do others perceive as your

strengths?

Weaknesses/liabilities, i.e. the attributes

associated with the (issue, problem,

agency, etc. under investigation) that are

detrimental or may prevent

achieving the end-state.

• What are the weaknesses?

• What do adversaries/other

partners do better?

• Where is the room for

improvement?

• What do others perceive as your

weaknesses?

7 Although a matrix typically displays a SWOT, SWOT analysis can be laid out in any way that is suitable for

the analyst (Prunckun 2010). It can be visualized as a list or other.

20

EXTERNAL Opportunities, i.e. the conditions (legal,

criminogenic, social, economic, political,

security, psychological, information, etc.)

that would assist in achieving the end-

state.

• What trends or conditions may

positively impact the subject?

• What opportunities are available

for the subject?

Threats, i.e. the conditions (legal,

criminogenic, social, economic, political,

security, psychological, information, etc.)

that might be detrimental for the subject

and its operations.

• What trends and conditions may

negatively impact the subject?

• What are the adversaries doing

that might impact the subject?

• Is solid financial support

available?

• What impact do the subject’s

weaknesses have on the threats to

it?

Table 1: SWOT matrix sample. Source: IH, inspired by Prunckun, J. (2010): Handbook of

Scientific Methods of inquiry for intelligence analysis.

Analyst then populates each of the four quadrants of the SWOT matrix with data and

information he/she collected or generated from a proper exploration of relevant primary or

secondary resources. For assessments on the strategic level, just it is the case in this thesis, it

is useful to apply a multidisciplinary approach to consider each of the four quadrants

thoroughly and from different perspective in order to get as broad and complex view as

possible. It allows allow gaining control over all factors functioning as variables influencing

the studied phenomenon in one way or another. After all the quadrants have been filled in, the

analyst assesses the factors one at a time and cross-checks then for agreement and arguments’

building. What the analyst has to ensure is that there are no contrary or paradoxical positions

stated in different quadrants. Prunckun suggest asking hypothetical questions to improve

assessment of the arguments build upon the data stated in the four quadrants. Questions like

“In what way can the strengths be used to an advantage?”, “How can the weakness be shored

up?”, “What is the best way to take advantage of each opportunity?”, “What needs to be done

to mitigate each threat?” or similar. (cf. Ibid). Analytical examination while applying SWOT

is not linear, but rather an iterative process, often embedded with the overall planning

processes. It has an extensive potential to be used in conjunction with other advanced

analytical techniques, like the PEST technique, perception assessment analysis, fishbone

analysis, or utilizing the analytic hierarchy process or similar hybrid methods.

The tactical dimension of the use of SWOT analysis is also relevant for this thesis, as

it helps examine operating structures of actors, their methods of operating, their capabilities,

21

their financial base etc., thereby allowing the actor of this thesis to examine the research topic

from different perspectives. Final steps of the SWOT analysis are then executed by

formulating strategy or policy recommendations (approach, in the case of this thesis), based

on combinations of the factors as follows:

• Strengths/Opportunities (Ways that will use strengths so that opportunities can be realized.)

• Weaknesses/Opportunities (Ways to address weaknesses in order to provide relief so that

opportunities can be followed.)

• Strengths/Threats (Ways that use strengths “offensively” to moderate threats.)

• Weaknesses/Threats (Defensive ways that will protect against threats.) (Ibid).

Table 2: SWOT policy recommendations. Source: IH, inspired by Ibid.

2.4.2 CEG model

Capability-expectations gap (CEG) model is based on a comparison of expectations and real,

credible capabilities to meet these expectations of an entity in a specific field. Use of CEG

model enables the author to investigate actual performance as different from potential

performance8 of the Czech Republic in the sphere of counterinsurgency operations, both

multinational and potentially unilateral. This additional analytical tool not only feeds the

scope and depth of the critical-analytical assessment presented in this dissertation thesis, but

also articulation of recommendations to the future.

American scholar Christopher Hill is recognized to be the main pioneer of the capabilities-

expectations gap analytical concept. In 1993, Hill developed the concept and used it for the

evaluation of the international role and the status of common foreign and security policy

(CFSP) of the EU, then European Community (EC). According to Hill, critical gap exists

between capabilities and expectations regarding the EC’s/EU’s roles in international system,

and this gap tends to widen instead of reduce itself. Hill devotes significant attention on the

part of third/external parties’ perceptions and expectations of the tasks and function the

EC/EU is and may be fulfilling. As Hill himself stresses, what is seeks is to “sketch a more

8 Similar to the CEG model, the so-called GAP analytical model is quite frequently applied across the business,

and increasingly public, sector in order to assess the actual vs. potential performance of a subject.

22

realistic picture of what the Community does in the world” (Hill: 1993: 306), and further

establishes that the whole study Hill presents in his paper is “essentially pre-theoretical”,

since he resorts to conceptualizing the Europe’s international capability rather than to

theoretical explanations and predictions of Europe’s behavior (Ibid). Inspired by Hill, the

author of this thesis also refrains from thorough theoretical framing of the research subject,

given its novelty, primacy and uniqueness in the research field. As suggested in the

concluding chapter, a number of theories can then be applied to the findings of this research in

order to develop the knowledge of this topic further and test the validity of the arguments

presented here.

Hill also recognized perilous potential of the CEG model as it could, in his own words,

“lead to debates over false possibilities”, and would “be likely to produce a disproportionate

degree of disillusion and resentment when hopes were inevitably dashed” (Hill 1998: 28;

comp. to Toje 2008). Hill developed the CEG concept further by dividing it into three main

components, in the capacity of indicators for measurement of the potential capabilities –

expectations gap, i.e. (1) its ability to agree; (2) its resources (and their allocation), and (3) the

instruments at one’s (the EC’s in Hill’s case) disposal (Hill 1993: 315). If the gap was to be

closed (or reduced), Hill argued, the performance of a studied entity has to be based on

demonstrated behavior rather than its potential and aspirations. For the purpose of closing the

gap, Hill urged that the studied entity must possess institutions to mobilize the instruments of

national power as well as the adequate decision-making mechanism to command them. The

alternative then is to simply lower the expectations in order to meet the more modest

capabilities at the disposal (Ibid). The author of this thesis argues that restructuring the

relevant institutions as well as improving decision-making procedures, acquiring more

appropriate resources and capabilities or bringing in new actors can all also narrow the gap.

On the contrary, the gap increases in situations where expectations grow faster than the pool

of capabilities and resources.

Keeping this in mind, the author of this thesis brings significant attention to the existing

governmental military, civilian, economic, information and other instruments and assets of the

individual relevant stakeholders, governmental as well as non-governmental ones, in such a

way that their potential to be mobilized in the overall context as part of the Czech

counterinsurgency approach. Considerable sections of the text also address the level of

agreement on the objectives of the Czech participation in multinational counterinsurgency

campaigns with its potential challenges, pitfalls and consequences in the broader context, as

well as internal agreement. It further examines the potential effectiveness and flexibility of the

23

relevant institutional structure on both the Czech and NATO levels, as well as the decision-

making capacities, their character, procedures and mechanics, shortfalls and its wider

implications. On the grounds of the CEG model, the actual as different from potential

performance of the Czech actors, (relevant to Czech counterinsurgency ambitions), is

assessed, and its inferences used for more precise articulation of more sufficient, cohesive,

pragmatic and realistic counterinsurgency approach.

Even though there are certain limits for of the CEG concept’s applicability on the case of

Czech approach to counterinsurgency (like the character of studied entity, because Hill

examines a multipurpose, multidimensional, semi-supranational, semi-intergovernmental

organization, whereas the main analytical unit of this research is a country),9 the use of such

analytical technique still represents a significant contributions to the author’s efforts to

analyze and evaluate the subject matter, and provide findings useful for its adjustments and

improvements. First, all the capabilities, both military and civilian, are described and

analyzed, and then compared to expectations voiced by various stakeholders (with the focus

placed on the Czech political representatives and the NATO/mission partners).

Figure 1: The capability-expectations gap scheme. Source: IH; inspired by Hill, Ch.: The

Capability-Expectation or conceptualizing Europe’s internal role.

All of the research methods, analytical techniques and analytical models listed above

enable the author of this thesis to bridge different levels and dimensions of analysis in order to

gain as broad and deep picture and understanding of the studied topic as possible. Given the 9 The author of this thesis is not the only Czech researcher who used the CEG analytical concept with the aim of

investigating certain security phenomena and issues, by their character differing from the EU’s CFSD. Oldřich

Bureš assessed the potential existing gap in case of the UN peacekeeping operations (for more, see Bureš, O.

(2008): United Nations Peacekeeping: Bridging the Capabilities-expectations gap, Saarbrucken: VDM Verlag).

24

fact that the Czech approach to counterinsurgency was, and still remains, a largely elusive

concept, the examination of different aspects, dimensions and sub-topics of the issue gives the

author enough data to identify the so-called patterns of behavior, the instruments and

mechanisms of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency as well as to assess individual

contributions of various parts (both positive and negative).

2.5 Data gathering techniques

2.5.1 Interviews

The main data gathering technique applied during the course of the research is several

face-to-face, semi-formal, semi-structured interviews with 64 (in total) subject matter experts

and military and civilian practitioners with the direct experience with counterinsurgency

operations and their Czech contributions to them, mostly as part of the ISAF mission in

Afghanistan. Out of the total number of 64 individuals, 40 were Czech (25 military personnel

(active duty), 15 civilians, including both civilian experts in reconstruction and political

representatives who took part in decision-making and planning processes, documents

development as well as representation on the ground in the areas of operations, and employees

of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 18 were American (10 military personnel (active duty or

retired), 8 subject matter experts), 4 were German (3 military personnel (active duty), 1

subject matter expert), 1 French military person and subject matter expert in NATO

operations planning and rules of engagements (ROE) in NATO operations, and 1 Italian

retired military person. The Czech nationals willing to be interviewed by the author on the

research topic were selected to represent all forms of the Czech participation, military and

civilian in the NATO counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and in Kosovo. Additionally,

the author also interviewed representatives connected to the production of official documents

that started to put stress on counterinsurgency missions and all relevant engagements and

deployment of both civilian and military personnel. The foreign nationals interviewed by the

author were selected and approached based on their direct experience with the Czech

counterinsurgency efforts, on all three levels of mission – strategic, operational and tactical,

within NATO as part of the Alliance’s planning and decision-making process, command and

control structures as well as joint operations and projects. The author also spoke with 8

Afghan nationals (3 military personnel (active duty), 1 political representative on the state

25

level, 1 political representative of a provincial council, and 3 civilians living in the Logar

province10). These interviews were conducted in an informal, unstructured manner, and the

information gained through them contribute significantly to the overall picture and

understanding of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency, and to the ways the Czechs and

their activities have been perceived in Afghanistan by the local population.

List of questions asked during the semi-structured interviews with the non-Afghan

respondents:

• In your opinion, is it necessary for the Czech Republic to have her own coherent, official

document establishing the guiding principles, provisions and clear objectives of the

Czech approach to counterinsurgency, mainly as contributing to the Alliance’s

counterinsurgency efforts? Why? Is the current state sufficient and feasible to the future?

• Does the lack of a coherent, adequate framework, codified in an official policy document,

negatively affect/impact the practical implementation of the Czech counterinsurgency

approach on the ground during the course of a mission (in terms of lack of resources

deployed, duplicity of efforts, avoidance/ignorance/inability of essential

counterinsurgency principles)?

• What are the main principles, instruments and measures of the Czech counterinsurgency

approach in theory, in practice? Do they differ? What can this mean?

• Describe your assigned tasks, preferably at all three levels of analysis (strategic,

operational, tactical).

• What practical problems or challenges did you encounter in connection to the Czech

counterinsurgency approach and its implementation?

• Are there any unique features in the Czech counterinsurgency understanding and conduct

that would be specific for the Czechs, given their historical development, cultural

traditions, strategic culture and alike?

• What counterinsurgency principles were the most problematic or challenging to put into

practice? Why?

• Is the Czech Republic capable and willing to engage in a counterinsurgency mission in its

whole broad spectrum, as full-spectrum operations? Does the Czech approach mirror this

understanding of counterinsurgency? How? What does the proportionality of tasks look

like and mean?

10 The Logar province in eastern Afghanistan was the geographical gravity of the Czech counterinsurgency

activities, because of the relatively extensive deployment of the Czech assets and resources in Afghanistan under

the ISAF mission umbrella.

26

• Are there any problems, issues or challenges identifiable within the civil-military

cooperation (CIMIC), cooperation of military forces with civilian experts? What are the

potential (mainly unintended) consequences of the degree and nature of civil-military

cooperation within the Czech counterinsurgency approach?

• When it comes to the chain of command of the respective mission, do you see it as

effective or problematic? Why? Were there any issues in communications with other

partners/actors? What was the role and effects of existing national caveats, and how do

you personally asses this measure imposed by respective national commands? What

national caveats did the Czech imposed on their assets and resources deployed in

counterinsurgency missions?

• In your opinion, were the doctrinal guidance, the orders, the tasks and rules of

engagement clearly communicated, and compatible with those of other partners in the

mission? Can you recall any controversies related to this?

• Do you think that the results, the outputs of the Czech counterinsurgency efforts are

feasible to the future? Why?

• Do you consider the Czech counterinsurgency approach to be effective? How? Why/why

not?

• In your opinion, is there any historical legacy in a sense that could be identified as having

influence over the contemporary Czech strategic thinking and the Czech approach to

counterinsurgency (not the NATO strategy doctrine, indeed)?

• Are the fundamental principles of counterinsurgency strategy, doctrine and approach, and

their objectives articulated explicitly and clearly in the relevant documentation on both

national (Czech) and transnational (NATO) level? Are the counterinsurgency principles

defined and articulated vaguely and ambiguously in the relevant documents? Do the

Czech military and civilian actors, engaging in counterinsurgency activities and efforts,

adhere to these principles?

• Has the growing direct experience with counterinsurgency helped to articulate the

counterinsurgency principles and relevant objectives in the Czech conceptual, strategic,

policy documents more clearly? In the other words, can we track an evolution of the

Czech counterinsurgency approach, as the Czech military forces and civilian experts

were gaining more counterinsurgency experience? With what impacts?

• Did you experience any shortage of resources (financial, material, human, …)? In your

opinion, what additional capabilities does the Czech Republic need to contribute in order

to meet her full potential in terms of counterinsurgency efforts?

• Do the factors of political commitment and political will have any impact on the Czech

counterinsurgency approach in both conceptual and practical terms? How would you

27

assess this effect?

Table 3: Questions for respondents. Source: IH.

Respecting the wishes of the absolute majority of her respondents,11 in most of the case, the

author doesn’t name the source of that information provided, for obvious reasons regarding

their personal safety or their job assignments, limitations imposed on it or potential

consequences. In order to keep the respondents’ anonymity, she refers to them as

“respondents” or “a military/civilian interviewed”. Their background and experience are,

however, briefly sketched in order to maintain at least a certain level of credibility and

verifiability of findings, arguments and conclusions presented and asserted in this thesis, as

well as the overall reliability and objectivity of this research. In the instances, where the

respondents explicitly agreed to be named publicly in the text, the author refers to them by

their names.

The author is well aware of the potential biases in the accounts provided by the

individuals she interviewed, as they always make for one’s personal opinion and

interpretations of events. Therefore, she cross-referenced every piece of information she was

given during this interviews with other sources, in order to increase the level of triangulation

of data as much as possible and feasible, in order for her to work with only verified and

credible data in this research.12

2.5.2 Content analysis

The author applies content analysis technique to analyze the contents of a number of highly

relevant primary, secondary, and in few cases also tertiary, sources of data. Content analysis

is an approach of systematic, rule guided text analysis. The subject of attention here is the

objective information, arguments or facts stated in the text itself, without attributing any

normative connotations or meanings to them. Content analysis can be distinguished by its

certain basic principles – researchers work with units of analysis, step models, with

11 As a majority of respondents expressed their concerns regarding the direct attribution of their statements,

thoughts and opinions, and wished not to be named, but rather asked the author to abide by the so-called

Chatham House rules, based on a principle of non-attribution. 12 In instances, where the accounts of individual respondents are controversial and cannot be easily verified by

other sources of data, the author includes them in her research under conditions of making a significant

contribution to the research problem or to the discussion on it, by interpreting them and putting them into

perspectives.

28

categories, validity and reliability. The main purpose of the use of content analysis is to

achieve and induce replicable and valid inferences by interpreting and coding textual material,

by systematically evaluating documentary evidence (like historical records, existing official

documents of policy, strategic, conceptual or doctrinal nature, news reports, investigative

journalism reports, photographs, etc.; more on the sources of data see below in the text). Use

of content analysis also enables researchers to examine various nuances in behavioral

patterns, perceptions as well as various trends and tendencies. According to a number of

scholars (for instance, Duriau, Reger & Pfarrer 2007), content analysis stands at the

intersection of the qualitative and quantitative research traditions, as it usually generates a

significant number of qualitative data which can easily be transformed through coding into

quantitative research data.13 Following the established mechanics of any use of content

analysis, the author of this thesis organizes the data obtained through the application of this

research technique in a structure of clusters (or categories), where she pays attention to the

originator of the text, his/her relation to the subject addressed in the document, timing and

broader context of documents’ release, their stated or assumed target audience(s), main

themes of the texts, the character of documents (informative, factual, conceptual, doctrinal,

political, etc.), references used in the text, portrayal of events or actors, depiction of

principles, guidelines and legal provisions, subject’s placement in media, purpose of the

documents, as well as their implications and impacts.

In some instances, discourse analysis is also used in this research, particularly in cases

of critical evaluations of statements, speeches, hearings and debates of political or military

representatives, humanitarian workers, adversaries, and other relevant and interested

stakeholders. Discourse analysis is, essentially, content analysis of verbal data. Discourse

analysis is connected to ideological as well as socio-psychological dimensions of the

originator of that statement, as its focus is predominantly represented by the structure of

argument, the syntax, lexicon and concepts used, style, rhetoric, meanings, as well as

strategies, turns, gestures or sounds. Discourse analysis is generally used to present evidence

as an instrument of a means of interaction with the target audience(s) for effective

communications of a certain narrative or message (cf. Jorgensen – Phillips 2002).

Use of both content analysis and discourse analysis techniques in this research then

allows for identification and critical assessment of continuity, trends and tendencies, priorities

13 Harold Kassarjian, who introduced the content analysis methodology to consumer research in his Journal of

Consumer Research article, published in 1977 asserts that the content analysis methodology “must be objective,

systematic, and quantitative” (Kassarjian 1977: 9, italics in original).

29

as well as problems of challenges of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency. Specific

attention is devoted to recurrence of narratives and concepts used in those sources, explained

in broader context of potential causes and consequences (in terms of, for example, frequency,

contexts and time frames of use of the concept of counterinsurgency, etc.).

Most of the data are also scattered through the sources of various characters, release

dates and purposes. There is no unitary official document on the state level that would

introduce the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency in a holistic, whole of government,

whole of society, comprehensive manner (see below). The author of this thesis compiles data

and evidence obtained from various resources, and cross-references them to each other in

order to increase reliability, objectivity, validity and overall triangulation of the data she

works with. Significant numbers of relevant date are derived from observations and analysis

of practical implementation of the Czech counterinsurgency approach on the ground during

the course of relevant missions.

Main sources of data

• Military and civilian individuals with adequate background, adequate experience and relevant

information (on policy, decision-making, practical implementation

• Strategic political and military documents (CZE, US, NATO, other allies, Afghans, UN, etc.);

• Military conceptual doctrines, field manuals, operational orders (when available);

• Official and some internal policy papers – relevant decision made by the executive, the

legislative and the judicial branches and their institutions, regulating the Czech

counterinsurgency approach;

• Public statements, reports and press releases;

• NATO Summits’ declarations;

• Official as well as internal guidelines of non-governmental actors (NGOs, PSMCs)

• Media materials – news reports, investigative journalism reports;

• Expert publications, academic journals and articles.

Table 4: Main sources of data subjected to content analysis. Source: IH.

With such significant role of the from-the-ground practical observations and examinations

have in this research, it is noteworthy that it often is difficult to determine the proper

relationship in terms of independent and dependent variables, i.e. if changes in practical

30

implementation on the ground have been caused by a more informed and progressed

understanding of the counterinsurgency doctrine implementation (stemming from joint

exercises with partners, exchange of information, education and training initiatives) from the

side of relevant Czech stakeholders, or whether the evolution (and development) of the Czech

counterinsurgency approach has happened mainly on the ground in practical terms (through

learning from experience and from partners in the mission) have been later reflected in the

relevant documents. It is required to see these dynamics as a cycle, or rather a system of

cycles, where certain theoretical/conceptual aspects are caused by practical development and

experience, whereas others induce changes on the ground.

The research of the issue of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency is closely connected

to the fields of foreign policy of the country, its security and defense policy, as well as other

policies, like economic or development policy. However, the Czech Republic as a country and

important contributor to international counterinsurgency efforts in general doesn’t have any

single, unifying official document, establishing the fundamental principles, guidelines or any

general overall framework of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency, that would bring

together the interests, principles and efforts of relevant civilian as well as military

stakeholders, decision-makers and executioners in a comprehensive, coordinated and

integrated manner, at her disposal. Moreover, as linked to the research of such topic, there are

many independent and dependent variables in the research environment that might or might

not be relevant for the purposes of this research. In order to exert the highest level of the

environment control possible, the author uses only the data and information clearly relevant

and directly linked to the research topic. For instance, activities and projects by some Czech

NGOs in Afghanistan’s northern Badakshan province might seem as highly relevant for this

research, however, as the respective NGOs have been active in that part of the country before

2002, when the Czech approach to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan started to be formed,

their activities are mentioned in the thesis, but are not considered directly relevant or

significant for her specific research purposes. In case of data, where their potential connection

to the research topic can be perceived as weak, flawed or disputable, the author weighs on the

potential link and discusses wider context of the respective data. Significantly, control of

some variables goes beyond the capacities and possibilities of the author, as, for instance, the

accident factor or the chance factor have the potential to influence the bigger picture and the

consequences, as well as potential effectiveness and success, regardless the decision-making

and planning capacities, commitment or free will of the relevant actors (like a natural disaster

etc.).

31

2.6 Limitations

Any research of the subject matter of this dissertation thesis also encompasses several

significant limitations to it. Firstly, the nature of the studied topic inherently contains the so-

called classification restriction, where a lot of primary data cannot be used in the research, as

they fall under the Czech, NATO or other country’s classification regime. This limitation is

difficult to overcome or get over with, however, the author tries to manage this quite

significant objection by using her own critical-analytical skills and common sense, supporting

her arguments and claims by the evidence obtained from other available source. Furthermore,

any multinational military operation, as all the counterinsurgency missions the Czech

Republic has participated in so far have been, and its success and cohesion is tested by the

imposition of so-called “necessary evil”, represented by various limitations and restrictions

individual national governments of the troops contributing nations (TCNs) place on their

forces deployed in the mission. Such restrictions are often referred to as “national caveats”,

and most of them fall under varying levels of national classifications, and/or are undeclared

and thus difficult to observe.

The existence and use of national caveats (see below) are for the purposes of this thesis

important for two reasons. First, it helps understand the planning and execution phase of

multinational military campaigns, again, the ISAF mission in particular, as the caveats had a

significant function in the conduct of the ISAF operation, influencing the practical

implementation of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency in a mission on the ground as

well as all of the counterinsurgency efforts of other coalition partners.

Second, the exploration and analysis of the issue of imposition of national caveats in

multinational operations provides the author with another set of lenses, through which to

analyze her research subject matter. The classification of relevant primary sources of data

may, however, deprive the author from an access to important information that could help her

compose the puzzle of the Czech counterinsurgency approach in its whole integrity.

Apart from caveats, the limitation by document classification stretches also to the

documents obtained in historical archives of totalitarian regimes (Nazi regime, Communist

regime), as their declassification and public release may bring along addition research

challenges in terms of dealing with propagandistic materials or exaggerated or false first-hand

accounts. The issue of propagandistic material and disinformation is also important when

studying counterinsurgency, given the nature of such efforts and the substantial place of

perceptions, emotions and ideas have in their execution.

32

Also, special operation forces and intelligence agencies play tremendous roles in any

counterinsurgency campaigns. Their operations are not only highly classified, but often also

allow for the use of so-called plausible deniability clause, potentially steering the evidence in

false or adjusted directions, mainly for political, but also security purposes. All of these

limitations create research, where some of the claims or evidence is difficult, if not impossible

to verify.

Another significant limitation in this research is the close relationship of the

counterinsurgency research sphere with the one of counterterrorism, which is closely linked

and interconnected to each other, potentially producing certain distortion of the research

conclusions. Some of the activities of the Czech military in multinational operations explored

in this thesis, and, again, the ISAF mission in particular are counterterrorism rather than

counterinsurgency by their character. Nevertheless, the author decided to include them in the

research as those actions and efforts have either been conducted as a part of the examined

campaign, or had a profound impact on the counterinsurgency lines of action. Related to this

are other limitations or more of a challenge, represented by the varying and constantly

changing terminology. Thus actions that can be classified as counterinsurgency by their nature

and existing broader context, are labeled with other terms (see below),14 depending on the

trending policies and discourses, further complicating the research of such topic.

It is difficult to study the Czech approach to counterinsurgency as an isolated

phenomenon, and always has to be explored within the broader context, the NATO one in

particular. Therefore, significant space in this thesis is devoted to the NATO level of

analysis, it counterinsurgency strategy doctrine, planning procedures, decision-making

processes, command and control (C2) structures as well as burden-sharing, interoperability,

cohesion and joint operations. The NATO approach to counterinsurgency serves as a

fundamental defining and shaping framework of the Czech approach. A lot of the military

lines of actions and efforts described and analyzed in this research mirror the ones of the

Alliance, and more room for variability is available in the civilian domain. NATO norms and

principles are established for operations of different types, and the activities and tasks of the

Czech Armed Forces have to comply with and fall within the framework set up by the

Alliance doctrines, as arising from the NATO membership commitments and rights.

14 This is, particularly, the case of those multinational operations, and actions and efforts carried out as part of

them, that are not counterinsurgency by their mandate, but where exists enough evidence of their

counterinsurgency character on the ground, like the KFOR mission.

33

3 Summary of existing literature

As already mentioned, there is no comprehensive study of the Czech approach to

counterinsurgency, caused perhaps by the lack of interest in the issue, or by the prevailing

notion of the pointlessness of such research. Those critics are certainly right, in a sense that

given the Czech Republic’s membership in NATO and other transnational and international

organizations, any outlooks for an autonomous Czech approach look almost impossible.

Nonetheless, the same critics fail to realize the huge potential such a study has with all of its

potential conclusions and consequences, especially for the preparation of the Czech Armed

Forces as well as civilian entities for future missions, allowing them to learn from the

experience as well as exploitation of the relationships and reputations they have gained. No

comprehensive case study of the new, 2011 NATO counterinsurgency strategy doctrine that

would provide at least a simple lead or guide for this research has been conducted either.

The absolute majority of relevant literature addresses attributes, complexities and

various aspects of the counterinsurgency strategy doctrine in general, of the multinational

operations in general, NATO operations or specifically the ISAF mission and its various

aspects and challenges. The most prominent pieces of the academic literature dealing with

these topics are introduced and discussed in appropriate and corresponding parts of this

dissertation thesis.

As for the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency itself, apart from a number of

articles and reports by journalists of various quality and biases, any clearly academic research

study is absent, and so is any comprehensive political document or report. The Czech armed

forces’ Doctrine Department at the Training Command – Military Academy in Vyškov, in

cooperation with its NATO Allies and partners, has published a quite significant number of

internal documents, mostly dealing with the guiding principles of counterinsurgency

operations, or with the lessons learned from operations. Counterinsurgency principles are also

scattered around in several strategic documents, with an important part devoted to them in the

new Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (2010). However, any original

comprehensive strategic or doctrinal document tailored for the Czech armed forces is absent.

As some of the military respondents the author interviewed told her, all of the

counterinsurgency related documents circling around the members and units of the Czech

armed forces are direct translation of NATO documents and materials.

What can be considered as the closest material to resemble academic studies are:

34

• Article “NATIONAL CAVEATS” and its impact on the Army of the Czech

Republic”, authored by John Brophy and Miloslav Fisera, published in Economics and

Management journal of the Czech Defense University in Brno, Czech Republic, in

2007;

• Diploma thesis of Mgr. Josef Daňhel, an alumnus of the Masaryk University in Brno,

Czech Republic, contemporary approaches to counterinsurgency combat, with a

substantial part dedicated to the description and analysis of the potential effects the

ISAF mission in Afghanistan has had on the Czech Armed Forces as well as the

activities and tasks they performed when deployed as part of the ISAF mission from

2010.

The author herself partly addressed the issue of the Czech approach towards

counterinsurgency in her previous research and summarized her findings in her bachelor

thesis, defended at the Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic, in June 2010. Her thesis

is a comparison of the counterinsurgency strategy, or more approach, of the Czech Republic

with the sophisticated counterinsurgency strategy of the United States of America, and serves

as one of the research basis of this thesis. The author uses some of the arguments she worked

with in her bachelor thesis, redefines them, reflects them critically, analyzes and provides

them with support from other sources of evidence and data. This thesis is by no means a copy

of parts of her bachelor’s thesis. What is self-evident then is the ambition of this thesis to

become the pioneer of the research into this topic, providing reasonable justifications for it as

well as serving as a springboard, or a pilot study in a sense, of future researches to this

important topic with significant practical (security, defense, political, diplomatic, economic,

societal, business, etc.) consequences.

4 Theoretical part

4.1 Theory of strategy

Before detailed introduction of the principal concept of this dissertation thesis, i.e.

counterinsurgency, and thorough discussion on that central issue, it is critical to highlight the

underlying premise of this research. As already aforementioned in the text, the membership of

the Czech Republic in NATO and its participation in multinational operations under the

NATO command doesn’t allow the country to have an autonomous, let alone independent

35

counterinsurgency strategy. For having one, the Czech Republic lacks necessary geopolitical

power as well as adequate resources. Therefore, when deployed in counterinsurgency

campaign, the Czech Republic strictly follows and abides by the overall the strategic doctrines

of NATO, which makes cooperation with the partners in mission more flexible and effective,

as it allows for increased interoperability of forces (more discussion on this aspect of the

research problem can be find below in the text in its empirical and analytical parts). The

NATO framework of operations leaves little, yet some room for variability among its member

states and their partners, in terms of their activities performed, when deployed to a mission.

Essentially, NATO establishes the strategic framework within which individual member states

adjust the NATO strategy to their national conditions, their national interests, their available

capabilities and resources, cultural specifics, or political and public mood. Therefore, what is

explored in this thesis isn’t the Czech counterinsurgency STRATEGY, as there is no such

thing (and truly even cannot be), but the APPROACH Czech Republic pursues when met

with a counterinsurgency challenge or a counterinsurgency mission. Nonetheless, given the

very important function and role of the NATO level in this analysis, Harry Yarger’s theory of

strategy is applied, with its extended use in terms of hypothetical pondering of the author

about the assessment of “Czech way of counterinsurgency” through the prisms of Yarger’s

theory of strategy in the concluding parts of this thesis.

Intuitively, a strategy and an approach are not equal phenomena. Simply put, strategy

is a systematic action or set of actions (a plan) designed to achieve a specific goal or a set of

goals, whereas approach is more of a personal style of the way certain strategy is pursued,

depending up on the entity’s available resources and needs. Therefore, touching up on a

constructivist theory, the author particularly focuses on the, let’s say, Czech comprehension of

the overarching NATO counterinsurgency strategy.

Any complete theory of strategy, in order to be recognized and accepted as such, needs

to incorporate elements any other complete theory in the social sciences have: any theory of

strategy requires (1) essential terminology and definitions to draw upon; (2) an explanation of

the assumptions and premises underlying the theory included within; (3) substantive

prepositions translated into hypothesis which can be tested; and (4) methods that can be used

to test hypothesis and modify the theory as appropriate (Foster 1990: 43). Moreover, any

appropriate theory of strategy also has to have a potential for being tested by other, innovative

tools or approaches. As there is no commonly accepted definition of strategy, any agreement

on what constitutes a theory of strategy doesn’t exist either. The field of security and strategic

studies is also overwhelmed by an existing confusion over terminology and definitions and

36

underlying assumptions and premises, their mutual relationship or consequences of their

potential interdependencies, which further complicates the search for an appropriate theory of

strategy.

Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., a professor at the U.S. Army War College, developed a

theoretical strategy model in 1989 that has been utilized in numerous ways for the purpose of

strategy development and evaluation in the Anglo-Saxon area. In his article “Toward an

Understanding of Military Strategy”, Lykke introduces his understanding of what constitutes

strategy. As he pointedly notes, there is no universal definition of strategy, not even the

approximation of consensus, leading to the problem of when trying to decide between

alternative strategies, what actually happens is that apples are being compared with oranges,

because the relevant choices don’t address the same factors (Lykke 1989: 179). The use of the

term strategy has stretched over too many different phenomena, embraced too many different

factors, and the term itself is used altogether too loosely, often ending up with a situation

where it has ceased to be have clear understanding of what the concept is essentially about. A

lot of confusion has been brought to the strategy research, as the matter of what elements and

processes constituting strategy has not been understood and approached in a united fashion.15

The term strategy is often misapplied. The prevailing tendency is to use it for a plan,

concept, course of action or something of an “idea” of a direction in which to proceed.

However, such misuse of the concept is inappropriate. Much of the essence and philosophy of

what strategy is captured already in 1965 Henry Eccles, who described strategy as “(…) the

comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to obtain

objectives.” (Eccles 1965: 48). What Eccles points to with this definition is the requirement

for comprehensiveness of strategy that embodies some direction with a purpose to control

certain object or situation. Significant feature of this definition of strategy is also the notion

about the application of power instruments, tools and means to serve the interests of an

originator of strategy in a comprehensive way. Most of the existing literature focus on a

nation state as the fundamental analytical unit and referential object for any efforts to theorize

about strategy, is nature and basic elements. Then the exploration of the strategy dwells on the

study of the use of elements of power in a way that would serve state interests, even though

15 This challenge is of a particular concern in this dissertation, as it explores a strategy adopted and pursued by a

transnational organization NATO. Based on the inner structure as well as planning and decision-making

procedures and mechanisms, the individual nation states are still the fundamental and ultimate power and

decision-making actor. Potential uncertainty then arises about the common understanding of what nature

transnational strategy should have and what elements and layers it should entail. However, as the united NATO

strategic doctrine was already adopted, this challenge of lack of clear (sic!) consensus over the format of NATO

strategy is not considered as significant for the purpose of this thesis, even though the same challenge is critical

for the study of accompanying aspects of the strategy itself.

37

more and more non-state actor, just like it is also the case in this dissertation thesis, develop

and operate with their own strategies, let it be NATO as a political-military alliance of 28

countries, nationalist insurgency like the Afghan Taliban movement, a state-like entity like

the so-called Islamic State, Mexican drug cartels, or even the global terrorist franchise of al-

Qaeda. Nonetheless, the framework of approaching strategy purely from the state perspective,

strategy is understood as the “employment of the instruments (elements) of power

(political/diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve political objectives of

the state in cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own interests.”

(Yarger 2006: 45).16 With this assertion, Yarger added two more significant factors into the

study of strategy, and the theoretical framework of this research as well, as he (1) stresses the

political nature of the pursued objectives, and (2) integrates interactions with other actors. As

the author seeks to analyze the NATO strategy framework and the manner of how the Czech

Republic embodied and executed this strategy, the significance of military or economic

objectives relative to the political ones is assessed.17 Additionally, the both the NATO

strategy and its Czech embodiment are based on a strong factor of cooperation (with partners

and the host nation) and even stronger factor of competition with the adversary, as well as the

specific forms these dynamics had in various instances. The population in respective areas of

operations then falls under both categories, depending on specific vectors and platforms of

interaction on the ground.

The theoretical model for a study of strategy presented and applied in this thesis also

focuses on a national state as the referential object for his model. However, the model is both

16 Some analysts draw distinction between what elements of national power and instruments of national power

are. Even though as any attempts to study social phenomena depend on how we define the concepts, intuitively

we can identify central nuances between what elements and what instruments are, even if they, as often is the

case, overlap. Generally speaking, the category of elements of national power is more inclusive and comprises of

the realities serving as a power base of a nation states (like geographic or demographic characteristics), whereas

the instruments of national power, on the other hand, include tools and means used to exercise interstate

influence (like informational or psychological tools) (cf. Jablonsky 1995). Where the two categories overlap,

political, military, economical or societal capacities can be identified. The distinction between elements and

instruments of national power can also translate into what David Baldwin called “the paradox of unrealized

power: (Baldwin 1979: 163), i.e. the difference between potential power of a state and its actual power. Lewis

W. Snider also addressed the factor of power and its two dimensions in its capacity as a catalyst for achieving

state interests, i.e. (1) power as resource base, and (2) power as function (Snider 1987: 316-319). 17 Discussions are being waged regarding the problem of military instrument of power employed in pursuit of

state interests in form of political or economic, thus not necessarily military objectives. Concerns have been

voiced about the challenges accompanying the use of military force as an appropriate policy tool and the

difficulties of effectively linking feasible military objective to those stated in the promoted national policy. This discrepancy is notable, for instance, in the case of the imposition of national caveats on the military force

deployed in an area of operation. Generally speaking, counterinsurgency operations often suffer from this

discrepancy at higher rates than most of other types of military operations, even though the counterinsurgency

strategy doctrine is political military in its nature (see below).

38

universal and flexible enough, to allow for its use in a study of strategy of a non-state entity.

Arthur F. Lykke works with the definition approved by the U.S. Joint Chief of Staff:

“The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of

national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force.” (U.S. Department of

Defense 1987: 232).

Looking at this definition that served as a cornerstone of the Lykke’s strategy

development and analysis model, what is interesting is the notion of strategy being both art

and science, which raises the significance of the Sun Tzu’s writing even more. Also, even

though the Lykke’s model is built on a definition of strategy limited only to the armed forces

as the elements of power applied in a certain direction for a certain purpose, the model itself,

as shown below, doesn’t lose on his credibility and wider applicability. Lykke builds his

model on a characterization of strategy presented by General Maxwell D. Taylor during his

visit to the U.S. Army War College in 1981, who characterized strategy as consisting of

objectives/ends, ways and means. Lykke expresses this concept as an equation:

Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means

Table 5: Lykke’s strategy model. Source: IH; inspired by Lykke, A.F.: Toward an Understanding of

Military Strategy, p. 3.

As Lykke himself states, this general conceptual model can be used as a framework for

formulation of any type of strategy (military, political, economic, etc.), depending upon the

character, type, size and range of the element of state power employed (Lykke 1989: 3).

Based on this presumption, it is also possible to utilize the Lykke’s model for development

and formulation of more comprehensive strategies that combine different elements of state

power, just like counterinsurgency strategy, which is scrutinized in this thesis. The author of

Component Definition

ENDS Objectives; What do we want to achieve?

WAYS Courses of action; How will we achieve our

ends?

MEANS Instruments; What resources do we need?

39

this thesis further steps beyond the suggested analytical box, and uses the model for study of

an approach (as an individual customized for of strategy execution).

Importantly, ends, ways, and means often get confusing in the development or analysis

of a specific strategy. The most common mistakes include, for instance, the use of means to

describe ways or the formulation of objectives as ways. Clarity and understanding have to

exist over the Lykke’s model. Objectives answer the question of what one is trying to achieve,

the desired end state compatible with one’s interests. Ways describe and explain courses of

action required to achieve the stated objectives, including the fashion of how the resources at

one’s disposal will be used. Means describe and explain what resources and capabilities will

be used to execute the required course of action (cf. Lykke 1989; Yarger 2010). The means

(resources) can then be physical and countable (like individual branches of armed forces,

intelligence agencies and their assets, individual ministries and their personnel, NGOs, natural

resources, industries, facilities, equipment, but also resources of an organization one is a

member of, like NATO, or resources of international non-state organization, like the Red

Cross etc.), as well as abstract and uncountable (like will, commitment, industrial capacity,

coercion or persuasion potential, partnerships, intellect, information, etc.).

Interestingly, Lykke stressed the need for differentiation between national (grand)

strategy, being the highest level strategy, and subordinate military (etc.) strategies, that is just

a part of the all-encompassing national strategy. In the military domain, Lykke continues, the

military strategy at its highest level is distinguishable from operational strategies that are

being used as the basis for military planning and operations (Lykke 1989: 4). Bearing this

requirement in mind, the author of this thesis stressed the importance of the comprehensive

nature of any counterinsurgency strategy, that by its nature combines different elements and

instruments of national power (see below), even though is often understood as purely military

strategic doctrine. Indeed, militaries of different countries or NATO-like organizations

possess specific military counterinsurgency doctrines. One of the added ambitions of this

thesis then is to test the 2011 NATO counterinsurgency strategy doctrine through the lenses of

this Lykke’s assertion, highlighting the wider scope of the studied strategy doctrine. The term

doctrine itself suggest, however, strong military width, and evidence suggest that it is right the

2011 NATO counterinsurgency strategy doctrine what was being used as a main reference

point of military planning efforts as well as operational orders during the course of the ISAF

mission.

Building on the basis of the concept of strategy as combining ends, ways and means,

Lykke develops (what he calls) an approach to military strategy (Ibid). He states that “Ends”

40

can be expressed as military objectives, and “Ways” encompass various methods of applying

military force. In essence, the “Ways” part of military strategy is closely linked to military

strategic concepts that contain various courses of action that are designed to achieve military

objectives. “Means” then refer to military resources and capabilities (manpower, material,

money, forces, logistics, weapon systems, equipment, etc.) required to accomplish the mission

(Ibid). In the other words, military resources are deployed in a certain way, as required by

respective courses of action evaluated and identified as appropriate for achieving desired

military objectives. Based on Lykke’s approach to military strategy presented above, the

aforementioned equation can be reformulated as put into the military perspective as:

Military Strategy = Military Objectives + Military Strategic Concepts + Military Resources

Table 6: Lykke’s military strategy model. Source: IH; inspired by Lykke, A.F.: Toward an

Understanding of Military Strategy, p. 5.

Significantly, as Lykke himself asserts, this conceptual model can be applied in strategy

development and assessment at all three levels, i.e. strategic, operational and tactical. In

Lykke’s opinion, important fundamental similarities exist among strategy, operational art, and

tactics, as strategy planners at all three levels have to consider ways to employ means to

achieve ends (Ibid). This assumption, back by a substantial amount of empirical evidence

drawn from observations as well as actual comparisons of conceptual documents at all three

levels, adds yet another layer of justification to its use in this thesis.

Complimentary to the Lykke’s model of strategy is also his analytical distinction of

two levels of military strategy. Lykke separates strategies based on existing military

capabilities and strategies addressing future security environment and related military

requirements, acquisitions or adjustments. Short-range time period strategies lie foundation

for the formulation of specific plans for action of existing military capabilities in a theater of

operation (i.e. operational military strategy), whereas long-range strategies are often based on

estimates of future security environment with identification of future threats, objectives and

related requirement, not constrained by the recent force posture (i.e. force development

military strategy) (Ibid). Ideally, a strategy combines comprehensive puzzle of both in an

appropriate manner. However, in reality, the force development military strategies are often

underestimated, as is the case of the Czech Republic.

41

Arthur F. Lykke also warns against potential unbalance within individual elements of

a (military) strategy. In conditions, where military resources are not compatible with strategic

concepts or commitments and/or are not matched by military capabilities, the possibility of

loss or damage, or of not achieving an objective occurs. Direct proportion exists between the

level of imbalance and the degree of associated risk (Ibid: 6-7). In order to keep the highest

possible degree of balance, one of the three elements and/or their mutual relationship needs to

be adjusted. What is highly relevant for contemporary security environment, and for

counterinsurgency strategies in particular, is the requirement of flexibility of strategy, which,

however, also has its limits. As Lykke notes, “military strategy can change rapidly and

frequently, since objectives can change in an instant. However, it takes much longer to alter

the military forces so that they may be responsive to new objectives and concepts.” (Ibid: 8).

This assertion is of a particular importance for the purposes of this dissertation thesis, as the

relatively swift arrival of the efforts to frame certain multinational military campaigns as

counterinsurgency (i.e. ends and ways) was not met with corresponding adaptation of military

force (i.e. means).

In order to make the theoretical and conceptual framework of this thesis as complex as

possible, some additional attributes shall be added and included. Strategy is fundamentally a

choice, and reflects a preference for a future state or condition (Yarger 2010: 45). Harry R.

Yarger then developed a theory of strategy, further applied in the empirical-analytical part of

this thesis as part of the efforts to assess both the NATO counterinsurgency doctrine and the

Czech counterinsurgency approach. Yarger’s theory of strategy is built on eight fundamental

premises of the nature or character of any strategy.

Eight premises of Yarger’s Theory of Strategy

First premise – Strategy is proactive and anticipatory, because it not only provides direction for the

coercive or persuasive use of power, but it also seeks to control the environment, as opposed to

reacting to it.

Second premise – Strategy is based on proper understanding of the internal and external

environments, allowing for formulation of appropriate objectives leading to the desired end state.

Third premise – Strategy must identify and maintain an appropriate balance among the desired

objectives, the methods chosen to pursue the objectives, and the resources required and available.

Ends, ways and means must be consistent with each other.

Fourth premise – It is the political purpose that dominates all strategy. This political purpose is stated

42

in policy, with which strategy must comply. Policy dominates strategy by its articulation of the end

state and its guidance. Policy ensures that strategy pursue appropriate aims, objective that provide

purpose, focus, and justification for the actions embodied in a strategy. Hierarchy of objectives,

presented in the strategy document adopted on the highest level, i.e. national strategy, is then

determined by the political purpose of the state.

Fifth premise – Strategy is hierarchical, and this hierarchy represents both national consensus and

comprehensive direction. Political leadership ensures and maintains its control and influence through

the hierarchical nature of strategy, which facilitates span of control. Objectives, concepts and

resources should be appropriate to the level of strategy and consistent with one another. Strategy

differ from operational art and tactics in functional, temporal, and geographic aspects.18 The U.S.

Army War College (in consonance with Joint Publication 1-02) defines the levels of strategy within

the state as:

• National Security Strategy – the art and science of developing, applying, and

coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military,

and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security;

• National Military Strategy – the art and science of distributing and applying

military power to attain national objectives in peace and war;

• Theater strategy – the art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts

and courses of action directed towards securing the objectives of national and

alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened

use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater (this is,

where the counterinsurgency strategy lies within the hierarchy of strategy – note

IH).

Sixth premise – Strategy is holistic, that is comprehensive, concerned with internal and external

factors at all levels. Strategy is based on comprehensive knowledge of what is happening and the

potential first, second, third, etc., consequences, ideally both intended and unintended, on the efforts,

of the “big picture”, relevant institutional capabilities and resources, and the impact on the whole of

the environment. Strategy must be fully integrated with the strategies or efforts of superior, co-equal

and subordinate elements. Goo strategy is never deployed in isolation.

Seventh premise – Strategy is developed from a thorough analysis and knowledge of strategic

18 Tactics is the domain of battles, engagements of relatively short duration in a narrowly defined territory.

Operational art is the domain of the campaign, a series of battles occurring over a longer period of time and is

broader and more regional in orientation. Strategy is the level of war which encompasses the protracted level of

conflict among actors, armed or unarmed, of a theater-wide, intercontinental or global scope. Counterinsurgency

strategy is then, indeed, a strategy, as it addresses the situation in an area of operation as a whole, combining

both armed and unarmed efforts and long-term in its nature.

43

situation/environment.

Eight premise – Strategy contains a certain degree of an inherent risk. The best strategy can offer is a

favorable balance against failure. Failure can be either the failure to achieve desired objectives, or

providing a significant advantage to one’s adversaries.

Table 7: Eight premises of Yarger’s theory of strategy. Source: IH; inspired by Yarger, H. (2010):

Toward a theory of strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College strategy model, pp. 45-48.

The Lykke’s model of strategy is frequently used for analysis of numerous historical cases,

which allows for its thorough testing, and generally results in increased validity and reliability

Sof the model itself. Lykke proposes to break a strategy into its component parts as an

effective way of its examination and evaluation, both in the development stage through

proactive evaluation and in the post-development phase (during its execution or in retrospect).

He further argued that any strategy can be examined for its sustainability (relates to

ends/objectives – will its attainment contribute to accomplish the desired effects?), feasibility

(relates to ways/concepts – can the action be accomplished by the means available and

selected?), and acceptability (relates to both ways and means/concepts and resources - are the

consequences of cost justified by the importance of the desired effects?) (Ibid: 7). Lykke thus

presumes an inclusion of a proper cost-benefit analysis. Since the Lykke’s model has proven

itself adaptable to explaining differing aspects of strategic thought and capable of providing

the solid basis for clearly articulating and objectively evaluating various strategies, its

application in this research proves not only justified, but also reasonable. As this thesis serves

as yet another test for the Lykke’s model, it will challenge his validity, among other

perspectives, from the point of its potential complementarity with other broader analytical

techniques, like SWOT analysis.

Importantly, what neither Harry R. Yarger, nor Arthur F. Lykke don’t address though

is the superior level of the political-military alliances, like NATO, determined by the

agreements on accession and the rights and commitments stemming from it. Moreover, in a

capacity of a TCN to a multinational operation led by a coalition of states under auspices of a

regional/an international organization, the country is obliged to abide by and implement a

strategy of the commanding authority. Certain level of autonomy of individual nation state

decision-making can be assured in two ways in the setting of multinational operations, i.e. (1)

by inclusion in the planning process of the respective operation, and/or (2) by imposition of

44

restrictions or limitations on the assets committed and deployed to the respective mission by

individual nation states. Both of these factors have a significant level of relevance to the

subject matter of this research. The Czech Republic, being a member of the NATO Alliance,

possess an equal say, in principal as based on the inner provisions and procedures off the

Alliance established by its founding document the Washington Treaty of 194919, in processes

of adopting documents of strategic (and doctrinal) importance as well as in the processes of

decision-making and planning of operations NATO seeks to execute. In the case of

multinational operations led by a coalition of states, without a clear overarching mandate of

an international organization, nation states keep their privilege of sovereignty and their

sovereign decision to join the coalition and participate in the operation, thus accepting the

strategic doctrinal framework as a result of decision-making and planning processes, the states

didn’t necessarily have to part take in. Again, in instances of certain reservations, states

maintain their right to express their reservations and/or impose certain limitations/restrictions

on the forces and other civilian assets deployed to the respective operation.

These restrictions/limitations imposed by nation states commanding structures and

decision-makers are often labeled as “national caveats”. Essentially, national caveats are

political restrictions imposed on military forces (and other civilian actors, as necessary). No

single, commonly accepted definition of what national caveats are has been adopted, however,

a certain common understanding about what caveats are exists. Virtually, from the more

proper perspective of multinational operations than in general, national caveats represent

qualifications imposed by allies on their national contributions and roles and activities on the

ground. The research interest of the issue of national caveats has been increasing since their

negative practical implications on the operational and tactical level started to surface and

become a subject of investigations and inquiries. There is a common rule for all TCNs in a

mission to declare restrictions and limitations on their contributions during the planning

phases of operations, however, as substantial evidence suggests, nation states impose a

number of previously undeclared caveats, as necessary, creating confusion and mistrust

among allies and partners in the mission as well as potentially undermining overall

effectiveness of the mission. Caveats represent an important contribution to the framework of

what deployed military force (or civilian actors, when under direct authority of the state) can

or cannot do, what mission, tasks and assignments they can or cannot execute. The right to

19 The text of Washington Treaty can be accessed at

http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf

(retrieved on February 9, 2017).

45

impose restrictions by a nation state on its military and civilian assets deployed in a

multinational mission limits the options of the commander of the mission on the ground in

terms of limitations on the use and maneuvering with the full force at the commander’s

disposal.

Caveats are commonly imposed on the operational and the tactical levels of the mission

and as such constituted a significant factor influencing the execution of the ISAF mission (see

below). Even though numerous negative effects of the use of national caveats by TCNs can be

identified, esp. on the operational and tactical level, there are certain positive effects the

caveats brought along as well. Analyzed through the prisms of the counterinsurgency

framework, which is the core character of a multinational operation scrutinized in this thesis,

positive effects can be observed predominantly at the strategic level, as it helps maintain

cohesion of the Alliance as well as legitimacy of the mission.20

As counterinsurgency is a political endeavor first and foremost, the practice of the use of

caveats has had more or less significant positive effects when put into the political

perspective. However, from the military perspective, caveats have been strongly perceived as

objecting or limiting successful accomplishment of various military goals. Again, from the

perspective of counterinsurgency, caveats undermined (or contribute to undermining of)

numerous fundamental counterinsurgency principles, including unity of effort, unity of

command, flaws in longer term continuance of efforts, or the what later became the very core

principle of NATO counterinsurgency efforts - winning hearts and minds of the population

(because of the factor of confusion in perception of the coalition forces, when ordinary

population were not able to distinguish between individual national contingents). Great

amount of mistrust affecting interoperability and, significantly, also intelligence-sharing

efforts has also been caused by national caveats (among other factors).

The imposition of restrictions in form of caveats on deployed forces of various

countries has also been one of the external factors shaping the Czech counterinsurgency

approach during the course of multinational (counterinsurgency) missions the Czechs

participated in. The sources of caveats in cases of individual nation states vary and don’t have 20 Nonetheless, detailed study of the relevant literature and mission reports suggests, caveats have never been

identified as a direct cause of any incident, wrongdoing or ineffective execution of individual assignments and

tasks as part of a mission, even though they have always been framed as carrying the major share of blame. One

of the limitations in attempts to determine how significant the impact of caveats actually is or can be is hindered

by the fact that they are mostly classified, and researchers can learn about them from reports or on the ground

observations, but generally cannot be granted a full access to the individual orders. Most notable examples of

national caveats are approvals from national capitals required before a certain action is taken, geographical

restrictions limiting the area of operation of a contingent, restrictions on participating in night operations,

restrictions on medical evacuations or restrictions on the weapon systems and other equipment allowed to be

used.

46

to be political per se, however, in most of the cases, the decision to impose caveats on

deployed forces are a mix of political, legal and partially also economic reasons. The status of

public opinion in home countries can also significantly influence the decision about the state’s

use of force. Most of the time, the real reasons behind the issuance of restrictions in form of

caveats are neither discussed, nor disclosed publicly. The narrative of “protection of forces”

has often been articulated and sold to the public, and, arguably, also has a significant impact

on the actual level of restrictiveness of the caveats. However, additional political, economic or

legal factors greatly contribute to the decision on imposition of the caveats, as well. The

“protection of forces” narrative cannot alone explain the caveats, as political and military

representatives of several NATO members used the very same narrative to advocate high

discretions levels among the forces deployed and against the use of caveats.

4.2 Conceptualization of counterinsurgency

Simply put, counterinsurgency strategy is a plan comprising of a series of measures to

minimize the potency and/or eliminate an insurgency in certain geographical area.

Nevertheless, as it is the case with a strategy or numerous other social phenomena, no

common, universally accepted definition of what counterinsurgency exactly is exists, even

though a certain common agreement on the basic premises on the nature of counterinsurgency

can be identified among practitioners as well as researchers. The NATO Glossary of Terms

and Definitions states that counterinsurgency (COIN), as well as counter-insurrection (thus

using the two concepts as synonymous to each other) comprises of “comprehensive civilian

and military efforts made to defeat an insurgency and address any core grievances.” (NATO

2013: 2-C-16).21 The US strategic conceptual and doctrinal documents have long played role

of the fundamental referential material for most of the NATO multinational operations, that

have been shaped as being counterinsurgency in their nature, both nominally and practically,

21 The NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions have undergone a number of revisions during which most of its

contents was either adjusted, or changed completely in order to better reflect the realities on the ground and

provide a more accurate conceptual framework for strategy development as well as execution. For example,

compared to the definition of counterinsurgency in the 2010 version (counterinsurgency as a mix of „military,

paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civilian activities executed by a government with the aim of

defeating an insurgency“ (NATO 2010)), the 2013 definition expands its scope to not only reactive activities

(defeat of an insurgency), but significant portion is also devoted to proactive, preventive efforts, as it seeks to

„address any core grievances.“ Furthermore, the less specific categories of the required activities in the 2013

definition might be interpreted as an effort not to specifically highlight or exclude certain activities that might

prove important in the course of counterinsurgency campaigns. The 2010 definition may also be perceived as

more military-centric than the 2013 one and as not sufficiently including the significant societal dimension (the

population) of counterinsurgency operations.

47

particularly long before a separate document on counterinsurgency strategy was approved and

enacted by all NATO member states at the NATO level in 2011 (see below). The U.S.

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms Joint Publication 1-02

(JP 1-02) has been one of these guiding documents. Its 2009 version provided the same

definition as the 2010 version of the NATO Glossary (see footnote no. 36 on this page).

However, as the publication dates of the two documents suggest, the US Military Dictionary

was used as the source of the definition, given both the dominant role of the US in NATO and

perceived accurateness of the definition. The latest (2016) amended version of the same

dictionary also provides a definition very similar to the one presented in the 2013 version of

NATO Glossary, i.e. it describes counterinsurgency as “comprehensive civilian and military

efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address root causes.”

(U.S. Department of Defense 2016: 53).

What is of a critical importance is the stress put on the word “simultaneously”,

suggesting the potential willingness of the US to commit a substantial number of various

resources in one specific time frame that NATO potentially can, given its character as an

alliance of 28 nations. The US Dictionary also describes more ambitious military and political

goal, as its understanding of counterinsurgency not only bears the responsibility of defeating

an insurgency, but possibly just “contain” it, giving the US somewhat more leverage in

practical terms. Another critically important document, for the US as well as for NATO

counterinsurgency operations (esp. ISAF) in particular is the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field

Manual no. 3-24/3-33.5 (commonly referred to as simply FM 3-24) that has essentially been

the corner stone of both the development and the execution phases of NATO operations. It

also provided the fundamental sources for actors lacking any previous direct experience (like

the Czech Republic) with counterinsurgency operations with a very useful blueprint of

counterinsurgency campaigns. One of the main reasons was behind the prominence of this

field manual in the theoretical and conceptual dimension of counterinsurgency was to ensure

as high level of interoperability in NATO multinational missions as possible, before the

separate document on the NATO level was adopted. Just like it was the case with the NATO

Glossary and the US Department of Defense Dictionary, the FM 3-24, originally published in

2006, has been revised according to the lessons learned and best practices obtained during the

counterinsurgency missions, particularly the one in Afghanistan, in order to reflect the

realities on the ground as thoroughly as possible and in order to provide potentially effective

guidelines and provisions for practical implementation of the document.

48

The 2006 version of FM 3-24 “filled an important doctrinal gap at a time when U.S.

forces were engaged in counterinsurgency operations.” (Department of the Army

Headquarters 2014: vii). Building on other relevant doctrines as well as the situation on the

ground in post-2003 Iraq, General David Petraeus and Marie Lt. General James N. Mattis,

along with a team at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center developed a new field manual on

counterinsurgency, published in 2006 under the markings FM 3-24/3-33.5. Application of the

principles presented in this manual by coalition forces in Iraq and later also (to a certain

extent) in Afghanistan meant a significant game-changer for the realities on the ground in

these two major areas of operation, as it provided the coalition forces in both theaters with

clear conceptual framework of their actions on the strategic and operational level

(complemented by numerous follow-up documents like the ISAF Commander’s

Counterinsurgency Guide; see below).

The 2014 version of the FM 3-24, renamed from being “Counterinsurgency” to the

new title “Insurgencies and Counter Insurgencies” marks an important evolution of the

conceptual understanding of counterinsurgency actions by the US. Compared to its 2006, the

2013 FM -24 provides more guidance for proper understanding of an adversary and a strategic

context, since the factor of thorough understanding and knowledge is the critically important

and should serve as a springboard for determining and defining effective efforts, or counter

measures, aimed at “defeating (or containing) an insurgency and addressing its root causes.”

Individual guidelines and provisions presented in this critical document are addressed,

introduced and discussed at the appropriate place in this thesis. At this point, it is important to

stress that the 2006 version of the FM 3-24 adopted and used the very same definition of

counterinsurgency as the 2010 version of the U.S. Department of Defense Dictionary of

Military and Associated Terms (see above), however, the 2014 version of the FM 3-24,

adequately reflecting the experience from two major counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and

in Afghanistan, adopted the definition presented in the latest version of the US Department of

Defense Dictionary (Ibid: 1-2).

The Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (*2011) as the highest conceptual

and strategic document regarding any multinational counterinsurgency operations, binding for

all NATO member states, including the Czech Republic,22 proposes a new definition of

counterinsurgency, as being understood and used in the document, i.e. counterinsurgency as

22 The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2611. STANAG is an abbreviated

form of a NATO standardization agreement, which is “a normative document, recording an agreement among

several or all NATO member nations, that has been ratified at the authorized national level, to implement a

standard, in whole or in part, with or without reservation” (NATO 2013: 2-N-2).

49

“the set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological

activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances” (NATO 2011a:

Lexicon-1). This definition is more specific than the one stated in the NATO Glossary, as it

lists a range of specific efforts required in conduct of a counterinsurgency campaign,

however, it still maintains the duality in terms of objectives of NATO counterinsurgency

efforts, i.e. not only elimination of an insurgency, but including also more proactive measures

to prevent its potential re-occurrence in the future.

All the strategic and conceptual documents at the NATO as well as national level

relevant for the research of the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency are introduced and

discussed in the empirical part of this thesis. At this stage of the thesis, it is sufficient to

present only the definition of counterinsurgency, draw up from the principles of the Czech

Armed Forces deployed to a counterinsurgency mission. The definition can be found in the

key doctrinal document of the Czech Armed Forces, i.e. the Doctrine of the Army of the

Czech Republic, released in 2010.23 The 2010 version of the document states that

counterinsurgency comprises of “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological

and civil actions executed with the aim of elimination of an insurgency.” (Ministerstvo obrany

České republiky 2010: 42 footnote 31; translated by IH). Clear inspiration by the U.S.

Army/Marine Corps FM 3-24 (version 2006) is more than obvious. Majority of the

respondents the author interviewed, let it be politicians, military or civilian practitioners,

confirmed the overt and direct efforts to copy the principles and imperatives presented in the

FM 3-24, given the lack of both potential and capacities of the Czech Republic as a sovereign

state to develop its own counterinsurgency strategy and the long-term absence of a

comprehensive conceptual framework of counterinsurgency operations on the NATO level as

well. Until the release of the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency in February 2011,

NATO mostly followed the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy during the course of its ISAF

mission as well as the NATO contributions in Iraq.24

Significantly, the 2014 version of the FM 3-24 frames counterinsurgency as a concept

subordinate to the broader and more widely used concept of irregular warfare (Department of

the Army Headquarters 2014: 1-1). The issue of counterinsurgency and its relationship (and

potential overlap) with other types of military operations is critically important to be

23 Previous version of the same doctrine neither focused on the possibility of the deployment of the Czech armed

forces into a counterinsurgency mission, nor they developed a conceptual framework of the understanding of the

counterinsurgent military activity, including the definition and key principles of it, from the Czech perspective. 24 The rationale behind is not only the extensive experience the U.S. has with counterinsurgency character of

operations, but also the presence and functions of the American military officers and officials in the commanding

structures of the NATO counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

50

addressed and understood predominantly for the research and analytical as well as planning

purposes. Failure to acknowledge existing relationships, overlaps and differences can cause

serious confusion, lack of clarity and flawed judgement with significant analytical, conceptual

as well as practical consequences.

First, conceptual clarity is required in the case of the relationship between the terms

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Particularly the missions in Iraq and in Afghanistan

were, often, mislabeled as “counterterrorism” operations, not mirroring the whole nature of

the two respective campaigns. Indeed, this relationship, and any identification of contact

points, contact mechanisms and overlaps, gravely depends on how the term terrorism and the

term insurgency are defined, since any strategies aimed at countering the two respective

security challenges must inherently reflect their nature. Even though it is possible to identify

certain aspects of counterterrorism activities during the course of the ISAF mission, especially

since it was led in parallel with the operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (OEF-A),

which was counterterrorism by its mandate (see below), characterization of the entire ISAF

mission as such is greatly misleading. Terrorism and insurgencies are two distinctively

different, but still closely connected phenomena. Terrorism is mostly a tactical method or

technique applied by various state as well as non-state actors, including insurgents, as one of

their preferred courses of action. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, counterterrorism

can be executed as part of a broader NATO counterinsurgency mission, focusing at

instruments and measures aimed at countering one of the frequently used tactical methods of

the insurgents.25 The character of contemporary insurgencies, that frequently use the terrorist

method, requires that any research efforts of measures intended to counter the insurgent

activities also need to contemplate counterterrorism policies and strategic documents of

relevant stakeholders.

The Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (see below) significantly contributes

to the efforts to clarify the conceptual distinction between insurgency and irregular warfare

(and, correspondingly, counterinsurgency measures and measures aimed at countering

irregular activities as such). The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine defines insurgency as “the

actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect

or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading

or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion” (NATO 2011a:

25 For other possible definitions and conceptualizations of counterterrorism see, for example, The Routledge

Handbook of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism (2016), or the publication The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A

Guide for Decision-Makers by Boaz Ganor (2011).

51

Lexicon-4), and irregular activity as “the use of threat of force by irregular forces, groups or

individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a

challenge to governance and authority” (Ibid). Nuanced, yet clear distinction between the

two concepts is achieved by the inclusion of the element of criminal motivation in the concept

of irregular activity, thus suggesting that irregular activity is a broader concept. In the same

document, NATO explicitly disclaims that counterinsurgents cannot ignore the destabilizing

effects of irregular activity associated with the respective insurgency (Ibid:1-3), therefore

highlighting a clear relationship existing between an insurgency and irregular activity.

Irregular activity is also mentioned as a primary stage of an alternative political

activity in the conditions of a fragile state, that can, “if successful, even on a small scale, (…)

garner increased popular support and develop into an insurgency” (Ibid: 2-4), thereby adding

an additional dimension to an insurgency/irregular activity inquiry. Insurgency is considered

an irregular activity, carried out by an organized group or movement, in the Allied

counterinsurgency doctrine. Other specific types of irregular activity are described in the

document: (1) terrorism, (2) criminality, (3) disorder, and (4) subversion (Ibid: 2-15 – 2-17).

This understanding is, however, challenged in the same document as it also states, contrary to

this position, that “insurgents might employ irregular activities (criminality, terrorism,

disorder and/or subversion) in order to obtain funds to inhibit the opposing population,

disseminating instability and insecurity over the country, so that the state’s government

cannot control it” (Ibid: 3-2), therefore effectively positioning the four mentioned irregular

activities as tools or instruments that insurgents (or potentially other actors) can use in order

to project their power, pursue their strategies and, ultimately, achieve their goals. A visual

figure of general interconnection between what is considered regular activities and irregular

activities and insurgency is provided in the document, as follows:

52

Figure 2: Relationship between insurgency and irregular activity. Source: NATO (2011a): Allied Joint

Doctrine for Counterinsurgency – AJP-3.4.4, p. 3-2.

This figure serves as a good instrument for explanation of what irregular activities in the

context of an insurgency are (i.e. an alternative to regular activities). Although it is obvious

from the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine that insurgencies tend to have significant

transnational/regional outreach (see below), this figure might be misinterpreted as it portrays

irregular activities carried out only at the national level. The purpose here probably is to

contain and highlight the national character of an insurgency NATO might happen to engage

with, however, even strongly nationalistic insurgencies may have significant

transnational/regional and sometimes even international outreach by the irregular activities

they use (esp. criminality).

As for counterinsurgency as such, significant changes of the post-cold war security

environment in terms of newly emerging challenges, threats, trends and tendencies (sharp

increase in asymmetrical conflicts was only one of them), have been captured and reflected in

the strategic and conceptual doctrinal documents of the Western countries, esp. the US, as

well as the major relevant literature since roughly the mid-1990s (cf. Galatík et al. 2008: 136).

53

The terrorist attacks from 9th September, 2001 and the developments in the international

community and global security environment that followed them, then, among other things,

served as a catalyst and accelerator for the increased military, political as well as academic

interest in irregular, low intensity warfare, including the problems of counterinsurgency. The

formulation of counterinsurgency doctrines has become a task of respective doctrine centers

of individual countries’ armed forces (like the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC) or the Czech Armed Forces’ Doctrine Department at the Training Command –

Military Academy. However, given the character of counterinsurgency operations, ministries

of foreign affairs of respective countries represent the leading elements in formation, planning

and execution phases of counterinsurgency efforts. Along with respective ministries of

foreign affairs and respective ministries of defense, other ministries and departments have

significant role in both planning and execution phases of counterinsurgency strategies, like

ministries of interior, homeland security, finance, actors relevant for foreign aid and

development aid provision, etc.). The level of cooperation and coordination of planning and

practical steps among the relevant stakeholders varies significantly on case by case basis.

Usually, the level of cooperation and coordination in this regards is directly

proportionate to the level of comprehensiveness and potential effectiveness of the overall

counterinsurgency strategy or counterinsurgency strategy approach. Uncoordinated actions

and efforts of major stakeholders in planning and execution of their respective strategies can

result in waste of resources caused by their abundance, in duplicity of efforts, in lack or

absence of essential resources and capabilities, in unclear definition of objectives, in

problematic relationship with partners and potentially damaged prestige, in lack of support,

flawed assessment, minimal commitment, etc.

Through the prisms of Yarger’s hierarchical structure and levels of strategy,

counterinsurgency strategy doctrine should be developed and understood as subordinate to the

National Security Strategy of a country, to its National Military Strategy and the Doctrine of

Armed Forces of the respective country. Counterinsurgency strategy doctrine is, by its nature,

a theater strategy that is formulated within the framework of the ends, ways and means

established in the strategies on superior levels. Theater strategies are then broken down into

strategies in the realm of operational art and further down in the tactical handbooks. The

hierarchical structure and relationship ensures that the subordinate levels of strategy comply

with and abide by the provisions of the higher level strategic documents. Superior level,

equally binding, is then represented by strategic doctrines and policies of international

organizations, and security alliances in particular.

54

Two basic approaches to counterinsurgency exist:

1. Enemy-centric approach, or “iron fist” approach (massive use of brutal force against the

insurgents as well as repressive against the segment of population that supports the

insurgents); or

2. Population-centric approach, or “hearts and minds” approach (ideological and emotional

appeal for the support of the populations, excluding the factors of repression and fear).

Table 8: Counterinsurgency approaches I. Source: IH; inspired by Collins, J. M. (2002): Military

strategy. Principles, Practices, ad Historical Perspectives.

Three categories of counterinsurgency activity:

1. “Search and destroy” – systematic pursuit and elimination of the insurgent forces;

2. “Clear and hold” – seizing key centers, winning the popular support, cutting the insurgent

supply lines and gradual expansion of the influence and control of the counterinsurgents; and

3. “Hold and harass” – combination of 1 and 2 – maintaining secure areas, while

simultaneously pursuing the enemy combat forces.

Table 9: Counterinsurgency approaches II. Source: IH; inspired by Ibid.

Gradually, building on the experience from Iraq and Afghanistan, a fourth category has been

developed and emphasized, i.e. so-called “Clear, hold, build” approach. This approach is

preferred by NATO and is introduced as a part of the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine. At

this point, the counterinsurgent side expand the second model to include military support for

reconstruction and development activities, beyond the framework full-spectrum of operations

(combining offensive, defensive and stabilization), as counterinsurgency campaigns are often

portrayed.

A number of distinguished scholars has attempted to develop an elaborated framework

of counterinsurgency, its fundamental pillars, principles and guidelines. Most of the theories

frame counterinsurgency as reactionary and multifaceted. It wasn’t until the post-9/11 Iraq

and even more Afghanistan experience when the preventive and proactive practices of

counterinsurgency efforts started to be incorporated into the broader counterinsurgency

framework.

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4.2.1. David Galula

David Galula is one of the most prominent counterinsurgency theorists, given his extensive

experience with insurgencies in various environments, like China, Greece, Indochina or

Algeria. Galula developed a comprehensive framework of the insurgency-counterinsurgency

nexus, reflecting the Cold War dynamics and trends regarding insurgencies and measures and

approaches aimed to counter and/or eliminate them. He focused on all the important attributes

of an insurgency, with a specific focus placed on the importance of the power of ideology,

propaganda and disinformation campaign. Galula frames his understanding of an insurgency

as a revolutionary war, reflecting the character of the Cold War insurgencies inspired by the

strategy of protracted popular war by Mao Zedong. Galula describes and analyzes the

fundamental principles of counterinsurgency through the prisms of all the significant

attributes of insurgency and in the format of close interdependence of one with the other one.

He distinguished 3 different categories of a revolutionary war, building on the presumption

established by Carl von Clausewitz that “Insurgency is the pursuit of policy of a party, inside

the country, by every means.” (Galula 2006: 1). These 3 types include (1) revolution, (2) plot,

and (3) insurgency. The main difference between insurgency and the other 2 categories is that

insurgency is “a protracted struggle, conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain

specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order”, and

even though he states that “insurgency is a civil war”, he also points out that “there is a

difference in the form the war takes in each case” (Ibid: 2), meaning civil wars usually

resemble conventional interstate war, whereas insurgency struggles are asymmetrical and

protracted.

The asymmetry between the insurgents and the counterinsurgents makes up the

essential referential line in Galula’s research. Importantly, Galula works with the presumption

of a government functioning as a counterinsurgent force against an insurgency being waged in

a territory of one state. This fact imposes certain limitations on modern day situations where

the counterinsurgency force is often transnational in nature. Some of his analytical

conclusions are, however, still valid and applicable. Galula highlights the high ratio between

counterinsurgents and insurgents, asserting that the ratio of counterinsurgent costs to the costs

of the insurgents may be ten or twenty to one, or higher, as the counterinsurgents are

responsible for maintaining order (Ibid: 7), whereas the insurgents can still inflict significant

damage to the order, even when operating at low cost. Galula further states that “the insurgent

is fluid because he has neither responsibility nor concrete assets; the counterinsurgent is

56

rigid because he has both.” (Ibid). Galula thus underscores high adaptability of the insurgents

that is rarely matched by the same level of adaptability and flexibility on the side of the

counterinsurgent. Interestingly, one of the aspects of the Galula’s text where significant

influence of the Mao’s theory can be identified is Galula’s claim that “the insurgent is obliged

to remain fluid at least until he has reached a balance of forces with the counterinsurgent.

However desirable for the insurgent to possess territory, large regular forces, and powerful

weapons, to possess them prematurely could spell him doom.” (Ibid). Here, Galula is talking

about the readiness of the broader environment for such an evolution of the insurgents in

terms of their capacities, which requires sustainably high level of popular support, strong

ideological cause and strong organizational structure.

In Galula’s opinion, from the counterinsurgents’ point of view, a revolutionary war (an

insurgency) can be divided into two periods: (1) the “cold revolutionary war” (the insurgent

activity remains legal and largely non-violent), and (2) the “hot revolutionary war” (the

insurgent activity openly illegal and violent) (Ibid: 43). In the cold phase of a revolutionary

war, Galula outlines four general courses of action open to the counterinsurgents, which are

not mutually exclusive.

Four counterinsurgent courses of action according to Galula:

1. Direct action against the insurgent leaders;

2. Indirect action against the conditions that are propitious to an insurgency;

3. Infiltration of the insurgent movement; and

4. Strengthening of the political machine.

Table 10: Four counterinsurgent courses of action. Source: IH; inspired by Galula, D. (2006):

Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, pp. 44-47.

In the phase of a “hot revolutionary war”, the range and scope of desirable counterinsurgent

actions change and widens, as it includes the efforts aimed at building support from the

population, which is not conditional, and is the main contested element of the insurgent-

counterinsurgent nexus. This support should be found through an active minority, supporting

the counterinsurgent cause (Ibid: 49-55). Any success of either side critically depends on the

so-called “neutral majority”, for which support the major battle is waged. Galula then derives

8 fundamental principles of a counterinsurgency strategy, which he lists as a step-by-step

process. These principles emphasized by Galula are solely of a political-military nature and

do not include the socioeconomic, developmental and reconstruction activities that form

57

significant part of contemporary counterinsurgency strategic thinking. Quite surprisingly, too,

Galula doesn’t emphasize the role of intelligence as much.

Eight fundamental principles of counterinsurgent strategy according to Galula:

1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents.

2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgents’ comeback in strength, install

these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives.

3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with

the guerillas.

4. Destroy the local insurgent political organization.

5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.

6. Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the soft and the

incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units.

7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement.

8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.

Table 11: Eight fundamental principles of counterinsurgent strategy. Source: IH; inspired by Ibid, pp.

55-56.

What is apparent here is the strong focus on the military and political dimension of the

counterinsurgency campaign. Galula doesn’t address the issue of economic development,

social cohesion, or reconstruction, in a direct opposition to today’s counterinsurgency

strategies, that accent the primacy of non-military activities. Although Galula discusses the

primacy of the political over the military power (cf. Ibid: 62-63), he doesn’t contemplate

reconstruction and development efforts. This fact may contribute to the broader debate over

the limits and boundaries of the modern counterinsurgency campaigns.

Interestingly, Galula dwells on the “experiment factor” of the counterinsurgency

campaign, as he works with the hypothesis that “the first area (is) as a test area” (Ibid: 73).

What he means is that in the initial phases of any counterinsurgency campaign, objective and

close observations have to be made on the counterinsurgent side to identify mistakes and

flaws, learn from them, being prompt and willing to alter what goes wrong.

4.2.2 David Kilcullen

The most prominent contemporary expert on modern warfare, who developed yet the most

comprehensive conceptual framework of what counterinsurgency means, as put into a broader

perspective of the contemporary security environment and contemporary warfare, is an

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Australian strategist, who also served as a senior counterinsurgency advisor to Gen. David

Petraeus, when he was the top commander of the operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as to the

then-US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and later to the Gen. Stanley McChrystal in

Afghanistan, David Kilcullen.

In his works, Kilcullen uses the concept of “conflict ecosystem”, which is

distinguishable by a high number of independent, but mutually interconnected actors, who try

to maximize their survival prospects and capabilities in the chaotic environment of a broader

conflict of insurgency (Kilcullen 2006: 2-3). In his most notorious publication

Counterinsurgency, Kilcullen introduces what he considers to be fundamental principles of

counterinsurgency on the company-level, alternative indicators for measuring progress (not

necessarily success) in counterinsurgency campaign, and use a case study of a rarely

discussed Indonesian insurgency and counterinsurgency. The findings he obtains from his

analysis Kilcullen further uses as lenses for a critical evaluation of the Taliban insurgency in

Afghanistan. His book then concludes with a conceptualization of what he calls global Islamic

insurgency. Elements of the phenomenon of global Islamic insurgency can be observed and

analyzed in close relevance to the NATO (and Czech) counterinsurgency efforts in both Iraq

and Afghanistan, and helped to shape the respective response and counter measures.

Kilcullen understands counterinsurgency as “a competition with the insurgent for the

right and the ability to win the hearts, minds, and acquiescence of the population.” (Kilcullen

2010: 29). Kilcullen sets up the framework of any counterinsurgency campaign by

establishing three fundamental pillars – security, political and economic.

Three counterinsurgency pillars according to Kicullen:

1. Security (military tasks, law enforcement tasks, public services, human security);

2. Political (legitimacy and efficiency of governance, institution building);

3. Economic (humanitarian and development assistance, resource management assistance, etc.).

Table 12: Counterinsurgency pillars. Source: IH; inspired by Kilcullen, D. (2006): Counterinsurgency

Redux, p. 5-6.

Presented as an important advice for military professionals of a presumed occupying (likely

NATO) troops, Kilcullen follows up with listing his 28 principles (or as he call them

“articles”) of counterinsurgency. Kilcullen is an advocate of the highest levels of discretion

and counterinsurgency mindset to the lowest levels of the echelon. He explicitly states that the

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list has been developed as a sum up of collective observations, lessons identified and lessons

learned from various counterinsurgency missions. Kilcullen also divides the principles into 4

categories, and he presents the last 28th principle after a systematic structure of the principles,

as they (should) follow in practice, during the course of counterinsurgency operation,

including a discussion of four key “what if” moments. The list of Kilcullen’s

counterinsurgency articles includes:

• Preparation phase (pre-deployment):

1. Know your turf (local knowledge of the environment – geography, demography;

understand the wider “area of influence”, develop a mental model of your area);

2. Diagnose the problem (who are the insurgents? Why and how are they getting

followers? Know your enemy);

3. Organize for intelligence (operations are driven by intelligence, but intelligence is

mostly gathered during operations, integrate intelligence analysts and linguists);

4. Organize for interagency operations (the State Department, aid agencies, local

police or fire departments; learn how not to scare the civilians; military operations

create temporary breathing space, it is, however, the civilians with their long-term

development projects and stabilization efforts what ultimately wins the war);

5. Travel light and harden your Combat Service Support (enable speed and mobility);

6. Find a political/cultural advisor (POLAD – a diplomat or military foreign area

officer, able to speak the language and navigate the intricacies of local politics,

who helps to shape one’s understanding of the environment);

7. Train the squat leaders – and trust them (train them to act intelligently and

independently without others; the training should focus on basic skills:

marksmanship, patrolling, security on the move and at the halt, basic drills);

8. Rank is nothing, talent is everything (mindset, flexibility);

9. Have a game plan (a mental picture of how you see the operation developing,

sometimes called “operational design”; this plan provides a robust idea what to

achieve, even if the means change; identify basic stages of the operation; simple

and known to everyone) (Kilcullen 2010: 30-35).

• The golden hour phase (entering your sector, initial phases of deployment):

10. Be there (establish presence; a residential approach in close proximity to the

population);

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11. Avoid knee-jerk responses to first impressions (don’t act rashly, get the facts first,

try to avoid a rush to judgement; different understanding of “normalcy” on the

local level, so you need to learn what the normality looks like);

12. Prepare for handover from day one (you will not resolve the insurgency under your

watch; prepare handover folders for your successors, including lessons learned,

details about the population, village and patrol reports, updated maps,

photographs; create a corporate memory);

13. Build trusted networks (the real meaning of the phrase “hearts and minds” –

“hearts means persuading people their best interests are served by your success,

“minds” means convincing them that you can protect them, and that resisting you

is pointless and counterproductive; calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what

counts; these networks include local allies, community leaders, local security

forces, NGOs and other friendly or neutral non-state actors in your area, and the

media; identify the needs of the community, follow through meet them, build

common interests and mobilize popular support; actions (even killing high-profile

targets) that undermine trust or disrupt your networks help the enemy);

14. Start easy (maneuver still matters; don’t go straight for the main insurgent

stronghold, try to provoke a decisive showdown, or focus efforts on villages that

support the insurgents; instead, start from secure areas and work gradually onward;

first win the trust of people in a few villages understand local power and business

relations and expand your influence through the trusted local networks, local

allies);

15. Seek early victories (stamp your dominance in your sector from the very

beginning; you might achieve victory by resolving long-standing issues, or

coopting a key local leader; a little goes a long way);

16. Practice deterrent patrolling (establish patrolling methods that deter the enemy

from attacking you, including multiple “satellite” patrolling, where you flood an

area with numerous small patrols working together; blue-green patrolling, where

you mount daylight overt humanitarian patrols which go covert at night and hunt

specific targets; constant and unpredictable activity required);

17. Be prepared for setbacks (recover your balance; give local commanders the

freedom to adjust their posture to local conditions, this creates elasticity that helps

you survive setbacks);

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18. Remember the global audience (the omnipresence of the media, the significance of

social media; the adversary seeks to defeat you in the court of global public

opinion; assume that everything they say or they do will be publicized; good

relationships with non-embedded media - especially indigenous media –

dramatically increase your situational awareness, and help your message across the

global and local audience);

19. Engage the women, beware the children (through targeted social and economic

programs; the role of female counterinsurgents; keep the children at arm’s length,

stop throwing candies or presents to children, as it attracts them to the

counterinsurgents, the insurgents seek to exploit the children);

20. Take stock regularly (develop metrics early in the tour and refine its indicators as

the operation progresses; they should cover range of social, informational,

military, and economic issues; typical effective metrics include: percentage of

engagements initiated by our forces versus those initiated by the insurgents;

longevity of friendly local leaders in positions of authority; number of tip-offs on

insurgent activity that originate spontaneously from the population; economic

activity at markets and shops, including the indicator of presence or price of exotic

vegetables and fruits in market stalls) (Ibid: 35-41).

• Groundhog day phase (the steady state, established in the sector, the most productive

phase):

21. Exploit the “single narrative” (know how people are mobilized; opinion-makers

are often local leaders, pillars of the community, religious figures, media

personalities, and others who set trends and influence public perceptions; a simple,

unifying, easily expressed story or explanation that organizes people’s experience

and provides a framework for understanding events; the importance of national

and ethnic historical myths, sectarian creeds provide such narrative; develop an

alternative narrative that excludes the insurgents; find a single mobilization

narrative that emphasized the inevitability and rightness of your ultimate success

after trusted local allies and thorough understanding of environment are

established);

22. Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves (go against the natural

tendency to build the local security forces in the counterinsurgents’ image; instead,

local indigenous forces need to mirror the enemy’s capabilities and seek to

supplant the insurgent’s role; they should move, equip and organize like

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insurgents, but have access to support; training, raising, and employing local

indigenous auxiliary forces (police and military); correlates with the expansion of

trusted networks and winning local allies – who want to take up arms in their own

defense)26;

23. Practice armed civil affairs (focus on meeting basic needs first, track the progress

in meeting them over time; intimate cooperation with interagency partners –

national, international, and local – don’t control them, but associate with them

loosely, as they need to preserve their perceived neutrality; a shared diagnosis of

the problem; the military role is to provide protection, identify, needs, facilitate

civil affairs, and use improvements in social conditions as leverage to build

networks and mobilize the population; there is no such thing as impartial

humanitarian assistance or civil affairs in counterinsurgency);

24. Small is beautiful (another natural tendency is to go for large-scale, mass

programs, but they take longer and don’t have to meet the specific local needs; test

them on a small scale and replicate them on a larger scale);

25. Fighting the enemy strategy, not his forces (if things go well for the

counterinsurgents, the insurgents go on an offensive, spikes of insurgent activity

late in the campaign is normal;27 the counterinsurgents shall still focus on the

countering the insurgent strategy (through cooptation of contested population, or

prevention of a sectarian conflict);

26. Build your own solution – only attack the enemy when he gets in the way (try not

to get distracted by the desire to capture of kill the insurgents; implement the game

plan you develop early in the campaign; environment-centric more than enemy-

centric approach; learn to negotiate with the enemy; exploit opportunities to coopt

segments of the enemy; at this stage, defection is better than a surrender, surrender

is better than a capture, and capture is better than a kill) (Ibid: 41-45).

• Getting short phase (maintain the previous activities and add):

27. Keep your extraction plan secret (the insurgents may exploit it to score a high-

profile hit, recapture the population’s allegiance by scare tactics that convince

them they will not be protected once you leave, or persuade them that your

successor unit will be oppressive or incompetent) (Ibid: 46).

26 Major problem in Afghanistan – local security architectures were poorly integrated into the broader ANSF

system. 27 This is, however, an ideal case scenario. In reality, spikes of offensive insurgent activity may also result from

them seizing the momentum and initiative, perceiving the counterinsurgent side as weak and losing.

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• Four “what ifs” to consider:

a) What if you get moved to a different area? Apply the understanding and

knowledge gained there. This time the process is easier and faster.

b) What if higher headquarters doesn’t “get” counterinsurgency? “First do no harm.”

Try not to create expectations that higher headquarters won’t let you meet.

c) What if you have no resources? Focus on self-reliance, keep it small and

sustainable, prioritize effort. Be honest with local leaders and discuss possible

projects with them. They will often find the translators, building supplies, or

expertise you need, and will only expect your support and protection in making

their projects work.

d) What if the theater shifts under your feet? Have a flexible, adaptive game plan.

Drop back a stage, consolidate, regain balance, and prepare to expand again when

the situation allows (Ibid: 46-48).

• Last but not least:

28. Whatever else you do, keep the initiative (if the enemy is reacting to you, you

control the environment; don’t be drawn into purely reactive operations: focus on

the population, build your own solution, further your game plan, and fight the

enemy only when he gets in the way) (Ibid: 48).

Majority of the Kilcullen’s fundamental counterinsurgency attributes has been adopted and

integrated in the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency. Nevertheless, their practical

execution proved to be more difficult and challenging by various factors like the reluctance to

adopt the counterinsurgency mindset by individual soldiers deployed in NATO

counterinsurgency missions. Furthermore, Kilcullen doesn’t address the issue of national

caveats and the limitation and restriction they entail and the negative impacts they can have,

which, in reality, again showed to be a significant, yet mostly underestimated28 factor.

Another particularly significant contribution to counterinsurgency research is Kilcullen’s

emphasis on the environment-centric, as opposed to the enemy-centric, approach in

counterinsurgency. Kilcullen expands the conventional understanding of the dichotomy

population-centric vs. enemy-centric counterinsurgency to include all the important factors

and vectors occurring and functioning in the environment of a mission. Importantly, when a

mission mandate changes from other type of operation to counterinsurgency, it requires

28 Two main reasons behind the lack of efforts to regulate or minimize the use of caveats by TCNs usually are

the efforts (and hopes) to maintain the cohesion and legitimacy of the mission on the strategic level.

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increasing the numbers of deployed troops to an appropriate level to meet the needs of the

theater.

5 Empirical part

5.1 Historical legacy?

As part of any efforts to study and analyze the contemporary Czech approach to

counterinsurgency thoroughly and in a comprehensive way, a researcher must focus of the

attribute of its potential continuity. In the case of the Czech Republic with such long historical

development, full of occupation and regime changes, it is obvious that the historical excurse

may prove very beneficial in the efforts to identify past experiences with activities we call

counterinsurgency today, as well as patterns, trends and tendencies. Although it is clearly

impossible to track or assume that any of the pre-1989 regimes could have any impact or

direct or indirect effect on the counterinsurgency strategy of NATO (given the NATO’s

history, structure, institutionalization and membership base, together with the fact that

honoring the commitments that the membership in the Alliance brings about means for the

Czech Republic (or other individual nation states) that it has to adopt and abide by the NATO

strategic documents and doctrines),29 such excurse can help identify certain unique features in

the mindset of the Czech political representatives or both civilian and military practitioners

who engage in counterinsurgency activities, or other factors that have helped shape the Czech

strategic culture of counterinsurgency conduct in direct or indirect way. Because of this

limited impact the historical excurse can have on the conclusions of this research, the

identification of the potential historical legacy is brief.

There were two periods in the modern history of the lands that now constitute the

sovereign state of the Czech Republic to which certain (but still very limited) data about the

counterinsurgency activities (labeled differently) are available for the research.30 A certain

29 Two members of the Czech armed forces were assigned to the task of aiding the development of the NATO

counterinsurgency strategy doctrine in 2011, however, their direct influence over the document, which is

essentially a consensus among 28 individual nation states, cannot be reliably traced or verified. 30 Although several other episodes in the Czech history bear a counterinsurgency mark, their deeper and more

thorough research is not included in this thesis. Such research would work predominantly with sources of data in

the Czech language and would be difficult to verify by sources of data written in English, and thus available to

all potential readers of this thesis. To name just the most significant or notorious historical examples, the

Czechoslovak government supported the fight against Russian Bolsheviks on the Russian front during the First

World War, where they, quite interestingly engaged in activities of a reconstruction character, next to direct and

supportive fighting roles. In the interwar period, the Czechoslovak authorities had to tackle the threat of the

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tradition of resistance (or insurgency, using the modern terminology) can be traced throughout

the Czech history. The activities of the Czechoslovak Legionaries during and after the First

World War on the territory of then-Czechoslovakia and Russia, with their roles, operational

capabilities, as well as with the presumed impacts of their actions can serve as a good

example supporting this claim.31 Also, the geostrategic location of the Czech

Republic/Czechoslovakia literally in the middle of the European continent attracted the

modern history world powers seeking to expand and project their power through the control

over the Czech lands. Certain grievances resulting from the attempted or successful power

seizures and occupations by some of the world power can still be sensed and felt among the

Czech population.

5.1.1 The World War II (1939-1945)

Historically, as probably the greatest impulse for any form of violent resistance can, quite

reasonably, be considered the 1938 Munich agreement. The Munich Agreement was a

settlement permitting Nazi Germany to annex portions of then-sovereign country of

Czechoslovakia, predominantly populated by ethnic Germans or German speakers, called

“Sudetenland”. This agreement signed Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy is

widely recognized and interpreted as a failed attempt to appease and satisfy the expansionist

ambitions of the Nazi Germany. The areas included in the concept of Sudetenland were,

however, of great strategic importance to Czechoslovakia, because most of its border defense

lines and systems as well as important industrial base were located there. Czechoslovak

political representatives were not invited to the Munich conference. What followed was a full

occupation of the territory of Czechoslovakia and declaration of the Protectorate Bohemia and

Moravia by the Nazi occupying power in March 1939 (cf. Wheeler-Bennett 1965; Fic 1990;

Bryant 2002; Crowhurst 2013).

In the aftermath, the Czech resistance started to form. It had two major dimensions –

external resistance (with the power centers in London and Moscow, where the Czech political

representatives exiled to) and internal/domestic resistance, and had various forms, mostly in

ethnic German Freikorps paramilitary group active in the Sudeten, emboldened by the successes and nationalistic

rhetoric that was gaining traction in Germany at that time after the German defeat in the First World War. (cf.

Jurado 2001). The Czechoslovak authorities also had to fight against Hungarian, Polish and Ukrainian separatists

that had escalated their armed campaign at the end of the 1930s. 31 More information about the Czechoslovak Legion and their operations inside and outside the country can be

found in the Richard C. Frucht’s publication Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Lands, and Culture

(Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO 2005), or a brochure The Czech Legion 1914-20 by David Bullock (Osprey

Publishing 2009).

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reaction to the activities of the Nazi occupying power. The insurgency, titled partisan

movement, was one of the forms of the Czech resistance in the domestic territory. The

apparatus of the occupying power tried to defeat and eliminate the centers of partisan

resistance from its early stages in 1942-1944. Nevertheless, the counteroffensive operation

Tetřev (operation Grouse) displayed the weaknesses, lack of flexibility and inefficiency of the

Nazi security apparatus in terms of counter-guerilla strategy. The Nazis tried to restructure the

security system in order to be more effective, and ultimately successful, in the elimination of

the centers of armed resistance, like the personal changes in the leading positions, deployment

of more elite SS paramilitary units (virtually counter-partisan special forces Einsatzkommand

and Jagdkommand) and an establishment of a special counter-resistance/counter-partisan

center in close proximity to the most active centers of armed resistance.

Important function during the Nazi counterinsurgency campaign, and later for the

Czechoslovak counterinsurgency efforts, had a grouping named Werwolf. This paramilitary

unit was established in 1944, originally as a SOF unit tasked with subversive actions behind

enemy lines (like cutting off lines of communication) of the Allied militaries fighting to

liberate the Czechoslovak territory. The character of Werwolf gradually changed with the

shifting context, security environment and conditions, and in the final stages of the WWII and

shortly after, Werwolf’s tasks focus on creating anti-Bolshevik resistance (Biddiscombe 1998;

Etscheit 1990; Pešl 2005). The actual operations, activities and achievements of Werwolf

remain veiled in uncertainty and confusion. Given their clandestine character, it is usually

difficult to determine that Werwolf was, indeed, perpetrator of a studied act, especially since

the portfolio of their tasks included false flag operations.

The approach the Nazi Gestapo pursued was generally strictly the iron fist one and the

population was mostly perceived through the lenses of the collective guilt and punishment.32

One special tactic the Nazi apparatus applied frequently was the method of infiltration of the

resistance movement, and placing individuals acting as provocateurs of Russian or Ukrainian

origins, seemingly in order to provoke and discredit the partisans, labeled as “bandits” for the

purpose of their de-legitimization in the eyes of the population. This fact shows a minimal

level of consideration of the factor of popular support by the Nazi occupying forces. The

Nazis didn’t underestimate the resistance and after the failed 1944 counteroffensive, they

deployment substantial forces and capabilities to the counter-resistance/counter-partisan

campaign. Evidence, however, indicates flawed intelligence-sharing activities among the

32 Including methods of targeted killings and assassinations of leaders of the resistance, public executions,

extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances.

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individual units deployed in a dense net of local special counter-resistance police stations and

centers. Although the number of the occupational security forces deployed to the counter-

partisan campaign, their efforts didn’t limit the activities of the armed resistance, which kept

increasing with higher intensity, forcing the occupying forces to escalate the conflict,

including the use of agents-provocateurs. That led to further escalation of the activities of the

partisans, that succeeded in expanding their territorial reach significantly. With the

intensification of the partisan activity across the territory of the then-Protectorate, the

partisans managed to hold key urban centers until the arrival of the Soviet Red Army troops,

correlating with the disintegration and demoralization of the Nazi counter-partisan forces

(Černý 2006; cf. Crowhurst 2013; Blood 2006; Macek-Uhlíř 2001).

5.1.2 The Communist regime era (1948-1990)33

Another significant historical period, from the perspective of the research subject in this

thesis, is the era of the Communist regime of Czechoslovakia. Soon after the seizure of power

by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, after their victory in post-WWII elections, in

February 1948, the resistance started to form. Likely building on the experience from the

WWII era, the anti-Communist resistance had two dimensions – external one (centers in

foreign countries, where many Czech and Slovak emigrated to after the WWII) and domestic

one. Even more significant growth and intensification of the resistance can be traced after the

occupation of the Czechoslovak territory by the Soviet troops in August 1968 and in the

following era of “normalization.” There wasn’t any more systematically organized resistance

or partisan movement operating in the territory of Czechoslovakia, due to the firm grip of the

regime and occupational forces. Majority of the responsibilities for eliminating any centers of

both armed and unarmed anti-communist resistance was assigned to the domestic intelligence

agency Státní bezpečnost (State Security; StB), from 1979 Státní národní bezpečnost (State

National Security; SNB). This domestic intelligence agency designated its 10th office as the

office responsible for the fight against an “internal enemy” (titled X. správa kontrarozvědky

33 In the 1945/46-1948 period, so-called Banderovci or Ukrajinská povstalecká armáda (the Banderists -

Ukrainian Insurgent Army in translation) engaged in irregular armed activities on the Czech/Czechoslovak

territory. The Czechoslovak authorities urged local population to provide them with critically important

intelligence on movements and possible whereabouts of the Banderists. It is important to mention, that the

Banderists didn’t enjoy large popular support in Czechoslovakia, given their criminal activities and foreign

origins. For a comprehensive study on activities of the Banderists is the post-WWII Czechoslovakia, see

Zemanová 2007, available at

https://is.muni.cz/auth/th/63654/ff_m/Pronikani_banderovcu_do_Ceskoslovenska_v_letech_1945_-_1948.pdf

(retrieved on February 10, 2017).

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pro boj proti vnitřnímu nepříteli), suggesting strongly militarized approach to any potential

resistance occurring in the Czechoslovak territory. It also implicates heavy ideological

influence over the activities and operations of this office. The category of “internal enemy”

was understood broadly and included any form of resistance and dissent, including priests, the

youth and signatories of the Charter 7734. In 1981, second office of the domestic intelligence

service StB was established, the 14th office (titled XIV. správa kontrarozvědky pro boj proti

mimořádným a zvláštním formám trestné činnosti), which was responsible for fighting

extraordinary and special forms of organized criminality. The X. správa was still active,

however, the scope of the counter-resistance/counter-partisan activities broadened, and the

language and narratives used softened. With the criminality label, the Communist regime

attempted to appeal to certain portions of the population by delegitimizing any potential

resistance (Archív bezpečnostních složek 2008-2013; cf. Mitáček-Vykoupil eds. 2008;

Macek-Uhlíř 2011). One of the most important tools of the Communist regime in their often

preemptive or preventive counterinsurgent efforts was a creation of paramilitary groupings

intended to function as an extended hand of the regime with the aim of eliminating any

pockets of potential resistance and providing valuable intelligence (cf. Mareš 2012).

American military researcher Lester W. Grau revealed to the author that as part of the

Cold War eastern communist bloc of countries, Czechoslovakia committed some armed

forces to the counterinsurgency operation after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979,

particularly in training and advising role (Grau 2015), distinguishable by heavy iron fist and

scorched earth approach. The author wasn’t. however, able to explore this area of the Czech

experience with counterinsurgency campaign more in depth, because she couldn’t find

credible sources addressing the roles, functions, tasks or accounts about the presence and

participation of the members of the Czechoslovak armed forces in the Soviet war in the

territory of Afghanistan from the period of 1979-1989. Available evidence shows that major

contribution to the counterinsurgency endeavor of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the

1980s was in the form of training and educational programs on the Czech territory,

specifically in a training facility codenamed “Přístav” (Harbour in translation) of the Ústav

zahraničních studií Vysoké školy SNB in Zastávka u Brna, established on 1st May 1982

(Foreign Studies Institute of the National Security Corps’ University in Zastávka u Brna,

34 An informal civic initiative in the Communist Czechoslovakia, established after the Communist regime signed

the 1975 Helsinki Pact on the universality of human rights. Its signatories called for the accountability of the

Communist regime and its proper compliance with the Helsinki Pact. The text of the Declaration of the Charter

77 can be accessed at https://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/archive/files/declaration-of-charter-77_4346bae392.pdf

(retrieved January 2, 2017).

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Czech Republic). This training facility run numerous training and educational programs,

focused primarily on support and logistical functions and activities, specializing in secretive

tradecraft of surveillance, training scouts, radio operators, cipher clerks, as well as guards,

commanders and planners of the members of respective national police corps with

paramilitary attributes. Such cooperation with countries like Afghanistan (more than 400

officers) and Nicaragua, but also Cambodia, Congo or Angola in training state forces facing

an insurgent or guerilla challenges in their own country was being conducted leveraging the

bilateral relations with other ideologically aligned regimes around the world on a commercial

basis. Communist Czechoslovakia also supplied numerous regimes (some of which were

engaged in counterinsurgency missions in the respective period of time) with high-quality

military material, weaponry and other equipment,35 again predominantly for commercial

purposes.

5.1.3 WWII or the Communist era legacy?

To identify the main features of the legacy of the pre-1989 historical period is difficult,

particularly because of the significant regime change and reformulation of the Czech national

interests and policies. Historically, counterinsurgency campaigns carried out on the Czech

territory is distinguishable by a vital role of paramilitary groupings, directed and supported by

the governing regimes. This feature can today be identified in the vital function of SOF in the

contemporary Czech approach to counterinsurgency. Drawing any direct links or even

correlations between the two attributes is, however, not possible, mainly because of the more

credible influence of other internal and external variables, like the general recent

developments across the NATO members’ armed forces.36 Virtually, due to the lack of any

larger or more significant direct experience on the side of the Czech political representatives

and military professionals in counterinsurgency (or similar operations), it can be assumed that

they started from a blank page with the increasing counterinsurgency efforts from the NATO

side. Tendency to avoid massive or larger use of force, largely present in the mindset of

interviewed military and civilian practitioners for the purposes of this thesis, and preference

of the political and civilian activities could potentially be the legacy features, to certain extent.

It can be, however, argued that the preference of non-military activities is more a result of the

resources the Czech Republic has at its disposal, and is willing to commit to a multinational

35 Notorious general-purpose plastic explosive Semtex or Scorpio submachine firearms. 36 Preferrence of small professional, expeditionary force.

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counterinsurgency operation, preferably under the NATO command. The absence of a united,

common document presenting the basic principles and features of the Czech approach toward

counterinsurgency can also be explain by the historical inexperience with counterinsurgency

operations, but more by the fact, as also revealed by some of the respondents, that the

likelihood of an insurgency occurring and waged in the territory of the Czech Republic is

close to zero (see below).

The major historical legacy thus can be identified as the so-called 1968 narrative,

frequently mentioned by Afghans, when asked about their perceptions and experience with

the Czech military and civilian actors deployed to the ISAF counterinsurgency operation.

Based on the testimonies and accounts of all three Afghans as well as majority of practitioners

interviewed by the author, some of the older Afghans with some knowledge of the history

perceive the Czechs as “brothers, very similar to us, who suffered under the Soviet

occupation the same way we did”. As shown below in the text, this perception contributed to

shaping the Czech approach to counterinsurgency, because the friendlier perception enabled

or facilitated the reconstruction efforts by the Czech PRT or the ANSF training efforts by the

Czech OMLT.

Perhaps even more important us legacy is then represented by the reputation the Czech

Republic has in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, gained through

commercial trade relations with them during the Cold War. Moreover, the Czech Republic

maintains its status as a global exporter of military material, including weaponry and other

military equipment. The Czech Republic also continues to provide numerous training and

educational programs for interested militaries on its territory, a clear Cold War legacy, but

with a changed focus – the Czech Republic mostly provides training in air force capabilities,

CNBR protection, EOD functions or dog handling skills nowadays. Such training and

education activities are usually conducted on bilateral basis and allow the Czech Republic to

further promote its brand in different regions.

5.2 Czech approach toward counterinsurgency – conceptual dimension

This part of the text addresses the conceptual level of the Czech counterinsurgency approach.

The main and most relevant official documents – policies, action plans, strategic documents,

conceptual doctrines, operational level doctrines, techniques, tactics and procedures, official

reports or statements linked to or with reference to the Czech approach toward

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counterinsurgency are introduced and analyzed. This chapter not only aids the political,

strategic and conceptual framework of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency, it also

generates data and findings critical for conducting the capability-expectations gap assessment

of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency, conducted in the analytical part of this thesis.

Another important added value of this detailed inquiry of the relevant conceptual documents

is the potential to broaden and deepen the overall scope of this research by allowing for a

comparison of the “ideal character” of the Czech counterinsurgency approach with its

practical executions, explaining what the identify differences mean in the broader context of

Czech security and military policies and the role of the Czech Republic in NATO to the

future. Importantly, this chapter doesn’t work with media reports or academic works

addressing the issue of the Czech counterinsurgency activities, the Czech activities in Kosovo,

in Iraq or in Afghanistan, unless it directly refers to some relevant primary source. Only

primary sources are presented and examined in order to establish the framework of the Czech

counterinsurgency framework that would be as clear and comprehensive as possible. Relevant

media reports or analyses, news or academic publications are used and analyzed as sources of

data in the chapter addressing the practical dimension of the Czech approach to

counterinsurgency.

The data in this chapter are systematically structured in a top-down format. First, all

relevant documents of NATO (published by NATO agencies or commanders of NATO

counterinsurgency missions), its Strategic Concept and Allied Joint Publications, as well as

less official publications like letters or reports are analyzed. Second, the official documents of

the Czech government and/or its individual ministries and agencies (policies, strategies,

visions, action plans, etc.) are subjected to a thorough scrutiny. Third, relevant public

documents (strategies, action plans) of the non-government actors, like the Czech NGOs are

presented with the purpose of building as comprehensive conceptual framework of the Czech

counterinsurgency approach as possible.

The highest official strategic document of the Czech government, Bezpečnostní

strategie České republiky (Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, *2015) states that “the

basic framework of the fundamental values and laws of the development and application of

the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic is represented by the constitutional order of the

Czech Republic, particularly the Constitution of the Czech Republic, the Charter of

Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, and the fundamental law no.110 (1998), on the security

of the Czech Republic, unabridged. Integral parts of the legal framework are the laws

connected to and following the constitutional order of the Czech Republic, and further allied

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and other international commitments resulting from the membership of the Czech Republic in

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the United

Nations (the UN), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).”

(Government of the Czech Republic 2015: 5; translated by IH). The official strategic and

conceptual documents of NATO are thus fundamentally important for the strategic and

conceptual framework of the Czech security policy, including its approach to

counterinsurgency.

The process of adoption and implementation of the standardized NATO doctrinal

documents (mainly Allied Joint Publications) by the Czech Ministry of Defense has certain

specifics and is directed by internal regulations of the Ministry. Until 2009, the adoption was

realized through integration of the Allied doctrines into the Czech national doctrines or into

military publications of doctrinal character, which allowed for the adoption and

implementation process to be conducted as quickly as possible (1-2 years), without long

legislative and approving procedures, in order to transfer the best practices and lessons

learned stated in NATO doctrines to the Czech armed forces units with the intention to

facilitate standardization and interoperability with other NATO partners. Nevertheless, in

2009, the Ministry of Defense issued an order no.29 (2009) aimed at modifying this adoption

and implementation process. A specific internal regulation is now required for the adoption of

NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs) on specific, individual basis. The proposed

internal regulation needs to go through specific comment procedure of several phases through

several working organs of the Ministry, before being approved for final adoption and

implementation. This modified process has, however, significantly prolonged the respective

process, and may also be one of the reasons of inadequate adoption of the Allied

counterinsurgency doctrine, for instance. Such a decision was reportedly made with the

intention of increasing the leverage of the Ministry in decision-making about any future

planning and management processes of the Czech armed forces. On the positive side though,

the new process may also provide a platform for the relevant Czech organs to incorporate

certain specifics or unique imperatives of a Czech approach towards some doctrine or

strategy, reflecting the resources and capabilities, importance, goals (limited?), strengths,

weaknesses, etc. of the Czech Republic with regards to the subject of reviewed NATO

STANAG. Significantly, the Czech Republic, as a NATO member, contributes to and is

deeply involved in the NATO Defense Planning Process as well as development of its

strategic and conceptual documents and doctrines, reflecting the internal regulations of

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decision-making in NATO, where all the member states are equal and have the veto or final

approval right at the national level.

5.2.1 Relevant NATO documents

The highest official strategic document of NATO is its Strategic Concept. The original

version of NATO Strategic Concept didn’t address the issue of counterinsurgency anymore

specifically or in detail. It wasn’t until November 2010 when the new Strategic Concept was

adopted at the NATO Lisbon summit. Only one reference to the practice of counterinsurgency

can be identified in the document. Counterinsurgency is framed as part of a broader category

of NATO non-Article 5 Crisis Management operations. The 2010 Strategic Concept

highlights the need to “further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary

operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations.”

(NATO 2010b: 21). It was until the new Strategic Concept was adopted, when the strategic,

conceptual and doctrinal basis of the NATO counterinsurgency operations started to be

developed, culminating in adoption of the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency

(AJP-3.4.4) in February 2011, which the basic guiding document for all the NATO forces

committed to NATO counterinsurgency operations. Quite interestingly, the 2010 Strategic

Concept puts counterinsurgency at the same level as stabilization and reconstruction efforts,

suggesting the tendency to NATO to underscore the higher importance of the stabilization

phases of counterinsurgency campaigns and long-term commitment to them. Other than this

reference, the document stresses the need of “a comprehensive political, civilian and military

approach for effective crisis management operations”, as the NATO operations in

Afghanistan and the Western Balkans proved (Ibid: 19).

The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine is addressed in more detail below. Other Allied

Joint Publications and other documents are important for the understanding of the NATO

counterinsurgency strategy. On the page xiii of the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine, 16

other counterinsurgency relevant documents are referred to, signaling their relevance, both

direct and indirect, to the subject of counterinsurgency. As they constitute the conceptual

basis of the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency, they are also highly relevant for the

Czech approach to counterinsurgency as such, since they played a major role in the NATO’s

counterinsurgency activities before the join counterinsurgency doctrine was adopted in

February 2011.

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The list of counterinsurgency-relevant NATO Allied Joint Publications includes:

• AAP-6 Glossary of Terms and Definitions

• AAP-15 Glossary of Abbreviations

• AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine

• AJP-2.5 Captured Persons, Materiel and Documents

• AJP-3 Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations

• AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations

• ATP-3.2.1 Allied Land Tactics

• ATP-3.2.1.1 Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks

• AJP-3.2.3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police

• AJP-3.4 Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations

• AJP-3.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations

• AJP-3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations

• AJP-3.10.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations

• AJP-3.15 Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering Improvised Explosive Device

(C-IED)

• AJP-9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)

doctrine

• C-M (2008)0029-COR1 Comprehensive Approach Action Plan (2 April 2008)

Table 13: Counterinsurgency-relevant Allied Joint Publications. Source: IH, inspired by NATO

(2011a): Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency – AJP 4.3.3, p. xiii.

The Glossary of Terms and Definitions (AAP-6) and the Glossary of Abbreviations used

in NATO Documents and Publications (AAP-15) establish the basic framework of the issue

by providing important definitions of the subject matter in order to clarify NATO’s

understanding of the concept (see above).

The Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP-01) doesn’t include any specific reference to

counterinsurgency, though its strong relevance to the topic is given by the guidelines and

principles introduced in the publication. The principal purpose of the document is to provide

Allied armed forces with a framework of guidance for the conduct of operations. It introduces

principles and guidelines on how the NATO operations should be directed, mounted,

commanded, conducted, sustained and recovered. It further underscores the importance of the

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joint doctrine, that is commonly accepted and applied by member states, by stressing its

importance for effective collation building, for enhancement of interoperability on the

intellectual and the procedural level. The intellectual interoperability is explained as that it is

“allowing commanders from different nations to have a common approach to operations”,

the procedural interoperability is explained in terms of the ability of “land forces from one

nation (to) request and direct air support from another” (NATO 2010c: 1-1).

The Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations (AJP-3.2) document provides the

doctrinal underpinning for the counterinsurgency campaign theme and its relationship to the

conduct of operations across the full range of military activities. It virtually develops the

provisions of the Allied Join Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations (AJP-3). Although

the publication makes a specific reference to the counterinsurgency campaign theme, it

doesn’t develop it further. The publication only directly refers to the Allied counterinsurgency

doctrine in a footnote to give readers an idea about what specifically NATO understands as

insurgency and counterinsurgency. Interestingly, even in this publication, insurgency is

framed in a context of wider irregular activity (NATO 2011b: 1-3 footnote 3).

The Allied Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO; AJP 3.4)

addresses all the important considerations relevant to the successful conduct of various types

of complex operations, including the specific designation of insurgency as being one of the

identified irregular threat that NATO has to counter. Counterinsurgency is also listed among

the basic forms of NATO non-article 5 crisis management operations, i.e. peace support

operations, counter irregular activities, support to civil authorities, search and rescue

operations, search and rescue mission, non-combatant evacuation, extraction, but also

sanctions and embargoes or freedom of navigation and over-flight.

Another potentially highly relevant publication may soon be added to the list of the

counterinsurgency-relevant NATO doctrines. The Allied Joint Doctrine for Military

Support to Stabilization and Reconstruction (AJP-3.4.5) have been undergoing drafting

process in the main relevant NATO agencies and departments. This publication would

complement the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine and would provide a broader framework

for the potential roles and functions of Allied armed forces deployed to a mission in support

of stabilization and reconstruction activities, slightly different from military stabilization

operations as such. Its draft version specifically refers to the counterinsurgency campaign

theme, asserting that stabilization and reconstruction activities will “overlap those activities

of other operations, such as peace support and counterinsurgency (COIN), especially when

they take place within a fragile environment.” (NATO STUDY DRAFT 4: 1-2), suggesting

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that NATO’s understanding of counterinsurgency (contrary to other forms of operations)

depends on the variable of fragility of a state. It follows with stating that “both include

strengthening the ability of the HN to provide the elements of a stable state while fostering

legitimacy.” (Ibid).

Importantly, Comprehensive Approach Action Plan (C-M (2008)0029-COR1) is

also listed one of the relevant referential sources of the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine.

The publication refers to its 2008 version, which was further updated in March 2011. What

the Action Plan stresses is the fact that different actors contribute to a comprehensive

approach, combining political, civilian and military instruments, based on a shared sense of

responsibility, openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths,

mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy (cf. NATO 2011c). In

practical terms, however, the implementation of the comprehensive approach as established in

the Action Plan was sometimes hindered by the lack of determination the same way by all of

the relevant actors, as well as flawed sense of responsibility. Not all of the relevant

stakeholders viewed the NATO counterinsurgency missions, especially ISAF, from the same

perspective as potentially important for pursing their national interests and the factors of their

sense of shared responsibility and determination were weakened. The factor of openness, too,

proved difficult to meet fully in practice, as demonstrating by the number of national caveats

imposed on deployed forces, and the character of those caveats. It further explicitly states that

the implementation of the comprehensive approach is “a permanent mindset of the Alliance’s

internal and external strands of work” (Ibid). The Alliance has increasingly adopted the

understanding of the importance of comprehensive approach, as the military means, although

essential, are not enough on their own to meet many complex challenges arising from the

contemporary security environment, as NATO acknowledges in the Action Plan. It

underscores the essential basis of any potential successful operations, stating that nation states

are required to contribute in a concerted effort and coordinate with international organizations

and non-governmental organizations, when responding to a crisis situation (Ibid).

Significantly, what all the efforts to update counterinsurgency-relevant doctrines or

create entirely new ones reflect is the Political Guidance on Ways to Improve NATO’s

Involvement in Stabilization and Reconstruction (2011). The essentiality of having such a

document available at the political level, potentially guiding other efforts, was stressed at the

NATO summit in Lisbon in 2010 (which all the updates or new NATO publications with the

high non-article 5 crisis management operations response to) and further at 2010 meetings of

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Defense Ministers of the NATO countries. This political guidance helps to clarify and explain

NATO’s role and ambitions in stabilization and reconstruction efforts. General principles of

this guidance are introduced in the document as following, divided accordingly to a cycle of

operation’s phases:

1. preparation for operation involving stabilization and reconstruction: (a) early

analysis and assessment of the situation in the conflict area, combining both

civilian and military expertise to account for all contributing factors and

implications of the conflict, and taking into account local political, social and

economic circumstances and sensitivities, incl. assessing the impact of military

operations; (b) early consultations with other international actors present, or who

may be present, in theater as well as if possible with relevant national authorities,

in accordance with the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan; (c) benchmarks

developed in close coordination with others involved; (d) facilitate pre-deployment

training for Allied and non-NATO contributors’ personnel in terms of responding

to stabilization and reconstruction requirements in line with established NATO

standards and provide assistance when appropriate and within available resources;

(e) development of appropriate standards and methodologies for providing

training and advice to indigenous security forces; and (f) coordination of strategic

communication on NATO’s role and activities (NATO 2011d: 6).

2. Execution of an operation involving stabilization and reconstruction: (a)

establishing secure and stable environment and freedom of movement; (b)

restoring public security (incl. law and order, the rule of law, the basic legal

infrastructure, like an elementary justice system); (c) help restore basic services,

ensure their provision by the local government, and restore basic infrastructure; (d)

facilitate support to humanitarian aid; (e) help lay down the ground for meeting

longer term governance and development needs; (f) support political institutions

and civil and economic infrastructure (incl. assistance with the elections); and (g)

establishment of coordination arrangements involving relevant actors in the field

(Ibid: 7).

3. Transition of stabilization and reconstruction activities: (a) close cooperation

with other actors; (b) progressively draw down capabilities, as appropriate to the

situation; and (d) continue to participate in coordination arrangements at

headquarters and field level units the exit (Ibid: 7-8).

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As it is obvious from the general principles listen in the political guidance to activities,

stabilization and reconstruction efforts in NATO’s understanding very closely resemble its

understanding of counterinsurgency, including its individual phases and most important

courses of action. Confusion may thus arise over the mandate of a mission. Generally

speaking, any application of the NATO counterinsurgency strategy is generally assumed in a

fragile or failed state environment, whereas no explicit mention about the character of the

environment can be identified with regards to the stabilization and reconstruction-relevant

publications in general.

On the operational level, one specific document, outlining or addressing the

comprehension of counterinsurgency by NATO in practice, stands out, i.e. the ISAF

Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance. There were two forms, issued by the then-

ISAF Commanders, one by Gen. Stanley McChrystal in August 2009, and the other one was a

letter issued by Gen. David Petraeus a year later, in August 2010, after Petraeus replaced

McChrystal. The installation of Gen. Petraeus was made in the high hopes of replication of

what was widely considered a counterinsurgency success under Gen. Petraeus from Iraq to the

situation in Afghanistan.

Gen. McChrystal’s guidance, titled “ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency

Guidance: Protecting the People is the Mission” (2009) is more of an introductory direction

to ISAF conducting counterinsurgency and stability operations in Afghanistan,37 building up

on the U.S Army/Marine Corps FM 3-24 in conjunction with the specifics of the situation in

Afghanistan. The guidance starts with a comprehensive and concise explanation of why

counterinsurgency practice is important, focusing on the factor of popular support. First, it

explains how insurgents operate and what is their center of gravity (i.e. the population) and

why, and follows with a depiction of a counterinsurgent behavior that plays “into their

hands”. Then, McChrystal stresses the critical importance of “changing our mindset” that

functions on the presumption that “the will of the people is the Objective”, explaining the

importance of such a mindset from the perspective of how it works with regards to the efforts

of defeating and/or ultimately eliminating an insurgency. A list of the key principles and their

concise explanations of the preferred courses of actions in compliance with the changed

mindset is then presented, and include:

37 This is an important and very interesting distinction, indicating the mood and discourse in the period of the

issuance of the McChrystal’s guidance. Counterinsurgency just started to be adopted as the appropriate label for

the ISAF mission, before that considered a stabilization mission. No clear distinction between what constitutes a

stabilization mission in NATO’s view, and how it differs from a counterinsurgency mission is explicitly

mentioned in any official NATO document. However, the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine defines and frames

stabilization efforts as one part (final phase) of counterinsurgency efforts.

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1. Embrace the people – think before you act. Understand the consequences of your

actions through the eyes of the Afghans; be an expert on the local situation, build

connections and hold routine meetings with tribal elders (jirgas); listen to the

population and adjust accordingly; earn their trust; develop their ownership; be a

positive force in the community, shield the people from harm and foster stability;

use local economic initiatives to increase employment (McChrystal 2009: 5);

2. Partner with ANSF38 - live, eat, and train together, plan and operate together,

depend on one another, and hold each other accountable; their success is our goal;

you are equal partners, respect them and coach them (Ibid);

3. Build governance capacity and accountability – facilitate and enable transparent

and accountable governance from national to community level; confront corrupt

officials and demand the Afghan higher leadership take appropriate action (Ibid:6);

and

4. Get better every day – learn and adapt (more quickly than the insurgents); improve

daily; learn how to shape the environment, and how to achieve greater effects;

listen to and learn from the Afghans; communicate and share ideas; this is a battle

of wills (Ibid).

After Gen. McChrystal’s replacement on the position of the commander of ISAF by Gen.

Petraeus, a letter signed by the ISAF Commander himself was sent out to the ISAF troops, the

COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance (2010), inspired by a Counterinsurgency Guide

he published while serving as the commander of the coalition forces in Iraq. Gen. Petraeus,

considered to be one of the biggest counterinsurgency experts, elaborates on the key

imperatives stated in the McChrystal’s guidance, in more detail and, as he acknowledges, with

the feedback from the Afghan partners, special forces and some local elders, as following:

1. Secure and serve the population;

2. Live among the people;

3. Help confront the culture of impunity (insurgency as well as inadequate governance,

corruption, and abuse of power);

38 Afghan National and Security Forces. Increasingly, a Pashto phrase “shona ba shona” (shoulder by shoulder)

became integrated as referring to one of the perceived fundamental imperatives of the NATO’s training and

advising actions in Afghanistan. Notably, this aspect of counterinsurgency is not elaborated on in more details

yet in the document.

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4. Help Afghans build accountable governance (help them develop checks and balances

to prevent abuses);

5. Pursue the enemy relentlessly (special focus put on the efforts to seek out and

eliminate those who threaten the population, and to target the whole network, not just

individuals);

6. Fight hard and fight with the discipline (aim to reduce civilian casualties to an

absolute minimum);

7. Identify corrupt officials;

8. Hold what we secure (incl. the prioritization of population security over short-

duration disruption operations and the beginning of transition to Afghan lead);

9. Foster lasting solutions (create good governance and enduring security, meet the

needs of locals, incl. small projects are often beautiful);

10. Money is ammunition; don’t put it in the wrong hands (institute “COIN

contracting”, how we spend is often more important than how much we spend);

11. Be a good guest (treat Afghans and their property with respect);

12. Consult and build relationships, but not just with those who seek us out (spend time,

listen and consult);

13. Walk (gain situational awareness through face-to-face interactions);

14. Act as one team (unity of effort and cooperation with the international and Afghan

partners);

15. Partner with the ANSF (be a good role model);

16. Promote local reintegration (help to address the grievances);

17. Be first with the truth (avoid spinning, acknowledge setbacks and failure, get accurate

information to the press);

18. Fight the information war aggressively (challenge disinformation);

19. Manage expectations (strive to under-promise and over-deliver, not the other way

around);

20. Live our value;

21. Maintain continuity through the transitions (maintain operational tempo and local

relationships throughout transitions);

22. Empower subordinates (flatten reporting chains; enable decentralized action);

23. Win the battle of wills (learn and adapt more quickly than the enemy; outsmart the

insurgents); and

24. Exercise initiative (Petraeus 2010).

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Both documents in their capacity of the ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency guidance also

were binding for the Czech military forces and civilian actor deployed in ISAF, assigned

various tasks. Moreover, majority of the Czech respondents, especially the military

professionals, interviewed for the purposes of this thesis, stated that it was the exactly these

two documents, and more the Gen. Petraeus’ letter what introduced them to the concept of

counterinsurgency, which was gradually being applied to the ISAF mission and which they

didn’t have any close prior experience with. Therefore, both represent important primary

sources of data in this research, functioning as helping shape the practical even more than

conceptual dimension of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency, due to their semi-official

character and specific focus.

5.2.2.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (AJP-3.4.4)

In February 2011, the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency was officially adopted. It

came in 8 years after NATO officially assumed the leadership and command of the most

notorious counterinsurgency campaign in the post-Cold War era – the ISAF mission in

Afghanistan. The Alliance itself, not just most of its members, had lacked any direct and/or

extensive experience in counterinsurgency efforts before the gradual transformation of the

ISAF mission (see below). The joint counterinsurgency strategy doctrine at the NATO level

represents an attempt by the Alliance to unite efforts of its members in counterinsurgency

campaigns led under the NATO command. Importantly, the Allied Joint Doctrine for

Counterinsurgency was drawn from the Afghan experience in particular, combined with

principles of the 2006 US counterinsurgency doctrine, long employed on the ground in

Afghanistan before that as the main guiding counterinsurgency framework for the NATO

ISAF mission, and the best practices of other member states, like the Great Britain. The long-

time gap that existed between the inception of the NATO’s takeover of the ISAF

responsibilities in 2003 and the final approval of the united NATO counterinsurgency

doctrine in 2011 mirrored the evolution of the Afghan insurgency as well as growing criticism

over the lack of clear counterinsurgency guiding framework at the NATO level with the

increasing involvement of the coalition forces, along with the increasing number of resources

deployed to the ISAF mission. In 2009, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, then Commander of the

ISAF mission in Afghanistan issues the ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance

intended as a predecessor to the then planned and being decided upon Allied Joint Doctrine

for Counterinsurgency. Considering the institutional structure of NATO and its planning and

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decision-making procedures, the idea of adopting a united document on the NATO level

serving as a join doctrine for counterinsurgency efforts of the Allies had been approved as

soon as the unsustainability of the ISAF mission efforts had been revealed on the ground,

after a thorough process of observing and identifying possible lessons from the progress, or

lack of it, in the mission. Possible existence of any classified comprehensive NATO draft

document, or at least a sufficient level of agreement among relevant parties, on

counterinsurgency efforts of all the coalition forces, used solely for the purposes of the ISAF

mission on the ground, before adoption of AJP-3.4.4 cannot be excluded, especially since

highly over a dozen of non-NATO partner countries contributed to the ISAF mission in

various, direct and indirect ways (see below).

By its character, as a unifying allied doctrine, the individual NATO member states

allowed for reservations being raised and recorded in the document itself (NATO 2011a: ix,

xi). In the end, the United Kingdom and the United States were the only NATO member state

openly expressing their reservations that mostly concern conceptual framing of the contents in

the document. The author of this thesis assumes that the reasons behind the reservations

expressed by the two countries could have been driven by the vast past experience these two

NATO members had had with counterinsurgency and to a certain extent differing approaches

of the two respective countries toward the art of counterinsurgency efforts in general, even

though the United States explains their rationale behind their reservations as generally not

being consistent with binding terminology documents and glossaries of NATO (Ibid: xi).

The Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency provides a comprehensive

framework of NATO counterinsurgency missions. Nevertheless, in order to gain, ensure and

maintain agreement among all of the NATO countries, the Allied Joint Doctrine for

Counterinsurgency seems to be more general the counterinsurgency doctrines of individual

states, like the United Kingdom, the United States or France. Moreover, originally intended

not only as a guiding doctrine for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, but potentially for any

future NATO counterinsurgency endeavors as well, this joint doctrine is still too

“Afghanistan-heavy” or “Afghanistan-centric”. The author of this thesis acknowledges the

critical importance of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan for both the NATO Alliance,

including in the sphere of identifying the lessons and best practices, adopting them and

learning them. However, the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency provides room for

adaptability only in certain passages and aspects, whereas in others, the complex Afghan

context clearly determines the wording of the principles presented in the joint doctrine. To

give NATO strategy planners and developers some credit though, the self-evident focus on

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Afghanistan could be a result of NATO’s considerations about its possible future involvement

in Afghanistan (like the current Operation Resolute Support and beyond), and is also

understandable when put into a broader perspective of the vast amounts of high quality

resources and capabilities of NATO member states and their partner countries, hence

considering the utmost importance the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan had for the

Alliance. What is also noteworthy is the lack of conceptualization of counter-narcotics

operations or the measures aimed at countering organized crime activities which often make

up for a generous source of revenue of the insurgents.

The Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency AJP – 3.4.4 also represents the

highest strategic guidance for any Czech counterinsurgency efforts. The NATO document

also serves as the fundamental cornerstone of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency, as the

broader and more general character of the Allied doctrine creates room for modifications and

adjustments according to the country’s specifics. Furthermore, most of the NATO member

states don’t have sufficient level and scope of resources and capabilities, as required for a

complex execution of the principles stated in the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine, available.

This significant fact further underlines the reasons behind the more generic than detailed

character of the counterinsurgency principles introduced in the respective Allied doctrine.

Importantly, each NATO member state had equal opportunities to express their reservations

or opinions on the wording, structure or overall text of the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine

both during the process of the document development as well as in the final approval stage, as

complying with the regular NATO practice of strategy development and adoption. The Allied

doctrine itself doesn’t, however, specify if a consent of a presumed host nation is required

prior the operation, or any specific essential legal provisions underpinning the legal

framework of a NATO counterinsurgency operation at the stage of its launch, apart from

general statements like any such operation “will be launched and executed in accordance with

the relevant provisions of international law and will abide by the relevant international law.”

(Ibid: 1-1).

As specified in the preface of the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN),

the document “provides a common NATO doctrine to guide commanders and staffs of

operational formations and units engaged in the conduct of COIN. The publication also

informs a wide range of civil actors and organizations, involved in security and stabilization

of the full range of capabilities that the military may contribute to a joint, interagency and

multinational response to the resolution of complex challenges, such as caused by

insurgency.” (Ibid: xiii) The publication of the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency

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also provided researchers interested in the topic of planning and execution NATO

counterinsurgency efforts, approaches or perspectives with a great tool for analysis and more

thorough understanding of the Allied counterinsurgency missions, both prior to February

2011 and after the doctrine’s release date. Even though the document itself has been

developed primarily for use at the operational and tactical levels, it gives the so far most

comprehensive insight into the NATO’s counterinsurgency strategy. Interestingly, NATO

agencies and representatives specifically refrain from labeling the document as strategy.

Indeed, certain differences exist between strategy and doctrine. NATO, reflective of its

nature, defines what a military strategy is in its Glossary of Terms, i.e. “that component of

national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be

developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations.” (NATO

2013: 2-M-6). The same document then differentiates doctrine as being “fundamental

principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is

authoritative but requires judgement in application.” (Ibid: 2-D-9).

The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine describes counterinsurgency as one of the main

campaign themes. As such, the description of counterinsurgency as a separate campaign

theme has been evolving since its recognition as a separate campaign theme in connection

with the operation in Iraq around the years 2005 and 2006 from the US side, and, for the

NATO part, with the evolution of the security situation and dynamics in the security

environment in Afghanistan around 2008/2009. NATO also considers counterinsurgency as

probably the most demanding variant of the several possible types of countering irregular-

activity campaigns (Ibid), which leads to the argument about the forms of potential

relationship and interactions between the concepts of (counter) insurgency and (counter)

irregular warfare in practical terms. The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine provides a

description of the complex operational environment with its key elements, trends and

characteristics, its actors and all important influencing factors, serving as potential

independent variables for the purposes of this research (cf. Ibid). The document also

characterizes insurgency as “the most dangerous and challenging irregular activity that can

occur in a failed or fragile state” (Ibid). Even though the document describes the major

characteristics of an insurgency, its motivations, objectives, preferred courses of action,

resources and other factors potentially functioning as influencers, like key conditions,

vulnerabilities or overall dynamics of an insurgency, the conditioning of the failed or fragile

nature of a state is not accurate and can be potentially misleading, since the document doesn’t

define any indicators or attributes of such failed or fragile state, except for a brief notion that

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“a characteristic of fragile states is the inability of their governments to discharge their

responsibilities effectively.” (Ibid: 1-1). This definition is, however, too narrow and general.39

Even though a more complex conceptualization of the fragile/failed state concept is

introduced in the second chapter of the document, where operational environment of potential

NATO counterinsurgency campaigns is described in general terms, elements of a stable state

are addressed and the downward spiral of state instability is charted, the state fragility (or

failure) is still viewed to narrowly as regarding the government dysfunction, loss of its

legitimacy and loss of its monopole over legitimate use of force (Ibid: 2-3). Basically, state

fragility is presented as regime fragility and as a separate factor complementing other aspects,

like societal disintegration, national fragmentation and economic collapse. Such a

comprehension of state fragility may, hypothetically speaking, derail an analysis by

potentially misidentifying causes and consequences, their mutual relationship and patterns of

interdependencies existing in the respective operational environment. Nevertheless,

importantly, the documents states that the sense of collective will of the insurgents is usually

relatively much greater than the governments of fragile states have (Ibid: 3-3).

Description of the insurgency phenomenon then establishes a solid framework for

(what itself calls as) “a comprehensive description of the attributes of counterinsurgency, the

planning and the military contribution” (Ibid), and highlights the areas and what can be

understood as a minimal level of potential of involvement of non-military/civilian actors and

coordination and cooperation with them. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents “employ

varied tactics and methods. These include political, military, economic, social, information

and infrastructure activities (ways), in an attempt to reach a favorable outcome (ends) and

within the resources available, including time (means).” (Ibid: 1-3). This assertion is clearly

formulated on basis of the perceived advantages of the Lykke’s theoretical model of strategy

and its general applicability, thereby providing another layer of justification for its use in this

thesis, in terms of both critical examination of the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine and

descriptive analysis of the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency.

Since insurgency is generally understood to represent politically motivated violence,

its political dimension is far more important and potent than any military considerations, as

the main struggle is for the population, its support and consent. Any measures designed and

intended to counter such a phenomenon effectively have to reflect this critical aspect of any

39 For more information on the concept of failed/fragile states, see, for example, publication When States Fail:

Causes and Consequences written by Robert I. Rotberg in 2010 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), or the well-known Failed (now Fragile) State Index published annually by the Fund for Peace, available at

http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/ (retrieved on February 9, 2017).

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insurgent struggle. Hence any counterinsurgency measures should not only “support a

political resolution to the problem” (Ibid), but also recognize the supreme importance of

political activities. This fundamental principle is significant when considering those

“organisations that contribute to humanitarian assistance and economic development efforts,

some of whom operate in an impartial and neutral manner” (Ibid).

From the insurgents’ perspective, such organizations cannot be perceived as neutral,

but rather as promoting the legitimacy of the government they seek to overthrow. This issue

was particularly acute and relevant during operations executed by civilian parts of PRTs in

Afghanistan. Association with a coalition military force in the eyes of both the population and

the insurgents stripped them of their intended status of neutrality and effectively made them a

legitimate target of the insurgent activity. Perceptions of civilian elements of PRTs by the

local Afghan population were more complex and had several dimensions. Not only the locals

associated them with the foreign/occupying military force, traditions and customs played a

significant role as well (the best example of related friction was frequent reluctance of the

decision-making authorities on the local level, the elderly jirgas, to negotiate with young

civilian experts, even more so in situations where the respective civilian expert was a woman,

with its potentially far-reaching consequences for coalition counterinsurgency efforts;

rotations of civilian expert teams and contingents of PRTs complicated the efforts further; see

below). This fact represents one of the most complex issues and dilemmas of NATO

counterinsurgency campaigns, as it affects overall effectiveness and efficiency of the entire

mission, because it gives the insurgents vulnerabilities to exploit (and NATO is well aware of

this problem; Ibid).

Moreover, the doctrine states that “civil authorities should normally have the lead for

delivering internal security and stabilisation. However, the lack of a permissive environment

may require military forces to contribute more widely to security and capacity-building tasks.

As a result the military contribution may dominate the early phases of a campaign during the

contest to deliver a favourable security environment that protects the population.” (Ibid).

Military element of a counterinsurgent force thus can act as the entity critical for laying the

foundation of the legitimacy and capacity of the government, providing state security and

building human security and stimulating economic activity and growth, as it not only executes

the task of providing security to the local population and ensuring stability of the security

environment for further actions, like humanitarian or development efforts, but may perform a

plethora of other, essentially non-military tasks, like “restoration of essential services,

support to economic and infrastructure development, establishment of interim governance

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and security of communication” (Ibid). The doctrine also advocates the fundamental need of

providing “the military contribution within a unified and comprehensive approach (…).

Civilian and military actors must work together in a coordinated and integrated manner.”

(Ibid). This ideal case scenario suffers from several fault lines, stemming from different

mentalities of the military vs. non-military actors, differing jargon used, personal sympathies

and relationships, differing priorities, competition and rivalry over the leading position,

different understanding of the mission and assigned tasks, differing opinions over

prioritization and preferences on activities and partners, autonomous planning, problematic

information sharing, differing impacts of political decisions, or differing patterns of

obedience, transparency and accountability.

The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine stresses the essential importance of the

existence of unity of purpose and unity of effort (cf. Ibid). That being said, maximum level of

cooperation and coordination of not only activities, but also consistent public pronouncements

and coherent behavior when dealing with partners or adversaries is required40 in multinational

counterinsurgency operations. As discussed more in detail below in the text, overall, the ISAF

mission suffered from critical flaws in unity, be it unity of purpose, unity of effort or unity of

command, affecting the progress and potential ultimate success of the mission as well as

performance of its individual TCNs, like the Czech Republic. Lack of unity also contributes

to the factors shaping the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency overtime.

The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine also devotes significant space for the

discussion over the fundamental principle of any counterinsurgency operation, i.e. the factor

of popular support. It states that “the support of the population must therefore be a key factor

throughout the planning and execution of COIN campaigns. (…) it is essential that both the

political and military apparatus address the strategic context of the operational environment

to ensure that any political settlement is both enduring and self-sustaining.” (Ibid: 1-4). In the

other words, addressing root causes of insurgency should be the primary focus of both

military and civilian actors deployed in a counterinsurgency operation, as it helps win the

popular support more significantly than a pure military defeat. Knowing what to focus on and

where the root causes are is vital for any efforts to bring an end to the insurgency. This

assertion is also phrased based on an assumption of political reform(s) as a way leading to

solving the root causes.

40 “The synchronization and coordination of information activities and public diplomacy are critical to the

success of a COIN campaign.” (NATO 2011a: 1-4).

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One of the significant advantages of the 2011 Allied counterinsurgency doctrine, in

both practical and comparative terms, is the inclusion of private security companies and their

contact points and contact mechanisms in terms of interaction in the NATO

counterinsurgency campaign framework (see Ibid: 2-15).41 More clarity and a comprehensive

analysis of what potential private military and security companies have in NATO

counterinsurgency operations.42 This thesis aims to partially fill this gap by drafting a SWOT

analysis matrix in its concluding chapter as part of recommendations to the Czech

counterinsurgency approach, generated from the findings described and analyzed in the main

body of the text.

What the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine doesn’t address though is the issue of

radicalization and potential counter-radicalization measures executed as part of

counterinsurgency activities, possibly because such actions are generally carried out by

civilian actors. In the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) settings, however, counter-

radicalization/counter-messaging measures were executed by the Czech civilians in close

coordination with CIMIC/military information and psychological operations. Hence, certain

reference to counter-radicalization efforts as part of a broader counterinsurgency campaign

could increase the inclusiveness of the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine, which address only

the issue of the use of information (in conjunction with legitimate use of force) to defeat

insurgents’ ideology (Ibid: 5-5; see below), and touches upon the counter-messaging issue just

very briefly (Ibid: 3-21; see below) Nevertheless, as the any effective counterinsurgency

efforts require use of a whole-of-society approach in the affected country, any counter-

radicalization efforts must go beyond the limited scope introduced in the Allied

counterinsurgency doctrine.

The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine also introduces the concept of PRTs. As a tool,

PRTs are decreed as an innovative instrument of reconstruction and development efforts as

part of broader category of stabilization activities tasked with provision of support in initial

phases of restoration of governance and services to population in the doctrine. PRTs are

defined as “small units that are responsible for coordinating, and in some cases, enabling, a

plethora of reconstruction tasks. Each of these is dependent on context but may include such

41 Contrary to, for instance, the U.S. equivalent doctrine FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Counter Insurgencies, which

includes just one single reference to “private security agents” in a context of different types of informal grouping

of military power and paramilitary character (U.S. Department of the Army 2014: 2-6). 42 Several academic studies have been published, focusing more on the challenges and negative impacts the use

of private security companies had in Iraq and Afghanistan, like Peter W. Singer’s study Can’t Win With ‘Em,

Can’t Go to War Without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency, available at

http://iraqslogger.powweb.com/downloads/singer200709.pdf (retrieved on February 9, 2017).

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activities as building schools, well construction, or providing veterinary advice and support

for local farmers. The name may change in other theatres of operation.” (Ibid: 5-26 footnote

30). At the same place, the publication claims that PRTs were first used in Afghanistan (Ibid),

which is only partially true, even from the NATO perspective. First PRTs were established as

part of the coalition counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq.

The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine is based on an underlying assumption that any

NATO or NATO-led operations involving counterinsurgency will be launched and executed

in accordance with the relevant provisions of international law and will abide by the relevant

international law. The doctrine explicitly states that “any provisions, definitions or obligations

in this AJP may not be interpreted or construed as state practice or a change in effective

agreement of the law of armed conflict (LOAC).” (Ibid: 1-1). In the other words, none of the

provisions or obligations stated in this doctrine has the power of law (i.e. is not legally

binding) nor it replaces, substitutes or supplements any provisions or obligations of neither

the law of armed conflict (the Geneva Conventions), nor the international humanitarian law

(the Hague Convention). Other critical legal aspect is addressed in the doctrine. The legal

principle of state sovereignty, which is addressed from 2 perspectives in the doctrine; (1) this

doctrine doesn’t apply in situations of an insurgency occurring in the sovereign territory of

any NATO member state, as such situations shall be governed and managed within the

framework of domestic law of the affected country; and (2) as this doctrine understands an

insurgency as an irregular activity occurring in the conditions of a fragile/failed state, whose

sovereignty effectively eroded by transnational/cross-border influences (both internal and

external actors), the international norm of sovereignty doesn’t apply anymore, further

supported by the legal requirement of the approval and mandate by a UN Security Council

resolution. Restoration of a state’s sovereignty by strengthening legitimacy, credibility,

performance and institutions of a host nation government (in terms of restoration of the

government’s over the whole territory of a state) is also one of the fundamental objectives of

counterinsurgency operations (cf. Ibid).

The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine describes an insurgency, its key conditions, key

dynamics and its significant vulnerabilities. In order to develop an effective counter-strategy,

both the operational environment and the insurgency phenomenon, which create the broader

context for counterinsurgency have to be thoroughly understood. The definition of insurgency

presented in the doctrine is introduced above (on the page 61). The doctrine states that

insurgency and counterinsurgency cannot be viewed in isolation, even though they represent

distinctly different activities. The two phenomena interact with each other, influence each

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other, react (or should react) to each other’s dynamics, and significant mutual

interdependency dynamics occur and work between the two. A comprehensive approach

emerges as potentially the most effective way of dealing with an insurgency. What the Allied

counterinsurgency doctrine is encouraging and demand is “a broader cooperation and

planning in accordance with the principles and decisions of relevant senior NATO bodies.”

(Ibid: 1-4). “(C)oordinated action from an appropriate range of civil and military actors,

enabled by the orchestration, coordination and de-conflicting of NATO’s political and

military instruments with the other instruments of power” (Ibid) is presented as the bottom

line for achieving any potentially effective comprehensive approach at the NATO level. The

Allied counterinsurgency doctrine further stresses that NATO’s engagement in a

comprehensive approach to crisis management should include 3 levels, all of which “must

function in a complementary manner to achieve success” (Ibid).

Three level What should NATO focus on

Political and strategic • building confidence and mutual understanding

between international actors

Theater • empowered to conduct effective cooperation and

coordination with indigenous local authorities and

other international actors in the execution of

operations

Operational • cooperate with other international actors in the

overall planning for complex operations in which a

large degree of civil-military relations will be

required

Table 14: Levels of NATO’s comprehensive approach. Source: IH; inspired by NATO (2011a): Allied

Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency, p. 1-4.

Importantly, in theory, every attempt to achieve a maximum level of comprehensiveness in

approaches of various state as well as non-state actors has to reflect three essential dimensions

of what the term “comprehensive approach” actually means. First, the fundamental element of

a comprehensive approach theory should be local ownership. Second, any efforts in terms of

development of a comprehensive approach have to reflect its inherent core objectives –

effectiveness and accountability of all stakeholders involved. Third, for any comprehensive

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approach to be successful and/or effective, it needs to be strongly political in its nature, it has

to be holistic and it also has to be technical (Roloff 2016). The principles of a NATO

comprehensive approach introduced in the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine don’t necessary

meet all three dimensions.

The sketched NATO comprehensive approach in counterinsurgency campaign is very

general, but a certain sense of political as well as holistic nature can be identified. It is

obvious though, that the NATO planners and strategy and doctrine developers didn’t adjust

the common comprehensive approach to NATO actions to the unique characteristics and

dynamics of counterinsurgency efforts. One of the reasons here could be the inclusion of

counterinsurgency campaigns into a broader category of non-article 5 and crisis management

operations by the relevant NATO bodies. This inclusion is logical, given the character and the

guiding principles of counterinsurgency, and the significance any stabilization activities have

in any crisis management operation (indeed, depending on the type of a crisis that is supposed

to be managed, here insurgency).

The doctrine, however, highlights the “need to proactively coordinate the activities of

wide range of actors.” (Ibid). It is also based on the assumption that a comprehensive action

seeks to “stimulate a cooperative culture within a collaborative environment, while

facilitating a shared understanding of the situation. It should invigorate existing processes

and strengthen relationships at the joint, inter-agency and multinational levels.” (Ibid), an

underlying principal that turned out to be quite problematic to fulfill in practice. Significantly,

the document further states that as operating alongside not only government actors, but also

NGOs or international organizations and other non-state actors, the military element of

counterinsurgency force “do not own, nor should they expect to lead, this comprehensive

approach, but they should aim to foster and create those conditions where cooperation and

collaboration support the campaign.” This important statement can be perceived as a partial

disclaimer, but it still is a very significant contribution to the efforts of gaining deeper

understanding of counterinsurgency in theory and practice. NATO thus explicitly declares

military subordination to civilian elements of counterinsurgency force (and the primary

function of political and other civilian activities during a course of counterinsurgency

campaigns). Indeed, as many theorists of counterinsurgency stressed, military force in any

counterinsurgency campaign should have a supportive role to more important political efforts

(see above), and so does the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine, as it states “Priority should be

given to addressing the political dimension of insurgency in which he military force of the

counterinsurgent plays a vital but essential supporting role.” (Ibid: 3-18).

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The key principles (called “attributes” in the document) of the NATO

counterinsurgency doctrine include (with their core lines of effort, as specifically listed in the

doctrine):

• Political primacy (and a clearly defined political objective) – the primacy of

the political dimension will have an impact on all campaign aspects, and

military campaign design must reflect and be in accordance with clearly stated

and achievable political goals; the requirement for political will to underpin

military effort and its sustainability (Ibid: 3-20);43

• It is a struggle for the populations, not against the population – population

as the center of gravity (COG); the perceptions of the population are critical;

counter-messaging efforts with the counter-narrative that is timely, transparent,

open, honest, verifiable and accessible, and clearly articulates the goals and

purposes of the legitimate political authorities, highlights military and political

achievements and successes, and manages public expectations44; engagement

with local authorities; smaller self-contained and agile units enabling deeper

integration of the military forces into the population (deployment of

detachments throughout the population, unit dispersion, dismounted patrols,

etc., leading up to potential greater risks for the counterinsurgent force);

planning and execution of operations measured against their potential effect on

the population, not just the insurgents (Ibid: 3-2);

• The relevance of the legitimacy factor – 2 basic levels: (1) the population’s

perception of the legitimacy of the HN government and their security forces,

and (2) the perception of the legitimacy of the Allied security forces by

international authorities, the HN and the TCNs; the insurgents will try to

undermine the legitimacy of the coalition forces and the government by

various means and simultaneously will seek to increase their legitimacy in the

eyes of both the population and the international community (Ibid). Here, the

Allied counterinsurgency doctrine doesn’t address the factor of the factor

legitimacy perceived by the domestic populations of the TCNs to its fullest

43 “persistent contest of political wills” both at home and in the theater of operations (NATO 2011a: 3-20) 44 As empirical evidence and testimonies of the Afghan respondents of this research show though, it is the factor

of public expectations what plays the crucial role and what has the critical impact on variations of the popular

support. For instance, during the course of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, public expectations were not, for

various reasons, managed properly, which then contributing to decreasing levels of popular support to the

coalition forces and the Afghan government, fluctuating over time, and a certain sense of disillusionment among

the population.

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potential. It does note the critical need to consider the public opinions and the

public support at the domestic stage in the TCNs, as it has the potential to force

withdrawal of the troops, (which further can damage alliance cohesion, be

claimed as a success by the insurgency, and undermine capabilities committed

to the campaign), the publication, however, fails to discuss the potential of

public support as related to possible political hijacking of the mission (as it

happened in the case of the Czech Republic; see below), and to possible lack of

unity of purpose and effort in more detailed terms;

• Intelligence-driven operations – requires close engagement with, and

understanding of, the target population, including its political, social and

cultural organization; utilization of all sources of intelligence with a special

emphasis om human intelligence (HUMINT); accurate and actionable

intelligence is key to defeating an insurgency; an efficient HN intelligence

architecture must be developed and accessible; strong preference for unified,

integrated and centralized information management, and decentralized for

information gathering; analysis of intelligence information at the lowest

possible level allowing for an effective tactical action; intelligence gathering

should be continuous and focused and should prioritize collection assets in

direct contact with the local population; skills of linguistic ability and deep

cultural understanding and local knowledge (Ibid: 3-22 – 3-23);

• Unity of effort (prerequisited by a coordinated government structure) – at all

levels to avoid “organization friction” inherent among all various stakeholders;

shared understanding of the problem; comprehensive and fully coordinated,

multifaceted approach combining political, economic and security solutions;

liaison elements among the various structures and elements (Ibid);

• Neutralize the insurgents – physical, economic and psychological isolation of

the insurgents from the population; insurgent communication disruption;

addressing the core grievances of the insurgency; application of appropriate

force to detect, capture or combat insurgents and the imposition of population

control measures; factor of counterproductive impact on both the population

(too restrictive control measures) and the insurgents (martyrs, recruitment;

collateral damage and resentment); amnesty, reintegration and rehabilitation;

efforts to discredit and demoralized the insurgents (Ibid: 3-24);

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• Prepare for a protracted campaign – considerable expenditure of time and

resources; political understanding and a recognition of the effect, in terms of

the human and economic costs; efforts to maintain popular support; military

defeat of the insurgents is not the end of the counterinsurgency campaign, as

political, social and economic programs must continue to be resourced (Ibid: 3-

25).

• Security under the rule of law is essential – establishment of a secure

environment is one of the pillars of counterinsurgency strategy in order to

allow to achieve the overall campaign objectives through sustaining all the

programs and reforms required; military commanders require capabilities and

resources allowing for them to meet the basic needs of the population in initial

stages; the aim is to reduce the level of violence as soon as possible in order to

allow law enforcement forces to assume their task of maintaining order and

establishing the rule of law, followed by an establishment of local government

institutions (esp. the law enforcement system); local culture, tradition and

idiosyncrasies should be respected and Western models should not be

replicated; the use of military forces for law enforcement tasks should only

occur in extraordinary circumstances and for a short period; countering

organized crime networks is required through development of the police and

justice authorities; undermining the rule of law in the name of military

expediency is always counterproductive; rectitude is a vital part of

counterinsurgency campaigning; avoidance any engagement in human right

abuses and any illegal activity (even more damaging to the counterinsurgency

objectives today with the speed and reach of the media); counterinsurgency

forces of the HN and NATO must ensure the fast dissemination of their public

affairs/information message through the media to counter any manipulation of

insurgent propaganda alleging human rights abuses (Ibid: 3-25). One of the

tools of ensuring accountability of NATO forces in a foreign country can be a

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) containing appropriate technical

arrangements of the presence of NATO forces in the country. However,

depending on the specific provisions of individual SOFAs, the public

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(domestic as well as in the respective foreign country) may object and protest

to the mechanisms of such agreement.45

• Hand over responsibility to the local forces as soon as practicable – in

order to transition to the next phase of the counterinsurgency operation;

development of reliable local leaders and institutions, and capable police and

military forces; provision of support when required to the strong local

institutions and forces preferable over the NATO’s leading role in operations;

ideally, “leading from behind” by providing support in terms of capabilities

and resources HN forces lack (like intelligence, helicopters, engineers, medical

care, the training of local forces; etc.);46 otherwise, the insurgency is likely to

present its cause as a struggle against an occupation force; transition of

responsibility at all levels of the counterinsurgency campaign;47 local forces

have a deeper understanding of the local culture and environment which allows

for gaining political momentum and avoids NATO units being considered to be

occupying forces; it also preservers NATO combat power (esp. in terms of

troops) in a situation where there may be scarce NATO forces (Ibid: 3-26); and

• Learn and adapt quickly – ideally more quickly that an insurgent; interactive

action-reaction process of the battle, it is competitive learning; the party of the

conflict which is able to adapt its techniques and understanding faster seizes

the initiative and progressively wins control of the operational environment;

flexible mechanisms to identify and implement appropriate changes must be in

place; tactics, campaign plans and the overarching strategy must be flexible

enough to account for shifts in government policy, public sentiment and

insurgent methods, while resources must be readily available to implement

decisions rapidly; an effective training program is essential, so is the good

management of lessons learned, all units should be able to analyze, outline and

implement lessons learned, and asses the results obtained; experiences and

45 Jurisprudence is usually one of the sensitive issues, and also friction points between the two distant public

pools, where the domestic population usually favors accountability over their forces being executed in a home

country, but the HN population prefers foreign forces falling under local jurisdiction. 46 Especially with this provision, the inspiration by the ISAF mission in Afghanistan is apparent. All listed

capabilities have been the major support contribution to the ANSF during the course of ISAF, because ANSF has

been lacking these critical capabilities and their development has not been among the main priorities of the

NATO efforts in the country. 47 However, as the NATO experience from Afghanistan showed the local understanding of counterinsurgency

may significantly differ from the NATO one, as it is based on the dominant mindset, which might not be as

flexible as needed and which might be heavily dependent up on traditions and customs of the respective region.

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lessons identified and learned from recent NATO missions should be

disseminated to units preparing for and while on operations (Ibid: 3-27). What

is essential here is to really understand the complexity of the situation in order

to avoid misinterpretation and false assessment.

All of these 10 fundamental pillars of NATO counterinsurgency approach/strategy have been

tested and heavily contested mainly during the course of the NATO ISAF mission in

Afghanistan, which also exposed major challenges regarding the provisions in this doctrine,

which are discussed in the chapter addressing the ISAF mission the ways in which the

campaign contributed to shaping the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency below. These

fundamental attributes are also meant to guide execution of the major lines of operation

(LOOs) of a NATO counterinsurgency campaign from the military perspective.

Determination of the best and also alternate LOOs usually follows determination of the

overall approach. LOOs connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives.

Commanders use them to focus combat power toward a desired end state, applying power

throughout three dimensions of space, time and purpose in a logical design that integrates all

the military capabilities of a joint force in order to converge upon and defeat the center of

gravity of their adversaries. They are key for visualizations of operational design, especially

in as complex campaign themes as counterinsurgency. LOOs describe the linkage of various

cross-sector actions on nodes and decisive points, as well as connect tasks and effects to

nodes and decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective. LOOs also define the

interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy. Counterinsurgency

missions then require synchronizations of activities along multiple primary and

complementary LOOs in order to attain tactical and operational objectives. (Ibid: D-1-1). In

the counterinsurgency setting, some of the LOOs focus on the population, whereas other are

aimed at countering the insurgent activities or gathering support for the HN government. The

military conditions and the overall conditions for a stated counterinsurgency end state are

interdependent, meaning all of the LOOs must lead to one joint end state of the

counterinsurgency mission. The following table shows some of the essential LOOs of

counterinsurgency missions:

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Figure 3: Examples of Counterinsurgency Campaign End State and Lines of Operations. Source:

NATO (2011a): Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency – AJP-3.4.4, p. 4-9.

The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine fails to draw a distinct line between LOOs and

lines of effort (LOEs), it rather merges them together. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps FM 3-24

differentiates between LOOs and LOEs in the context of joint operation planning and states

that LOEs are based on “using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward

establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions.

Because counterinsurgents are often more oriented towards an intended outcome or purpose

than an enemy force, counterinsurgency operations generally use lines of effort. If a line of

operation is spatially oriented, then that line of effort is purpose oriented and is appropriate

when positional references to an enemy or adversary are not the determining factor in

friendly action. Because counterinsurgency operations involve many nonmilitary factors, lines

of effort may form a way to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the desired end state. Lines of

effort help commanders visualize how to integrate their military capabilities into the efforts of

the rest of the unified action community.” (U.S. Department of the Army 2014: 7-7).

Considering this definition, it seems that NATO doesn’t differentiate between LOOs and

LOEs and integrates both under the term LOOs in the publication, because it either considers

the nuanced differences existing between the two categories as minimal and thus irrelevant, or

works with the presumption that synchronization of activities along all LOOs and LOEs leads

to unity of effort, which is one of the fundamental pillar of any counterinsurgency campaign.

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To put the basic NATO counterinsurgency attributes into a broader context of

indicative activities and tasks of NATO counterinsurgent force within the three essential

elements of building human security, stimulating economic growth and development, and

cultivating and promoting HN governance and legitimacy (the three pillars of state stability

introduced in the NATO counterinsurgency doctrine; see p. 86),the Allied counterinsurgency

doctrine puts forward a following table, demonstrating the critical interdependencies existing

among the individual activities and tasks. The cycle dynamics is important here, as it shows

that efforts executed within one pillar have to be in balance proportionate to efforts conducted

in other two pillars. What is noteworthy is the innovative nature of this table, because neither

any counterinsurgency theoreticians, nor any counterinsurgency strategy doctrine (like FM 3-

24 or other) contemplate the counterinsurgency activities from this perspective.

Figure 4: Indicative Activities and Tasks in Counterinsurgency. Source: NATO (2011a): Allied Joint

Doctrine for Counterinsurgency – AJP-3.4.4, p. 3-27.

The Allied counterinsurgency doctrine also defines NATO’s preferred operational approach

to counterinsurgency. It determines its basic principles and provisions within a broader clear,

hold, build (CHB) approach. Essentially, CHB counterinsurgency approach is based on a

civil-military cooperation and combination of efforts of NATO, HN and civil actors, and must

be driven, virtually, by an in-depth understanding of the operational environment.

Counterinsurgency operations being full-spectrum operations, CHB encompasses all major

four types of military activities – offensive, defensive, stability and enabling activities (NATO

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2011a: 5-13). “CHB establishes control over the population and areas so that HN governance

and internal development programmes can be pursued in a secure environment. It also

supports development operations by preventing insurgent interference.” (Ibid: 5-14). The

following table visualizes the key phases of CHB efforts and all the potential actors involved

in them, including the range of their potential involvement. What it also shows is the

assumed, ideal case evolution of each counterinsurgency mission, which, most likely, starts as

primarily offensive campaign through the process of gradual decrease of the offensive phase

all the way to fostered stability activities, an evolutionary process marked with shifting

proportion of the key phases. Notably, the publication mentions the concept of enabling

activities, executed as part of a counterinsurgency mission, but the respective table uses the

term paramilitary forces instead. For the purposes of the doctrine, the term paramilitary forces

“refer to those forces or militias which have risen in some inhabited areas aiming at ensuring

self-protection for the population and the rule of law. These forces are under the control of

the HN authorities and work closely with NATO forces.” (Ibid: 5-14 footnote 20).48

Figure 5: Clear, Hold, Build interconnected and evolving activities. Source: NATO (2011a): The

Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency, p. 5-14.

48 During the most significant NATO counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan, ISAF, numerous paramilitary

forces were integrated (or meant to be integrated) into the broader counterinsurgency campaign. However, given

significant structural, cultural as well as behavioral problems, that often impacted the overall NATO campaign

negatively, no more specific framework of their integration has been developed and implemented.

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The doctrine further lists key capabilities of an effective CHB approach to counterinsurgency,

as follows:

1. physically and psychologically separate insurgents from the population;

2. provide the conditions for economic, political and social reforms;

3. safeguard the population and key infrastructure;

4. provide training and opportunities for HN security forces to improve and take the lead

in taking and maintaining control;49

5. provide opportunities for the HN police and other governmental institutions to

establish and maintain the rule of law;

6. provide essential services and address the core grievances of the insurgency;

7. assist with resettling displaced persons and refugees to their homes (this task is done

by UNHCR, and only in extreme circumstances will the military be asked for

assistance);

8. use and train local workers and materials to rebuild and provide a sustainable

economic and social system;

9. deny the enemy active and passive support; and

10. gain support of the populace (Ibid: 5-15 – 5-16).

Significantly, for the purposes of this thesis, the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine also

establishes a clear framework of the key CHB phases, allowing for both easier understanding

of the topic and more precise and pointed evaluation of individual campaigns and missions,

including the case of the Czech Republic and its efforts and activities.

The publication establishes total of four phases for successful execution of the CHB

approach, i.e. planning phase, clear phase, hold phase and build phase. The non-linear nature

in progression is highlighted, along with the fact that all four are linked to a series of decisive

conditions that allow transition of responsibility and authority to the HN (Ibid: 5-16).

Comprehensive approach and sufficient resources are required. The list of typical activities of

each of the phases follows, as stated in the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine:

49 Any security sector reforms cannot, however, be designed according to any Western model of security sector

system and attempted to be replicated in different environment, which can have significant consequence in the

longer term period. One of the critical challenges is temptation to (re)build local security forces as a

counterinsurgency force, mirroring the immediate security threat, but still underestimating or ignoring intended

and unintended consequences of such efforts (like in the case of the Afghan National Security Forces).

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(1) PREPARATION PHASE (2) “CLEAR” PHASE

(primarily offensive activities)

• an assessment of the situation

and resources and the vetting of

HN personnel;

• conducting overall planning;

• assigning responsibilities to civil

and military elements;

• conducting combined/joint

training and rehearsals;

• beginning information activities

and/or information engagement

operations; and/or

• establishing temporary facilities

for basic services to civilians

being displaced in the area to be

cleared.

• information activities;

• cordon and search;

• neutralizing armed elements; and

• removing those who have

infiltrated the HN government or

security forces

in order to deprive the insurgents of their

control over the territory.

(3) “HOLD” PHASE

(primarily defensive activities)

(4) “BUILD” PHASE

(primarily stability efforts)

• information activities;

• providing basic essential services

and humanitarian assistance;

• conducting infrastructure

assessment;

• establishing combat outposts;

• fortifying police stations;

• cordon and search;

• combined and joint dismounted

presence patrols;

• building intelligence networks;

• identifying and neutralizing

remaining insurgent underground,

auxiliary and leaders;

• recruiting local police and security

forces; and

• reassessing the situation and the

resources.

• CIMIC activities, in particular

establishing / holding liaison

network with local key leaders,

• information activities;

• promoting the legitimacy of

the HN’s authority;

• beginning the transition of

authority to the HN

government and security

forces, shifting to advisory

and support roles for NATO

civil-military elements;

• providing security for the

reconstruction efforts;

• providing security for

infrastructure; and

• training, equipping and

advising police and civil

defense forces.

• CIMIC activities, in

particular keeping close

contact with key leaders, the

populace and agencies

engaged in stabilization

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reassessing the civil environment

and initiating quick impact projects

if required.

In order to ensure that areas freed from

enemy control remain so. This requires the

control of the HN government with and

adequate HN security force presence.

activities and reconstruction

efforts

In order to build the capacities of local

institutions to deliver services, advance the

rule of law and nurture civil society.

Table 15: Activities of each phase of CHB counterinsurgency approach. Source: NATO (2011a): The

Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency, pp. 5-15 – 5-17.

The following figure represents a visualization of the evolution of CHB operations,

demonstrating especially the shifting the significance proportion of offensive, defensive and

stability activities during all CHB phases. The most important independent variable

influencing the progress/evolution of CHB counterinsurgency operations is the stability of

security environment in the area. The figure depicts an ideal case of the CHB evolution. In the

reality, the insurgents’ endeavor challenges all the counterinsurgency efforts, slowing or

entirely stopping the progress. Variables of the level of effort and capacity of key actors are

included in the visual.

Figure 6: Evolution of roles during the main stages of counterinsurgency. Source: NATO (2011a):

The Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency, p. 5-18.

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The figure depicting evolution of roles during main stages of counterinsurgency shows some

interesting assumptions. First, the insurgent capability is thought to be severely degraded

during the second phase of an operation, i.e. the “hold” (defensive) phase. Not knowing the

methodology of this projection, what is likely is that the insurgents would be deprived of the

population base support proportionate to the increase in defense and stability activities,

complementing reconstruction and development efforts. Second, it (apparently) doesn’t work

with significant factors like organized crime, corruption or strong dynamics of tribalism,

assuming a progressive HN government, gradually gaining strength and capabilities. Third,

the figure doesn’t show an end or a termination point of the activities of the NATO

counterinsurgency force and the training and advising portion of the mission (Operational

Mentor and Liaison Teams, OMLT), assuming the long-term engagement in area of

operations. The projection of the increasing capabilities of the HN security forces is also more

austere, showing modest increase during the first two phases and a stable level in the third

“build” phase, correlating with the projections of the level of NATO involvement.

The doctrine also emphasizes the reconciliation efforts, which should be supported by

NATO forces during the stabilization phase of counterinsurgency campaign (as part of efforts

to support initial restoration of services and initial governance), led by the HN government.

The population is considered as the main actor in the process (Ibid: 5-25). Reconciliation

should be part of a broader reintegration, demobilization, disarmament and reconciliation

programs and initiatives. The way detainees are treated can have a profound impact on these

efforts, especially with respect to the future mobilization and recruitment potential of the

insurgency. The integration of the former insurgents within the local armed forces, that will

further provide a useful knowledge about the insurgent system and the ways in which they

operate (Ibid: 5-26). What the doctrine doesn’t consider is the human factor present in the

potential reintegration efforts, i.e. how the former insurgent will be perceived by and treated

by the fellow servicemen, potentially undermining the cohesion of the corps.

The importance of available expertise during the course of counterinsurgency is stressed

in many provisions of the doctrine, highlighting the key role civilian and military experts have

in counterinsurgency efforts. The expertise by not only government civilian and military

experts, but also subject matter experts from the private sector should be utilized (Ibid: 2-15).

As acknowledged in the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine, history has shown that

counterinsurgency may be counterintuitive to more traditional or conventional types of

warfare, as the strategy itself brings along a number of paradoxes of varying importance and

impact on the actual conduct of a mission. Different, adaptive and flexible mindset is required

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of the all military force engaged in counterinsurgency. Even though the doctrine states that

“these paradoxes are offered to stimulate thinking, not to limit it. The applicability of the

thoughts behind the paradoxes depends on the context faced by the commander in any given

insurgency.” (Ibid: 5-10). However, as the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, and to some extent

even the KFOR mission in Kosovo, showed, these paradoxes might have significant negative

impacts on the practical level and execution and success of the mission, when not managed

adequately at all levels. The potential for counter-productivity or blowback of certain

counterinsurgency provisions is underestimated (or intentionally downplayed) in the

publication. The paradoxes don’t have to apply in all cases, and the list of the paradoxes

presented in the doctrine and here is not exhaustive. The major paradoxes of

counterinsurgency according to NATO are (Ibid: 5-10 – 5-11; comments by IH):

• The more you protect a force, the less secure you may be – often in form of national

caveats imposed on national military (and to a certain extent civilian) contributions;

isolation from the population, which is supposed to be the essential center of gravity of

counterinsurgency efforts; population may perceive it as a sign of weakness (“If the

well-equipped and technology savvy foreign troops are not leaving their compounds,

the insurgents must pose a very significant threat to them. They are afraid.”, as the

author of this thesis was told by all the Afghan respondents she interviewed about the

Afghan perception of the NATO presence and activities in their country); freedom of

action ceded to the insurgent who enjoy a greater freedom of movement, and are

generally perceived as the stronger side, when the coalition forces are restrained in

their activities; the doctrine states that “commanders should find a balance between

implementing restrictive force protection measures and the need to maintain close

contact with the locals” (Ibid), but even these commanders are limited by political

decisions and restrictions in their management of the mission; restrictive force

protection measures also complicate or hinder intelligence gathering activities;

• The more force is used, the less effective it may be – again closely linked to the issue

of national caveats where some of the TCNs may impose restriction on the use of

force in adherence to their constitutions and national laws, allowing to use deadly

force only in self-defense, i.e. when being directly targeted (Francavilla 2015); this

fact might have both positive and negative impacts on the population; NATO

highlights the positive dimension by asserting that “the greater the force applied, the

greater the chance of collateral damage and mistakes” (NATO 2011a: 5-10),

however, on the other hand, as the author was told by several respondents, the

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coalition forces then cannot shoot a person planting an IED, which might kill civilians

later; the key point for counterinsurgents is to understand when more force is needed

and when it might be counterproductive; efforts to minimize or avoid collateral

damage are crucial;

• The more successful a counterinsurgency operation is, the less force can be used

and the more risk must be accepted – this paradox is based on the underlying ideal

case evolution of counterinsurgency campaigns, where more responsibilities and

reliance are meant to be placed on law enforcement forces, and the rules of

engagement of foreign troops may be tightened accordingly (see above); in many

cases, it is difficult to determine how much the counterinsurgency operation actually is

successful given the complexity of the security environment as well as often poorly

defined objectives that should lead to a desirable end state;

• If a tactic works today, it might not be the case on the following days; if it works in a

given area, it might not work in another area – the environment of counterinsurgency

campaign is usually very dynamic, flexible and influenced by a high number of

external and internal factors which might evince varying levels of significance in

different areas of an AO; insurgents are generally very adaptive and have advantages

of deep local knowledge and a widespread network of contacts; the more effective

some counterinsurgency tactic, technique or procedure is, the more insurgents might

seek to counter it and adapt; a certain level of common doctrine and set of tactics is

required among counterinsurgents to “provide a common understanding on the

planning and execution of military activities which creates a starting point for

adaptation” (Ibid: 5-11);

• Tactical success alone guarantees nothing – political actions and decisions matter the

most; tactical actions must be linked to strategic and operational military objectives,

but also to the political goals of the HN government and (to a certain level) NATO; in

situations where tactical success is not met with strategic success or political

achievements, the effects don’t spread beyond the tactical level; effective military

forces on the tactical level cannot substitute for a lack of political will and political

commitment of the most relevant stakeholders;

• Doing nothing may be the best reaction – insurgent calculus (especially with

insurgencies widely using the terrorist tactic) is to cause overreaction, among other

things, on the counterinsurgent side, which the insurgents can further exploit;

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• The host nation doing something tolerably is often better than the force doing it well

– critical importance of local ownership of the action; even though in societies with

deep tribal, clan or ethnic cleavages, the foreign actor may be trusted more by the local

population than local establishment; another factor countering the local ownership

narrative might be the prevailing mindsets of actors (for instance, the understanding of

preferred counterinsurgency approach and methods may differ between NATO and a

HN); cultural understanding represents an important advantage in favor of increasing

local ownership.

Interestingly, the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine mentions the potential of providing

external support to an insurgency by various actors, including the prospects of waging a

“proxy war”, which can have a significant destabilizing effect (Ibid: 3-9). The doctrine

underestimates the nature and potential of proxy war fighting by not providing any clearer

guidance on how to counter the unique inherent dynamics of using proxies by other interested

stakeholders in their own interests, and the potential consequences (intended and unintended,

as well as longer term) the practice can have on a respective counterinsurgency mission.

As it is more than obvious from both the attempts to theorize about counterinsurgency

efforts and the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine itself (or other military conceptual

documents, like the U.S. Army/Marine Corps FM 3-24), the military dimension of

counterinsurgency is clearly and systematically defined, conceptualized and the guiding

principles are established in a coherent and structured way to allow for an effective practical

implementation. The civilian dimension of counterinsurgency campaign is, however, under-

conceptualized, the basic attributes of civilian counterinsurgency efforts are incoherent and

unsystematic. Indeed, an objection about the requirement of customized civilian approaches

can be raised, given the specific conditions and context and the unique set of internal and

external forces functioning in an area of operation. Although such potential for variability of

civilian counterinsurgency approaches is useful in terms of research and their potential

adaptability and flexibility in practice, it might also cause problems in terms of coherence or

lack of coherence of the activities of civilian actors within one approach in both the planning

and the execution phases of an operation. In most of the cases, counterinsurgency

stakeholders (like the Czech Republic, other states or even NGOs) usually don’t have a

united, common framework or action plan outlining their counterinsurgency approaches in

detailed terms, combining both civilian and military activities.

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The following visual figure summarizes the complexity and interconnectedness of the

operational environment, where insurgents and counterinsurgents battle each other. It also

helps to understand the dynamic interactions between the two opposing forces. What the

figure clearly shows is the imperative that the military contribution is part of a solution to the

problem, but not the complete solution to countering insurgents. In so far as insurgency takes

benefit from different fields, COIN must address all these fields.

Figure 7: Nature of Counterinsurgency. Source: NATO (2011a): The Allied Joint Doctrine for

Counterinsurgency, p. 3-19.

5.2.2 Relevant documents of the Czech Republic

The official counterinsurgency-relevant documents adopted and published by the government

of the Czech Republic, or its ministers or agencies, can be divided in two categories, i.e.

political and military. The political category includes official documents published by the

government, both chambers of the Parliament, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (as the leading

actor in counterinsurgency) or other ministers, including the Ministry of Defense, in cases of

documents outlining or addressing policies of the ministry, and other civilian non-state actors,

if applicable. The military category then includes documents relevant for the Czech armed

forces, their counterinsurgency tasks, experience and preparation and training materials.

There is no united, commonly agreed and accepted document, introducing the key

goals and objectives, preferred courses of action, fundamental principles and imperatives and

potential resources of the approach to counterinsurgency of the Czech Republic in a

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comprehensive manner, i.e. integrated the objectives, activities, attributes and tools of all

relevant civilian and military actors, governmental and non-governmental, with the

experience with and engaged in counterinsurgency activity.50 Most of the available primary

resources are designed to reflect and present the military perspective, most likely because the

civilian sector doesn’t usually label the activities they can potentially contribute with (or

already do so) to counterinsurgency missions as “counterinsurgency”. This fact may have a

certain effect on the potential distortion of the conclusions draw from the data presented in

this research, as only those civilian actors either specifically referring to counterinsurgency, or

those active in the area where a NATO counterinsurgency mission is underway are considered

for the analysis, with the purpose of keeping the research as coherent as possible.

As some of the respondents told the author, especially two civilian officials

responsible for the counterinsurgency campaign theme at the Czech armed forces’ Doctrine

Department at the Training Command – Military Academy in Vyškov Ondřej Socha and

Pavol Varga, the rationale behind the absence of such a comprehensive, common

counterinsurgency document is the absolute minimal likelihood of an insurgency erupting and

operating in the territory of the Czech Republic,51 as well as the commitment to abide by and

honor NATO strategies and doctrines. This rationale is, however, feasible particularly from

the military point of view. From the political perspective, as also acknowledge by the former

ambassador of the Czech Republic to Afghanistan retired Major General Petr Pelz, it can

create problems and challenges in terms of the apparent lack of clarity of goals and lack of

clarity on coordination of efforts of relevant civilian and military stakeholders (what the

Czech Republic wants to achieve, how and why, including potential utilization of the

experience to future). Pelz noted, that the absence of the common official document outlining

50 Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs have internal reports and evaluation material at their disposal,

including the analysis of the benefits and challenges of the Czech activities in Afghanistan, including drawn

lessons learned, such documents are not publicly releasable though. 51 Certain features of insurgent elements active on the Czech territory have been identified, for instance reported

training camp of the Chechen separatists close to South Moravian town of Mohelno in the 1990s (Mareš 200).

Territory of the Czech Republic is, however, generally exploited as a logistical hub my foreign insurgent or

terrorist entities (cf. Mareš 2011), thus not requiring full-fledged counterinsurgency response by the Czech

authorities. Domestic paramilitary units active in the Czech territory could, theoretically, develop into an

insurgency. Nevertheless, their very limited, if any, success thus far maintains the likelihood of such

developments at a very low level. Another possible phenomenon that could, theoretically, develop into an

insurgency, or aid such developments, is represented by the Czech citizens leaving the country as volunteers or

foreign fighters to join various conflict. When (if) they come back, they can try to utilize their experience and

skills through starting a subversive campaign in the Czech territory, for various reasons. The numbers of Czech

foreign fighters has, however, remained comparatively very low. The fact that the potential of an insurgency

occurring in the Czech territory in the foreseeable future is weak or minimal, yet still present provides another

reason for researching the issue of contemporary Czech approach toward counterinsurgency, as well as for an

adoption of a united document outlining its main attributes, principles and perspectives by the relevant

governmental as well as non-governmental stakeholders.

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the Czech approach to counterinsurgency (and to counterinsurgency specifically in

Afghanistan) causes the inability of the Czech Republic to exploit the full potential of our

participation, especially in terms of the absence of clearly formulated objectives and demands

of what we want from our NATO partners, Afghans and other international partners in

exchange for our contributions, thus severely decreasing the negotiation leverage of the Czech

Republic in the context of wider international relations.

In general terms, the issue of counterinsurgency started to become part of political and

military debates in the Czech environment in connection to the participation of the Czech

civilian and mainly military agents in the NATO counterinsurgency operation in Afghanistan.

The Czech military professionals themselves confirmed that they learned about the art of

counterinsurgency from the Kilcullen’s conceptualization, as well as the US counter-

insurgency relevant documents and materials, later into the deployment, and gradually also

during the preparation pre-deployment phase. Related to this, the same respondents also claim

that the Czechs deployed to Afghanistan realized in essence counterinsurgency tasks, without

knowing or labeling them as counterinsurgency, especially during the phases of ISAF

preceding the counterinsurgency guidance material issued by the ISAF commanders.

5.2.2.1 Political

As aforementioned, the highest official strategic document of the Czech Republic in the field

of its security and international relations is Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky

(Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, 2015). Due to the character of the document, there

are no explicit or specific references to the issue of counterinsurgency. What the document

establishes and what is relevant to the efforts of shaping and/or examining the range and

scope of the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency is the explicit reference to the

commitments linked to the membership in NATO, EU, UN and OSCE (see p. 72).

The document further states that NATO and its policies and strategic not only

contribute significantly to the fundamental principles of the Czech security policy, it also is

one of the country’s strategic interests, formulated as “strengthening cohesion and effectivity

of NATO and the EU, and maintaining functional and credible transatlantic bond”, along

with “fulfilling the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, including strengthening

their cooperation in complementary development of defense and security capabilities” (Vláda

ČR 2015: 7; translated by IH).

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Other counterinsurgency-relevant parts of the document include conflict prevention

and management of local and regional conflicts and mitigating their impacts, and support to

international stability through cooperation with regional partners (among the Czech strategic

interests; Ibid), as well as NATO or EU crisis management operations beyond the

geographical boundaries of the Eurasian space (Ibid: 10). Membership in NATO is considered

to be one of the fundamental instruments of the pursuit of national interests and objectives.

The document also highlights the cohesion, proportionate burden-sharing and solidarity

among Allies. The reliability and credibility of each of NATO member states, including their

participation in NATO’s programs and policies, is then considered as the prerequisite for

maintaining the NATO collective defense pillar (Ibid: 13). On the same page, the principle of

the Czech Republic “creating conditions for an active participation in NATO, EU and UN

conflict resolution missions across their wide spectrum” (Ibid; translated by IH), i.e. conflict

prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution missions.

It further notes that “when honoring these commitments, (the Czech Republic) adheres

to the principles of a comprehensive approach to crisis management operations” (Ibid;

translated by IH). This, essentially, means, in more specific counterinsurgency context, that

the Czech Republic is willing to contribute to all possible tasks and types of activities of a

mission, as long as they fall within the comprehensive counterinsurgency framework of

NATO (or EU). As an example of conflict prevention and management through capability-

building efforts in third countries on international or bilateral basis, the document explicitly

use the tasks of training of indigenous security forces and assistance in security sector reform,

especially via involvement of civilian and military professionals (Ibid), which constitute two

of a broader range of fundamental activities in counterinsurgency missions. Furthermore,

according to the document, in situation, when conflict prevention efforts fail, the country

“will join the coercive mechanisms in accordance with its commitments to NATO and the EU,

abiding by the provisions of the Charter of the UN.” (Ibid: 14). Additionally, the document

states that the Czech Republic recognized the risks, threats and challenges resulting from the

growing instability in the regions of the North Africa, Sahel as well as the Middle East (Ibid:

15), and that the Czech Republic also contributes to the “counterterrorism efforts of NATO

via intelligence sharing, development of adequate capabilities, expanding the framework of

consultations with partners, and its active participation in the Alliance’s operations and

missions.” (Ibid). Put into the counterinsurgency perspective, the more general language and

use of the term “counterterrorism” instead of “counterinsurgency” suggest divergent

tendencies from counterinsurgency efforts, reflective of the general tendencies occurring and

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increasing within NATO, especially to the future, even though the document is clearly heavily

influenced by the Czech experience with counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. The apparent

avoidance of the term itself, and use of other terms (crisis management, counterterrorism)

supports this hypothesis.

Importantly, what is also relevant to the purposes of this thesis, and is worthy of

notice, in the Czech Security Strategy is the provision of activities of the Czech Republic in

the field of development and transformational cooperation and humanitarian aid provision.

The Czech Republic considers these three important activities as effective tools contributing

to regional and global efforts aimed at provision of security and ensuring stability (Ibid: 15).

Development activities are important and integral part of any counterinsurgency campaign.

Directly subordinate to the Security Strategy document is the Czech military strategy,

outlined in the document titled Obranná strategie České republiky: Odpovědný stát a

spolehlivý spojenec (Defense Strategy of the Czech Republic: Responsible State and

Responsible Ally; 2012). This document builds upon and further develops the principles and

imperatives stated in the security strategy document. As for the counterinsurgency-relevant

parts of the text, no specific, direct or explicit mention of either insurgency, or

counterinsurgency can be identified. Nevertheless, as the title of the document itself (i.e.

“reliable partner”) suggests, alliance bonds and partnership play an integral and critically

important role in the security and defense system of the country. The Defense Strategy

presents the basic principles of development and functioning of the defense system of the

Czech Republic, main tasks of the armed forces, and political-military ambitions. It further

mentions compliance with the NATO Strategic Concept and relevant security and defense

documents of the EU, and the pillar of NATO collective defense system, in accordance with

Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (Ministerstvo obrany ČR 2012: 4-5). Both the Security

Strategic and the Defense Strategy even more highlight the importance of the Article 5 of the

Washington Treaty (1949),52 the founding treaty of NATO, as a cornerstone of the overall

52 „The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be

considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of

them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of

the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert

with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and

maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result

thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.“

(NATO 1949).

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security and defense policies of the country. This fact is particularly important for the efforts

to examine the Czech counterinsurgency approach, which has been shaped primarily by the

Czech active participation in the NATO counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan, ISAF.

ISAF was directly linked to the operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan, which was waged

simultaneously with ISAF in the same area of operation (see below). Operation Enduring

Freedom was then a direct response to the historically first activation of the Article 5 clause in

reaction to the terrorist attacks from 9th September, 2001.

The document further notes that the Czech Republic “has been developing its

capabilities in the field of cooperation of its armed forces, other public administration

institution and the civilian sector as part of so-called comprehensive approach during peace

support operations and security and civil-military missions” (Ibid: 8; translated by IH).

Strong emphasis in both security and defense (and counterinsurgency) relevant documents on

comprehensive approach is clearly closely linked to the experience of civilian and military

actors from counterinsurgency (not only, but mainly, given the character of counterinsurgency

campaigns in general, as well as the emphasis NATO places on comprehensive approach),

especially gained in Afghanistan. However, same tendency of framing the foreign/out-of-area

missions more broadly as crisis management is traceable in the document. Paragraph 26 of the

document on foreign military operations follows as “in foreign operations, the Armed Forces

of the Czech Republic cooperate with Allied armed forces on the basis of international

agreements and commitments. Out-of-area deployments are executed as part of broader

efforts of international community in accordance with the provisions of international law.

They are capable of deployment in peace enforcement, peace support and peace keeping

operations and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions. Members of the Czech

armed forces can further fulfill tasks as part of humanitarian mission, rescue and evacuation

activities, and contribute to other civilian operations or monitoring missions of international

organizations.” (Ibid: 9; translated by IH). Compared to its previous version from 2008,

where a specific reference to the operations aimed at countering insurgencies was made in the

part of the text addressing foreign deployments of the Czech armed forces, in order to

minimize its impact on security interests of the Czech Republic and its allies (Ministerstvo

obrany ČR 2008: 4), this direct reference is clearly absent. Mirroring the NATO trend the

later version of the strategy works with term “stabilization and reconstruction”. The author of

this thesis suggests that such developments in the conceptual dimension of NATO operations

reflects certain disillusionment with ambitious counterinsurgency mission after the Afghan

experience, with exposed the existing fault lines among the Allies regarding their potential

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willingness and/or capabilities to commit to a large-scale counterinsurgency mission in the

future. As the notion from the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine (about the efforts to establish

counterinsurgency as another campaign theme; see p. 85) suggests continuing relevance of the

concept. With preference of the use of other concepts by individual member states, however,

this relevance of counterinsurgency is decreasing.

Even though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs represents the leading actor of any

counterinsurgency efforts by default, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not developed

any common strategy or plan for the Czech contribution to counterinsurgency efforts. The

Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs also doesn’t use the term counterinsurgency at all, not even

when referring to its activities in Afghanistan as part of ISAF. It designates the respective

activities as “humanitarian aid”, “development aid” or “reconstruction”, indicating that in the

Czech context, the term counterinsurgency is used only in military (and academic)

environment.

Considering the nature of counterinsurgency as a joint civilian-military endeavor, the

Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Czech Ministry of Defense developed and

published joint conception Střednědobá koncepce působení České republiky v operacích

v zahraničí (Mid-term Concept on the activities of the Czech Republic in operations abroad)

in 2009, i.e. during the peak of counterinsurgency discussions. It stated that the Czech

Republic seeks to actively engage in reconstruction and development activities, capacity

building of local security forces, along with deployments of special operation forces and

contributing with other capabilities to the ISAF force (Ministerstvo obrany ČR, Ministerstvo

zahraničních věcí ČR 2009). Although no specific reference to counterinsurgency can be

identified in the document, the explicit reference to ISAF means that the document listed the

Czech priorities for its engagement in the NATO counterinsurgency area of operation.

In November of the same year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also published a

concept on its priorities and preferred and potential trajectories of developed of the Czech

contributions to the stabilization efforts in Afghanistan in the time period of from 2010 to

2012, titled Perspektivy účasti České republiky na stabilizaci Afghánistánu 2010-2012.

The document summarizes the volume and character of the development and humanitarian aid

provided to Afghanistan until 2009. It specifies three main areas of the Czech engagement and

activities in the country as (1) institution building, good governance and the rule of law

support; (2) reconstruction and development; and (3) security. The main pillar of those efforts

(esp. areas 1 and 2) is considered to be the Czech PRT Logar (see below). Monetary volume

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of the developmental and humanitarian aid provided to Afghanistan until 2009 are presented

in the document. What is noteworthy is the strong emphasis placed on the activities aimed at

development the Afghan economy (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2009a).

Furthermore, in the official document of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Koncepce ZPS ČR 2010-2017 (Concept of Czech FPS 2010-2017; 2009), the fundamental

principles and imperatives of the Czech foreign policy for the given period of time are

outlined. In this conceptual document, Afghanistan is designated as a “special security-

development priority” of the Czech foreign policy. It develops to state that the Czech

Republic “has been supportive of the Afghan government’s efforts to achieve political,

security and economic stabilization of the country”, and specifically underscored the

activities of the Czech PRT Logar (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2009b: 13; translated

by IH). It also lists three main areas of developmental cooperation with Afghanistan:

environment, agriculture, economic development (including security sector) (Ibid: 34). Same

same information can be found in document Koncepce zahraniční rozvojové spolupráce

České republiky na období 2010-2017 (Foreign Development Cooperation Concept of the

Czech Republic for 2010-2017; 2009).

The executive arm of the developmental policies of the Czech Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, Česká rozvojová agentura (Czech Development Agency) list Afghanistan among its

geographic and territorial priorities. Afghanistan hold a status of “bilateral development

cooperation” country, with education sector and agricultural sector as the main areas of

development activities, mirroring the sector priorities introduced in document Program

rozvojové spolupráce 2013-2017 Afghánistán (Program of Development Cooperation 2013-

2017 Afghanistan). Additionally, Afghanistan is also prioritized in documents Operační

strategie humanitární pomoci ČR (Operational Strategy of Humanitarian Aid of the CZE;

published and updated annually).

The scope of the development and humanitarian assistance provided to Afghanistan on

the basis of bilateral cooperation reflects the long-term outlook of the stabilization phase of

counterinsurgency operation. The Czech development ambitions are only partially match by

the military deployment, widely reflecting the official transition of responsibility for security

to the Afghan security forces at the end of 2014, assuming that the security tasks of the

counterinsurgency operation would be delivered by indigenous security forces. None of the

documents of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, frames the topic in such terms.

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Separately, but in coordination with the government efforts, Czech NGO Člověk

v tísni (People in Need) is very active in Afghanistan in terms of humanitarian aid and

development assistance. In the works of its workers, Člověk v tísni seeks to disassociate

themselves from the coalition military forces operating in Afghanistan in order to preserve

their neutral status and perceived imparity. They publish own development strategies and

plans, based on a program-to-program basis, which are, however, not publically releasable.

Each Czech military contingent deployed to a mission, particularly to the Czech PRT

Logar also developed their own operational plans (for the civilian side) and operational orders

(for the military side). Neither these sources of primary sources of data are, however,

releasable to public. The author learned about their existence and about some of their contents

from the respondents she interviewed. Military operational orders contained ROE were in

accordance with the orders of the higher echelon of the ISAF command (i.e. it specifically

dealt with individual counterinsurgency principles and tasks), which were drafted in the

Czech Republic before the deployment itself. The key rule of engagement for the Czech

military was the legal use of force only when an adversary’s weapon is visible (i.e. open

carry), or when directly shot at. The operational plans of the civilian part of the PRT Logar

were, reportedly, focused on reconstruction and development efforts, and didn’t address the

topic of counterinsurgency as such or in its wider complexity. The civilian plans presented

priorities of the individual contingents, individual steps, metrics of progress, time frames and

budget.

5.2.2.2 Military

Contrary to the evolution of the language and framing of the Czech defense strategy, the

Czech highest doctrine, Doktrína Armády České republiky (Doctrine of the Army of the

Czech Republic, 2010) has undergone an opposite trend. Its first 2004 version talks about

capabilities of the Czech armed forces allowing for their deployment to the full-spectrum of

operations – combat (both offensive and defensive) and non-combat, in the territory of the

Czech Republic as well as out of the area, in peace (stabilization) and support missions

(Ministerstvo obrany ČR 2004). The updated 2010 version of the Czech army doctrine,

approved and released before the NATO counterinsurgency doctrine was published, refers to

counterinsurgency 17 times in the document. Firstly, it states that the Allied Joint Doctrine

(AJP-01) is the creates both the foundational basis and springboard for the Czech Army

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doctrine, as it “creates the conceptual basis for operational standardization” (Ministerstvo

obrany ČR 2010: 4; translated by IH). Counterinsurgency operations are listed among the

main possible types of operations (or campaign themes) the Czech armed forces can be

deployed to, i.e. combat operations (war), counterinsurgency operations, peace support

operations, and peacetime military engagement (Ibid: 30, 34). Counterinsurgency operations

are considered to be the type of an operation that is the closest to the combat deployment (to

war), and can only be conducted by the Czech army either as an Article 5 operation, or a non-

Article 5 operation with the UN mandate (Ibid: 34). In the other words, counterinsurgency

operations, even though limited, require commitment of a high number of military forces and

substantial volume of military resources.

In the doctrine, counterinsurgency is defined in close connection to definition of

insurgency, suggesting its variable contents, dependent on local circumstances and the

context. A clear definition is stated only in a footnote, as follows “military, paramilitary,

political, economic, psychological, and civilian activities, conducted with the aim of defeating

an insurgency” (Ibid: 42 footnote 31; translated by IH), copied from the 2008 version of the

NATO Glossary. The provisions of the doctrine further states that the Czech army will

execute counterinsurgency operations only “with political agreement (on the national level –

note IH), only based on the UN mandate” (Ibid; translated by IH). It follows with elaborating

“under such conditions, the Czech army can be deployed to a counterinsurgency mission,

where the goal is to defeat an insurgency with military or paramilitary forces (police forces,

local militias), simultaneously with political, economic, psychological and civilian activities,

and mitigate the conflict to the level where the efforts of peace support and infrastructure

building (reconstruction assistance) can solve the conflict” (Ibid: translated by IH). The

presented definition of counterinsurgency indicates that the Czech armed forces can be

deployed in collaboration with all possible actors during all phases of the NATO-defined

counterinsurgency mission framework.

The doctrine further stresses the shift from enemy-centric to population-centric

counterinsurgency activities. It also mentions concept of “embedded partnering”, which has to

be based on trust and friendship (Ibid). NATO doesn’t work with this concept in its strategic

counterinsurgency documents. Even though it is a different term for the “shoulder by

shoulder” principle originating from NATO/ISAF documents, its inclusion into the main text

of the Czech army doctrine may serve as an indirect evidence of the conceptual dimension of

the Czech approach to counterinsurgency reacting to the evolution of the practical dimension,

more than vice-versa. In the other words, in the case of references to counterinsurgency and

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its framing in the main Czech conceptual documents followed practical execution, suggesting

a certain lack of conceptual guidance of the Czech counterinsurgency approach on the

national level.53 To allow for “geographic and command flexibility”, the NATO troops should

accompany host nation forces into a mission. The doctrine also states that units must be

deployed for long enough time period to build necessary relationships, and highlights the

change in the duration of individual rotations to 12 months (Ibid) from previous 6 months.

It concludes with listing what it calls as 4 NATO counterinsurgency strategy priorities.

NATO counterinsurgency strategy priorities according to the Doctrine of the Army of the

Czech Republic

• Improvement of the population security;

• Indigenous local forces’ capabilities-building, and their leading role in the tasks of provision

of security;

• Good governance and development support;

• Negotiations with neighboring countries.

Table 16: NATO counterinsurgency strategy priorities in the Doctrine of the Army of the Czech

Republic. Source: Ministerstvo obrany ČR (2010): Doktrína Armády České republiky, p. 42.

Clearly, the framework of counterinsurgency presented in the Czech army doctrine assigns

primacy to human security over state security during the duration of an insurgency. What is

indicated is a tendency to ensure state security through diplomatic means (i.e. negotiations

with neighboring countries).

Moreover, the Czech army doctrine also contextualizes counterinsurgency differently

than NATO. Whereas the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine explicitly mention the conditions

of fragile or failed state (see p. 85-6), the Czech army doctrine states “An insurgency will,

most likely occur in states with racial, cultural, religious and ideological differences among

different groups of population, which lead to the lack of national cohesion, and,

simultaneously, weak, incapable or unpopular government rules. Additional factors, like

corruption or external intervention, can facilitate the occurrence of insurgency” (Ibid: 43;

translated by IH). Unpopular government doesn’t necessarily translate to state fragility, even

though it may serve as one of its indicators or facilitating factors. The stated perspective also

53 An argument can be raised, the NATO, too, reacted to the developments on the ground with the adoption of

the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine in 2011. As in the case of the Czech Republic, such assumption is valid

only partially, due to the initiatives of the US commanders of ISAF mission.

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doesn’t specifically mention ethnical cleavages, but it goes deeper to “cultural” differences,

which can also be interpreted as cultural differences among tribes, on the urban vs. rural

cleavage or any other culturally determined groups existing within the society. The same

contextualization also emphasizes the transnational dimension of both insurgency (“external

intervention”, indicating, when viewed in its close relation to the rest of the relevant parts of

the text in the doctrine neighboring countries), and counterinsurgency, noting that

“counterinsurgency operations should not focus only on suppression of an insurgency in the

territory of a state, but should also aim at destroying the ties between regional insurgencies

and their external supporters” (Ibid; translated by IH). This explicit demand places further

emphasis on the activities to counter flows of external support to insurgencies, and indicates

clear inspiration by the Afghanistan experience. This also, again, indicates the reactionary

nature of the Czech counterinsurgency-relevant documents to the developments on the

ground.54

Clearly, the framework for counterinsurgency operations introduced in the Czech army

doctrine doesn’t necessarily cover the whole scope of the general nature of counterinsurgency.

The presented conceptualization is adjusted to the conditions of the Czech Republic, and the

resources and capabilities it has available to commit and deploy.

Detailed and more specific elaboration of the individual key provisions of the Czech

army doctrine are presented in doctrines on the hierarchically lower level – military

operational doctrines, tactical doctrines and military regulations of individual missions and

tasks of the Czech Armed forces, branches of armed forces and their character, their services,

and for commanders and military staff headquarters at all C2 echelons. For obvious reasons,

however, these regulations are not releasable to the public. Their relevance for this research

thus varies, dependent on their specific subject and target audience.

Other military sources, containing counterinsurgency-relevant data are handbooks and

tactical manuals issued by the Doctrine Department at the Training Command – Military

Academy in Vyškov. Majority of these handbooks is, however, either classified, or publicly

non-releasable. Therefore, the information these publications contain could not be cited and

work with in this thesis. The handbooks and tactical field manuals are either framed as

preparation material in the pre-deployment phase of forces, and present the fundamental

attributes of counterinsurgency operations, that are usually adopted from NATO and US

54 Side-note: in the list of abbreviations, a factual mistake can be found in the Czech army doctrine. When

explaining the (frequently used) abbreviation COIN, the doctrine wrongly explains its meaning as “contingency

plans” instead of “counterinsurgency operations”, even though the Czech translation of the abbreviated meaning

is correct (Ministerstvo obrany ČR 2010: 97).

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relevant materials (as confirmed by 13 military respondents), as well as the best practices and

lessons learned from the practice on the ground (always the ISAF mission), or as general

learning and training material for increased awareness, efficiency and interoperability of the

Czech armed forces with other NATO Allies during exercises as well as missions. Study of

subject-relevant articles, published in the journal Doktríny (Doctrines; by the Doctrine

Department at the Training Command – Military Academy in Vyškov, from 2014 then

University of Defense in Brno as Economics and Management) by Czech subject matter

experts can help to frame the understanding of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency, by

looking at what they focus on and the language they use. Nonetheless, again, potential

limitation on variability and research value of such articles can be represented by the

translation of NATO or US materials, which are critically analyzed in a professional and

standardized way. Shared experiences, best practices and lessons learned addressed in the

articles provides useful insights into individual types of missions, tasks and assignment of the

Czech actors in ISAF, like the CIMIC unit operating as part of the Czech PRT in Logar

province (see below). Particular attention deservers an article titled “Je možné zvítězit v

Afghánistánu bez afghánských žen?” (Is victory possible in Afghanistan without the

involvement of Afghan women?), published in the Doktríny journal by Ing. Jozef Buza

(Doktríny 2/2010). Existence of this articl can also serve as evidence of strong emphasize of

the Czech efforts in Afghanistan on the gender-related and women empowerment issues.

Another highly relevant official document of the Czech Ministry of Defense is its Bílá

kniha o obraně (White Paper on Defense; 2011). The publication describes the current state

the Czech Armed Forces find themselves, presented in realistic light, and proposes systematic

changes for their improvement and increase of efficiency, including suggestion to terminate

some of non-essential military capabilities. It categorically refuses the opinion that, due to the

fact that the Czech Republic is a NATO member, it doesn’t need to aim at developing its

armed forces’ capabilities, and stresses the importance of the very opposite. The paper

justifies the development of such a critical analysis of the current state of armed forces by the

dynamically changing security environment, experience and lessons learned gathered from the

operations, the new NATO Strategic Concept, updated Security Strategy of the country, along

with impact of the economic crisis on the Czech Republic’s budget (Ministerstvo obrany ČR

2011). The analysis presented in the document also addreses the current state of miltiary

capabilities at the Ministry of Defense’s disposal. It also generates key recommendations in

terms of future development of the armed forces and their capabilities. Counterinsurgency-

relevant are all of them, nevertheless only the most relevant ones (either recommendations

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refering to as developed based on lessons learned or the new NATO Strategic Concept, or

recommendations refering to foreign deployments of the Czech armed forces, keeping in mind

the prevailing assumption of the very low likelihood of the insurgency occuring in the Czech

territory) are listed below:

• Strictly prioritize investments into the development of military capabilities according

to their contributions to roles, functions and international commitments of the Czech

armed forces;

• Increase the defense spending on the basis of specific and justified investment

requirements and projects;

• In defense planning, prioritize requirements depending on the availability of sources

and risk assessment in terms of postponing or cancelling a requirement;

• Strive to stabilize defense expenditure and maintain a long-term planning

predictability through the development of a sliding-scale budget outlook for the

current fiscal year with a four-year outlook;

• Rationalize structures and functions of current training and educational activities and

institutes; maximize educational capacities and programs both at home and abroad;

• In terms of military capabilities, retain the tactical Air Force for defending the

country’s airspace, supporting land forces and taking part in joint operations;

withdraw the Mi-24/35 attack helicopters from active service (not interoperable by

NATO standards); reassess mobilization needs, primarily retain and develop the HN

Support (HNS, i.e. capacities for the operational preparation of the territory to receive

allied support); increase interoperability, deployability and sustainability of the forces

according to NATO standards; commit to material and equipment that will most likely

be deployed in operations within the next five years and achieve a high added value;

fulfill tasks within NATO’s Network Enabled Capability (NEC), i.e. the NATO’s

integrated information environment; increase the protection of deployed forces by

strengthening the capacities of unexploded ordnance disposal and improvise explosive

device (IED) protection;

• Invest in research, development and innovations, and concentrate efforts in

perspective areas such as unmanned and robotic devices, cybernetic systems and

applications focused on cybernetic security;

• Support cooperation in the field of military defense and civil security research;

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• Search for ways of sharing, interconnecting or in the joint development of military

capabilities with NATO/EU allies;

• Decrease the scope and number of military training areas so as to be appropriate to the

Czech armed forces’ needs (Ibid).

The publication further states that “the expected character of operations call for deploying

smaller units capable of maintaining a high operational tempo and minimising logistical

demand. Their effectiveness is increased by reduction of numbers and unification of the types

of armament; equipment is highly reliable and economical; command and control systems are

effective and supported by appropriate technologies for gathering information by using

sensors, processing, distributing and sharing information in real time throughout the entire

spectrum of forces. They operate in the system of Network Enabled Capability (NEC) with

high level of cybernetic protection and interoperability with the allied systems.” (Ibid: 96).

The document also specifically works with the experience of the Czech armed forces’

deployment in Afghanistan, when it stresses the necessity of proper coordination between

military and civilian capabilities, pointing to the PRT Logar and missions in the Balkans as to

the good examples of CIMIC cooperation. It further calls for creation of a national lists of

experts55 with appropriate training to be sent abroad, as necessary, and underscores the

importance of civilian and military lessons learned such training has to reflect, and include

variety of activities (like survival courses, military planning, rules of engagement, etc.) (Ibid:

97). The strong emphasis on the role of subject matter experts and their utilization during

counterinsurgency operations is consistent with the broader NATO counterinsurgency

strategy.

The publication further calls for efficient cooperation among central administrative

offices for adequately “coordinating international and security policy, as well as for

formulating approaches to key missions such as cybernetic protection, comprehensive crisis

response or counter-terrorism measures” (Ibid). This statement is particularly important due

to its deliberate wording – the concept of counterinsurgency is not present in the document,

whereas the terms counter-terrorism and comprehensive crisis response are. This fact serves

as further evidence supporting the hypothesis about gradual regression from the ambitious

counterinsurgency missions after the NATO Afghan experience. It also serves as an indication

that counterinsurgency is subordinate to comprehensive crisis response, since counter- 55 It, however, is not clear from the document how such a list would be systematically created, structured or

used.

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terrorism deployments of military force don’t usually include stabilization activities, unless

understood from the broader counter-terrorism perspective. The White Paper doesn’t,

however, provide any clarification of the terms and the roles of armed forces in these types of

operation, or what is understood by them, causing confusion and bringing another layer of

discrepancy to the research of the Czech counterinsurgency approach.

Moreover, the White Paper notes that “in an armed conflict, coordinated cooperation

between the Czech Armed Forces, governmental, nongovernmental as well as international

organizations play a significant role. Its success is dictated by respecting fundamental

principles that the organizations follow (i.e. impartiality, independence and neutrality in case

of non-governmental organizations) and knowing their missions, mandates and capacities.

Adequate training of experts at a national level and engagement in multinational projects is

essential for accomplishing operational missions and running effective cooperation among

the Czech Armed Forces, governmental, non-governmental as well as international

organizations.” (Ibid). In the other words, familiarization with all of all of the actors, who

would be a part of the deployed contingent, along with coordination activities among them

need to begin in already in the early pre-deployment phase, in order to facilitate easier

interoperability, mutual understanding and cooperation and coordination of activities. The

White Paper further presents a set of long-term recommendations in this regard:

“In the long-term, the following activities shall be supported:

• building awareness of different attitudes to responding to crisis situations by various

actors and the necessity of their mutual cooperation;

• sharing information on crisis and conflict areas. Bearing in mind that the emergence

of crises is an unpredictable factor, this capability must be institutionalised,

continuous and inclusive of external experts (outside the public administration), such

as members of the academia and security communities;

• collection, evaluation and sharing of lessons learned from activities by civilian and

military components in responding to crisis situations both in the Czech Republic and

abroad, and their application in personnel training;

• capability development of CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) units.” (Ibid: 97-98).

The CIMIC capabilities of the Czech armed forces were among the underdeveloped

capabilities of the Czech armed forces. First CIMIC teams were created in 1998 and with their

gradually increasing importance as part of military tasks and missions. The Czech CIMIC

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units participated in missions in Bosnia & Herzegovina (SFOR), Kosovo (KFOR), Iraq

(NTM-I) and Afghanistan (ISAF), what indicates a certain counterinsurgency component in

varying level in all four theaters.

Document Dlouhodobý výhled pro obranu 2030 (Long-Term Defense Outlook

2030; 2015) contains the data highly relevant for study of the Czech approach to

counterinsurgency. Building on a basis of forecasted future strategic environment, the

document discusses most likely forms of future deployments of the Czech armed forces,

contemplates implications of these deployments on development of military capabilities and

outlines major presumptions and prerequisites that need to be met in order to meet the level of

required military capability. The document builds upon legal provisions and strategic

documents of the Czech Republic and draws the main principles from security and defense

documents of NATO and the EU. The document also creates framework for elaboration of a

concept of capability-building of the Czech Armed Forces.

The document accurately reflects the trends and tendencies occurring in the global

security environment. The list of the major future security challenges includes hybrid warfare,

weak governance, failed states, spread of extremism, the phenomenon of foreign fighters,

ethnic and religious conflict, climate change or migrant flows (Ministerstvo obrany ČR

2015a: 6-7). What the document doesn’t include is a notion of insurgencies posing a major

challenge to peace and security in the broader security environment, indicating, again, the

tendency to avoid the insurgency label.

The character of future security environment also requires adequate capabilities and

resources for effective mitigation/elimination of the challenges it poses. The Outlook

document mentions rapid response and strategic distance capabilities; full-spectrum

operational capabilities for large-scale, corps missions; flexibility, increased readiness and

mobility of forces; international cooperation, and increased combat readiness of NATO and

the EU in particular; comprehensive approach56 (Ibid: 7). The capabilities included in this list

suggest not only reference to the key security documents of the Czech Republic, NATO and

the EU, but also indicate an inspiration by the Afghanistan experience, and don’t a priori

exclude deployment of the armed forces to counterinsurgency mission. Quite contrary, all the

capabilities included in the list are required and critically important to have for effective and

successful NATO counterinsurgency missions.

56 The document defines comprehensive approach as “the ability of all components of armed forces to execute

joint operations, and the ability to execute combined operations with participation of intelligence, military and civilian elements on traditional battlefield, as well as in cyberspace and media space.” (Ministerstvo obrany ČR

2015a: 7; translated by IH).

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The document continues with forecasting the most likely character of future Czech

armed forces’ deployments. It considers the Czech contribution to multinational operations

(NATO, EU, UN) outside the Czech territory as the most likely and the most frequent form of

deployment in the next 20 years, and determines that it will be a formation of task force,

“drawn from the organic units, complemented by other capability modules, as required, like

combat support service and combat logistics in particular” (Ibid: 8; translated by IH). What

is also noteworthy is the specification of capabilities the Czech armed forces should have at

their disposal, if deployed in Article 5 operations as well as crisis management operations, i.e.

aerial supremacy and air support of land forces, firepower superiority, maximal protection of

deployed forces, information dominance, real time situational, area of operation awareness,

flexibility and mobility of units, joint activities of all components of the deployed armed

forces, and individual special capabilities and logistical support on long distance range (Ibid:

9). Again, development and maintenance of all of these listed capabilities are key for maintain

initiative and overall effectiveness of counterinsurgency missions in general as well.

Achieving an appropriate level of standardization in accordance with NATO standards

is designated as priority in the document (Ibid: 10). Another noteworthy requirement, as

stated in the document, is represented by the active utilization of lessons learned57 and the

possibility of expert consultations based on the Reach Back system58 (Ibid). The concept of

Reach Back system was not included in the previous strategic documents, and thus signals an

innovation in the Czech military environment. In the context of counterinsurgency campaign,

being able to use such system would greatly help troops deployed on the ground with timely

decision-making, potentially increasing effectiveness of the counterinsurgents, as it would

help avoid cultural misunderstandings or low level of awareness about tribal relations in a

HN. Such system has not been used by the Czech armed forces in any of the

counterinsurgency missions they contributed to. Therefore, it represents an important

innovation in the Czech military environment.

The document further stresses the important continuance of efforts to develop

specialized capabilities, essential for their deployability in out-of-area missions, and with a

significant added value of the Czech armed forces in the context of the Czech NATO

commitments. There are two major areas of specialization of the Czech armed forces: (1)

57 The document doesn’t, however, specify, how the lessons learned are meant to be systematically catalogued

and stored. It, however, correlates with the provisions stated in the White Paper about the need of having a list of

subject matter experts potentially available (see p. 122). 58 Defined as a “system of information support Reach Back represents a capability of providing the commander

and headquarters staff of the units in a mission with timely and credible expert information from external

sources” (Ibid: 10; translated by IH).

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protection against weapons of mass destruction and (2) passive surveillance system as part of

ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) (Ibid). Seven key

capabilities then represent a core of any capability-building efforts – prepare; project; engage;

sustain; consult, command, and control (C3); protect; and inform (Ibid: 12).

The key emphasis is put on the element of interoperability in all seven key capability

areas. The critical importance of counterinsurgency is further reinstated in connection to the

acquisition of weapon systems and other equipment, including interoperability with

international partners, primarily then NATO and the EU (Ibid: 17). These seven capability

areas are necessary to fulfill NATO commitments as well as execute all required missions and

tasks successfully. The capability-development of the Czech armed forces also has to reflect

the strategic relevance of individual capabilities in general terms, and need to be developed

accordingly (special operation forces or real-time complex awareness about the area of

operation) (Ibid: 13-15).

Based on all of the imperatives and principles stated above, the likelihood of the

deployment of the Czech armed forces to counterinsurgency (by nature and mandate, not their

designation label) missions in the future is still fairly high. Certain reluctance to work with the

concept of insurgency/counterinsurgency in most of the Czech strategic documents indicates

that future deployments will be limited in their scope and range, and not necessarily achieve

as high volume as ISAF did.

Potentially significant is the occurring discrepancy between the Doctrine of the Army

and other military strategic documents of the Czech Republic. The doctrine addresses the

counterinsurgency campaign theme is more complexity and detail and recognizes it as one of

the major 4 types of operation (see p. 117), but other potentially relevant documents don’t

mention or discuss the topic at all. Such discrepancy can lead to increased tension in terms the

same language used across the Czech military environment per se, friction over wording and

interpretation of mandate of deployed forces, misinterpretation of political decisions in the

military environment, or uncertainties during the forces’ preparation, education and training.

Koncepce výstavby Armády České republiky 2025 (Concept of Development of

Army of the Czech Republic; 2015) has relevance to this research as well. Not only it puts

forward main guidelines and principles of the future development of the Czech armed forces,

but also identifies the existing challenges and offers recommendations for the way ahead. The

document is closely linked to the Security Strategy, Defense Strategy and Long-term Outlook

publications, however, its relationships with the White Paper on Defense in largely

unspecified and unclear. The SWOT analysis of the current state of the Czech armed forces is

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realistic and critical, and includes criticism on not meeting a number of NATO standards,

resulting from a flawed transformation process of the Czech armed forces. No explicit or

direct reference to counterinsurgency can be found in the text of the document.

What the document mentions though is the impact foreign deployments had on the

Czech armed forces, and ISAF mission in particular, especially in terms of what problems,

weaknesses and challenges the foreign deployments exposed in terms of their capabilities and

equipment. Mainly negative impact of these foreign deployments is addressed, represented by

the “acquisition of the equipment reflecting urgent operational needs (…) led to limited

preparation of forces, commanders and headquarter staff for all main combat types,

significant wearing of material, overburdened personnel, and suppressed conceptualization

potential of the Czech armed forces development.” (Ministerstvo obrany ČR 2015b: 9).

This narrative is interesting when contrasted to the often claimed positive impacts of

the foreign deployments of the Czech military. One of the major issues with the ISAF mission

was, as several respondents disclosed, overloading and overburdening of only certain units of

the Czech army (expeditionary forces, special operations forces, forward aerial controllers,

etc.; see below). Such disproportion in the capabilities deployed then caused significant

discrepancies between individual units of the Czech armed forces in terms of their

preparation, education, training and combat or stabilization experience, potentially leading to

a leap of these prepared, educated, trained and experienced individuals or units being

deployed again, shall the opportunity or necessity arise, as the ministry and the General Staff

don’t have to invest too much money into their pre-deployment preparation. Even though

there were certain attempts to avoid this discrepancy, it largely remained a topical challenge.

The Concept also criticizes the insufficient level of interoperability both inside and

outside of the Czech armed forces, as well as inaccurate exploitation of full potential of the

military personnel (Ibid: 9-10). Among the strongest characteristics though, the document lists

the combat experience and level of preparedness of special operation forces, the potential of

military personnel for their future development (adaptability, flexibility and creativity) as well

as the strategic transport, reconnaissance and communication capabilities (Ibid: 9). All of

these forces and capabilities have been tested (and developed) during their deployments in

foreign missions, especially the KFOR and even more the ISAF missions, and provide a

strong basis for their further development and utilization to the future.

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5.3 Czech approach to counterinsurgency – practical dimension

5.3.1 Kosovo

One of the major foreign missions the Czech armed forces have been deployed to was NATO

operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo, the KFOR mission. KFOR has become the principal

foreign mission of the Czech Armed Forces in the Balkans. KFOR started operating on 12th

July, 1999 as a multinational peacekeeping operation under NATO command. The KFOR

mandate was established by a UN Security Council Resolution no. 1244,59 adopted on 10th

June, 1999, in order to provide resolution to the deep-rooted and dangerously escalated

ethnical nationalistic conflict between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Kosovar Albanians60. The

Resolution 1244 effectively established an international protectorate over the territory of

Kosovo under the auspices of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), serving in its capacity as

a transnational governance regime and administration over the territory. The security

dimension of the UNMIK mission was provided by the NATO-led mission KFOR. NATO

signed a Military Technical Agreement (MTA) with the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia

and Serbia, since the Kosovo territory was still part of its sovereign territory.

The mandate of KFOR was to support the UNMIK mission and contribute to

establishing and preserving secure and stable environment for continuation of reconciliation,

negotiations and peace building activities between the opposing parties with the efforts to

transition to and establish sustainable democratic governance regime in Kosovo, allowing for

the ultimate withdrawal of the multinational military forces. The KFOR operation was

categorized as a UN Charter’s Chapter VII operation in capacity of a peacekeeping mission.

However, in reality the rules of engagement of KFOR troops as well as the form of practical

execution of the KFOR mandate was virtually peace enforcement with important

counterinsurgency features, as the author was told by plk. Ing. Hynek Pavlačka, Czech army

officer with extensive experience from Kosovo and Afghanistan operations and an UN

mission in the Democratic Republic of Kongo. Plk. Ing. Pavlačka was assigned as a military

liaison element to the UNMIK mission. Therefore, he didn’t take a direct part in KFOR

activities, but can be understood more of a direct observer of the mission and its execution.

59 Text of the Resolution 1244 can be accessed at https://documents-dds-

ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement (retrieved on February 9, 2017). 60 For more information about the conflict in Kosovo see, for example, publication Religion and the Politics of

Identity in Kosovo by Ger Dujizings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), or Neighbors at War:

Anthropological Perspectives on Yugoslav Ethnicity, Culture, and History by Joel M. Halpern and David A.

Kideckel (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2000).

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Plk. Ing. Pavlačka shared with the author several examples of why he considered

KFOR as effectively a counterinsurgency campaign. In his view, what started as peace

enforcement with peace keeping mandate gradually progressed to counterinsurgency in

practice. He claims that KFOR troops have, couple times, been forced to overstep their rules

of engagement in order to either save own or civilian lives, or prevent severe violations of

human rights.

Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence on 17th February, 2008, in a move that

legally amounted for a violation of the 1244 Resolution. The declaration and events that

followed led to a strengthening of resistance by ethnic Serbs living still living in certain parts

of Kosovo, especially as KFOR significantly scaled down its numbers and limited its tasks.

The Serbian resistance wasn’t monolithic and had its active and passive elements. According

to plk. Ing. Pavlačka, the passive element of the resistance don’t recognize the efficiency of

violence in resistance, and resort to boycott of the Kosovar government bodies and

institutions and close collaboration with the Serbian authorities in Belgrade. The active

Serbian resistance adopted violent methods for manifestation of their discontent – they

organize demonstrations, build barricades or clashed with the KFOR forces, which they

perceive as strongly pro-Albanian. Plk. Ing. Pavlačka also disclosed that the ethnic Serbs

living in Kosovo keep their paramilitary security forces active and mobilized (they are

reportedly armed, well organized with united C2 structure and good means of

communication). The Serbian Defense Corps are not supposed to be armed, according the

existing legal framework in Kosovo, as their main tasks should be disaster relief (widespread

fires, etc.). However, facing increasingly confident Kosovo Albanians, the Kosovo Serbs

started providing arms and weapons to their defense units.

Tensions escalated twice throughout the KFOR deployment – in 2004 and in 2008.

According to plk. Ing. Pavlačka, it was in these two years when the pogroms of non-Albanian

ethnic groups (especially the Serbs) occurred in Kosovo. The KFOR forces had to prevent

mass violations of human rights. Nevertheless, the record of KFOR is disputable in this

regard, according to several first-hand accounts shared with the author. Reportedly, live

ammunition was also fired by the KFOR forces in order to restore order. Some accuse KFOR

of blocking the access of medical personnel or the UNMIK representatives (Krstic – Bytyci

2012). Such reports cannot, however, be independently verified.

The genesis of the Czech military presence in Kosovo can be divided into several

phases, reflecting the wider process of re-structuralization of KFOR itself. The Czech

Republic has contributed its forces to KFOR since its inception in 1999. It was the

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reconnaissance unit of 126 servicemen, followed by a mechanized unit. In February 2002, the

Czech military battalion was extended and integrated the Slovak military element into a joint

Czech-Slovak KFOR battalion that contributed to the Multinational Brigade CENTRE, with a

common ratio of 500 Czech and 100 Slovak military men and women.

In April 2005, the NATO operation Joint Guardian was restructured and renamed to

Joint Enterprise, with the Czech Republic becoming a lead nation of the mission for a year.

The Parliament of the Czech Republic approved the deployment amounting 660 military

personnel as part of the Multinational Task Force CENTRE (MNTF(C)), where a mechanized

unit was the core of the deployed contingent. The Czech Task Force eventually left its base at

Sajkovac in 2011, where their KFOR participation significantly changed and transformed into

the deployment of 9 Czech officers as part of the KFOR headquarters in Pristina. Currently,

11th Task Force of the Czech army is present (its mandate terminates in February 2017). The

key capabilities of this Czech Task Force are represented by 3 Czech specialists of the

Deployable Communication Module of the CIMIC unit of the Czech army (Ministerstvo

obrany ČR – KFOR).

The Czech army capabilities deployed to KFOR and their assigned tasks have been

widely variable during the development of the KFOR mission itself. Reconnaissance unit and

an aerial component were gradually complemented by a mechanized unit, guard teams as well

as the CIMIC unit, newly created with limited experience from Bosnia, and Military Police

forces. 4th Rapid Deployment Brigade then replaced the reconnaissance capability already in

1999, suggesting the practical character of the mission. In the other words, deployment of

forces trained in rapid deployment and combat to a peacekeeping mission may indicate its

significant enforcement dimension. The main tasks assigned to the Czech KFOR troops was

to monitor and guard the border between Kosovo and Serbia and its surrounding areas,

registering and allowing for a safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs),

along with creating an environment favorable to reconciliation and peaceful coexistence

between the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs living in Kosovo (Kosovo Force 2017).

The CIMIC unit also started to closely cooperate and coordinate with the Czech NGO

People in Need, and contributed to the initiatives aimed at reconstruction of schools, or with

other Czech companies engaged in reconstruction of the area. These mandated tasks are very

significant for the purposes of this thesis. The Czech Army’s CIMIC units engaging in

reconstruction and development, simultaneously with the military force executing tasks of

providing for a secure and stable environment and elimination of potential threats fits the

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conceptual framework of counterinsurgency, as established in the theoretical/conceptual part

of this thesis.

The Czech special operations forces, the 601st Special Forces Group, were also

actively participating in the KFOR operation. Most of the information regarding their

activities and foreign deployments is classified. However, their official website suggests that

they were present in Kosovo as part of KFOR in the period from 1999 to 2006. The KFOR

experience was also confirmed by two members of the Czech special operations forces,

without providing any further details, the author interviewed.

Other evidence validating the argument about the significant counterinsurgency

element of the KFOR mission can be interpreted as the mandated task to provide secure and

stable environment for peace effort and democratic development of the society in Kosovo,

after the reconstruction in 2002, when the area of responsibility of the Czech-Slovak battalion

expanded. The main concrete tasks of the Czech military forces by then were to irregular

search operations, checkpoint controls, escorting people and vehicles, riot control, training,

assistance and oversight of the Kosovo Protection Corps or assistance to UNMIK.

Furthermore, the contribution of the military element to the reconstruction and humanitarian

efforts was explicitly stated (cf. Kosovo Force 2017; Ministerstvo obrany ČR – KFOR II –

Česko-slovenský prapor, od 2/2002, Kosovo, 2 400 příslušníků). During the escalated violence

in 2004, the Czech KFOR contingent as a protective element of the Serbian population in

Kosovo, their property, but also the cultural heritages (like churches, which were a popular

target for the Kosovo Albanians as they put a number of them on fire), according to some of

the respondents, who were deployed to Kosovo. Since 2005, the Czech contingent was

expanded by inclusion of artillery unit, and later air wing of military helicopters Mi-17 in

2007 (Ibid). Main tasks in this period included border monitoring, provision of security to

ethnic minorities and the cultural heritage sites. As NATO has significantly scaled down its

forces since 2008, the counterinsurgency element of the KFOR mission has been reduced as

well.

The mandate stated like this perfectly fits any counterinsurgency handbook, as it

basically covers the full spectrum of efforts of counterinsurgency operations in general,

especially the NATO-preferred CHB counterinsurgency approach (see pp. 99-100). Certain

limitation of classifications of the KFOR mission as peacekeeping or peace enforcement can

be underscored by two arguments: (1) peacekeeping efforts usually don’t require active

creation of the stable environment by the peacekeeping forces, and (2) peace enforcement

forces don’t commonly execute stabilization tasks and do not actively contribute to

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reconstruction tasks. Moreover, both peace keeping and peace enforcement don’t include

training and assistance mission by default.

In the other words, the argument about significant counterinsurgency dimension of

Czech military activity and tasks as part of KFOR is validated by the scope and range of the

tasks assigned to the forces. Indeed, drawing a conclusive inference is disputable as it is not

clear what the respondents considered as counterinsurgency or peace enforcement. However,

keeping in mind the framework provided by the 2010 version of the Doctrine of the Army of

the Czech Republic, the counterinsurgency narrative seems to fit the KFOR case in several

ways. First, the inherent CHB framework of the assigned tasks mirrors the CHB framework

presented in the theoretical/conceptual part of this thesis, i.e. clear the territory from

subversive violent elements (not labeled as insurgency in the Kosovo case, however!),

establish control and security environment, protect the population, assist in development of

their democratic institutions and train the security forces as well as active assistance in

reconstruction and humanitarian efforts. Second, the military dimension of the operation itself

also fits the counterinsurgency narrative, as the assigned task of conducting search operations

and deployment of special operations forces indicates offensive element in the Czech KFOR

deployment. Third, the Czech troops also directly supported and sought to facilitate

reconciliation efforts, which is one of the key components of counterinsurgency. As part of

KFOR, they also indirectly contributed to the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration

(DDR) efforts, by monitoring the flow of good crossing the border, which included arms

smuggling. Importantly, the original mandate of KFOR doesn’t allow for clear identification

of the parties that could function as insurgency in this KFOR counterinsurgency argument, a

fact, that limits the argument itself, but doesn’t entirely deny or falsify it.

5.3.2 Iraq

Another significant foreign deployment of the Czech armed forces with strong

counterinsurgency framing was represented by their participation in the Multinational Force -

Iraq (MNF – Iraq), aka operation Iraqi Freedom, and in the NATO Training Mission – Iraq

(NTM-I). The involvement of Czech military forces in Iraq was, however, limited in its scope.

Importantly, disclaimer: this thesis doesn’t intend to discuss the justification, legality or

legitimacy of the entire operation Iraqi Freedom, nor it seeks to address the evolution of the

operation itself in its complexity, character of the insurgency or overall security landscape, all

of its external and internal aspects or intended or unintended consequences. The focus of this

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thesis remains strictly placed on the participation of the Czech Republic in counterinsurgency

efforts in the country, put into the perspective of broader, but relevant or closely related

counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq.

The coalition campaign against Iraq in March 2003 was carried out by a coalition of

forces from different countries, some of which were NATO member countries and some were

not. NATO as an organization had no role in the planning or decision-making of the operation

to undertake or conduct it (cf. NATO 2015a). The operation was named Iraqi Freedom, an

apparent reference to the operational Enduring Freedom with the aim of underscoring the

presumed counter terrorism (al-Qaeda) connection and connotation. The stated objectives of

MNF-I were to stabilize the security situation in the post-invasion environment and after the

ouster of the regime of Saddam Hussein, and to restore the basic administrative and governing

functions, and provision of services to the population. The Resolution of the UN Security

Council no. 1637 (2005)61 then provided the MNF-I with its clear mandate.

Mirroring the development of the situation on the ground, the operation Iraqi Freedom

was gradually shaped and framed as counterinsurgency, a process which culminated in the

installation of four-star Gen. David Petraeus as Commanding General of the MNF-I from

February 2007 to September 2008. As commander of MNF-I, he then oversaw all coalition

forces present in Iraq. Gen. Petraeus is also, along with Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, the

overseeing commander of the publication of FM 3-24 on Counterinsurgency. As the “world’s

leading expert in counterinsurgency warfare, Gen. Petraeus then implemented his

counterinsurgency expertise in Iraq, and published his “Commander’s Counterinsurgency

Guidance” to help guide the coalition forces in Iraq, later re-issued in Afghanistan (see p. 79).

This guide is, however, relevant for the research of the Czech counterinsurgency approach

only partially,62 due to the limited number of the Czech contribution to the MNF-I.

The Czech government along with both chambers of the Czech Parliament approved

the deployment of the Czech element to the MNF-I gradually from December 2003 to

December 2008, when the Czech armed forces were withdrawn. At its highest peak, 300

Czech servicemen and women were deployed to Iraq. The time frame of the Czech

participation suggests the relevance of the Gen. Petraeus’ counterinsurgency guidance for the

activities and tasks of the Czech forces. But again, their involvement was rather limited (423

61 Text of Resolution 1637 can be accessed at http://gjpi.org/wp-content/uploads/res16371.pdf (retrieved on

February 9, 2017). 62 Can be found at

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20081031_art004.pdf

(retrieved on February 9, 2017).

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in total), especially in comparison to their mission in Afghanistan. The number of the

deployed Czech personnel steadily decreased to 17 servicemen comprising the last, 5th Czech

contingent deployed to the MNF-I before they were ultimately withdrawn in December 2008.

The main tasks of the Czech MNF-I element were to defend and protect the base of the

multinational forces close to the City of Basra, and performance of certain police and law

enforcement tasks outside the base perimeter, under the British command, as part of the

Multi-National Division South-East. The Czech troops also worked as instructors training and

assisting the Iraqi military in maintenance and service of Iraqi T-72 tanks and BVP-1 infantry

fighting vehicles, given the extensive experience the Czech military has with these types of

equipment.

Another mission the Czech Republic contributed its military forces to was the NATO

Training Mission – Iraq (NTM-I). The number of the Czech soldiers deployed to this

operation was small, 4 people, located at the NTM’s headquarters in Baghdad. NATO didn’t

have a direct role in the international stabilization efforts in post-invasion Iraq, the Alliance

contributed to the efforts to help Iraqi military to gain a sustainable level of operational

capability in order to take over the responsibility for the security in Iraq by the Iraqi armed

forces. NATO helped to train the Iraqi military and police personnel and supported the

development of Iraq’s security institutions in order to develop a democratically-led and

enduring security sector. NATO also functioned as a coordinator of the delivery of the

equipment for the forces of its members deployed in Iraq for the Iraqi forces. The mission was

established in 2004 and its mandate expired on 31st December, 2011, as the agreement about

the legal status of the NATO troops in Iraq past 2011 wasn’t reached with the governing Iraqi

regime. Importantly, the NTM-I was set up at the request of the Iraqi Interim Government and

in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution no. 1546 (2004),63 that established

mandate of the NTM-I as training and mentoring of the Iraqi security forces, as well as

equipment donation and coordination of its delivery. The Alliance also established a

structured cooperation framework to develop its long-term strategic partnership with Iraq

(NATO 2015b).

The Czech armed forces’ CIMIC unit was also deployed in Iraq in 2003. Its mission

was to contribute to the humanitarian operation in the City of Basra from May to December

2003, and its concrete tasks included area assessment, reconstruction of school and delivery of

the humanitarian aid in close cooperation with Czech NGOs (like ADRA, Člověk v tísni

63 Text of Resolution 1546 can be accessed at https://documents-dds-

ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/381/16/PDF/N0438116.pdf?OpenElement (retrieved on February 9, 2017).

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(People in Need), Červený kříž (Red Cross), Česká katolická charita (Czech Catholic

Charity), and the Stonožka (Centipede) movement). (Ministerstvo obrany ČR - 103. centrum

CIMIC-PSYOPS2004-Irák). The Iraq deployment cannot, however, be included into the

overall analysis of the Czech counterinsurgency approach, given its short time length. 2003

was also a year of post-invasion stabilization and reconstruction efforts, not

counterinsurgency per se yet.

Czech special operation forces, the 601st Special Forces Group, were also deployed to

Iraq in 2004 as part of the MNF-I (website). Any details about their mission and tasks are,

however, not available. Only discussions and speculations can be led about their assignment –

whether they were deployed to counter the threat of the rising insurgent threat in Iraq.

Nevertheless, this argument can be countered by the absence of any records of their later

deployments in Iraq, when the insurgency was at its peak. Therefore, it is more likely, that the

Czech special operation forces were committed to the efforts of searching, capturing or killing

of the highest representatives of the overthrown Baath regime, or perhaps Saddam Hussein

himself.

The main counterinsurgency tasks performed by the Czech military then included

guarding the perimeter of a multinational base and conducting police and law enforcement

tasks outside its perimeter until 2008. The geographical location of the Czech contingents was

the calmest and more peaceful area of Iraq that didn’t suffer from the escalation of violent

extremism, thereby the Czech experience with counterinsurgency activities is rather limited,

especially in the last year of their deployment, when the operation Iraqi Freedom increasingly

started to be framed as counterinsurgency, along with the application of counterinsurgency

principles on the ground by the MNF-I Commander Gen. Petraeus. What was also a

significant contribution to the overall counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq was the Czech

participation in the training and advising role of the HN forces by the coalition forces. The

reported deployment of the Czech special operations forces in Iraq cannot, however, be

considered as being linked to the coalition counterinsurgency campaign in the country.

Therefore, even though some elements potentially shaping the Czech counterinsurgency

approach can be identified from this deployment, the overall impact can be understood as

limited.

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5.3.3 Afghanistan

The best exemplary case for efforts of researching the Czech counterinsurgency approach is

the Czech involvement in the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Importantly,

disclaimer: this thesis doesn’t intend to address the overall NATO mission in Afghanistan, its

progress, success or effectiveness, in its entire complexity, nor it seeks to provide an

exhaustive assessment of the insurgency with all of its objectives, preferred courses of action,

evolution or sources of external support, unless directly linked to the issue of Czech approach

to counterinsurgency. The author doesn’t aim to provide a complex and comprehensive

analysis of the developments of the security situation, or at the political level, in Afghanistan

or exhaustive introduction into the genesis of ISAF and OEF-A either, as well as she doesn’t

discuss the activities not directly linked to the NATO/Czech counterinsurgency efforts (like

activities and operations of UNAMA or EUPOL) in more detail, only in terms of how they

contributed to the overall Czech counterinsurgency approach and efforts. The focus of this

thesis remains placed strictly on the Czech missions and efforts, contributions to the NATO

counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, put into the perspective of broader, but still only

relevant and related NATO counterinsurgency efforts in the country.

It is also important to understand the framework as well as the key principles and

mechanics of the NATO counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. Two foreign missions

were authorized to take place in Afghanistan by the UN Security Council resolutions, i.e.

operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A)64 and the International Security

Assistance Mission (ISAF), both executed in parallel, under the same C2 structure65, but with

different mandates in the same area of operations. In practice, however, given the joint chain

of command, the two operations merged, as confirmed by interviewed respondents. The U.S.

military personnel on the ground, according to their accounts, sometimes didn’t even know

themselves where they were assigned tasks under the OEF-A banner or ISAF. Indeed, running

two parallel missions without clear borderline between the two creates more confusion in

conceptual and theoretical terms, although in practice, no such confusion was mostly

noticeable, and the missions supplemented one another and supported their objectives. An

64 OEF-A has frequently also been referred to simply as operation Enduring Freedom, creating a certain level of

confusion by the inclarity of the meaning of the term in the context it was used. 65 The ISAF Joint Command Headquarters in Kabul changed its organizational structure with the aim of

increasing effectiveness of the ISAF chain of command in the increasingly complex security environment and

with the transition to the new preferred doctrine of counterinsurgency. Strategic and every-day operational

functions of the headquarters were separated, and commanders were interconnected to each other. The

organizational structure then included higher strategic command, ISAF headquarters, two operational

headquarters IJC, along with NTM-A headquarters (Kurej 2011).

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argument can be raised regarding the relationship of superiority between the two missions. As

already stated in the conceptual chapter of this text, the OEF-A is considered supplementary

to ISAF, as counterterrorism operations are often one preferred course of action within the

broader counterinsurgency framework, since the terrorism tactic is a popular modus operandi

of insurgents. Therefore, both OEF-A and ISAF are subjected to analysis and included in this

research.

OEF-A lasted from 7th October 2001 to 31st December 2014, and was a reaction to the

historically first activation of the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty about collective self-

defense in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on New York City and Washington, DC on 9th

September 2001. The legal mandate was given to it by the UN SC Resolution no. 1368

(2001)66 which, adopted unanimously, strongly condemned the terrorist attacks on the US and

called on all countries to cooperate in bringing the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the

attacks to justice, and that those responsible for harboring or supporting the perpetrators,

organizers or sponsors would be held accountable. The document also called upon the

international community to increase its efforts aimed at suppressing and preventing future

terrorist activities through cooperation and implementation of anti-terrorist conventions and

all relevant UN SC resolutions, particularly Resolution no. 1269 (1999)67 regarding

combating terrorism (UNSC 2001). Effectively, OEF-A was then counterterrorism operation,

whose theaters included not only Afghanistan, but also the Philippines, Somalia, Pankisi

Gorge in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan or the Sahara (so-called Maghreb) region, virtually anywhere

where the terrorist network al-Qaeda, the designated perpetrator of the terrorist attacks of the

9th September, 2001, established its presence, franchise or recruiting and support base. OEF-

A was initiated as a joint U.S., U.K. and Afghan operation in October 2001, and the rest of

NATO joined the campaign in 2003, after assuming its leading role of ISAF. This observation

can serve as yet another argument highlighting the practical merge of the two operations.

The decision to established International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was

adopted during the Bonn conference in December 2001. Its mandate was set by 18 UN SC

Resolutions – i.e. resolutions no. 1368, 1413,68 1444,69 1510,70 156371, 1623,72 1707,73 1776,74

66 Text of Resolution 1368 can be accessed at https://documents-dds-

ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement (retrieved February 9, 2017) 67 The text of Resolution 1269 can be accessed at https://documents-dds-

ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/303/92/PDF/N9930392.pdf?OpenElement (retrieved on February 3, 2017). 68 Text of Resolution 1413 can be accessed at https://documents-dds-

ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/397/33/PDF/N0239733.pdf?OpenElement (retrieved on February 9, 2017). 69 Text of Resolution 1444 can be accessed at https://documents-dds-

ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/397/33/PDF/N0239733.pdf?OpenElement (retrieved on February 9, 2017).

137

181775, 1833,76 1890,77 1917,78 2011,79 2041,80 2069,81 2096,82 2120,83 2145,84 and 218985

which only further highlights the strong legal basis of the mission. ISAF was then first

deployed to Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan authorities with its original mandate,

authorized by the UN SC, was to assist the Afghan Transnational Authority, elected during

the Bonn conference, in maintenance of security in the capital Kabul and its surrounding areas

with the primary aim to enable the operations and activities of the UN agencies and the

Afghan government itself in the secure and stable environment and supporting the

reconstruction efforts. Although ISAF was not a UN force, it was a UN-mandated

international force under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter.86 The Afghan insurgency,

represented mainly, but not only by the Taliban movement, was still in its pre-natal stages,

recovering from the defeat they sustained during the initial phase of OEF-A. The mission was

initially limited to the Kabul area, with the intentional to gradually extent its area of operation

throughout the country as the influence and control of the central Kabul government would be 70 Text of Resolution 1510 can be accessed at

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1510(2003) (retrieved on February 9, 2017). 71 Text of Resolution 1563 can be accessed at

http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1563.pdf (retrieved on February 9, 2017). 72 Text of Resolution 1623 can be accessed at http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1623.pdf

(retrieved on February 9, 2017). 73 Text of Resolution 1707 can be accessed at http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1707.pdf

(retrieved February 9, 2017). 74 Text of Resolution 1776 can be accessed at

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1776(2007) (retrieved February 9, 2017). 75 Text of Resolution 1817 can be accessed at https://www.incb.org/documents/PRECURSORS/Resolutions-

Precursors/SecurityCouncilRes1817.2008.pdf (retrieved February 9, 2017). 76 Text of Resolution 1833 can be accessed at http://www.mofa.go.jp/ICSFiles/afieldfile/2009/08/21/1833.pdf

(retrieved on February 9, 2017). 77 Text of resolution 1890 can be accessed at http://afghanistan-un.org/wp-

content/uploads/2011/01/sres1890_2009.pdf (retrieved February 9, 2017). 78 Text of Resolution 1917 can be accessed at

https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/march222010scunamamandate.pdf (retreved on February 9,

2017). 79 Text of Resolution 2011 can be accessed at

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2011(2011) (retrieved on February 9, 2017). 80 Text of Resolution 2041 can be accessed at

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2041(2012) (retrieved February 9, 2017). 81 Text of Resolution 2069 can be accessed at

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2069(2012) (retrieved February 9, 2017). 82 Text of Resolution 2096 can be accessed at

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2096(2013) (retrieved on February 9, 2017). 83 Text of Resolution 2120 can be accessed at

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2120(2013) (retrieved on February 9, 2017). 84 Text of Resolution 2145 can be accessed at

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2145(2014) (retrieved on February 9, 2017). 85 Text of Resolution 2189 can be accessed at

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2189%20(2014) (retrieved on February 9, 2017). 86 Text of the Chapter VII can be accessed at http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/ (retrieved on

February 3, 2017). Articles 42-47 are most relevant to ISAF. Initially, ISAF was then launched as a peace

keeping operation which with the gradual spread and rise of insurgency transformed into peace enforcement and

ultimately counterinsurgency.

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spreading across the country’s provinces. The ISAF nations assumed the command of the

mission on a six months rotational basis. Along the way, the ISAF Commander also signed a

detailed Military Technical Agreement with the Afghan Transnational Authority in January

2002, which provided additional guidance for ISAF and its operations.

NATO assumed leadership of ISAF in August 2003, and NATO became responsible

for the command, coordination and planning of the operation, including the provision of a

force commander and its multinational headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan (NATO

2015c). In October 2003, the UN SC Resolution no. 151087 extended ISAF’s mandate to

cover the entire country. The expansion of the mission happened in 4 stages:

• Stage 1 – to the north

• Stage 2 – to the west

• Stage 3 – to the south

• Stage 4 – to the east (with ISAF effectively taking responsibility across the

entire country, and ISAF regional commands were established in their

respective area of responsibility) (Ibid).

The expansion of ISAF, and thus the expansion of the NATO’s area of operations, was

completed in October 2006, when the command of eastern Afghanistan was taken from the

US-led coalition. This fact further supports the argument about a symbiotic relationship

existing between OEF-A and ISAF. The expansion was also reflected in the revised

operational plan, which conceptualized the greater role of ISAF in the country. The revised

operational plan included the deployment of ISAF training and mentoring teams to Afghan

National Army units at various levels of command, while retaining its initial tasks of

providing secure environment for reconstruction efforts, and support to the central Afghan

government. Already during the stage 1, NATO adopted the model of PRTs as the most

suitable one for the reconstruction of Afghanistan in highly unstable security environment,

and the military components of the already existing PRTs were subdued under the NATO

command. The expansion of the ISAF mandate was also mirrored by the growing number of

forces, capabilities and resources deployed in the mission.

The ISAF mission had two major dimensions:

• Capacity building and transitioning to Afghan lead (NATO provided support to the

Afghan government and international community in security sector reform (SSR),

87 Text of Resolution 1510 can be accessed at http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1510.pdf

(retrieved on February 3, 2017).

139

including mentoring, training and operational support to the Afghan National Army

(ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) with the aim of building professional,

independent and sustainable forces able to provide security to the population across

the country; this task was executed simultaneously by the NATO Training Mission

Afghanistan (NTM-A), ISAF’s Joint Command (IJC) and the EU Police Mission in

Afghanistan (EUPOL88), along with other important national actors with clear division

of responsibilities89); and

• Support for reconstruction and development (contribution to the reconstruction and

development efforts by securing areas in which reconstruction work was conducted by

national or international actors, mainly in the PRT framework90; in close coordination

with UNAMA, ISAF provided practical support for reconstruction and development

efforts as well as support for humanitarian assistance conducted by other actors)

(Ibid).

Such framing of the ISAF’s mandate indicates NATO’s efforts to create as comprehensive

framework for ISAF operation as possible, in close cooperation with other national and

international partners. However, for instance, the structure of the HN capability-building

efforts, divided among three different entities with seemingly clear division of responsibility,

can prove to be very challenging in practical terms and potentially also undermining certain

key attributes of counterinsurgency. It not only gravely increases the bureaucratic burden of

all activities and efforts by the international coalition in Afghanistan, potentially challenging

the processes of transition, and communication and coordination between the respective

organs, particularly with separate EU framework of operations.

Such structure can also undermine the counterinsurgency actions in a sense of not

adhering to the unity of command imperative. The overall security sector reform was also

technically and practically flawed, with potentially negative consequences in the long-term

outlook, as it sought to copy the Western model of security sector, with centralized

democratic oversight over the armed forces.

88 EUPOL didn’t, however, have the mandate to leave the compound. 89 NTM-A was responsible for the training of initial recruits and building institutional training capability of the

ANSF, whereas IJC focused on developing fielded ANSF units through mentoring, advice and assistance. 90 PRTs also helped the Afghan authorities strengthen their institutions as part of wider efforts to establish good

governance and the rule of law and to promote human rights in the country, with the goal of building Afghan

capacity, support the growth of governance structures and promote environment in which governance can

improve. Mirroring the transition process, all PRTs canceled their operations by the end of 2014, and handed

over their functions to the Afghan government, traditional development actors, NGOs and the private sector

(NATO 2015c).

140

Local ownership of the SSR process has been often emphasized as the key attribute of the

SSR in post-conflict environments. However, Afghanistan was not in a post-conflict state, but

the SSR has been carried out in the environment of a continuing low intensity conflict91. As

distinguished expert on Afghanistan Antonio Giustozzi notes political authority in

Afghanistan has remained highly contested, and the profound level of insecurity has ensured

that locals have been preoccupied with short-term survival more that any efforts to manage,

let alone plan for their security sector. Moreover, Afghan capacity to initiate or mitigate

reform has been seriously damaged by decades of continuous conflict environment, and the

SSR has been deeply intertwined with the politically charged state-building efforts (Giustozzi

2008: 215-232). Local ownership of the SSR in Afghanistan has thus been absent or very

minimal, which led to lack of accountability of the state itself in terms of its control and

oversight mechanisms over the armed forces. The challenge of the minimal local ownership

also undermined efforts aimed promoting nationalistic feeling among the recruits.

Another major challenge for the ANSF capacity building was represented by the realities

on the ground and the necessity to fight the insurgent anti-government elements in order to

secure and stabilize the country. Additionally, the revised operational plan of ISAF put

additional pressure on building the ANSF as primarily counterinsurgency force, instead of

regular national armed forces system. Such tendency was understandable in a short-term, but

had (and will continue to have) negative impact and consequences in long-term projections.

Some of these implications has manifested after the ISAF mission was terminated and

replaced by the NATO training mission Resolute Support, like the huge disproportionality in

preparedness of difference armed forces components (very well trained and equipped Afghan

special operation forces vs. ill-equipped and unprepared border guards, let alone the Afghan

air force), that reflected the priorities of the counterinsurgency/counterterrorism campaign.

Assistance in reconstruction was very significant endeavor. Nonetheless, it was met with a

critical challenge of balancing the neutrality, impartiality and independence of NGOs and

their activities in the absence of permissible security environment. The concept of PRTs is

one of the most effective concepts of CIMIC cooperation in stabilization and reconstruction in

theory, but it faces multiple challenges and obstacles when implemented, like the perception

of civilian workers as a party of conflict by the locals (as confirmed by all of the respondents

91 The SSR in post-2001 Afghanistan has been established with the understanding and perception that the

adversary was defeat. Initial warning signs were ignored and the realities on the ground in Afghanistan gravely

misunderstood. For more on this topic, see Bergen, P. – Tiedermann, K. (2013): Talibanistan: Negotiating the

Borders between Terror, Politics, and Religion (OUP USA), or Giustozzi, A. (2012): Decoding the New

Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (Hurst Publishers).

141

interviewed). Other NGOs refused military protection in order to avoid such a perception and

to maintain their impartial status. In the unstable security environment of Afghanistan, with

the widespread culture of impunity, NGOs have, however, become a target of several violent

attacks92 several times already. The NGOs operating independently without military

protection thus can become victimized by a widespread perception, where in the eyes of

Afghans foreign civilian reconstruction and humanitarian workers along with their local

employees are associated with military force accompanying them. Targeting of NGOs can

also be understood in the context of increasing adoption of the civilizational struggle and

jihadism narratives by the insurgents. This fact represents an additional challenge for

counterinsurgency campaigns. Technically, the concept of PRTs in a sense partially

undermines the principles stated in the Long-Term Outlook for the Czech defense sector,

about respecting and maintaining the status of civilian workers (see p. 86). The document

was, however, adopted after the Czech PRT Logar terminated its operations, and thereby a

clear argumentative connection cannot be established here. The stated principle may also be

promoted a lesson learned from the Afghan experience.

Main LOOs of the ISAF mission, which included protection of the population, ANSF

capability-building, support of socio-economic development, support of the regional and local

governance as well as elimination of insurgent activity were coordinated, synchronized and

conducted simultaneously, in conjunction with one another. Counterinsurgency doctrine was

then implemented through all five ISAF LOOs.

ISAF’s role progressively changed from leading operations to enabling the Afghan

security forces to conduct independent operations themselves, under the mentoring and

supervision of the coalition forces. Accordingly, the ISAF mission gradually evolved from the

one primarily focused on combat operation (military-centric counterinsurgency approach) to

an enabling Security Assistance Force (SAF) role, centered on training, advising and assisting

the HN security forces with the goal of preparing them to fully assume responsibilities for

security in the country by the end of 2014. This became the main focus of ISAF in 2011 and

onward.

With the evolution of the mission itself, its narrative framing as well as preferred

strategies for its execution changed with the dynamic security environment, the growing

Taliban insurgency, and also reflective of the developments in Iraq. The coalition forces surge

92 One of the most notable ones happened in Mazar-e Sharif on June 2, 2015 (see

http://www.voanews.com/a/ngo-employees-gunned-down-afghanistan/2804066.html (retrieved February 4,

2017). This attack targeted workers of the Czech NGO People in Need.

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in 2009 and issuance of counterinsurgency guidance materials by the two consecutive ISAF

commanders prove the growing preference for counterinsurgency efforts, which culminated in

the adoption of the NATO counterinsurgency strategy doctrine in 2011. The

counterinsurgency label of the coalition efforts in Afghanistan was gradually dropped,

attempting to reframe the mission as counterterrorism with nation-building campaign and

alike, mirroring the growing unwillingness of individual ISAF TCNs to engage in such

demanding and long-term efforts, reflective of the growing public discontent with the mission

as well. It, however, didn’t prove the inadequacy or relevance of counterinsurgency strategy

to the attempts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan per se, as it was more of a political

decision. Closely linked to this issue is different understanding of the mission’s ill-defined

objectives by different ISAF TCNs, manifested in the use of national caveats (see p. 31). The

incoherence of ISAF in terms of how limited the goals and the end state of the mission were

posed one of the fundamental challenges to its efficiency and success. This discrepancy in

different goal setting also mirrored differences between individual countries on what

counterinsurgency means and how to best approach it. Many countries, like the Czech

Republic, also mostly abstained from using the counterinsurgency narrative in their policies.

The transition process was broken down into six phases and was mirrored by the gradual

drawdown of the coalition forces (NATO 2015c). NATO itself asserts that this drawdown was

conducted in a “coordinated, measured and gradual way in line with the ANSF’s capacity to

manage the security situation” (Ibid). However, as manifested by the recent developments

and as noted by the majority of the respondents, the capacities and capabilities of the ANSF

were greatly overestimated. For instance, 1st Lt. Staněk disclosed that on the highest levels of

policy and strategy planning the transition was executed according to the pre-planned

schedule, however, the reality on the ground was completely different.93 The transition

process was agreed on during the NATO summit in Lisbon 2010,94 launched in July 2011 and

completed by the end of 2014.95

The country of Afghanistan also represents particularly challenging case

counterinsurgency efforts in general, as it bears some unique features and characteristics that,

potentially, can hamper the effectiveness and success of the counterinsurgency efforts,

93 The notion of the proper transition as scheduled could have also been caused by the flawed metrics of progress

in ISAF. 94 The summit declaration can be accessed at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68828.htm

(retrieved on February 4, 2017). 95 According to some of the respondents, the later phases of the transition process were marked by weakening of

counterinsurgency efforts on the ground by individual troops, with the justification of them knowing their

deadline for final withdrawal/transformation of the mission.

143

especially when contrasted to the overall characteristics of Kosovo or Iraq. Universal

application of counterinsurgency is, indeed, impossible, as local conditions, specific

developments and unique features must always be considered (which is also one of the key

imperatives of counterinsurgency in general). In case of Afghanistan, the challenge of

implementing counterinsurgency strategy has been hampered by its topography (high

mountainous ranges and dry deserts), its history of decentralized governance and previous

absence of historical experience with centralized government and its infrastructure across the

entire country, at the time of the 2001 invasion three decades of constant state of conflict in

the territory of Afghanistan, widespread organized crime activity and vast poppy fields,

overabundance of militias and other armed non-state actors, power struggles between

warlords virtually ruling the country, ethnic composition of the population and resulting

tensions and rivalries, strong tribalism and respect to the tribal authority and customs,

traditions and culture96, and rivalries and conflicts existing between tribes or clans, as well as

its geopolitical and geostrategic location and involvement and deep interests of external actors

in the country, particularly Pakistan and Iran. The Taliban movement, let alone the Afghan

insurgency is by no means a monolithic entity, and comprises of numerous groups with

differing, and sometimes even mutually antagonistic ideologies and goals. Majority of the

respondents interviewed by the author also claimed that switching sides, alliances and

allegiances on a daily basis is a common occurrence in the Afghan landscape of the armed

actors. In the other words, a tribal militia cooperating with ISAF and the government changes,

for opportunistic reasons, its preference and starts to cooperate with the Taliban, only to go

back to the coalition/government side one month later.

Based on the interviews the author conducted and on the thorough study of relevant

primary and secondary sources of data, she discovered that the involvement of the Czech

Republic in the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan comprised of three main lines of

effort:

• Deployments of special operations forces (SOF);97

• Training and advising to the ANSF; and

• Reconstruction and stabilization efforts. 96 Even the Taliban themselves combine elements of the Pashtun tribal code Pashtunwali with deo-bandi Islamic

motives in their ideology. See, for instance, Brahimi, A. (2010): Taliban’s Evolving Ideology, accessible at

http://www.lse.ac.uk/globalGovernance/publications/workingPapers/WP022010.pdf (retrieved on February 4,

2017). 97 Even though they were initially officially committed to OEF-A, the existing relationship between OEF-A and

ISAF and the author’s decision not to analyze the two operations separately (see p. 136) means the inclusion of

Czech special operation forces’ activities is not only appropriate, but also beneficial and necessary for the

purposes of this research.

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5.3.3.1 Deployments of special operations forces (SOF)

According to the respondents familiar with such deployments, as well as according to the

official websites of the Czech special forces and the Czech Ministry of Defense, the Czech

SOF, 601st Special Forces Group (601SFG)98 first deployed to Afghanistan from March to

August 2004, in compliance with the mandate approved by the Czech government and both

chambers of the Czech Parliament, in the capacity of 120 soldiers. More detailed information

about this deployment is not available to the public. Speculations are circulating about the

engagement of 601SFG in the operations along the eastern and southern border with Pakistan,

aimed eliminating the al-Qaeda elements from the area, in coordination with the Pakistani

armed forces at that time. Clearer idea about the 2004 601SFG deployment can also be

obtained through the examination of the deployments that followed. It is, however, important

to keep in mind dynamics and evolution of the security environment in respective time

frames, which affect the scope and range of the mandate of 601SFG during respective

deployments. In general, the individual tasks of 601SFG are derived from the NATO

directives and doctrines as well as based on their definition by the highest national command.

601SFG was redeployed in 2006 with the assigned tasks of special reconnaissance,

direct action and other kinds of special operations in the southern Kandahar province aimed at

elimination of the adversary’s activities (nominally Taliban and al-Qaeda), and hence

contribute to the efforts to create secure and stable environment in Afghanistan. 601SFG was

subordinated to the Multinational Special Operations Command of OEF-A. The 2006 601SFG

deployment marked historically second combat deployment of the Czech armed forces (601.

skupina speciálních sil generála Moravce a), indicating that even their 2004 deployment

included combat operations. 601SFG was actively engaged in combat missions on a regular

basis and participated in all of the coalition significant offensives (like operation Mountain

Thrust, lasting from 15th May to 31st July, 2006),99 without sustaining any combat casualties

(Ibid). Cooperation with legitimate local authority and assistance to the population was

reportedly also among the main mandated tasks 601SFG was committed to. Any details in this

regard are, however, absent.

98 601SFG doesn’t have capabilities and resources for continuous deployment, was thereby deployed several

times. This further poses challenges for counterinsurgency efforts, as the impact of their operations wasn’t

sustainable as no one immediately replaced them. 99 More information about operation Mountain Thrust can be found at

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/06/three_days_of_operat.php (retrieved on February 4, 2017).

145

Third deployment of 601SFG to Afghanistan was served in the operation 18 months

during 2008 and 2009 with three rotations of 100 personnel. The assigned tasks executed

during this deployment reportedly remained the same – special reconnaissance, direct combat

action and other special operations, and followed the two previous deployments. Even though

the main base with headquarters, C2 elements and logistic support was located on the

Kandahar Air Field base, the main area of operations of 601SFG during this deployment was

neighboring Uruzgan province, where a multinational forward operational base was

established (601. skupina speciálních sil generála Moravce b).

601SFG asserts that this deployment contributed to strengthen security of local

population, as key figures of the insurgent anti-government elements, providing them with

financial and logistical support were eliminated. This reportedly further led to the decrease

and limitations of operational capabilities of the insurgents, because they were not able to plan

and conduct coordinated attacks against coalition forces or ANSF in the area anymore (Ibid).

The combat action escalated during the 2009 presidential elections, with the total of 200 direct

combat encounters in the 18 months’ period. 601SFG’s website also emphasizes the gradual

progress of ANSF in improving their operational capabilities, combat skills and gaining

respect and legitimacy in the eyes of the population (Ibid), suggesting that 601SFG also

participating in efforts to train and advise Afghan SOF.

Considering the fact that training activities of Afghan SOF are generally considered a

rare success of the mostly unsuccessful SSR in Afghanistan, 601SFG would then contributed

to one of major successes of the overall ISAF mission. 601SFG further emphasizes their

population-centric approach to their actions, along with meetings with tribal elders and

provision of medical and material aid to the population. Great attention was also devoted to

minimization of civilian casualties resulting from their actions (Ibid).

In accordance with the decision of the Czech government from October 2009,

approved by both chambers of the Czech Parliament, 601SFG also functions as the guard at

the Embassy of the Czech Republic in Kabul, and provides personal security detail to its

employees, from February 2010 to this day (601. skupina speciálních sil generála Moravce c).

The decision to deploy SOF to guard a nation’s embassy is uncommon procedure, as countries

usually deploy rapid response unit of national police forces, or hire services of private security

actors. The decision to utilize 601SFG for this purpose was justified by the deteriorating

security situation in the Afghan capital, and was met with a wave of criticism along the main

lines of argumentations of inadequate use of SOF or their overloading with tasks.

146

The last recorded combat deployment of 601SFG was in eastern province of

Nangarhar in 2011100 and 2012, with two six months long rotation of task force of 100

servicemen, as part of the Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (SOJTF-A)101.

601SFG admits to engaging in full spectrum of special operations with the home base

HOMBRE in Jalalabad. It also emphasizes the task of training, mentoring and advising to the

special response unit of the ANP, so-called Provincial Response Company Nangarhar (601.

skupina speciálních sil generála Moravce d). This fact not only validates the argument about

the flaws of the Afghan SSR, but also indicates escalated training efforts after the July 2011

announcement of the time specific transition process, because military SOF training a police

unit may, potentially, prove counterproductive, as it can lead to militarized police force. Other

assigned tasks of 601SFG during this deployment consist of information-sharing, cooperation

and coordination of efforts with all intelligence and SOF units deployed in the area of

operation, along with other agencies responsible for counterterrorism, counter-narcotics

operations or measures aimed at elimination of other forms of criminal activity (like arms

smuggling) (Ibid). The key operations also included elimination of the network producing and

distributing narcotics (used to finance insurgent activities), seizure of caches of arms,

weapons and explosives (including IED producing factories), capture of high-value targets, or

operations aimed at freeing kidnapped hostages (Ibid).

Details and specifics about 601SFG deployments and operations in Afghanistan

remain murky and classified. The unit itself publicizes only the basic information about their

activities, for obvious reasons. Therefore, their potential involvement in night raids or in

cross-border operations on the territory of Pakistan remains publicly unavailable, as well as

the statistics of their deployments (number of high-value targets captured vs. killed, number

of civilians killed as direct/indirect result of the 601SFG actions, etc.).

Sources claim that no serviceman of 601SFG was killed, captured or went missing in

action, demonstrating the level of preparedness, training, equipment as well as

interoperability, skills and abilities of the Czech SOF. To measure effectiveness of their

actions in Afghanistan is impossible, given the fact that they mostly operating in multinational

task forces, as confirmed by respondents familiar with this matter. Two of them made a case

of the zero casualty count as proving their efficiency and good intelligence collection as a

100 Fall 2011 marked the culmination of the Czech foreign deployment at the peak of 800-850 military

professionals deployed to Afghanistan, which in the Czech context (considering the resources available) is a

great force and enormous expenditure. 101 More information on the SOJTF-A can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/sojtf-

a.htm (retrieved February 4, 2017).

147

special operations force. Respondents also stressed the reputation and respect 601SFG earned

among the allies and partner countries for the psychological resilience, professionalism and

heroism proved in their actions. Furthermore, 601SFG also engaged in other activities,

deemed critical for the success of counterinsurgency campaign, like provision of aid to the

population and respecting local authorities, which, along with their stated principle of

avoidance of civilian casualties, indicates their preference of population-centric approach to

counterinsurgency.

Additionally, the Czech Military Police also deployed its Special Operations Group

(SOG) to Afghanistan in 2006-2009 in Helmand and later also Logar provinces. The mandate

of SOG comprised of rapid response unit during security operations of coalition forces,

counterterrorism operations, and, at the request, provision of personal security detail to high-

ranking officers and high political representatives, along with protection of significant

facilities, civilian aircraft, but also police protection for especially dangerous criminals.

According several sources of data, SOG also participated in target operations of individuals

involved in serious organized crime gangs operating inside and outside the Czech military (cf.

(Ministerstvo obrany ČR – SOG v Afghánistánu; SOFREP 2015; Česká televize 2008). SOG

deployment in Afghanistan also marked the first Czech combat death since the WWII, when

SOF operator Milan Štěrba died in a suicide attack in Helmand on 17th March, 2008.

Existence and operations of the SOF unit are accompanied by series of serious accusations

and criticisms (most notably about their alleged reluctance to fight, which allegedly resulting

in abandoning their British partners in the battlefield with the insurgents)102. The unit was

dissolved after this scandalous accusation in 2009. As eight respondents informed the author,

the members of SOG often complained about the lack of clear guidance from the national

command. Therefore, this accusation may turn out to be a result of an undeclared caveat

issued by the Czech authorities, classified and previously not known to the force deployed on

the ground, or by the police as opposed to the military mentality of the SOG members. As

such, the deployment and activities of SOG provided important contribution to the overall

counterinsurgency efforts of ISAF, especially with their focus on the activities of organized

crime.

Czech FAC operators have also been deployed to Afghanistan on individual basis,

mostly with the task of supporting operations of the US with cooperation with forces of other

102 See, for instance an article on Gurdian, acvailable at

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/czechrepublic/5200990/Czech-troops-abandoned-British-

soldiers-in-Afghanistan.html 9retrieved on February 4, 2017).

148

partner countries. Skills and activities of the Czech FAC operators have been, as the author

was told by two of them, greatly appreciated, honored and valued by other coalition partners,

especially the Americans, and are reportedly considered to be among the top few in their field

of specialization, as the American soldiers told the author. FACs are operating from FOBs,

and the Allied Glossary of Military Terms defines them as “qualified individuals who, from a

forward position on the ground or in the air, directs the actions of combat aircraft engaged in

close air support of land forces” (NATO 2013: 2-F-6). More details about their operations

are, however, subjected to classification, for obvious reasons. Nonetheless, considering their

role in military contributions, it is fair to state that the deployment of Czech FAC operators

was among the most significant and valuable contributions to the NATO counterinsurgency

operation in Afghanistan.

5.3.3.2 Training and advising to ANSF

Training and advising of the HN security forces represent another key pillar of the Czech

counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. Generally speaking, training and mentoring HN

security forces is widely considered the fundamental pillar of sustainability and success

counterinsurgency efforts in a long-term. It also is the only line of effort (excluding the

protection of the Czech Embassy by 601SFG) the Czech Republic continues to engage in as

part of operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan. This line of effort also in certain sense

connects the other two (SOF deployments and reconstruction and stabilization) categories,

because as stated above, 601SFG helped to build capacities of the ANP units, and as shown

below, the Czech PRT Logar also ran its ANP training program, and so did the specialized

personnel deployed to the Kabul International Airport. Important difference existed between

numerous ANSF capacity building initiatives – OMLT and POMLT teams accompanied the

Afghan units they were responsible for to the front lines103, but other training programs didn’t

require the front line mentoring (it wasn’t their priority).

Separate autonomous training, advising, assisting and mentoring missions were

represented by:

Czech OMLT Team in Wardak (March 2010 – April 2013; 5x54 personnel) – training,

advising, assisting and mentoring the ANA at the battalion (Kandak) at the Carwile Base

(Solthan Kheyl) in south of Wardak. The major task of the unit was to help the ANA rifle unit

in process of C2 planning in order to upgrade operational capabilities of all units of the 103 According to some reports up to 95 percent of the activities, particularly search operations.

149

Kandak. The goal was to build secure environment, ensure the freedom of movement within

the respective area of responsibility104 and planning and setting the conditions for future

operations. Czech and Afghan soldiers, along with their American partners operates from

three FOBs in the area. According to the statement of the Czech Ministry of Defense, as all as

testimonies of 5 Czech military respondents who served in each of the OMLT contingents, the

Czech Task Force was fully equipped and capable of independent engagement and operations

in the respective area with their Kandak, autonomous from the US actions. The 1st OMLT

contingent along with their assigned ANA Kandak started their training at the Black Horse

Base in Kabul. After the Afghans got the basic training and basic operating procedures were

optimized and coordinated, the Kandak with its Czech instructors moved to Wardak to fulfil

tasks received from the ANA command. Majority of the Czech military personnel deployed to

the OMLT was from the 43rd Airborne Mechanized Battalion (Chrudim), supplemented by

other specialists (air controllers, artillery) to meet the requirements for completion of specific

tasks. (Ministerstvo obrany ČR – Afghánistán Wardak (OMLT ISAF); Staněk 2013). Then 1st

Lt. Jiří Staněk who served in the Czech OMLT unit in Wardak shared with the author his

views on the main challenges and problems of that deployment. In his opinion, the main

problem severely hindering the effectiveness of the OMLT mission were the Afghan

themselves. Three to four decades of constant state of conflict in Afghanistan caused a wide

spread illiteracy among the population and strong spiritual and religious believes, combined

with their mountainous stubborn mentality based on respect to traditions was, reportedly,

sometimes difficult to deal with. Another major problem was reportedly the existence of

ethnic quotas for the composition of Afghan units. As evidence gathered from numerous

resources shows the prevailing ethnic tensions and mistrust was prevalent during the training.

Connected to the negative impacts of the factor of ethnicity was also the language barrier

when often different ethnicities don’t understand each other. 1st Lt. Staněk mentioned an

example of one Tajik in one team, where the rest were Pashtuns. Not only he couldn’t

understand his colleagues, but they, allegedly, also didn’t treat him fairly. Another significant

challenge, he mentioned was the strict restrictions imposed on the ANSF recruits, as they

were not allowed to work in the area they live, for security reasons.105

104 More specifically, the Taliban smuggled their fighters and weapons to Kabul through the Wardak province,

along the mountainous range, which, however, was also in the close proximity to the perimeter of the Carwile

Base. 105 They relatives reportedly didn’t even know they were undergoing military or police training. The rationale

behind was to prevent tipping of the families of soldiers and retaliation by the insurgents.

150

Training Units of the Military Police in Wardak (October 2010 - March 2013; 4x12

personnel) – a joint Czech and Slovak military police training program for the ANP as part of

a team of international mentors led by France, which included mentors from Portugal and

Romania as well. The main tasks of the unit included mentoring of the instructors of the

National Police Training Center in Wardak, supervision of their organization and planning of

the training at the respective Training Center, and support the efforts aimed at building

command corps along with extensive preparation of the key staff of the Police Training

Center (Ministerstvo obrany ČR – Afghánistán, Wardak (Vojenská policie, ISAF));

ISAF Military Advisory Team (MAT)106 in Wardak (April – October 2013; 59 personnel) –

the main mission of the MAT unit was to advise, assist and support ANA Kandak at the staff

level in operational planning and combat use of its units, but also to cooperate and coordinate

with other coalition units and participate in their operations, as necessary. The main effort and

focus of the mission were placed on the improvement of the Kandak’s combat capabilities,

their autonomous planning, decision-making and operational maneuvering, and their ability to

lead professional operations without support of the coalition forces. The Czech MAT

contingent included also medical personnel teaching the Afghans in the practice of life saving

support and treatment of patients on a daily basis (Ministerstvo obrany ČR – Afghánistán

Wardak (1. MAT ISAF)); and

ISAF Military Advisory Team (MAT) in Logar (March – October 2013; 64 personnel) –

tasked with advising the command staff and personnel of ANA Kandak in order to facilitate

their professional growth in command and planning procedures, and included military

medics/combat support personnel as well (Ministerstvo obrany ČR – Afghánistán Lógar (1.

MAT ISAF)).

Significant portion of the training activities as one of the signature features of the

contemporary Czech approach toward counterinsurgency is represented by the utilization of

the training facilities in the Czech Republic itself. Training activities on the Czech territory

are conducted by the elements of the Czech armed forces, but also increasingly by Czech

private corporate entities (like the flight training programs in Hradec Králové)107.

106 MAT is basically OMLT at the officers’ level. 107 For some information see, for example, http://zpravy.idnes.cz/zbehli-afghanci-v-cesku-07u-

/domaci.aspx?c=A120828_112048_domaci_jw (accessed on January 17, 2017).

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5.3.3.3 Reconstruction and stabilization efforts

According to the Czech military and political representatives the author interviewed, and

confirmed by Ing. Varga from the then Doctrine Department at the Training Command –

Military Academy in Vyškov, the primary focus and line of counterinsurgency efforts of the

Czech Republic are stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

As stated in the ISAF mandate itself (see p. 139), great and key part of the ISAF

operation was represented by reconstruction and stabilization activities, mainly in the format

of PRTs, which were both national and multinational. First direct experience with the

operations and activities of a PRT the Czech military gained in the period from March 2005 to

November 2007, when 600 Czech soldiers were deployed in 6 rotations to support a German

PRT in Fayzabad the northern province of Badakshan. PRTs generally operate on the

principle of civil-military partnership. The main tasks of the Czech military personnel

deployed to Badakshan were to support provision of security in the area, provide security to

the international units of civilian and military teams of the PRT, monitoring of the security

situation in area of responsibility, patrolling and convoy escorts, as well as cooperation with

the local population in reconstruction projects. The core unit of the Czech task force was

formed by the members of 102nd Reconnaissance Battalion of General Karel Paleček (102.

průzkumný prapor generála Karla Palečka in original), based in Prostějov. Therefore,

reconnaissance activities also played a significant role during their deployment, more details

about their operations are, however, classified. The Czech personnel were assigned to the

military component of the German PRT, sized 200 in total, along with Danish and German

military. As three servicemen of the Czech Reconnaissance battalion disclosed, one of the

main drivers behind this deployment was existing national caveats on the side of the German

military, who were restricted in the use of force and the Danish contingent wasn’t able to

provide security to the entire PRT by itself (cf. Ministerstvo obrany ČR – Fayazabad). This

marks the first time the Czech military has been directly exposed to counterinsurgency

activities, even if in such limited fashion. What this deployment proved though, was not only

the professionalism of the Czech reconnaissance servicemen, but also their level of

interoperability with their coalition partners, particularly in a situation when some of them is

restricted by their national caveats.

According to report published by Lubomír Světnička in 2005, the major source of

insecurity and hostile reactions from the locals was represented by their continued efforts of

poppy growing. The prevailing perception was, that the “war was over” and the fears that the

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foreign troops are still present in the country with the goal of destroying their poppy fields,

which they didn’t have mandate for anyway (Světnička 2005). His report also discloses

information about adjusting the procedures and protocols of patrols, convoys through villages

as well as direct contact with the locals, based on the situation on the ground and the activities

of the population (Světnička mentions “throwing rocks” at the Czech forces; Ibid). Such

adjustments to local conditions continued throughout the various deployments of the Czech

forces in ISAF, as confirmed by the Czech respondents.

The greatest contribution to ISAF counterinsurgency efforts in terms of support to

reconstruction, development and stabilization activities was a joint project of the Czech

Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, autonomous Czech national PRT108 which

operated from the US FOB Shank in the eastern Afghan province of Logar. The solely Czech

PRT started to operate in Logar in March 2008 and terminated its activities by July 2007.

2.500 personnel (and up to the third of them several times)109 comprised of the Czech army

professionals and civilian experts rotated in six months long rotation 11 times, with the last

contingent (January to July 2013) tasked with withdrawing equipment and material, part of

them sending back to the Czech Republic and responsible for the transition phase of handing

over the last reconstruction projects of the Czech PRT to Afghan authorities. Each contingent

included 4-12 civilian experts from Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the fields of construction

engineering, agriculture, veterinary medicine, security and media. 39 civilian experts than

rotated with several of the contingents deployed to PRT Logar. Civilian experts were then

protected by 290 Czech soldiers on the average (Ministerstvo obrany ČR – ISAF PRT). The

military component was basically a task force put together from various units of the Czech

army (including logistic support, medical and EOD personnel, and Military Police). Both

military and civilian PRT personnel were then in equal position to each other, except for the

security protocols and procedures, when the civilians are obliged to follow the orders of the

military commander, as stated and confirmed by numerous respondents.

Established at the NATO request for military and reconstruction reinforcements, PRT

Logar represents the most direct and the largest single unit experience with counterinsurgency

108 According to Mjr. Ivo Zelinka, the PRT model of the deployment meant new modus operandi for both the

Czech military and civilians, accompanied by confusion in the early phases. Particularly then, the deployment of

a team of civilian experts was new for the Czech Republic, that didn’t keep any database of civilian experts

available, trained, prepared and willing to be deployed. 109 The repeated deployment had its positive as well as negative consequences. The positive ones are represented

by the ability to enable and maintain certain relationships with locals on the personal level, an imperative for

effective counterinsurgency, especially in a country like Afghanistan. The negative consequences manifested

themselves, again, in overburdening and overloading of just certain units and the discrepancies created within the

Czech armed forces in level of their preparedness and funding.

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Czech military and civilian professionals gained in Afghanistan and have gained thus far.110

In total numbers, the Czech PRT Logar completed and realized 138 reconstruction and

development projects and 107 Quick Impact Projects111 during the five years’ period

according to the Czech Ministry of Defense, and 248 projects in total according to the Czech

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all in the line with the Czech national development strategy.112

The main focus and efforts of PRT Logar can be divided into three major categories,

consistent with the main official documents addressing the issue of development and its

priorities in Afghanistan (i.e. Afghanistan Compact, Afghan National Development Strategy

and Provincial Development Plan):

• Support of the Afghan authorities at the provincial level and provision of

supplies (including a sophisticated media program ( and support to distribution

of development and humanitarian assistance, in close cooperation with the

Afghan government and UNAMA mission, when appropriate);

• Provision of security and stabilization of the environment (securing the area

in which construction work is conducted by other national and international

actors, construction of checkpoints and prisons; including the training program

for the ANA and the ANP and counter-narcotics operations in the area of

responsibility; key also was to maintain freedom of traffic on the main

highway to Kabul passing through Logar); and

• Reconstruction and development (infrastructure projects like building bridges

or roads; agriculture projects, including reconstruction of diaries, delivery of

seed grains; water management (reconstruction of irrigation systems or the

Surchab dam); education (construction of schools for local boys and girls);

health (construction of hospitals and delivery and maintenance of emergency

vehicles) (Ministerstvo obrany ČR – ISAF PRT; Ministerstvo zahraničích věcí

ČR – PRT Logar).

110 And in the words of the Czech Ministry of Defense “(…) 1st Contingent PRT Logar (…) launched the new

chapter of Czech participation in ISAF operations in ensuring both security and reconstruction efforts in favour

of Afghan people.” (Ministerstvo obrany ČR – ISAF PRT; the grammar and spelling mistakes maintained in the

direct citation). 111 Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are small-scale, low cost projects implemented in a short time frame and

generally understood as a confidence-building tool. QIPs can range from community irrigation systems, clean

water supply or road improvements to small power systems or construction or reconstruction of government

buildings and facilities, schools, and clinics to gender-related activities, job placement and media projects. 112 The numerical difference between the two counts has been explained by the Czech Ministry of Foreign

Affairs as “only three projects of this number were not finished due to security or technical conditions.”

(Ministerstvo zahraničích věcí ČR 2013).

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From the civilian point of view, 3 core pillars of PRT Logar can be identified as:

• Support for the provincial government and Logar’s public administration (including

provision and support security and good governance);

• Support for the province’s economic development; and

• Support for the media (support for independent radio stations, development of the

provincial branch of the state radio service) (Ministerstvo zahraničích věcí ČR 2008).

Another major initiative of PRT Logar was focused on gender-related issues and support to

women’s rights (like training about the voting rights for women, or women-only meetings).

Construction of an agricultural high school was probably the largest project of PRT Logar.

The capacity of the high school was 500 students, and it was the first specialized school in the

province. Agriculture represents the main source of income in the province, and thereby the

school was built with the primary motivation to significantly increase the level of business in

the area (Ibid). PRT Logar also organized a number of educational and training initiatives for

Afghan would-be farmers, veterinarians, government officials as well as journalists.

Czech political representatives highlight the long term impact of the activities of PRT

Logar, as it, in their words, enabled to grow education and working state administration in the

province. The truth, however, is that it is still too soon to evaluate any long-term impacts of

the PRT Logar operations, as well as to really assess the efficiency of the activities, since no

Czech is currently present in Logar. Therefore, the real contemporary state of the projects

built by PRT Logar is difficult to access, as confirmed during interviews with the respondents

with personal PRT Logar experience.

In 2009, PRT Logar developed its strategy for the Logar province. This strategy could

potentially serve as a springboard for a united Czech document defining and clarifying the

main principles, imperatives, goals, preferred courses of actions and tools and resources

available of the Czech counterinsurgency approach, shall there be the need or request to

develop one.

In its 2009 strategy, PRT Logar introduced main principles and areas of its main focus, as

follows:

o Sustainability – the capacity of local communities to manage the projects PRT Logar

builds in a long term perspective and in a way that would not impose unrealizable

demands on financial and human resources (PRT Logar expressed their awareness of

the limited resources of the Afghan government in terms of finances of human capital,

and emphasized their preference of extension of an existing school over a construction

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of a new one, as the Afghan government would not have the resources to equip and

maintain the school operations);

o Participation of local communities – respect to the local social structure and

communication and negotiations with the tribal elders were amongst the main

imperatives of the PRT Logar operations, including the inclusion of communities in

decision-making processes and providing security and secure environment;

o Cooperation with provincial authorities – PRT Logar helped strengthen legitimacy of

the local government, as well as contributed to building trust of the population by

supporting projects resulting from the official district development councils and

provincial development plans, including the activities aimed at increasing capacities of

the local authorities;

o Needs assessment – an objective assessment of the needs of the community and

identification of the so-called wish lists; what the PRT Logar strategy doesn’t specify

though is how the Czech experts handled the imperative of thorough local knowledge

or how much were the Afghans included in the needs assessments113;

o Long-term effect – PRT Logar didn’t support interim or provisional, short-term

solutions;

o Transparency – in selecting and awarding contracts in order to avoid prejudice of

favoritism, such conduct also helped set standards of ethical behavior in the Afghan

market environment, which, however, according to some respondents, didn’t resonate

with the Afghans too much; and

o Local companies, materials – PRT Logar awarded contracts to local companies which

helped to increase the employment of local suppliers and the local workforce with the

vision of building capacities of the companies and simultaneously encouraged local

economy (cf. Ministerstvo zahraničích ČR 2009).

As evident, localization (“afghanization”) was a very strong and important priority of PRT

Logar, which can be considered an important specific of the Czech approach, as it differs

from the operations of some other ISAF partners (particularly the US and those who copied

the US model of PRT). This hypothesis provides a space for further deeper research into this

specific matter. The reason of the strong “afghanization” of PRT Logar activities may be

considered as stemming from the Czech mindset and strategic culture, it can, however, also

113 According to the interviewed respondents, the locals were involved significantly, which, however, the PRT

military element was hesitant about for security and safety reasons.

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reflect limited resources at the Czech disposal (or limited willingness to commit sufficient

resources). Again, the long term viability and impact of the PRT Logar’s operations is

difficult to measure, especially in terms of sustainability of the Afghan companies, work

force, work ethic and the local economy the efforts of PRT Logar sought to promote. Five

years long period of operations didn’t have to be enough of a time to make a viable and

sustainable economic footprint, especially when put into the broader Afghan context. At the

same time, according to several respondents with the direct experience in this matter, the

chain of development and humanitarian aid delivery was heavily bureaucratic, flawed and

corrupted that sometimes only 5 percent of the initial amount. The abundance of resources

and related waste gravely undermined the success of entire counterinsurgency campaign, as it

not only didn’t achieve the intended objectives and resulted in not meeting the expectations of

the local population, but it also contributed to the culture of bribe-taking and corruption.

Importantly though, this challenge existed in the operations of other ISAF nations as well,

which further complicates any attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of the mission.

For the military part, the CIMIC task force played a particularly significant role in the

PRT Logar’s operations, as it functioned as the enabling and facilitating factor between the

military component and the civilian expert of PRT Logar and in their joint reconstruction

efforts, making contacts and establishing relationships with the local population (including

negotiations with tribal elders), gaining their trust and support, decreasing security risks to

both PRT Logar and the population and helping the civilian experts to be more effective and

productive in their operations (Ministerstvo obrany ČR - 103. centrum CIMIC-PSYOPS2004-

2014b). The role of CIMIC professionals was essential and especially important given their

extensive experience from their previous deployments in various conflict environments. The

civilian experts themselves had not, necessarily, have experience with working in a conflict

environment and in close cooperation and coordination with military actors before their

deployment to Logar. Their different mindsets and preferences from those of the military thus

had to be bridged and aligned to the most convenient level in order to allow for a productive

cooperation and coordination of efforts of the two entities. Coordination and synchronization

of the civilian and military components of PRT Logar, their planning, prioritization and

activities are critically important imperatives of the effectiveness, efficiency and ultimate

success of the PRT operations in general. The author, however, encountered conflicting

reports about the level of such synchronization, coordination and mutual understanding from

the respondents serving in several of the first PRT rotations. This possible tension can be a

result of improper pre-deployment preparation and lack of relevant guidelines from the

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highest national commands and sending institutions (particularly the Czech Ministries of

Defense and Foreign Affairs), partially also mirroring the possible lack of coordination

between the two Ministries at the initial phases of the PRT Logar’s mission.

Other CIMIC’s tasks, that were key to operations of the entire PRT Logar include first

reconnaissance and assessment missions with the aim of mapping the living standard in a

previously uninvolved area; negotiations with the locals (including the very first contact

which including presentation of the mission of PRT Logar and ISAF as such); contact with

the population aimed at gathering information about their needs and preference which were

later used for the realized reconstruction and development projects; and cooperation and

coordination with the ISAF partners in psychological operation (PSYOPS) and information

operations (INFOOPS), like the leaflets distribution, etc. The CIMIC unit was also

responsible for the QIPs realized by PRT Logar (like acquisition and distribution of school

supplies, construction of volleyball playground, acquisition of supplies for police force

working at checkpoints, ANP training or training of the ANA drivers, to name just a few)

(Ibid). Importantly, CIMIC task force was also deployed in 2005, 2006 and 2007 to

Badakshan, most likely because the partners lack experienced CIMIC units. The 2005

deployment was focused on executing PSYOPS.

In addition to the PRT activity, the Czech Republic also had significant presence and

function at the Kabul International Airport (KAIA). From 2002 onwards, the Czech Republic

kept its presence at KAIA in the capacity of field hospital units which were tasked with

medical support of the ISAF troops as well as with provision of humanitarian services

(including medical aid) to the Afghan population. The field hospitals also included a

designated field surgical team from January to April 2003. In 2003, a Czech Explosive

Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Detachment was deployed to KAIA. The main task of the Czech

EOD personnel was to demine and dispose any ordnance in the area of KAIA and its close

proximity, explosives-related reconnaissance, and the IED disposal in the entire Kabul area of

responsibility. Additional task the EOD personnel fulfilled while deployed to KAIA was an

anti-explosive preparation of equipment (from hand-guns to armored vehicles). Another

significant contribution was represented by the Czech contingents of meteorological

professionals, which included air traffic controllers, air traffic information service, aerial

security and safety personnel, and logisticians. The “meteo team” was tasked with

management of all KAIA operations, provision of security to civilians around KAIA, as well

as preparation to hand over the responsibility for KAIA to the Afghan authorities, which also

included preparation and training of the ANA personnel in air traffic safety and control and

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other related tasks. Also, in 2007, the Czech KAIA contingent took over the role of lead

nation of the ISAF KAIA forces (Ministerstvo obrany ČR - KAIA).

In 2007 and 2008, the Czech KAIA contingent was expanded by a field hospital

personnel (81 personnel) and Chemical Detachment (8), at the request of the Allied Command

of Operations (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. SHAPE requested to deploy a medical facility and

the Czech government decided to comply with the request by committing a field hospital,

chemical detachment and a squad of the Military Police (3), which contributed to a contingent

of 8 Czech soldiers serving in the OMLT capacity. The KAIA OMLT task force was tasked

with maintenance of the ANA helicopters (and their training in maintenance), directly linked

to the delivery of the Mi-171Š helicopters (Ibid).

Other periodical contributions of the Czech Republic to the coalition

counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan was a deployment of Czech airborne military

professionals to Uruzgan province in the period from 2007 to 2009. At the request of the

Dutch government, the Czech government decided about the deployment of a task force was

responsible for the protection and security of the Dutch PRT based in Camp Hadrian, its

perimeter as well as the base entry points and traffic in a capacity of 63 personnel in each

contingent (total of 4 contingents was deployed). In 2009, the Czech protection unit was

replaced by the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic (Ministerstvo obrany ČR - Uruzgan).

The Czech field hospital was responsible for provision of medical services to the ISAF

troops at KAIA and in the area of 10km radius around KAIA, preventive as well as veterinary

medical care for the local population, and participated in medical preparation initiatives and

programs for the ANA and ANP personnel. The chemical detachment was responsible for

biological, chemical, radiation and nuclear protection (CBRN) in the area of responsibility.

The most significant Czech non-governmental reconstruction, development and

humanitarian activities in Afghanistan are conducted by the Czech NGO People in Need.

Afghanistan is one of the priority countries of this NGO and it has completed or executes 10

projects in the country since 2002, when it started to operate in the country. The operations of

People in Need in Afghanistan focus on provision of humanitarian aid and reconstruction,

disasters prevention (finished), education initiatives (like support to the Afghan Ministry of

Education capacities – finished, or support and increase in quality of agricultural high

schools), local development in terms of construction of infrastructure in villages (finished)

and support to sustainable use of natural resources, increase in food security in and around

Mazar-e Sharif, support to small local businesses or increasing the efficiency of agricultural

production, and access to drinkable water (finished) (Člověk v tísni). Most of the projects

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mirror the focus of the operations of PRT Logar, including the strong “afghanization” of the

projects in terms of work force and supplies, however, given their longer presence in the area

and indirect association with military forces, the project of People in Need appears to be more

beneficial and potentially also effective. Also, the level of coordination with the Czech

government efforts in Afghanistan is not immediately clear, but the prevailing assumption is

that there exists a minimal level of contact between the two parties, as confirmed by two

respondents who worked for People in Need in Mazar-e Sharif. These respondents also

disclosed to the author that the efficiency of funding of the project is severely limited by the

abundance of financial support from donor which is not always used effectively, claiming

high amounts of money waste accompanying the operations of People in Need in

Afghanistan.

5.3.3.4 Logistical support for coalition forces

Additionally, Czech helicopter unit was deployed to Paktika (December 2009 – December

2011; 700 personnel) – in total seven Czech units served along with the US Air Force and

Portuguese Air Force as the Task Force HIPPO and as part of the US Helicopter Task Force

FALCON (simultaneously) at FOB Sharana. The Czech Republic deployed 3114 upgraded

military helicopters Mi-171Š with 20 flying personnel and 80 logisticians and service and

maintenance personnel, modified for both active and passive defense. Both formations

fulfilled transportation tasks (transportation of personnel, equipment and other material) in all

climate conditions during both day and night, visual reconnaissance missions as well as

medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)115 in the RC-East area of responsibility (Ministerstvo

obrany ČR).

5.3.3.5 National Support Element (NSE)

Each country which contributes and participates in ISAF has own NSE assigned to the ISAF

Joint Command HQ. NSE functions as liaison officers between national capitals and the

114 Two fully combat ready and one under maintenance and servicing. 115 Certain ISAF national imposed their caveats on MEDEVAC helicopters – because of the equipment,

appropriate clearances or even trust/mistrust factor, MEDEVAC units were not allowed to fly MEDEVAC for

injured Afghan soldiers, or some coalition partners (Johnson 2015). This, however, was not the case of Czech

helicopters, because the Czechs also trained the Afghans with the same type of aircraft at the Kabul International

Airport (KAIA). Imposing MEDEVAC caveats thus would be potentially counterproductive for the Czech side.

Also, none of the respondents confirmed the existence of such caveats during the Czech deployment, even

though a number of them confirmed their existence in general (without providing any additional details).

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contingents deployed to ISAF, and was responsible for overall logistic support, material and

supplies for all Czech military units deployed in ISAF. The Czech NSE started to operate at

KAIA in 2007.

According to the officers deployed to the Czech ISAF NSE, the positions they were

deployed to included a position of liaison officer for the ISAF HQ with NTM-A. This liaison

officer was assigned to facilitate appropriate information sharing between the two missions,

functioning as the point of contact for all the NTM-A relevant questions, keep updating the

NTM-A about the ISAF operations and activities in the joint area of responsibility, and

similar (Kurej 2011).

5.3.3.6 Relations with the Afghan population

As the population progressively became the center of gravity of the coalition

counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan, the perception on the side of the Afghan population

should be examined for any study to be truly comprehensive and in order to consider all

relevant factors shaping the Czech counterinsurgency approach. Perceptions of the local

population can provide important information about the effectiveness or success of certain

activities, willingness to cooperate, and potentially also more secure environment, as in

counterinsurgency, positive relations with the population in an area of operation correlate with

better HUMINT or potentially also support of local defense militias or other armed groupings.

Contrary to case of Kosovo, were the population predominantly perceived the KFOR

forces as strongly pro-Albanian, as plk. Ing. Pavlačka disclosed to the author, the Afghan

population was generally favorable of the Czech presence. Mainly the older generations of

Afghans, according to Petr Pelz, remembered goods116 then-Czechoslovakia exported to the

country before 1979, which created a generally solid basis for friendly relationships. Afghans

themselves quite repeatedly emphasize and use the so-called 1968 narrative (see p. 70).117

Some of them go even further to claim that the Czech disapproval of the Soviet invasion

inspired them to start their own anti-Soviet resistance after the 1979 invasion, a claim which

is very difficult to verify. Logically though, even though there could have been some

motivation gained from the Czech experience, fatwas calling for defensive jihad issued after

the USSR (non-Muslim) invaded a Muslim country for the historically first time could serve

116 Trolleybuses in Kabul, Jawa motorbike (reportedly very popular among the Taliban and former mujahideen

fighters), machinery and equipment for coal mines, bakeries, etc. (Hlouchová 2015). 117 Interestingly, the same Soviet generals who planned the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia prepared plans for

the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.

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as a greater source of motivation to resist the invader. Importantly, according to Matyáš Zrno,

who served as director of the civilian element of PRT Logar two times (in 2010 and 2011),

the Czechs also utilized this narrative during negotiations with locals.

Majority of the interviewed Czech and Afghan respondents agreed on the friendly

relationship existing between Czechs and Afghans. Afghans reportedly liked Czechs, who

they perceived as friendly and opposite to the “arrogant Americans”, whom they didn’t like.

The perception of Americans as “arrogant and ignorant” was also confirmed by the American

respondents interviewed. One of the major difference that played role in the differing

perceptions was the heavily militarized PRT of the US, whereas the Czech PRT had an

important civilian component, even though the locals sometimes didn’t respect the decision-

making authority of young experts and women, given their strong respect to traditions and

culture. Nevertheless, the dichotomy existing between the perceptions of Americans and the

prevailing perceptions of Czechs could help to explain an opinion of some of the Czech

military professionals that the insurgents didn’t attack basis with a strong presence of

Afghans, explaining it by the intentions to inflict casualties and loses to the coalition forces,

which was countered by some of the interviewed American soldiers who didn’t share this

view at all, claiming attacks on their multinational FOBs (like Shank itself). According to 1st

Lt. Staněk, the FOB in Wardak wasn’t attacked because of the absence of the American

forces, a claim difficult to verify. Reportedly, affiliation with the partner Jordanian forces,

based in Shank, also helped to perceive the Czechs more favorably (sometimes even as

Muslims).

6 Analytical part

In order to accomplish the aim of this thesis as well as provide transparency in the processes

of drawing conclusions, selected analytical models are applied to the information presented in

the empirical part.

6.1 SWOT analysis

As established in the methodology chapter, SWOT analysis starts with defining the end state

of it, the reason why it is being done and what is meant strategic setting is meant to aim at and

ultimately achieve. The end state for SWOT analysis in this thesis is to identify spaces for

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further development of the Czech counterinsurgency approaches in order to increase its

effectiveness, and ultimately contribute to a pursuit of national interests and strategic

objectives. Analyzing the data presented in the empirical part, the author then populates the

four quadrants of SWOT matrix are populated as follows:

HELPFUL/SUPPORTIVE HARMFUL/DETRIMENTAL

INTERNAL STRENGTHS:

• Flexibility, adaptability, quick

to learn;

• Progressive evolution of Czech

approach;

• Significant attention to the

issue, certain prioritization;

• Reliability;

• Reputation;

• Professionalism and efficiency;

• Interoperability;

• Effective security forces’

training efforts (expertise);

• Mindset, strategic culture,

historical legacy;

• High-quality specialized

military capabilities;

• Preference of localization of

efforts;

• Strongly population-centric;

• Strong NGO sector;

• Willingness to cooperate;

• Intelligence-sharing;

• Clarity of military

OPORDs/ROE;

• Effective NSE;

• Level of discretion;

• Ability to mobilize maximum

resources;

• Minimal involvement in local

organized crime;

• PSYOPS/INFOOPS;

WEAKNESSES/LIABILITIES:

• Strong fractionalization;

• Lack of clarity on goals;

• Lack of clear guidance and

management;

• Lack of previous experience;

• Limited of local knowledge;

• Lack of experts (including

interpreters);

• Limited own intelligence-

gathering, esp. HUMINT;

• Bureaucratic and long process

of decision-making;

• Insufficient preparation in the

pre-deployment phase;

• Limited leverage over

partners;

• Undeclared caveats;

• Waste of resources;118

• Ineffective, counterproductive

reconstruction projects;

• Rather short-term planning;

• Flawed synchronization;

• Political pressure;

• Limited capabilities and

resources;

• Too much focus on infantry

patrols.

118 Some of the respondents also stated that they perceived deployments of the SOG contingents to Afghanistan

as a waste of valuable resources, that could have been deployed somewhere else more effectively.

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• Emphasizing negotiations;

• Theoretically effective model

of PRT;

• Full-spectrum of military

activity;

• Strong contribution to

economic development.

EXTERNAL OPPORTUNITIES:

• Gained combat experience;

• Utilization of experience in

local knowledge;

• More confident and bold in

foreign deployments;

• Utilization of experts;

• Broadened understanding of

different cultures and religions

(Islam);

• Private security sector;

• Counter violent extremism;

• Industrial and technological

innovations;

• Good relations with Allies as

well as Muslim countries,

popularity;

• NGOs.

THREATS:

• Not meeting the full potential;

• Loss of the acquired level of

interoperability;

• Insufficient conceptualization

in official documents;

• Lack of clarification of the

relationship between civilians

and military elements at the

strategic level;

• Inability to fully utilize lessons

learned;

• Flawed metrics of

progress/success;

• Weakening of the cohesion the

EU/NATO.

Table 17: SWOT analysis of Czech approach towards counterinsurgency. Source: IH.

As the cases examined showed, key strength and advantage of the Czech Republic is its

ability to mobilize a maximum amount of capabilities and resources at its disposal in one time

point, even though it may not be for a prolonged period of time, the level of maximal amount

of resource was the Czech Republic able to maintain for more or less a year (without missing

the resources anywhere else), which marks significant accomplishment. Striking is also the

ability of the Czech Republic to deploy several different training teams to help in HN security

forces’ capacity building efforts and the variety of capabilities and specializations they were

able to teach and mentor. The Czech Republic committed two OMLTs, two MATs, Air

Mentoring Team in Kabul, Military Police Training Unit, PRT Logar had its own training

initiative, so had the Czech SOF as well as the smaller contingents of air traffic controllers or

EOD detachment. Additionally, the Czech Republic also contributed policemen to the

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EUPOL mission, and deployed its military trainers and advisors to Iraq. All of these training

deployments were deemed successful, when measure to their limited goals of preparing an

assigned group of ANSF, which can result from the recent Czech experience with its own

transition to democratization and rebuilding its security sector. This fact means certain, at

least minimal level of efficiency of the Czech counterinsurgency efforts.

Moreover, trainings and other educational initiatives were also executed by civilians

(PRT, NGOs) in Afghanistan and Kosovo. The subjects of these programs mirrored the

extensive expertise existing on the Czech expert market (agriculture, technical sciences, etc.),

that greatly contributed to meeting the needs of local populations. Perhaps that has been the

reason why the Czech counterinsurgency approach has shown to be very sensitive to local

needs with strong emphasis on localization of the efforts (that reportedly is a Czech feature).

As much flawed as the practical implementation of this localization could have been (see

below), the intention to include locals in planning and decision-making is quite unique. The

prevailing Czech mindset of open mindedness, adaptability, flexibility and friendliness has

proved to be a vital advantage, relative to other counterinsurgency partners. Strong

commitment and ability to learn quickly have also been demonstrated, by the speed of

implementation of the NATO counterinsurgency imperatives in the Czech context and the

evolution of the Czech counterinsurgency approach can be traced, from an actor who didn’t

know anything about it (not even the term itself) to a professional, reliable and popular ally

capable of providing vital support in counterinsurgency campaigns.

Also, the emphasis Czechs place on negotiations is relatively unique, and further

demonstrates the general readiness and appropriateness for executing counterinsurgency

tasks. The Czech Republic also strongly contributed to the economic development of the

theaters, particularly Afghanistan, not only by the reconstruction projects and utilization of

local workforce, supplies and companies. The meteo task force operating at KAIA contributed

significantly, due to their capable flight safety management.

The Czech approach to counterinsurgency thus proved to be very strongly population-

centric, even by the part of SOF in their activities, which included kinetic military tasks. The

deployed civilians as well as military forces demonstrated a high level of professionalism, and

gained an incredible recognition and respect among international partners. The Czech

Republic has manifested it is a reliable ally in counterinsurgency missions, as it was able to

deployed resources at the requests by other coalition partners, who couldn’t deploy their own.

Due to its historical legacy, the Czech Republic is also popular among Muslim-majority

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countries119 and maintains good relations with many international partners, an attribute vital

for any effective participation in multinational counterinsurgency mission.

For the military part, deployed forces demonstrated an incredible level of

interoperability with other coalition partners (even without complex preparation before

deployment, if any, see below), and were able to operate with forces of different nations in an

effective way. This feature is vital for any future multinational counterinsurgency missions, as

interoperability represents one of the fundamental pillars of successful counterinsurgency in

theory. Furthermore, recent counterinsurgency missions enabled to recognize of the high level

of preparedness and skills of the Czech specialized military capabilities – SOF,

reconnaissance task force, Military Police, air force (transport capabilities and FAC), EOD

detachment, medical personnel, CBRN protection units as well as very experienced CIMIC

task forces, and helped further develop and expand these capabilities for any potential future

deployments. The Czech military is capable of deployment to the full spectrum of

counterinsurgency operations (offensive, defensive, stabilization), as well as to provide vital

and important logistical support to not only the Czech elements, but to all coalition partners.

PSYOPS/INFOOPS executed by the CIMIC detachment were assessed as effective, as they

managed to deliver the main message to rather a broad target audience, especially when

combined with the PRT Logar’s efforts to stimulate the media activities in the area. The

model of PRT Logar also proved to be theoretically effective and productive in the

counterinsurgency context, because the civilian and military elements were mostly to each

other in most of their responsibilities (apart from security). PRTs of some other coalition

countries, particularly the US, were heavily militarized, and weren’t generally perceived well

among the local population, contrary to the overall Czech experience.

Counterinsurgency efforts have gained a certain priority in the Czech context,

especially in the military sphere (civilians refrain from use of this term) as well as to the

future, which is demonstrated by the prolonged involvement and strategic bilateral

cooperation with Afghanistan, the main consumer of the Czech counterinsurgency services.

Afghanistan has been prioritized in strategic documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in

terms of provision of development and humanitarian assistance as well as foreign policy in

general, because Afghanistan also provides great business opportunities for the Czech

business sector.

119 Due to the export of weapons by Czechoslovakia to countries in the Middle East, in case of Afghanistan the

USSR invasion, as well.

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Significant liabilities and weaknesses of the Czech counterinsurgency approach can,

however, be identified as well. Majority of these weaknesses is cause by or closely connected

to the lack of previous experience with the art of counterinsurgency. The Czech

counterinsurgency approach remains strongly fractionalized, with too many different actors

involved with inappropriate level of coherence of their strategies/policies and of coordination

of their activities. Manifested by the absence of a united common document that would

outline the main goals (in the mission, from the partners), preferred courses of actions and

appropriate resources of the Czech counterinsurgency approach shows to be a critical flaw

and disadvantage, particularly when compared to other countries. The explaining assumption

of the very low likelihood of insurgency occurring on the Czech territory seems to be a priori

by default. Inconsistent prioritization of the counterinsurgency theme in the official Czech

documents further exposes lack of mutual understanding between military and civilian

components. Although a memorandum of understanding was signed between the two Czech

ministries of defense and foreign affairs, lack of coordination clearly manifested itself the

early stages of the PRT Logar’s operations, when the activities of military and civilian

components not only weren’t adequately synchronized, but they, reportedly, sometimes

refused to negotiate with each other, and often also resulted in too much focused put on

infantry patrols, when put into military perspective.

The PRT concept itself was new for the Czech Republic and it clearly didn’t know

how to manage its operations. This fact was further undermined by the overall lack of

coordination of reconstruction efforts among the ISAF nations. The fractionalization is

closely connected to the vital weakness of lack of clarity on common goals and preferred end-

state between the military side and their civilian counterparts, as well as among coalition

partners. Unknown aims of the activities, as well as inherent reconciliation of some of the

preferred courses of action between the military and civilians often significantly undermined

progress, efficiency and effectiveness of the overall counterinsurgency efforts. Furthermore,

contrary to the officially declared long-term commitments, strong political pressures on

transition as scheduled resulted in rather short-term focus of projects. Even though the Czech

Republic maintains strong bilateral relations with Afghanistan and the projects were planned

and designed in long-term perspective, the overall drawdown and transformation of the

mission significantly decreased the sustainability of these projects.

Furthermore, a significant number of the respondents in particular complained about

the lack of clear political guidance (in a sense of “a vision”), which only shows poor oversight

and management mechanisms by the Czech political representatives. Even though the

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political pressure on foreign deployments, including counterinsurgency, is high (and can turn

counterproductive for the actions on the ground), the reluctance of Czech political

representatives to even talk about the Czech counterinsurgency deployment in the public was

strong (and potentially undermining effectiveness of counterinsurgency; see below), let alone

to utilize certain leverage over the coalition partners (obtained by the willingness to meet the

requests). Czech political representatives didn’t (and still don’t) know how to utilize this, even

if still limited leverage for own national gains. The flawed and/or inappropriate management

was also demonstrated in some of the projects completed by PRT Logar, which proved

ineffective, counterproductive and unsustainable in a longer-term in particular. Even though

the level of utilization of local business and local work market was strong, limited rights and

authority of the coalition forces to avoid working with corrupt governmental officials led to a

significant waste of resources within the Czech counterinsurgency approach. Long and

heavily bureaucratic decision-making procedures on the national level also significantly

decreased the potential of effectiveness of the Czech counterinsurgency efforts (in Kosovo

potentially even more than in Afghanistan). According to some of the Czech respondents,

PRT Logar also contributed to bribe the Taliban in exchange for safety of their projects. The

author wasn’t able to verify this claim, but the history of ISAF in Afghanistan keeps the

record of such instances, thereby such claim wouldn’t be surprising, if true. In the opinion of

some of the respondents, even the Czech contribution to EUPOL was a waste of resources

that could have been used more effectively in other counterinsurgency task.

Particularly the ISAF mission showed that the Czech Republic doesn’t have enough

resources not only to execute a counterinsurgency operation unilaterally, but also to provide

for at least a sustainable level of preparedness and experience across the Czech army’s units.

Limited intelligence gathering resources by the Czech units themselves, particularly in

HUMINT, represents a critical liability of the contemporary Czech approach toward

counterinsurgency that has to be mitigated and managed for any potential future operations, as

it could significantly undermine the effectiveness of their security operations. Additionally,

overall ineffective and insufficient preparedness in the pre-deployment phase, as well as the

inappropriate utilization of civilian experts in both pre-deployment and deployment phases,

along with resulting overburdening and overloading of only certain Czech military units and

capabilities, meant initial limited local knowledge that slowed the progress of Czech

counterinsurgency ambitions and efforts. The direct counterinsurgency experience also

exposed critical shortage of experts on particular areas of operation as well as language

experts, who could possibly work as interpreters during counterinsurgency missions. Even

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though the function of interpreters is vital for any success of counterinsurgency, the Czech

Republic doesn’t have any program on their training or further accommodation, after the

mission is completed. Another potentially critical liability is an existence of so-called

undeclared or unofficial national caveats. Its existence and real impacts are, however, difficult

to prove.

The analysis also exposed significant space of opportunities for increasing

effectiveness of the Czech counterinsurgency approach, particularly in connection to

increasing the security and defense capabilities of the Czech Republic and pursuing its

national interests. The greatest opportunity is represented by the acquired experience than

should be utilized for future deployments in all of its phases (preparation, planning, execution,

withdrawal). The combat experience has already been, reportedly, utilized during the Mali

deployment. Furthermore, the Czech counterinsurgency deployments brought significant

attention to the issue by both the public and the experts. The Czech political and military

representatives should identify and adopt measures to integrate and utilize these experts in the

future. Increased attention and interest in the areas of deployment also bears significant

societal opportunities in promoting multicultural dialogue and exchange, and greater mutual

understanding, by increasing the awareness on both sides of the spectrum.

Direct experience from foreign counterinsurgency deployments also exposed potential

points and mechanisms for utilization of a private security sector and experts, perhaps in the

field of countering violent extremism. The knowledge gain throughout the deployments as

well as the media and gender-related activities of PRT Logar should serve as a solid base for

such efforts. Underestimating the potential of both private security market (regulated through

clear contracts) as well as of counter violent extremism in counterinsurgency campaign

significantly limits the overall potential of the Czech Republic in this regards. Also, the use of

unmanned aerial vehicles and exposure to other forms of technical innovations during these

deployments might help to stimulate domestic production of such technologies.

Most importantly, the Czech Republic should not hesitate to utilize the good relations

it maintains with a number of countries, particularly those potentially strategically important

for further counterinsurgency operations. Its performance during these deployments further

increased the Czech, yet limited leverage that can be used for accomplishing foreign, security

or economic policy goals and interests. Also, the NGO and civil society scene in the Czech

Republic is strong and active, and possesses important potential for any future Czech

counterinsurgency endeavors, if properly managed and synchronized.

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Certain threats to the Czech counterinsurgency approach exist as well, potentially

significantly undermining its effectiveness, success or contribution to the overall security and

defense of the country, as well as to the potential of the Czech Republic to maintain the status

of responsible and reliable ally in international relations. The key threat identified is the

failure to meet the full potential the country has – in terms of its resources, not meeting the

opportunities fully or not managing them effectively. Another big threat is not learning the

lessons identified and learned during the recent counterinsurgency deployments, or adopting

best practices from other allies adequately to the Czech context. This inability or

unwillingness to grow and progress in terms of counterinsurgency conduct, civil-military

cooperation and multinational foreign deployments could lead to critical loss of

interoperability, which would damage the position and reputation of the Czech Republic in

international relations, severely decrease the level of its defense preparedness and its ability to

respond to new emerging threats or other developments in security environment. The threat of

maintain the flawed metrics of success/progress in counterinsurgency operations and

following it in the future can threaten the lives of the Czech civilian and military professionals

in these operations, to further waste of resources or their ineffective use, as well as to not fully

understanding the realities of the area of operation. Additionally, the case of Afghanistan also

showed that this can contribute to increased instability of international security, including

increased security threat level for the Czech Republic itself.

Loss of interoperability could also be caused by the unwillingness or inability to improve

preparation of the forces in general, not only pre-deployment phases of operations. With

resolving the critical weakness of insufficient preparedness within the Czech

counterinsurgency approach, threat of the absence of sufficient clarification of the civil-

military relationship would be managed. If not met with appropriate proactive action, the lack

of clarification on this relationship gravely damages the operational capabilities of the

resources that can be potentially deployed to future operations. This could further damage the

reputation of the country and minimize its already limited leverage in international relations,

and thus also the overall capabilities required to secure national interests. The Czech Republic

should seek to resolve the flawed, slow and heavily bureaucratic decision-making, oversight

and management process to avoid increasing the threat potential of these challenges.

It would also contribute to mitigate the threats stemming from insufficient

conceptualization of the Czech counterinsurgency approach in official documents has

generally created a lot of confusion and tension during its execution among variety of actors.

Insufficient, or sometimes contradictory, conceptualization leads to insufficient preparedness

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of both civilian and military elements, which further causes not meeting the full potential of

operational capabilities. If not resolved, this issue can severely decrease the effectiveness of

the Czech efforts, not only in terms of negotiations with allies or other countries, but also the

potential inability to manage operations on the ground, to maintain continuity of the process

or to truly reflect and meet the needs, potentially also endangering the Czech civilian experts

and military professionals deployed in a foreign mission. This threat is closely connected to

the inability or lack of will or resources to fully utilize the experience gained in the most

recent deployments.

Perhaps the more important threat to the Czech counterinsurgency approach and its future

efficiency and significance is represented by the latest trends in the transatlantic security

environment, which indicates a gradual weakening, if not disintegration yet, of the EU as an

individual entity, and more gravely NATO. NATO being the fundamental pillar of the

security and defense of the Czech Republic, weakening of NATO represents an existential

threat to the Czech national interests themselves, not only its counterinsurgency approach,

which would lose traction, importance, but more importantly vital guidance and resources the

Czech Republic doesn’t have, which also shape the approach and significantly contribute to

its execution. If unresolved, lack of clarity on goals within the Czech Republic as well as

among the allies only further undermines the strategic cohesion of the two transnational

institutions. Waste of resources should be transformed into more effective and increase

defense spending that could, consequently, inspire other actors to reform their defense

budgets as well. Such developments would help strengthen the bond and cohesion of NATO

(as well as the EU to a certain level), and thus mitigate the threat of their weakening.

Potential use of undeclared caveats also negatively impacts the limited leverage within the

two blocs the Czech Republic currently has. If anything, the Czech Republic should

emphasize the importance of synchronization and coordination of civilian efforts among

partners in multinational counterinsurgency operations, and for its credibility should resolve

its issue of uncoordinated civilian-military operations which can further serve as an example

in this regard.

6.2 CEG analysis

Second analytical method aimed at delivering inferences further used to answer the research

question and to achieve the stated goal of this thesis is CEG model. CEG model helps identify

and explain actual performance and how it differs from intended (or wished for) performance

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by the Czech political and military representatives within the Czech counterinsurgency

approach. This task is complicated by the inconsistent conceptual framework existing in the

official documents and the grave lack of clarity on its strategic goals. Importantly, the CEG

concept itself is static (cf. Hill 1993: 322), and is thus not allowing to capture all the

complexities and their mutual dynamics in the relevant field of the Czech approach to

counterinsurgency, which is constantly evolving, and so are its impacts. The main added

value of this CEG analysis is thus its usefulness as a starting point, as it enables both the

researchers and practitioners to see potentially dangerous tensions within the Czech approach

toward counterinsurgency, with the space for their management by either increasing

capabilities, or decreasing expectations (when put simplistically).

The author decided to deal with this obstacle by using the objectives of the individual

official documents that are relevant for the Czech counterinsurgency approach as an

imaginary bar for the expectations the Czech authorities had in this regard.120 In consideration

of real capabilities, the author utilizes both the empirical part of this thesis and her SWOT

analysis conducted above, with the focus on Hill’s indicators of (1) ability to agree, (2)

resource allocation, and (3) available instruments and tools (Ibid: 315). Importantly, Hill

doesn’t introduce a clear methodological mechanics behind his EC’s CEG assessment.

Nevertheless, his research provides numerous concepts and indicators that could be used as

criteria for evaluation of possible CEGs existing in terms of certain policies (and approaches)

of the Czech Republic. Therefore, in addition to the three basic indicators of the ability to

agree, resources and their allocation, and the instruments at the disposal, factors like the

degree and the number of expectations held of the Czech Republic by external actors in the

sphere of counterinsurgency. Use of the concepts of “actorness” and “presence”, which Hill

introduces in his work (Ibid: 308-310), provide significant inputs for the analysis of the Czech

approach toward counterinsurgency, as well.

Any attempts of measuring the actual volume and range of the gap existing between

the capabilities the Czech Republic can realistically commit to counterinsurgency operations

and the expectations about its performance, functions and roles are severely complicated by

the lack of methodological underpinning of this inherently quantitative exploration. Hill

120 Public statements of the political and military representatives generally correlate with these goals. The author

doesn’t consider the rhetoric of generally anti-establishment Communist Party of the Czech Republic, only the

political parties that formed government coalitions during the researched period of 1999-2013, i.e. ČSSD, ODS,

US-DEU, SZ, TOP-09, KDU-ČSL and VV/Lidem. Furthermore, foreign deployments got hijacked several times

for political and personal purposes, therefore any objections political parties, or their individual representatives,

had with regard to the Czech participation in counterinsurgency operations can’t be used as credible data for this

research, because determining their real motivation was beyond the ability of the author. Moreover, strategic

approaches are generally shaped by adopted documents, not public proclamations of politicians per se.

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avoids any debate that would potentially provide even the basic guidance in the efforts to

measure the actual CEG volume. It appears, that it is necessary to assign numerical values to

both the expectations and the real capabilities on the same scale, and use these numerical data

to generate the actual value of the gap.

Regarding the level of expectations, the Czech Republic has participated in

counterinsurgency operations under the NATO command. Therefore, the expectations and

key goals NATO establishes serve as a solid basis for the expectations raised with regards to

the Czech counterinsurgency approach. NATO emphasizes building confidence and mutual

understanding between international actors, effective cooperation and coordination with HN

authorities and other international partners in execution of an operation, as well as

cooperation with other international actors in the overall planning for complex operations in

which a large degree of civil-military relations is required. Furthermore, individual mandates

and priorities of NATO operations usually followed key LOOs framed as protection of the

population, HN security forces capability-building, support to socio-economic development,

support of good local governance and the rule of law as well as elimination of the insurgent

activity and capabilities. The efforts aimed at negotiating with external actors in the region,

where a mission is carried out, are stressed as well.

At the Czech level, its Security strategy states the strategic importance of

strengthening cohesion and efficiency of NATO and the EU, including its participation in

NATO or EU crisis management operations beyond the geographical boundaries of the

Eurasian space across their wide spectrum. Furthermore, when honoring its commitments, the

Czech Republic seeks to adhere to principles of a comprehensive approach in these foreign

deployments. In Afghanistan, the Czech Republic prioritizes its contributions to institutions

building, good governance and the rule of law, reconstruction and development, along with

provision of secure and stable environment. The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs further

specifies the priority fields of reconstruction and development as economy, environment and

agriculture.

During its counterinsurgency deployments, the Czech Republic contributed to

confidence building between international actors on the political as well as theater level

answering the requests of its partners for increased contributions. On the other hand, however,

mutual understanding between international actors has been undermined by the lack of clarity

on goals and different perceptions of counterinsurgency mission by the Czech Republic and

other international actors. The cooperation with HN authorities was effective only to limited

degree, considering the reports of working with the corrupt officials and inherent differences

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between Czechs and locals, which were, however, managed to a certain, “workable” level.

Effective cooperation and coordination with other international actors during the execution of

an operation can be divided into two dimensions – military and civilian. From the perspective

of the Czech military contribution, the cooperation and coordination with other actors was

smooth and effective. Nevertheless, for the civilian part, counterinsurgency operations lacked

any coordination among contributing countries whatsoever. Evidence indicates efforts to

coordinate at least with the UN agencies in provision of humanitarian aid in area of operation.

The expectation embedding in the factor of coordinated planning can be subverted by the

existence of undeclared caveat and restrictions imposed on the contingents deployed, which,

however, has not been verified and proved in this thesis. Large degree of civil-military

relations has shown to be the most challenging expectation to meet on the Czech side, given

its mostly lacking previous experience with the significance of the civilian element and its

coordination and synchronization with the military component during deployment in a

conflict zone.

Furthermore, the Czech capability deployed in counterinsurgency missions generally

contributed to provision of security to the local population. The predominant lasting positive

effect (or success, perhaps) of ISAF has been the space for operational maneuver the coalition

forces created for the ANSF. After the withdrawal of the coalition forces from most parts of

the countries and their increased concentration only at the big military bases caused an

exposure of the population to the insurgent or criminal activity again. The real level of

security provided to the population thus remains disputable, especially when considering the

population that collaborated with the foreign troops (and PRTs). Not even in the Kosovo case

the population has been protected completely, considering the inability of the KFOR troops to

prevent or react to the escalation of inter-ethnic tensions.

The expectation of HN security forces capability-building has been met by a

significant amount of resources committed to this counterinsurgency pillar by the Czech

Republic. Also, the remarkable variety of specialized military components executing

capability-building tasks in all three studied cases, and particularly Iraq and Afghanistan,

indicates minimal gap between expectations and resources in this regard. Support to socio-

economic development then widens the scissors though. The prioritization of economic

reconstruction and development, commitment of substantial resources to it during the

existence and operations of PRT Logar as well as the dedication of the Czech NGOs have

been undermined by flawed and ineffective decision-making and management of the

reconstruction efforts, as well as by their disputable long-term sustainability. Support of good

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local governance and the rule of law provide conflicting accounts as well. The presence of the

Czech military (and civilian) professionals and their operations generally greatly contributed

to positive impact on the overall situation in general. On the other hand, however, working

through corrupted Afghan officials and the reported investments of Afghan warlords in the

reconstruction and development projects realized by PRT Logar, for instance, as well as the

relatively short-term presence of the Czech counterinsurgency force didn’t improve the

situation on the local level in this regard at all.

The Czech military forces have also proved capable of deployment in the full spectrum

of counterinsurgency operations in wide variety of functions. The Czech military operations

have been deemed successful and greatly contributing to the efforts of eliminating the

insurgent networks, particularly due to their professionalism, remarkable level of

interoperability and adaptability as well as apparent non-existence of national caveats

imposed on their actions and clear ROE. However, in the broader perspective, these military

successes were gravely undermined by other factors, which were beyond the control of the

Czech military professionals, or their possible ability to mitigate them. Measuring the effect

of the Czech civilian efforts on addressing the root causes of insurgency is not possible for

obvious reasons. Although the Czech Republic highlights the importance of negotiations with

external actors as well, the real scope and range of the resources it has devoted in this regard

is not immediately measurable. Diplomatic relations have been leveraged by the Czech

Republic to help achieve the missions’ goals, however, the involvement of intelligence

agencies in the process makes any efforts to measure real Czech impact impossible.

By its willingness to mobilize maximum resources and answer requests of its allies as

well as by apparent inexistence of caveats the Czech Republic contributed enormously to

maintaining the cohesion of NATO and the EU with regards to crisis

management/counterinsurgency efforts. The wide variety and spectrum of professionals

deployed to NATO counterinsurgency missions further strengthened the efficiency of its

efforts, which was, however, undermined by a palette of other factors already stated above.

The fact that Czechs contributed to the EUPOL mission as well indicates the willingness to

mobilize resources in order to meet these expectations. What showed to be challenging is

maintaining comprehensive approach during foreign developments, as indicated by the

general lack of synchronization and coordination as well as the grave lack of clarity on the

goals of the missions. Furthermore, the inability to utilize civilian experts to their full

potential further weakened the expected comprehensiveness of the overall approach, and so

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did the challenge of overburdening of only certain military capabilities of the Czech armed

forces.

Specifically, in Afghanistan, the Czech Republic contributed to institutions building

mainly by its military efforts aimed at ANSF capacity-building, however, the potential of

utilization own experience of recent democratic transition wasn’t fully exploited. The Czech

Republic could have, for instance, provided experts in the fields of democratic oversight of

the security forces or anti-corruption initiatives, perhaps even for countering organized crime

activities. The expectations related to the support to good governance, rule of law, security

and reconstruction and development have been addressed above. As for the Czech priority

fields, in the studied time frame of 1999-2013, the Czech Republic to the significant level met

the expectations only in the sphere of agriculture where it run several trainings and projects.

The efforts to stimulate local economic development by utilizing local workforce, local

supplies and local companies were mostly hampered by factors like dealing with corrupt

officials, bribing, waste of resources, unstable security situation as well as poor oversight,

management and decision-making measures and procedures in place. When it comes to the

field of environmental challenges and protection, the focus of the Czech actors was strictly on

the issue of water management, which doesn’t reflect the full scope of such expectation.

Additional follow-up research is required in order to measure the real scope of the gap

existing between expectations and capabilities with regards of the Czech counterinsurgency

approach. Generally, the gap tends to widen when considering the civilian dimension of

counterinsurgency, probably caused by the lack of clear goals aimed to achieve, which wasn’t

the issue for clearly stated ROE of the counterinsurgency military forces.

The analysis above indicates that in the Czech context, the ability to agree exists

basically only at the strategic level on the general topics like contributing specific resources to

a certain counterinsurgency mission. Where the ability to agree is dangerously low is the area

of goals settings, manifested in minimal coordination between the individual important

players, resulting in lack of political guidance and strategic management from the highest

levels of decision-making authorities.

Similar dynamics can be traced with second Hill’s indicator of resource allocation,

where, again, at the strategic level, required resources have been generated and allocated

relatively quickly and as needed, without any greater objections. Significant dichotomy also

exists between the military component of the Czech counterinsurgency approach and the

civilian one. Interviewed Czech military professionals didn’t raise any concerns or

dissatisfaction with the level and quality of logistical and financial support of their

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deployments. Quite contrary, the NSEs reportedly worked effectively and quickly. On the

civilian side, however, the allocation of adequate resource was significantly slowed down by

the reported long and heavily bureaucratic decision-making procedures regarding approvals of

funding for specific projects requested by the PRT civilian component, which then further

negatively impacted the community and potentially also usefulness of the project, due to its

limited amount of time to get it completed. Even though the author didn’t collect any data that

would point to negative impacts on the relations with the local population (in terms of not

meeting their needs or expectations), such an unintended consequence of postponing a certain

project could, in theory, severely damage relation with the population. Such a harm would

then produce additional challenges for the Czech counterinsurgency activities by undermining

its core pillar of the importance of popular support as well as redirection of resources to win

the trust and support again, potentially also endangering lives of military and civilian

professionals in the process.

Considering the instruments the Czech Republic has as its disposal, and their

utilization for counterinsurgency campaigns, both positive and negative dynamics can be

observed. The country has been capable to mobilize a substantial amount of capabilities and

resources, which culminated in fall 2011. What was especially remarkable was the range of

military capabilities the Czech Republic has been capable to provide to counterinsurgency

missions, as requested by NATO or other partner countries. The civilian landscape of

instruments available for execution of counterinsurgency missions was, however, not exploit

to the fullest potential. Experts were not appropriately utilized, perhaps due to their

inadequate preparedness to deployment in a conflict zone. Funding of activities of the civilian

component was reportedly abundant and needlessly exceeded the required amount, which led

to huge waste of resources at the also. Also appropriate oversight and management

mechanisms were not in place, that would at least mitigate this waste, which then reportedly

led to funding and supporting those internal factors of the conflict situation (like corruption,

power of warlords, funds for insurgents) that ultimately made any Czech counterinsurgency

efforts unproductive.

Hill considers “actorness” in the context of the ability and capability of an entity (EC,

or CZE) to act as a genuine international actor in wider contexts (multinational

counterinsurgency operations in this research). As Hill (1993: 309) points out himself,

examining the character of “actorness”121 “provides us with a theoretical perspective which

121 Any efforts to measure levels of “actorness” would be hampered by insufficient operationalization of the

concept in the existing literature, and stretches beyond the research scope of this thesis anyway.

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can incorporate both the internal dynamics of institutional development (…) and the changing

nature of the international environment in which it has to operate.” Modified and adapted to

the research subject of this thesis, the efforts to explore “actorness” of the Czech Republic in

the sphere of campaigns aimed at eliminating an insurgency contributes important data to the

overall inquiry on the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency.

Importantly, there has been an increase in the scope of actorness, as well as the

consequences in the respect of more organic changes in the relations between the CZE and the

rest of the world, when but into the broader counterinsurgency perspective. This increase has

correlated with the gradual progressive exposure of Czech military and civilian actors to both

conceptual and practical dimensions of counterinsurgency as one of the main contemporary

campaign themes (using the NATO conceptualization; see p. 85). As the empirical data

presented above indicate, the Czech Republic has progressively also become one of the more

generous and committed partners in the counterinsurgency missions it has participated in. On

the other hand, however, the strong commitment has also severely weakened over the course

of the foreign missions, particularly ISAF, mirroring the persisting implicit inconsistency and

confusing relevant policy making. Political will of the Czech government representatives to

ensure required counterinsurgency performance of its military and civilian assets in areas of

operation has coincided with the general trend of decreasing political will of other NATO

member states, but also reflect the pervasive problem of the lack of clear definition of the

objectives and goals of the Czech Republic as a sovereign country and actor in the field of

multinational counterinsurgency operations. Efforts to increase actorness of the Czech

Republic in the sphere of counterinsurgency are identifiable. This increase has had several

important consequences as well, particularly in terms of stronger confidence of the Czech

Republic in terms of preparation of its military forces and civilian assets to be deployed to a

multinational mission abroad, as well as utilizing the gained direct experience from several

perspectives (combat experience, interoperability with partners, CIMIC, etc.) further.

Reputation of the Czech Republic as a credible and reliable partner, generally easy to

cooperate and collaborate with during multinational deployments, has also been positively

affected by the Czech “counterinsurgency actorness” increase.

Hill further works with a concept of international actor developed by G. Sjoestedt in

1977. Following Sjoestedt, Hill introduces three key attributes of an international actor as an

entity which is (1) delimited from others, and from its environment, (2) autonomous, in the

sense of making its own laws and decisions (resembling the concept of sovereignty), and (3)

in possession of structural prerequisites for action on the international level (like legal

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personality, a set of diplomatic agents and the capability to conduct negotiations with third

parties) (Ibid). For the purposes of this thesis, these indicators are modified and adjusted to

the topic of individual stakeholders in the realm of multinational counterinsurgency

campaigns. All three indicators are virtually applicable to the research subject in this thesis

with the goal of achieving yet another perspective on the data sets of general Czech approach

to counterinsurgency. The first indicator, delimitation of an actor, in the sphere of

multinational (NATO) counterinsurgency operations is clearly established by the importance

of the national level of planning and decision-making about all individual steps or

contributions in the multinational setting. The Czech Republic as a sovereign country can

decide by itself, in compliance with its own national interests, risk assessments and threat

perceptions what kind and what amount of resources and capabilities it would commit to a

mission. Even in terms of the developments on the ground during the missions, the Czech

Republic has often kept semi-autonomous profile in the eyes of local population, most notably

in Afghanistan. Even though the Czech forces and civilian experts comprised an integral part

of the ISAF coalition forces, they also maintained strong national profile, lately culminating

in signing numerous bilateral strategic agreements with the Afghan government.

Second indicator focuses on the level of autonomy in a sense of making own laws and

decisions. As already mentioned with the first indicator, the level of importance of national

decision-making has been strong during the courses of the counterinsurgency missions the

Czech Republic contributed its resources to. As a sovereign state, the Czech Republic could

have expressed its reservations or disapprovals, usually in forms of national caveats, a

practice that has allowed for maintaining high level of cohesion of the Alliance as well as

legitimacy of the mission. Such decision-making autonomy of nation states has also been

manifested in the leeway given to them mainly on the tactical level, up to the level of

OPORDs that are usually issued by national C2 structures for respective national contingents

deployed to multinational missions. However, such leeway is limited and framed by the

NATO documents like STANAGs, and by the strong emphasis on interoperability between

(the deployed) NATO member states’ forces. The Czech Republic as a comparatively smaller

state with less negotiating power within NATO/EU cannot resort to drafting and adopting its

own national legislation separate and different from the legislative frameworks established by

NATO/EU as such. As determined by the Czech constitutional law, the NATO/EU legal

provisions are superior to those of individual nation states. In terms of structural prerequisites,

the third indicator of actorness in counterinsurgency sphere, the Czech Republic has proved it

can mobilize substantial number of resources relevant and effective in counterinsurgency

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endeavors in military and economic terms. Political dimension of the Czech approach to

counterinsurgency is difficult to measure and delineate accurately. The country has quite

capable diplomatic corps at its disposal, indicating relatively high capability to conduct

negotiations with third parties. This potential has been illustrated by the discussions and

negotiations the Czech political and military representatives held both in NATO format and

bilaterally with the Afghan government. Nevertheless, the exact leverage and influence the

Czech Republic has had in the NATO structures regarding the counterinsurgency operations,

their planning, execution or evaluation, cannot be accurately determined.

Despite the fact the Czech Republic essentially met every request the Allies made with

regards to reinforcement of forces and capabilities deployed to a counterinsurgency mission

and has been able to mobilize fairly maximum of the resources at its disposal to its

boundaries, the actual negotiating power and leverage in relations with other Allies or

partners is generally understood to be rather limited by the comparatively small amount of

resources and capabilities it can offer, regardless their high quality. Additional influential

variable is the lack of geopolitical power on the site of the Czech Republic in general. The

country’s relevant military and civilian actors has essentially failed to exploit the reputation

the Czech Republic gained among its coalition partners as well as local population to its

greater advantage. Lack of previous direct experience, weak political will, minimal public

awareness and public debate along with the absolute lack of any appropriate clarification or

definition of desirable objectives, goals and end states (mainly in political terms) can be

identified as some of the major reasons behind this inability meet and exploit the acquired

potential for its own benefits.

Another major factor with a profound impact on actorness of the Czech Republic in

the field of multinational counterinsurgency operations, as well as on the character, scope and

overall evolution of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency, is the one of flawed

coordination of activities on the levels, i.e. (1) among Czech military and civilian

counterinsurgency executioners, and (2) among the coalition partners, incl. the NATO

platform. Based on the data obtained and analyzed in this research, despite the fact that

interoperability has long been promoted as one of the essential operational capabilities of

armed forces of NATO member states and partner countries, its maximum was never reached

on the ground during the missions. One of the major impediments of effective interoperability

and coordination among coalition military forces was the practice of use of national caveats

restricting the rules of engagements of individual national contingents. On the same mission

level, as the ISAF case showed in particular, civilian (reconstruction and development) efforts

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were not coordinated on the highest mission command levels. The individual contributors

were granted significant leeway in their actions and operations, at the expense of the

coherence and consistency of the mission per se. Civilian dimension of multinational/NATO

counterinsurgency operations generally provides more research opportunities and space, given

its strong national character, providing for a greater variation of the research subject and

enabling identification of patterns, specifics and interests that comprise a national approach to

a united, common strategy.

Internal issues with coordination, mainly in terms of complex cooperation between

military and civilian elements of the Czech counterinsurgency contingents, affected the

“counterinsurgency actorness” of the Czech Republic through strong inconsistency of the

overall efforts. Problems with coordination and consistency was also reinforced with the

rotational character of the PRT Logar. Individual sequential contingents usually developed

their own mission program with specific priorities, not always matching the priorities of the

previous contingents they replaced. Some reports also suggest strong personalized character

of the mission programs of individual PRT Logar contingents of civilian experts, reflecting

the background, interests and ideological leanings of the leadership elements of the civilian

part of PRT Logar. Coordination issues in the mission on the ground then reflected the issues

and problems in coordinating negotiations, planning, decision-making and practical

implementation between the governmental (and non-governmental) agencies and institutions

relevant for counterinsurgency conduct of the Czech Republic on the strategic and political

level. This challenge closely mirrored the inexperience of the Czech Republic with

counterinsurgency, CIMIC and the PRT concept as such. Even though the CIMIC units of the

Czech armed forces generally have quite extensive experience with deployments, the concept

of CIMIC has encountered difficulties in transferring it to a broader political Czech context

and in consequent manifestations that surfaced in a form of commitment of abundant

resources and their ineffective management, use and spending. This issue is then closely

connected to the critical requirements of the necessity to improve planning and concrete

budgeting chapters of the specific Czech contributions to multinational/NATO

counterinsurgency missions, in order to increase the overall efficiency and actorness of the

Czech Republic in the field of counterinsurgency efforts. Both such individualistic efficiency

and actorness is, however, difficult to measure adequately, given the complexities of the

context and interconnectedness with other actors of different character and influence. Hence

this thesis only outlines the framework and key attributes and tendencies in this regard.

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Follow up research is necessary to thoroughly understand the Czech actorness in

multinational/NATO counterinsurgency operations.

Hill also works with the concept of “presence” as highly relevant for methodological

framework of capability-expectations gap case studies. For the purposes of this thesis, the

character of “presence” of the Czech Republic with regards to multinational

counterinsurgency campaigns. Such presence is heavily influenced by variable and

multidimensional presence of the Czech Republic in international affairs,122 as well as

NATO/the EU or different bilateral relations. Hill further suggests using the variables of the

outside perceptions of the studied entity (EC/Czech Republic) and the significant effects it has

on both the psychological and the operational environments of third parties (Ibid). In the

context of the Kosovo and Iraq deployments, the Czech Republic’s contribution to the

mission was generally perceived as a part of the bigger multinational force. In Kosovo, it was

largely due to the general simplistic view of the conflict as having two sides, the zone of

neutrality was greatly eliminated from the specter of perceptions of third parties (local public,

domestic public, neighboring countries, regional and global powers, interested non-state

stakeholders) under the veil of heavy emotions accompanying the predominantly ethnical

conflict. In such conflict landscape, the KFOR force was, for various reasons, perceived as

pro-Albanian. The author didn’t succeed in obtaining credible data regarding the third parties’

perceptions of the specifically Czech activities in the mission. What could have had a decisive

influence on this absence of credible data is the very limited and rather sporadic Czech

contributions to the overall mission.

On the contrary, the case of Afghanistan evinced different dynamics. Undoubtedly, the

Czech Republic could have been, and sometimes also was perceived merely as a “coalition

force”. However, the testimonies of respondents indicate that, especially in the areas with the

physical presence of the Czech military professionals and civilian practitioners, the overall

perceptions were relatively positive, distinguishing the Czech Republic as an individual,

sovereign actor in the landscape of the Afghan conflict, in some occasions also among the

insurgent ranks. Where the Czech presence was reportedly observable the most were the areas

of provision of security, reconstruction and primary socioeconomic development.

122 Czech Republic functions in the international relations across several parallel systems – as a sovereign nation

state in the bilateral format, as a member state of NATO, EU, OSCE, UN and other international and regional

organizations, and private sector (military industry, NGOs). These parallel systems of international relations then

shape the multiple identities of the Czech Republic in the international system. The form of the Czech

involvement may be governmental, semi-governmental and non-governmental, depending on the level of

government involvement and authority. Specifically, the semi-governmental involvement in military industry as

part of a wider counterinsurgency engagement is worth researching deeper.

182

The prevailing framework of the counterinsurgency missions the Czech Republic has

participated in is the multinational/NATO command. Therefore, any attempts to explore

outside perceptions of the presence of the Czech Republic are blurred with the perceptions

about the presence and performance of other coalition partners. This blurred line can also be

demonstrated by the emerging confusion among third parties over when to negotiate with the

Czech Republic as an autonomous actor and when to negotiate with NATO itself.

Exploration of the existing capability-expectations gap in the current Czech approach

toward counterinsurgency should, logically, start with identification and analysis of the

demands relevant influential insiders and outsiders have or might have on the Czech Republic

and its contribution to and performance in multinational counterinsurgency operations. As a

basis of his examination of the CEG present in the foreign and security performance of the

EC/EU, Hill identifies a list of external demands on the EC/EU’s foreign and security policy

performance in two time periods: (1) EC functions in the international system up to the

present (i.e. 1993), and (2) conceivable future functions for the EC in the current flux (i.e.

security environment of the first half of 1990s) (Ibid: 310-315). The fact that Hill himself

doesn’t elaborate on the proper methodology of his CEG analysis, nor does he present provide

any explicit guidance or reasoning behind his two lists of presumed EC functions, in terms of

justifications or explanations of how he identified the individual functions listed and their

indicators, gives future researchers significant flexibility and numerous loose ends, yet still

allowing for being conducted along the key pillars of the Hill’s CEG analysis. The main three

attributes of the Hill’s analysis – the ability to agree, the resources, and the instruments at its

disposal – have already been applied to the case of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency

and discussed above (see pp. 173-177).

What is also important to emphasize here is that the underlying starting points of a

CEG analysis are usually translated into language of number and degree of the expectation of

outside actors as well as the studied entities themselves. CEGs tend to emerge and start to

widen at a point where the researched entity (EC/the Czech Republic) is no longer capable of

fulfilling expectations articulated in connection to its future performance and actorness in the

respective field. Many of these expectations are, indeed, distinguishable by a high degree of

irrationality they usually encompass, as indicated in the case of Czech approach toward

counterinsurgency as well. Demands and expectations on the functions and performance of

the Czech military and civilian assets deployed to multinational counterinsurgency operations

generally reflected changing perceptions of the Czech assets by the outsiders and third parties

that, mirroring the developments on the ground (like progressively increasing and expanding

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Czech participation in the period of 2008-2011/2012). Accompanied by relatively high level

of irrationality, high third-party expectations on the Czech counterinsurgency performance

have tended to reflect the general (unreasonably) high expectations imposed on the entire

counterinsurgency mission itself.

Strong irrationality present within the Czech approach to counterinsurgency,

connected to the misunderstanding, miscomprehension or inadequate knowledge of the

developments on the ground or the complexities of the issue itself, demonstrated its influence

in two dimensions. First, reflective of the generally high expectations from the coalition

forces themselves, respective (and responsible) political representatives in individual TCNs,

in partner and/or neighboring countries as well as indigenous local population tended to

expect from the Czech military and civilian assets committed to a counterinsurgency mission

more than they were capable to deliver. The challenge of meeting the high expectations was

exacerbated by existing ineffective and bureaucratic decision-making procedures, reported

ineffective coordination and collaboration between key stakeholders, critically insufficient

definition and clarification of the objectives of respective missions (in political and military

terms) as well as the novelty of the phenomenon in the Czech environment. Confusion over

the source of the CEG in this regard evinces two major dynamics – lack of the resources and

capabilities needed to meet those expectations, and ineffective management of the resources

and capabilities available. Problematic resource management could have, theoretically,

contributed to widening the existing CEG even more.

Second, the domestic Czech population was generally confused about the functions

and performance of the Czech resources deployed to counterinsurgency missions. Inadequate

understanding and minimal awareness, resulting from the failure of the Czech political elites

to inform the public on the deployments properly, consequentially widened the existing CEG,

because it generated broadened range of demands and expectations on the Czech functions in

counterinsurgency endeavors. Such minimal awareness within the Czech society produced

incoherent mismatch in terms of the expectations the Czech public had from the Czech

counterinsurgency performance. Two major tendencies can be identified – on the one side,

Czechs expressed their support to the counterinsurgency and mainly development and

reconstruction efforts in the country, on the other hand, increasingly disapproving (or

disillusioned in a sense) sentiment started to gain traction across the Czech society. The

common narratives articulated by this opposition sentiment was drawn along the lines of not

understanding the purposes and objectives of the Czech participation in the missions,

especially ISAF, complemented by economically and to some extent security charged

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arguments. According some of the respondents the author talked to, and supported by

empirical evidence, the obvious reason behind the strong resentment was the ineffective

communication of the political and military representatives with the public. A kind of

information vacuum was created and later hijacked by anti-establishment and populist parties

active in the Czech political landscape for their own political goals and benefits, exploiting

the huge lack of awareness, understanding and knowledge. An interesting difference is thus

observable here – even though the INFOOPs and PSYOPs realized in the foreign missions

have generally been deemed as effective and successful to some extent, the public relations

and strategic communications part of the Czech political and military representatives has been

falling short of any sophisticated channels and mechanics.

Consequentially, any management of high expectations various parties had for the

Czech engagement in counterinsurgency has been exacerbated by variables of lack of

understanding and knowledge, minimal clarity on the desired realistic objectives and end

states and, perhaps to some extent, the prevailing Czech strategic culture and mindset of

maintenance of (historically determined) secrecy of the activities of the Czech armed forces.

The factor of inexperience or novelty of the art of counterinsurgency in the Czech context is

only partially plausible. Despite the fact that it projected itself to the ineffective decision

making and coordination mechanisms among the relevant agencies, the general public

awareness remained remarkably low, even as the Czech military professionals and civilian

practitioners progressively gained valuable experience in their foreign deployments and as the

public awareness campaigns started to be held more often.

The issue of ineffective resource management is also closely linked to the challenge of

consensus building. The fact that the Czech Republic deployed considerably high number of

resources to counterinsurgency operations indicate the ability to overcome dissent at the end

of the decision-making process and reaching a consensus in settings of parliamentary

democracy. The decision-making process was, however, based on the testimonies of the

Czech respondents the author talked to, marked with different language and understandings of

the Czech role and importance in respective counterinsurgency missions between relevant

stakeholders (mainly along the civilian – military dichotomy). Troublesome consensus

building is also reflected in the absence of a united document outlining the priorities and

ambitions, major instruments as well as long term vision of the nature of the Czech

involvement in multinational counterinsurgency operations, and, most demonstratively, in the

absence of clearly defined objectives of such involvements. Building on the works of

Christopher Hill, researcher Asle Toje elaborated the concept of CEG and transformed it into

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his original concept of “consensus-expectations gap” (Toje 2008). Main argument of his work

is that the EC/EU succeeded in attempts to close the existing CEG highlighted by Hill in

terms of increasing or adjusting the character and volume of resources available to meet the

expectations of its foreign policy roles and functions, however, the gap is still present in a

reduced form (Ibid). For the purposes of this thesis, Toje’s concept is useful in identification

of additional attributes of the still evolving Czech approach toward counterinsurgency.

Restructuring of the counterinsurgency-relevant resource pool and base in particular, along

with the requirement to rationalize decision-making processes serve as main illustration of a

solid basis of existing consensus and agreement building among the relevant stakeholder. On

the contrary, evidence of flawed synchronization and coordination of efforts between the key

agencies indicates persisting challenges in efforts to reach unanimous consensus on issues

relevant for Czech counterinsurgency performance. Closer and more throughout research on

the application of the consensus-expectations gap concept in the context of the Czech

counterinsurgency approach though.

Any credible attempts to measure the CEG existing within the Czech approach toward

counterinsurgency must reflect the dichotomy in expectations Hill emphasizes. Hill

distinguishes two different dimensions of expectations, as indicated in the text of this

subchapter above, (1) own ambitions of the studied entity, and ways of communicating the

facts to the outsiders, so that the limits of one’s actorness and intentions and clearly visible,

and (2) perceptions by others (Hill 1993: 322). The Czech Republic considerably and largely

failed to define, articulate and communicate its own ambitions for the Czech contributions to

NATO counterinsurgency missions. Czech political representatives didn’t officially express

what they seek to gain or achieve through these deployments. Some of the ambitions can only

be identified in broad general terms complying with the objectives stated by NATO or the

missions’ mandates themselves. Important positive attribute of the Czech approach toward

counterinsurgency and the CEG existing within it is the minimal level of both declared and

undeclared national caveats imposed on the deployed military forces and civilian capabilities.

This fact increased actorness of the Czech Republic in the field of counterinsurgency

operations and helped clarify the military intentions of the Czech Republic. Confusion and

prevailing obscurity of the objectives and ambitions of the Czech Republic shaped the

perceptions of others as well. The greatest challenge in this regard was represented by the

very high expectations the presence of foreign military forces and humanitarian, development

and reconstruction aid created within local populations, particularly the Afghans. The military

professionals and civilian practitioners sought to manage such expectations through their

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activities and negotiations with the locals, but the degree to which these efforts managed the

existing high expectations is difficult to determine and questionable.

In terms of capabilities, Hill names three attributes that are required to be evaluated,

i.e. (1) cohesiveness, (2) resources, and (3) operational capacity (Ibid: 318-321).

Cohesiveness of the Czech capabilities deployable to counterinsurgency missions abroad must

be understood and evaluated within the broader context of cohesiveness of the entire mission

and NATO itself (i.e. on the collective level). Functioning of NATO is generally structured

and institutionalized to accommodate strong role of individual NATO member states. On the

national level, cohesiveness of the Czech approach was undermined by ineffective

coordination and synchronization of efforts between the civilian and military components of

the Czech counterinsurgency contingents, occasional political hijacking as well as ambiguity

of the desirable realistic objectives, goals and end states of the Czech participations in

counterinsurgency missions. Internal cohesiveness was also curtailed by the problematic

continuity of the individual deployments, especially to PRT Logar, visible particularly in the

early years of its operations. Individual contingents tended to have different mission priorities,

not necessarily following and building up on the priorities and projects of the contingents they

replaced.123 Furthermore, resources the Czech Republic can deploy to a counterinsurgency

operation are generally limited in their numbers, but mostly their preparedness. Previous

inexperience with counterinsurgency craft represents a significant influencing factor in this

regard. Limited monetary resources are also mirrored in the tendency to re-deploy military

units, but also some civilian experts, that had been prepared, trained and deployed previously.

This inclination seeks to reduce the costs of the counterinsurgency deployments, possibly

reflecting the opposing sentiment in the Czech society with its economic argument, however,

it has also created quite significant discrepancy within the pool of Czech military

professionals and civilian experts deployable to foreign missions in the future, as well as

within the structures of the Czech armed forces, their funding and educational and training

programs. On the contrary, operational capacity of the Czech resources deployable to

counterinsurgency campaigns evinced to be remarkably high. The military forces (and civilian

experts to some extent) deployed to foreign counterinsurgency mission were able to learn and

123 Deeper research into the issue of cohesion of the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency would require

study and analysis of a potential convergence in voting procedures and results as well as public statements of

representatives of political parties that had presence in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies of the

Czech Parliament. Connected to this is another significant factor of domestic policies and their potential

influence over the character of the conceptual vs. practical approach to counterinsurgency of the Czech Republic.

187

adapt quickly,124 and showed impressive interoperability skills in their actions with other

coalition partners. Also, as already aforementioned, the Czech Republic succeeded in

mobilization vast amount of resources to the ISAF mission, demonstrating slowly, but

steadily growing institutionalization of the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency.

Measuring the Czech achievements in counterinsurgency field must be carried out

against theoretical characteristics of a single, effective counterinsurgency strategy doctrine.

For the purposes of this thesis, it is necessary to evaluate the Czech counterinsurgency

performance to the key attributes of the Allied counterinsurgency doctrine, as realized in the

concluding chapter of this thesis. But, again, to clearly determine the existing capability-

expectations gap in the research subject represented a challenge, due to the practical

inexistence of clearly articulated objectives and goals of the approach, which complicates

efforts to identify expectations in more precise or detailed terms. Czech approach toward

counterinsurgency is still evolving. Therefore, any attempts to explore, analyze and evaluate

the present capability-expectations gap within must be subjected to future re-examined.

More of capability-expectations gap than exists particularly in the context of the

civilian component of the Czech counterinsurgency approach. The striking dichotomy

between the preparedness of the military component on the one hand, and the insufficient

preparedness and mobilization of civilian resources on the other requires to be adequately

bridged by improved preparedness of both components of the Czech counterinsurgency

efforts. This existing dichotomy has then manifested itself in dubious level of

synchronization and sometimes challenging coordination of activities between the two

components. The military-civilian dichotomy was also underscored by the existing minimal

clarity on the common goals and objectives of the Czech counterinsurgency mission.

Whereas, even in theory, the military counterinsurgency component usually derives goals of

its tasks and missions from OPORDs/ROE, the civilian part of the Czech counterinsurgency

landscape lacks any clear guidance for its efforts. Minimal or unclear political guidance then

also affects civil-military cooperation back. Particularly efficiency and effectiveness of the

Czech counterinsurgency approach could also be examined through analysis of the existence

of capability-expectations gap from the local perspective, i.e. what expectations the local

population had and what was the reality of the Czech performance. Such research is, however,

beyond the scope of this thesis. May this dimension serve as recommendation for one

direction of any future research of this subject matter.

124 Learn and adapt has long been accented as one of the fundamental pillars of any counterinsurgency efforts.

188

The two figures below illustrate the major findings of the evaluation of capability-

expectations gap existing within the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency. First figure

visualizes two axes that function in the respective approach. What the table evinces is the

character of the capabilities the Czech Republic committed to NATO counterinsurgency

missions it participated in,125 and its decomposition into practice according to individual

expectations. Key attributers stated in the NATO counterinsurgency doctrine are used as

categories of expectations. This figure works only with character of the capabilities, their

specifications are defined in the concluding chapter of this thesis, answering the first research

question.

Politic

al

prima

cy

Popul

ation

-

centri

c

Impor

tance

of

legiti

macy

Intelli

gence

Neutr

alize

the

insurg

ents

Protrac

ted

Rule of

law

Transiti

on of

respons

bility

Learn

and

adapt

Collec

tive126

POL

DIPL

MIL

HUM

DEV

DIPL

MIL

HUM

DIPL

MIL

POL?

DIPL?

MIL

HUM

DEV

MIL

HUM

DEV

POL?

DIPL?

MIL

HUM

DEV

POL?

DIPL?

MIL

DEV

POL

DIPL

MIL

HUM

DEV

Natio

nal

POL

DIPL

MIL

ECO

SOC

INF

PSY

DEV

REC

MIL

ECO

SOC

INF

PSY

DEV

REC

DIPL

MIL

ECO

SOC

INF

PSY

DEV

REC

DIPL

MIL

ECO

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INF

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DEV

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ECO

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INF

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DIPL

MIL

ECO

SOC

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PSY

DEV

REC

DIPL

Figure 8: Two axes of CEG in the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency. Source: IH.

125 Short forms of characteristics are used in the figure: POL – political, DIPL – diplomatic, ECO – economic,

MIL – military, PSY – psychological, INF – information, SOC – societal, HUM – humanitarian, REC –

reconstruction, DEV – development. DIPL in the cluster of national efforts include negotiations with locals.

Importantly, national policies outlining what individual states do and don’t do set limitations for collective

policies. 126 With the direct involvement of the Czech Republic. This category includes deployments as part of a larger

multinational force (like SOF deployments). National efforts include all sovereign Czech missions (like PRT

Logar or OMLT Wardak).

189

The data presented in the figure as related to the two key axes of CEG existing in the Czech

counterinsurgency approach indicate the range of resources the Czech Republic deployed to

counterinsurgency missions abroad. What the figure doesn’t show, however, is the

quantitative value of these data and the extent to which the committed capabilities meet the

individual expectations (attributes). Hence figure 8 should be used as one of the possible

springboards and directions for farther research that is required for deepening the

understanding of the research subject.

Second figure, a table represents a visualization of the CEG in Czech

counterinsurgency approach. The author of this theses first assigns numerical values on the

scale 0-1 to the degree to which individual listed expectations are met by the capabilities

committed and deployed. Importantly, the list of individual expectations (assigned value 1)

reflects key LOEs of NATO counterinsurgency and major characteristics of broader contexts.

Numerical values assigned to the Czech deployments reflect both the character and numbers

of the contributions. This table uses figure 1 (see p. 23) as springboard, however, modified to

allow to illustrate the fluctuation of the CEG in Czech approach toward counterinsurgency in

the studied period of time. In order to generate similarly graphical illustration, numerical

values would must be assigned to the individual expectations as well, reflective of their

demanding character. Nevertheless, the listed expectations are only loosely based on ill-

defined or absent expectations and objectives formulated by relevant stakeholders. Additional

research is required in this regard.

Expectations (value 1-5) Value Capabilities (value 0-1)

Security of the population

(full spectrum operation)

0.9 SOF, SOG, PRT, EOD

HN capacity building - political 0.2 No evidence on specific political initiatives. Cooperation

with local authorities, but complaints about corruption.

HN capacity building – military 0.9 Almost exemplary, “the sole success”, but complaints.

HN capacity building – civilian-

other

0.75 Socioeconomic development – projects, trainings,

including specialties (KAIA METEO)

Reconstruction 0.6 Infrastructure projects, incl. KAIA, limitations, some of

them reportedly accepted by the Taliban.

Humanitarian assistance 0.8 Provision of supplies, facilitation of humanitarian

deliveries of other actors.

Development 0.8 Localization of efforts, but corrupted officials.

Third parties – negotiations, other

involvement

0.2 Not clear how the CZE leveraged its reputation;

facilitation of the relations-building of locals with

coalition partners.

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Countering organized crime 0.4 Partially by SOF, SOG, border monitoring in Kosovo.

INFOOPS/PSYOPS 0.85 CIMIC, media development.

DDR 0.4 Limited, mainly in Kosovo, partially EOD.

Expectations of locals 0.5 Expectations too high, capable of managing those just to a

certain level, interconnected with the broader context.

Expectations of coalition partners 0.85 Minimal caveats, met the requests, great reputation, but

SOG allegations.

Expectations of domestic public 0.3 Not clear, information embargo, opposing arguments, bad

or minimal public awareness and communication

campaign.

Media 0.6 Reflecting confusion about the issue, progressively

positive reporting and portrayal.

Expectations by adversary (if

clearly identifiable)

0.5 Friendly and strongly population-centric approach,

reputation and the 1968 narrative.

Table 18: List of expectations and capabilities. Source: IH.

What the table shows is the scope of existing capability-expectations gap in Czech

counterinsurgency performance. The Czech Republic has adequate and sufficient military

capabilities to meet the basic expectations in the military and security sphere, however, non-

military areas indicate perilous gaps between what the Czech Republic is expected to

accomplish and what it is capable of accomplishing in counterinsurgency context. The

greatest deficiency is apparent in the political/diplomatic affairs, which can serve as another

illustration of the need of articulating clear political objectives of the Czech

counterinsurgency deployments. The table also discloses the vital need to improve strategic

messaging on the side of the Czech Republic to the third parties’ audiences. This task won’t,

however, be effectively undertaken, until agreement is reached on the desirable objectives,

end states and ambitions across the domestic political, military and civilian landscape, until

the strong positive reputation of the country abroad can be leveraged and unless the lessons of

the recent counterinsurgency deployments are learned and followed.

7 Conclusions

The Czech approach towards counterinsurgency represents a challenging research subject. All

relevant data are scattered across various sources, and researchers must pay considerable

attention to the practical manifestation in form of execution on the ground and must consider

the broad context and specific conditions of the dominance of NATO and its framework of

military strategies for the Czech Republic’s foreign and security policies. This also means that

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the Czech Republic is obliged to adopt NATO strategies, excluding existence of any

autonomously Czech counterinsurgency strategy per se. What is the subject of research in this

thesis then is the way Czech Republic adopts NATO counterinsurgency strategy framework

and further translates it into the Czech context, with the Czech resources and capabilities, i.e.

the approach. This thesis is thus a case-study of the NATO counterinsurgency doctrine,

among other added values of it. Research of the counterinsurgency topic in general requires

multidimensional research combining various military, political, socioeconomic and even

psychological sciences of various relevant state and non-state actors, in order to provide as

comprehensive results as possible. Furthermore, the previous lack of any direct experience

with the counterinsurgency vocabulary and its key attributes in multinational foreign

operations further complicates the research landscape of the topic of Czech approach toward

counterinsurgency, and so does the dynamic nature of its practical implementation,

distinguishable by strong interdependency on the changes in nature, organization, funding

schemes, preferred modes of operandi and other features of the adversary, here insurgents.

The Czech Republic represents quite a unique case in the counterinsurgency research

field, given its relatively small geopolitical power and resource base in international relations

as well as short direct experience with the research subject in both conceptual and practical

terms, a topic which generally got little attention in the academic discourse. Absence of

existence of an official common document that would outline the desired goals, key attributes

and features and resource base available to deploy in the context of the Czech approach to

counterinsurgency demonstrates the pervasive confusion over how to best comprehend and

manage the challenge of counterinsurgency in the Czech context.

Desired aim of this thesis was to fill the gap in the Czech as well as international

expert literature by developing a comprehensive study of the contemporary Czech approach

toward counterinsurgency by describing and analyzing its key features. The justification for

this ambition is that such a pilot study of this topic would allow interested actors to learn

about the Czech counterinsurgency experience, understand its key internal dynamics,

challenges, problems and limitations it must face, as well as to understand where the strengths

of the Czech approach are and why. Moreover, this thesis brings closer attention to the

resources the Czech Republic has, to their preparedness and conditions of their use. All these

variables are important for managing expectations for any possible future counterinsurgency

deployments the Czech Republic would most likely participate in. By systematical analytical

process, this thesis provides critical descriptive analysis of the current state of the Czech

approach toward counterinsurgency, identifies and discusses its potential efficiency as well as

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its strong and unique features and liabilities. It also provides recommendations for further

development of the approach by addressing the opportunities and threats to it as well as the

key areas where a significant gap between expectations and real capabilities in the context of

the Czech counterinsurgency approach lie.

The thesis is divided into three main parts, closely linked to each other, i.e. theoretical

part, empirical part and analytical part. In the theoretical part, conceptual framework of the

research is established by defining the scope of what constitutes a strategy, and where does an

approach stand in this. The author uses the theory of strategy developed by Harry Yarger with

the 8 underlying premises of what constitutes a strategy, complemented by theoretical model

developed by Arthur J. Lykke, who approaches strategy as a balance visualized in an equation

“strategy = ends + ways + means”. Their use for the purposes of analyzing the Czech

counterinsurgency approach is limited, since no “Czech counterinsurgency strategy” exists. It,

however, helps to understand, why an autonomous Czech counterinsurgency strategy even

cannot exist (apart from the conditioning by the commitments and obligations stemming from

the NATO membership). The basic conceptual framing is conducted also for the topic of

counterinsurgency itself, in order to understand the essence and limits of the subject for the

purposes of this thesis.

In the empirical part, relevant historical legacy is studied on two cases of the

Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,

acknowledging the limited connection and influence over the current Czech

counterinsurgency approach. In the following part, the Czech counterinsurgency approach is

addressed, and its key attributes presented, in two dimensions – conceptual and practical.

Conceptual dimension introduces the official strategic documents of the NATO and the Czech

level, which are highly relevant for the Czech participation in counterinsurgency operations,

with special attention devoted to the NATO counterinsurgency doctrine, which represents (or

should represent) the ultimate conceptual and strategic framework of the Czech

counterinsurgency approach. The subchapter on the practical dimension of Czech

counterinsurgency approach then describes and analyses three foreign deployments of the

Czech military and civilian professionals, that helped shape the overall Czech

counterinsurgency approach, i.e. Kosovo, Iraq and predominantly Afghanistan. Given the

significance of the Afghanistan deployments for the subject of this research, analysis of this

case study provided most of the data needed to achieve the aim of this thesis. Deployments to

Kosovo and Iraq were limited from the perspective of the Czech counterinsurgency approach,

because they included only military component of the overall counterinsurgency force.

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In the analytical part, SWOT analytical model and CEG analytical model are applied

and used to analyze the key findings from the empirical part, generating a set of key positive

and negative features, tendencies and inherent dynamics that allow the author to answer the

research questions she formulated in the satisfactory manner.

First research question (see p. 13) sought to identify the fundamental key attributes of

the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency, and potential consistency of this approach.

The author was able to identify a number of key features within the research subject. First, the

Czech Republic has a solid capability and resource base than can be used throughout the full

spectrum of counterinsurgency operations, and was able to mobilize maximum of it for its

foreign counterinsurgency deployments, and answer the requests of its allies, particularly in

case of the mission in Afghanistan. Military capabilities and resources are specialized and of a

high quality, with distinctive level of interoperability and professionalism. The Czech

counterinsurgency efforts have been strongly focused on HN security forces’ capability-

building in different areas, at different levels, in different specializations and sizes. Focus on

expertise and specialization is yet another key attribute of the Czech counterinsurgency

approach, considering also the number of not only military, but also training programs and

initiatives in areas of operations. Vital feature is then represented by focus on reconstruction

and development complemented by significant localization of efforts in terms of stimulating

local security, stability and economic growth, by HN security forces’ capacity-building, as

well as use of local workforce, companies and supplies in reconstruction and development

projects. Considering the lack of any previous direct experience, the Czech counterinsurgency

force proved to learn quickly, be adaptive and flexible as well as culturally sensitive. The

population and its security, safety and well-being constitute the center of gravity of the Czech

counterinsurgency approach. The Czech counterinsurgency efforts resulted in significant

contributions mainly to security and economic development in area of operation.

Structural identification of the key features of Czech counterinsurgency approach and

its overall consistency can be achieved through applying the key counterinsurgency attributes

defined in the NATO counterinsurgency doctrine:

• Political primacy and clearly defined political objectives – the Czech Republic

didn’t develop a clear political guidance for its deployments in

counterinsurgency operations, it also didn’t clearly defined goals and

objectives its sought to achieve by and through their counterinsurgency

contributions;

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• Struggle for the population, not against it – the Czech Republic’s

counterinsurgency approach is strongly population-centric, population and its

security and well-being was at the center of gravity of all the deployed forms

of Czech counterinsurgency contributions, including SOF;

• Importance of legitimacy – the legitimacy factor must be viewed in two

dimensions – at the local level in area of operation, the Czech Republic sought

to gain legitimacy for itself as well as HN government it supported, by strong

focus on the population and their needs as well as by INFOOPS/PSYOPS and

development of media sector; it also sought to avoid any civilian casualties. On

the other hand, however, Czechs had to cooperate with corrupt local officials

(and reportedly bribe them even themselves), which significantly undermined

the positive efforts. The legitimacy of the mission in the eyes of the public

audience was problematic and too challenging to measure, as the Czech

political and military representatives rarely addressed the counterinsurgency

deployments to the public and, more importantly, were not able to explain to

the public the importance, goals and real assessment of its progress;

• Intelligence-driven operations – the Czech Republic itself exercised limited

intelligence gathering capabilities, particularly with regards to HUMINT, given

the coalition nature of the efforts. However, its willingness to share

intelligence in a timely manner has been widely acknowledged by its

international partners. The manner or level of intelligence sharing between the

civilian and military component in general is unclear and not readily possible

to assess;

• Unity of effort – the Czech Republic didn’t meet the required of

comprehensive and fully coordinated approach, given the huge discrepancy

existing between the military and civilian components of its counterinsurgency

approach, in both conceptual and practical dimensions, manifested in lack of

clearly defined goals and reported lack of synchronization and coordination of

efforts between the two. The Czech Republic, however, greatly contributed to

security and economic programs within the overall counterinsurgency

missions, which, however, suffered from lack of coordination themselves;

• Neutralize the insurgents – the Czech military professionals were deployed to

the full spectrum of counterinsurgency operations (offensive, defensive,

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stabilization), with strong focus on avoidance to civilian casualties. It also

helped counter the insurgent propaganda by running own PSYOPS/INFOOPS,

and by efforts to build and establish local media capability;

• Prepare for a protracted campaign – the only programs the Czech Republic

continue to source are the economic programs as part of bilateral Czech-

Afghan partnership, however, the Czech Republic is not involved in the HN

security forces’ capability building initiatives after termination of the ISAF

mandate in the Afghan territory, it has never been involved in any political

reforms or programs. In a sense, the Czech Republic contributed prepared

Afghans themselves for a protracted campaign by its strong, significant and

relatively effective training, advising, assisting and mentoring activities during

ISAF, along with the continuing training and education programs and

initiatives for the members of the ANSF in the Czech Republic itself;

• Security under the rule of law – even though the Czech Republic committed

significant resources to the training of HN police forces, provision of secure

environment during the time of its deployment, also negotiated and dealt with

local tribal elder authorities, demonstrating its strong devotion to localization

of the counterinsurgency efforts and their outputs;

• Hand over responsibility as soon as practicable – mostly achieved, even

though the respondents stressed the political pressures on adherence to the

schedule of transition, the Czech security forces’ capacity-building efforts are

generally deemed effective; and

• Learn and adapt – the Czech military and civilian professionals showed

remarkable ability for both.

As evident, what the Czech approach to counterinsurgency doesn’t include are efforts to

address the core grievances functioning as root causes of the insurgency, as any political

action is absent from the approach. The Czech counterinsurgency approach also evinces great

level of inconsistency, at two levels. First, the practice is not fully consistent with the

conceptual framework stated in most of the relevant official Czech documents. This could

have been caused by the fact that conceptualization in the Czech environment was more of a

reaction to the developments at the NATO level and on the ground as well as the lack of

previous experience with the subject. The second dimension of inconsistency marks the

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existing dichotomy between the military and civilian component in both conceptual and

practical terms, and generally strong fractionalization of the Czech counterinsurgency

approach. The Czech Republic wasn’t involved in the reconstruction and development

counterinsurgency efforts until 2008, when it deployed its own PRT to Afghanistan. The

Czech government should learn from the lessons it identified during counterinsurgency

deployments to avoid waste and counterproductive or ineffective courses of action, and in

order to exploit the potential it has in the counterinsurgency realm to the highest level

possible. Certain evolution of the Czech counterinsurgency approach is possible to track, and

if and how it develops further greatly depends on the importance of counterinsurgency efforts

in general, in the Czech context as well as on the utilization of the lessons learned and best

practices of the allies.

Second research question sought to identify the potential level of autonomy of the

Czech counterinsurgency approach and its unique features. Our membership in NATO

doesn’t allow for high level of autonomy by default, especially in military terms. The space

left for the variations among individual nation states’ approaches is terms of the scope of their

involvement, the resources they deploy and, mainly, the reconstruction component of their

counterinsurgency efforts. As stated above, reconstruction and development efforts within

ISAF were not coordinated. Quite unique is the importance of the civilian component of the

Czech counterinsurgency approach, further underlined by the deployment of experienced,

capable and strong CIMIC detachments. Furthermore, strong preference of localization of

stabilization, reconstruction and development, with hiring local companies, employing local

workers and using local supplies, is perhaps even more significant. The attention on

contributing to the economic security and development of a HN is remarkable (from business

stimuli to provision security of the airspace or main lines of communications, like highways).

Unique feature of the Czech counterinsurgency approach is certainly also its popularity in the

Muslim world (caused by the historical legacy as well as friendly attitude), resulting in mostly

highly positive perception of the Czech presence in the countries of counterinsurgency

deployments, that further facilitate the core pillar of any counterinsurgency – winning hearts

and minds, and support of the population. The Czech Republic also proved remarkably

capable to mobilized maximum resources (for a limited period of time), specialization and

expertise and further share it with HN security forces and population, and thereby perhaps

utilizing its experience from its own most recent democratic transition, security sector reform

and economic reform. The devotion of the Czech representatives to training and preparation

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of HN security forces is demonstrated in the effective utilization of the training facilities in

the Czech Republic, too. Such training initiatives and programs stretch the outreach of the

Czech counterinsurgency activities into the longer outlooks, and can potentially serve as an

illustration of growing political commitment to the recent counterinsurgency activities it

engaged in abroad. Also, quite interestingly, the unique Czech experience with countering

organized crime in its own territory was attempted to be exported to the counterinsurgency

deployments in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, which represented a culmination point in this

regard with the deployment of the police SOG unit as well as the certain participation on

counter-narcotics missions during the deployments.

The third research question about the counterinsurgency models is closely connected

to the theoretical and conceptual part of this thesis. Through the prisms of the typology

developed by John M. Collins (see p. 54), the Czech counterinsurgency approach is strongly

population-centric, distinguishable by extensive efforts and devotion to winning hearts and

minds of the population during all phases of counterinsurgency missions, including the

offensive one. As Collins further categorized three different categories of counterinsurgency

campaigns, the Czech approach fits his third category “hold and harass”, i.e. simultaneous

efforts aimed at pursuing the insurgents and securing an area of responsibility. However,

again, the Czech counterinsurgency approach is highly fractionalized, including in terms of its

continuity and cohesiveness of action, i.e. the Czech Republic generally engages in smaller

individual mission tasks in various time periods (which may overlap). The Czech presence

and activities in areas of counterinsurgency operations contributed to or by itself enabled at

least opening of the hearts and minds of local populations, by providing them with alternative

opportunities and alternative narratives to those of anti-government forces. Ultimate winning

of those hearts and minds would require much longer and generally greater presence and

activities of the Czech forces and capabilities.

NATO in its counterinsurgency doctrine stresses its preference of so-called “clear,

hold, build” model of counterinsurgency campaign. The Czech approach meets most of its

core attributes and requirements:

• Physically and psychologically separate insurgents from the population – the Czech

Republic greatly contributed to continuous kinetic efforts to pursue and eliminate the

insurgents, mostly also its sources of funding, and also engaged in PSYOPS and

INFOOPS aimed at countering the insurgents’ propaganda;

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• Provide conditions for political, social, economic reforms – the deployments were

short for establishing any solid foundations for sustainable reforms, however, the

Czech Republic generally sought to stimulate the economic development and greatly

contributed to economic security. It also shared some of its transitional experience in

security forces and business capacity building;

• Safeguard the population and key infrastructure – among the Czech

counterinsurgency priorities was provision of security to the local population from all

potential threats (i.e. including avoidance to civilian casualties), maintaining freedom

of movement on key lines of communications by building check points as well as

local security forces;

• Training and opportunities for HN security forces to improve – extensive part of the

Czech counterinsurgency approach in all phases of HN security forces preparation

and especially mentoring and assisting to improve their capabilities on the front lines;

frequent and effective utilization of training facilities on the territory of the Czech

Republic itself then also represents another unique feature of the Czech approach

toward counterinsurgency;

• Opportunity for HN police forces and other government institutions to establish

and maintain rule of law – the Czech Republic contributed vast resources to training

efforts of the HN police forces, however, continued to work with corrupt local

officials and therefore contributed also to maintaining the existing culture of impunity

in area of responsibility;

• Provide essential services and address the core grievances of the insurgency – the

Czech Republic coordinated its efforts and helped with humanitarian aid delivery by

its own as well as by other international actors and sought to meet the basic needs of

the population through provision of secure and stable environment and projects that

meet the needs of locals, some of them included essential services like water

irrigation system. The Czech Republic didn’t, however, participate anyhow

significantly in efforts to address and solve the core grievances of the insurgency.

• Assistance with refugees and IDPs – the Czech Republic didn’t directly participate

in this line of operation;

• Use and train of local workers and materials to build and provide a sustainable

economic and social system – the Czech Republic considered stimulating economic

development of in the areas of responsibility as one of its priority efforts, and

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developed on this focus by continued prioritized bilateral development arrangements.

Strong localization of counterinsurgency efforts, especially in terms of realization of

reconstruction projects by utilizing local capacities is one of the most defining

features of the Czech approach to counterinsurgency;

• Deny the enemy active and passive support, along with the last principle of

• Gain support of the populace also proved to be the fundamental attributes of the

Czech counterinsurgency approach, enabled by friendly and respectful mutual

relationship, which can also help to explain the absence of any green-on-blue attacks,

committed by the trained Afghans targeting the Czech forces.

When the author attempts to apply the Yarger’s theory of strategy and the Lykke’s

theoretical model of strategy on the key characteristics of the Czech approach to

counterinsurgency in order to evaluate whether or not it could theoretically be considered a

strategy, the results build a strong argument against any claims of strategic nature of the

Czech approach towards counterinsurgency. The Yarger’s theory of strategy is based on 8

fundamental premises, which the Czech counterinsurgency approach greatly fails to meet:

1. Proactive, anticipatory nature of strategy – the Czech counterinsurgency approach

has been largely reactive in both conceptual and practical terms;

2. Formulation of appropriate objectives and the desired end state – the desired end

state of the Czech counterinsurgency efforts mirrors the overall desired end states of

the entire missions, whereas clear and appropriate objectives were not clearly defined

and specified in the Czech context;

3. Appropriate balance between the ends, ways and means – the Czech

counterinsurgency approach fails especially within the first pillar, as demonstrated by

below with the Lykke’s theoretical equation of strategy, modified to the basic

characteristics of the Czech counterinsurgency approach below;

4. Political purpose – the Czech counterinsurgency approach suffers from lack of clear

political guidance and vision of what the Czech Republic wants to achieve as a

sovereign state in more specific terms;

5. National consensus and comprehensive direction – the Czech approach to

counterinsurgency is distinguishable by huge discrepancy between its military and

civilian components;

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6. Holistic nature – the Czech counterinsurgency approach is based on a compilation of

individual deployments of military and civilian resources with specific mission tasks;

7. Knowledge of the environment – the Czech Republic long lack experts on the areas

of counterinsurgency operations and gravely failed to effectively and systematically

utilized them; and

8. Inherent risk (either failure to achieve objectives, or providing significant advantage

to the adversary) – the Czech Republic generally achieved some isolated inherent

objectives of the deployments of its resources in terms of completed reconstruction

projects or trained and prepared HN security forces’ units (especially SOF, which the

Czech SOF help train), however, their long-term sustainability is questionable;

furthermore, allegations occur about bribing the Taliban, which didn’t provide

significant advantage to the adversary per se, however, it contributed to grow its

sources of funding. Complete withdrawal with limited successes left behind can also

be perceived as bigger advantage handed over to the adversary.

The Czech approach toward counterinsurgency translated and visualized in the form of

Lykke’s strategic equation would look similar to this:

CZECH STRATEGY = ??? + SOME OF THE WAYS + SOME OF THE MEANS

Table 19: Czech approach toward counterinsurgency – Lykke’s strategy model. Source: IH.

The goals of the Czech counterinsurgency approach have never been clearly specific.

However, great amount of confusion and lack of clarity exists with multinational/NATO

counterinsurgency missions in general, as many different actors pursue different objectives

and interests. For instance, in the case of ISAF itself, whether the desired objectives of the

mission were focused on preventing the terrorist network al-Qaeda, its affiliates and allies

from establishing their safe-haven in Afghanistan once again, and thus prevent any future

attacks by this terrorist entity on Western targets and interests (i.e. limited objectives), or

whether the ultimate objective was democratic transition in Afghanistan (i.e. total objective)

remains unclear.

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Czech approach toward counterinsurgency also doesn’t fit the counterinsurgency model

outline by David Galula. From the four counterinsurgent courses of action Galula

characterizes (see p. 56), the Czech counterinsurgency performance has contained elements of

the first two courses of action in combination, i.e. direct action against the insurgent leaders

and indirect action against the conditions that are propitious to an insurgency. With the

deployment of the Czech SOF to multinational SOF task forces across Afghanistan the Czech

Republic contributed to the capture or kill missions targeting leadership of the Taliban. Other

forms of the Czech counterinsurgency contributions has fallen under the indirect actions

against the conditions propitious to insurgency, as they including HN security forces

capability building, economic development and human security efforts and activities. These

tasks were generally also considered to promote the legitimacy of the local government,

thereby it can be argued that the Czech approach towards counterinsurgency touches up on

the fourth course of action outline by Galula (strengthening of the political machine),

however, the evidence suggest no direct or greater political involvement of the Czech

Republic. Infiltration of the insurgent movement was virtually impossible from the side of the

Czech military and civilian actors, given their initial minimal preparation, let alone the

language barrier. Galula also draws 8 main principles that are, in his view, vital for success in

counterinsurgency campaigns (see p. 57). Considering the limited resource base the Czech

Republic has and can commit to a multinational counterinsurgency operation, it is difficult to

categorize the Czech counterinsurgency performance according to Galula principles.

Moreover, one of his key principles is based on the necessity to replace corrupt or

incompetent officials from administrative positions, a competency the Czech civilian and

military contingents clearly lacked. Where solid contact points with the Galula’s

counterinsurgency principles can be identified is in the activities of making a frequent contact

with the population and facilitation of functioning of provisional local authorities, including

support to elections. Nevertheless, the Czech counterinsurgency deployments inherently

couldn’t meet the criteria of “enough” armed forces concentrated in an area or them being

embedded with the local population.

David Kilcullen’s counterinsurgency expertise was repeatedly stressed by the respondents

as the most important learning material during their deployments. Kilcullen’s

conceptualization then gradually became one of the key preparation materials for the military

(and civilian) professionals in the pre-deployment phases. His 28 counterinsurgency

principles (see p. 59-63) thus represent a key guiding material for the Czech

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counterinsurgency performance. Some of those principles are, however, too strategic to allow

for an appropriate application in the Czech context. David Kilcullen also recognizes 3 main

pillars of counterinsurgency – security, political and economic (see p. 58). The Czech

Republic committed its resources to the security and economic pillars in particular, as the

main tasks of their counterinsurgency execution included military and to certain extent law

enforcement tasks, provision of public services and human security, as well as resource

management assistance, along with some humanitarian and development assistance to the

Afghan population. Involvement in activities that Kilcullen categorizes under the political

pillar (legitimacy and efficiency of government and institution building) were limited and

included provision of public services, development and reconstruction aid and HN security

forces training and capacity building tasks. Even though the activities of the Czech

contingents themselves were meant and framed in the promotion of legitimacy of the local

government narratives, the locals were often differentiating between the services and projects

handed to them by the foreign (Czech) contingents, and thereby gave the local authorities

minimal, if any credit and appreciation. Promotion of legitimacy of the local government has

thus been one of the most challenging tasks of the Czech counterinsurgency deployments.

The research conducted in this thesis demonstrated that the Czech Republic has its potent

approach toward counterinsurgency missions, which has undergone recent and swift

evolution. The major problems and challenges that it entails are largely connected to the

inexperience of the Czech Republic in this field. This research also showed that in the Czech

context, counterinsurgency has been widely understood solely as a military theme. This fact

can be partially explained by the lack of clear conceptualization of the counterinsurgency

topic of the civilian agencies and organizations the Czech Republic is a member of. Strong

militarization of the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency is also mirroring the previous

unfamiliarity of the topic, as the Czech civilian agencies and institutions have not been able to

establish a clear policy and conceptual framework on their part of the overall Czech approach

toward counterinsurgency. The research conducted in this thesis also generates a highly

hypothetical hypothesis that from both qualitative and quantitative points of view, the Czech

Republic would not be able to tackle the challenge of eliminating an insurgency unilaterally

on its own. Variables of very limited resources as well as still quite limited practical

experience, inconsistent and scattered across the scope of relevant civilian and military actors,

and still critically insufficient preparation of these actors (and the prevalent prioritization in

this regard) prevent any more ambitious counterinsurgency endeavors of the Czech Republic.

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However, the Czech Republic as a united country should sought to overcome existing

liabilities existing within the approach and learn how to best utilize the precious experience,

contacts and reputation it gained through its most recent counterinsurgency deployments. It

should also seek to further develop this approach to be more effective by integrating other

actors (like private security sector or cooperation with NGOs), themes of activities (CVE,

gender-related issues), as well as by establishing effective mechanisms of coordination,

negotiation and synchronization of activities and efforts of all relevant state and non-state

stakeholders, along with effective and flexible decision-making procedure and oversight and

management mechanisms. Most importantly, the Czech Republic should articulate its

objectives and goals, what it seeks to achieve by and through their counterinsurgency

deployments from the mission, from its allies and partners as well as HNs. Moreover, the

Czech political and military representatives should prepare united common document that

would outline the framework and key characteristics of the Czech counterinsurgency

approach, and should make it publicly available. The general communication with the

population is essential for any future support of similar missions, especially in terms of clearly

explaining them why the Czech Republic deploys its assets, capabilities and resources to a

counterinsurgency campaign. The common document would then serve also as an instrument

of transparency and credibility in the eyes of the public.

This thesis was a first ever attempt to provide a comprehensive study of the Czech

approach toward counterinsurgency, and evinces numerous spaces and potentials for future

research. The Czech counterinsurgency approach can be compared to other countries of

Visegrad Group or to the approaches of other countries with similar characteristics to the

Czech Republic in terms of their political, military and economic capabilities. Deeper look

into issue of national caveats deserves more attention as well, so does the potential Czech

private security sector has with regards to supporting, expanding or developing the Czech

counterinsurgency approach to the future. Other areas can cover the capability-expectations

gap existing from the perspective of perception by coalition partners and by the local

populations the Czech Republic deployed its resources and capabilities to, or the domestic

population at home, as well as comparisons of different national PRTs and their operations.

The Czech counterinsurgency experience can also be examined in the contexts of EU or UN

crisis management missions, or broader Czech foreign and security policies with

identification of potential impacts the Czech counterinsurgency deployments had in this

regard, like the preparedness of the Czech military and civilian professionals. Content and

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discourse analysis of the PSYOPS/INFOOPS the Czech Republic engages in during

counterinsurgency missions is yet another potential extension of the scope of this research,

which generally yields significant practical conclusions and recommendations. The topic of

Czech approach toward counterinsurgency can be subjected to numerous theoretical

examinations as well – applying theories of realism, liberalism, neo-institutionalism and neo-

functionalism can greatly contribute to the overall research in the respective topic, and so

would explorations directed through the lenses of theory of implementation, theory of

dependency and theory of bureaucratic behavior. The research presented in this dissertation

thesis can serve as a solid starting point for such further theoretical as well as practical

studies, as the ambition of this thesis was to build a pre-theoretical, more realistic, arguments-

charged and process-oriented study of the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency.

The Czech Republic’s approach toward counterinsurgency is still evolving, so far has,

however, been reactive more than proactive. With the growing experience, an increase in

assertiveness and confidence of the relevant stakeholders can be identified. What is required

now for the relevant stakeholders is to reach an agreement on the desirable objectives and end

states, setting priorities and demands as well as defining and understanding of external and

internal, intended and unintended longer term consequences of recent and future

counterinsurgency deployments of the Czech Republic’s resources in order to rationalize

decision-making processes, enact wider institutional reforms, achieve better preparedness for

countering future security challenges and increase defensibility of the Czech Republic as a

sovereign country in the international system along with its democratic accountability in the

domestic sphere. Interesting extension of the scope of the research presented in this thesis

would also be a deeper exploration of the counterinsurgency campaigns conducted in the

territory of the Czech Republic from a historical perspective.

205

8 Bibliography

All electronic sources were accessed again on February 10, 2017 (to check for their

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• Petr Pelz, interview in person, November 2014.

• Plk. Ing. Oldřich Socha, interview in person, March 2012

• 1st Lt. Jiří Staněk, interview in person, May 2013.

• Michal Švéda, interview in person, November 2014.

• Ing. Pavol Varga, interview in person, March 2012.

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List of tables

Table 1 SWOT matrix sample …………………………………………...……….. 19-20

Table 2 SWOT policy recommendations ……………………………………………. 21

Table 3 Questions for respondents ……………………………………………… 25-27

Table 4 Main sources of data subjected to content analysis ………………………… 29

Table 5 Lykke’s strategy model ……………………………………………………... 38

Table 6 Lykke’s military strategy model ……………………………………………. 40

Table 7 Eight premises of Yarger’s theory of strategy ………….……………..… 41-43

Table 8 Counterinsurgency approaches I ………………………………………….… 54

Table 9 Counterinsurgency approaches II ………………………………………….... 54

Table 10 Four counterinsurgent courses of action by Galula ……………………….… 56

Table 11 Eight fundamental principles of counterinsurgent strategy ……………….… 57

Table 12 Counterinsurgency pillars ………………………………………………….... 58

Table 13 Counterinsurgency relevant Allied Joint Publications …………………….. 74

Table 14 Levels of NATO’s comprehensive approach ……………………………….. 90

Table 15 Activities of each phase of CHB counterinsurgency approach ……….. 101-102

Table 16 NATO counterinsurgency strategy priorities in the Doctrine of the Army of the

Czech Republic …………. …………………………………….……………117

Table 17 SWOT analysis of Czech approach toward counterinsurgency .......….. 162-163

Table 18 List of expectations and capabilities ………………………………….. 189-190

Table 19 Czech approach toward counterinsurgency – Lykke’s strategy model ……. 200

217

List of figures

Figure 1 CEG scheme ………………………………………………………………… 23

Figure 2 Relationship between insurgency and irregular activity ……………………. 52

Figure 3 Examples of Counterinsurgency Campaign End State and Lines of Operation …. 97

Figure 4 Indicative Activities and Tasks in Counterinsurgency …………………….... 98

Figure 5 Clear, Hold, Build interconnected and evolving activities ………………….. 99

Figure 6 Evolution of roles during main stages of counterinsurgency ……………… 102

Figure 7 Nature of counterinsurgency ………………………………………………. 107

Figure 8 Two axes of CEG in the Czech approach toward counterinsurgency……… 188

218

List of abbreviations

601SFG 601 Special Forces Group

AJP Allied Join Publication

ANA Afghan National Army

ANP Afghan National Police

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

AO Area of Operation

C2 Command and Control

C3 Consult, Command and Control

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear

CEG Capability-Expectations Gap

CHB Clear, Hold, Build

CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation

COIN Counterinsurgency

COMISAF Commander ISAF

CPO Causal process observation

CSFP Common Security and Foreign Policy

CVE Counter Violent Extremism

CZE Czech

ČR Česká republika (Czech Republic)

DDR Diarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration

DSO Data-set observation

EC European Community

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EU European Union

EUPOL EU Police Training Mission in Afghanistan

FAC Forawrd Air Controller

FM Field Manual

FOB Forward Operational Base

HN Host Nation

HQ Headquarters

HUMINT Human Intelligence

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

219

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IJC ISAF Join Command

INFOOPS Information Operations

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance

KAIA Kabul International Airport

LOAC Law of Armed Conflict

LOEs Lines of effort

LOOs Lines of operation

MAT Military Advisory Team

MNF-I Multinational Force - Iraq

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEC Network Enabled Capability

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NSE National Support Element

NTM-A NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan

NTM-I NATO Training Mission - Iraq

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OEF-A Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OMLT Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team

OPORD Operational Order

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

POLAD Political Advisor

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

PSMCs Private Security and Military Companies

PSYOPS Psychological Operations

QIP Quick Impact Projects

ROE Rules of Engagement

SAF Security Assistance Force

SNB Sbor národní bezpečnosti (National Security Corps)

SOF Special Operation Forces

SOFA Status of Forces Agreement

SOG Special Operations Group

220

SOJTF-A Speacial Operations Joint Task Force - Afghanistan

STANAG Standardization Agreement

StB Státní bezpečnost (State Security)

SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats

TCNs Troops Contributing Nations

TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

UK United Kingdom

UNAMA UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNMIK UN Mission in Kosovo

US United States

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WWII Second World War