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Legislative Influences on Performance Management ReformAuthor(s): Carolyn Bourdeaux and Grace ChikotoSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2008), pp. 253-265Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25145600 .
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Carolyn Bourdeaux
Grace Chi koto
Georgia State University
Legislative Influences on Performance Management Reform
The management literature argues that legislative
involvement is important to the implementation of
performance management reform, but it does not specify
how legislatures should be engaged or how different
legislative organizational arrangements affect reform. This article blends theories of management and legislative
professionalism to better understand the influence of leg islatures on the implementation of management reform.
Drawing on data from several surveys, it examines the
influence of legislative organization on the managerial
use of performance measures. The findings suggest that
citizen legislatures
are associated with better administra
tive practices than professional legislatures and that the
quality of legislative involvement may be more important than its
quantity.
Democratic governing institutions attempt to
achieve multiple and often competing objec
tives, including representation, responsive
ness, leadership, constraint of
power, preservation of rights, and
general freedom, as well as the
efficient and effective provision of public services.1 A dilemma in the design of democratic institu
tions is that the institutional
arrangements that emphasize one
set of objectives may undermine
others. For public administrators,
a key tension is that administra
tive organizations are expected
to achieve efficiency and economy, which may directly conflict with the
"legislative" values of representativeness, openness,
and responsiveness (Rosenbloom 2000, 140). Al
though this tension is, in part, inextricably associated
with democratic governance, one hope of institutional
scholarship is that through the exploration of alterna
tive institutional arrangements, one can identify
new
ways to balance these competing objectives (Weaver
and Rockman 1993).
This article examines the tension between legislative bodies and administrative agencies in the implementa
tion of management reform. Specifically, we examine
whether different state legislative institutional arrange
ments affect the agency-level implementation of perfor
mance-based management reform. State legislatures in
the United States are predominantly bicameral2 and
subject to the separation of powers; yet within this
overarching constitutional framework, these legislative
bodies vary substantially in their structure and capacity.
Among other differences, state legislatures vary in size,
staff support, professionalism of the legislators, term
limits, and levels of authority relative to the executive.
Some of these variations affect policy making (Rosenthal 1998, 2004) and budget processes (Abney and Lauth
1987, 1998; Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003) and likely influence legislative interactions with administrative
agencies in performance management reform as well.
This article first examines the tension between legisla tive decision making and control and administrative
A dilemma in the design of democratic institutions is that
the institutional arrangements that emphasize one set of
objectives may undermine
others.
efficacy and then considers how
differences in legislative organiza
tion and capacity influence these
conflicts. Then, using several data
sets, it tests the influences of
legislatures on the implementa
tion of performance manage ment in state
agencies.
Legislative oversight of reform
emerges as a critical variable
influencing effective agency
implementation; yet professional legislators, with
broad authority and capacity, have a significant and
negative effect on implementation, with the inverse
implication that citizen legislators have a
significant
positive effect.
Legislative Organization and Capacity and
Performance Management Reform In keeping with Hatry (1999), in this analysis, perfor
mance management is defined as a reform that focuses
on the use of performance measures in policy making,
management, and budget decisions, as well as a philo
sophical shift to focus on results rather than inputs or
Perspectives on Performance
Management
Carolyn Bourdeaux is an assistant
professor in the Andrew Young School of
Policy Studies at Georgia State University. Her research focuses on the implications of
legislative integration of performance information into budget processes. Previous
publications include a review of efforts to
implement performance-based manage ment at the local level in Public Administra
tion Review and an evaluation of the use of
alternative dispute resolution at the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency in
Negotiation Journal.
E-mail: cbourdeaux@gsu.edu
Grace Chikoto is a research associate
working on her doctoral degree in the
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at
Georgia State University. Her research
interests include program evaluation and
performance management. E-mail: gchikoto@gsu.edu
Legislative Influences on Performance Management Reform 253
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processes. This analysis focuses primarily on U.S. state
legislatures but also draws on federal-level experiences
with the Government Performance and Results Act. The
U.S. Congress is larger and more
professionalized than
most state legislatures; however, it is organizationally
similar to state legislatures and has been used in other
studies of state legislatures
as a comparable institution
(see, e.g., King 2000; Mooney 1994; Squire 1993).3
A number of important works in public administra
tion acknowledge the democratic importance of legis
latures and the allegiance that administrators owe to
legislative bodies (Burke 1986; Lowi 1969; Piotrowski
and Rosenbloom 2002; Rohr 1986; Rosenbloom
2000), but the theoretical and empirical literature
exploring state and federal legislative influences on
administrative efficiency generally describes a negative effect.4 Administrative efficiency requires clear policy
direction and some level of administrative discretion
to apply
resources toward their most productive ends
(Ingraham 1995; Wilson 1989). Legislative bodies are
designed to act as a restraint on executive power, to
represent a broad cross-section of the population
(Rohr 1986), and to act as advocates for their con
stituents (Rosenthal 2004). However, the same legisla
tive features that support these activities are also
associated with unclear and conflicting policy objec tives, micromanagement of administrative activities
(Ingraham 1995; Moe 1989, 1997; Wilson 1989), a
tendency to advance parochial
concerns over ones that
are good for the polity
at large, and a reactive, short
term policy perspective (Joyce 2005).
The institutional conflict over administrative effi
ciency is a recurring theme in public administration,
and the tension between legislatures and administra
tive agencies has colored administrative reforms
throughout the 20th century
(Rosenbloom 2000). Fragmenta
tion of decision making and
competing political priorities have been implicated
as a prob
lem for performance-based
management reforms, as have
legislative capacity and legislature
failure to use the information
generated from the reform.
Fragmentation and
Micromanagement At the state and federal levels in
the United States, the executive
and legislative branches, as well as administrative
agencies, compete for control over policy making and
implementation (Rourke 1993; Sundquist 1992). Furthermore, with the exception of Nebraska, state
and federal legislatures are bicameral and large in size
(with 60-424 members) and may divide control over
a policy
area among multiple committees in each
chamber (Radin 2000; Rosenthal 1998, 133-37). The
complexity of this process often leads to competing or
vague policy directives (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Rosenbloom 2000; Weaver and Rockman
1993). Alternatively, when there is disagreement be
tween the legislative and executive branch or adminis
trative agencies, the legislature may attempt to control
administrative activities by issuing minutely detailed instructions or
by refusing to remove
legal impedi ments (Sundquist 1992).
Performance management reforms require agencies to
identify clear mission-oriented policy objectives (CBO 1993; Joyce 1999, 2005; Radin 2000), a process that
is made difficult by political conflict. For instance, in
2003, $91 billion in federal spending for 30 programs was allocated without authorizing language because of
internal congressional disagreements or
congressional executive conflict over reauthorization (Joyce 2003,
27). Even if Congress identifies program objectives, these may compete with other legislative priorities.
Piotrowski and Rosenbloom (2002) express concern
that performance management reforms have under
mined important non-mission-oriented legislative
values, such as transparency. Along the same lines,
agency or executive identification of objectives may
conflict with legislative intent. Radin (2005), in testi
mony before a U.S. Senate subcommittee, points out
that the Office of Management and Budget's efforts to
set performance
measures for Community Develop ment Block Grant funds undermine the ability of
local governments to use the money in an flexible
manner, a legislated purpose of the program.
Similar conflicts occur when the policy recommenda
tions that emerge from performance reviews conflict
with political pressure to protect key constituencies.
Fragmentation of decision
making and competing political
priorities have been implicated as a problem for performance based management reforms, as
have legislative capacity and
legislature failure to use the
information generated from the
reform.
Kettl (1995, 20) observes that, at
the national level, performance
reform led to suggested budget cuts in areas such as the Veterans
Health Administration, but
legislative leaders rejected the
recommendations in order to
avoid any appearance of under
mining veterans programs.
Roberts (1997) describes union
resistance and subsequent con
gressional resistance to
proposed
reorganizations in air traffic
control administration and in the
Patent and Trademark Office.
Observing state legislatures, Barrett and Greene
(2005) note that in some states, performance audits
have been scaled back because legislators do not want
to see results for a favored program. The Congressio
nal Budget Office (1993) report on performance
management reforms concludes that state govern
ments seem to be struggling to with implementation
254 Public Administration Review March | April 2008
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because of the diffusion of authority that is inherent
in their institutional structures. Although
some of
these studies are from the early days of reform, it is
unlikely that the pressures that they observe have
changed.
Institutional variations and implications. In sum,
fragmentation and micromanagement are associated
with complex political preferences that are expressed
through complex institutional structures with many
"points of access" through which stakeholders can
influence policy and implementation. In part, frag
mentation and micromanagement are related to het
erogeneity in the political environment and, in part,
to constitutional features of American government,
such as the separation of powers, that are not ame
nable to change. However, at the state level, there are
a few variations in structure that may increase or
decrease fragmentation in legislative decision making,
as well as in interbranch negotiations. First, legislative
bodies may be fragmented by their size and possibly
by the number of committees with purview over a
single policy area. With the intent of strengthening
the authority and capacity of legislatures to make
decisions effectively, some states have reduced mem
bership in their legislatures or streamlined their com
mittee structures (Rosenthal 1998, 50-51, 134-36). Second, state
legislatures vary in their power relative
to the governor. Greater executive authority may make
the implementation of performance management
reform easier?agencies understand which cues to
follow, and legislators have less authority or
capacity to intervene or
micromanage. Obviously, this type of
shift may have democratic costs, and some empirical
evidence suggests that gubernatorial power may not
necessarily come at the expense of legislative power.
Dilger, Krause, and Moffett (1995) observe that states
with higher levels of institutional legislative power seem to have stronger and more effective governors.
Also, some evidence suggests that legislatures with
more responsibility for budgets (typically reflecting shared budgetary authority with the governor) may
manage the public purse more responsibly and may be
more interested in agency efficiency. In a 1994 survey
of budget officers, Abney and Lauth (1998) found that only 30 percent of respondents who ranked gu
bernatorial power as high also said that legislators
were as concerned about efficiency as the governor,
whereas 52 percent of respondents who ranked legisla tive power as
high made the same characterization.
Thus, higher levels of legislative authority relative to
the governor may lead to fragmentation and micro
management, but they may also lead to more respon
sible legislative decision making.
Propensity and Capacity to Use Performance Information
Legislators also face constraints imposed by the nature
of their elected office. Electoral cycles tend to focus
elected officials on short-term time horizons because
votes cannot be "capitalized" or spent on any election
other than the next one (Downs 1957). Voters or key interest groups may reward legislators for attention to
local or "parochial"
concerns over ones that affect the
polity at large (Rosenthal 2004). In addition, legisla tors are bounded by the time and resources that they
have to absorb policy issues. The length of legislative session, term limits, and amount of pay may encour
age or
discourage legislators from spending more time
on policy and political activities, while the number of
staff and possibly technological resources may affect a
legislator's ability to make informed policy decisions.
Finally, large legislative bodies not only increase the
number of viewpoints brought to bear on decision
making but also drive up the costs of decision making.
Because of electoral constraints, as well as constraints
on their time and capacity to assimilate information
and make decisions, legislative bodies tend to make most decisions "incrementally"
or at the margins
(Wildavsky 1988), and a variety of administrative
reforms intended to improve the level of information
brought to bear on
governmental decision making
have failed to alter this pattern (e.g., Lauth 1978;
Mosher 1969; Schick 1973; Wildavsky 1969).
Scholars have observed these same phenomena in
performance management reforms. At the national
level, Joyce (2003, 2005) and Radin (2000) note that
Congress seems to operate with a short-term time
horizon, and despite the availability of performance
information, Congress still tends to rely
on anecdotal
information, makes parochial choices, and often only
considers changes at the margin. Furthermore, con
gressional oversight focuses on high-profile, politically sensitive issues rather than systematically focusing
on
performance information. State information is less
detailed, but surveys suggest that state legislative bodies
also lag in the use of performance information (Melkers
and Willoughby 2001, 2004; Moynihan 2002).
Institutional variations and implications. Improv
ing legislative professionalism has been a long
standing recommendation for improving legislative
capacity for good policy making. The dimensions of
professionalism encompass both the legislators and
their staff resources. The effects of the former dimen
sion are more highly contested than the latter. Profes
sional legislators are
higher paid and work full-time.
The rationale behind the move to create more profes
sional legislators was that full-time, well-paid legisla
tors would both attract more qualified candidates and
would allow legislators more time to learn policies and
carefully assess their effects (Rosenthal 1998). Similar
arguments have been made against term limits
(Greenblatt 2005, 2006). These kinds of arguments suggest that professional legislators should have more
time and capacity to use
performance information
effectively.
Legislative Influences on Performance Management Reform 255
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However, research on term limits and professional
legislators seems to indicate the opposite. Rosenthal
(1998) argues that legislators who see politics as their
profession are ambitious for higher office and depen
dent for their livelihood on their current office. As a
result, they are anxious about risking defeat, less con
cerned about the state as a whole, and more eager to
curry favor with their district and key interest groups.
They may also have too much time on their hands and
thus be more likely
to "meddle" in administrative
activities. Some empirical evidence supports these
ideas, finding associations between higher legislative salaries and increased spending
on developmental
(interpreted as "pork barrel") spending rather than
redistributive policies (Barrilleaux and Berkman
2003). A study of term limits found that they lead
legislators to be less interested in pork barrel projects and more apt to make decisions based on "conscience"
and statewide needs (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998). Other research has shown higher levels of citizen
distrust of professional legislatures (Squire 1993).
Finally, Grizzle and Pettijohn (2002) suggest that term
limits might bring in legislators who are more likely to
need performance measures to
guide their activities or
who might have a higher propensity to use new types
of information such as performance information in
the first place.
In contrast, there does not appear to be the same level
of debate over staff professionalism. Rosenthal (1998) notes that increasing legislative staff capacity
was at
the top of legislative reformers' lists in the 1970s. Their reasoning
was that more and higher-paid staff
would give legislative bodies more capacity
to analyze
and oversee policy. Staff capacity to
analyze and pres
ent performance information generated by agencies is
also potentially critical to the effective use of perfor mance information in budgeting (Grizzle and
Pettijohn 2002).
Legislative Oversight The difficulties associated with engaging legislative bodies in performance reforms have led some scholars
to encourage administrative
agencies to
adopt reforms inter
nally without waiting for elected
officials (Joyce 2003; Swiss
2005). Most scholars would
likely agree that legislative en
gagement would be desirable?if
nothing else from a democratic
perspective; however, legislative
engagement is not generally
perceived as critical to
imple
mentation. Yet both Rosenthal
(2000) and Rosenbloom (2004) point out the impor tance of legislative bodies in their role of providing
oversight of executive activities. Although oversight is
typically conceptualized as
"checking the authority of
the executive," oversight can also serve an
important
administrative purpose as well. Without legislative
oversight (or oversight from legislatively governed organizations such as an
inspector general's office or a
legislative auditor), there might not be any serious
mechanism for ensuring administrative agency ac
countability. Criticizing an administrative agency is
often associated with criticizing the governor's stew
ardship, which suggests that the executive office may
not be as forthcoming about agency performance
problems as an external auditor.
While a legislature that is politically aligned with the
executive officeholder may choose to defend executive
interests or may want to defend a particular program
from oversight, institutionally, one would expect the
legislature to be less likely to be co-opted because it is
separated from regular management processes. Cer
tainly, Virginia's success in
developing serious admin
istrative accountability has been attributed, in part, to
its legislatively governed Joint Legislative Audit and
Review Commission (GPP 2005). In keeping with the
idea of external accountability, Grizzle and Pettijohn
(2002) call for an external nonpartisan agency to
provide oversight of performance reform. However,
unless they are affiliated with a branch of government, such entities may struggle
to find a political "constitu
ency" interested in their survival. In Florida, the gov
ernor attempted
to eliminate and then cut funding for
Florida's Office of Program Policy Analysis and Govern
mental Accountability, requiring the legislature to
intervene in support of the organization (Barrett and
Greene 2005).
Methodology
Methods and Data
Research and theory on
legislative bodies suggests that
legislative organization, authority, professionalism,
and capacity for oversight may affect state imple
mentation of a performance management reform,
although whether these variables will have a positive
or negative effect is not
always clear. This research uses
The difficulties associated with
engaging legislative bodies in
performance reforms have led
some scholars to encourage administrative agencies to adopt
the reform internally without
waiting for elected officials.
multiple regression analysis to
assess these relationships.
The analysis draws on surveys
that Melkers and Willoughby
developed and administered for
the Governmental Accounting
Standards Board in 2000. Spe
cifically, they sent surveys to 434
agency staff and program direc
tors in 50 states and received
152 complete responses (a re
sponse rate of 35 percent) from 48 states. The surveys
asked agency staff to assess the level of implementa
tion and use of performance information in general
management decision making and in very specific
256 Public Administration Review March | April 2008
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practices, such as the use of performance measures in
making determinations about funding and their use
in the reduction of duplicative services. Obviously,
some cautions apply in the use of such self-assessment
data. For instance, respondents may not be fully
aware of levels of implementation; they may be bi
ased in favor of their particular program, or they may
feel pressure to answer positively. However, the data
for the survey was collected confidentially. The survey
was sent to agency leadership, who should have more
than a speculative knowledge about agency imple
mentation, and there is no initial reason to believe
that the respondents would dissimulate in reporting
use of performance measures for specific practices in
implementation. Although objective data from an
external evaluator would be desirable, this survey
data is currently one of the best available assessments
of state-level performance management
implementation.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables are two indices created from
questions in the Melkers and Willoughby survey. The
first index is the mean response of seven questions
on
the effectiveness of performance measures in improv
ing specific management practices, ranging from
raising agency awareness about performance to very
concrete practices such as
changing agency strategies
and eliminating programs (see table 1). The variables
are measured on a Likert scale, with 1 being "not
effective" and 4 being "highly effective." Not surpris
ingly, respondents tended to be more positive about
performance measures raising
awareness about perfor mance than about their use in actually changing pro
grams.5 The variables have an alpha
score of 0.91,
which indicates a high level of internal consistency in
the responses.
The second measure captures the extent of effective
management practices using performance informa
tion. For these questions, respondents were asked to
assess the number of programs in their agency using
performance measures for management purposes
(table 1). The categories used for this variable were not
initially equivalent. Specifically, the second category,
"a few programs," is not comparable
to the other
categories, "less than 50 percent," "greater than 50
percent," or "no agencies."
To develop comparable
categories, "a few programs" was
grouped with "less
than 50 percent." Thus, the analysis assumes that re
spondents interpreted "a few" as "less than 50 percent,"
and further, that the categories are
equivalent otherwise.
Table 1 Dependent Variables
Index Measure of Effectiveness of Performance Management in Improving Management (Effectiveness of Use)
In your opinion, how effective has the
development and use of performance Descriptive
measure been in agencies in your Not Somewhat Very Statistics for
state regarding. . . Effective Effective Effective Effective Mean Index
Improving effectiveness of 8 68 52 17 2.36 Alpha = 0.91
agency programs?
Reducing duplicative services? 34 71 31 6 1.92 Average = 2.49
Reducing/eliminating ineffective 36 70 30 6 1.90 Std = 0.63
services/programs?
Changing strategies to achieve 6 62 60 16 2.41 Min =1.00
desired results?
Improving programs/service quality? 6 76 45 17 2.32 Max = 4.00
Increasing awareness of and focus 2 52 59 32 2.63 N =135
on results?
Increasing awareness of factors 7 51 61 25 2.53
that affect performance results?
Index Measure of Extent of Effective Use of Performance Management in Management (Extent of Effective Use)
Based on what you have observed, please "A Few
place a check to indicate the extent to Select
which output or outcome performance Programs" measures are actively used by agencies and "Less Greater Descriptive
in your state for the following types of No Than 50% Than 50% All Statistics
activities or decisions... Programs of Programs" of Programs Programs Mean for Index
Establishing or changing policies 6 66 48 19 2.58 Alpha = 0.84
Program planning, annual business 6 58 55 26 2.70 Average = 2.63
planning, or oversight activities, Std = 0.66
including programmatic changes Assessment of program results 5 55 47 37 2.81 Min = 1.00
Managing operations (e.g., managing 14 68 42 12 2.38 Max = 4.00
services or contractors) or daily N = 129
decisions (e.g., scheduling activities)
Legislative Influences on Performance Management Reform 257
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Though the second model might be considered the more
stringent test because it attempts to capture
both the breadth and depth of the use of performance measures, there are variations in
wording across the
two sets of questions that suggest caution in this sort
of interpretation. For instance, the second set of ques
tions asked about whether "output or outcome" mea
sures were used (see table 1). The inclusion of "output" measures
might indicate to the respondents a weaker
form of performance measurement. Thus, the differ
ences in the models are suggestive, but the main pur
pose of using the models is to see whether the
independent variables have consistent effects across
different metrics of performance use in management.
Independent Variables
Fragmentation. The principal independent vari
ables assess legislative organization and capacity,
including internal fragmentation, institutional
gubernatorial power relative to the legislature, and
external fragmentation in preferences that might
create conflict within the government. To assess frag
mentation internal to the legislature, two measures are
used. The first is the total number of legislators (CSG 2000, 72), with the expectation that the larger the
number of people involved in decision making, the more
complex the process. The second measure is a
dummy variable capturing whether different parties
control the House and Senate (CSG 2000, 70), and
again the expectation from the literature is that split
control will lead to more fragmentation in decision
making and thus be negatively associated with admin
istrative outcomes.
To assess equality of power between the legislative and
executive branches, we used Beyle's index of institu
tional gubernatorial power for the year 2000. This
index measures the governor's control over the budget, veto powers, appointment powers, and tenure, as well
as the extent to which the governor's political party
controls the legislature (Beyle 2003). Higher values
indicate more gubernatorial authority
or power. Con
trol over the budget, veto
authority, and party control
in the legislature are direct measures of gubernatorial
authority relative to the legislature. The literature
anticipates that gubernatorial power will be positively
associated with implementation. Finally, an index of
heterogeneity is used based on the criteria and meth
odology described by Koetzle (1998). This measure
captures the extent to which the population is hetero
geneous across the dimensions of race, rural or urban
residence, education, and homeownership. A high
number indicates a greater degree of heterogeneity
(Koetzle 1998), and the expectation is that heteroge
neity leads to fragmentation and thus difficultly in
implementation. Descriptive statistics for these
variables are reported in table 2.
Propensity and capacity to use
performance
information. A series of measures of legislative and
staff professionalism assess the effects of professional
ism on implementation of performance reform. As
noted earlier, legislator professionalism is associated
with being full-time with long-term tenure. To exam
ine whether the legislators were highly professional ized, we use a measure for number of days in session
following a methodology described in King (2000),6 as well as a
dummy variable for states that had term
limits in place as of 1997 (Rosenthal 1998, 75).
Characteristics of professional staff support include
the number of staff per legislator and resources ex
pended on staff support. King (2000) observes that
these measures are highly correlated. A staff index was
created from a 2003 National Conference of State
Legislators survey of total staff available to the legisla ture during session and dividing this number by the
total number of legislators. Staff per legislator was
then divided by the total estimated number of staff for
the U.S. Congress in 2003. A legislative expenditures
index was created following a
methodology described
in King (2000), which also uses the U.S. Congress as
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Effective use of performance management 2.49 0.63 1 4 135
Extent of effective use 2.63 0.66 1 4 129
Number of legislators 143.05 52.99 49 424 152
Gubernatorial power 3.47 0.40 2.7 4.2 152
Split of legislative control 0.18 0.39 0 1 152
Population heterogeneity index 0.34 0.04 0.25 0.44 152
Days in session 90.98 56.62 33.6 363 152
Term limits 0.43 0.50 0 1 152
Staff index 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.78 152
Legislative oversight 0.34 0.48 0 1 152
Executive oversight 0.39 0.49 0 1 152
Legislative bill 0.49 0.50 0 1 152
Pm basics 2.13 0.47 1 3 143
Citizen ideology 35.09 26.24 0 90.5 152
Government ideology 41.87 14.29 15.22 77.26 152
Expenditures per capita 2.96 1.15 1.90 10.95 152
Ln state population 15.08 1.08 13.11 17.34 152
South_031_046_0_1_^52
258 Public Administration Review March | April 2008
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a base. The two variables were then combined to
create a staff support index.7
Legislative oversight. To measure legislative
oversight, we use a variable in the Melkers and
Willoughby survey. Respondents were asked to iden
tify who they believed verified performance measures
"for accuracy, reliability, relevance and validity."
Respondents had options in the executive branch, the
legislative branch, state auditor, and various forms of
external oversight and could mark responses for all
that applied. If the respondents identified legislative branch oversight either through the budget office or a
legislative auditor, this variable was coded as a 1;
otherwise, it was 0. The responses to this question
varied within states, which suggests that this variable
may capture a perceived level of involvement and
oversight rather than a formally defined oversight
capacity. In general, however, this legislative oversight
variable was more consistent in states in which there is
a known high level of legislative engagement in per formance management, such as Texas, Louisiana, and
Florida.
Control Variables
Executive oversight. Traditionally, public adminis
tration has been concerned with executive authority over management processes in
order to improve administration
(e.g., Brownlow 1949). To cap
ture executive engagement in the
performance management re
form, we constructed an index
similar to the legislative oversight
index (i.e., a binary variable
capturing whether the respon
dents believed that executive staff
verified performance measures).
Effort to
implement reform. In 2000, some states
had only begun to
implement the reform, while oth
ers were using it quite broadly. To control for this level
of effort, we created two variables to assess effort to
implement. Because this analysis focuses on legislative
influences, the first variable captures whether the
legislature had enacted a law to implement the reform
(as opposed to the reform being implemented through an administrative action or executive order). Accord
ing to a report by Melkers and Willoughby, as of
2000, 22 states had legislation that required perfor mance measurement. In general,
most states followed
a model resembling the federal Government Perfor
mance and Results Act, so the type of reform was
similar; however, there were variations in the stage and
level of implementation (Melkers and Willoughby 2004, 14). To control for agencies that were in early
stages of implementation, had not implemented the
reform, or had abandoned the reform, we used an
index averaging the responses from two questions
from the survey that asked the respondent to evaluate
whether there were problems collecting performance
information and whether there were problems
main
taining performance information.8 Because these
questions are framed as
"problems in implementa
tion," there is likely to be a
negative relationship with
the dependent variables.
Other variables of interest. Citizen and elected
official ideology is measured using an index developed
by Berry et al. (1998). The index captures the strength of liberal ideology (as measured by the Americans for
Democratic Action and American Civil Liberties
Union) in the population and elected official ideology. A positive relationship would suggest the positive
influence of a liberal ideology on the dependent vari
able. Size of state and state expenditure
measures are
added, including the natural logarithm of the state
population and expenditures per capita. Also, a
dummy variable for "South" is added as control
variable.
Results and Analysis The results shown in table 3 for both of the dependent variables suggest a consistent if unexpected story. Note
that for each of the dependent variables, a "reduced
form" model is presented that drops two of the non
Traditionally, public administration has been
concerned with executive
authority over management
processes in order to
improve administration.
significant independent variables:
number of legislators and citizen
ideology. There is multicollinear
ity between the independent and
control variables, and dropping these two variables clarifies the
effects of several key dependent variables without substantially
reducing the overall power of the
model.
Fragmentation and Gubernatorial Power
The literature anticipated that fragmentation should
have a negative effect on administrative implementa
tion of a performance management reform, but here
the effect is mixed depending on the dimension of
fragmentation. In both models, gubernatorial power is
significant. This finding is in keeping with a long tradition in
public administration of emphasizing executive leadership and the idea that having clear
direction from the executive branch makes adminis
tration easier. The positive effect of executive oversight in the first model also supports the importance of
executive engagement in the reform.
Unexpectedly, the two other measures of fragmenta
tion, the measure of split party control in the legisla ture and heterogeneity
in the environment, have a
positive rather than negative effect on agency respon
dents' assessment of effective use of performance measures in management. Heterogeneity also has a
positive effect on the second dependent variable,
Legislative Influences on Performance Management Reform 259
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Table 3 Regression Results
_(1)_ _(2)_ Effective Use of Effective Use of Extent of Extent of
Performance Management Performance Management Effective Use Effective Use
Number of legislators 0.002 -0.001
(1.12) (1.21) Gubernatorial power 0.533 0.420 0.334 0.375
(3.72)*** (2.43)** (1.98)** (2.54)**
Split legislative control 0.478 0.455 0.185 0.193
(3.88)*** (3.65)*** (1.27) (1.32)
Population heterogeneity index 5.546 5.206 3.063 4.177
(3.38)*** (2.86)*** (1.31) (2.15)**
Days in session -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(1.40) (1.58)t (2.17)** (1.92)* Term limits 0.597 0.537 0.135 0.240
(4.08)*** (3.63)*** (0.83) (1.62)t Staff index -0.232 -0.429 -0.126 -0.177
(0.32) (0.64) (0.17) (0.25) Legislative oversight 0.168 0.202 0.305 0.289
(1.57)t (1.77)* (2.70)*** (2.67)*** Executive oversight 0.290 0.317 0.049 0.030
(2.66)*** (2.99)*** (0.45) (0.28)
Legislative bill 0.124 0.044 0.072 0.067 (1.03) (0.34) (0.54) (0.54)
Performance management basics -0.401 -0.387 -0.489 -0.481
(3.47)*** (3.35)*** (4.34)*** (4.20)*** Citizen ideology -0.005 -0.005
(1.14) (1.12) Government ideology 0.004 0.002 0.008 0.006
(1.42) (1.12) (2.92)*** (2.96)***
Expenditures per capita 0.108 0.101 0.022 0.040
(2.30)** (2.04)** (0.41) (0.74) LN state population 0.091 0.117 0.221 0.186
(0.78) (1.08) (1.73)* (1.52)t South -0.339 -0.302 -0.403 -0.368
(1.90)* (1.75)* (2.01)** (1.90)* Constant -2.635 -2.350 -1.702 -2.176
(1.37) (1.08) (0.81) (1.06) Observations 130 130 124 124
R2 0.40 0.38 0.41 0.40 Robust t statistics in parentheses
tSignificant at 15%; *
significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
extent of effective implementation. At a minimum, we
can conclude that there is no evidence to support the
proposition that heterogeneity in the population
at
large or
split legislative control has a negative effect on
administrative implementation of a reform.
Why the effect should actually be positive may require further investigation. The positive effect of split
con
trol of the legislature may capture the rise of Republi can control in state legislatures. In 2000, Republican and Democratic shares of seats in state
legislatures
overall were almost exactly evenly divided. The last
time there had been such parity in control was 1948
(NCSL 2005). In Georgia, we have observed that a
long period of single-party dominance created stasis?
embedded interests resisted change to programs and
management practices, efficiency or effectiveness
notwithstanding. Recently, with more political volatil
ity, longtime staff and elected officials have left, and
there has been more opportunity
to make changes in
management that were politically impossible previ
ously. There is also more need to make changes that
increase information about agency operations because
so much institutional memory has been lost. Along
the same lines, heterogeneity or
split control may
require agencies to exert more effort in explaining
or
justifying their programs and policies.
An alternative proposition is that heterogeneity and
split control may make it harder for legislatures to
govern and thus allow agencies more freedom to man
age as needed. More detailed assessments of the inter
actions between legislatures, the executive, and
administrators in different institutional contexts are
needed to assess these effects.
Legislative Professionalism
The proposition that legislative professionalism might
improve administrative implementation of a reform
also does not fare well. Term limits are strongly signifi
cant in the first model and just under significance at .10 in the reduced form of the second model. The
effect of term limits is large in the first model. A shift
from a non-term-limited to term-limited legislature
increases the respondent s assessment of implementa
tion by 0.60, or 20 percent (0.6 + 3). Similarly, the
260 Public Administration Review March | April 2008
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days in session measure is just under significance at
. 10 in the reduced form of the first model and is
significant at .05 in the second model. Here, the effect
is small. For every 100 additional days in session, a
respondent's assessment of extent of effective use of
performance (model 2) decreases by 3 percent (0.1 -s- 3). The staff index appears to have no effect, and the
sign is consistently negative. At a minimum, we can
assert that there is no evidence that that legislative
professionalism, either for staff or legislators, has a
positive effect on implementation. These findings
are
actually in keeping with recent research on
profession
alism and term limits described in the literature
review.
Again, a
question for future research is better under
standing why professionalism might be having such a
negative effect on administration. Rosenthal (1998) contends that citizen legislators prioritize better, have
less inclination to micromanage, and take a less paro
chial, statewide view on policy. However, another
possibility is that citizen legislatures do not have the
capacity to ensure that agencies incorporate demo
cratic values such as responsiveness and transparency
into their decision making, and thus agencies do not
experience any conflict in the pursuit of mission
oriented objectives and the implementation of a per
formance management reform.
Legislative Oversight In contrast to
legislative professionalism, legislative
oversight has a positive impact
on agency level assess
ment of implementation and use of the reform. In
fact, it is also one of the few institutional variables
that is consistently significant in models testing the
use of performance measures in
budgeting processes as
well (reported in another paper, Bourdeaux 2006). This indicator is positive and significant at .01 in the
second model, is just under significance in the first
model, and is significant at .10 in the reduced form of
the second model. In the second model, if the respon
dent perceives legislative oversight, then his or her
assessment of the extent of effective use of perfor mance measures increases by 0.2, or 6.7 percent
(0.2 + 3). The question reflects agency identification
of active legislative staff engagement in verifying
performance measures, in effect an external oversight role that Grizzle and Pettijohn (2002) suggest might be important (although they propose a politically neutral entity).
How does a positive view of legislative oversight
square with the negative association with legislative
professionalism? In a more detailed examination of
states, one can see that legislative oversight does not
necessarily equate with legislative professionalism, either in terms of staff or
legislators. The National
Conference of State Legislatures uses a
typology of
professionalism that includes number of staff, legisla
tor time conducting legislative activities, and legisla tive salaries.9 The respondents in Melkers and
Willoughby's survey identified a strong legislative role
in seven states: New Hampshire, South Dakota, Texas,
Louisiana, Florida, New Mexico and South Caro
lina.10 Of these, only Florida is identified as having a
highly professional legislature, although Texas does
have significant staff support (12 staff per legislator
during session). All of the states except for New
Hampshire and South Dakota are known for having a
strong legislature?in particular, these legislatures
share authority for developing the budget with the
governor (CSG 2000). Three of the states, New
Mexico, Louisiana, and South Carolina, have "moder
ate" levels of professionalism in the rankings, which
includes around 3.1 staff per legislator and legislators that spend 70 percent of their time or less on the
job and receive an average salary of $35,326. New
Hampshire and South Dakota have "low" levels of
legislative professionalism.
The intriguing finding here is that legislative engage ment in overseeing performance measures, presum
ably through their staff, leads to better agency level use of performance
measures in making management
decisions. However, high levels of responsibility are not
necessarily paired with high levels of staff or legislative
professionalism, which indicates that quality of staff
and legislator engagement rather than quantity might
be important.
The package of legislative features that is associated
with administrative efficacy in implementing the
performance management reform may be moderate or
even low levels of legislative professionalism combined
with significant engagement in oversight. This sort of
legislative model is evident in states such as Virginia,
which has consistently received high rankings from
the Government Performance Project for good admin
istrative practices and has high levels of legislative oversight (GPP 2005) but has only a moderately
professional legislature.
Conclusion At the most
general level, this analysis suggests that
legislative bodies have an important influence on the
implementation of an administrative management
reform. The results also support a distinct set of hy
potheses about legislative and administrative interac
tions. As described earlier, there is a growing
stream of
research indicating that term limits and citizen legisla
tures (or perhaps moderately professional legislatures) foster a
particular legislative outlook that is less fo
cused on micromanagement,
more apt to prioritize,
and less likely to be parochial in focus than profes sional legislatures. These qualities
are similar to those
required for administrative efficacy in a performance
management reform, and this research supports the
further conclusion that there may be a connection
Legislative Influences on Performance Management Reform 261
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between less professional legislatures, term limits, and
more positive administrative outcomes. Less devel
oped in the literature is the issue of legislative over
sight and the closely related concept of legislative
responsibility. This analysis shows that legislative
responsibility is not the same as legislative profession
alism and, furthermore, that engagement in oversight
of performance measures (a dimension of responsibil
ity) is a robust and positive influence over administra
tive outcomes. More intensive qualitative examinations
of entities such as Joint Legislative Audit and Review
Commission in Virginia or Office of Program Policy
Analysis and Governmental Accountability in Florida
and of legislatively driven budget processes such as
those in Texas or New Mexico might help build a better
understanding of the administrative response to legisla
tive oversight
as well as how to craft a constructive
legislative role in performance management reform.
Also interesting are the findings about heterogeneity and fragmentation, classic culprits
in analyses of dem
ocratic institution-administrative conflict. These
variables have a positive rather than negative effect.
Ideally, this would indicate that a healthy debate
between political parties has a positive effect on ad
ministration. A more cynical interpretation is that this
keeps elected officials occupied and gives administra tors the policy space to manage. Again, further analy
sis is warranted. These findings do not purport to be
the final word on these issues, but they do suggest some directions for future research as well as some
serious considerations for those who want to imple
ment reform at the state level.
Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Greg Lewis for his
careful review of this manuscript, as well as the anony
mous reviewers for their comments. The authors would
also like to thank Julia Melkers and Katherine
Willoughby for the use of the data set that they collected on behalf of the Government Accounting Standards
Board.
Notes 1. This list is a compendium of issues described by Dahl
(1998), Rosenbloom (2000), and Kaufhian (1969).
2. The only exception is Nebraska, which has a
unicameral legislature.
3. Local governments in the United States, although
interesting in their own right, tend to be institu
tionally different?typically much smaller, uni
cameral institutions, with significant variations in
the level of separation of executive and legislative
authorities. As a result, their experiences may be
difficult to translate to the state and federal levels
and vice versa (CBO 1993; Joyce 1999).
4. Trie term "efficiency" is used instead of "effective
ness," in keeping with Ingraham (1995), who
associates efficiency with the rational and cost
effective organization and allocation of resources,
whereas effectiveness encompasses the manage
ment of the institutional conflicts that create
multiple and competing objectives.
5. More detailed analyses of these questions can be
found in Melkers and Willoughby (2001, 2004)
and Willoughby and Melkers (2001).
6. Following King's methodology, the "days in session
index" was created by taking the total days in
session, including special sessions, for the legisla
ture during the 1998-99 biennium and dividing
by 2. Legislative days are counted as seven-fifths of
a calendar day. The data for the states is from the
Book of the States (2000-01) (CSG 2000), and the
data for the U.S. Congress is from the Resume of
Congressional Activity (U.S. Senate 2000). Alterna
tives tested included session indices for 2002-03,
which had the same effect, and controls for a
biannual budget cycle, which did not increase the
strength of the model but did introduce multicol
linearity, making the session index fall just below
significance at 10 percent in some models.
7. The staff support index used staff data from 2003,
as the National Conference of State Legislatures
only reports data for 1996 and 2003 (NCSL
2003). Staff for Congress was taken from Con
gressional Quarterly (2000). The expenditures
index was created using a method described by
King (2000), which is as follows: The expendi
tures index takes legislative expenditures (U.S.
Census Bureau 2004) divided by total number of
legislators less legislative compensation, which is
then divided by average expenditures per member
of the U.S. Congress, less average congressional
compensation (Congressional Quarterly 2000).
Total compensation per legislator was calculated
by taking salary information which was added to
per diem information multiplied times annual
days in session (CSG 2000, 83). Both the staff
support index and the expenditures index are
divided by the U.S. congressional numbers in
order to create comparable percentages that can
be combined into an index. The Cronbach's alpha
for the combined index was 0.881, reflecting the
high level of intercorrelation between staff and
expenditure indices.
8. This variable, PM Basics, is coded 3 for "signifi
cant problem" and 1 for "no problem," so one
would predict a negative association with the
dependent variables measuring effective manage
rial use of performance measures. Responses to
the two questions had an alpha score of 0.85,
indicating a high level of internal consistency.
Although this variable may raise concerns about
placing the dependent variable on both sides of
the equation, removing it did not substantially
change the results, except in one case. Testing
the first dependent variable, this PM Basics
measure slightly strengthened the significance and
262 Public Administration Review March | April 2008
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magnitude of effect of the independent variables.
In the second model, it had the same effect,
except that gubernatorial power measure became
statistically significant.
9. The National Conference of State Legislatures
defines a high level of professionalism as spending
80 percent of the time on the job for legislators,
earning $68,599 in salary, and having 8.9 staff
per legislator. A moderate level of professionalism
occurs when legislators spend 70 percent of their
time on the job, receive an average of $35,326 in
compensation, and have 3.1 staff. A low level of
professionalism occurs when legislators spend
54 percent of their time on the job, receive an
average of $15,984 in compensation, and have
1.2 staff (NCSL 2005).
10. A strong legislative role is indicated when more
than half the agency respondents for a state
identified some form of active legislative oversight
in their survey response.
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the ABCD Initiative collective action
A Look at New Perspectives on E-Government
Book Reviews
Legislative Influences on Performance Management Reform 265
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