Post on 22-Feb-2023
1
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
‘European Court for Africans?: Challenging the Narrative of Aid Dependency and
African Commitment to the ICC’
Kevin Coffey
University College Dublin
kevdcoffey@gmail.com
November 2014
The backlash against the International Criminal Court (ICC) by the African Union (AU) has
generated increased speculation over the reasons more than two-thirds of Sub-Saharan
African governments decided to integrate their jurisdictions into the Rome Statute system. A
narrative that has gained growing traction in light of AU’s hostility to the Hague-based Court
is that African states committed to the Court in order to satisfy donor demands. The European
Union is the central player to this narrative. As the primary financial contributor to the ICC as
well as the largest distributor of aid to Africa, it is viewed as having twisted the arms of weak
and economically dependent African states to sign on to the Rome Statute (Chuter 2012;
Kimenya 2013; New African 2012; Rosenthal 2004). In November 2014, the former UN
Human Rights Chief Navi Pillay, strengthened these assumptions by referring to the use of
EU’s material resources to universalize the Court’s membership. In a New York Times op-ed
piece, she wrote that the EU “is a staunch support of the I.C.C. It uses its trade and
development deals to encourage other countries to join, and it has withdrawn aid from
countries from countries refusing to cooperate with the Court” (Pillay 2014). The purpose of
this paper is to investigate whether these claims are valid in the African context. Namely, has
the EU induced African states to adopt ICC legal instruments through either promising
increased aid, or threats to withhold it?
The findings from this paper contradict this narrative. Using a mixed methods approach, there
is little evidence pointing to the EU foisting the ICC onto African states. Aid conditionality
has not been included in the EU’s policy framework to universalize the Court’s membership.
Instead the EU has adopted soft policy instruments such as political dialogues, demarches and
technical assistance to persuade African government to deepen their integration with the
Rome Statute system. Furthermore, African positions during negotiations to establish the ICC
do not sufficiently align with their principle European donors, indicating that the enthusiasm
for the creation of the ICC among African governments was independent of aid
considerations. In addition, the association between African dependency on EU aid and legal
2
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
commitments to the ICC is not positive according to quantitative tests. Finally and consistent
with the rest of the data, interview respondents from Africa and Europe downplay the
importance of aid towards African states committing to the ICC. Instead, the vast majority
highlight the importance of regional factors and national factors.
The paper is structured in four parts and is for the most part, chronologically ordered. Section
4.1 investigates the evolution of the EU’s strategy to promote international criminal justice in
third-party countries. More specifically, it focuses on the institutional framework governing
EU-African relations on the issue of the ICC with an eye towards the role of aid. Section 4.2
examines the degree of preference alignment between EU donors and African recipients on
key issues discussed at the Rome Conference in 1998. Section 4.3 interprets the results from
a large-N analysis testing the effect of aid (along with control variables) on the four
indicators of ICC commitment. Finally, section 4.4 triangulates the findings from the
previous sections through interviews with relevant political stakeholders.
Section 4.1: The EU framework to universalize the ICC
The following section provides an overview and evaluation of the legal and political
framework governing EU relations with African states on this issue; an overview which is
presented in Figure 4.1. In order to draw out and analyse the relevance of the causal
mechanisms, it is necessary to detail the context and the conditions under which the EU and
Africa have engaged on this issue. The optimal method for doing so is to trace the
development of EU policies on the ICC. From this vantage point, one can answer key
questions such as what type of pressure has the EU employed in its attempt to universalize
the Court’s membership? If aid has been employed, in what manner has it been? And if so,
when? The conclusions drawn are informed by examination of the official European Council
Common Positions and Action Plans, and the text of the Revised Coutonou Partnership
Agreement (See Figure 4.1 for more information). I corroborate the interpretation of these
texts through interviews with EU officials and examination of secondary sources.
Since the discussions to create the ICC began in earnest, the EU has demonstrated its
commitment to universalizing international criminal justice. In keeping with its objective of
establishing an international order based on multilateral effectiveness, the EU has expended
financial and diplomatic capital to the ICC cause, or more broadly, the fight to end impunity
for egregious violation of human rights (Antoniadis & Bekou 2008: 1-3). As stated by the
former EU Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten: “The EU had been a strong
3
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
supporter of the establishment of the ICC; we had worked for years to achieve its creation;
we helped to fund organizations that themselves acted as advocates for the Court” (Patten
2006: 309). As early as 1995, the European Commission through the use of the European
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) provided generous grants to
empower rule-of-law civil society groups in Africa to sensitize and provide technical
assistance to national governments on the issue of the ICC (Glasius 2005). During the Rome
Conference, these NGOs operating within the Coalition for the International Criminal Court
(CICC) – a network of NGOs committed to an effective and just ICC – were instrumental in
ensuring under-resourced African delegations stayed apace amid negotiations of such
magnitude and complexity (Interview British Participant at the Rome Conference; Interview
No Peace Without Justice official). In terms of funding civil society organizations beyond the
Rome Conference, the European Commission has provided "€17 million to global ratification
campaigns undertaken by civil society coalitions such as the Coalition for the International
Criminal Court and the Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA)" (General Secretariat for
the Council 2008: 16).
Despite the EU financing programmes and activities to generate support for the Court, the
European Council of Ministers did not take concrete measures to mainstream international
criminal justice into the EU’s external relations framework until 2001. Unlike the
Organization for African Unity, the EU did not enter the Rome Conference with common set
of guidelines to inform their positions during the negotiations even though the majority of EU
states were members of the Like-Minded Group; a caucus that cut across regional lines
advocating for a strong, independent ICC. France, in particular acted as an impediment to a
European common position. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council with
significant overseas deployments, the French delegation sought to minimize the risk of its
nationals being brought before the Court, and therefore, took positions to retain sovereign
control over the Court on several key issues involving the institutional design of the Court
(Busby 210: 224).
The formulation of an EU Common Position was eventually concluded in 2001 due in large
part to the efforts of the Council Working Group sub-area dealing with ICC matters (COJUR
ICC). The working group consisting of national technical experts and diplomatic contacts,
had worked closely on the ICC since the PrepCom sessions in 1996. Regular contacts
4
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
between individuals operating within COJUR ICC fostered a sense of identification with and
common understanding of the ICC among member states, a dynamic which produced less
tolerance for the independent policy positions taken previously by France and the UK
(Groenleer & Van Schaik 2007: 978). The impetus to integrate the ICC into the Common
Foreign & Security Policy was also informed by the yearning to have a fully operationalized
Court as soon as possible (Article 1(2) of the 2001 Common Position). For the Statute to
enter into force, at least sixty states needed to ratify it. Meeting such a threshold was deemed
to be highly attainable since in the space of three years, thirty-three states had already
ratified. Consequently, in drawing up the 2001 Common Position, the Council of Ministers
established a basic framework to define the approach of the Union in regard to the Court.
Article 2 of this Common Position is the first Union policy statement that referenced EU and
member states’ obligation to raise the issue of ratification and implementation of the Rome
Statute in its political dialogues with third party states (Article 2 of the 2001 Common
Position). However, as Antoniadis & Bekou (2008) point, the formulation is articulated in
very general terms, leaving
“many gaps to be covered by either atypical instruments (Action Plan, EU
Guiding Principles) or by further initiatives in international fora, either in the
form of unilateral technical assistance to third states to deal with implementation
issues or by establishing the ICC as part of the common vocabulary in relations
with third states and international organizations” (7).
The updated versions of the Common Position (2002 and 2003) elaborate more specifically
the measures to further the objective of achieving universal membership for the Court. Article
2.3 of the 2002 Common Position for instance, articulates that EU member states should
provide technical and financial assistance to third countries which request assistance in
overcoming the legislative work required for ratification and implementation of the Rome
Statute. However, it is not until the formulation of an Action Plan in 2004 that the EU
developed a systematic strategy for advancing universal support for the Court and its
effective functioning. The Action Plan outlines practical and coordinated measures to be
adopted by member states and EU institutions. Critically, none of these measures are linked
to the EU using its material capabilities, namely foreign aid to induce third party states.
Instead the strategy relies on rhetorical and informational devices to achieve this goal. One of
the foremost considerations in the design of the Action was to enhance the consistency,
5
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
density and flow of information on ICC-related matters among EU institutions; measures that
are ultimately intended to maximize the effectiveness of its soft power policy instruments.
The creation of an EU Focal Point and national Focal Points by the General Secretariat of the
Council arose from this ambition. With the EU Focal Point acting as the central coordinator,
the national Focal Points attempt to establish appropriate contacts and exchange information
among relevant political actors, and identify “opportunities to include the ICC on the draft list
of issues to be discussed in negotiations and political dialogues” (Wouters & Basu 2009).
Along with pressing the importance of ICC commitment through political dialogues with
third party states, the EU’s other main policy instrument used to externalize the Union’s ICC-
related objectives, involves démarches. The EU sends out démarches encouraging third party
states to ratify and implement the Rome Statute. It has sent out 275 cables targeting more
than 110 countries and international organizations (General Secretariat for the Council 2008:
9). The use of démarches is not exclusively employed to encourage legal commitments to the
Court but is also used in cases where states have failed or may fail to uphold their treaty
obligations. In the case of al-Bashir's scheduled trip to Malawi in 2011, the EU pre-emptively
sent out cables stressing the need for Malawi to not violate their obligations under the Rome
Statute (Interview EU Focal Point official 2).
In 2005, the linkage between EU aid to African states and commitment to the ICC eventually
became formalized through the Revised Coutonou Partnership; the main framework for EU
development assistance to African Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP). Yet despite this
formalization, the Agreement did not necessarily lock-in ICC conditionalities; rather it
extended the soft power instruments available for the EU to employ when engaging with
African states.
Building on its precursors, the Lomé Convention and the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement
2000 (also known as the Coutonou Agreement), EU negotiators sought to expand the remit of
mutual obligations held between the EU and ACP. During lengthy negotiations in 2004 and
2005, these negotiators led by officials from the European Commission, managed to persuade
African states to accept the insertion of an ICC-related clause in the new partnership
agreement. The clause, Article 11.6 obliges State Parties "to share experience" on the
adoption and implementation of the Rome Statute and parties "shall seek to take steps"
towards both of the aforementioned goals. The insertion of this clause in the revised
6
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
Figure 4.1: Timeline of EU-African relations on the ICC issue
EU Commission Council Common Positions Revised Coutonou Partnership Agreement (CPA):
begins funding (2001), (2002) and (2003): Defines Development cooperation agreement
ICC-supportive EU approach regarding ICC. Focus between EU and African Caribbean and
African NGOs on early establishment of the ICC. Pacific states. Legally-binding ICC-related
Accordingly, obligation on EU to clause inserted into agreement. No
raise issue in its relations with conditionality attached to "non-essential
third parties. Acting under Common clause" however.
Foreign & Security Policy.
Rome Conference: EU Action Plan on ICC: Practical Revised Coutonou Partnership
EU finances several measures to coordinate EU activities, Agreement enters into force: Sudan
African delegations further the universality and integrity of the refuses to ratify revised CPA due to
to attend the six-week Rome Statute. Emphasis on political inclusion of ICC clause which means
Conference. dialogues, demarches and technical the country loses out on development assistance.
assistance.
1995 1998 2001-2003 2004 2005 2008
7
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
Coutonou Agreement is the first and so far only "legally-binding instrument" designed to
pressure African states to ratify and implement the Statute. It entered into force in 2008 with
only Sudan refusing to ratify the agreement in protest to the insertion of the ICC-related
clause. Sudan’s decision to forgo ratifying the partnership agreement meant that the European
Commission could not disburse €300 million in previously pledged assistance to Sudan
(Europa 2009).
Critically however, failure to adhere to the ICC-related clause does not constitute grounds for
aid suspension. Although Article 11.6 is legally-binding, it also qualifies as a non-essential
clause. Unlike “essential” clauses involving democracy and human rights, the consultation
procedure under Article 96 and Article 97 involving possible suspension from the partnership
agreement cannot be activated (Revised Coutonou Partnership 2005; Interview EU Focal
Point official 2; Interview DG Development official). According to an EU official that
participated in these negotiations, attaching aid to ICC commitment was felt to be counter-
productive (Interview DG Development official). Even though by ratifying the Revised CPA,
African states are accepting only a “soft political commitment” regarding the ICC clause
(Interview Delegate for the EU in South Sudan), the clause is sufficiently contentious to deter
both Sudan and South Sudan from entering the agreement (Europa 2009; Interview EU
Delegate to South Sudan).
The absence of formal negative conditionality in cases of non-implementation does not mean
an absence of pressure. For instance, the inclusion of the Article 11.6 in the primary
framework managing EU-African relations serves to legitimize the consistent appraisal of
each sides’ performance on progress towards universalizing and enhancing the integrity of
the ICC (Interview Francoise Moreau, DG Development official). The European External
Action Service can and does raise the issue systematically with its African partners during
political dialogues (Interview with official from ICC Focal Point 1). The nature of this
engagement often avoids coercive approach however. Instead, EU officials generally seek to
rhetorically empower their African partners by emphasizing the “shared values” that are
expressed in the ACP-EU agreements and the AU Constitutive Act (Interview EU Focal
Point official 1) A further element of this empowering approach in political dialogues is
offering technical expertise to help clarify concerns African governments have towards the
Court, in particular issues relating to official immunity and the death penalty. In cases, where
8
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
governments do not have the requisite expertise or resources to carry out the legislative
changes needed to ratify or implement the Statute, the EU will share their capacity with the
government and domestic civil society through seminars and workshops (Interview with EU
Focal Point official 2).
Whilst aid has not been used by the European Commission to encourage Sub-Saharan
African states to join the Court, this does not mean it will not in the future. The EU body for
instance, has recently used aid to encourage countries emerging from the Arab Spring to join
the Court. The possibility of extending this “positive conditionality” to Sub-Saharan Africa
has not been excluded but for the time being, this instrument only applies to Arab states
(Interview with EU Focal Point official 2).
At the bilateral level, it may be a different story in some cases. There is evidence – albeit
limited evidence - to suggest that certain EU member states did employ increased material
assistance to the law and justice sectors as an inducement to ratify the Rome Statute
(Interview 20/8/2013). However, as explored in section 4.4, interview respondents
consistently pointed to other factors for the ratification of the Rome Statute. In addition, as
will be documented in section 4.3, statistically there is not a positive association between EU
aid dependency and ICC commitments.
To conclude this section, it is evident that official development assistance is not an
instrument which the EU at the institutional level has wielded in order to coerce economically
insecure states to accept the Court’s jurisdiction. Power is multi-dimensional and issue-
specific. Rather than employing hard power, the EU instead has instead invested in policy
instruments which are primarily geared towards empowering a liberal identity within African
states through an emphasis shared community of values in tandem. These policy instruments
are also supplemented by offering technical expertise to states which request it.
The frameworks used by the EU to further ICJ in Africa have continuously evolved and
become more institutionally embedded with African governments. Examples of these
frameworks include: funding African civil society to lobby their national governments;
developing nascent common positions on advancing international criminal justice worldwide;
generating a coordinated set of soft policy instruments on ICC-related matters; and the
insertion of a legally-binding clause in a partnership agreement referencing ICC commitment.
It is important to bear in mind that whilst EU efforts to promote the ICC have been present
9
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
since 1995, the institutional impetus to set up a coordinated set of policies on this issue only
began in 2001, and were effectuated from 2004 onwards. Critically, most African states had
ratified the Rome Statute prior to 2004. As a result, an appropriate point to start the empirical
investigation of the impact of EU aid on African states behaviour towards the Court is to first
analyse interactions at the inter-state level; that is whether bilateral aid had any influence on
the stances African state held at the Conference.
Section 4.2 - Alignment of preferences between primary donors and recipients
At the 1998 Rome Conference, African delegations were in the vanguard of supporting an
independent Court with substantial powers (See Coffey 2014). But what if the positions taken
by African delegations at the Rome Conference simply masked external pressures to support
these principles by EU donor states? Particularly, if EU states deemed that African
participation in the ICC was crucial to the Court’s future relevance, as Africa was likely to be
primary site of the ICC’s activities.
If EU sponsors did press their recipients, one should expect African governments to adopt
similar negotiating positions during the Rome Conference. In particular, African preferences
should be far more aligned with EU states compared to a random set of states which have not
provided aid. To ascertain whether these observable implications actually transpire, I
conducted a detailed comparison of the positions adopted by African and EU delegations at
the 1998 Conference in order to operationalize the positional alignment between recipient and
donor. In order to effectively analyse these results, I also compiled a control sample using a
matching technique which identified states sharing the closest similarities to EU member
states according to the control variable, World Development Indicators (WTI).1 The control
sample consists of fifteen non-EU states which did not provide foreign direct assistance to
African governments.
Studying the records of the Rome Conference, I collated data on ten key political issues
which dominated the Conference negotiations for all African, EU and the control sample
states. The issues selected include questions over the Court’s jurisdiction, prosecutorial
independence and the role of the UN Security Council. Given how contentious these political
1 The sample matched twelve EU states with twelve non-EU States. The following details the matches:
Austria/Hungary; Belgium/Slovenia; Germany/Canada; Denmark/Bosnia & Herzegovina; Spain/Japan;
Finland/Australia; France/Israel; United Kingdom/Hong Kong SAR, China; Greece/Puerto Rico;
Ireland/Macedonia; Italy/; Luxembourg/Switzerland; Netherlands/Mauritania; Portugal/Iceland;
Sweden/Norway.
10
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
questions were, there was a large degree of participation and variation among states, giving
the study reasonable scope for empirical examination.
Once I tabulated the positions, I paired each African state with each EU state (and the same
for African and control sample states) and calculated the degree of positional alignment
between all combinations. For combinations in which there is no overlap, I tallied the score
as 0. For complete alignment across all positions, the pair scored 1. To safeguard against low
EU contributors such as Greece skewing the analysis, I weight the proportion of aid given by
each EU state to their African recipient from 1996-1998. Finally, I multiple the degree of
positional alignment with the proportion of aid for each combination, and then aggregate the
score for each issue.
The results from Table 4.1 suggest that African states did not mimic their benefactors; rather
it is more likely their positions were inspired by domestic and regional considerations. If
African delegations formed preferences in order to satisfy donor interests, we would expect a
significantly higher percentage alignment between (group A) African delegations and
European donor delegations than (group B) African delegations and the controlled sample of
delegations. Interestingly, this is not the case. Rather, there is no clear pattern indicating a
consistent distance between group A from group B as one would expect if the theoretical
expectations were valid. Strikingly, certain positions show very low levels of positional
convergence between African recipients and EU donors such as on extent of the Security
Council’s power to defer investigations. Such low levels explain the counter-intuitive finding
shown in the final bar of the table that African delegations overall, agreed to a slightly lesser
extent with their European donors relative to the controlled sample on how the institutional
design of the Rome Statute should be constituted.
In the absence of a clear pattern of policy alignment, we can assume that African delegations
for the most part developed their preferences towards the Court independent of aid
considerations. There is only 39% degree of convergence on arguably the most crucial aspect
of negotiations, the nature of the Court’s jurisdiction. Faced with four alternatives (universal
jurisdiction; inherent jurisdiction for core crimes for State Parties; inherent jurisdiction for
genocide and crimes against humanity but not war crimes for State Parties; and Opt-in and
Out for State Parties for all crimes in the Statute), most African delegations rallied behind
giving the Court inherent jurisdiction; that is, once a state ratifies the Rome Statute it
automatically submits its jurisdiction to the ICC in matters of international criminal law.
11
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
France, the primary donor for 18 of the 47 states during the period under review, pursued the
third option mentioned above. Its delegation assiduously fought to reduce its foreign
deployments exposure to war crimes, typically thought as the most easily violated
international crime due to its lower threshold and the numerous crimes listed under Article 8
of the Rome Statute. As a result, the high-powered French delegation supported inherent
jurisdiction for State Parties but an opt-in jurisdiction for war crimes, a proposal which all of
its recipients rejected. In cases like the aforementioned, the weighted distribution allotted to
primary donors can dramatically impact on the percentage alignment. Gabon for instance,
supported inherent jurisdiction along with the majority of EU delegations but as French
assistance constituted 95% of its total aid, the degree of convergence is less than 5%.
The results in Table 4.1 challenge Scheippers & Sicurelli (2009) assertion that oppressive
Francophone African countries supported the Court due to fears that France would cut off
Table 4.1: Percentage of Positional Alignment at the Rome Conference 1998 between
African delegations and delegations from EU donors, and African delegations and the
Controlled Sample of delegations
0 50 100
Overall Degree of Positional Alignment
Treaty Crimes
Sections C & D
Security Council Referral
Security Council Deferral
Inclusion of Aggression at start of Conference
Inclusion of Aggression without Definition
Weaponry outlawed in Statute
Jurisdictional threshold for War Crimes
Independence of the Prosecutor
Nature of the Court's Jurisdiction
ControlledSample andAfrican State
EU Donorsand AfricanRecipient
12
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
military and development aid (6). According to the aforementioned authors, during the sixth
meeting of the PrepCom, France distanced itself from the United States’ preference for the
Court to have a strong link to the UN Security Council and aligned itself with the LMG
position of including an independent prosecutor. Whilst it is true that the French Foreign
Minister, Hubert Vedrine, gave explicit support for an independent prosecutor in the opening
days of the Rome Conference, the claim that French-speaking African countries only
supported the Court due to anticipated cuts in aid is dubious. If this were the case, one would
expect France and its African recipients to act in concert when negotiating on other
contentious and institution-defining issues such as the Court’s jurisdiction, the threshold for
war crimes, and the inclusion of a prohibition on nuclear weapons. Instead, as has been noted
earlier, the principal donor and its recipients appeared to have operated from considerably
different philosophies over the Court’s institutional design. The French delegation sought to
minimize the Court’s remit over sovereignty on several key issues, while the majority of
Francophone African states were inclined to support proposals that broadened the Court’s
authority and remit.
The contrasting philosophies over the design of the Court evidently extended beyond France
and its recipients based on the results in Table 4.1. The most glaring schism between EU
member states and African states revolved around the UN Security Council’s powers,
specifically, its power to defer investigations. Admittedly, there was a high degree of
consensus in relation to enabling the Security Council to trigger investigations (along with
State Parties and the prosecutor). However, the Security Council’s ability to defer
investigations only reached 16% alignment. The majority of EU delegations agreed with the
United States on this issue. The US delegation pushed aggressively for Court to be in
harmony with the existing international political architecture regarding the UNSC’s
responsibilities to maintain international peace and security as delineated under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter. As a result, twelve of the 15 EU delegations supported giving the Security
Council the capacity to defer investigations up to 12 months subject to renewal in the case of
a Chapter VII resolution. However, the majority of African delegations objected to or least
held reservations in relation to a perceived over-reach of the Security Council’s powers.
Beyond matching the degree of positional convergence at the aggregate scale, I also observed
patterns between individual primary donors and their recipients that may indicate African
delegations did not adopt positions on substantive grounds but merely mimicked their
dominant benefactors. One method is to track whether recipients support donor outlier
13
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
positions; that is, positions endorsed by the donor that lack general support. Yet again, the
data is not consistent with theoretical expectations. As previously demonstrated, no
Francophone African delegations rallied behind France’s proposal for an opt-in jurisdictional
scheme for the Court. Equally, of the five African states to support the German-led call for
providing the Court with universal jurisdiction, only Burundi was a significant recipient of
German aid during this period. Even then, Burundi vigorously defended this proposal due to
domestic interests; that is, the failure of the UN Security Council to investigate crimes that
had taken place in the years prior to 1998, not out of consideration for German preferences
(Interview Burundian Delegate).
There are isolated cases which fit the expectations of the aid dependency theory. For instance,
Guinea-Bissau’s positions are almost identical to its principle donor, Portugal. Similarly, the
Malawian delegation adopted positions which closely resembled the UK’s approach.
However, these cases are far from representative of the broader patterns expressed in the data.
Rather, the empirical findings which emerge from this section strongly indicate African states
endorsed a strong, independent Court independent of aid considerations.
Section 4.3: Does EU aid explain patterns of commitment to the ICC?
Looking beyond the Rome Conference, Section 4.3 quantitatively tests whether dependency
on EU aid significantly impacts on adopting ICC legal instruments. I conduct a survival
analysis to test this relationship. The data for this section is as follows. The variable aid
dependency is measured by taking the total annual sum of foreign direct assistance from the
EU states and institutions and dividing this value by the total annual Gross National Product
(GDP). The data for EU aid is taken from the OECD DAC database and the data for GDP is
drawn from the World Bank.
I also include a number of control variables which theoretically enhance a recipient’s
autonomy over its affairs when dealing with external donors. These include African state
recipients possessing professional civil service2, consolidated democratic institutions3, and a
2 A professionalized civil service theoretically instils credibility in the eyes of the donor. 3 Theoretically, consolidated democratic institutions provide the regime with a high degree of political
legitimacy
14
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
diversification in donors4 (Whitfield & Frasier 2009). To account for a professionalized civil
service, I use data taken from World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators on
‘government effectiveness’. This measurement “captures the perceptions of the quality of
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from
political pressure, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of
the government’s commitment to such policies” (Kaufmann, Kray & Mastruzzi 2010: 4). The
control for capturing democracy is taken from Polity IV’s data on Regime Type which is
coded according to the “general qualities of political institutions and processes, including
executive recruitment, constraints on executive action, and political competition” (Marshall,
Gurr & Jagger 2009:12). The score ranges from -10 (fully institutionalized autocracy) to +10
(fully institutionalized democracy). Finally, to account for non-EU aid, I aggregate the
countries’ total amount of aid provided by non-EU actors and divides this by the countries’
GDP. The data for non-EU aid is similarly taken from the OECD DAC database.
Based on the results from Table 4.1, there is no positive association between aid dependency
and ICC commitment. In the both, the variable aid dependency are negatively associated with
ratification of the Rome Statute.
The absence of a positive relationship between dependency on EU aid and ratification is not
particularly surprising if one takes into consideration that the EU had not adopted Council
Conclusions on the ICC by the time most African states had ratified the Rome Statute. For
instance, by the time the EU got around to adopting practical measures to universalize the
Rome Statute in 2004, over two-thirds of the eventual African State Parties had acceded to
the ICC treaty (twenty-three out of thirty-two). In the absence of coercive mechanisms to
press third-party states to join the ICC, it is not necessarily surprising that a number of
partner states which rely most on EU aid, such as Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe have
not felt sufficiently compelled to ratify the ICC Statute.
Likewise, Tables 4.2 to 4.6 (See Appendix) indicate that drafting and implementing the Rome
Statute is not explained by reliance on EU aid. Across all models, the main explanatory
variable is negatively associated with each metric of ICC commitment. In one respect, this is
unexpected. The period in which most African states began drafting or implementing the
Statute, coincided with the EU developing a streamlined set of collective policy instruments
to press African states to advance on ICC commitment. Yet in other respects, the lack of
4 States are less vulnerable to pressure from specific donors in these cases.
15
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
Table 4.1: Ratification of the Rome Statute among Sub-Saharan African States (1998-
2013)
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2
TOTAL EU AID AS PER 0.980** 0.997
PROPORTION OF GDP (0.008) (.005)
DEMOCRACY 1.267***
(0.079)
GOVERNMENT 0.290*** 1.169
EFFECTIVENESS (0.153) (.332)
TOTAL AID FROM 1.002 1.005
NON-EU COUNTRIES (.012) (.008)
AS PER PROPORTION
GDP
Number of Subjects 42 48
Number of Observations 736 658
Significant level at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
correlation is not surprising. The concept of power, a central feature of explanations
regarding foreign aid as a form of leverage; needs to be understood as both multidimensional
and issue-specific (Rourke 2008: 266-267). Although the EU has attached great importance to
promoting the universality and effective functioning of the Court, it has not used its’
economic or military capabilities to pressure weaker third party states to acquiesce on this
issue. Instead, the EU has drawn on its political assets such as political dialogue, demarches
and technical assistance (General Secretariat of the Council 2008). In addition, the EU has
focused on providing technical assistance to only those states which request it. (Interview
with EU Focal Point official 2). This reveals that the EU does not channel its energies and
resources towards targeting regimes which have demonstrated little enthusiasm for initiating
the domestication process but instead responds to governments with genuine political will to
undertake the reforms necessary to fully implement the Statute. Furthermore, unlike
democratic development or economic liberalization, progress on international criminal justice
is not formally attached to official development assistance (European Commission 2006: 11).
16
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
To conclude this section, the empirical findings clearly indicate that the degree of
dependency on EU aid does not explain the extent or timing of commitment to the
international criminal justice mechanisms.
17
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
4.4 – Interviews and Analysis
In order to triangulate the findings from the quantitative tests, I have also conducted
interviews with officials from the European Union, African states and non-governmental
organizations. The data derived from interviews corroborates the findings from the preceding
section. In almost all cases, EU aid is perceived to have made no impact on a countries
decision to adopt ICC legal instruments. Among African interviewees, the factors informing
the government’s decision to integrate itself with the Rome Statute system were independent
of considerations. Among EU officials, there is further confirmation that aid has not been
employed to incentivize ICC commitment.
It is true that during the negotiations to create the ICC many African delegations ending up
joining the European-led coalition of the Like-Minded Group (LMG) instead of rallying
behind the non-Aligned Movement (which offered greater safeguards on national
sovereignty). Yet the reason for doing so was not motivated by sensitivities to European
preferences. Rather, it was a strategic move to further their national interests. Burundi, for
instance, a poor country emerging from a genocide which depended highly on aid joined the
Like-Minded Group largely due to political expedience. Realizing that the LMG bloc was
driving the negotiation process, the Burundian delegation calculated that in order to further
their national political agenda, “they needed to be at the forefront of the negotiations than
somewhere in middle with an unclear position” on other issues not critical to their goals
(Interview Burundian delegate). Likewise the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
supported a strong, independent Court on the basis of national considerations; namely, its
incapacity to deal with the massive human rights violations occurring in Eastern Congo
(Interview DRC delegate and government official). Similarly, domestic incapacity to deal
with internal crimes motivated the Sierra Leone government to support the Court (Sierra
Leone Delegate). Likewise a Lesotho government official dismissed the misperceptions that
African states were strong-armed towards the Court due to EU pressure. He stated that
African countries’ preferences towards the Court were formed as early as 1995 in response
to the international community’s neglect to intervene in Rwanda. A legal advisor for the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) who attended the Rome Conference, reaffirmed the
absence of EU aid as a factor in African preferences at Rome and beyond. He stated that
African states have sought to create an ICC since 1978, due to domestic incapacities to deal
with internal crises (Interview Senior OAU Legal Advisor)
18
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
A high-ranking South Sudanese government official stated that in meetings with European
officials, commitment to the ICC was presented as being “not compulsory” within the ACP-
EU agreement but a goal to be striven for in the future once the country has built up its local
capacity to be able to properly adhere to the Statute. An EU delegate working in Juba
reaffirmed this view; however the delegate also stated that although there was no deadline for
accession to the Statute, if South Sudan were to sign the Coutonou Partnership Agreement the
government would be obliged to make progress on ICC commitment (Interview 21/6/2013).
Returning to the South Sudanese state official, he recalled that the question of aid and ICC
commitment was mentioned only once in tandem by a “small EU member state”.
Interestingly, he stated the donor partner stressed that ratification to the Rome Statute would
be “good for both of us” as the distribution of aid to South Sudan could be an “easier sell to
the home Parliament” However, there was no explicit mention of conditionality and despite
its dependence on foreign aid after the shutdown of oil production in 2012 (Robinson 2012),
South Sudan does not intend to ratify the Rome Statute in the near future due to national and
regional considerations (Interview South Sudanese Director-General of Research, Policy and
Monitoring).
Moving on to interviews with EU officials, there is further confirmation of the marginal role
aid played in explaining Africa’s commitment to the ICC. The negotiations for the Revised
Coutonou Partnership Agreement in Luxembourg in 2004 provide a telling insight into the
dynamics of EU relations with African states which is instructive for this paper. Three
conclusions emerge from these negotiations. Firstly, the ambition to universalize international
criminal court is clearly a priority for the EU but attaching progress on ICC commitment was
deemed to be an inappropriate application of aid conditionality. Francoise Moreau, acting on
behalf of the European Commission led the Unit which carried out policy work on the ICC-
related clause. In devising the EU’s negotiating position on this clause, initially there were
voices within the EU calling for the ICC-clause to be one of the items covered in Article 96
which would leave partner states making inadequate progress on ICJ commitments
vulnerable to aid suspension. However, the argument was not retained in recognition that
conditionalities are an extremely sensitive matter and if applied, need to be appropriately and
sensibly calibrated among the other obligations in the agreement. According to this rationale,
ratifying and implementing the Rome Statute was agreed to be an inappropriate objective to
attach to aid for one specific reason. Within the centres of EU policymaking, there is a
conviction that multiplying conditionalities for political objectives can be counter-productive,
19
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
particularly if they are not linked to development processes and outcomes (Interview DG
Development). Progress on the ICC falls into this category and would have potentially
disrupted the balance achieved in Article 11 (where democracy, the rule of law and human
rights fall) which are each deemed as essential items. The employment of soft policy
instruments to universalize the Court makes sense in this context.
With commitment to the Court off the table in terms of formal conditionalities to aid, EU
negotiators strove to negotiate an ambitious text that committed EU and their African
partners to clear, measurable steps to advance international criminal justice that could be
assessed at regular intervals. However, African negotiators resisted such moves. And they
were partially successful, challenging assumptions of deep asymmetries between perceived
European power and African impotence, which brings us to the second conclusion.
What is clear from the EU-ACP negotiations in Luxembourg is that African states have real
leverage in negotiations with the EU, a dynamic which has been under-appreciated by current
discourses on the ICC and perceived Western imperialism. The relative absence of clear
power equivalences is due to two factors. The EU’s priority to universalize and achieve the
effective functioning of the Court (Action Plan 2004) requires above all else, the support of
African states, a group which Finnemore & Sikkink (1998) would call “critical states” to the
court’s evolution. Secondly, in order to garner support among these actors, the EU through its
soft form of engagement had to be willing to compromise with African peers. If the EU were
more disposed to deploy its hard power through economic inducements, it would likely have
been able to impose its terms to a much greater degree on the final EU-African framework
concerning the ICC. However, since the EU chooses to “engage in a discourse of partnership,
solidarity and dialogue towards SSA” (Sicurreli & Scheippers 2009: 608), it must be
sensitive to and give ground to African political interests (although these interests can be
challenged normatively) if necessary to conclude an agreement.
The European Commission pushed for a strong and explicit reference to the ICC in
Luxembourg. Yet a cohort of African states consistently resisted European advances on this
issue (Interview DG Development official, Interview European Commission official,
Interview Irish delegate to the Coutonou Partnership Agreement negotiations). Despite
assurances from African legal advisors throughout the negotiations indicating their support
the ICC and the principles that underlie it, a substantial number of African delegations
remained evasive towards European proposals. According to the three interviews cited above,
20
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
after weeks of negotiations it finally emerged that resistance stemmed from concerns that
such an inclusion would derogate from the bilateral immunity agreement signed by over two-
thirds of African states with the United States. Upon realizing this, the EU-led negotiators
proposed an ICC-related clause with much less assertive language relative to their earlier
proposals. Instead of the initially-proposed clause, “the parties shall ratify and implement the
Rome Statute”, the ACP governments consented to the watered-down version “the parties
shall seek to take steps towards ratifying and implementing the Rome Statute”. It is clear that
the finalized language for Article 11.6 provides African states greater discretion in regard to
the depth and pace of committing to the ICC.
It is debatable whether the use of aid as a “carrot and stick” would have produced a more
ambitious ICC-clause in the EU-ACP agreement, or more pertinently would have led to
higher levels of commitment to ICJ on the continent at this point. However, two cases
suggest aid conditionality does strongly influence African positions on issues related to
international criminal justice. Firstly, the United States’ threats to suspend military aid proved
effective in forcing thirty-eight African states to sign bilateral non-surrender agreements
(BIA); a treaty designed to protect US military personnel operating overseas from the Court’s
jurisdiction (Coalition for the International Criminal Court 2006a). The EU reacted by
heavily criticizing the American policy, and drafted legal guidelines detailing the
inconsistencies between the US-proposed agreement and the obligations of State Parties to
the ICC (AMICC 2002). Despite a public line that the EU would not compensate African
states for lost aid, the “EU quietly established a framework that allows it to provide funds to
countries that had lost aid as a result of their rejection of a BIA” (Scheippers & Sicurreli
2008: 613). Even though the EU developed measures to prevent the integrity of the Rome
Statute from being compromised, the soft policy instruments adopted by the EU -
compensation apart - were no match for the robust material pressure exerted by the United
States.
In 2012, the United States again successfully employed material leverage in Africa on an
ICC-related issue. This time however, the US having reversed its policy on the ICC,5
threatened to withhold aid in order to ensure the Malawian government did not breach their
5 At the tail-end of the Bush administration’s presidency, the US softened its stance against the ICC. The work
of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC careful strategy to placate US concerns played an influential
role in not only, forcing the US to temper their previously strident opposition to the Court, but eventually under
the Obama administration to express its’ willingness to cooperate with the Court (Bosco 2014).
21
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
ICC obligations by hosting the indicted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir at an AU summit
in Lilongwe. The previous year, the US suspended $350 million that was allocated to Malawi
citing specifically al-Bashir’s visit as a principle reason. In 2012, the “message was not lost
on Malawi’s new government (as) Malawi refused to invite Bashir to the African Union
Summit it was scheduled to host, choosing to give up its hosting role rather than invite Bashir
and violate its ICC commitments” (Capuano et al 2013).
Section 4.7 - CONCLUSION
Speaking at the close of two-day AU summit in Addis Ababa in May 2013, the AU and
Ethiopian Prime Minister accused the ICC of “race hunting” (AFP 2013), a denunciation
which is steeped in the historical narratives of Western imperialism in Africa. When
considering the recent clamour among African political elites and sections of the media
towards the ICC, which the previous statement taps into, it is important to ask why so many
governments from the region made legal commitments in the first place? Why would so
many national governments so readily turn against their international obligations and a treaty
which they initially endorsed? The paper empirically tests one explanation which if valid,
would add further weight to arguments that the ICC is an instrument of the West, targeting
poor, backward African states. The explanation that would serve to add fuel to this narrative
is that weak, cash-strapped African states entered the ICC treaty on the basis of seeking to
satisfy and anticipate the demands of their European donors. If this were the case, the recent
backlash makes a great deal of sense. African states, largely ignorant of the implications of
signing up to the ICC, ratified the Rome Statute without a great deal of consideration due to
the more immediate short-term rewards in the form of increased European material
assistance. However, once the ICC indicted a sitting African Head of State, governments
became cognizant of the ICC’s powers and turned against it in fear they too may be targeted.
The paper demonstrates that this narrative is unlikely to be true. The framework guiding EU
member states and institutions in its relations with third states concerning ICJ has employed
soft power instruments since 1995. As a result, the imbalance in power relations is not
necessarily heavily-tilted on the EU side; rather African states have had a key role in defining
the extent to which the EU can press African states on this issue. Furthermore, it is clear that
African states had independent preferences towards the institutional design of the Court. The
absence of alignment between African recipients and their European donors implies that
African states did not consider European aid as a motivating factor in mobilizing behind a
22
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
strong, independent Court. The paper also demonstrates the absence of a positive association
between dependency on EU aid and commitment to ICJ mechanisms. Rather, if any factor
was likely to prompt African states to ratify the Rome Statute, it derives from a different
policy instrument used by the EU: funding pro-ICC international and national NGOs to
sensitize and offer technical assistance to the government. Finally, based on interviews from
relevant stakeholders in this process, aid is not considered a contributing factor. EU officials
discuss the use of political tools to apply pressure on this issue, but not material. African
government officials justify their support or rejection of the ICC on the basis of national and
regional considerations.
To conclude, whilst I do not dispute that some African states may have ratified the Rome
Statute on the basis of EU pressure or in an attempt to satisfy donor preferences (Chad is an
obvious example), there is insufficient evidence of a general pattern fitting this hypothesis.
Bibliography:
Action Plan to Follow-Up on the Common Position on the International Criminal Court
(2004). <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC48EN.pdf>
BBC News Africa (2012) Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir Not Welcome for Malawi’s Banda.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17963368>
Antonis Antoniadis & Bekou, Olympia (2007) The EU and the International Criminal Court:
An Uneasy Symbiosis in Interesting Times, The International Criminal Law Review, 621-655.
Benedetti, Fanny & John L. Washburn (1999) Drafting the International Criminal Court
Treaty: Two Years to Rome and an Afterword on the Rome Diplomatic Conference, Global
Governance 5, 5.
Busby, Joshua (2010) Moral Movement and Foreign Policy, Cambridge Studies in
International Relations, 224.
Capuano, Michael E., Barbara Lee, James P. McGovern, Joseph R. Pitts, Janice D.
Schakowsky & Frank R. Wolf (2013), Letter to Secretary of State John Kerry, Congress of
the United States, March 15 2013. < http://www.internationaljusticeproject.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Letter-to-Secretary-Kerry.pdf>
Chuter, David (2012) The ICC: A Place for Africans In Their Place?, Taken from “Africa
and the Future of International Criminal Justice”, Edited by Vincent O. Nmehielle, The
Hague: Eleven International Publishing, pp.161-183.
Coffey, Kevin (2014) Why African States Supported the International Criminal Court:
Equality Not Exceptionalism in International Law, Paper presented for European Consortium
of Political Research, University of Glasgow 2014.
<https://www.academia.edu/8028023/Why_African_States_Supported_the_ICC_Equality_N
ot_Exceptionalism_in_International_Law>
23
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
Council of the European Union (2001) Council Common Position of 11th June 2001 on the
International Criminal Court, (2001/443/CFSP)
< http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/icc0en.pdf>
Council of the European Union (2003) Council Common Position of 16th June 2003,
2003/444/CFSP
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/l_15020030618en00670069.pdf>
European Commission (2006) Partnership Agreement ACP-EU, European Communities.
Europa (2009) Non-ratification of the Revised Coutonou Agreement by Sudan FAQ.
<http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/sudan_final_non-ratification_faq_200908.pdf>
Finnemore, Martha & Kathryn Sikkink (1998) International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, International Organization, 887.
General Secretariat for the Council (2008) The European Union and the International
Criminal Court, European Communities.
ICC Monitor (2004), Burundi, Liberia and Gyuana: Three Approaches to Ratification of the
Rome Statute, Issue 28, 1.
International Development Statistics (IDS) online databases on aid and other resource flows.
<www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/5037721.htm>
Kauffman, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010) Methodology and Analytical
Issues. World Bank.
Kimenyi, Mwangi S. (2013) Can the International Criminal Court Play Fair In Africa,
Brookings, Africa In Focus, October 17th 2013. <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-
focus/posts/2013/10/17-africa-international-criminal-court-kimenyi>
Marshall, Monty, Ted Robert Gurr & Keith Jaggers (2010) Polity IV Project: Political Regime
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009, Center for Systemic Peace.
New African (2012) Europe, Masters Behind the ICC.
<http://www.newafricanmagazine.com/special-reports/sector-reports/icc-vs-africa/europe-
masters-behind-the-icc>
Nkhata, Mwiza (2011) Implementation of the Rome Statute in Malawi and Zambia: Progress,
Challenges, and Prospects, Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa edited by Chacha
Murungu & Japhet Biegon, Pretoria University Press, 277-303.
Patten, Chris (2006) Not Quite a Diplomat, Penguin, 306.
Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Datasets 1800-2012.
Pillay, Navi (2014) Europe is Blocking Mideast Peace, The New York Times, Op-Ed
Contributor, November 6th 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/07/opinion/europe-is-
blocking-mideast-peace.html?_r=0>
Rosenthal, John (2004) A Lawless Global Court: How the International Criminal Court
Undermines the UN System, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Policy Review, No.123
<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/7859>
24
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
Rourke, John T. (2008) International Politics on the World Stage, McGraw-Hill Higher
Education, 266-267.
Scheippers Sibylle & Daniela Sicurelli (2008) Empowering Africa: Normative Power in EU-
Africa Relations, Journal of European Public Policy 15(4), 607-621.
Whitfield, Lindsay (2009) The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors,
Oxford University Press, 19.
World Bank (2011) Worldwide Governance Indicators, Government Effectiveness
Wouters Jan & Sudeshna Basu (2009) The Creation of the Global Criminal Justice System:
The European Union and the International Criminal Court, Antwerp, 117-142.
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court (1998), Official Records Volume II, Summary records of the
plenary meetings of the Committee of the Whole, A/CONF.183/13(Vol.II), 64-362.
25
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
Appendix:
Produced Draft Cooperation Legislation of the Rome Statute among Sub-Saharan
African States (1998-2013)
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2
TOTAL EU AID AS PER 0.973*** 0.986* PROPORTION OF GDP (0.010) (.006) DEMOCRACY 1.348*** (0.1211) GOVERNMENT 0.266** 1.492 EFFECTIVENESS (0.173) (0.318) TOTAL AID FROM 614208.0*** 4657635*** NON-EU COUNTRIES (2658074.0) (1.85e+07) AS PER PROPORTION OF GDP
Number of Subjects 44 48
Number of Observations 736 736
Significant level at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
26
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
Produced Draft Complementarity Legislation of the Rome Statute among Sub-Saharan
African States (1998-2013)
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2
TOTAL EU AID AS PER 0.961*** 0.988* PROPORTION OF GDP (0.010) (.006) DEMOCRACY 1.564*** (0.158) GOVERNMENT 0.899** 1.227 EFFECTIVENESS (0.161) (0.434) TOTAL AID FROM 369613.4** 715144.5*** NON-EU COUNTRIES (1963089.0) (3336736) AS PER PROPORTION OF GDP
Number of Subjects 44 48
Number of Observations 736 736
Significant level at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
27
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
1.5.1 –Domestic implementation of cooperation legislation among Sub-Saharan African
States (1998-2013)
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2
TOTAL EU AID AS PER 0.977 0.982 PROPORTION OF GDP (.016) (.016) DEMOCRACY 1.140 (0.122) GOVERNMENT 1.230 3.554* EFFECTIVENESS (1.247) (2.496) TOTAL AID FROM 556226.4 994245.7 NON-EU COUNTRIES (5977917) (1.35e+07) AS PER PROPORTION
OF GDP
Number of Subjects 44 48
Number of Observations 658 658
Significant level at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
28
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
1.5.1 –Domestic implementation of complementarity legislation among Sub-Saharan
African States (1998-2013)
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2
TOTAL EU AID AS PER 0.989 0.996 PROPORTION OF GDP (.009) (.016) DEMOCRACY 1.303** (0.140) GOVERNMENT 0.597 2.479* EFFECTIVENESS (0.459) (1.358) TOTAL AID FROM 43579.66* 44107.83 NON-EU COUNTRIES (274643) (413038.9) AS PER PROPORTION
OF GDP
Number of Subjects 45 48
Number of Observations 658 658
Significant level at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
29
*Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission
Table 4.2 –Ratification of APIC among Sub-Saharan African States (2003-2013)
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2
TOTAL EU AID AS PER 0.933*** 0.985 PROPORTION OF GDP (.017) (.010) DEMOCRACY 1.462*** (.162) GOVERNMENT 0.095*** 1.182 EFFECTIVENESS (0.067) (0.496) TOTAL AID FROM 5.15e+21*** 7726731 DEOM NON-EU COUNTRIES (8.10e+22) (9.63e+07) AS PER PROPORTION OF GDP
Number of Subjects 45 48
Number of Observations 658 658
Significant level at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1