Post on 25-Jan-2023
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)
Topic: Establishment of an African Capacity
for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC):
Analysis of this new-fangled mechanism
vis-à-vis the African Standby force (ASF)
and its Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC)
within APSA
Written by Tchioffo Kodjo (tkodjo@gmail.com)
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ______________________________________________________________ 1
II. Origin/ Historical settings of ACIRC ________________________________________ 3
III. Funding and configurations of ACIRC vis-à-vis ASF ________________________ 7
III.1. Funding sources and mechanisms ___________________________________________ 7
III.2. Organizational and Force generation configurations ___________________________ 9
III.2.1. Mission Scenarios _________________________________________________________________ 9
III.2.2. Multidimensional components and spatial configurations _______________________________ 11
III.2.3. Dynamics between the Force Generation and the Chain of Command and Control ________ 12
III.3. Implementation Roadmaps __________________________________________________ 14
IV. Attitude of ASF stakeholders towards ACIRC _____________________________ 15
V. Conclusion ___________________________________________________________ 19
VI. References/Bibliography __________________________________________ 20
List of Tables
Table 1 - Funding mechanims of ACIRC and ASF RDC ____________________________ 8
Table 2 - Deployment scenarios of ACIRC vis-a-vis ASF __________________________ 10
Table 3 - Mission components of ASF and ACIRC _______________________________ 11
Table 4 - Dynamics between the Force Generation and the Chain of Command and
Control of ACIRC and RDC _________________________________________________ 13
1
I. Introduction
Recently, African Union shortcomings in crafting an effective African Peace and
Security Architecture to achieve the goal of a conflict-free continent were again put
into light. The drop of water that has made the vase overflow is the ill-timed
military coup that overthrown Malian government last year and opened a security
vacuum for rebels to take control of the country’s north. AU and ECOWAS
attempted first endless mediation efforts and then endeavoured to deploy AFISMA.
At the same time, rebels had already taken control of the north and launched a
massive offensive on the capital.1 Mali lastly called on its former colonial ruler to
deal swiftly with the rebellion and restore government authority on the north.
France jumped on the field and launched operation “serval” to stop the southward
advance of armed groups.
While officially backed by African Union and most of its members, France operation
humbled and embarrassed AU executives indoor.2 Africans perceived it as a missed
rendez-vous for the ASF RDC to try its muscles and give weight to the principle of
African solution to African problems.3 Feeling that this was the time to take a
decisive initiative, the chairwoman of the AU Commission proposed in her report to
the STCDSS on 30 April 2013 the establishment of an African Capacity to
Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC). The project was then brought on the table
1 In a briefing, South African Minister for International Relations and Cooperation, Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane said “Leaders in that region
[ECOWAS] say, it took them 11 meetings in 11 months polishing the decision to intervene in Mali, until one day they woke up and the rebels
were now marching towards Bamako. That shouldn't have happened." See the article: SA backs African rapid response force, 30 May 2013 at
http://www.southafrica.info/africa/rapid-response-300513.htm, accessed 26 July 2013.
2 Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni. Enhancing Africa's responsiveness to crisis situations? , 03 June 2013, http://www.issafrica.org/iss-
today/enhancing-africas-responsiveness-to-crisis-situations, accessed 26 July 2013.
3 Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra was interviewed by Elissa Jobson and said: “we all felt that such military action should have come from Africa
itself”. See the subsequent article. Regional blocs frown on new AU force, 03 May 2013 at
http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2013/05/03/regional-blocs-frown-on-new-au-force, accessed 27 July 2013.
2
of Head of States during the twenty-first summit of the union. It was lobbied by
President Jacob Zuma of South Africa and finally adopted in the final decision of
the summit.4
Embracing ACIRC during the Golden Jubilee of the OAU/AU anchored on the
theme "Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance" sounds as a historical
endeavour for AU to give a new impetus and own its peace efforts across the
continent. However, this initiative was also widely sniped within APSA
stakeholders especially the RECs and many member states.
This paper seeks to dissect the origin of this initiative, critically examines its
configuration vis-à-vis ASF and its RDC, elucidates its position within APSA and
furthermore appraises the reactions of ASF key stakeholders to the ACIRC. The
article is both descriptive and analytical in its approach. Accordingly, the main part
starts by digging the roots and historical settings of the ACIRC. Then, it analyzes
its configuration in light of the existing ASF anatomy via its organizational, force
generation and chain of command and control structures. Lastly, it inspects the
feelings of ASF key stakeholders to the ACIRC.
This essay uses both primary and secondary sources and draws heavily on official
documents such as reports, decisions and policy instruments. It also makes an
extensive usage of information gathered in academic books, journal and think-thank
articles. All this is supplemented by details gained through personal observation
and involvement in AU events relevant to the subject.
4 Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn, announced publicly the creation of ACIRC on 27 May 2013 and insisted that it was proposed
by South African President Jacob Zuma. See the article by the Ministry of Ethiopia Foreign Affairs. New Military Force for Africa: the African
Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), 29 May 29 2013, http://www.mfa.gov.et/news/more.php?newsid=2062, accessed 27 July
2013.
3
II. Origin/ Historical settings of ACIRC
Ambitions for a continental force capable to contain and eradicate conflicts in Africa
can be traced back to 1963 at the dawn of the Organization of African Unity (OAU),
ancestor of the African Union.
In the global cold war era, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana stressed in 1963
the need of "a common defence system with African high command to ensure the
stability and security of Africa” and advocated for a federal union in a continental
state. He declared in his celebrated speech that “By creating a true political union of
all the independent states of Africa, with executive powers for political direction, we
can tackle hopefully every emergency and every complexity”.5 Nkrumah’s dream of
AHC was abandoned at the founding conference to the benefit of a gradual approach
championed by the Monrovia group. It is worth recalling that the OAU finally
created a defense commission whose deficiencies in designing a clear continental
security strategy and handling conflicts such as the Chadian crisis in 1979 had
grown nowadays to lessons learned in regional peacekeeping.6 Few initiatives like
the Cairo Declaration of 1993 establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management and Resolution could be put to the credit of the OAU in dealing with
continental security issues.
More than a decade ago, the vision of an all-African force was reignited when the
AU replaced the OAU with a fresh impetus and a target to promote peace, security
and stability as a major requirement to the socio-economic development of the
continent.
5 Kwame Nkrumah's Speech at the Founding Meeting of the OAU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 24, 1963, at
http://panafricannews.blogspot.com/2012/09/kwame-nkrumah-speech-at-founding.html , accessed 25 July 2013.
6 Amadu, S. The Limits of Peace-Keeping by a Regional Organization: The OAU Peace-Keeping Force in Chad, 1991.
Kodjo, T. A reappraisal of the first OAU peacekeeping operation: the Inter-African-Force (IAF) in Chad (27 June 1981 – 30 June 1982), 2013.
4
To materialize its yearning, the constitutive act was equipped with an innovative
article which reserved the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State in
respect of grave circumstances. At its launching on 09 July 2002 in Durban, the
protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the
Union was adopted. The protocol instigates APSA, the overall security architecture
of the organization hallowing the Peace and Security Council as its central organ
supported by various pillars including the African Standby Force.
Since then, the AU Commission in Addis Ababa has been working towards the
implementation of APSA through the establishment and consolidation of its
structures among which the African Standby Force. ASF emerges as one of the
critical pillar of APSA given the fact that it represents an opportunity for the union
to restore peace and security using forceful means when mediation and other
initiatives are not fruitful.
It is significant to mention that Libya’s, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi proposed to
fund, equip and house the force in purpose-built barracks in Sirte.7 Other AU
leaders were more often lukewarm or skeptic about that “one-million-strong army”
based in the guide’s hometown.8 Finally that offer didn’t prosper and was
abandoned after Gaddafi’s death.
On the spot, three Roadmaps based on capacity building and field training exercises
have successively guided the operationalisation of the force in order to cover the six
scenarios of deployment. Each roadmap has suffered deadlocks and subsequent lags
during its execution leading to numerous postponements. In a recent press
statement, the PSC acknowledges that “the main obstacles to the operationalisation
7 Garth Cilliers, Africa’s intervention force: Is the dream of Africa's own military force finally coming true? , 18 June 2013, at http://www.leadershiponline.co.za/articles/africas-intervention-force, accessed 28 July 2013. 8 Ibid, 7.
5
of the ASF are inadequate logistical capacities and funding” and announces ASF
full readiness for 2015.9
However, as ASF operationalisation “stand by”, crisis pace across Africa did not
lessen. During latest crisis successively in Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and now Mali, Africa
had experienced or called for foreign intervention. This resounded like a blatant
failure for the union and its interventional peace and security architecture to foster
the ideal of African owned solutions. The case of Mali has invigorated the need for
AU to appraise its duty to cope timely and effectively with security issues on the
continent. Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, AU commissioner for Peace and
security made it clear that "all of us welcomed as necessary the intervention of
France in Mali, which made it possible for us to avert a looming catastrophe", "but
we all felt that such military action should have come from Africa itself." 10
Subsequently, the January 2013 summit tasked the commission to submit a report
ahead of the may summit on progress made and challenges encountered for the
early operationalisation of the African Standby Force(ASF) Rapid Deployment
Capability (RDC), within the framework of the APSA. The chairwoman of the
AU commission endeavoured to tackle this looming challenge and proposed in her
report to the Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Security and Safety
(STCDSS) on 30 April 2013, the establishment of an African Capacity for
Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC).
Interestingly, the final declaration adopted by the STCDSS minimally took note of
the report of the chairperson without acknowledging the need for an ACIRC.11 The
declaration rather requested the commission to “conduct a comprehensive and
physical assessment of the ASF, including its RDC” in collaboration with
9 Press Statement of the PSC at its 387
th meeting on the operationalisation of ASF and establishment of ACIRC, 29 July 2013, at
http://www.peaceau.org/, accessed 02 august 2013. 10 Elissa Jobson, Regional blocs frown on new AU force, 03 May 2013, at http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2013/05/03/regional-
blocs-frown-on-new-au-force, accessed 26 July 2013.
11 Declaration of the 6th Ordinary Meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security held in Addis Ababa, 30 April 2013, at http://www.peaceau.org/, accessed 02 august 2013. .
6
member states and RECs/RMs. 12 This was probably a call to the AU commission
to stick to the January 2013 summit decision which “Stresses the need for the early
operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF) Rapid Deployment
Capability (RDC), within the framework of the African Peace and Security
Architecture (APSA)”.13
However, Dr Dlamini-zuma did not give up. Timely, the report of the Peace and
Security Council (PSC) on its activities and the state of peace and security in Africa
submitted to the Head of States during the twenty-first summit on 27 May 2013
stresses the need for a more sustained commitment to establish ACIRC, the precise
panacea for the union to act in due time and own its peace efforts on the continent.
Decisively, President Zuma championed the idea and it was validated and openly
announced by AU current chairman, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn of
Ethiopia.14
The final decision of the summit, which also marked the fiftieth anniversary of the
OAU/AU explicitly provides “in principle to immediately establish, as a transitional
arrangement and pending the full operationalisation of the ASF and its RDC, an
African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises, to provide the AU with a
flexible and robust force, made up of military/police capabilities, force enablers and
multipliers, equipment and resources to be voluntarily provided by Member States
on the basis of their willingness and capabilities, to be deployed very rapidly to
effectively respond to emergency situations, within the framework of the African
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); ”.15
This can be analyzed as a triumph for the AU chairwoman who succeeded in getting
the ACIRC approved within six months and most significantly, during the fiftieth
12 Ibid, 11. 13
) Solemn Declaration of the Assembly of the Union on the Situation in Mali, 28 Jan 2013. 14 Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Military Force for Africa: the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), 29 May
2013, at http://www.mfa.gov.et/news/more.php?newsid=2062a ,accessed 02 August 2013.
15 Decisions, Declarations and Resolution of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, 26 - 27 May 2013, at
http://iccnow.org/documents/AU_decisions_21st_summit_May_2013.pdf, accessed 02 august 2013.
7
anniversary of the OAU/AU, designed as an historic event to advance the spirit of
Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance. Yet, one can question the originality of
ACIRC funding mechanisms and organizational configuration vis-à-vis the ASF
RDC while ASF operationalisation standstill.
III. Funding and configurations of ACIRC vis-à-vis ASF
ACIRC promises to be “an efficient, robust and credible force, which can be deployed
very rapidly, able to conduct operations of limited duration and objectives or
contribute to creating enabling conditions for the deployment of larger AU and/or
UN peace operations”.16
This section intends to depicts in details and take to mean its structural
configuration vis-à-vis ASF and specially ASF RDC. It considers one after another
the organizational, force generation, chain of command and control and the
roadmaps of the ACIRC and the ASF.
It draws heavily on the report of the chairperson on the operationalisation of the
Rapid Deployment Capability of the ASF and the establishment of the ACIRC as
well as official documentation of doctrine and principle of the African Standby
Force.
III.1. Funding sources and mechanisms
In a global arena characterized by multidimensional and uneven conflicts
proliferation, peacekeeping operations funding have proven to be an expensive
endeavor. For example, AMISOM considered as a “cheap” peacekeeping operation
16 See Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the African Standby Force and the establishment of an “African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises”, 30 April 2013, at http://www.peaceau.org/, accessed 02 august 2013.
8
cost rose from USD 303 million to about USD 550 million in 2012 through the
including of Kenyan troops.17
The matrix below highlights the similarities/dissimilarities in the funding source
and mechanisms of both the ACIRC and the ASF and its RDC.
Funding features ACIRC ASF and its RDC
Official funding
sources
Member States on a voluntary
basis so it could “act
independently”.
AU Peace Fund18 (part of
AU budget plus voluntary
contribution from member
states or other sources
within Africa)
Factual Funding
sources
[Not yet started] So far, just
South Africa, Uganda and
Ethiopia have pledged to support
ACIRC
More than 95% from EU
(through APF19) and USA
Alternative funding
sources or
mechanisms
[Not specified officially] UNSC (Chapter VIII of
the UN Charter and the
Resolution 2033 of the
UNSC)
Degree of
dependence on
donor/partners
[seems less dependent but
cannot conclude at this point ]
Heavily dependent on
partners/donors in
practice
Table 1 - Funding mechanims of ACIRC and ASF RDC (Kodjo T, 2013)20
17 Gabriel Gatehouse report for BBC, Can Somalia's cheap peacekeeping defeat al-Shabab?,11 June 2012 at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18392212, accessed 25 July 2013. 18
Policy Framework to the establishment of the ASF and the MSC, p.12. 19
See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/index_en.htm, visited 28 July 2013. 20
The matrix critically reflects on the Policy Framework to the Establishment of the ASF and the MSC (May 2003) and the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the African Standby Force and t he establishment of an “African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises” (January 2013), at http://www.peaceau.org/, accessed 01 august 2013.
9
At this point one can note that official funding of ACIRC is directly entrusted to
contributing member states while ASF and its RDC are more reliant on AU and
RECs funding apparatus. Existing restrictions in AU and RECs budget and funding
mechanisms may justify that ASF is heavily dependent on external grant for its
implementation.
III.2. Organizational and Force generation configurations
Peacekeeping operations structure has evolved greatly and concomitantly with
technology pace, local/global entanglement of crisis and recent doctrines and
approaches developed by regional organizations or think-thank. Nowadays, they
tend to be multidimensional thanks to UN lessons learnt captured in the United
Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guideline edited in 2008.
This part scrutinizes ACIRC intended structure alongside ASF configuration with
an emphasis on the mission scenarios, the multidimensional components and force
generation model in order to grasp correlations.
III.2.1. Mission Scenarios
Typical scenarios facilitate projections to the reality on the ground and can push for
decision makers to select adequate techniques and tools to manage timely and
effectively crisis. The matrix below was constructed based on the six scenarios of
ASF stated in the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby
Force and the Military Staff Committee. It tries to capture correspondence with
ACIRC.
Scenarios ACIRC ASF and its
RDC
Scenario 1: AU/Regional Military advice to a Political
mission. (Deployment within 30 days of an AU mandate
provided by the PSC)
10
Scenario 2: AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with
UN mission. (Deployment within 30 days of an AU mandate
provided by the PSC)
Scenario 3: Stand alone AU/Regional observer mission.
(Deployment within 30 days of an AU mandate provided by
the PSC)
Scenario 4: AU/Regional peacekeeping force (PKF) for
Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions.
(Deployment within 30 days of an AU mandate provided by
the PSC)
Scenario 5: AU peacekeeping force for complex peacekeeping
mission – low-level spoilers - a feature of many current
conflicts. (Deployment within 30 days of an AU mandate
provided by the PSC)
Scenario 6: AU intervention – e.g. genocide situations where
international community does not act promptly (Deploy a
robust military force within 14 days.)
Table 2 - Deployment scenarios of ACIRC vis-a-vis ASF (Kodjo T, 2013)21
ACIRC operations fits scenario 6 of the ASF which correspond to the deployment of the ASF
Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC). It is equally observable that ACIRC rationale to
“establish an efficient, robust and credible force, which can be deployed very rapidly, able to
conduct operations of limited duration and objectives or contribute to creating enabling
conditions for the deployment of larger AU and/or UN peace operations”22 sounds
equivalent to the ASF RDC aims to “take a preliminary preventive action, while preparing
for a more comprehensive action that could include the participation of the United
Nations. The emphasis here is on rapid action and deployment”. Furthermore, ACIRC and
ASF RDC are planned to be operational respectively within 15 and 14 day of the AU
Mandate which is somewhat akin.
21 This matrix draws heavily on the on the Policy Framework to the Establishment of the ASF and the MSC (May 2003) and the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the African Standby Force and the establishment of an “African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises” (January 2013) , at http://www.peaceau.org/, accessed 01 august 2013. 22
Report of the Chairperson on operationalisation of ASF RDC and establishment of ACIRC, 30 April 2013, p.7, at http://www.peaceau.org/, accessed 02 august 2013.
ASF RDC
< 14 DAYS
< 15 DAYS
11
III.2.2. Multidimensional components and spatial configurations
Multidimensional peacekeeping missions are not limited to military capabilities and can
engage in non-military tasks to be effectual and bring back long-term peace depending on
their mandate. ASF and ACIRC peacekeeping components are represented below to put
in perspective their resemblances/differences.
23
Ibid, 21.
Table 3 - Mission components of ASF and ACIRC (Kodjo T, 2013)23
Mission components(organizational and spatial) ACIRC ASF and
its RDC
MU
LT
IDIM
EN
SIO
NA
L
Military Component (Special Forces, Engineers, Military health
services, Logistics (Plans and support)
Police Component (Reform and restructuring of local police
Executive functions typically include powers of arrest, search and
seizure)
Civilian Component (Political Affairs, Legal Advice, Public
Information, Human Rights, Gender, Child Protection, SSR/DDR)
SP
AT
IAL
Air Component (Offensive Air Power, Reconnaissance and
Surveillance, Strategic Airlift and Tactical Airlift, Helicopters)
Land Component (Armour, Artillery, Infantry)
Maritime Component (Naval Diplomacy, Disaster Relief,
Evacuation Operations, Embargo, Sanctions and Quarantine
Enforcement)
12
ACIRC provides mainly for military capabilities while ASF operations can turn
multidimensional in regards to UN peacekeeping doctrine. Both may use all the
spatial (air, land and maritime) components to engage on the field.
It is pertinent to recall AU PSC press statement on 29 July 2013 which formally
“acknowledged that the main obstacles to the operationalisation of the ASF are
inadequate logistical capacities and funding”. Helmoed-Romer Heitman, a South
African defense analyst, asks: “How do you deploy quickly if you don’t have heavy
airlift?” This exposes Africa’s urgent necessity to acquire heavy military aircraft
whose lack has somehow hindered its political will to materialize into timely actions
on the ground.
III.2.3. Dynamics between the Force Generation and the Chain of Command and
Control
The correlation between a peacekeeping force generation and the chain of command
and control is vital to find out key actors and establish their mutual responsibility.
It also helps to understand how actors’ may influence the attitude and outcome of
the force in the field.
The matrix below captures the relationship between force generation and its chain
of command and control in the case of ACIRC and ASF missions.
Dynamics ACIRC ASF and its RDC
PK Force
Generation
* Individual AU Member States
[Ad-Hoc]
*Regional ASF (through
contribution from member states)
13
PK Force
Utilization *AU Commission *AU Commission
PK Chain of
Command
and Control
*Political and strategic
management
AUC Chairperson
(delegation of power to AUC
Commissioner for Peace and
Security)
Special Representative of
AUC Chairperson (SRCC)
*Administrative
management
Member countries
contributing troops
*Overall coordination
and management
synchronization of AUC
Chairperson with
PLANELMs (AU and
Regions) through Africa-
wide interoperable C3IS
Special Representative of
AUC Chairperson (SRCC)
Coordination
Mechanism [Not specified]
AUC PLANELM (within PSOD)
Regional ASFs PLANELM
Table 4 - Dynamics between the Force Generation and the Chain of Command and Control of ACIRC and RDC (Kodjo T, 2013)24
The dynamics between peacekeeping force generation and its chain of command and
control differs greatly between ACIRC and the ASF. It can be said that ASF is
based on a “Region-AUC” dynamic and is managed between the AUC and the
PLANELMs in PSOD and the Regions/RECs connected in real-time by the C3IS.
ACIRC on the other side is structured around a “Contributing Member States-AUC”
24 This matrix critically reflects on the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment
Capability of the African Standby Force and the establishment of an “African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises” (January 2013) and the
article by Jakkie Cilliers,The African Standby Force An Update on Progress (2011) , at http://www.peaceau.org/ , accessed 01 august 2013.
14
dynamic and is managed by the AUC at a political and strategical level and by the
contributing states at an administrative level.
This opens the door to several questions in regards to power configuration and
implications in regards to ACIRC. Can a member state contributes to and finances
a mission and is relegated to a strategically piddling administrative management?
If no, can it assent and endorse such project? Furthermore, if a contributing
state/group of states is given the political and strategic management of ACIRC
operations will it/they starve its/their own interests in the region?
In addition, ACIRC, until now, did not specify the mechanism it will apply to
coordinate with states for a coherent organization and functioning of its missions. If
this mechanism is not specified and put in place, some may fear subsequent
frictions between the instructions of the AUC Chairperson and those of the
contributing nations. This may lead to inaction into the field of operations.
It is worth recalling that, to date, only South Africa, Ethiopia and Uganda have
pledged support to ACIRC. This shows that AU member states may be reluctant to
approve the ACIRC model.
III.3. Implementation Roadmaps
While ACIRC has been adopted very recently, ASF is struggling with its third
roadmap. Originally designed to be operational in 2008, ASF full implementation
was pushed back to 2010, then 2013, and most recently given a timeline of 2015.
ACIRC adoption provides in principle for its immediate implementation as a
transitional arrangement before ASF’s readiness. Several times, it has been
15
described as a stop-gap measure pending the full operationalisation of the ASF.25
This assertion is contradicted by a fresh information note on the implementation
status of ACIRC released by the PSC on 29 July 2013 which stipulates that “The
Commission intends to complete both the work on ACIRC and the ASF assessment
by October 2013, in order to submit a comprehensive report to the STCDSS.
As requested by the 21st ordinary session of the Assembly, the Commission will
submit a report on the implementation of this decision at its next ordinary session,
in January 2014”. It is quite possible that the usual bureaucracy of the union hold
up its attainment until a new crisis triggers on the continent. Also, this may send a
wrong message to the RECs and divert them from finalizing their regional brigades
by 2015.
IV. Attitude of ASF stakeholders towards ACIRC
ACIRC has been presented for the first time in the report of the Chairperson of the
AUC during her meeting with the STCDSS on 30 April 2013. The STCDSS is
composed of experts from Minister of Defense, Security and Safety Services from
member states.
In its final declaration, the STCDSS “took note” of the report of the chairperson on
the operationalisation of the ASF-RDC and the establishment of the ACIRC and
25 Kim Helfrich, AU working towards African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), 01 August 2013 at
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=31411:au-working-towards-african-capacity-for-immediate-
response-to-crises-acirc&catid=56:diplomacy-a-peace&Itemid=111, accessed 06 August 2013.
Boris Bachorz, News Analysis: Doubt over AU’s stop-gap intervention force, 30 May 2013 at
http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2013/05/30/news-analysis-doubt-over-aus-stop-gap-intervention-force, accessed 10 August 2013.
Reuters, African leaders create emergency military force, 28 May 2013 at http://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/05/28/african-leaders-create-
emergency-military-force/, accessed 06 August 2013.
16
entrusted the document to the analysis of member states and regional bodies.
Diplomatically, this connotes that the defense ministers of the union were
unconvinced by the idea of a new-fangled ACIRC knowing that ASF-RDC was still
on the board.
With the endorsement and political support of South Africa, considered as the
current driver of the AU “Big Five”26, the AU Commission managed to get the
ACIRC adopted during the twenty-first summit and golden jubilee of the union.
This sends the subliminal message that ACIRC is a significant and consistent Pan-
African initiative which is intended to work towards the “African renaissance”.
However, a number of ASF stakeholders’ reactions towards this endeavor have
fueled polemics. For instance, Elissa Jobson points out that “, the proposal for the
new force has been heavily criticized by the regional economic communities of the
AU, which feel that their pivotal role in the defense of the continent is being
usurped by the union’s peace and security department.” 27 She adds that “The
heads of state [in January] requested the commission draft proposals for the
speeding up of the "operationalisation" of these standby forces. But instead, the
commission came up with the ACIRC”.28
Meanwhile, Ghana's Deputy Defense Minister Ebenezer Terlabi considers ACIRC
as a “duplication” of the ASF and requests it to be “referred to the Regional
Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) for detailed study and
analysis”. 29
Some astute analysts perceive ACIRC as an opportunity for member states to push
forward their personal hegemonic agenda on the union and grab possible economic
26 Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa are generally perceived as the big five in terms of GDP and contributions to the budget of the African Union. To be in the big five is a sign of sufficient leadership and power to weight on the union decisions and someti mes to advance personal agendas. 27 Elissa Jobson is a writer on African affairs in Theguardian and Deputy Editor of Global: The International Briefing. See her article: Regional blocs frown on new AU force, 03 May 2013. 28 Ibid, 13. 29 See the article of the Pan African News Agency(PANAPRESS): Ghana's Deputy Defence Minister tasks ECOWAS on security challenges, 27 June 2013.
17
advantages. This is the case of Tunji Ajibade of Nigeria. He says, “One thing the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs should do now that Nigeria has yet to be mentioned
among nations that have committed themselves to the AICRC[ACIRC], is not
to commit the nation yet.” 30 For him, Nigeria must commit to ACIRC on a “case
by case basis” depending on economic return it must get when involved in such
operations. He adds, “One way for Nigeria to handle this continent … is to
strategically link31 … conflict spots to the economic, trade, or military advantages it
can benefit where such is feasible”. Farther, he emphasizes that “Africa can’t ignore
Nigeria when it is pressed. Let nations get pressed and beg”. 32
Others project that ACIRC could degenerate in a “new elite club”. In this sense,
Andre Roux points that “The bottom line is that Africa will have a new elite – a club
of those states that can ‘walk the talk’”. 33 In regards to the AU official records, this
argumentation is questionable. The report of the chairperson provides clearly that
“The political direction and strategic management, as well as the activation of
AICRC fall within the ambit of the Chairperson of the Commission of the African
Union, … Member countries contributing troops to the AICRC will be responsible
for the administrative control of their Force in the theatre of operations”.34 So it is
difficult for member states to form their “elite club” since they are officially
restricted to the administrative management of their respective troops. Thought, a
new “elite club” may emerge if the view of Solomon Ayele Dersso is applied by the
union. He argues that “One thing that’s different about the new force … is that it
will be based on the principle of military capacity”. 35 If ACIRC is finally shaped on
the most capable military countries, it could be painted as the club of Africa’s
gendarmes.
30 Tunji Ajibade is a Communications Consultant and Literary Administrator at Exodus Consulting in Nigeria. See his article in The Punch Newspaper: Reloading AU, strategising for Nigeria (14 June 2013). 31 Italic emphasis added by the author. 32 Ibid, 16. 33 Andre Roux is a Senior Researcher in ISS, a leading think-thank in South Africa. See his article: New `super` combat brigade: creation of an
African elite? 14 June 2013. 34
Report of the chairperson on the operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the ASF and the establishment of the ACIRC , 30
April 2013, p.8-9.
35 Solomon Ayele Dersso is a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa office. See its interview and subsequent
article by Agence France-Presse(AFP): Africa plans emergency force, but can it deliver? , 29 may 2013.
18
An insightful session of the South African parliament took place on 20 June 2013.
Honorable Joseph Meshoe raised two critical issues concerning ACIRC to President
Jacob Zuma who backed the idea. He asked whether the establishment of the
planned military rapid reaction force will advance the commencement date of
operations of the planned African Standby Force and if the Western countries will
be requested to assist with training. 36 In his answers, President Zuma recognizes
the massive lack of military capacity in Africa to address quickly peacekeeping
issues and emphasizes that AU is largely financed by donors who put conditions to
use their funds according to their interests. 37
He rightly points that Africa remains “helpless”. For President Zuma, Africa needs
volunteers’ countries that will take the burden on their head and will act as joint
force whenever there is a crisis on the continent. He explains that whenever there is
a crisis such countries must be able “to move swiftly and finance their actions
because if we don’t so, it will be financed by tax payers from across the seas and
they will control us forever”.38 He then asks “Do we want to continue to be
controlled by other people or do we want to be independent and stand on our
own?”39 President Zuma argumentation seems logical but raise issues about the
capability of such willing countries to run this kind of mission effectively. It is worth
recalling Helmoed-Romer Heitman informing IRIN that “South Africa ordered eight
Airbus military A400m transport aircraft in 2005 at a cost of about US$1 billion,
but later cancelled the order citing financial constraints and associated cost
increases”.40 This demonstrates that even if there is political will, the lack of
effective military capacity is a persisting reality on the continent that may hamper
36 Honorable Reverend Dr. Kenneth Rasalabe Joseph Meshoe is the President of the African Christian Democratic Party in South Africa. Watch
his questions to President Jacob Zuma answers the Youtube channel of the South African parliament, session of 20 June 2013 at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TCCvw-zxC3M or http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p9hB_BoFc8k, accessed 11 august 2013.
37 President Jacob Zuma answers can be watched on the Youtube channel of the South African parliament, session of 20 June 2013 at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TCCvw-zxC3M or http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p9hB_BoFc8k, accessed 11 august 2013. 38
Ibid, 23. 39 Ibid, 23. 40
See the interview of Helmoed-Romer Heitman and subsequent article by IRIN: Analysis: AU prepares its shock troops (03 June 2013).
19
ACIRC. It must be addressed first if Africa wants to be to be independent and stand
on its own when it comes to peacekeeping.
V. Conclusion
To sum up, ACIRC originates from a political attempt of the AUC to embark
member states on African solutions at the eve of the golden jubilee of the union. The
initial intention was to propose a new instrument to address timely the pressing
realities on the ground. This paper demonstrates that its raison d’être and
deployment preconditions are similar to the ASF RDC within APSA, albeit they
differ greatly in their anatomy, funding mechanisms and particularly their
operating model. ACIRC model put an emphasis on the willingness of individual
member states to intervene early in case of crisis under the umbrella of the AUC
Chairperson. Despite the political will and enthusiasm of AUC to set up ACIRC, it
is prudent to expose that unsolved issues around the implementation of ASF RDC
may thwart its establishment and performances. It is particularly the case of
logistical capabilities of the member states; specifically heavy airlift equipments to
rapidly deploy. Moreover, ACIRC configuration neglects the RECs which are a
fundamental pillar of the APSA. Finally, in the rush to put an African solution on
the table, the AUC might have generated new concerns. However, it is insightful to
argue like Solomon Dersso that ACIRC “may take a different course altogether,
depending on its success”.41 In this sense, the achievements of the new-fangled UN
intervention brigade including African troops in Eastern Congo may foretell
realistic expectations from ACIRC.
41 Interview of Solomon Ayele Dersso and subsequent article by IRIN: Analysis: AU prepares its shock troops, 31 May 2013 at http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=98139, accessed 11 august 2013.
20
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