African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

Topic: Establishment of an African Capacity

for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC):

Analysis of this new-fangled mechanism

vis-à-vis the African Standby force (ASF)

and its Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC)

within APSA

Written by Tchioffo Kodjo (tkodjo@gmail.com)

Table of Contents

I. Introduction ______________________________________________________________ 1

II. Origin/ Historical settings of ACIRC ________________________________________ 3

III. Funding and configurations of ACIRC vis-à-vis ASF ________________________ 7

III.1. Funding sources and mechanisms ___________________________________________ 7

III.2. Organizational and Force generation configurations ___________________________ 9

III.2.1. Mission Scenarios _________________________________________________________________ 9

III.2.2. Multidimensional components and spatial configurations _______________________________ 11

III.2.3. Dynamics between the Force Generation and the Chain of Command and Control ________ 12

III.3. Implementation Roadmaps __________________________________________________ 14

IV. Attitude of ASF stakeholders towards ACIRC _____________________________ 15

V. Conclusion ___________________________________________________________ 19

VI. References/Bibliography __________________________________________ 20

List of Tables

Table 1 - Funding mechanims of ACIRC and ASF RDC ____________________________ 8

Table 2 - Deployment scenarios of ACIRC vis-a-vis ASF __________________________ 10

Table 3 - Mission components of ASF and ACIRC _______________________________ 11

Table 4 - Dynamics between the Force Generation and the Chain of Command and

Control of ACIRC and RDC _________________________________________________ 13

1

I. Introduction

Recently, African Union shortcomings in crafting an effective African Peace and

Security Architecture to achieve the goal of a conflict-free continent were again put

into light. The drop of water that has made the vase overflow is the ill-timed

military coup that overthrown Malian government last year and opened a security

vacuum for rebels to take control of the country’s north. AU and ECOWAS

attempted first endless mediation efforts and then endeavoured to deploy AFISMA.

At the same time, rebels had already taken control of the north and launched a

massive offensive on the capital.1 Mali lastly called on its former colonial ruler to

deal swiftly with the rebellion and restore government authority on the north.

France jumped on the field and launched operation “serval” to stop the southward

advance of armed groups.

While officially backed by African Union and most of its members, France operation

humbled and embarrassed AU executives indoor.2 Africans perceived it as a missed

rendez-vous for the ASF RDC to try its muscles and give weight to the principle of

African solution to African problems.3 Feeling that this was the time to take a

decisive initiative, the chairwoman of the AU Commission proposed in her report to

the STCDSS on 30 April 2013 the establishment of an African Capacity to

Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC). The project was then brought on the table

1 In a briefing, South African Minister for International Relations and Cooperation, Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane said “Leaders in that region

[ECOWAS] say, it took them 11 meetings in 11 months polishing the decision to intervene in Mali, until one day they woke up and the rebels

were now marching towards Bamako. That shouldn't have happened." See the article: SA backs African rapid response force, 30 May 2013 at

http://www.southafrica.info/africa/rapid-response-300513.htm, accessed 26 July 2013.

2 Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni. Enhancing Africa's responsiveness to crisis situations? , 03 June 2013, http://www.issafrica.org/iss-

today/enhancing-africas-responsiveness-to-crisis-situations, accessed 26 July 2013.

3 Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra was interviewed by Elissa Jobson and said: “we all felt that such military action should have come from Africa

itself”. See the subsequent article. Regional blocs frown on new AU force, 03 May 2013 at

http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2013/05/03/regional-blocs-frown-on-new-au-force, accessed 27 July 2013.

2

of Head of States during the twenty-first summit of the union. It was lobbied by

President Jacob Zuma of South Africa and finally adopted in the final decision of

the summit.4

Embracing ACIRC during the Golden Jubilee of the OAU/AU anchored on the

theme "Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance" sounds as a historical

endeavour for AU to give a new impetus and own its peace efforts across the

continent. However, this initiative was also widely sniped within APSA

stakeholders especially the RECs and many member states.

This paper seeks to dissect the origin of this initiative, critically examines its

configuration vis-à-vis ASF and its RDC, elucidates its position within APSA and

furthermore appraises the reactions of ASF key stakeholders to the ACIRC. The

article is both descriptive and analytical in its approach. Accordingly, the main part

starts by digging the roots and historical settings of the ACIRC. Then, it analyzes

its configuration in light of the existing ASF anatomy via its organizational, force

generation and chain of command and control structures. Lastly, it inspects the

feelings of ASF key stakeholders to the ACIRC.

This essay uses both primary and secondary sources and draws heavily on official

documents such as reports, decisions and policy instruments. It also makes an

extensive usage of information gathered in academic books, journal and think-thank

articles. All this is supplemented by details gained through personal observation

and involvement in AU events relevant to the subject.

4 Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn, announced publicly the creation of ACIRC on 27 May 2013 and insisted that it was proposed

by South African President Jacob Zuma. See the article by the Ministry of Ethiopia Foreign Affairs. New Military Force for Africa: the African

Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), 29 May 29 2013, http://www.mfa.gov.et/news/more.php?newsid=2062, accessed 27 July

2013.

3

II. Origin/ Historical settings of ACIRC

Ambitions for a continental force capable to contain and eradicate conflicts in Africa

can be traced back to 1963 at the dawn of the Organization of African Unity (OAU),

ancestor of the African Union.

In the global cold war era, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana stressed in 1963

the need of "a common defence system with African high command to ensure the

stability and security of Africa” and advocated for a federal union in a continental

state. He declared in his celebrated speech that “By creating a true political union of

all the independent states of Africa, with executive powers for political direction, we

can tackle hopefully every emergency and every complexity”.5 Nkrumah’s dream of

AHC was abandoned at the founding conference to the benefit of a gradual approach

championed by the Monrovia group. It is worth recalling that the OAU finally

created a defense commission whose deficiencies in designing a clear continental

security strategy and handling conflicts such as the Chadian crisis in 1979 had

grown nowadays to lessons learned in regional peacekeeping.6 Few initiatives like

the Cairo Declaration of 1993 establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,

Management and Resolution could be put to the credit of the OAU in dealing with

continental security issues.

More than a decade ago, the vision of an all-African force was reignited when the

AU replaced the OAU with a fresh impetus and a target to promote peace, security

and stability as a major requirement to the socio-economic development of the

continent.

5 Kwame Nkrumah's Speech at the Founding Meeting of the OAU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 24, 1963, at

http://panafricannews.blogspot.com/2012/09/kwame-nkrumah-speech-at-founding.html , accessed 25 July 2013.

6 Amadu, S. The Limits of Peace-Keeping by a Regional Organization: The OAU Peace-Keeping Force in Chad, 1991.

Kodjo, T. A reappraisal of the first OAU peacekeeping operation: the Inter-African-Force (IAF) in Chad (27 June 1981 – 30 June 1982), 2013.

4

To materialize its yearning, the constitutive act was equipped with an innovative

article which reserved the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State in

respect of grave circumstances. At its launching on 09 July 2002 in Durban, the

protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the

Union was adopted. The protocol instigates APSA, the overall security architecture

of the organization hallowing the Peace and Security Council as its central organ

supported by various pillars including the African Standby Force.

Since then, the AU Commission in Addis Ababa has been working towards the

implementation of APSA through the establishment and consolidation of its

structures among which the African Standby Force. ASF emerges as one of the

critical pillar of APSA given the fact that it represents an opportunity for the union

to restore peace and security using forceful means when mediation and other

initiatives are not fruitful.

It is significant to mention that Libya’s, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi proposed to

fund, equip and house the force in purpose-built barracks in Sirte.7 Other AU

leaders were more often lukewarm or skeptic about that “one-million-strong army”

based in the guide’s hometown.8 Finally that offer didn’t prosper and was

abandoned after Gaddafi’s death.

On the spot, three Roadmaps based on capacity building and field training exercises

have successively guided the operationalisation of the force in order to cover the six

scenarios of deployment. Each roadmap has suffered deadlocks and subsequent lags

during its execution leading to numerous postponements. In a recent press

statement, the PSC acknowledges that “the main obstacles to the operationalisation

7 Garth Cilliers, Africa’s intervention force: Is the dream of Africa's own military force finally coming true? , 18 June 2013, at http://www.leadershiponline.co.za/articles/africas-intervention-force, accessed 28 July 2013. 8 Ibid, 7.

5

of the ASF are inadequate logistical capacities and funding” and announces ASF

full readiness for 2015.9

However, as ASF operationalisation “stand by”, crisis pace across Africa did not

lessen. During latest crisis successively in Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and now Mali, Africa

had experienced or called for foreign intervention. This resounded like a blatant

failure for the union and its interventional peace and security architecture to foster

the ideal of African owned solutions. The case of Mali has invigorated the need for

AU to appraise its duty to cope timely and effectively with security issues on the

continent. Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, AU commissioner for Peace and

security made it clear that "all of us welcomed as necessary the intervention of

France in Mali, which made it possible for us to avert a looming catastrophe", "but

we all felt that such military action should have come from Africa itself." 10

Subsequently, the January 2013 summit tasked the commission to submit a report

ahead of the may summit on progress made and challenges encountered for the

early operationalisation of the African Standby Force(ASF) Rapid Deployment

Capability (RDC), within the framework of the APSA. The chairwoman of the

AU commission endeavoured to tackle this looming challenge and proposed in her

report to the Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Security and Safety

(STCDSS) on 30 April 2013, the establishment of an African Capacity for

Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC).

Interestingly, the final declaration adopted by the STCDSS minimally took note of

the report of the chairperson without acknowledging the need for an ACIRC.11 The

declaration rather requested the commission to “conduct a comprehensive and

physical assessment of the ASF, including its RDC” in collaboration with

9 Press Statement of the PSC at its 387

th meeting on the operationalisation of ASF and establishment of ACIRC, 29 July 2013, at

http://www.peaceau.org/, accessed 02 august 2013. 10 Elissa Jobson, Regional blocs frown on new AU force, 03 May 2013, at http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2013/05/03/regional-

blocs-frown-on-new-au-force, accessed 26 July 2013.

11 Declaration of the 6th Ordinary Meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security held in Addis Ababa, 30 April 2013, at http://www.peaceau.org/, accessed 02 august 2013. .

6

member states and RECs/RMs. 12 This was probably a call to the AU commission

to stick to the January 2013 summit decision which “Stresses the need for the early

operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF) Rapid Deployment

Capability (RDC), within the framework of the African Peace and Security

Architecture (APSA)”.13

However, Dr Dlamini-zuma did not give up. Timely, the report of the Peace and

Security Council (PSC) on its activities and the state of peace and security in Africa

submitted to the Head of States during the twenty-first summit on 27 May 2013

stresses the need for a more sustained commitment to establish ACIRC, the precise

panacea for the union to act in due time and own its peace efforts on the continent.

Decisively, President Zuma championed the idea and it was validated and openly

announced by AU current chairman, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn of

Ethiopia.14

The final decision of the summit, which also marked the fiftieth anniversary of the

OAU/AU explicitly provides “in principle to immediately establish, as a transitional

arrangement and pending the full operationalisation of the ASF and its RDC, an

African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises, to provide the AU with a

flexible and robust force, made up of military/police capabilities, force enablers and

multipliers, equipment and resources to be voluntarily provided by Member States

on the basis of their willingness and capabilities, to be deployed very rapidly to

effectively respond to emergency situations, within the framework of the African

Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); ”.15

This can be analyzed as a triumph for the AU chairwoman who succeeded in getting

the ACIRC approved within six months and most significantly, during the fiftieth

12 Ibid, 11. 13

) Solemn Declaration of the Assembly of the Union on the Situation in Mali, 28 Jan 2013. 14 Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Military Force for Africa: the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), 29 May

2013, at http://www.mfa.gov.et/news/more.php?newsid=2062a ,accessed 02 August 2013.

15 Decisions, Declarations and Resolution of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, 26 - 27 May 2013, at

http://iccnow.org/documents/AU_decisions_21st_summit_May_2013.pdf, accessed 02 august 2013.

7

anniversary of the OAU/AU, designed as an historic event to advance the spirit of

Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance. Yet, one can question the originality of

ACIRC funding mechanisms and organizational configuration vis-à-vis the ASF

RDC while ASF operationalisation standstill.

III. Funding and configurations of ACIRC vis-à-vis ASF

ACIRC promises to be “an efficient, robust and credible force, which can be deployed

very rapidly, able to conduct operations of limited duration and objectives or

contribute to creating enabling conditions for the deployment of larger AU and/or

UN peace operations”.16

This section intends to depicts in details and take to mean its structural

configuration vis-à-vis ASF and specially ASF RDC. It considers one after another

the organizational, force generation, chain of command and control and the

roadmaps of the ACIRC and the ASF.

It draws heavily on the report of the chairperson on the operationalisation of the

Rapid Deployment Capability of the ASF and the establishment of the ACIRC as

well as official documentation of doctrine and principle of the African Standby

Force.

III.1. Funding sources and mechanisms

In a global arena characterized by multidimensional and uneven conflicts

proliferation, peacekeeping operations funding have proven to be an expensive

endeavor. For example, AMISOM considered as a “cheap” peacekeeping operation

16 See Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the African Standby Force and the establishment of an “African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises”, 30 April 2013, at http://www.peaceau.org/, accessed 02 august 2013.

8

cost rose from USD 303 million to about USD 550 million in 2012 through the

including of Kenyan troops.17

The matrix below highlights the similarities/dissimilarities in the funding source

and mechanisms of both the ACIRC and the ASF and its RDC.

Funding features ACIRC ASF and its RDC

Official funding

sources

Member States on a voluntary

basis so it could “act

independently”.

AU Peace Fund18 (part of

AU budget plus voluntary

contribution from member

states or other sources

within Africa)

Factual Funding

sources

[Not yet started] So far, just

South Africa, Uganda and

Ethiopia have pledged to support

ACIRC

More than 95% from EU

(through APF19) and USA

Alternative funding

sources or

mechanisms

[Not specified officially] UNSC (Chapter VIII of

the UN Charter and the

Resolution 2033 of the

UNSC)

Degree of

dependence on

donor/partners

[seems less dependent but

cannot conclude at this point ]

Heavily dependent on

partners/donors in

practice

Table 1 - Funding mechanims of ACIRC and ASF RDC (Kodjo T, 2013)20

17 Gabriel Gatehouse report for BBC, Can Somalia's cheap peacekeeping defeat al-Shabab?,11 June 2012 at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18392212, accessed 25 July 2013. 18

Policy Framework to the establishment of the ASF and the MSC, p.12. 19

See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/index_en.htm, visited 28 July 2013. 20

The matrix critically reflects on the Policy Framework to the Establishment of the ASF and the MSC (May 2003) and the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the African Standby Force and t he establishment of an “African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises” (January 2013), at http://www.peaceau.org/, accessed 01 august 2013.

9

At this point one can note that official funding of ACIRC is directly entrusted to

contributing member states while ASF and its RDC are more reliant on AU and

RECs funding apparatus. Existing restrictions in AU and RECs budget and funding

mechanisms may justify that ASF is heavily dependent on external grant for its

implementation.

III.2. Organizational and Force generation configurations

Peacekeeping operations structure has evolved greatly and concomitantly with

technology pace, local/global entanglement of crisis and recent doctrines and

approaches developed by regional organizations or think-thank. Nowadays, they

tend to be multidimensional thanks to UN lessons learnt captured in the United

Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guideline edited in 2008.

This part scrutinizes ACIRC intended structure alongside ASF configuration with

an emphasis on the mission scenarios, the multidimensional components and force

generation model in order to grasp correlations.

III.2.1. Mission Scenarios

Typical scenarios facilitate projections to the reality on the ground and can push for

decision makers to select adequate techniques and tools to manage timely and

effectively crisis. The matrix below was constructed based on the six scenarios of

ASF stated in the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby

Force and the Military Staff Committee. It tries to capture correspondence with

ACIRC.

Scenarios ACIRC ASF and its

RDC

Scenario 1: AU/Regional Military advice to a Political

mission. (Deployment within 30 days of an AU mandate

provided by the PSC)

10

Scenario 2: AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with

UN mission. (Deployment within 30 days of an AU mandate

provided by the PSC)

Scenario 3: Stand alone AU/Regional observer mission.

(Deployment within 30 days of an AU mandate provided by

the PSC)

Scenario 4: AU/Regional peacekeeping force (PKF) for

Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions.

(Deployment within 30 days of an AU mandate provided by

the PSC)

Scenario 5: AU peacekeeping force for complex peacekeeping

mission – low-level spoilers - a feature of many current

conflicts. (Deployment within 30 days of an AU mandate

provided by the PSC)

Scenario 6: AU intervention – e.g. genocide situations where

international community does not act promptly (Deploy a

robust military force within 14 days.)

Table 2 - Deployment scenarios of ACIRC vis-a-vis ASF (Kodjo T, 2013)21

ACIRC operations fits scenario 6 of the ASF which correspond to the deployment of the ASF

Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC). It is equally observable that ACIRC rationale to

“establish an efficient, robust and credible force, which can be deployed very rapidly, able to

conduct operations of limited duration and objectives or contribute to creating enabling

conditions for the deployment of larger AU and/or UN peace operations”22 sounds

equivalent to the ASF RDC aims to “take a preliminary preventive action, while preparing

for a more comprehensive action that could include the participation of the United

Nations. The emphasis here is on rapid action and deployment”. Furthermore, ACIRC and

ASF RDC are planned to be operational respectively within 15 and 14 day of the AU

Mandate which is somewhat akin.

21 This matrix draws heavily on the on the Policy Framework to the Establishment of the ASF and the MSC (May 2003) and the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the African Standby Force and the establishment of an “African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises” (January 2013) , at http://www.peaceau.org/, accessed 01 august 2013. 22

Report of the Chairperson on operationalisation of ASF RDC and establishment of ACIRC, 30 April 2013, p.7, at http://www.peaceau.org/, accessed 02 august 2013.

ASF RDC

< 14 DAYS

< 15 DAYS

11

III.2.2. Multidimensional components and spatial configurations

Multidimensional peacekeeping missions are not limited to military capabilities and can

engage in non-military tasks to be effectual and bring back long-term peace depending on

their mandate. ASF and ACIRC peacekeeping components are represented below to put

in perspective their resemblances/differences.

23

Ibid, 21.

Table 3 - Mission components of ASF and ACIRC (Kodjo T, 2013)23

Mission components(organizational and spatial) ACIRC ASF and

its RDC

MU

LT

IDIM

EN

SIO

NA

L

Military Component (Special Forces, Engineers, Military health

services, Logistics (Plans and support)

Police Component (Reform and restructuring of local police

Executive functions typically include powers of arrest, search and

seizure)

Civilian Component (Political Affairs, Legal Advice, Public

Information, Human Rights, Gender, Child Protection, SSR/DDR)

SP

AT

IAL

Air Component (Offensive Air Power, Reconnaissance and

Surveillance, Strategic Airlift and Tactical Airlift, Helicopters)

Land Component (Armour, Artillery, Infantry)

Maritime Component (Naval Diplomacy, Disaster Relief,

Evacuation Operations, Embargo, Sanctions and Quarantine

Enforcement)

12

ACIRC provides mainly for military capabilities while ASF operations can turn

multidimensional in regards to UN peacekeeping doctrine. Both may use all the

spatial (air, land and maritime) components to engage on the field.

It is pertinent to recall AU PSC press statement on 29 July 2013 which formally

“acknowledged that the main obstacles to the operationalisation of the ASF are

inadequate logistical capacities and funding”. Helmoed-Romer Heitman, a South

African defense analyst, asks: “How do you deploy quickly if you don’t have heavy

airlift?” This exposes Africa’s urgent necessity to acquire heavy military aircraft

whose lack has somehow hindered its political will to materialize into timely actions

on the ground.

III.2.3. Dynamics between the Force Generation and the Chain of Command and

Control

The correlation between a peacekeeping force generation and the chain of command

and control is vital to find out key actors and establish their mutual responsibility.

It also helps to understand how actors’ may influence the attitude and outcome of

the force in the field.

The matrix below captures the relationship between force generation and its chain

of command and control in the case of ACIRC and ASF missions.

Dynamics ACIRC ASF and its RDC

PK Force

Generation

* Individual AU Member States

[Ad-Hoc]

*Regional ASF (through

contribution from member states)

13

PK Force

Utilization *AU Commission *AU Commission

PK Chain of

Command

and Control

*Political and strategic

management

AUC Chairperson

(delegation of power to AUC

Commissioner for Peace and

Security)

Special Representative of

AUC Chairperson (SRCC)

*Administrative

management

Member countries

contributing troops

*Overall coordination

and management

synchronization of AUC

Chairperson with

PLANELMs (AU and

Regions) through Africa-

wide interoperable C3IS

Special Representative of

AUC Chairperson (SRCC)

Coordination

Mechanism [Not specified]

AUC PLANELM (within PSOD)

Regional ASFs PLANELM

Table 4 - Dynamics between the Force Generation and the Chain of Command and Control of ACIRC and RDC (Kodjo T, 2013)24

The dynamics between peacekeeping force generation and its chain of command and

control differs greatly between ACIRC and the ASF. It can be said that ASF is

based on a “Region-AUC” dynamic and is managed between the AUC and the

PLANELMs in PSOD and the Regions/RECs connected in real-time by the C3IS.

ACIRC on the other side is structured around a “Contributing Member States-AUC”

24 This matrix critically reflects on the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment

Capability of the African Standby Force and the establishment of an “African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises” (January 2013) and the

article by Jakkie Cilliers,The African Standby Force An Update on Progress (2011) , at http://www.peaceau.org/ , accessed 01 august 2013.

14

dynamic and is managed by the AUC at a political and strategical level and by the

contributing states at an administrative level.

This opens the door to several questions in regards to power configuration and

implications in regards to ACIRC. Can a member state contributes to and finances

a mission and is relegated to a strategically piddling administrative management?

If no, can it assent and endorse such project? Furthermore, if a contributing

state/group of states is given the political and strategic management of ACIRC

operations will it/they starve its/their own interests in the region?

In addition, ACIRC, until now, did not specify the mechanism it will apply to

coordinate with states for a coherent organization and functioning of its missions. If

this mechanism is not specified and put in place, some may fear subsequent

frictions between the instructions of the AUC Chairperson and those of the

contributing nations. This may lead to inaction into the field of operations.

It is worth recalling that, to date, only South Africa, Ethiopia and Uganda have

pledged support to ACIRC. This shows that AU member states may be reluctant to

approve the ACIRC model.

III.3. Implementation Roadmaps

While ACIRC has been adopted very recently, ASF is struggling with its third

roadmap. Originally designed to be operational in 2008, ASF full implementation

was pushed back to 2010, then 2013, and most recently given a timeline of 2015.

ACIRC adoption provides in principle for its immediate implementation as a

transitional arrangement before ASF’s readiness. Several times, it has been

15

described as a stop-gap measure pending the full operationalisation of the ASF.25

This assertion is contradicted by a fresh information note on the implementation

status of ACIRC released by the PSC on 29 July 2013 which stipulates that “The

Commission intends to complete both the work on ACIRC and the ASF assessment

by October 2013, in order to submit a comprehensive report to the STCDSS.

As requested by the 21st ordinary session of the Assembly, the Commission will

submit a report on the implementation of this decision at its next ordinary session,

in January 2014”. It is quite possible that the usual bureaucracy of the union hold

up its attainment until a new crisis triggers on the continent. Also, this may send a

wrong message to the RECs and divert them from finalizing their regional brigades

by 2015.

IV. Attitude of ASF stakeholders towards ACIRC

ACIRC has been presented for the first time in the report of the Chairperson of the

AUC during her meeting with the STCDSS on 30 April 2013. The STCDSS is

composed of experts from Minister of Defense, Security and Safety Services from

member states.

In its final declaration, the STCDSS “took note” of the report of the chairperson on

the operationalisation of the ASF-RDC and the establishment of the ACIRC and

25 Kim Helfrich, AU working towards African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), 01 August 2013 at

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=31411:au-working-towards-african-capacity-for-immediate-

response-to-crises-acirc&catid=56:diplomacy-a-peace&Itemid=111, accessed 06 August 2013.

Boris Bachorz, News Analysis: Doubt over AU’s stop-gap intervention force, 30 May 2013 at

http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2013/05/30/news-analysis-doubt-over-aus-stop-gap-intervention-force, accessed 10 August 2013.

Reuters, African leaders create emergency military force, 28 May 2013 at http://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/05/28/african-leaders-create-

emergency-military-force/, accessed 06 August 2013.

16

entrusted the document to the analysis of member states and regional bodies.

Diplomatically, this connotes that the defense ministers of the union were

unconvinced by the idea of a new-fangled ACIRC knowing that ASF-RDC was still

on the board.

With the endorsement and political support of South Africa, considered as the

current driver of the AU “Big Five”26, the AU Commission managed to get the

ACIRC adopted during the twenty-first summit and golden jubilee of the union.

This sends the subliminal message that ACIRC is a significant and consistent Pan-

African initiative which is intended to work towards the “African renaissance”.

However, a number of ASF stakeholders’ reactions towards this endeavor have

fueled polemics. For instance, Elissa Jobson points out that “, the proposal for the

new force has been heavily criticized by the regional economic communities of the

AU, which feel that their pivotal role in the defense of the continent is being

usurped by the union’s peace and security department.” 27 She adds that “The

heads of state [in January] requested the commission draft proposals for the

speeding up of the "operationalisation" of these standby forces. But instead, the

commission came up with the ACIRC”.28

Meanwhile, Ghana's Deputy Defense Minister Ebenezer Terlabi considers ACIRC

as a “duplication” of the ASF and requests it to be “referred to the Regional

Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) for detailed study and

analysis”. 29

Some astute analysts perceive ACIRC as an opportunity for member states to push

forward their personal hegemonic agenda on the union and grab possible economic

26 Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa are generally perceived as the big five in terms of GDP and contributions to the budget of the African Union. To be in the big five is a sign of sufficient leadership and power to weight on the union decisions and someti mes to advance personal agendas. 27 Elissa Jobson is a writer on African affairs in Theguardian and Deputy Editor of Global: The International Briefing. See her article: Regional blocs frown on new AU force, 03 May 2013. 28 Ibid, 13. 29 See the article of the Pan African News Agency(PANAPRESS): Ghana's Deputy Defence Minister tasks ECOWAS on security challenges, 27 June 2013.

17

advantages. This is the case of Tunji Ajibade of Nigeria. He says, “One thing the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs should do now that Nigeria has yet to be mentioned

among nations that have committed themselves to the AICRC[ACIRC], is not

to commit the nation yet.” 30 For him, Nigeria must commit to ACIRC on a “case

by case basis” depending on economic return it must get when involved in such

operations. He adds, “One way for Nigeria to handle this continent … is to

strategically link31 … conflict spots to the economic, trade, or military advantages it

can benefit where such is feasible”. Farther, he emphasizes that “Africa can’t ignore

Nigeria when it is pressed. Let nations get pressed and beg”. 32

Others project that ACIRC could degenerate in a “new elite club”. In this sense,

Andre Roux points that “The bottom line is that Africa will have a new elite – a club

of those states that can ‘walk the talk’”. 33 In regards to the AU official records, this

argumentation is questionable. The report of the chairperson provides clearly that

“The political direction and strategic management, as well as the activation of

AICRC fall within the ambit of the Chairperson of the Commission of the African

Union, … Member countries contributing troops to the AICRC will be responsible

for the administrative control of their Force in the theatre of operations”.34 So it is

difficult for member states to form their “elite club” since they are officially

restricted to the administrative management of their respective troops. Thought, a

new “elite club” may emerge if the view of Solomon Ayele Dersso is applied by the

union. He argues that “One thing that’s different about the new force … is that it

will be based on the principle of military capacity”. 35 If ACIRC is finally shaped on

the most capable military countries, it could be painted as the club of Africa’s

gendarmes.

30 Tunji Ajibade is a Communications Consultant and Literary Administrator at Exodus Consulting in Nigeria. See his article in The Punch Newspaper: Reloading AU, strategising for Nigeria (14 June 2013). 31 Italic emphasis added by the author. 32 Ibid, 16. 33 Andre Roux is a Senior Researcher in ISS, a leading think-thank in South Africa. See his article: New `super` combat brigade: creation of an

African elite? 14 June 2013. 34

Report of the chairperson on the operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the ASF and the establishment of the ACIRC , 30

April 2013, p.8-9.

35 Solomon Ayele Dersso is a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa office. See its interview and subsequent

article by Agence France-Presse(AFP): Africa plans emergency force, but can it deliver? , 29 may 2013.

18

An insightful session of the South African parliament took place on 20 June 2013.

Honorable Joseph Meshoe raised two critical issues concerning ACIRC to President

Jacob Zuma who backed the idea. He asked whether the establishment of the

planned military rapid reaction force will advance the commencement date of

operations of the planned African Standby Force and if the Western countries will

be requested to assist with training. 36 In his answers, President Zuma recognizes

the massive lack of military capacity in Africa to address quickly peacekeeping

issues and emphasizes that AU is largely financed by donors who put conditions to

use their funds according to their interests. 37

He rightly points that Africa remains “helpless”. For President Zuma, Africa needs

volunteers’ countries that will take the burden on their head and will act as joint

force whenever there is a crisis on the continent. He explains that whenever there is

a crisis such countries must be able “to move swiftly and finance their actions

because if we don’t so, it will be financed by tax payers from across the seas and

they will control us forever”.38 He then asks “Do we want to continue to be

controlled by other people or do we want to be independent and stand on our

own?”39 President Zuma argumentation seems logical but raise issues about the

capability of such willing countries to run this kind of mission effectively. It is worth

recalling Helmoed-Romer Heitman informing IRIN that “South Africa ordered eight

Airbus military A400m transport aircraft in 2005 at a cost of about US$1 billion,

but later cancelled the order citing financial constraints and associated cost

increases”.40 This demonstrates that even if there is political will, the lack of

effective military capacity is a persisting reality on the continent that may hamper

36 Honorable Reverend Dr. Kenneth Rasalabe Joseph Meshoe is the President of the African Christian Democratic Party in South Africa. Watch

his questions to President Jacob Zuma answers the Youtube channel of the South African parliament, session of 20 June 2013 at

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TCCvw-zxC3M or http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p9hB_BoFc8k, accessed 11 august 2013.

37 President Jacob Zuma answers can be watched on the Youtube channel of the South African parliament, session of 20 June 2013 at

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TCCvw-zxC3M or http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p9hB_BoFc8k, accessed 11 august 2013. 38

Ibid, 23. 39 Ibid, 23. 40

See the interview of Helmoed-Romer Heitman and subsequent article by IRIN: Analysis: AU prepares its shock troops (03 June 2013).

19

ACIRC. It must be addressed first if Africa wants to be to be independent and stand

on its own when it comes to peacekeeping.

V. Conclusion

To sum up, ACIRC originates from a political attempt of the AUC to embark

member states on African solutions at the eve of the golden jubilee of the union. The

initial intention was to propose a new instrument to address timely the pressing

realities on the ground. This paper demonstrates that its raison d’être and

deployment preconditions are similar to the ASF RDC within APSA, albeit they

differ greatly in their anatomy, funding mechanisms and particularly their

operating model. ACIRC model put an emphasis on the willingness of individual

member states to intervene early in case of crisis under the umbrella of the AUC

Chairperson. Despite the political will and enthusiasm of AUC to set up ACIRC, it

is prudent to expose that unsolved issues around the implementation of ASF RDC

may thwart its establishment and performances. It is particularly the case of

logistical capabilities of the member states; specifically heavy airlift equipments to

rapidly deploy. Moreover, ACIRC configuration neglects the RECs which are a

fundamental pillar of the APSA. Finally, in the rush to put an African solution on

the table, the AUC might have generated new concerns. However, it is insightful to

argue like Solomon Dersso that ACIRC “may take a different course altogether,

depending on its success”.41 In this sense, the achievements of the new-fangled UN

intervention brigade including African troops in Eastern Congo may foretell

realistic expectations from ACIRC.

41 Interview of Solomon Ayele Dersso and subsequent article by IRIN: Analysis: AU prepares its shock troops, 31 May 2013 at http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=98139, accessed 11 august 2013.

20

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