Post on 31-Mar-2023
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
Kevin GenerousUniversity of Connecticut, Ph.D. Candidate
Presentation to the New England Political Science Association2014 Conference, April 26, 2014
Abstract: The US-Soviet strategic arms talks that ushered in the Cold War endgame in the 1980s and 1990switnessed the extraordinary intervention by Congress in the Executive’s traditional policymaking areas insecurity strategy and foreign policy. In the 20th Century Congress rarely succeeded in efforts to re-shapenational security policy and grand strategy. A research puzzle focuses on whether Congress deliberatelymodified nuclear weapons acquisition programs that were simultaneously subject to bilateral negotiationsin order to exert policy influence on the arms negotiation process and to pursue their preferred securitypolicy ends at the expense of the Executive. This paper begins to analyze this puzzle through a contentanalysis to determine deviation from Executive weapons acquisition requests by congressional defensecommittees from FY 1975-FY 1990, and an assessment of the amendment process in each chamber todetermine whether the influence of Hawks, Doves or Owls prevailed in Congressional weapons acquisitionand arms control policy preferences.
1. Introduction: Congress, Strategic Weapons Acquisition and Arms ControlNegotiations
This paper is part of an ongoing doctoral dissertation that
explores congressional policy influence in U.S. foreign policy,
specifically strategic arms control negotiations conduction by the
Foreign Policy Executive (FPE) by means of its constitutional
authority of the power of the purse and oversight over military
weapons acquisition.
This larger research task uses a case study approach
investigating congressional use of strategic nuclear weapons
acquisition in the late Cold War period (roughly 1975-1990) to
influence the conduct of US-Soviet arms negotiations. It explores
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
the causal linkage between two developments: the first, the
changing systemic distribution of global power that precipitated
the end of the Cold War, uses Neoclassical Realist (NCR) IR theory; the
second, the contribution of legislative political elites to
facilitating the end of the Cold War strategic nuclear
competition, employs the New Institutionalism’s American Political
Development (APD) theory.1
A central puzzle under investigation focuses on Congress’
contribution to American foreign policy behavior: whether Congress
directed strategic weapons acquisition programs that were
simultaneously subject to bilateral negotiations in such a manner
as to exert policy influence on the arms negotiation process and
general foreign policy outcomes. Specifically, the research puzzle
asks: did Congress manipulate the weapons acquisition process in order to drive U.S.
diplomatic strategy in key negotiation forums? The dissertation also asks, Can
small, elite groups of legislative players, acting on their collective assessments of
1 Two recent works constitute an excellent overview of the Neoclassical Realist andAmerican Political Development theories, respectively. A basic theoretical treatise forNCR, see Taliaferro, Lobell & Ripsman (eds.), Neoclassical Realism, The State and Foreign Policy(2009); The concept of the president as the “Foreign Policy Executive” (FPE) is centralin recent Neoclassical Realist literature. For APD theory, see Orren and Skowronek, TheSearch for American Political Development (2004); For a practical application of elements of bothNCR and APD theory to American foreign policy, see Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S.Foreign Policy (1994) and his other publication on this subject.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
international threats and opportunities, bargain with the chief executive over weapons
procurement as a means to influence the state’s arms negotiation positions and pursue
their preferred security policy ends? The objective is to better understand
why, how, and under what conditions did Congress attempt to influence
American foreign policy through strategic arms acquisition
decisions. Five major strategic weapons acquisition cases subject
to simultaneous, bilateral arms talks covering the 1970s-1990s are
investigated in the ongoing doctoral research.
NEPSA Conference Paper, Purpose. This conference paper represents a
small part of the ongoing investigation into this larger research
puzzle. It focuses on a narrower search: to define and discern
congressional elite attitudes towards strategic weapons
modernization programs and related arms negotiations. It uses a
conceptual content analysis of annual legislative bills and
reports by the Defense Authorization and Appropriations Committees
of the Congress, and the degree to which these committees’
legislative recommendations were accepted or amended by the larger
chambers. Clarifying congressional elite views as to their
perceptions of global threats and opportunities to the state by
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
examining their legislative output can provide further theoretical
grist for exploring the larger questions of both why and how
Congress attempts to influence American foreign policy.
This paper, like the larger dissertation project, uses a
heuristic that identifies three categories of congressional
defense elites—Hawks, Doves and Owls—each of which incorporates a
distinct world-view of superpower power relations, the role and
value of strategic nuclear weapons, and strategies to acquire and
control these weapons. 2 The struggle for control over U.S.
strategic weapons acquisition policy and, as a related by-product—
influence over U.S. arms control stances in bilateral negotiations
—can be told through employing these heuristics.3
The conceptual analysis summarized below characterizes two important
pieces of the research puzzle: (1) Defense Committee perspectives
2 Specification of the elite factions is based on a typology by Graham Allison, AlbertCarnesale and Joseph Nye of hawks, doves and owls. The hawk-dove-owl typology serves as aheuristic device to classify congressional arms control policy preferences by weaponsprogram. This typology was created and first identified in Graham T. Allison, AlbertCarnesale and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds. Hawk, Doves and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War (NewYork: WW Norton, 1985). In this volume, the authors develop an agenda constructed by theAvoiding Nuclear War Project at Harvard’s JFK School of Government.3 The original typology was employed as a means of differentiating overall policyapproaches to minimizing the prospects for nuclear war. While certain weaponsacquisition programs and approaches might become apparent from their design, this wasnot the focus of the book by Allison, et.al., which makes only passing references to thefive acquisition case studies my doctoral dissertation employs. This paper will focussole on a single case, ICBM modernization.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
on what types of strategic nuclear deterrence capabilities were
needed to address Soviet strategic nuclear threats and that
encouraged stabilizing bilateral strategic arms agreements, and
(2) to what extent the Defense Committees’ preferences reflected
the majority of Congress.
Central Questions Addressed. The main questions this content
analysis addresses deals with congressional defense committees’
approaches to weapons acquisitions that were simultaneously
subject to U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations. This paper addresses
three questions:
Did the Defense Authorizing and Appropriating Committeesexhibit the characteristics of the Hawk, the Dove, or the Owlin the late Cold War period?
On the floor of their respective chambers, did efforts bysome members to amend the defense bills resemblecharacteristics of the Hawk, the Dove, or the Owl?
By what means—innovative legislative procedures—did anychanges made by either the Defense Committees or the Chambersattempt to change the negotiating tactics of the FPE?
Purpose and Conduct of this Content Analysis. Congressional Defense
committees framed their preferences for strategic force
modernization programs in their bills and reports, while the
larger chambers provided a stamp of institutional approval on
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
their legislative handiwork, at times challenging the FPE’s
preferences. The purpose of this content analysis is to identify
the intentions, focus or communication trends of the heuristic groups
Hawks, Doves and Owls. The unit of analysis chosen is “U.S.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Nuclear Weapons,
acquired for Military Deterrence and Arms Control Purposes.”
The type of content analysis conducted here is a conceptual
analysis, the purpose of which is to establish the existence and
frequency of concepts most often represented by words or phrases
in congressional defense report literature on ICBM programs
simultaneously subject to arms control limitations. The analysis
identifies both explicit and implicit occurrences within the
committee texts, as well as the frequency of keywords and
comparative analysis with the types and outcomes of Floor
Amendments offered to alter the Defense Committee bills. Analysis
can indicate a strong presence of positive or negative words with
respect to the proposed research question and the frequency of
keywords associated with Hawks, Doves or Owls indicate which
groups’ policy preferences were reflected in Congress’s weapons
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
acquisition decisions in the late Cold War period. Content
analysis helps characterizes attempts made by both weapons program
opponents and supporters to amend the committee-recommended
legislation and thus influence—directly or indirectly—American
diplomacy at the conclusion of the Cold War.
The results of the conceptual analysis subsequently will be
used to conduct a more in-depth relational analysis that will examine
relationships among concepts in a text to determine if different
meanings emerge as a result of the conceptual groupings.
Stages of Analysis for Conceptual Content Analysis: There are four stages
in the conduct of this conceptual analysis:
1. Theories: The research reflects the theories of Neo-Classical
Realism (a theory of International Relations) and American
Political Development (a theory of New Institutionalism in
American Politics). These general theories are applied to the
problem of understanding Congress’s use of weapons acquisition
to influence US arms control policy and strategy, and the
inter-branch negotiation over both arms and arms control.
These are found in the next section.
2. Categorization: The characterization of Hawks, Doves and Owls is
described on page 16.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
3. Concepts: The policy preferences of Hawks, Doves and Owl are
conceptualizaed in terms of, respectively, Damage Limitation, Cost
Reduction/Arms Race Stability, and Crisis Stability. These concepts are
defined on page 17.
4. Codes: Specific codes, or key words in context (KWIC) are
assigned to the Categories and Concepts. These represent the
search terms used to analyze the congressional data sets. These
key words are also used for later data coding necessary to
conduct the relational analysis. These are defined on page 19.
Conceptual content analysis results are found on pages 24-40.
THEORIES: The IR and APD Literature and Two-Level Game Framework.The main thrust of Neoclassical Realism asks: what is the intervening role
of the State in explaining foreign policy actions in IR? NCR adherents argue that
“the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven
first and foremost by its place in the international system and
specifically by its relative power capabilities.”4 The recent NCR
agenda posits why, how and under what conditions internal
characteristics of the state intervene between leaders’
assessments of threats and opportunities in the international
system and “the actual diplomatic, military and foreign economic
policies those leaders pursue.”5 This research agenda further4 Rose, “Review Article: Neoclassical Realism And Theories Of Foreign Policy”. WorldPolitics, (1998), 146. 5 Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman (eds.) (2009), 28.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
explores how these processes are defined and constitutes a wider
investigation of how top state officials make decisions in three
areas. First, how elites view, assess and react to likely threats
within the international system; second, the development of national
strategies to address these perceived threats; and finally, how they
mobilize societal resources necessary to implement and sustain those
strategies.6 Thus, the study of Congress and the end of the Cold
War appears a fruitful research application and test of NCR
theory.
NCR’s research agenda focuses on the state’s relative material
power, which in this paper suggests is measured by superpower
nuclear arsenals (as opposed to more general foreign policy assets
and interests) as the underlying basis for perceptions of both
threat assessments and strategic opportunities by congressional
and policy elites, perceptions perhaps motivating efforts to alter
a state’s foreign policy stances. Thus, why, how, and under what
conditions the relative material resources of great powers are
constituted and supported – in terms of strategic capabilities and
their impact on the systemic distribution of power as perceived by
6 Ibid., 3-4.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
congressional elites – are central to the research puzzle.
Neoclassical Realist theory therefore can help examine how
congressional perceptions of relative material power in the late
Cold War period shaped both American strategic force acquisitions
and arms control strategies. Applying a Neoclassical Realist
approach to analyze congressional influence on U.S. policy and
strategy requires a structured framework to assess not only the
intervening variable of domestic influences on the formulation of
negotiation positions, but establishing a policy correlation and
exploring causality between the congressional influence and the
overall arms control negotiation outcomes.7
Assessing the intervening domestic variable within a
Neoclassical Realist approach also involves focusing on the
domestic processes of American political structures. As part of
the effort to show how to “bring the state back in” within IR
theory, Gideon Rose points out that “to incorporate state
structure as an intervening variable, one has to know a decent
7 These could be defined as national resource allocations leading to a final treaty (orno agreement) and adjustments to grand strategy. Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro (eds.2009) address how foreign policy debates can be framed by domestic debates over threats,strategy adjustments and resource decisions, which in this study constitute Level IIbargaining between the FPE and Congress.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
amount about how different countries' political institutions work,
both in theory and in practice.” 8
How domestic institutions influence overall foreign policy and,
relevant to this study, how Congress may exert its policy
preferences on U.S. arms negotiations, also suggests a theoretical
application of American Political Development (APD), drawn from New
Institutionalism.9 The application of APD in this analysis posits
that the Congress can influence national policy outcomes by
forcing the Executive to accept its policy preferences by means of
innovative legislative procedure. APD investigates the processes
of political change via the historical development of institutions
through analyzing recurrent patterns of order and stability while
seeking sources of change. APD theory points to a dynamic, not
static, understanding of American politics, and demonstrates that
change can be explained by studying institutional flexibility and
adaptability over time, under conditions such as path
dependencies, junctures, punctuated changes, and multiple
8 Ibid., 166.9 New institutionalism focuses on developing a sociological view of how politicalinstitutions interact and the broad effects of institutions on individuals withinsociety. Two major approaches within New Institutionalism are American Political Development(APD) and Rational Choice. This analysis employs an APD theoretical paradigm.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
concurrent orders, and which employ methods such as process
tracing.10
APD theory in the context of this study argues that the ability
to mandate structures and procedures upon the FPE can provide
Congress a powerful means to build their preferences into the
policy-making process without passing policy-oriented legislation
in the traditional manner.11 In this way congressional bargaining
leverage can structure executive branch decision-making in ways
that promote a president’s compliance with explicit legislative
intentions. Indeed, content analysis of Defense Committee reports
herein reveal a series of innovative procedural means by which the
legislative branch creates mandates, reporting requirements,
legislative vetoes, and “fences” and “hooks” on appropriations
that reflect clear congressional policy preferences.
In terms of foreign policy formulation, APD theory provides a
valuable research means to focus on “how” Congress serves as an
intervening variable under NCR theory to influence American
foreign policy. Thus, APD theory can be employed to look at the10 Orren and Skowronek (2004). The process tracing method will be used in the broaderdoctoral research dissertation.11 Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy (1994), 282.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
institutional evolution of Congress in foreign policymaking in the
post-Vietnam, post-Watergate era, the historical period of the
strategic arms control cases at the end of the Cold War.
The phenomena of congressional influence on U.S. foreign policy
formulation and arms control negotiation processes through weapons
acquisition and might best be explored by using Robert Putnam’s
model of two-level negotiation games (see Figure 1 below).12 This
study uses Putnam’s model as an organizing concept for identifying
the nature of domestic influences that explain American foreign
policy behavior in the late Cold War period, incorporating both
NCR and APD theory.
Inter-Branch Relations: Foreign Policy Making by Two-Level Games. Applying
Putnam’s two-level game concept implies an ongoing Executive-
Legislative branch negotiation (or struggle) over foreign policy
control that dates back to the republic’s origins. However, since
the second half of 20th century, especially during the early (1945-
1960) and middle (1961-74) Cold War years, the FPE eclipsed12 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International
Organization (1988), 427-460. See also Evans, Jacobson and Putnam (1993) and Mo (1994),Trumbore & Boyer (2000) and Boyer (2000), who also apply this research to foreignpolicy problems.
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Congress’ role in policy formation. As the US-Soviet global
competition intensified in the 1950s and 1960s, Congress largely
served in a supporting – some say subservient – role of providing
the FPE with the means through appropriations of building and
maintaining national power sufficient to compete with the U.S.S.R.
It rarely challenged the Executive’s overall direction of national
security policy.13
Figure 1:
13 The eclipse of Congress’ constitutional role in war declaration is seen in the Koreanand Vietnam conflict and in the crisis management of superpower relations. In the post-World War II period, the modern presidency became the dominant player in Americanforeign and national security policy and strategy-making. For a critique of thisexecutive-dominant foreign policy paradigm, see Schlesinger’s The Imperial Presidency (1972);for a vigorous defense of it, see John Yoo, Crisis and Command (2009).
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
Institutionally, Congress was ill-equipped to address many day-
to-day policy aspects of the Cold War, particularly in an ongoing
management of Cold War crises and challenges of global diplomacy.
While this was foreseen by the Founders in the institutional
design of the political branches, the degree to which the
Executive branch dominated and the Legislative branch acquiesced,
American federative policy had by the 1970s, in the wake of the
Vietnam War and the Watergate scandals, become an institutional
embarrassment to many in Congress. Its main federative policy
tools, its war-declaration power, its treaty-making and
ambassadorial approval powers of advice and consent, were largely
bypassed by the modern Cold War national security apparatus. The
normal legislative process (“regular order”) was also cumbersome
for Cold War security management. Further, Congress’s remaining,
and most potent federative power – the appropriations power
(“power of the purse”) – had become something a president largely
took for granted in providing the weapons and means to fight the
Cold War. Congress did not challenge the FPE’s preferences for
nuclear strategy, doctrine or weapons choices, largely fulfilling
the president’s defense appropriations requests.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
The late Cold War period (1974-1991) presented an opportunity
for Congress to reclaim some of its lost policy influence in
federative affairs. Three reasons explain this opportunity:
First, Vietnam and Watergate politically weakened the
president’s hold over federative policy. This was a result of an
acute erosion of public support for the presidency. A second
reason was the strengthening of congressional means to challenge
the FPE through institutional reform that weakened the committee
seniority system and expanded the number of legislative players in
determining and shaping budget priorities. This resulted in a
resurgence of congressional challenges to executive policy
prerogatives as a new generation of aggressive, younger
congressional policy entrepreneurs emerged after 1974, equipped
with congressional budget process reforms that decentralized
institutional power on the defense policy and appropriations
committees, long dominated by more conservative, compliant and
pro-military chairmen.
A final reason for congressional defense policy resurgence
involved the need to overhaul and modernize American strategic
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
nuclear deterrent forces at a time when arms negotiations with the
Soviet Union became an important political imperative. As the
Soviets approached parity in strategic nuclear capabilities with
the United States in the mid-1970s, in part as a result of the
Soviets taking full advantage of provisions of the 1972 SALT I
agreement, the American defense establishment emphasized the acute
requirement to incorporate evolutionary changes in both strategic
weapons technology and employment doctrine that resulted in new
weapons requests coming before Congress at the same time the U.S.
and USSR were entering into prolonged negotiations to constrain
strategic nuclear arms.14
The result was congressional efforts to promote their policy
preferences in federative affairs by demanding more influence in
American security policy making. The instruments of that
influence would center on the defense policy-writing and
appropriations-making committees of Congress, using their most
latent constitutional power for leverage: the “power of the purse”14 The implication of Soviet achieving nuclear parity was the FPE concern over thecontinued validity of the American Cold War grand strategy of containment as a means tomaintain and extend the American post-WW II geopolitical position. A wide range of viewsexisted within presidential administrations as to how Soviet parity might affect theAmerican grand strategy of Containment. Of particular concern: Could the United Statescontinue to contain the Soviet Union under conditions of parity (i.e. without possessingstrategic superiority)?
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
and management oversight of the armed forces, especially weapons
development and acquisition.
Inter-Branch Relations on Weapons Acquisition and Arms Negotiations. Using the
latent power of the “functional veto”, Congress would attempt to
influence the shape of US negotiation stances through the
constitutional means of the “power of purse” and defense
oversight.15 Employing this leverage sets the stage for the two-
level game and examines two propositions.
In the first proposition, congressional efforts to influence
U.S. arms control stances is represented as an inter-branch struggle
between the executive and Congress over formulation of national
policy and its implementing strategy. Specifically, the inter-
branch struggle focuses on competing institutional views over the
prevailing external threat environment and strategic opportunities
to address American power potential via weapons modernization and
arms control.
15 John Yoo posits that the latent power of the purse provides Congress with a“functional veto” over most presidential activities, including in federative affairs, bythreatening to de-defund government operations. He also argues that Congress tooinfrequently employs this “veto” in its inter-branch federative struggles with theexecutive branch. See Yoo, Crisis and Command (2009), 76.
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For each executive decision on forces and arms control,
Congress potentially has a direct means to exert its policy
influence. Executive officials must make and coordinate three
determinations on weapons systems that affect arms negotiations:
first, which weapons to permit (or ban) in a treaty; second, which
weapons to fund and deploy given treaty opportunities; and third,
which future weapons to develop unconstrained by treaty
limitations.16
In each of these steps, an assertive and determined Congress
can press upon the Executive its institutional policy preferences
that shape (or re-shape) U.S. negotiation stances that can affect
U.S. foreign policy and nuclear strategy and doctrine. Congress
selectively picks policy fights with the Executive by seeking
points of greatest institutional leverage and by developing new
procedural tools to maximize that leverage.
In the second proposition, the inter-branch struggle is further
complicated by an intra-legislative battle between three diverse and
conflicting views over net assessments of the bi-polar threat
16 Paul N. Stockton, “The New Game on the Hill: The Politics of Arms Control and Strategic Force Modernization,” International Security, (Autumn, 1991), 151.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
environment and the condition of the material distribution of
systemic power, characterized through the Hawk/Dove/Owl heuristic.
This intra-legislative conflict guides the congressional portion
of the inter-branch domestic bargaining over the content of U.S.
arms negotiation stances. Each congressional faction attempts to
exert influence over the FPE on American arms control negotiation
stances and to shape foreign policy behavior by means of non-
traditional and innovative policy and procedural behavior that
represent significant inroads into traditional presidential
foreign policy prerogatives.
The executives spanning these administrations had two primary
objectives in US-Soviet bargaining over arms control and
deployment of new weapons systems. First, they planned to deploy
advanced military capabilities to modernize U.S. strategic
capabilities that, relative to Soviet systems, by the mid-1970s,
were becoming or had become increasingly obsolete and expensive to
maintain.17 Second, imminent deployment of these systems was
designed in part to encourage arms concessions that the U.S.17 The leveraging of new weapons systems as a means to negotiate constraints on thefuture capabilities of the adversary was typical of arms control theories of the 1960s,as developed by American think tanks and academics. See Brennan (1961), Schelling andHalperin (1969) and Hyland (1982).
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
leaders hoped would place constraints on existing (and future)
Soviet/Russian strategic capabilities. Using an analogy of the
poker game, U.S. negotiators sought assurance that their stack of
“bargaining chips” (U.S. weapons systems in the pipeline that
would provide advanced military capabilities) would be available
when planned to “bet” with their Soviet counterparts.18 The
presence (or absence) of these high-value chips, in their view,
could significantly influence the way the negotiation game would
unfold, and provide sufficient leverage for the FPE to secure
favorable terms.
Congressional interest in arms control policy typically is
explained by a struggle within Congress (paralleling struggles in
the executive bureaucracy) between arms controllers (“doves”) and
force modernization supporters (“hawks”), with the ideological
divide defined in terms of a desire for either more or less
18 Military advocates would typically promote deployment of these capabilities based ontheir contribution to an evolving military doctrine and mission requirements; few wouldever concede new weapons capabilities would not be required to execute deterrencerequirements, and, if deterrence failed, operational war-time missions. Once bilateral armstalks began, however, civilian decision-makers and arms negotiators in the executivebranch began to refer (at least in public and before Congress) to the bargaining leverageinherent in some new systems and capabilities. Whether this subtle change in programrationale was necessary to increase congressional likelihood of funding new systems, ora matter of actual bargaining leverage is an additional research question to beexplored.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
weapons. Arms control is thus seen by its advocates as just
another means to restrict weapons procurement rather than to shape
or address a distribution of power.
The congressional intervening variables must be operationalized
by the degree to which any of the perspectives of the Hawk/Dove/Owl
heuristic emerge in legislative products that shape nuclear
weapons acquisition programs. These programmatic actions are
designed to promote (1) “crisis stability, (2) damage limitation through
enhanced counterforce capabilities, (3) reduction in weapons cost or
quantity, (4) outright program cancellation, (5) full program authorization, or
(6) conditional programmatic activities (referred to as program “hooks”
because of funding was held up until specific conditions were
satisfied).19 Hawks, Doves and Owls are highly unlikely to support
in the aggregate all of these programmatic actions; for some
programmatic actions, there may exist temporary alliances (e.g.
19 Programmatic “hooks” could be tied to any type of conditions: arms control progress,recommendations of independent expert commissions, successful programmatic milestones(such as flight testing or independent technical reviews, rates of expenditure ofappropriated funds), or whatever restrictions the relevant committee imposed and wasable to incorporate into the final bill which became law. Critics, frequently those inthe executive branch suffering under the restrictions, chafed at programmatic ‘hooks’,which they felt were legislative efforts to either to micromanage the program, ordesigned to deliberately slow down the weapons program and, even perhaps to slowly killa program by raising program cost sufficient to induce a death spiral by peeling awaylegislative supporters concerned about rising program costs.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
Hawk-Owls, or Owl-Dove), while other actions will gather support
for only a single group (e.g. Hawks for full program
authorization, or Doves for outright cancellation). How do these
perspectives and programmatic activities emerge? Evidence can be
found through content analysis of the annual legislative language
in congressional authorization and appropriations bills and
through use of innovative legislative procedures, as well as from
interviews with former congressional members and staff.20
The overall tone and length of congressional debate over these
new weapons programs could theoretically influence Level I
bargaining prospects if the deployment prospects of modern,
technologically advanced systems were cast in doubt. While
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, legislators had reliably supported
new nuclear weapons, after the 1970s many legislators came to
support funding development of strategic programs only to serve as
“bargaining chips.” Thus, congressional support for final
deployment of these American systems could never be an absolute
20 Subject interviews with former members and key staff are also a part of the methodbeing used in dissertation research.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
certainty in the minds of Level I negotiators, whether on the
American or Soviet side of the table.
How would deployment uncertainly affect the credibility of the
U.S. bargaining position? If Soviet negotiators ever came to
believe that, in the absence of an arms deal, future U.S. weapons
capabilities might not be present, then what were their incentives
to make concessions to the United States in areas of comparative
strategic advantage?21 Thus, a FPE would have to carefully
consider Level II bargaining position with the Congress, if he
would want to maintain negotiation credibility in Level I. This
provides an assertive Congress considerable bargaining leverage
should the legislative institution attempt to influence American
foreign policy by means of their weapons procurement authority.
Setting aside the simple poker analysis, within a more complex
legislative process this task of creative a coherent legislative
arms control strategy would involve a difficult coordination of
several key defense committees, dozens of important legislators on
21 As the case studies on SALT and START indicate, this was a great concern among American negotiators regarding the US goal to address Soviet advantages in heavy, multi-warhead ICBMs, which caused American civilian and military leaders such heartburn.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
those committees, a party leadership often sharply at odds with
each other and the FPE’s own priorities, and persuading and
winning the votes of several hundreds of their legislative
colleagues who are also likely divided on the issue. Successful
coordination of this type in the Congress is rare and even rarer
still on issues of high politics and foreign policy.
By examining both inter-branch perceptions of the strategic
environment and how each intra-legislative faction seeks to use its
institutional role in the weapons procurement process as a means
to impose their preferences on the Executive branch, the study
reveals the degree to which Congress as an intervening variable
influences the material and strategic components of American grand
strategy and foreign policy. This should then allow an informed
assessment of how Congress may have uniquely shaped American
foreign policy behavior in the late Cold War and immediate post-
Cold War period.
CATEGORIES: Hawks, Doves and Owls.This typology serves as a heuristic device to classify factions of
congressional arms control policy preferences by weapons program
and strategic objectives.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
Hawks tend to promote aggressive strategic force modernization
in order to retain nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union to
acquire either quantitatively more or qualitatively better nuclear
“swords” than the Soviets.22 In addition, more and modern
technologically advanced weapons also served a purpose to “get
tough” on the Soviets at the bargaining table, through the tactic
of “bargaining from strength.”
In contrast, Doves favored aggressive arms control measures and
consistently oppose development of next generation nuclear weapons
on moral, budgetary or other grounds.23 Funding nuclear weapons is
seen as, at worst, a waste of scarce resources better used
elsewhere in society; at best, nuclear R&D programs are little
more than “bargaining chips” to be traded away in for favorable
disarmament agreements before the need to actually build and
deploy the weapons. As a group, congressional Doves would adopt22 For example President Ronald Reagan’s nuclear deterrence policy was based on thenotion of “peace through strength.” 23 Hawks and Doves are further defined as “Nuclear Hawks” or “Nuclear Doves” forpurposes of this study, although the “nuclear” designation will not be used in the text.This is because some interview subjects felt the use of the term “Dove” implied non-support for a strong national defense. In this study, “doves” may support militaryspending for legitimate national defense purposes, but are opposed to additionalincrements of nuclear weapons in general, or against specific nuclear weapons systemsfor moral, budgetary or other reasons, such as redundancy and/or disagreement withdoctrinal issues. The voting records of some congressional “doves” identified in thisstudy indicate consistent support for conventional military programs, but opposition to1970s-90s-era nuclear weapons programs.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
(sometimes enthusiastically, at other times more tenuously) the
populist “nuclear freeze” movement of the early 1980s and
consistently sought to turn nuclear “swords” into “plowshares.”24
Some policy elites in Congress eventually adopted a “third way”
distinct from Hawks and Doves, a third type referred to in this
study as Nuclear Owls.25 Owls are motivated by a mix of sometimes
conflicting intentions: first, the loss of U.S. nuclear
superiority by the late 1970s with the Soviet Union’s attainment
of rough nuclear parity brought with it uncertainties regarding
the effectiveness of the existing U.S. nuclear deterrent; second,
bilateral arms control negotiations began with great promise in
the 1960s but became stalemated after 1975; and third, a new
generation of U.S. strategic weapons and revolutionary24 The “nuclear freeze” movement was based on the concept of a mutually verifiablesuspension (“freeze”) of all US-Soviet nuclear weapons deployments at existing levels.Advocates argued that this measure would prevent further growth of newer, more dangerousweapons, allowing follow-on negotiations to focus on pursuit of more substantive armscontrol; even if these follow-on talks were unsuccessful, it was argued, a freeze wouldhalt additional nuclear proliferation and lead to the gradual erosion of older weapons’military and political utility. Critics argued that the “freeze” would prevent plannedmodernization in the 1980s of 1960s-era US weapons, and would lock in a Soviet strategicadvantages attaining after they completed a series of generational force modernizationprograms in the 1970s. These programs were seen to have helped the Soviets attain roughstrategic parity with the United States in overall strategic weapons capabilities by theend of the 1970s.25 While the “Owl” moniker was established in the Allison, Carnesale and Nye book Hawk,Doves and Owls (1985), the political origins—if not the moniker—of the Owls can be tracedback to the 1979 abortive SALT II treaty ratification debate and, even further, to thetheoretical roots of arms control writings of Thomas Schelling, Morton Halperin andother theorists in the 1960s.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
technologies appeared in the development pipeline with performance
characteristics some in Congress felt could threaten the stability
of the mutual deterrence relationship, changed as it might be as a
result of parity; and, fourth, there existed among some in
Congress, in the eyes of critics, a desire to “triangulate” among
Hawks and Doves and posture as ‘moderates’ supporting some nuclear
programs as a means of protecting their political flanks from
attacks by Hawks. These policy elites, academics and think tank
scholars therefore sought to stakeout a distinct approach to
maintaining nuclear deterrence, Carving out the middle position
between Hawks and Doves, Owls could support the arguments of
either group on a case-by-case basis; at other times, they might
stand on completely different grounds to support or oppose the
FPE’s nuclear weapons plans and even formulate their own distinct
policy position.
CONCEPTS: Damage Limitation, Arms Race and Crisis Stability
Grounded in knowledge of post-WW II nuclear doctrine, arms
control theory and recent weapons technological advances, the Owl
school argued for the return to basic arms control objectives.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
Overall arms control objectives are defined as (1) “crisis stability, or
reduction in the possibility of nuclear war, (2) damage limitation if
war breaks out, and (3) cost reduction in creating stability in arms
competition.”26 Of these three goals, Hawks and Doves generally
claim to support the latter objectives of damage limitation and
cost reduction, respectively. However, Owls tended to focus
principally on crisis stability, allowing Owls to carve out a
distinct space between Hawks and Doves in the policy formulation
debate, one that relies on either arms control, or highly
selective weapons acquisition choices, or a combination of both.
Joseph Nye writes that
Crisis stability remains central to arms control. Althoughnegotiated reductions are one way to seek crisis stability,they are not the only way. What is crucial for crisis stability is to avoidforce structures that would make first strike advantageous, and to improvetransparency, communication and predictability, allowing defense plannersto adjust doctrine and weapons procurement decisions to maximize security—whichincludes deterrence, crisis stability and damage limitation—within resource constraints.27
Introduction of a distinct Owl perspective, seeking a “middle
ground” defined by the pursuit of strategic stability (as opposed to
26 Emphasis added. See Nye, Jr., “Restarting Arms Control,” Foreign Policy, No. 47. (Summer,1982), pp. 98-113. For the original theoretical formulation see Thomas C. Schelling andMorton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (1961).27 Ibid., 107.
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superiority), and supporting procurement of carefully “tailored”
nuclear swords, also challenges traditional explanations for
congressional action on strategic arms control and/or strategic
weapons procurement. Arms control agreements would be one way to
mutually incorporate carefully tailored, stabilizing ‘swords’ in
U.S. and Soviet arsenals.
Each congressional faction attempts to exert influence over the
FPE on American arms control negotiation stances and to shape
foreign policy behavior by means of non-traditional and innovative
policy and procedural behavior that represent significant inroads
into traditional presidential foreign policy prerogatives. This
is a conflict characterized by competing factions of congressional
policy elites each with differing perspectives.
CODES: Key-Words-In-Context for Hawks, Doves and Owls
Using data sets described below, Congressional actions regarding
ICBM modernization programs were searched using specific keywords
tied to the categories and concepts characterized in the previous
sections.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
The frequency and context of these coded keywords in the
congressional data reveal the character of the committees’
preferences for weapons programs as well as arms control
preferences. However, care must be taken in assessing word
frequency. These coded keywords must be understood in their
proper context. For example, Doves will frequently use ‘Hawkish’
or ‘Owlish’ terms as a means to criticize or differentiate
positions (e.g. “counterforce” capabilities as a destabilizing
weapons characteristic), while Hawks and Owls will readily embrace
the term as necessary to enhance deterrence. The same applies to
Hawks and Doves. For example a search of the FY 1974 House
Authorization bill reveals seven instances of the Dovish term
“bargaining chip,” which denotes support for a weapons research
and development program for the sole purse of trading it away in
negotiations rather than preparing it for deployment and
enhancement of U.S. military capabilities. Six of these terms were
found in a “Dissenting View” of a Dove discussing the value of an
ICBM program strictly for purposes a negotiation bargaining chip,
while the seventh instance was found in the committee’s main
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
report in a critical context, indicating the committee’s clear
preference for deployment of the weapon’s military capability.
The totality of the KWIC assessment, however, provides a
reliable means to characterize congressional elites and the
defense committees in the analysis.
Table 1 (see below) shows the integration of Heuristic
Categories, Weapons Concepts and Coded Keywords employed in this
content analysis.
Table 1: Integration of Categories, Concepts and Code Words
Heuristic Category HAWKS DOVES OWLS
Characterization
Tough on Soviets,
Force modernization/ improvement
Limit damage if deterrence fails
Bargain from strength
More/Better “Swords”
Oppose U.S. new generation of nuclear arms
“Bargaining chips”only
Nuclear Freeze “Plowshares”
Seek “middle ground”
Crisis strategicstability
Avoid nuclear war & limit damage if deterrence fails
“Tailored Swords”
Strategic Weapons/ Arms Control Imperative
Limit Damage Cost Reduction,Arms RaceStability
Crisis Stability
KWIC Codes hard target kill counter-force (good)
prompt response deeply buried targets
Cost Reduction: arms control savings too expensive unaffordable not needed
command and control
first strike stability
stable weapon silo vulnerability
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
inferiority launch under attack
Soviet treaty non-compliance
Soviet superiority Strategic parity (bad)
Strategic imbalance
Single-shot kill probability (SSPK)
unnecessary overkill cost of mobility
Arms Race Stability: Arms race bargaining chip action-reaction counterforce (bad) destabilizing hair-trigger overkill mutual verifiable nuclear freeze
force survivability
survivable basing surprise attack strategic parity recallable bolt-out-of-blue Confidence building measures (CBM)
build-down launch on warning Nuclear risk reduction
Analytic Framework/Methodology.
This paper uses a content analysis approach to determine policy
preferences of the key defense committees on ICBM modernization in
the late Cold War period. According to Krippendorf, there are six
relevant questions to address when conducting content analysis:28
1. What data is being analyzed?2. How are they defined?3. What is the population from which they are drawn?4. What is the context relative to which the data are analyzed?5. What are the boundaries of the analysis?6. What is the target of the inferences?
These are addressed below.
Data Sets. Two data sets are used and analyzed: The first is the
Congressional Defense Committee Bills and Reports data drawn from the period
of FY 1974 through FY 1990. These data include both the committee
28 Krippendorf, Klaus, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology, (2004), 414.[www.contentanalysis.org ]
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
and joint conference legislative provisions and explanatory
language that are approved in committee, as well as “dissenting
and additional views” that are included at the end of the
committee reports. These dissents represent the minority views of
individual committee members dissenting from the majority report;
typically these members’ perspectives represent proposed actions
that the majority rejected and are candidates for categorization
as either Hawks, Doves or Owls.
The Bills/Reports data set includes approximately six reports per
fiscal year: A (1) House and (2) Senate authorization report from
both the HASC and SASC, followed by an (3) Authorization
Conference report, where differences between House and Senate
authorizing bills passed in the respective chambers are reconciled
into a common report that – once re-approved in each chamber – is
sent to the president for signature or veto. A signed bill becomes
public law. The remaining three reports represent the
Appropriations process, including the (4) House and (5) Senate
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee reports, followed by a (6)
Defense Appropriations Conference report, which is reconciled and
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
passed in the same manner as the Authorization bill.29 Records of
these committee bills and reports are obtained electronically from
THOMAS, the Library of Congress on-line electronic legislative
information service, which provides access to literally thousands
of committee bills and reports per year. With an average of six
(6) committee reports per year, the FY 1974-90 Committee Bill/Report
data sets includes over 100 committee and conference reports. Just
for ICBM programs alone, in the timeframe under examination, these
data extend to hundreds of pages.
A second data set, Floor Amendments, comes from floor amendments
to the defense committee bills when they are offered for
consideration in the full House and Senate chambers. Amendments
are debated and voted on by the respective chambers, prior to
being sent to a House-Senate conference committee (which is part
of the first data set). Amendment language and votes are drawn
from the published Congressional Record, also obtained electronically
29 In years when one or both of the chambers do not complete their defenseappropriations bills, there may be a temporary “Continuing Resolution (CR) in place ofthe Appropriations Conference, which rolls the unfinished bills into a shortenedversion, bundled with other unfinished government appropriations bills. The CR thenfunds the government in the new fiscal year until regular appropriations are passed andsigned. A CR is not as detailed as a typical Appropriations Conference. Temporary CRshave become more common in recent years, reflecting the dysfunction of the legislativebudget process and/or partisan gridlock and may cover an entire fiscal year.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
from THOMAS, which documents all daily legislative activities
occurring in the House and Senate chambers.
The ICBM Floor Amendments data set includes 132 amendments
offered in the FY 1974–90 timeframe, defined in the data set by
Fiscal Year, Amendment Sponsor, Sponsor Type (Hawk, Dove. Owl),
relevant Bill being amended (authorization or appropriations),
Outcome/Vote Count, Amendment Summary, and Procedural Means by
which the specific amendment seeks to impose control over policy
or spending.
Content Analysis of Bills/Reports and ICBM Amendments Data Sets. The Defense
Committee Bill/Reports data set of 106 bills and reports extend over
a tumultuous 17-year period covering a range of
national/international events and executive administrations,
including:
Post-Vietnam/Watergate budget process reforms 1970s Détente’s start/finish through the superpower summitry
of the 1980s/90s Signing of SALT I, SALT II through START I arms agreements Four presidencies (Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush)
These years constitute the last third of a roughly 40-plus years
of the Cold War, when the most intensive efforts to negotiate arms
36
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
limitations and reductions occurred. The Defense Committee reports
often contain long preambles that frame and document the
committees’ perspectives on Soviet threat, arms control
opportunities, defense budget environment and the strategic
rationale and requirements for specific weapons programs. In this
way they are fertile ground to conduct content analysis by coded
keywords.
The texts of the Bills/Reports data are searched using a Key-Word-
in-Context (KWIC) approach that identifies frequency of keywords
associated with the known views of Hawks, Doves or Owls.
“Dissenting and Additional Views” within the reports are searched
in the same manner. In this way, the orientation of each report
can be generally assessed to reflect the views and preferences on
specific weapons acquisition and arms control policies of the
majority of committee members. The orientation of the committee
reports assessed by KWIC content analysis is further established
by characterizing the weapons/arms control preferences of the
dissenting minority views using the same KWIC codes. In many
cases, the same individuals consistently offer similar minority
37
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
critiques of the committee positions on weapons systems over
successive years. This consistency reinforces the
characterizations of the KWIC content analysis of the parent
(majority-view) committee reports.
The second data source of ICBM Floor Amendments are the House and
Senate floor amendments, which are offered by, and debated among,
Hawks, Doves and Owls. The analysis does not conduct a KWIC
content analysis of actual floor debates texts in the
Congressional Record; since these debates find Hawks, Doves and
Owls together debating proposed amendments, KWIC searches used for
Committee Bills/Reports data would not reveal any useful insights for
this conceptual analysis. Rather, the insights gained from ICBM
Floor Amendments can be obtained by coded identification of which
heuristic group offered the amendment and the judgment of the
overall chamber in either accepting or declining to embrace the
sponsoring group’s amendment; a majority rejection by the chamber
is an implicit endorsement of the defense committee position,
while acceptance of the amendment would indicate chamber consensus
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
of a position contrary to the defense committee’s policy
preference.
Case Study for the Analysis: ICBM Modernization. The larger dissertation
study uses a multi-case study approach involving five weapons
acquisition cases subject to multiple arms control forums over a
20-year period. The cases were selected based on the fact that
some weapons systems were pursued through deployment, while others
were cancelled prior to deployment; similarly, some arms control
forums ended in signed bi-lateral agreements, while others did
not, and some agreements resulted in retirement or withdrawal and
destruction of deployed weapons. This case selection approach
allows both within- and across-case analysis and robust
examination of the role Congress and its actions might have on
American negotiation stances and US-Soviet arms control outcomes.
For this paper, however, only a single case is used. This case
chosen reflects ICBM modernization programs (the Minuteman III,
MX/Peacekeeper, Small ICBM, and related basing and technology
development programs), conducted across a 17-year period. As ICBM
modernization was frequently the highest profile and most
39
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
controversial weapons acquisition issue in this period, there is a
robust record of congressional activities that could be
extracted/excerpted from the committee the Bills/Reports data set and,
for ICBM Amendments data set, from the Congressional Record pages.
This paper therefore conducts a “within case” context analysis.
Content Analysis Results.
A preliminary conceptual analysis was conducted and tallied via
the KWIC assessments of committee reports and a quantitative
assessment of the success-failure ratios of floor amendments
offered by Hawks, Doves and Owls. Analysis of the data sets using
both qualitative and quantitative measurement revealed the
following regarding the Main Questions:
Q: Did the Defense Committees exhibit the characteristics of the Hawk, the Dove, or the Owl in the late Cold War period?
Historically, the Defense Committees have been far more hawkish
than the general congressional population. This is a function of
defense committee member self-selection, subject expertise and a
focus on national security. While the 1970s reforms resulting in
a lessening of the hawkish bent of the defense committees –
generally because more dovish members were encouraged and
40
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
emboldened to join these committees and challenge the status quo –
Defense Committees in the period examined still reflected the
defense program and policy preferences of the Hawk or Owl.
However, the characterization was not completely static; over
time the degree of hawkishness ebbed and flowed, allowing in a
greater degree of either Owlish, or in rare cases, Dovish
perspectives. These periods of fluidity to some extent reflected
the geopolitical and domestic politics of the period. These
periods can be generally separated into four chronological blocks.
For example, the FY 1974 through FY 1976 period reflected the
most Dovish of the 17-year period. What explains this
development? This was the by far the most anti-military period in
the time range—in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam
withdrawal, and the election of the highly dovish ‘Watergate Class
of 1974” to Congress. Geopolitically, US-Soviet relations were
entering a period of “détente” characterized by warming political
and economic relations and the signing of the SALT I Interim
Agreement and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; in the domestic
afterglow of these arms treaties, with SALT II negotiations
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
starting, the major weapons procurement program of the period, the
B-1 bomber, faced tough sledding and enhanced scrutiny from
defense committees. Institutionally, the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Reform Act of 1974 created opportunities and
incentives for more dovish members to join the defense committees
and challenge the prevailing FPE policy preferences. The post-
Watergate Defense Committees were also more skeptical of Defense
Secretary Schlesinger’s public articulation of a new nuclear
weapons employment (targeting) doctrine – driven by rapidly
evolving technology developments pursued by both US and Soviet
military establishments – that rendered most existing U.S.
strategic nuclear weapons both increasingly vulnerable to surprise
attack and less effective in their deterrence function.30
While KWIC assessments make this the most Dovish of the four
periods, Doves nevertheless still dominate the dissenting views,
as illustrated in Figure 2 below. This underscores the overall
dovish nature of the committees and the generally anti-defense
environment of the period.
30 National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242, 1974.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
Figure 2: FY 74-76 Dissenting Views
FY 74FY 75
FY 76
02468
101214161820
OWLDOVEHAWK
The next period, FY 1977 through FY 1981, saw a swing back
towards a more Hawkish perspective among the committees, driven by
a growing concern by Hawks that US-Soviet détente was a bad
bargain for the United States and the Soviets were aggressively
pursuing a strategic nuclear weapons doctrine and capability that
rapidly approached strategic nuclear parity with the U.S. The
impending loss of what had always been unquestioned U.S. strategic
nuclear superiority earlier in the Cold War was fueled by the
defense community debate of the CIA’s controversial and hawkish
“Team B” findings that determined Soviet intentions and
capabilities were considerably more threatening than previously
believed by the national security establishment. In addition,
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
former SALT negotiator and long-time defense expert Paul Nitze’s
formation of the “Committee on the Present Danger” encouraged a
more hawkish posture critical of the results of the SALT I and ABM
Treaty agreements. The Committees stressed Intelligence Community
confirmation of Soviet deployment more accurate and MIRVed
warheads on their large, heavy ICBMs that created a impending
vulnerability of the entire U.S. fixed silo based Minuteman ICBM
force; the achievement of Soviet nuclear parity appeared to be
accelerating at a time when all three legs of the U.S. strategic
Triad (land-based ICBMs and bombers, and submarine based sea-
launched ballistic missiles) required upgrading and modernization,
a highly expensive program. President Carter’s cancellation of
the B-1 bomber in 1977, and the outright rejection of his “deep
cuts” SALT proposal led to a more Hawkish perspective on all
defense committees, symbolized by Democratic Hawks such as Sen.
Henry “Scoop” Jackson, a prominent and influential SASC member,
who promoted strategic nuclear programs while criticizing Carter’s
SALT II negotiating strategy. The least hawkish of the four
defense committees was the House Appropriations Defense
Subcommittee. Yet a more aggressive and muscular Soviet foreign
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
policy, culminating in their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979,
which also shelved the Senate’s ratification of the much
anticipated, but long-delayed SALT II treaty, brought both Carter
and the Congress to raise the defense budget and boost strategic
nuclear weapons programs even before the election in 1980 of the
decidedly more hawkish Ronald Reagan. The FY 77 through FY 81
period was certainly more hawkish than the previous period, but
was also trending “Owlish,” mostly due to skepticism towards
basing of the MX missile in an expensive, complicated mobile and
deceptive basing mode that even Reagan rejected outright upon
entering office in 1981. Analysis of the dissenters showed a
greater balance between Hawks and Doves in the FY 77-81 period. A
large spike in Hawk dissent in FY 81 reflects the degree of
unhappiness with the Carter Administration (see Figure 3 below).
45
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
FY 77 FY 78 FY 79 FY 80 FY 810
5
10
15
20
25
FY 77 - 81 Dissenting Views
Series3Series2Series1
This surge is explained by Hawk demands for greater defense
spending (at a time of growing Owl influence), as well as the
Hawks’ vocal concerns over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
Iranian hostage crisis and aborted rescue mission, and an
expression of the ‘Sagebrush rebellion’ by Western legislators
unhappy over the administration’s MX/Multiple Protective Shelter
(MPS) basing mode plan which planned to incorporate thousands of
square miles of territory in Western states.
Ironically, in the third period, FY 1982 through FY 1987, the
defense policies of a hawkish Reagan administration helped to
accelerate the Defense Committees’ overall trend towards a more
Owlish stance. This was a result of a number of factors,
Owl
DoveHawk
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
especially negative public reaction in both Western Europe and the
United States to the U.S. and NATO military buildup designed to
counter Soviet programs; by 1980, the first “nuclear freeze”
resolutions were introduced in Congress, the result of a growing
anti-nuclear grass-roots movement. This was also in reaction to
Reagan’s robust substantial nuclear modernization program, which
accelerated counter-force strategic weapons and sought to
immediately deploy the MX missile in interim, silo basing.31 This
decision came despite the previous six years of the Defense
Department’s efforts to promote a mobile MX by emphasizing the
dangerous vulnerability of America’s silo-based ICBMs. Reagan
faced stubborn congressional committee resistance to silo-based
MX, and the administration badly bungled a proposed series of
quick-fix, poorly conceptualized and publically articulated, MX
basing schemes, which were all rejected by the congressional
Defense Committees. To make matters worse, the administration
enthusiastically, and very publically, embraced the counter-force
nuclear doctrine that had essentially already been de facto American
policy under both Ford and Carter, but now characterized by anti-31 Interestingly, Reagan also cut in half the number of proposed 10-warhead MX missilesfrom the 200 Carter has proposed, by requesting only 100 deployed missiles.
47
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
nuclear advocates as a “nuclear warfighting” doctrine. These
actions encouraged the idea that nuclear war was not outside the
realm of acceptable policy to the administration, which further
alarmed congressional Owls. With new counterforce weapons now
nearing development or in the pipeline, such charges sounded
credible. Administration officials also made impolitic and
frightening public comments about surviving nuclear warfare,
further fueling the popularity of the nuclear freeze movement.
Reagan’s own rhetoric added to the fire, with public comments
characterizing the Soviet Union as a state ruled by leaders “who
reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to
cheat” and openly regarded the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.”
Such rhetoric shook the confidence of an American public that had
just elected Reagan to take a firmer stance with the Soviet Union,
and pushed the Defense Committees towards the Owls’ influence.
The Defense Committee reports were generally on-board Reagan’s
strategic policy goals – that the modernization of aging U.S.
strategic forces was imperative, and that new strategic systems
must be more capable – but often disagreed at the means and
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
acquisition strategies Reagan pursued. Again, the least Hawkish
and most Dovish defense committee was House Defense
Appropriations. This disagreement accelerated the Owlish trend of
the committees’ actions. They were generally critical of Reagan’s
initial START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) proposal, seeing
his calls for mutual deep cuts in the most dangerous weapons
systems (not unlike Carter’s in 1977) as either naïve or lacking
negotiating credibility; they insisted a more credible proposals
be forthcoming or else his strategic weapons acquisition programs
would suffer. As the Reagan strategic buildup continued, Owls
insisted that the U.S. keep within the (unratified) SALT II
constraints as long as the Soviets did also; they actively
encouraged a “build-down” concept (where newer, but fewer, modern
systems would replaced older weapons) to counter the popular-
sounding nuclear freeze concept, and continued efforts to block or
cancel MX deployments unless it was in an acceptable and
survivable basing mode. With the imminent threat of MX
cancellation in late 1982 and with strong encouragement by Owls,
Reagan created a blue-ribbon presidential commission (the
Scowcroft Commission, chaired by former Ford NSC advisor Brent
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
Scowcroft) to recommend a final solution to the MX basing issue.
Their report in March 1983 was a conscious, political effort to
encourage a Hawk-Owl coalition in Congress: it recommended that
the 100 multi-warhead MX missiles be based in existing Minuteman
silos to immediately address a perceived imbalance in ICBM
counter-force capability (pleasing the Hawks), but moving
expeditiously towards developing a small, single-warhead missile
in a mobile mode that promoted, eventually, a more stable force
posture (which pleased the Owls). The Small ICBM was designed to
diminish Soviet attack incentives (in reducing the value of each
individual single-warhead missile, the cost to attack was both
dramatically was increased and complicated), and promote a
mutually stable ICBM force structure and arms control regime
incorporating the build-down concept. The plan displeased
congressional Doves, who now had not just one, but two new ICBMs
to work to de-fund; Doves faced a political master-stroke aimed at
peeling away political moderates, who wanted to support a
reasonable defense plan other than the more radical nuclear
freeze.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
The effect of the Scowcroft Commission plan was to forge what
was (hoped to be) a lasting moderate defense coalition on
strategic forces between Hawks and Owls; however, almost
immediately, Reagan jeopardized this coalition by introducing a
wild card that severely tested the “Scowcroft consensus.” On March
23, in a speech announcing his support for the Commission’s plan,
Reagan inserted into the end of a speech a plan for a high-level
defense research effort to render nuclear ballistic missiles
“impotent and obsolete” by creating a “strategic defense
initiative.” The plan – not well discussed internally or
telegraphed in advance – caught even some of Reagan’s top military
and political advisors flatfooted. Quickly dubbed “Star Wars”
after the popular movie, Reagan’s strategic defense research
initiative injected a great degree of uncertainty into what had
become (since the 1972 ABM Treaty) an assumption of offensive-
based nuclear means to assure deterrence (the so-called concept of
“mutual assured destruction,” or MAD). Defense committee members
gave it either mixed, or publicly muted reviews, while raising a
number of conceptual problems with the idea. How would “Star Wars”
interact with Reagan’s own ambitious strategic offensive
51
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
modernization plan? Could the nation afford such a plan along with
existing force modernization plans? How would the US-Soviet
strategic relationship transition from an offensive to a defensive
dominant deterrence posture? How would the U.S. arms control
strategy be affected? How would the Soviets react? The March 23
speech raised many difficult questions that tended to rally Hawks
around the concept (perhaps at the cost of their allegiance to the
MX/Small ICBM compromise), while raising Owls’ strategic concerns
(by questioning Reagan’s strategic logic, and his commitment and
ability to fulfill the Scowcroft bargain), and gave the Doves
another Reagan defense program to target.
While it was hoped the Scowcroft consensus would finally
resolve the MX issue, it did not. Some moderate Owls began to
waiver when the Soviets walked out of the START talks in Geneva in
December 1983. This Soviet move was ostensibly because Reagan held
firm on a 1979 NATO decision to deploy intermediate range nuclear
Pershing II ballistic and ground-launched cruise missiles in
response to a large Soviet buildup of SS-20 missiles designed to
intimidate NATO governments, which were also under pressure from
52
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
anti-nuclear mass movements. However, it was also in part to
protest and undermine Reagan’s Star Wars proposal, which the
Soviets could not match technologically, and which potentially
could challenge the huge Soviet investment in ballistic missiles.
The lack of an ongoing strategic arms negotiation for the first
time since 1969, created political problems for Reagan, especially
for the MX prospects. Congress effectively blocked the funding for
MX by “fencing” procurement funds unless Reagan could somehow coax
the Soviets back to the bargaining table, or somehow demonstrate
that the Soviets were “negotiating in bad faith.” It appeared to
be a lose-lose proposition, one that didn’t incentivize the
Soviets to return, and proved to be a political test of Reagan’s
political credibility.
In a complicated series of legislative provisions detailed in
the FY 85 bills, the administration was required to successfully
win four separate votes (one to authorize and appropriate funds
for MX, in both the House and Senate) or see the MX cancelled
outright , a mere year after the Scowcroft report. By expending
much political capital, the administration prevailed in each of
53
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
the four votes, preserving the FY 1985 MX program; while it
appeared the Scowcroft consensus had remained intact, however, the
success came at a price. Shortly afterward, Sen. Sam Nunn, the
influential SASC ranking member and top Owl in the Senate,
introduced a measure to permanently cap deployment of MX in silos
at 50 missiles in the FY 86 Authorization bill. Any addition
missiles would have to be deployed in a survivable, congressional
approved, basing mode. While the Air Force would work hard over
the next several years to develop and advocate for a satisfactory
rail-mobile basing mode, the “second fifty” MX basing debate would
drag on for another five years, but ultimately the MX program was
permanently capped at fifty missiles.
The Owls’ capping of MX based in silos at 50 missiles weakened
the Hawks’ resolve for supporting the Small ICBM part of the
Scowcroft deal, and official administration and Pentagon support
for the program was weak, even bordering on hostile. Still the
“Scowcroft consensus” limped along through FY 1988, with the Small
ICBM and MX Rail-Garrison programs being alternately twisted and
54
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
re-shaped by the Defense Committees that appeared unable to fully
support one or the other.
Figure 4: FY 82-87 Dissenting Views
FY 82 FY 83 FY 84 FY 85 FY 86 FY 87024681012141618
FY 82 -87 Dissenting Views
Series3Series2Series1
Dissenting views in this period reflects firm and consisted
opposition by the Doves to the Reagan defense modernization
program. Hawk dissent was relatively muted in the FY 82-85,
reflecting general satisfaction with Committees’ support for
55
Owls
Doves
Hawks
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
strategic programs; the large spike which occurred in FY 87
reflected the growing tendency of the Owls to increasingly
restrict the Administration’s SDI program, and perhaps
anticipation that the Scowcroft consensus on ICBMs among Hawks and
Owls was beginning to fracture as key Owls showed reluctant
support for a “second 50 MX” deployment in any basing mode. Owl
dissent in the FY 82-84 period reflected concerns and warnings by
key Owls such as Sen. William Cohen (R-ME) on the credibility of
Regan’s START proposals and the advocacy of the build-down
concept. The large spike in FY 86, the year (1985) that Sen. Nunn
capped the MX in silos program at 50 missiles, reflected a
tendency of Owls to questions administration priorities,
especially what they saw was an overemphasis on pushing SDI
program before key strategic policy questions had been addressed.32
The fourth and final block, covering FY 1988 to FY 1990, moved
from the Owlish to favor the Doves’ intentions. An advantage to
the situation of effective gridlock on MX and Small ICBM was that
both programs survived and provided to the Soviets evidence of two32 For example, Sen. Nunn had been increasingly speaking out in public forums as well asin SASC hearings, asking how a more defense-dominant deterrence would emerge, and howthe SDI program rationale could be integrated in the administration’s own strategicoffensive force programs.
56
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
possible American mobile ICBM programs, which may have benefitted
the FPE in START talks. The Soviet side was also pre-occupied
from 1983 through 1985 with a leadership succession crisis, which
eventually saw the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev, an unusually
dynamic and vigorous Soviet leader. The resulting “Gorbomania”
swept Western capitals, led to a succession of high-profile and
dramatically contentious Reagan-Gorbachev summits from 1985
through 1988 that eventually produced an INF treaty in 1987, START
progress under a Defense and Space Talks forum that included
discussion of strategic defense research programs, and
establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, a congressional
Owl project focused on lessening the risk of accidental or
inadvertent nuclear exchanges.
The summits also created an atmosphere of hope for progress in
non-arms control areas that eventually led to the fall of the
Berlin Wall in November 1989, and the loosening of the Soviet hold
on Eastern Europe, and eventually the Soviet Union itself.
This ambitions and hopeful period saw the gradual unraveling of
the Scowcroft consensus, as budget pressures, especially in the
57
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings sequestration statute, undermine the
strategic, political and budgetary consensus for a two-ICBM-plus-
Star Wars defense program. The final collapse of both the
Scowcroft coalition and political support for a robust “full up”
vision originally articulated by Reagan in 1983 SDI is evident in
the increasing resistance in the Defense Committees to Reagan’s
defense requests, and the paring back of the SDI program. Figure
5 shows a surge in dissenting views by Hawks, directed at cutbacks
in SDI funding and declining MX/Rail-Garrison; the Hawks also
become more critical of the Small ICBM program.
Figure 5
58
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
FY 87 FY 88 FY 89 FY 900
5
10
15
20
FY 87 - 90 Dissenting Views
Series3Series2Series1
While this gave the Pentagon an opportunity to de-emphasize the
Small ICBM program, it also emboldened Doves to finally kill the
MX Rail-Garrison program in the House’s FY 90 defense
authorization bill. Dove dissents in the FY 89-90 timeframe were
the least numerous in the time series examined in this paper.
Taken by surprise by the House leadership’s retreat from the
Scowcroft consensus in the FY 90 bill, House Republican Hawks, who
felt betrayed by the move, in retaliation eliminated Small ICBM
funds, with help on the House floor from the Doves. While both
programs were somewhat restored in conference, the political
“consensus” unraveled, to the benefit of congressional Doves, who
saw no serious deployment prospects for either program after this
time. The ICBM modernization program in the 1990s would consist
59
OwlsDovesHawks
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
largely of upgrading the Minuteman III ICBM, which was based on
mostly 1960s technology and had been first deployed in 1970.
Characterization of Dissenting Views. This assessment is based on a KWIC
content analysis of the Committees’ reports. This assessment is
also reinforced by keyword analysis of the “dissenting and
additional views” of some minority Committee members who
overwhelmingly reflect the dissent of the Doves. The entire
breakout of FY 1974 -1990 dissenting views is show in Figure 6.
Figure 6
FY 74
FY 75
FY 76
FY 77
FY 78
FY 79
FY 80
FY 81
FY 82
FY 83
FY 84
FY 85
FY 86
FY 87
FY 88
FY 89
FY 90
0510152025
FY 74 - 90, Dissenting Views
OWLDOVEHAWK
Figure 6 shows a dominance number of dissents coming from the
Doves, which confirms a general tendency of Committee majorities
to reflect the program and policy preferences of Hawks and Owls.
These minority views are most often expressed as a result of the
60
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
member being on the losing end of the program and policy debate in
the full or subcommittee markups, where the bills and report
language are drafted. Thus the characterization of dissenters is
in direct contrast to the preferences of the committee majorities,
which usually held more Hawkish or Owlish program and policy
views. The data in Figure 7, using the same KWIC content data,
show the share of dissenting views by heuristic type from 182
dissenting and additional views in Defense Committee reports from
FY 74 - FY 90.33
While there was always a consistency of minority Dove dissents in
the period, Hawk dissents tended to be grouped around either
perceptions of increased external threats Hawks felt the
committees were inadequately addressing (FY 77 through FY 81), or
when cherished programs were being threatened by either Owls or
Doves (SDI, MX/Rail Garrison in FY 87 and FY 88). Finally, Owlish
dissents tended to be more “shots across the bow” directed at
administration officials, such as Sen. Cohen’s FY 84 and FY 85
dissents advocating the build-down concept and threatening
33 In instances where there are multi-member submission of views, each members’ viewsare counted individually.
61
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
withdrawal of his support for the Scowcroft coalition if the
administration did not formulate more serious proposals on arms
control.
Figure 7
31%
61%
8%
Dissenting Views on Defense Committees, FY
74 - FY 90HAWK DOVE OWL
ICBM Floor Amendments
Q: On the floor of respective chambers, did efforts to amend the defense bills exhibit thecharacteristics of the Hawk, the Dove, or the Owl?
Q: By what means—innovative legislative procedures—did either the Defense Committeesor the Chambers attempt to change the negotiating tactics of the FPE?
It is also clear from both the same KWIC content analysis of
Dissenting Views and an assessment of ICBM Floor Amendments offered
62
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
to the Defense Committee reports that the minority dissenters in
committee are the most likely proponents and sponsors of floor
amendments.
The answer to the second and third questions employs the ICBM
Floor Amendments data set to analyze floor amendment sponsorship,
success/failure and actual content, to determine the following:
Sponsorship : What % sponsors were Hawks, Doves or Owls?
Success : What % of each groups’ amendments passed on floor?
Content I : What procedural means/constraints did proposed
amendment impose?
Content II : What % of amendments had overt linkage to arms
control?
Amendment Sponsorship. The sponsorship for floor amendments could
be by single groups, or , at times alliances made for specific
purposes. Figures 8 and 9 display amendment sponsorship breakdown
by fiscal year defense bills, and by overall percentage,
respectively.
Figure 8: ICBM Amendment Sponsorship (by Type/Coalition)
63
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
FY 80
FY 81
FY 82
FY 83
FY 84
FY 85
FY 86
FY 87
FY 88
FY 89
FY 90
0
5
10
15
20
25
ICBM Floor Amendments by Sponsor/Year
DOVE-OWL HAWK-OWLOWLDOVE HAWK
These data again demonstrate the dominant effort (50%) by the
Doves to alter the majority perspectives of the Defense
Committees. However, more relevant to amendments offered is the
degree of success attained in this effort.
Figure 9: ICBM Amendment Sponsorship (by percentage)
HAWKS 6%
DOVES50%
OWLS 19%
HAWKS-OWLS 7%
DOVES-OWLS 8%
ICBM Floor Amendment Sponsors, FY 80-90
64
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
Success: How successful was each group? This involved what percentage of
each groups’ amendments were successful passed on floor. Figures
10 documents the groups’ success rates in the aggregate, while
Figures 11 through 13 look at each group’s “batting average” for
floor success.
Figure 10
HAWK - Pass, 14%
HAWK - Fail, 7%
DOVE - Pass, 19%
DOVE - Fail, 32%
OWL-Pass, 24%
OWL - Fail, 4%
Floor Amendments Pass/Fail FY 80 - 90
Figure 11
65
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
.
Passed, 87%
Failed 13%
ICBM Amendment "Batting Average" - OWLS (.872)
Figure 12
Passed, 67%
Failed, 33%
ICBM Amendment "Batting Average" - HAWKS (.666)
66
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
In terms of averages, the Owls “batted” at a much higher rate
(.872) than either Hawks or Doves, winning in 34 of 39 efforts on
the chamber floors. Hawks, however, won two-thirds (.666) or 10
of 30, of their floor battles. Of the three groups, Doves were the
least successful (.375), although far more prolific, taking far
more “at bats” (72) than either Hawks or Owls, although prevailing
far less often (only 27 times). Given the Democratic majority
control of Congress during most of these years, and given chamber
rules, the higher amount of the Doves’ amendment offerings can be
attributed to party leadership sympathy for the Dove position.
This is especially true in the House, where the Rules Committee,
controlled by the Speaker, frequently dictates the number and type
of floor amendments allowed on any bill.34
Figure 13
34 While the Senate was held by the Republicans between 1981 and 1987, key years in thisanalysis, Senate rules are more flexible than in the House when allowing minoritymembers to offer amendments on the floor. In both chambers in these years, majorityleadership frequently allowed a wide range of floor amendments to be offered on defenseauthorization and appropriations bills.
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Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
Passed, 37%
Failed, 63%
ICBM Amendment "Batting Average" - DOVES (.375)
Content I: Did proposed amendment reflect Hawk, Dove or Owlish goals?
Figure 14 shows the legislative vehicles and means for Congress
trying to impose policy direction on the FPE.
Figure 14
any x3
any x4
x6 x3 only
x3, x5
x3, x7
x3, x5, x7
x3, x5, x7, x8
x3, x4, x5, x7, x8
any x8
any x9
0
40
80
120
Procedural Means Employed by ICBM Floor Amendments
KEY: Procedural Innovations:x3 = Weapons Funding (budget authority or appropriated levels)x4 = Expert Commissions (outside panels to study/make recommendations)x5 = Legislative Vetoes (allowing Congress altitude to allow spendingx6 = New Group Franchises (creation of new bureaucratic structures by Congress)x7 = Mandates & Conditions (imposed requirements or conditional approval)
68
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
x8 = Studies & Report Reqts (formal reporting requirements’ similar to x7)x9 = Sense of Congress (non-statute statements of policy intent; typically non-binding)
The data show that Congressional floor amendments most frequently
attempted to use program funding (‘x3) as the most effective means
of leverage. His indicates a desire to use appropriations as a
“functional veto” over presidential policy preferences.
Additional frequent use of mandates and conditions (‘x7’), often
tied to report requirements (‘x8’) was also a favorite means.
These, when combined with funding constraints imposed considerable
program management constraints on defense officials and tied
release of funds to information requirements, which in turn,
frequently led to additional conditions the following year.35
Finally, a large number of procedural means involved “sense of the
Congress” (or House or Senate) statements, which, although non-
binding, often indicated clear statements of congressional policy
preferences, which the FPE could not completely ignore if he did
not want future bills and reports to contain new mandates and
conditions.
35 Defense Department program managers frequently complained of this legislative“micromanagement”, when, in fact, such oversight is clearly within the constitutionalauthority of Congress, as provided in Article I, Section 8.
69
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
Content II: Another key question involves the linkage between ICBM
programmatic actions and arms control. Figure 14 looks only at the
overt linkage, detailing what percentage of amendments had any
overt linkage to arms control policy.
This area is more subtle, and goes to the heart of the more
difficult research question of whether Congress used program
acquisition oversight and funding to try to influence arms control
strategy and policy. Most of the 42 arms control–related
amendments reflect “sense of the Congress” type of amendments,
mostly un-controversial statements of support or congressional
preferences desired to register a member’s support for an
important national goal with constituents. It is thus a far less
useful indicator of congressional intent to use weapons
procurement as policy leverage. By what means did any changes made
by either the Defense Committees or the Chambers attempt to change
executive tactics?
Figure 14
70
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
PASSED FAILED WITHDRAWN0
20
40
ICBM Amendments - Arms Control Related -
Pass/Fail
To ascertain this requires going beyond the content of the data
and speaking to principals via detailed subject interviews or
researching available memoir or oral history data. Analysis of
these types of data would also require a relational content
analysis, rather than the conceptual content analysis used here.
These efforts are part of the larger, ongoing dissertation
research.
Inferences Drawn
The conceptual content analysis presented here reveals important
inferences regarding a larger research effort. From the content
analysis, it can be concluded that, during this period of time:
Committee Reports. Analysis reveals there is clear influence
dominance by the policy preferences of the Hawks, for a critical
period in the Reagan Administration, by the Owls. The dissenting
71
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
views were dominated by the Doves, reflecting a minority view in
the Defense Committees, which strengthens and helps validate the
KWIC analysis and assessment of Hawk-Owl dominance on the Defense
Committees.
ICBM Modernization Floor Amendments. Analysis reveals that efforts
to overturn or alter the Defense Committees’ preferences on the
chamber floors was robust and often successful. Here again, the
Doves (often members of the Defense Committees and who had offered
minority dissents in the committee reports) were most likely to
offer amendments, but also were the least successful in doing so.
The great success of the Owls in their floor efforts to amend the
bills demonstrates perhaps the strength of their appeal to the
lager Congress, at least for a time in the early to mid 1980s.
The Hawks also shared in this success to a lesser degree, but
their efforts showed a degree of support from the larger
institution.
Implications for U.S. Arms Control. It is more difficult to draw
discernable inferences in this area, based on a conceptual content
analysis alone. Additional research and application of a more
relational content analysis can provide a clearer picture, as can
72
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
the conduct of subject interviews with contemporary prinicipal
actors and analysis of memoir and documentary evidence.
However, the results presented hear can point the way by
providing some empirical evidence necessary to address larger
questions of policy influence and NPD and APD theory.
Specifically these include,
How did congressional policy preferences on weaponsacquisition and arms control contrast with the executiveadministration?
To what degree did the contrary (or coordinating) preferencesof the Congress change or influence the negotiating stancesof U.S. arms control policy; in other words, didcongressional influence help or hinder the executive innegotiating with the Soviet Union and thereby positivelycontribute to the end of the Cold War?
What do these results indicate regarding the validation orrefutation of NCR and APD theories?
Future Research Efforts. Future research efforts in this area are to
code remaining bills and report and dissenting view texts of all
five program case studies into manageable content categories in a
more sophisticated computer-based analysis. An on-line computer
analysis tool that allows for mixed method qualitative and
quantitative analyses (Dedoose.com) is being employed for the large
case study program data sets, interviews and archival materials.
73
Congressional Use of Strategic Weapons Acquisition to Influence U.S. Arms Control Negotiations
This tool is useful and preferable for both ease of detailed
coding, analysis speed and presentation of results and analysis.
74
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